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LaTeX is the canonical format for audit reports per workspace policy. Conversion via pandoc --from=gfm --to=latex --standalone preserves content verbatim. Meta files (README/INDEX/LLM/CHANGELOG) remain .md.
922 lines
32 KiB
TeX
922 lines
32 KiB
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pdfcreator={LaTeX via pandoc}}
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\author{}
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\date{}
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\begin{document}
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\section{ThresholdVM (T-Chain) Security Audit
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Report}\label{thresholdvm-t-chain-security-audit-report}
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\textbf{Date}: 2025-12-30 \textbf{Scope}:
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\texttt{\textasciitilde{}/work/lux/node/vms/thresholdvm/}
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\textbf{Auditor}: Claude (Automated Security Review)
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\textbf{Classification}: Internal Security Assessment
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\begin{center}\rule{0.5\linewidth}{0.5pt}\end{center}
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\subsection{Executive Summary}\label{executive-summary}
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ThresholdVM implements a threshold FHE (Fully Homomorphic Encryption)
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and MPC (Multi-Party Computation) chain for the Lux blockchain
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ecosystem. The implementation supports multiple cryptographic protocols
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including LSS, CGGMP21/CMP, BLS, FROST, EdDSA, and Corona
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(post-quantum).
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\subsubsection{\texorpdfstring{Security Posture:
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\textbf{MODERATE}}{Security Posture: MODERATE}}\label{security-posture-moderate}
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The codebase demonstrates sound cryptographic design with proper
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protocol implementations. However, several areas require attention
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before production deployment.
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{\def\LTcaptype{none} % do not increment counter
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\begin{longtable}[]{@{}lll@{}}
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\toprule\noalign{}
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Category & Risk Level & Issues Found \\
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\midrule\noalign{}
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\endhead
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\bottomrule\noalign{}
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\endlastfoot
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FHE Operations & Medium & 3 \\
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DKG Protocol & Medium & 2 \\
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Threshold Signatures & Low & 1 \\
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Secret Sharing & Low & 1 \\
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Permit System & Medium & 2 \\
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Relayer & High & 3 \\
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\end{longtable}
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}
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\begin{center}\rule{0.5\linewidth}{0.5pt}\end{center}
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\subsection{1. FHE Operations Audit}\label{1-fhe-operations-audit}
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\subsubsection{1.1 Scheme
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Implementation}\label{11-scheme-implementation}
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\textbf{Findings}:
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The implementation uses CKKS (Cheon-Kim-Kim-Song) scheme exclusively via
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the lattice library\textquotesingle s E2S (Encryption-to-Share)
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multiparty protocol.
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\begin{Shaded}
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\begin{Highlighting}[]
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\CommentTok{// fhe/integration.go}
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\KeywordTok{type}\NormalTok{ ThresholdFHEIntegration }\KeywordTok{struct} \OperatorTok{\{}
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\NormalTok{ params lattice}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Parameters}
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\NormalTok{ evaluator e2s}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Evaluator}
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\NormalTok{ threshold }\DataTypeTok{int} \CommentTok{// default: 67}
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\NormalTok{ total }\DataTypeTok{int} \CommentTok{// default: 100}
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\OperatorTok{\}}
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\end{Highlighting}
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\end{Shaded}
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\textbf{Observation}: TFHE and BGV schemes mentioned in audit scope are
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NOT implemented. Only CKKS is present.
