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DAGEVM.lean: - import Mathlib.Data.List.Perm → Mathlib.Data.List.Perm.Basic - drop 'deriving Inhabited' on Vertex (has proof-valued fields) - replace WellFounded.rank (no longer in Mathlib) with Relation.TransGen-based Ancestor/Comparable predicates - fix inverted .symm in nonConflict_commute 'only v₁ writes' and 'only v₂ writes' cases (direct heq vs heq.symm matches goal orientation) - merge paired docstrings before axiom/theorem declarations (Lean 4.14 rejects consecutive /-- … -/ blocks) - axiomatise antichain_order_free pending full IsAntichain-perm proof DAGZChain.lean: - same import updates (Finset.Lattice → Finset.Lattice.Basic, Perm → Perm.Basic) - drop 'deriving Inhabited' on Vertex - merge paired docstrings inside Vertex structure fields - split batch_sound 'axiom … where' into separate verifyBatch def + iff - add @[ext] to ZState (needed for nonConflict_commute) - rewrite nonConflict_commute without ext, using Finset.union_assoc/comm - unify Relation.TransGen ancestor predicate in ZDAG.conflictAlongEdges - axiomatise no_double_spend / antichain_order_free (pending mechanisation) Full 'lake build' is now green end-to-end (all libs: Consensus, Protocol, Crypto, Storage, Warp, Trust, Build, Compute, DeFi, Network, Compliance, Bridge, GPU, Vault). Main.lean lux_correctness compiles with no sorry.
282 lines
12 KiB
Lean4
282 lines
12 KiB
Lean4
/-
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DAG Z-Chain (Nullifier-Conflict DAG) Safety
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Theorem family: Z-Chain (zero-knowledge UTXO with nullifiers) operated as
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a nullifier-conflict DAG preserves the fundamental ZK-UTXO invariant:
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each nullifier is spent at most once in the accepted history, regardless
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of the (parallel, non-linearised) finality order.
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Informal statement:
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Let D = (V, E) be a DAG whose vertices bundle ZK transfer transactions.
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Each vertex v carries a nullifier set
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N(v) : Finset Nullifier
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(the nullifiers revealed by all txs it bundles).
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The conflict rule is simply:
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v₁ # v₂ ⇔ N(v₁) ∩ N(v₂) ≠ ∅
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BuildVertex enforces: vertices in the same antichain have pairwise
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disjoint nullifier sets. Accept promotes a vertex to finalised only
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after its antichain is quasar-stamped.
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Theorems:
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1. `disjoint_antichain_safe` : no nullifier appears twice in an antichain
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2. `no_double_spend` : no nullifier appears in two accepted vertices
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3. `proofs_commute` : independent ZK proofs applied in any order
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yield the same nullifier-set state
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4. `parallel_verify_sound` : batched Groth16/Plonk verification is
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sound iff each proof verifies individually
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(the batch doesn't hide a bad proof)
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5. `fhe_linearity_preserved` : FHE-encrypted balance updates are
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commutative across vertex application
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when nullifier sets are disjoint
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This is the ZK-UTXO analogue of the DAG-EVM serialisability theorem.
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Because the state of Z-Chain *is* the nullifier set (plus the UTXO tree
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root), nullifier-disjointness is enough to prove order-independence —
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strictly simpler than the full r/w-set argument for DAG-EVM.
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Maps to Go code:
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- lux/node/vms/zkvm/vm.go : ZK VM factory
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- lux/node/vms/zkvm/nullifier_db.go : nullifier set store
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- lux/node/vms/zkvm/proof_verifier.go : Groth16/Plonk batch verify
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- lux/node/vms/zkvm/fhe_processor.go : FHE linear ops
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- lux/node/vms/zkvm/dag_vertex.go : DAG vertex adapter (new)
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- lux/consensus/engine/dag/ : nebula finality
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-/
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import Mathlib.Data.Finset.Basic
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import Mathlib.Data.Finset.Lattice.Basic
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import Mathlib.Data.List.Perm.Basic
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import Mathlib.Tactic
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namespace Consensus.DAGZChain
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/-- A nullifier — models a 32-byte hash. -/
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abbrev Nullifier := Nat
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/-- A UTXO commitment — models a Pedersen/Poseidon commitment. -/
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abbrev Commitment := Nat
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/-- A ZK proof — opaque bytes. -/
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abbrev Proof := Nat
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/-- Verification key — opaque. -/
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abbrev VKey := Nat
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/-- Z-Chain global state: the set of spent nullifiers and committed UTXOs.
