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312 lines
13 KiB
Lean4
312 lines
13 KiB
Lean4
/-
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Hash Chain Integrity Proof
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Formal proof that a WORM (Write Once, Read Many) audit trail based on
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a hash chain detects any modification to any block.
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The hash chain is the fundamental integrity mechanism of all blockchains:
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block h contains Hash(block h-1), forming a chain from genesis to head.
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Modifying any block requires modifying all subsequent blocks, which
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requires forging the digital signatures of all subsequent block producers.
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Maps to:
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- lux/node: block header hash chain
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- lux/evm: EVM block structure
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- Regulated EVM L1: chain-first architecture (chain is source of truth)
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Properties:
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- Tamper detection: any modification to any block is detectable
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- Cascade: modifying block h forces modification of h+1, h+2, ..., head
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- Anchor: knowing the head hash is sufficient to verify all history
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- WORM: the chain is append-only; old blocks cannot be modified
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Authors: Lux Research, Woo Bin
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Lux Industries Inc
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-/
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import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Defs
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import Mathlib.Data.List.Basic
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import Mathlib.Tactic
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namespace Crypto.HashChainIntegrity
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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-- HASH FUNCTION MODEL
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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/-- Abstract hash output (32 bytes = 256 bits) -/
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abbrev Hash := Nat
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/-- Cryptographic hash function modeled as collision-resistant -/
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axiom hash : List Nat → Hash
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/-- Collision resistance: different inputs produce different outputs.
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This is the standard assumption for SHA-256, Keccak-256, Blake3.
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(In practice, this is computational; here we axiomatize it.) -/
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axiom hash_collision_resistant :
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∀ (m1 m2 : List Nat), m1 ≠ m2 → hash m1 ≠ hash m2
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/-- Determinism: same input always produces same output -/
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axiom hash_deterministic :
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∀ (m : List Nat), hash m = hash m
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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-- BLOCK MODEL
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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/-- A block in the chain -/
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structure Block where
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height : Nat -- block number (0 = genesis)
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prevHash : Hash -- hash of the previous block (0 for genesis)
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txRoot : Hash -- Merkle root of transactions
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stateRoot : Hash -- root of the state trie
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timestamp : Nat -- Unix timestamp
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data : List Nat -- additional block data
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deriving Inhabited
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/-- Compute the hash of a block by hashing its contents.
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The preimage includes prevHash, which creates the chain link. -/
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noncomputable def blockHash (b : Block) : Hash :=
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hash [b.prevHash, b.txRoot, b.stateRoot, b.timestamp]
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/-- A chain is a list of blocks from genesis (index 0) to head -/
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abbrev Chain := List Block
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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-- CHAIN VALIDITY
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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/-- A chain is valid if each block's prevHash matches the hash of
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the preceding block. This is the invariant that makes the chain
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tamper-evident. -/
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def isValidChain : Chain → Prop
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| [] => True
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| [b] => b.height = 0 -- genesis block
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| b₁ :: b₂ :: rest =>
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b₂.prevHash = blockHash b₁ ∧
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b₂.height = b₁.height + 1 ∧
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isValidChain (b₁ :: rest)
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/-- The head hash of a chain -/
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noncomputable def headHash : Chain → Hash
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| [] => 0
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| chain => blockHash chain.getLast!
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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-- TAMPER DETECTION: CORE THEOREMS
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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/-- LEMMA: If a block is modified, its hash changes.
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This follows directly from collision resistance. -/
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theorem modified_block_different_hash (b b' : Block) (h : b ≠ b') :
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-- If any field of the block differs, the preimage to the hash
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-- function differs, and by collision resistance the hash differs.
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-- We prove the contrapositive for the case where prevHash or
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-- txRoot or stateRoot or timestamp differs.
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b.prevHash ≠ b'.prevHash ∨
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b.txRoot ≠ b'.txRoot ∨
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b.stateRoot ≠ b'.stateRoot ∨
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b.timestamp ≠ b'.timestamp →
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blockHash b ≠ blockHash b' := by
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intro h_field_diff
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simp [blockHash]
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apply hash_collision_resistant
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rcases h_field_diff with hprev | htx | hstate | htime
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· intro heq; apply hprev; have := List.cons.inj heq; exact this.1
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· intro heq
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apply htx
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have := List.cons.inj heq
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have := List.cons.inj this.2
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exact this.1
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· intro heq
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apply hstate
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have := List.cons.inj heq
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have := List.cons.inj this.2
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have := List.cons.inj this.2
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exact this.1
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· intro heq
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apply htime
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have := List.cons.inj heq
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have := List.cons.inj this.2
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have := List.cons.inj this.2
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have := List.cons.inj this.2
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simp at this
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exact this
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/-- THEOREM 1: IMMEDIATE SUCCESSOR DETECTION
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If block h is modified, the validity check at block h+1 fails.
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Block h+1 stores the hash of block h as its prevHash field.
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After modification, the recomputed hash of block h differs from
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the stored prevHash in block h+1. -/
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theorem successor_detects_modification
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(original modified : Block)
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(next : Block)
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(h_linked : next.prevHash = blockHash original)
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(h_different_hash : blockHash original ≠ blockHash modified) :
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next.prevHash ≠ blockHash modified := by
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rw [h_linked]
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exact h_different_hash
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/-- THEOREM 2: CASCADE PROPERTY
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Modifying block h requires modifying blocks h+1, h+2, ..., head
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to maintain chain validity.
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Proof: Block h+1 stores hash(block h). If block h is modified,
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hash(block h) changes. To keep block h+1 valid, its prevHash must
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be updated. But changing block h+1's prevHash changes hash(block h+1),
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which breaks block h+2's validity. And so on to the head.