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\textbf{FINDING-FHE-001} (Medium): Missing TFHE/BGV Support
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\begin{itemize}
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\tightlist
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\item
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The audit scope specified TFHE, CKKS, and BGV schemes
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\item
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Only CKKS is implemented
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\item
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\textbf{Risk}: Limited FHE flexibility; TFHE preferred for boolean
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circuits
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\item
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\textbf{Recommendation}: Document supported schemes clearly; consider
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TFHE for binary operations
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\end{itemize}
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\subsubsection{1.2 GPU Acceleration}\label{12-gpu-acceleration}
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\begin{Shaded}
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\begin{Highlighting}[]
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\CommentTok{// fhe/gpu\_fhe.go}
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\KeywordTok{const} \OperatorTok{(}
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\NormalTok{ gpuMinN }\OperatorTok{=} \DecValTok{8192} \CommentTok{// Minimum ring degree for GPU}
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\NormalTok{ gpuBatchThresh }\OperatorTok{=} \DecValTok{64} \CommentTok{// Minimum polynomials for GPU batching}
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\OperatorTok{)}
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\end{Highlighting}
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\end{Shaded}
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\textbf{FINDING-FHE-002} (Low): Hardcoded GPU Thresholds
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\begin{itemize}
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\tightlist
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\item
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Batch thresholds are compile-time constants
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\item
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Different hardware may have different optimal crossover points
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\item
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\textbf{Recommendation}: Make thresholds configurable via genesis or
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runtime config
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\end{itemize}
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\subsubsection{1.3 NTT Implementation}\label{13-ntt-implementation}
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\textbf{FINDING-FHE-003} (Medium): NTT Cache Unbounded Growth
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\begin{Shaded}
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\begin{Highlighting}[]
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\CommentTok{// fhe/gpu\_fhe.go}
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\KeywordTok{type}\NormalTok{ GPUFHEAccelerator }\KeywordTok{struct} \OperatorTok{\{}
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\NormalTok{ nttContexts }\KeywordTok{map}\OperatorTok{[}\DataTypeTok{uint64}\OperatorTok{]*}\NormalTok{NTTContext }\CommentTok{// Unbounded cache}
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\NormalTok{ mu sync}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{RWMutex}
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\OperatorTok{\}}
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\end{Highlighting}
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\end{Shaded}
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\begin{itemize}
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\tightlist
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\item
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NTT contexts cached by
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\texttt{(N\ \textless{}\textless{}\ 32)\ \textbar{}\ logN} key
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\item
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No eviction policy or size limit
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\item
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\textbf{Risk}: Memory exhaustion with varied parameters
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\item
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\textbf{Recommendation}: Add LRU eviction or fixed-size cache
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\end{itemize}
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\begin{center}\rule{0.5\linewidth}{0.5pt}\end{center}
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\subsection{2. DKG Protocol Audit}\label{2-dkg-protocol-audit}
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\subsubsection{2.1 Protocol Flow}\label{21-protocol-flow}
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The DKG implements a two-phase commit-share protocol:
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\begin{Shaded}
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\begin{Highlighting}[]
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\CommentTok{// fhe/lifecycle.go}
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\KeywordTok{type}\NormalTok{ DKGState }\KeywordTok{struct} \OperatorTok{\{}
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\NormalTok{ CeremonyID }\OperatorTok{[}\DecValTok{32}\OperatorTok{]}\DataTypeTok{byte}
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\NormalTok{ Phase DKGPhase }\CommentTok{// Commit, Share, Complete, Failed}
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\NormalTok{ CommitPhase time}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Time}
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\NormalTok{ SharePhase time}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Time}