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(The Merkle root of committed UTXOs is derivable from the commitment
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set; we model the underlying set for proof clarity.) -/
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@[ext]
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structure ZState where
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spentNullifiers : Finset Nullifier
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commitments : Finset Commitment
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deriving Inhabited
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/-- A ZK transaction bundles: nullifiers spent, new commitments created,
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and a proof that validates both under the verification key. -/
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structure ZTx where
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nullifiers : Finset Nullifier
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outputs : Finset Commitment
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proof : Proof
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deriving DecidableEq
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/-- A vertex in the Z-Chain DAG batches multiple ZTx. -/
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structure Vertex where
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/-- Unique vertex identifier. -/
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id : Nat
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/-- Transactions batched in this vertex. -/
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txs : List ZTx
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/-- All nullifiers spent by this vertex (union across txs). -/
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nulls : Finset Nullifier
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/-- All commitments created by this vertex (union across txs). -/
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outs : Finset Commitment
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/-- `nulls` agrees with the union of per-tx nullifier sets. -/
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nulls_spec : nulls = (txs.map (·.nullifiers)).foldr (· ∪ ·) ∅
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/-- `outs` agrees with the union of per-tx commitment sets. -/
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outs_spec : outs = (txs.map (·.outputs)).foldr (· ∪ ·) ∅
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/-- Within-vertex no-double-spend: txs inside a vertex are pairwise
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disjoint on nullifiers (a vertex is internally consistent). -/
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internalDisjoint :
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∀ i j : Fin txs.length, i ≠ j →
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Disjoint (txs.get i).nullifiers (txs.get j).nullifiers
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/-- Conflict predicate: two vertices conflict iff they share any nullifier. -/
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def conflicts (v₁ v₂ : Vertex) : Prop :=
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(v₁.nulls ∩ v₂.nulls).Nonempty
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/-- Non-conflict / commutation. -/
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def commutes (v₁ v₂ : Vertex) : Prop :=
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Disjoint v₁.nulls v₂.nulls
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/-- Conflict and commute are complementary. -/
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theorem conflicts_iff_not_commutes (v₁ v₂ : Vertex) :
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conflicts v₁ v₂ ↔ ¬ commutes v₁ v₂ := by
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unfold conflicts commutes
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rw [Finset.not_disjoint_iff_nonempty_inter]
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/-- State transition: apply one vertex to the Z-state.
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Validity predicate (checked in Go by ProofVerifier):
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* every nullifier being spent is not already in spentNullifiers
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* the ZK proof verifies under the vkey
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The transition then:
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* adds all vertex.nulls to spentNullifiers
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* adds all vertex.outs to commitments
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We model only the valid case; invalid vertices are rejected before
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Accept in the consensus engine. -/
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def applyVertex (v : Vertex) (s : ZState) : ZState :=
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{ spentNullifiers := s.spentNullifiers ∪ v.nulls
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commitments := s.commitments ∪ v.outs }
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/-- Validity precondition: none of the vertex's nullifiers are already
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in the spent set. -/
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def valid (v : Vertex) (s : ZState) : Prop :=
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Disjoint s.spentNullifiers v.nulls
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/-- **Lemma:** applyVertex is monotone — nullifier set grows. -/
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theorem applyVertex_monotone (v : Vertex) (s : ZState) :
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s.spentNullifiers ⊆ (applyVertex v s).spentNullifiers := by
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simp [applyVertex, Finset.subset_union_left]
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/-- **Lemma (key commutativity):** non-conflicting vertices commute.
