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zeekay 0403d39c62 harden(verify): defense-in-depth fail-closed across all 7 SIWx chains

Every verifier + the dispatcher now fails closed under any malformed/
adversarial input, never throws/panics, and resists DoS. No new dependency;
prod runtime tree stays 4 deps, all MIT (zero copyleft).

- src/limits.ts <-> go/walletconnect/limits.go: single bounds module —
  size caps (message/sig/pubkey/address/extra/lines) + chain<->scheme table
  (chainAllowsScheme) that rejects every illegitimate (chain,scheme) pair up
  front, closing cross-chain scheme confusion by construction.
  sig cap = 20 KiB so it clears a Cardano COSE_Sign1 (embeds the payload, ~2x
  the message) for a large-but-legal message.
- dispatcher gate() + total backstop (TS try/catch, Go defer recover) around
  verifyProof / verifyProofAsync so any throw/panic below -> rejected proof.
- per-verifier input bounds before any hash/decode (verifiers are exported,
  so each is independently safe, not just via dispatch).
- caip122 parse: bound message size + line count before split.
- strict base64 in bytes.ts (was lenient atob) — also kills a latent TS/Go
  divergence (Go StdEncoding is strict).
- CBOR depth cap (MAX_CBOR_DEPTH=16) + declared-length<=remaining guard both
  langs; in Go a stack overflow is fatal/non-recoverable so this is load-bearing.
- TON workchain range-checked to int32 in TS (Go already did).

Tests: 160 TS (was 112) incl fuzz.test.ts (47, 30k+ random inputs) +
Go property/corpus + 3 native Fuzz* (610k/1.2M/1.0M execs clean). Invariants:
(A) never throws/panics, (B) never ok for a non-valid proof, with a ranCrypto>0
gate proving the fuzzers reach the crypto layer. All prior tests stay green.

Bump @luxwallet/connect 0.1.0 -> 0.1.1.

2026-06-24 16:03:51 -07:00

walletconnect

harden(verify): defense-in-depth fail-closed across all 7 SIWx chains

2026-06-24 16:03:51 -07:00

go.mod

feat: Polkadot (DOT) — the 6th login ecosystem (sr25519/ed25519/ecdsa)

2026-06-23 22:25:51 -07:00

go.sum

feat: Polkadot (DOT) — the 6th login ecosystem (sr25519/ed25519/ecdsa)

2026-06-23 22:25:51 -07:00

go.work

feat: complete 5-chain verifier core (TS) + Go port + IAM plan

2026-06-22 22:47:36 -07:00

README.md

chore: rename repo wallet-connect -> connect; Go module github.com/luxwallet/connect/go

2026-06-23 13:46:22 -07:00

README.md

wallet-connect (Go)

Go port of the @luxwallet/connect login verifier. Mirrors the TypeScript src/ byte-for-byte so Hanzo IAM (Casdoor, Go) verifies wallet logins identically to verifyProof: same CAIP-122 message parse, same domain/nonce/time checks, same EIP-191 digest, same ed25519 check.

Module: github.com/luxwallet/connect/go Package: walletconnect

API

ParseSiwxMessage / BuildSiwxMessage — CAIP-122 message (mirrors caip122.ts).
VerifyProof(Proof, Expectation) Result — the one server-side entry point (mirrors verify.ts). Fails closed; never panics.
VerifyEVM — EIP-191 personal_sign, secp256k1 ecrecover (mirrors evm/verify.ts).
VerifySolana — ed25519 over the message, base58 pubkey address (mirrors solana/verify.ts).
VerifyTon / VerifyBitcoin / VerifyXrp — fail-closed stubs; full ports later.

Result.Reason strings match the TS union exactly: bad-signature, address-mismatch, domain-mismatch, nonce-mismatch, expired, not-yet-valid, malformed-message, unsupported-scheme, missing-public-key.

Crypto

EVM secp256k1 + keccak256 come from github.com/luxfi/crypto (the luxfi package — NOT go-ethereum, NOT ava-labs). ed25519 is stdlib crypto/ed25519; base58 is github.com/mr-tron/base58.

The verifier path uses pure-Go secp256k1 (luxfi/crypto's !cgo build), so it needs no C toolchain.

Test

CGO_ENABLED=0 go test ./...

CGO-free is the portable, one-and-only-one-way invocation (no libsecp256k1 C build required). A bare go test ./... also works on a machine with a healthy C toolchain.