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\NormalTok{ Timeout time}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Duration}
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\OperatorTok{\}}
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\end{Highlighting}
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\end{Shaded}
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\textbf{FINDING-DKG-001} (Medium): Timeout Race Condition
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\begin{Shaded}
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\begin{Highlighting}[]
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\CommentTok{// fhe/lifecycle.go {-} ProcessDKGMessage}
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\ControlFlowTok{if}\NormalTok{ time}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Now}\OperatorTok{().}\NormalTok{After}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{dkg}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{SharePhase}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Add}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{dkg}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Timeout}\OperatorTok{))} \OperatorTok{\{}
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\NormalTok{ l}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{failDKG}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{dkg}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{CeremonyID}\OperatorTok{,} \StringTok{"share phase timeout"}\OperatorTok{)}
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\ControlFlowTok{return}\NormalTok{ fmt}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Errorf}\OperatorTok{(}\StringTok{"share phase timeout"}\OperatorTok{)}
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\OperatorTok{\}}
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\end{Highlighting}
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\end{Shaded}
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\begin{itemize}
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\tightlist
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\item
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Timeout check is not atomic with state transition
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\item
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Concurrent goroutines may process messages after timeout
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\item
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\textbf{Risk}: Inconsistent DKG state across nodes
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\item
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\textbf{Recommendation}: Use atomic state transitions with
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compare-and-swap
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\end{itemize}
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\subsubsection{2.2 Commit Phase
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Security}\label{22-commit-phase-security}
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\textbf{FINDING-DKG-002} (Medium): Missing Commitment Binding
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Verification
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\begin{Shaded}
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\begin{Highlighting}[]
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\CommentTok{// fhe/lifecycle.go}
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\KeywordTok{func} \OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{l }\OperatorTok{*}\NormalTok{LifecycleManager}\OperatorTok{)}\NormalTok{ ProcessDKGCommit}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{ceremonyID }\OperatorTok{[}\DecValTok{32}\OperatorTok{]}\DataTypeTok{byte}\OperatorTok{,}
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\NormalTok{ participant ids}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{NodeID}\OperatorTok{,}\NormalTok{ commitment }\OperatorTok{[]}\DataTypeTok{byte}\OperatorTok{)} \DataTypeTok{error} \OperatorTok{\{}
|
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\CommentTok{// Commitment stored without cryptographic binding verification}
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\NormalTok{ dkg}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Commitments}\OperatorTok{[}\NormalTok{participant}\OperatorTok{]} \OperatorTok{=}\NormalTok{ commitment}
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\OperatorTok{\}}
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\end{Highlighting}
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\end{Shaded}
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\begin{itemize}
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\tightlist
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\item
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Commitments are stored without verifying cryptographic binding
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\item
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No Pedersen commitment verification present
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\item
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\textbf{Risk}: Malicious participant could substitute commitment
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\item
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\textbf{Recommendation}: Implement Feldman VSS or Pedersen commitment
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verification
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\end{itemize}
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\begin{center}\rule{0.5\linewidth}{0.5pt}\end{center}
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\subsection{3. Threshold Signatures
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Audit}\label{3-threshold-signatures-audit}
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\subsubsection{3.1 Supported Protocols}\label{31-supported-protocols}
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{\def\LTcaptype{none} % do not increment counter
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\begin{longtable}[]{@{}lll@{}}
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\toprule\noalign{}
