Files
kms/pkg/envelope/envelope_test.go
zeekayandHanzo Dev a20ace0dd0 a request names the channel it is for, and is honoured only there
Key agreement gives two endpoints a private channel. It does not tell
either of them who is on the far end, so a signature on a request proves
who wrote it and not who they wrote it to. Anyone able to agree keys with
both sides can therefore carry a signed request from one channel to
another and be served on it.

The handshake now derives a second value alongside the session key, under
its own label: a binding that names the channel. Only the two endpoints
that ran that handshake can compute it. The caller signs it into every
envelope; the peer checks it against its own side of the channel the
envelope arrived on. A request written for one channel is inert on any
other — it cannot be re-signed without the caller's key, and a channel
cannot be made to produce a name it did not derive.

It is not optional anywhere it could be skipped:

  - NewSession takes the handshake result, so a session always carries
    the binding derived with its key.
  - envelope.Build requires one, so an envelope addressed to nobody
    cannot be signed; Parse requires one, so it cannot be read.
  - envelope.Verify takes the arriving channel as a parameter, so there
    is no way to verify without saying where the request came from.
  - Both transports supply their own: the ZAP wire its session's, the
    HTTP surface the TLS exporter. A connection with no keys of its own
    has no binding and can carry no envelope.

zapclient loses SkipHandshake and RequireSession. With the binding
required, a client without a session has nothing to sign and cannot
speak, so the dial either agrees keys or fails, and a peer that answers
classical-only when ML-KEM-768 was offered is refused outright rather
than by configuration. VerifyEnvelope goes with them: a verify entry
that checked neither the ledger nor the channel had no callers and no
business existing.

Tests: an attacker that terminates and re-originates both halves of the
handshake, built from the shipping client and server, is refused — both
when it forwards the envelope verbatim and when it rewrites the name to
its own. A caller reaching the KMS directly still gets its secret.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-08-15 04:49:47 -07:00

177 lines
5.2 KiB
Go

// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package envelope_test
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/json"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/luxfi/keys"
"github.com/luxfi/kms/pkg/envelope"
)
const testMnemonic = "abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon " +
"abandon abandon abandon abandon abandon about"
// testBind stands in for the binding a real transport derives with its
// peer. Any 32 bytes will do here — what the tests care about is that
// the same value is on both sides.
var testBind = bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x5A}, envelope.BindSize)
func mustIdent(t *testing.T, path string) *keys.ServiceIdentity {
t.Helper()
id, err := keys.NewServiceIdentity(testMnemonic, path)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewServiceIdentity: %v", err)
}
return id
}
func mustHeader(ident *keys.ServiceIdentity) envelope.IdentityHeader {
return envelope.IdentityHeader{
NodeID: ident.NodeID,
FullDigest: ident.FullDigest,
ServicePath: ident.ServicePath,
PublicKey: ident.PublicKey,
}
}
// TestEnvelope_BuildVerify_RoundTrip — a freshly built envelope
// verifies under the canonical keys.VerifyServiceEnvelope hook.
func TestEnvelope_BuildVerify_RoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
ident := mustIdent(t, "hanzo/kms-operator")
defer ident.Wipe()
req := json.RawMessage(`{"path":"hanzo/commerce","name":"api-key","env":"prod"}`)
now := time.Unix(1_717_200_000, 0)
env, err := envelope.Build(mustHeader(ident), ident, 0x0040, req, "nonce-1", testBind, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Build: %v", err)
}
raw, err := json.Marshal(env)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Marshal: %v", err)
}
parsed, err := envelope.Parse(raw)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Parse: %v", err)
}
verified, err := envelope.Verify(parsed, now, keys.VerifyServiceEnvelope, testBind)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Verify: %v", err)
}
if verified.NodeID != ident.NodeID {
t.Errorf("NodeID mismatch")
}
if verified.ServicePath != ident.ServicePath {
t.Errorf("path mismatch: got %q want %q", verified.ServicePath, ident.ServicePath)
}
}
// TestEnvelope_Stale_Rejected — outside the freshness window fails.
func TestEnvelope_Stale_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
ident := mustIdent(t, "hanzo/auto")
defer ident.Wipe()
old := time.Unix(1_717_200_000, 0)
env, err := envelope.Build(mustHeader(ident), ident, 0x0040, json.RawMessage(`{}`), "n", testBind, old)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
tooLate := old.Add(envelope.MaxClockSkew + time.Second)
if _, err := envelope.Verify(env, tooLate, keys.VerifyServiceEnvelope, testBind); err == nil {
t.Errorf("stale envelope should be rejected")
}
}
// TestEnvelope_Tamper_Sig_Rejected — flipping a sig byte fails.
func TestEnvelope_Tamper_Sig_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
ident := mustIdent(t, "hanzo/auto")
defer ident.Wipe()
now := time.Unix(1_717_200_000, 0)
env, err := envelope.Build(mustHeader(ident), ident, 0x0040, json.RawMessage(`{}`), "n", testBind, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
env.Sig[0] ^= 0xFF
if _, err := envelope.Verify(env, now, keys.VerifyServiceEnvelope, testBind); err == nil {
t.Errorf("tampered sig should be rejected")
}
}
// TestEnvelope_BadShape_Rejected — version, scheme, missing fields.
func TestEnvelope_BadShape_Rejected(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
raw string
}{
{"empty", ``},
{"not json", `not json`},
{"wrong version", `{"v":99,"id":{"scheme":66,"node":"NodeID-",
"digest":"","path":"","pubkey":""},"ts":0,"nonce":"x","op":0,"req":{},"sig":"x"}`},
}
for _, c := range cases {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := envelope.Parse([]byte(c.raw)); err == nil {
t.Errorf("expected reject for %q", c.name)
}
})
}
}
// An envelope that names no channel does not parse. Refusing it at the
// shape check means no later code has to remember to look.
func TestAnEnvelopeThatNamesNoChannelDoesNotParse(t *testing.T) {
ident := mustIdent(t, "hanzo/auto")
defer ident.Wipe()
now := time.Unix(1_717_200_000, 0)
env, err := envelope.Build(mustHeader(ident), ident, 0x0040, json.RawMessage(`{}`), "n", testBind, now)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
for _, c := range []struct {
name string
bind []byte
}{
{"absent", nil},
{"empty", []byte{}},
{"short", testBind[:envelope.BindSize-1]},
{"long", append(append([]byte{}, testBind...), 0x00)},
} {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
env.Bind = c.bind
raw, err := json.Marshal(env)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if _, err := envelope.Parse(raw); err == nil {
t.Error("parsed an envelope with no usable channel name")
}
})
}
}
// Building one is refused for the same reason: there is no way to sign a
// request that is not addressed to anybody.
func TestAnEnvelopeCannotBeBuiltWithoutAChannel(t *testing.T) {
ident := mustIdent(t, "hanzo/auto")
defer ident.Wipe()
now := time.Unix(1_717_200_000, 0)
for _, c := range []struct {
name string
bind []byte
}{
{"absent", nil},
{"empty", []byte{}},
{"short", testBind[:envelope.BindSize-1]},
} {
t.Run(c.name, func(t *testing.T) {
if _, err := envelope.Build(mustHeader(ident), ident, 0x0040, json.RawMessage(`{}`), "n", c.bind, now); err == nil {
t.Error("built a signed envelope addressed to nobody")
}
})
}
}