Files
proofs/lean/Compute/CrossChain.lean
2d7e2a6309 proofs: drive Lean library to 0 errors, eliminate native_decide
The lean/ library (112 files) had ~110 type-check errors across 52 files (the
prior "green" status was a grep artifact). It now verifies at 0 errors under
the project's strict setting: `lake env lean -D autoImplicit=false`, all 112
files.

Fixed:
- Quasar/Consensus: replaced `by native_decide` with `by decide` (kernel-checked
  rather than compiler-trusted).
- Vault/KeyIsolation, Bridge/{YieldVault,OmnichainRouter,FillIntegrity},
  Storage/{ZapDB,Replicate}: PRF/string-encoding lemmas, division-bound vault
  accounting, renamed/removed deprecated List lemmas, noncomputable.
- Crypto (Pulsar/Magnetar/Corona/CGGMP21/MLKEM/FROST/FHE/P3Q): missing local
  dependency oleans compiled in dependency order; theorem→noncomputable def for
  Type-valued re-exports; deriving Inhabited for opaque artifact types; dead
  Mathlib imports removed.
- DeFi (AMM/staking/fees/flashloan/HFT/router) + Protocol + GPU + Warp + Trust +
  Compute + Network + Build: Nat-division/AMM-invariant proofs via
  Nat.div_le_of_le_mul / Nat.div_mul_le_self; omega in-scope invariants;
  record-projection opacity; dead tactics; stale Nat.Basic import → Nat.Defs;
  BFT quorum theorems tightened to n=3f+1.

Integrity: no sorry/admit/native_decide remaining (verified); no
proof-by-assumption axiom cheats. Statement changes only tightened false draft
theorems to true invariants. Remaining axioms are trusted-base only (opaque
crypto groups/pairings, RLWE/MLWE/MSIS hardness, FIPS 203/204/205 correctness,
VSS/Paillier, protocol modeling).

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-06-10 22:34:27 -07:00

122 lines
4.8 KiB
Lean4

/-
Cross-Chain Compute Verification
Proves that AI compute can be safely distributed across N chains
simultaneously, with purely accretive rewards based on proven
compute used.
Inspired by OpenAI Compute Protocol + Bittensor subnet model,
adapted for Lux multi-chain architecture.
Maps to:
- lux/node: multi-chain VM execution
- zoo/ZIPs/ZIP-002-poai.md: Proof of AI consensus
- hanzo/engine: inference serving across chains
Properties:
- Safety: compute on chain_i doesn't affect chain_j
- Accretive: rewards only increase with proven compute
- Conservation: total rewards ≤ total compute value
- Composability: N chains compose safely
-/
import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Defs
import Mathlib.Data.List.Basic
import Mathlib.Data.Finset.Basic
import Mathlib.Tactic
namespace Compute.CrossChain
/-- A chain identifier -/
structure ChainId where
id : Nat
deriving DecidableEq, Repr
/-- Compute attestation from a single chain -/
structure ComputeAttestation where
chain : ChainId
computeUnits : Nat -- normalized compute (GPU-hours equivalent)
resultHash : Nat -- Merkle root of outputs
teeValid : Bool -- TEE attestation verified
timestamp : Nat
/-- Cross-chain compute state for a single provider -/
structure ProviderState where
totalCompute : Nat -- cumulative compute across all chains
totalRewards : Nat -- cumulative rewards earned
attestations : List ComputeAttestation
activeChains : List ChainId -- chains currently computing on
/-- Reward function: compute → reward (monotone, sublinear) -/
def computeReward (computeUnits : Nat) (rewardRate : Nat) : Nat :=
computeUnits * rewardRate / 1000 -- basis points
/-- Submit attestation from one chain -/
def submitAttestation (s : ProviderState) (a : ComputeAttestation) : ProviderState :=
if a.teeValid then
{ s with
totalCompute := s.totalCompute + a.computeUnits
totalRewards := s.totalRewards + computeReward a.computeUnits 100
attestations := a :: s.attestations
activeChains := if s.activeChains.contains a.chain then s.activeChains
else a.chain :: s.activeChains }
else s -- invalid TEE attestation rejected
-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
-- SAFETY THEOREMS
-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
/-- CHAIN ISOLATION: Submitting compute on chain_i doesn't reduce
existing compute from chain_j -/
theorem chain_isolation (s : ProviderState) (a : ComputeAttestation) :
(submitAttestation s a).totalCompute ≥ s.totalCompute := by
by_cases h : a.teeValid <;> simp [submitAttestation, h]
/-- ACCRETIVE ONLY: Rewards only increase, never decrease -/
theorem rewards_accretive (s : ProviderState) (a : ComputeAttestation) :
(submitAttestation s a).totalRewards ≥ s.totalRewards := by
by_cases h : a.teeValid <;> simp [submitAttestation, h]
/-- INVALID TEE REJECTED: Without valid TEE, state unchanged -/
theorem invalid_tee_rejected (s : ProviderState) (a : ComputeAttestation)
(h : a.teeValid = false) :
submitAttestation s a = s := by
simp [submitAttestation, h]
/-- CONSERVATION: rewards never exceed compute value -/
theorem reward_bounded (computeUnits rewardRate : Nat) :
computeReward computeUnits rewardRate ≤ computeUnits * rewardRate := by
simp [computeReward]
exact Nat.div_le_self _ _
/-- N-CHAIN COMPOSABILITY: Processing attestations from N chains
in sequence is equivalent to processing them in any order
(because addition is commutative) -/
theorem multi_chain_commutative (s : ProviderState)
(a1 a2 : ComputeAttestation) :
(submitAttestation (submitAttestation s a1) a2).totalCompute =
(submitAttestation (submitAttestation s a2) a1).totalCompute := by
by_cases h1 : a1.teeValid <;> by_cases h2 : a2.teeValid <;>
simp [submitAttestation, h1, h2] <;> omega
/-- MONOTONE CHAIN COUNT: active chains only grows -/
theorem chains_monotone (s : ProviderState) (a : ComputeAttestation) :
(submitAttestation s a).activeChains.length ≥ s.activeChains.length := by
simp [submitAttestation]
split
· split <;> simp [List.length_cons]
· exact Nat.le_refl _
/-- ZERO COMPUTE = ZERO REWARDS -/
theorem zero_compute_zero_reward (rate : Nat) :
computeReward 0 rate = 0 := by
simp [computeReward]
/-- EMPTY PROVIDER: initial state has zero everything -/
def emptyProvider : ProviderState :=
{ totalCompute := 0, totalRewards := 0, attestations := [], activeChains := [] }
theorem empty_provider_zero : emptyProvider.totalCompute = 0 := rfl
end Compute.CrossChain