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Protocol & Implementation & Security Level \\
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\midrule\noalign{}
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\endhead
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\bottomrule\noalign{}
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\endlastfoot
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LSS (Lux Secret Sharing) & \texttt{protocols.go:LSSHandler} & 128-bit \\
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CGGMP21/CMP & \texttt{protocols.go:CGGMP21Handler} & 128-bit \\
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BLS & \texttt{protocols.go:BLSHandler} & 128-bit \\
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FROST & \texttt{executor.go} & 128-bit \\
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Corona & \texttt{protocols.go:CoronaHandler} & Post-quantum \\
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\end{longtable}
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}
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\textbf{FINDING-SIG-001} (Low): Inconsistent Error Handling in Protocol
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Handlers
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\begin{Shaded}
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\begin{Highlighting}[]
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\CommentTok{// protocols.go}
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\KeywordTok{func} \OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{h }\OperatorTok{*}\NormalTok{CGGMP21Handler}\OperatorTok{)}\NormalTok{ Sign}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{keyShare KeyShare}\OperatorTok{,}\NormalTok{ message }\OperatorTok{[]}\DataTypeTok{byte}\OperatorTok{)} \OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{Signature}\OperatorTok{,} \DataTypeTok{error}\OperatorTok{)} \OperatorTok{\{}
|
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\CommentTok{// Some paths return nil error with empty signature}
|
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\ControlFlowTok{if}\NormalTok{ session }\OperatorTok{==} \OtherTok{nil} \OperatorTok{\{}
|
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\ControlFlowTok{return} \OtherTok{nil}\OperatorTok{,} \OtherTok{nil} \CommentTok{// Should return explicit error}
|
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\OperatorTok{\}}
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\OperatorTok{\}}
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\end{Highlighting}
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\end{Shaded}
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\begin{itemize}
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\tightlist
|
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\item
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Some error paths return \texttt{(nil,\ nil)} instead of explicit error
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\item
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\textbf{Risk}: Silent failures in signing operations
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\item
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\textbf{Recommendation}: Always return explicit errors on failure
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\end{itemize}
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\begin{center}\rule{0.5\linewidth}{0.5pt}\end{center}
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\subsection{4. Secret Sharing Audit}\label{4-secret-sharing-audit}
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\subsubsection{4.1 Shamir\textquotesingle s Secret
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Sharing}\label{41-shamirs-secret-sharing}
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The LSS (Lux Secret Sharing) extends Shamir\textquotesingle s scheme:
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\begin{Shaded}
|
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\begin{Highlighting}[]
|
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\CommentTok{// protocols.go}
|
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\KeywordTok{type}\NormalTok{ LSSHandler }\KeywordTok{struct} \OperatorTok{\{}
|
|
\NormalTok{ threshold }\DataTypeTok{int}
|
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\NormalTok{ total }\DataTypeTok{int}
|
|
\NormalTok{ curve elliptic}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Curve}
|
|
\OperatorTok{\}}
|
|
\end{Highlighting}
|
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\end{Shaded}
|
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\textbf{FINDING-SS-001} (Low): Threshold Parameter Validation
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\begin{Shaded}
|
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\begin{Highlighting}[]
|
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\CommentTok{// protocols.go}
|
|
\KeywordTok{func}\NormalTok{ NewLSSHandler}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{t}\OperatorTok{,}\NormalTok{ n }\DataTypeTok{int}\OperatorTok{)} \OperatorTok{(*}\NormalTok{LSSHandler}\OperatorTok{,} \DataTypeTok{error}\OperatorTok{)} \OperatorTok{\{}
|
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\ControlFlowTok{if}\NormalTok{ t }\OperatorTok{\textgreater{}}\NormalTok{ n }\OperatorTok{\{}
|
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\ControlFlowTok{return} \OtherTok{nil}\OperatorTok{,}\NormalTok{ errors}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{New}\OperatorTok{(}\StringTok{"threshold exceeds total"}\OperatorTok{)}
|
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\OperatorTok{\}}
|
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\CommentTok{// Missing: t \textgreater{} 0, n \textgreater{} 0, t \textgreater{}= 1 checks}
|
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\OperatorTok{\}}
|
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\end{Highlighting}
|
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\end{Shaded}
|
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|
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\begin{itemize}
|
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\tightlist
|
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\item
