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zeekay
a9abf813ce
Tighten the LaTeX spec for the submission tag. - pulsar.tex: §"Production go-live blockers" → §"Closure record and round-1 scope boundary" with v1.0.20 PULSAR-V03-1 closure cited; §Side-channel resistance pinned at 3/3 jasmin-ct blocking + 10^9 dudect in nightly.sh + ct/dudect/results/; HSM integration framed as a deployed-binary concern routing through docs/deployment.md; encoding §wire-format tag width pinned at DD-008. - system-model.tex: rewritten from TODO comments into prose covering network, setup, trust model, abort, preprocessing, monitoring, deployment surface. - parameters.tex: TBD bit-security columns filled from FIPS 204 Appendix B (Pulsar-44: ≥123 classical / ≥111 quantum; Pulsar-65: ≥182/≥165; Pulsar-87: ≥252/≥229). - threat-model.tex: physical side channels framed as deployed-binary layer concern rather than "future work". - nist-mptc-category.tex: closure-record appendix framing. - design-decisions.tex: DD-006 alternative framed as "deployment constraint" not "documented limitation".
49 lines
2.1 KiB
TeX
49 lines
2.1 KiB
TeX
% Pulsar system model — included by pulsar.tex §"System model".
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\section*{System model}
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\paragraph{Network model.}
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Pulsar assumes synchronous broadcast within the round window: all
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honest parties receive all honest broadcast messages within a bounded
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$\Delta$. The reference deployment uses authenticated, eventually-
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delivered broadcast channels; authenticated, encrypted point-to-point
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channels for share / blind delivery; and an authenticated,
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append-only public bulletin (consensus-anchored) for DKG commitments
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and reshare records.
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\paragraph{Setup assumptions.}
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Each party advertises a long-term ML-DSA-65 verification key on the
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public bulletin (per HIP-0077 validator-set records). A shared
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randomness oracle (the Lux consensus randomness beacon) supplies
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the per-reshare quorum seed.
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\paragraph{Trust model.}
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Up to $t-1$ corrupted parties, static (the MPTC requirement).
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Liveness requires an honest majority of $n - t + 1$ available
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parties. The proactive resharing protocol handles the HJKY97 mobile
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adversary by re-randomising shares at each epoch.
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\paragraph{Abort model.}
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Identifiable abort: every protocol stage emits a signed complaint
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when a deviation is detected, naming the deviating party. The
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consensus layer consumes these complaints for slashing.
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\paragraph{Preprocessing and rotation.}
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DKG runs once per validator-set epoch. Reshare runs at every
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epoch boundary; typical cadence is hours to days. Sign runs
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per-message with no preprocessing requirement (the offline / online
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split is optional). Members join and leave at epoch boundaries
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subject to the $(n', t')$ constraint.
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\paragraph{Monitoring.}
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Public artifacts safe for observability: $\mathit{pk}$, commitments,
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signed complaints, signature outputs, beacon values, identity-key
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signatures. Private artifacts that MUST NOT be logged: shares,
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blinds, masks, samples, PRNG seeds, per-round derived state,
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norm-check intermediate values.
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\paragraph{Deployment surface.}
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The reference implementation is software (Go). HSM-backed share
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custody is a deployed-binary concern handled by the operator
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hardening checklist in \texttt{docs/deployment.md}.
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