mirror of
https://github.com/luxfi/node.git
synced 2026-10-30 15:24:05 +00:00
Two packages were named for the same word and meant different things. network/ dialed peers, exchanged keys, throttled and tracked them; nets/ tracked which chains share a validator set and when they have all bootstrapped. One letter apart, and neither name said which was which. The peer layer is mesh — the word this estate already uses for it, in lux-rs/node's own mesh.rs. That frees network for the thing that is actually a network: a set of chains sharing a validator set. A network holds chains; a chain belongs to one network. github.com/luxfi/p2p stays what it is, the gossip library the VMs use. Three concerns, three names, none of them borrowed from another. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
173 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
173 lines
4.8 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
|
|
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
|
|
|
|
package peer
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"crypto"
|
|
"crypto/rand"
|
|
"crypto/rsa"
|
|
"crypto/x509"
|
|
"crypto/x509/pkix"
|
|
"math/big"
|
|
"net/netip"
|
|
"testing"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
|
|
|
|
"github.com/luxfi/node/staking"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// TestSignedIP_ReplayAttackPrevention verifies that old timestamps
|
|
// are rejected to prevent replay attacks.
|
|
func TestSignedIP_ReplayAttackPrevention(t *testing.T) {
|
|
req := require.New(t)
|
|
|
|
// Generate test certificate
|
|
key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
|
|
req.NoError(err)
|
|
|
|
certTemplate := &x509.Certificate{
|
|
SerialNumber: big.NewInt(1),
|
|
Subject: pkix.Name{
|
|
Organization: []string{"Test"},
|
|
},
|
|
NotBefore: time.Now().Add(-time.Hour),
|
|
NotAfter: time.Now().Add(time.Hour),
|
|
KeyUsage: x509.KeyUsageDigitalSignature,
|
|
ExtKeyUsage: []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth},
|
|
BasicConstraintsValid: true,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
certDER, err := x509.CreateCertificate(rand.Reader, certTemplate, certTemplate, &key.PublicKey, key)
|
|
req.NoError(err)
|
|
|
|
stakingCert := &staking.Certificate{
|
|
Raw: certDER,
|
|
PublicKey: &key.PublicKey,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
currentTime := time.Now()
|
|
maxClockDiff := time.Minute
|
|
|
|
tests := []struct {
|
|
name string
|
|
timestamp time.Time
|
|
maxTimestamp time.Time
|
|
shouldSucceed bool
|
|
expectedError error
|
|
}{
|
|
{
|
|
name: "current time - should succeed",
|
|
timestamp: currentTime,
|
|
maxTimestamp: currentTime.Add(maxClockDiff),
|
|
shouldSucceed: true,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "slightly in future - should succeed",
|
|
timestamp: currentTime.Add(30 * time.Second),
|
|
maxTimestamp: currentTime.Add(maxClockDiff),
|
|
shouldSucceed: true,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "slightly in past - should succeed",
|
|
timestamp: currentTime.Add(-30 * time.Second),
|
|
maxTimestamp: currentTime.Add(maxClockDiff),
|
|
shouldSucceed: true,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "far in future - should fail",
|
|
timestamp: currentTime.Add(2 * maxClockDiff),
|
|
maxTimestamp: currentTime.Add(maxClockDiff),
|
|
shouldSucceed: false,
|
|
expectedError: errTimestampTooFarInFuture,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "far in past (replay attack) - should fail",
|
|
timestamp: currentTime.Add(-15 * time.Minute), // Beyond 10-minute window
|
|
maxTimestamp: currentTime.Add(maxClockDiff),
|
|
shouldSucceed: false,
|
|
expectedError: errTimestampTooFarInPast,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "exactly at min boundary - should succeed",
|
|
timestamp: currentTime.Add(-maxClockDiff),
|
|
maxTimestamp: currentTime.Add(maxClockDiff),
|
|
shouldSucceed: true,
|
|
},
|
|
{
|
|
name: "exactly at max boundary - should succeed",
|
|
timestamp: currentTime.Add(maxClockDiff),
|
|
maxTimestamp: currentTime.Add(maxClockDiff),
|
|
shouldSucceed: true,
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for _, tt := range tests {
|
|
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
|
|
innerRequire := require.New(t)
|
|
|
|
unsignedIP := &UnsignedIP{
|
|
AddrPort: netip.MustParseAddrPort("1.2.3.4:5678"),
|
|
Timestamp: uint64(tt.timestamp.Unix()),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Sign the IP (must hash first per staking.CheckSignature requirements)
|
|
ipBytes := unsignedIP.bytes()
|
|
hash := crypto.SHA256.New()
|
|
hash.Write(ipBytes)
|
|
hashed := hash.Sum(nil)
|
|
signature, err := key.Sign(rand.Reader, hashed, crypto.SHA256)
|
|
innerRequire.NoError(err)
|
|
|
|
signedIP := &SignedIP{
|
|
UnsignedIP: *unsignedIP,
|
|
TLSSignature: signature,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Verify
|
|
err = signedIP.Verify(stakingCert, tt.maxTimestamp)
|
|
|
|
if tt.shouldSucceed {
|
|
innerRequire.NoError(err, "Expected verification to succeed")
|
|
} else {
|
|
innerRequire.Error(err, "Expected verification to fail")
|
|
if tt.expectedError != nil {
|
|
innerRequire.ErrorIs(err, tt.expectedError)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// TestSignedIP_ClockSkewWindow verifies the size of the acceptance window.
|
|
func TestSignedIP_ClockSkewWindow(t *testing.T) {
|
|
require := require.New(t)
|
|
|
|
// With MaxClockDifference = 1 minute:
|
|
// - maxTimestamp = currentTime + 1 min
|
|
// - minTimestamp = currentTime - 1 min
|
|
// - Total window = 2 minutes
|
|
|
|
currentTime := time.Date(2025, 1, 1, 12, 0, 0, 0, time.UTC)
|
|
maxClockDiff := time.Minute
|
|
|
|
// Expected window boundaries
|
|
expectedMinTime := currentTime.Add(-maxClockDiff)
|
|
expectedMaxTime := currentTime.Add(maxClockDiff)
|
|
|
|
// Total window should be 2 * MaxClockDifference
|
|
expectedWindow := 2 * maxClockDiff
|
|
|
|
actualWindow := expectedMaxTime.Sub(expectedMinTime)
|
|
require.Equal(expectedWindow, actualWindow,
|
|
"Clock skew window should be 2x MaxClockDifference")
|
|
|
|
t.Logf("Clock skew acceptance window:")
|
|
t.Logf(" Current time: %s", currentTime.Format(time.RFC3339))
|
|
t.Logf(" Min timestamp: %s (current - %s)", expectedMinTime.Format(time.RFC3339), maxClockDiff)
|
|
t.Logf(" Max timestamp: %s (current + %s)", expectedMaxTime.Format(time.RFC3339), maxClockDiff)
|
|
t.Logf(" Total window: %s", actualWindow)
|
|
}
|