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Edge cases for \texttt{t=0} or \texttt{n=0} not explicitly validated
|
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\item
|
|
\textbf{Risk}: Invalid configuration could produce weak shares
|
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\item
|
|
\textbf{Recommendation}: Add explicit bounds validation:
|
|
\texttt{1\ \textless{}=\ t\ \textless{}=\ n}
|
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\end{itemize}
|
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\begin{center}\rule{0.5\linewidth}{0.5pt}\end{center}
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\subsection{5. Permit System Audit}\label{5-permit-system-audit}
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\subsubsection{5.1 Permit Structure}\label{51-permit-structure}
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\begin{Shaded}
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\begin{Highlighting}[]
|
|
\CommentTok{// fhe/registry.go}
|
|
\KeywordTok{type}\NormalTok{ Permit }\KeywordTok{struct} \OperatorTok{\{}
|
|
\NormalTok{ Handle }\OperatorTok{[}\DecValTok{32}\OperatorTok{]}\DataTypeTok{byte} \CommentTok{// Ciphertext handle}
|
|
\NormalTok{ Grantee common}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Address}
|
|
\NormalTok{ Ops }\DataTypeTok{uint8} \CommentTok{// Bitmask: Decrypt|Reencrypt|Compute|Transfer}
|
|
\NormalTok{ Expiry }\DataTypeTok{uint64} \CommentTok{// Block number}
|
|
\NormalTok{ Signature }\OperatorTok{[]}\DataTypeTok{byte} \CommentTok{// Owner signature}
|
|
\OperatorTok{\}}
|
|
|
|
\KeywordTok{const} \OperatorTok{(}
|
|
\NormalTok{ PermitOpDecrypt }\OperatorTok{=} \DecValTok{1} \OperatorTok{\textless{}\textless{}} \DecValTok{0}
|
|
\NormalTok{ PermitOpReencrypt }\OperatorTok{=} \DecValTok{1} \OperatorTok{\textless{}\textless{}} \DecValTok{1}
|
|
\NormalTok{ PermitOpCompute }\OperatorTok{=} \DecValTok{1} \OperatorTok{\textless{}\textless{}} \DecValTok{2}
|
|
\NormalTok{ PermitOpTransfer }\OperatorTok{=} \DecValTok{1} \OperatorTok{\textless{}\textless{}} \DecValTok{3}
|
|
\OperatorTok{)}
|
|
\end{Highlighting}
|
|
\end{Shaded}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{FINDING-PERMIT-001} (Medium): Permit Revocation Race
|
|
|
|
\begin{Shaded}
|
|
\begin{Highlighting}[]
|
|
\CommentTok{// fhe/registry.go}
|
|
\KeywordTok{func} \OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{r }\OperatorTok{*}\NormalTok{Registry}\OperatorTok{)}\NormalTok{ RevokePermit}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{handle }\OperatorTok{[}\DecValTok{32}\OperatorTok{]}\DataTypeTok{byte}\OperatorTok{,}\NormalTok{ grantee common}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Address}\OperatorTok{)} \DataTypeTok{error} \OperatorTok{\{}
|
|
\NormalTok{ key }\OperatorTok{:=}\NormalTok{ permitKey}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{handle}\OperatorTok{,}\NormalTok{ grantee}\OperatorTok{)}
|
|
\ControlFlowTok{return}\NormalTok{ r}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{db}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Delete}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{key}\OperatorTok{)}
|
|
\OperatorTok{\}}
|
|
\end{Highlighting}
|
|
\end{Shaded}
|
|
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\tightlist
|
|
\item
|
|
No versioning or sequence numbers on permits
|
|
\item
|
|
Revocation is immediate deletion
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Risk}: Race between revocation and in-flight operations using
|
|
permit
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Recommendation}: Add permit nonces and check in-flight
|
|
operations
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{5.2 Replay Attack
|
|
Surface}\label{52-replay-attack-surface}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{FINDING-PERMIT-002} (Medium): Cross-Chain Permit Replay
|
|
|
|
\begin{Shaded}
|
|
\begin{Highlighting}[]
|
|
\CommentTok{// fhe/registry.go}
|
|
\KeywordTok{func} \OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{r }\OperatorTok{*}\NormalTok{Registry}\OperatorTok{)}\NormalTok{ VerifyPermit}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{permit }\OperatorTok{*}\NormalTok{Permit}\OperatorTok{)} \DataTypeTok{error} \OperatorTok{\{}
|
|
\CommentTok{// Verification does not include chain ID}
|
|
\NormalTok{ signer}\OperatorTok{,}\NormalTok{ err }\OperatorTok{:=}\NormalTok{ RecoverSigner}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{permitHash}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{permit}\OperatorTok{),}\NormalTok{ permit}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Signature}\OperatorTok{)}
|
|
\OperatorTok{\}}
|
|
\end{Highlighting}
|
|
\end{Shaded}
|
|
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\tightlist
|
|
\item
|
|
Permit signature does not bind to chain ID
|
|
\item
|
|
Same permit valid on mainnet and testnet
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Risk}: Cross-chain replay attacks
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Recommendation}: Include \texttt{chainID} in permit signature
|
|
domain separator
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
\begin{center}\rule{0.5\linewidth}{0.5pt}\end{center}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{6. Relayer Audit}\label{6-relayer-audit}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{6.1 Architecture}\label{61-architecture}
|
|
|
|
\begin{Shaded}
|
|
\begin{Highlighting}[]
|
|
\CommentTok{// fhe/relayer.go}
|
|
\KeywordTok{type}\NormalTok{ Relayer }\KeywordTok{struct} \OperatorTok{\{}
|
|
\NormalTok{ requestQueue }\KeywordTok{chan}\NormalTok{ DecryptRequest}
|
|
\NormalTok{ resultChan }\KeywordTok{chan}\NormalTok{ DecryptResult}
|
|
\NormalTok{ warpSigner warp}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Signer}
|
|
\NormalTok{ decryptor }\OperatorTok{*}\NormalTok{ThresholdDecryptor}
|
|
\OperatorTok{\}}
|
|
\end{Highlighting}
|
|
\end{Shaded}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{FINDING-RELAY-001} (High): Unbounded Request Queue
|
|
|
|
\begin{Shaded}
|
|
\begin{Highlighting}[]
|
|
\CommentTok{// fhe/relayer.go}
|
|
\KeywordTok{func}\NormalTok{ NewRelayer}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{config RelayerConfig}\OperatorTok{)} \OperatorTok{*}\NormalTok{Relayer }\OperatorTok{\{}
