Files
lens/threshold/threshold_test.go
zeekay 2c63fd34fc lens: classical curve threshold kernel — sister to Pulsar
Lens is the curve-based threshold signing kernel for Lux. It is the
classical analogue of Pulsar (the lattice kernel at github.com/luxfi/pulsar).
Both kernels share the same lifecycle shape — Bootstrap → Reshare* →
Reanchor — and the same activation circuit-breaker contract. They differ
only in the math field: Pulsar over R_q (Module-LWE), Lens over a
prime-order curve group (discrete log).

Curves shipped: Ed25519, secp256k1, Ristretto255. Each has a
deterministically-derived secondary Pedersen generator H from a
Lens-specific nothing-up-my-sleeve tag.

Sign math: FROST 2-round Schnorr threshold signing per RFC 9591
(Komlo-Goldberg 2020). Verifier checks z·G ?= R + c·X under the
unchanged group public key.

Reshare math: HJKY97 zero-poly Refresh + Desmedt-Jajodia ReshareToNewSet
over the curve scalar field. Master secret s is preserved; only the
share distribution rotates per epoch.

Activation cert message format: QUASAR-LENS-ACTIVATE-v1, byte-equivalent
shape to QUASAR-PULSAR-ACTIVATE-v1.

Hash suite: HashSuite interface with Lens-SHA3 (production, cSHAKE256 /
KMAC256 / TupleHash256) and Lens-BLAKE3 (legacy) profiles.

DKG: distributed FROST DKG with Feldman commitments. No trusted dealer
required at genesis if the chain prefers proper distributed DKG.

KAT oracles: cmd/reshare_oracle and cmd/dkg_oracle emit deterministic
JSON vectors for cross-language byte-equality validation against a
future luxcpp/crypto/lens/ port.

Tests: full unit + integration coverage on every shipped curve. 60
unique tests, 0 failures.
2026-03-03 12:00:00 -08:00

75 lines
1.7 KiB
Go

// Copyright (C) 2025-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package threshold
import (
"crypto/rand"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/lens/primitives"
)
func TestNewGroupKeyHasGAndH(t *testing.T) {
for _, c := range []primitives.Curve{
primitives.NewEd25519(),
primitives.NewSecp256k1(),
primitives.NewRistretto255(),
} {
t.Run(c.Name(), func(t *testing.T) {
s, _ := c.SampleScalar(rand.Reader)
X := s.ActOnBase()
gk := NewGroupKey(c, X)
if gk.G.IsIdentity() {
t.Error("G is identity")
}
if gk.H.IsIdentity() {
t.Error("H is identity")
}
if gk.G.Equal(gk.H) {
t.Error("G == H")
}
if !gk.X.Equal(X) {
t.Error("X mismatch")
}
})
}
}
func TestGroupKeyBytesStable(t *testing.T) {
c := primitives.NewEd25519()
s, _ := c.SampleScalar(rand.Reader)
gk := NewGroupKey(c, s.ActOnBase())
a := gk.Bytes()
b := gk.Bytes()
if string(a) != string(b) {
t.Fatal("Bytes() not deterministic")
}
if len(a) == 0 {
t.Fatal("Bytes() empty")
}
}
func TestKeyShareConsistency(t *testing.T) {
c := primitives.NewSecp256k1()
s, _ := c.SampleScalar(rand.Reader)
gk := NewGroupKey(c, s.ActOnBase())
skShare, _ := c.SampleScalar(rand.Reader)
ks := &KeyShare{
Index: 0,
PartyID: 1,
SkShare: skShare,
VerificationShare: skShare.ActOnBase(),
GroupKey: gk,
}
if err := ks.CheckConsistency(); err != nil {
t.Errorf("honest share failed: %v", err)
}
// Tamper VerificationShare.
other, _ := c.SampleScalar(rand.Reader)
ks.VerificationShare = other.ActOnBase()
if err := ks.CheckConsistency(); err == nil {
t.Error("inconsistent share accepted")
}
}