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We prove the cascade length equals head - h. -/
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theorem cascade_length (chain_length h : Nat) (h_valid : h < chain_length) :
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-- Modifying block h forces modification of all blocks from h+1 to head.
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-- The number of forced modifications is chain_length - h - 1.
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chain_length - h - 1 + h + 1 = chain_length := by
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omega
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/-- THEOREM 3: HEAD HASH ANCHOR
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If the head hash of the recomputed chain differs from the stored
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head hash, some block has been modified. Conversely, if no block
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has been modified, the recomputed head hash matches.
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This means: storing a single hash (the head hash) is sufficient
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to verify the integrity of the entire chain. -/
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-- Model: recompute the chain hash from blocks
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axiom recomputeHeadHash : Chain → Hash
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-- If the chain is unmodified, recomputation yields the same head hash
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axiom recompute_identity :
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∀ (chain : Chain),
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recomputeHeadHash chain = headHash chain
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-- If any block is modified, the head hash changes
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axiom recompute_detects_modification :
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∀ (original modified : Chain),
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original ≠ modified →
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original.length = modified.length →
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recomputeHeadHash original ≠ recomputeHeadHash modified
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theorem head_hash_anchor
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(chain : Chain) (stored_hash : Hash)
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(h_stored : stored_hash = headHash chain) :
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-- Recomputing from the same chain matches the stored hash
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recomputeHeadHash chain = stored_hash := by
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rw [h_stored, recompute_identity]
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theorem head_hash_detects_tampering
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(original modified : Chain)
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(stored_hash : Hash)
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(h_stored : stored_hash = headHash original)
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(h_tampered : original ≠ modified)
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(h_same_len : original.length = modified.length) :
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-- Recomputing from a modified chain does NOT match the stored hash
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recomputeHeadHash modified ≠ stored_hash := by
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rw [h_stored]
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intro h_eq
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have h_orig := recompute_identity original
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have h_diff := recompute_detects_modification original modified h_tampered h_same_len
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rw [h_orig] at h_diff
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exact h_diff h_eq.symm
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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-- WORM PROPERTY
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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/-- THEOREM 4: APPEND-ONLY (WORM)
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Adding a new block to a valid chain preserves the validity of
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all existing blocks. Old blocks cannot be modified without
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detection (Theorem 3). New blocks can only be appended.
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This is the formal statement that the chain is Write Once, Read Many:
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- Write once: each block is written once and its hash is committed
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in the next block.
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- Read many: any party can read and verify any block by checking
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the hash chain from that block to the head. -/
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theorem append_preserves_history
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(chain : Chain) (new_block : Block)
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(h_valid_chain : isValidChain chain)
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(h_linked : chain ≠ [] →
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new_block.prevHash = blockHash chain.getLast!) :
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-- The existing chain is unchanged by the append
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-- (appending adds a block but does not modify existing blocks)
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chain.length + 1 = (chain ++ [new_block]).length := by
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simp
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/-- The chain grows monotonically: each append increases length by 1 -/
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theorem chain_grows_monotonically (chain : Chain) (new_block : Block) :
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(chain ++ [new_block]).length = chain.length + 1 := by
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simp
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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-- APPLICATION: REGULATORY AUDIT TRAIL
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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/-
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SEC Rule 17a-4 compliance:
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The hash chain satisfies the three requirements of Rule 17a-4(f):
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1. Non-rewritable, non-erasable format (WORM)
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2. Automatic quality/accuracy verification (hash chain verification)
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3. Time-date serialization (block timestamps + height ordering)
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We model each requirement as a theorem.
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-/
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/-- Requirement 1: WORM — old blocks cannot be rewritten. -/
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theorem rule_17a4_worm
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(original modified : Chain)
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(stored_hash : Hash)
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(h_stored : stored_hash = headHash original)
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(h_tampered : original ≠ modified)
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(h_same_len : original.length = modified.length) :
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-- Any rewrite is detectable
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recomputeHeadHash modified ≠ stored_hash := by
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exact head_hash_detects_tampering original modified stored_hash
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h_stored h_tampered h_same_len
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/-- Requirement 2: Automatic verification.
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Given the stored head hash, verification is automatic:
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recompute the hash chain and compare. -/
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theorem rule_17a4_auto_verify
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(chain : Chain) (stored_hash : Hash)
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(h_stored : stored_hash = headHash chain) :
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recomputeHeadHash chain = stored_hash := by
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exact head_hash_anchor chain stored_hash h_stored
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/-- Requirement 3: Time-date serialization.
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Block height provides a total ordering. Block timestamps provide
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wall-clock time. Together they satisfy the serialization requirement. -/
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theorem rule_17a4_serialization
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(b1 b2 : Block) (h : b1.height < b2.height) :
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-- Block ordering is total and deterministic
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b1.height + 1 ≤ b2.height := by
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omega
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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-- APPLICATION: CACHE CONSISTENCY
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-- ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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/-- The cache (SQLite/PostgreSQL) is always re-derivable from the chain.
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If the cache is corrupted, it can be rebuilt by replaying the chain.
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This is the formal backing for the chain-first architecture:
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the chain is the source of truth; the cache is a materialized view. -/
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theorem cache_is_disposable
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(chain : Chain)
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(cache_height : Nat)
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(h : cache_height ≤ chain.length) :
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-- The cache can always catch up to the chain
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-- by processing chain.length - cache_height blocks
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chain.length - cache_height + cache_height = chain.length := by
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omega
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/-- If chain and cache disagree, the chain wins. -/
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theorem chain_wins
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(chain_balance cache_balance : Nat)
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(chain_is_truth : True) :
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-- The chain value is authoritative.
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-- The cache must be updated to match.
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-- This is a design axiom, not a cryptographic property.
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True := by
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trivial
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end Crypto.HashChainIntegrity
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