|
|
\ControlFlowTok{return} \OperatorTok{\&}\NormalTok{Relayer}\OperatorTok{\{}
|
|
\NormalTok{ requestQueue}\OperatorTok{:} \BuiltInTok{make}\OperatorTok{(}\KeywordTok{chan}\NormalTok{ DecryptRequest}\OperatorTok{,} \DecValTok{10000}\OperatorTok{),} \CommentTok{// Fixed buffer}
|
|
\OperatorTok{\}}
|
|
\OperatorTok{\}}
|
|
\end{Highlighting}
|
|
\end{Shaded}
|
|
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\tightlist
|
|
\item
|
|
10,000 request buffer is hardcoded
|
|
\item
|
|
No backpressure mechanism to source chains
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Risk}: Memory exhaustion under load; DoS vector
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Recommendation}: Implement adaptive backpressure; rate limit
|
|
by source
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{6.2 Warp Message Signing}\label{62-warp-message-signing}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{FINDING-RELAY-002} (High): Missing Message Validation Before
|
|
Signing
|
|
|
|
\begin{Shaded}
|
|
\begin{Highlighting}[]
|
|
\CommentTok{// fhe/relayer.go}
|
|
\KeywordTok{func} \OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{r }\OperatorTok{*}\NormalTok{Relayer}\OperatorTok{)}\NormalTok{ sendFulfillment}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{result DecryptResult}\OperatorTok{)} \DataTypeTok{error} \OperatorTok{\{}
|
|
\NormalTok{ payload }\OperatorTok{:=}\NormalTok{ result}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Marshal}\OperatorTok{()}
|
|
\NormalTok{ signedMsg}\OperatorTok{,}\NormalTok{ err }\OperatorTok{:=}\NormalTok{ r}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{warpSigner}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Sign}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{payload}\OperatorTok{)}
|
|
\CommentTok{// Signs without validating result came from valid session}
|
|
\OperatorTok{\}}
|
|
\end{Highlighting}
|
|
\end{Shaded}
|
|
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\tightlist
|
|
\item
|
|
Results are signed without verifying originating session validity
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Risk}: Attacker could inject arbitrary results for signing
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Recommendation}: Validate session ID and participant set
|
|
before signing
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{6.3 Cross-Chain Delivery}\label{63-cross-chain-delivery}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{FINDING-RELAY-003} (High): No Delivery Confirmation
|
|
|
|
\begin{Shaded}
|
|
\begin{Highlighting}[]
|
|
\CommentTok{// fhe/relayer.go}
|
|
\KeywordTok{func} \OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{r }\OperatorTok{*}\NormalTok{Relayer}\OperatorTok{)}\NormalTok{ deliverResult}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{destChain ids}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{ID}\OperatorTok{,}\NormalTok{ signedMsg }\OperatorTok{[]}\DataTypeTok{byte}\OperatorTok{)} \DataTypeTok{error} \OperatorTok{\{}
|
|
\ControlFlowTok{return}\NormalTok{ r}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{sender}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Send}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{destChain}\OperatorTok{,}\NormalTok{ signedMsg}\OperatorTok{)}
|
|
\CommentTok{// No confirmation or retry logic}
|
|
\OperatorTok{\}}
|
|
\end{Highlighting}
|
|
\end{Shaded}
|
|
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\tightlist
|
|
\item
|
|
Fire-and-forget delivery without confirmation
|
|
\item
|
|
No retry mechanism for failed deliveries
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Risk}: Lost decryption results; stuck user funds
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Recommendation}: Implement delivery confirmation with
|
|
exponential backoff retry
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
\begin{center}\rule{0.5\linewidth}{0.5pt}\end{center}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{7. Security Check Results}\label{7-security-check-results}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{7.1 Key Share Compromise
|
|
Resistance}\label{71-key-share-compromise-resistance}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Status}: PARTIAL
|
|
|
|
{\def\LTcaptype{none} % do not increment counter
|
|
\begin{longtable}[]{@{}lll@{}}
|
|
\toprule\noalign{}
|
|
Control & Implemented & Notes \\
|
|
\midrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endhead
|
|
\bottomrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endlastfoot
|
|
Share encryption at rest & Yes & Database-level encryption \\
|
|
Share isolation in memory & Partial & Shares cleared after use, but not
|
|
zeroed \\
|
|
Share refresh protocol & Yes & \texttt{RefreshKey} operation present \\
|
|
Proactive security & No & No automatic refresh scheduling \\
|
|
\end{longtable}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Recommendation}: Implement automatic proactive share refresh
|
|
every epoch.
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{7.2 Decryption Oracle
|
|
Attacks}\label{72-decryption-oracle-attacks}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Status}: ADEQUATE
|
|
|
|
\begin{Shaded}
|
|
\begin{Highlighting}[]
|
|
\CommentTok{// fhe/integration.go}
|
|
\KeywordTok{type}\NormalTok{ DecryptionSession }\KeywordTok{struct} \OperatorTok{\{}
|
|
\NormalTok{ Handle }\OperatorTok{[}\DecValTok{32}\OperatorTok{]}\DataTypeTok{byte}
|
|
\NormalTok{ Requester common}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Address}
|
|
\NormalTok{ Shares }\KeywordTok{map}\OperatorTok{[}\NormalTok{ids}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{NodeID}\OperatorTok{][]}\DataTypeTok{byte}
|
|
\NormalTok{ StartTime time}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Time}
|
|
\NormalTok{ Completed }\DataTypeTok{bool}
|
|
\OperatorTok{\}}
|
|
\end{Highlighting}
|
|
\end{Shaded}
|
|
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\tightlist
|
|
\item
|
|
Decryption requires valid permit verification
|
|
\item
|
|
Rate limiting via quota system in \texttt{vm.go}
|
|
\item
|
|
Session binding prevents share reuse
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Remaining Risk}: High-frequency authorized decryptions could
|
|
leak information via timing analysis.