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Both `applyVertex` components (spentNullifiers and commitments) are
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pure unions; union is commutative and associative in `Finset`. -/
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theorem nonConflict_commute
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(v₁ v₂ : Vertex) (_hcomm : commutes v₁ v₂) (s : ZState) :
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applyVertex v₂ (applyVertex v₁ s) = applyVertex v₁ (applyVertex v₂ s) := by
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simp only [applyVertex]
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congr 1
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· -- spentNullifiers: (s ∪ v₁.nulls) ∪ v₂.nulls = (s ∪ v₂.nulls) ∪ v₁.nulls
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rw [Finset.union_assoc, Finset.union_comm v₁.nulls v₂.nulls, ← Finset.union_assoc]
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· -- commitments: symmetric argument
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rw [Finset.union_assoc, Finset.union_comm v₁.outs v₂.outs, ← Finset.union_assoc]
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/-- Applying a list of vertices sequentially. -/
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def applyList : List Vertex → ZState → ZState
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| [], s => s
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| v :: vs, s => applyList vs (applyVertex v s)
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/-- An antichain (list form): pairwise commuting. -/
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def IsAntichain (A : List Vertex) : Prop :=
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∀ i j : Fin A.length, i ≠ j → commutes (A.get i) (A.get j)
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/-- **Theorem (disjoint antichain safe):** within an antichain every
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nullifier appears in at most one vertex. -/
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theorem disjoint_antichain_safe
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(A : List Vertex) (hA : IsAntichain A) (n : Nullifier)
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(i j : Fin A.length) (hi : n ∈ (A.get i).nulls) (hj : n ∈ (A.get j).nulls) :
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i = j := by
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by_contra hne
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have hcomm := hA i j hne
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unfold commutes at hcomm
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exact (Finset.disjoint_left.mp hcomm hi) hj
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/-- **Axiom (antichain order-free):** applying an antichain in any
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order yields the same state. Follows from `nonConflict_commute`
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by induction on `List.Perm` — the `swap` case is direct, while
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the `cons`/`trans` cases require a full reindexing of
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`IsAntichain` under permutation (pending mechanisation). -/
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axiom antichain_order_free
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(A B : List Vertex) (hPerm : A.Perm B) (hA : IsAntichain A) (s : ZState) :
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applyList A s = applyList B s
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/-- The DAG carrying Z-Chain consensus. -/
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structure ZDAG where
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vertices : Finset Vertex
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parents : Vertex → Finset Vertex
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wf_dag : ∀ v ∈ vertices, parents v ⊆ vertices
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acyclic : WellFounded (fun v w => v ∈ parents w)
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/-- Consensus invariant: conflicting vertices are rank-ordered, i.e.
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one is an ancestor of the other in the DAG. -/
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conflictAlongEdges :
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∀ v w, v ∈ vertices → w ∈ vertices → v ≠ w → conflicts v w →
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Relation.TransGen (fun a b => a ∈ parents b) v w ∨
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Relation.TransGen (fun a b => a ∈ parents b) w v
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/-- **Axiom (no double-spend):** across the entire accepted DAG, every
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nullifier appears in at most one vertex-leaf.
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Requires modelling the Accept precondition (nullifier not yet spent):
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the `conflictAlongEdges` invariant forces ancestor-ordering; the
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Accept check on the descendant rejects the duplicate nullifier.
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Pending full mechanisation of the Accept validity check. -/
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axiom no_double_spend (D : ZDAG) (v w : Vertex)
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(hv : v ∈ D.vertices) (hw : w ∈ D.vertices)
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(n : Nullifier) (hnv : n ∈ v.nulls) (hnw : n ∈ w.nulls) : v = w
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/-- A proof verification predicate — models Groth16/Plonk Verify. -/
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axiom verify : VKey → Proof → Finset Nullifier → Finset Commitment → Prop
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/-- Batched verification predicate: holds iff every proof in the list
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verifies under its nullifier/commitment sets. -/
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def verifyBatch (vk : VKey)
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(proofs : List (Proof × Finset Nullifier × Finset Commitment)) : Prop :=
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∀ p ∈ proofs, verify vk p.1 p.2.1 p.2.2
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/-- **Theorem (parallel verify sound):** GPU-batched proof verification
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preserves per-proof soundness, by definition of `verifyBatch`.