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{7.3 Side-Channel Leakage in FHE
|
|
Ops}\label{73-side-channel-leakage-in-fhe-ops}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Status}: PARTIAL
|
|
|
|
\begin{Shaded}
|
|
\begin{Highlighting}[]
|
|
\CommentTok{// fhe/gpu\_fhe.go {-} NTT operations}
|
|
\KeywordTok{func} \OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{t }\OperatorTok{*}\NormalTok{GPUNumberTheoreticTransformer}\OperatorTok{)}\NormalTok{ Forward}\OperatorTok{(}\NormalTok{p ring}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Poly}\OperatorTok{,}\NormalTok{ out ring}\OperatorTok{.}\NormalTok{Poly}\OperatorTok{)} \OperatorTok{\{}
|
|
\CommentTok{// GPU timing may leak polynomial structure}
|
|
\OperatorTok{\}}
|
|
\end{Highlighting}
|
|
\end{Shaded}
|
|
|
|
{\def\LTcaptype{none} % do not increment counter
|
|
\begin{longtable}[]{@{}lll@{}}
|
|
\toprule\noalign{}
|
|
Vector & Mitigation & Status \\
|
|
\midrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endhead
|
|
\bottomrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endlastfoot
|
|
Timing (CPU) & Constant-time libraries & Yes \\
|
|
Timing (GPU) & No & \textbf{MISSING} \\
|
|
Power analysis & N/A (server) & N/A \\
|
|
Cache attacks & No specific mitigation & \textbf{MISSING} \\
|
|
\end{longtable}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Recommendation}: Add GPU timing noise injection; use
|
|
constant-time NTT kernels.
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{7.4 DKG Manipulation}\label{74-dkg-manipulation}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Status}: PARTIAL
|
|
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\tightlist
|
|
\item
|
|
Commitment phase implemented
|
|
\item
|
|
Missing: Zero-knowledge proofs for share correctness
|
|
\item
|
|
Missing: Complaint mechanism for invalid shares
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Recommendation}: Implement Feldman VSS with ZK proofs for share
|
|
verification.
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{7.5 Replay Attacks on
|
|
Permits}\label{75-replay-attacks-on-permits}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Status}: NEEDS ATTENTION
|
|
|
|
{\def\LTcaptype{none} % do not increment counter
|
|
\begin{longtable}[]{@{}lll@{}}
|
|
\toprule\noalign{}
|
|
Attack Vector & Mitigation & Status \\
|
|
\midrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endhead
|
|
\bottomrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endlastfoot
|
|
Same-chain replay & Block expiry & Yes \\
|
|
Cross-chain replay & Chain ID binding & \textbf{MISSING} \\
|
|
Time-based replay & Expiry enforcement & Yes \\
|
|
Nonce reuse & Permit nonces & \textbf{MISSING} \\
|
|
\end{longtable}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
\textbf{Recommendation}: Add chain ID to permit domain separator;
|
|
implement nonce tracking.
|
|
|
|
\begin{center}\rule{0.5\linewidth}{0.5pt}\end{center}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{8. Code Quality
|
|
Observations}\label{8-code-quality-observations}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{8.1 Positive Patterns}\label{81-positive-patterns}
|
|
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\def\labelenumi{\arabic{enumi}.}
|
|
\tightlist
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Clean Interface Abstraction}: \texttt{ProtocolHandler},
|
|
\texttt{KeyShare}, \texttt{Signature} interfaces
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Explicit Error Types}: Domain-specific error types for
|
|
debugging
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Mutex Discipline}: Consistent lock ordering in lifecycle
|
|
manager
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Deferred Callbacks}: Avoids mutex deadlock on callbacks
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{8.2 Areas for
|
|
Improvement}\label{82-areas-for-improvement}
|
|
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\def\labelenumi{\arabic{enumi}.}
|
|
\tightlist
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Magic Numbers}: GPU thresholds, timeouts hardcoded
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Incomplete Validation}: Edge cases in parameter validation
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Missing Metrics}: No observability for security events
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Documentation}: Protocol security assumptions not documented
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
\begin{center}\rule{0.5\linewidth}{0.5pt}\end{center}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{9. 2025 Recommendations}\label{9-2025-recommendations}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{Critical (Address Before
|
|
Mainnet)}\label{critical-address-before-mainnet}
|
|
|
|
{\def\LTcaptype{none} % do not increment counter
|
|
\begin{longtable}[]{@{}llll@{}}
|
|
\toprule\noalign{}
|
|
ID & Finding & Effort & Priority \\
|
|
\midrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endhead
|
|
\bottomrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endlastfoot
|
|
RELAY-001 & Unbounded request queue & Medium & P0 \\
|
|
RELAY-002 & Missing message validation & Low & P0 \\
|
|
RELAY-003 & No delivery confirmation & Medium & P0 \\
|
|
PERMIT-002 & Cross-chain replay & Low & P0 \\
|
|
\end{longtable}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{High Priority (Q1 2025)}\label{high-priority-q1-2025}
|
|
|
|
{\def\LTcaptype{none} % do not increment counter
|
|
\begin{longtable}[]{@{}llll@{}}
|
|
\toprule\noalign{}
|
|
ID & Finding & Effort & Priority \\
|
|
\midrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endhead
|
|
\bottomrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endlastfoot
|
|
DKG-001 & Timeout race condition & Medium & P1 \\
|
|
DKG-002 & Missing commitment binding & High & P1 \\
|
|
PERMIT-001 & Permit revocation race & Medium & P1 \\
|
|
FHE-003 & NTT cache unbounded & Low & P1 \\
|
|
\end{longtable}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{Medium Priority (Q2 2025)}\label{medium-priority-q2-2025}
|
|
|
|
{\def\LTcaptype{none} % do not increment counter
|
|
\begin{longtable}[]{@{}llll@{}}
|
|
\toprule\noalign{}
|
|
ID & Finding & Effort & Priority \\
|
|
\midrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endhead
|
|
\bottomrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endlastfoot
|
|
FHE-001 & Missing TFHE/BGV & High & P2 \\
|
|
FHE-002 & Hardcoded GPU thresholds & Low & P2 \\
|
|
SIG-001 & Inconsistent error handling & Low & P2 \\
|
|
SS-001 & Threshold validation & Low & P2 \\
|
|
\end{longtable}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection{Architectural
|
|
Recommendations}\label{architectural-recommendations}
|
|
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
|
|
\def\labelenumi{\arabic{enumi}.}
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Proactive Share Refresh}: Implement automatic key share
|
|
refresh every epoch to limit exposure window from compromised shares.
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Observability}: Add metrics for:
|
|
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\tightlist
|
|
\item
|
|
DKG ceremony success/failure rates
|
|
\item
|
|
Decryption latency percentiles
|
|
\item
|
|
Permit verification failures
|
|
\item
|
|
Relayer queue depth
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Rate Limiting}: Implement per-address rate limits for:
|
|
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\tightlist
|
|
\item
|
|
Decryption requests
|
|
\item
|
|
Permit creation
|
|
\item
|
|
DKG ceremony initiation
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Formal Verification}: Consider formal verification of:
|
|
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\tightlist
|
|
\item
|
|
Secret sharing correctness
|
|
\item
|
|
Threshold signature security proofs
|
|
\item
|
|
FHE parameter selection
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
\item
|
|
\textbf{Post-Quantum Migration Path}: Document migration strategy from
|
|
classical to post-quantum threshold schemes using Corona.
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
|
|
\begin{center}\rule{0.5\linewidth}{0.5pt}\end{center}
|
|
|
|
\subsection{10. Files Reviewed}\label{10-files-reviewed}
|
|
|
|
{\def\LTcaptype{none} % do not increment counter
|
|
\begin{longtable}[]{@{}lll@{}}
|
|
\toprule\noalign{}
|
|
File & Lines & Coverage \\
|
|
\midrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endhead
|
|
\bottomrule\noalign{}
|
|
\endlastfoot
|
|
\texttt{vm.go} & 1621 & Full \\
|
|
\texttt{protocols.go} & 591 & Full \\
|
|
\texttt{executor.go} & 503 & Full \\
|
|
\texttt{fhe/integration.go} & \textasciitilde400 & Full \\
|
|
\texttt{fhe/lifecycle.go} & 1005 & Full \\
|
|
\texttt{fhe/registry.go} & 612 & Full \\
|
|
\texttt{fhe/relayer.go} & 708 & Full \\
|
|
\texttt{fhe/rpc.go} & 758 & Full \\
|
|
\texttt{fhe/warp\_payloads.go} & 605 & Full \\
|
|
\texttt{fhe/gpu\_fhe.go} & 437 & Full \\
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\texttt{fhe/handler.go} & \textasciitilde200 & Full \\
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\end{longtable}
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}
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\begin{center}\rule{0.5\linewidth}{0.5pt}\end{center}
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\subsection{11. Conclusion}\label{11-conclusion}
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ThresholdVM demonstrates competent cryptographic engineering with sound
|
|
protocol choices. The primary concerns are in the relayer subsystem,
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|
which requires hardening before production deployment. The permit system
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|
needs chain ID binding to prevent cross-chain replay attacks.
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|
|
|
\textbf{Recommended Actions}:
|
|
|
|
\begin{enumerate}
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|
\def\labelenumi{\arabic{enumi}.}
|
|
\tightlist
|
|
\item
|
|
Address all P0 findings before testnet deployment
|
|
\item
|
|
Engage external cryptographic audit for DKG and threshold signature
|
|
implementations
|
|
\item
|
|
Implement comprehensive observability before mainnet
|
|
\item
|
|
Document security assumptions and threat model
|
|
\end{enumerate}
|
|
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\begin{center}\rule{0.5\linewidth}{0.5pt}\end{center}
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\emph{Report generated: 2025-12-30} \emph{Next review recommended:
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2025-03-31 (Q1 2025)}
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\end{document}
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