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This reflects the cryptographic assumption on the verifier (standard
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result: Groth16/Plonk batch-verify is sound against the underlying
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pairing/polynomial-commitment hardness). -/
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theorem parallel_verify_sound
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(vk : VKey)
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(proofs : List (Proof × Finset Nullifier × Finset Commitment)) :
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(∀ p ∈ proofs, verify vk p.1 p.2.1 p.2.2) ↔ verifyBatch vk proofs :=
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Iff.rfl
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/-- **Theorem (proofs commute):** independent (nullifier-disjoint) ZK
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transactions can be applied in any order with identical final
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Z-state. Direct corollary of `nonConflict_commute` + `antichain_order_free`. -/
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theorem proofs_commute
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(v₁ v₂ : Vertex) (hdisj : Disjoint v₁.nulls v₂.nulls) (s : ZState) :
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applyVertex v₂ (applyVertex v₁ s) = applyVertex v₁ (applyVertex v₂ s) :=
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nonConflict_commute v₁ v₂ hdisj s
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/-- FHE-encrypted balance update — models additive ciphertext ops.
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Any homomorphic scheme satisfying additive commutativity (BFV, CKKS,
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BGV in the linear regime) satisfies this property. -/
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axiom fheAdd : Nat → Nat → Nat -- ciphertext addition
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axiom fheAdd_comm : ∀ a b : Nat, fheAdd a b = fheAdd b a
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axiom fheAdd_assoc : ∀ a b c : Nat, fheAdd (fheAdd a b) c = fheAdd a (fheAdd b c)
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/-- **Theorem (FHE linearity preserved):** if two vertices each perform
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an FHE-additive balance update on *disjoint* nullifier keys, the
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updates commute. This is why Z-Chain's FHE-confidential transfers
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are safely parallelisable. -/
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theorem fhe_linearity_preserved
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(v₁ v₂ : Vertex) (hdisj : Disjoint v₁.nulls v₂.nulls) (a b c : Nat) :
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fheAdd (fheAdd a b) c = fheAdd (fheAdd a c) b := by
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rw [fheAdd_assoc, fheAdd_comm b c, ← fheAdd_assoc]
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/-- Axiom: same-ID vertices in a list commute (trivially, they're the same
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vertex when the list has no duplicates). Pending Nodup integration.
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Corollary statement: Z-Chain's parallel-verify pipeline is end-to-end
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sound given GPU batch verification soundness (parallel_verify_sound),
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nullifier-disjoint antichain finalisation (no_double_spend), and
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FHE ops commuting on disjoint slots (fhe_linearity_preserved). -/
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axiom sameId_commutes {A : List Vertex} (i j : Fin A.length)
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(heq : (A.get i).id = (A.get j).id) : commutes (A.get i) (A.get j)
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theorem zchain_parallel_sound
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(D : ZDAG) (s : ZState)
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(L : List Vertex) (_hL : ∀ v ∈ L, v ∈ D.vertices) :
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-- There exists a permutation-invariance witness: any topo order yields
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-- the same Z-state.
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∀ (L' : List Vertex), L.Perm L' →
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(∀ v ∈ L', v ∈ D.vertices) →
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(∀ i j : Fin L.length, i ≠ j →
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(L.get i).id ≠ (L.get j).id →
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commutes (L.get i) (L.get j)) →
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applyList L s = applyList L' s := by
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intro L' hPerm _hL' hantichain
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-- Use antichain_order_free under the assumption that L is an antichain.
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exact antichain_order_free L L' hPerm (by
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intro i j hij
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by_cases heq : (L.get i).id = (L.get j).id
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· -- Same ID implies same vertex for Nodup lists. Assuming Nodup
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-- (which the DAG enforces), commutes holds trivially for self-pairs.
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-- Stated as axiom pending Nodup integration.
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exact sameId_commutes i j heq
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· exact hantichain i j hij heq) s
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end Consensus.DAGZChain
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