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Squashed batch covering:
- lux-adopts-liquidity-protocol.tex: protocol adoption proof artifact
- chronology updates aligning Quasar consensus references to LP-020
- pq-finality-no-bls.tex: Pulsar (Corona-derived lattice threshold)
naming clarification; per-block / per-epoch / per-era cert language
- quasar-cert-soundness.tex: Pulsar (systems-layer composition with
key-era lifecycle, resharing, activation cert, rollback) vs Corona
(signing primitive); math notation and theorems unchanged
- INFRASTRUCTURE-STATUS-2026-04-20.md → INFRASTRUCTURE-STATUS.md
(drop date stamp from filename)
- LP back-refs and chronology integration
quasar-cert-soundness.tex production-publishable depth (March 3 final):
- NEW Section 6 (Pulsar Key-Era Lifecycle Lemmas): formal
definitions for Pulsar share state, GroupKey hash, and Refresh /
Reshare / Reanchor transitions. Four lifecycle lemmas with full
proofs:
Lemma 10 (Generation monotonicity)
Lemma 11 (KeyEraID stability across Reshare)
Lemma 12 (GroupKey byte-identity across Refresh and Reshare)
Lemma 13 (Rollback-lineage forward reconstruction)
Plus Theorem 14 (Activation-certificate soundness): VerifyActivation
accepts iff the new committee shares Lagrange-recombine to the
master secret under the unchanged GroupKey, except with negligible
probability under MLWE/MSIS.
- Lagrange-recombination identity written as a labelled display
equation, citing
Crypto.Threshold.Reshare.reshare_preserves_public_key in
lean/Crypto/Threshold/Reshare.lean for the mechanised companion.
- Bibliography additions: hjky97 (Herzberg--Jarecki--Krawczyk--Yung
proactive secret sharing), desmedtjajodia97 (redistribution),
wongwangwing02 (verifiable redistribution), lp073 (Pulsar paper).
- LP-073 section pointers updated to text-form references that
survive without LP-073 .aux file.
Naming evolution: throughout this work, "Corona" refers to the
lattice signing primitive (Sign1/Sign2/Combine math); "Pulsar" refers
to the Lux production fork at github.com/luxfi/pulsar that wraps it
with key-era lifecycle for permissionless validator-set rotation.
- proofs/fhe/ (NEW): canonical proof bucket for the Lux FHE
dual-runtime stack (LP-167 companion):
correctness.tex — encrypt → evaluate → decrypt correctness.
dual-runtime-equivalence.tex — Lux FHE-Go and Lux FHE-C++ produce
byte-equal output on identical inputs
and parameters; KAT closure witness.
nebula-binding.tex — FHE result roots bind into Nebula /
Quasar transcripts; reduces a forged
binding to hash collision + Pulsar
SUF-CMA forgery.
parameter-security.tex — concrete LWE parameter security under
the Albrecht estimator; ≥128-bit
classical and ≥128-bit quantum for
PN10QP27 / PN11QP54 / PN9QP28_STD128.
Theorem statements + remarks; no proof bodies duplicated in the
companion paper (papers/lux-fhe-runtime/) — the paper cites these.
46 lines
2.0 KiB
TeX
46 lines
2.0 KiB
TeX
%% ============================================================
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%% quasar/l1-l2-covalidation.tex
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%% ============================================================
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%%
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%% Canonical L2 co-validation security theorem.
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%% ============================================================
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\subsection*{L2 co-validation security}
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\begin{theorem}[L2 co-validation security inheritance]
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\label{thm:l2-covalidation}
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Let $\mathsf{Chain}_X$ be an L2 with
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$\mathsf{primary\_network\_id} = N_P$, and let
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$V_X \subseteq V_{N_P}^{(\eta_P, g_P)}$ at the moment of
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$\mathsf{Chain}_X$'s key-era Bootstrap. If a Horizon-final certificate
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on $\mathsf{Chain}_X$ binds
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$\mathsf{primary\_nebula\_root} = R_P$ (a NebulaRoot of $N_P$ at era
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$\eta_P$ generation $g_P$), then any adversary forging conflicting
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finality on $\mathsf{Chain}_X$ must:
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\begin{enumerate}[nosep]
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\item Compromise enough of $V_X$ to forge an L2-local Pulse, AND
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\item Either compromise enough of $V_{N_P}$ to forge an alternative
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$R_P$ (whence the security reduction inherits Theorem
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\ref{thm:horizon-soundness} applied to $N_P$), OR
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\item Break the transcript binding (collision on TupleHash256
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\cite{nistsp800185}).
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\end{enumerate}
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Therefore the L2's safety bound is at least the minimum of $N_P$'s
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safety bound and the L2's own validator-set safety bound.
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\textbf{Note.} This is co-validation security, not rollup security.
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There is no fraud-proof window, no validity-proof anchoring; the
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inheritance is purely via shared validator-set membership and
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transcript binding.
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\end{theorem}
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\begin{remark}[L3 is a different layer model]
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$\mathsf{Chain}_X$ at L3 (rollup / validity / app-execution layer per
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Definition~\ref{def:network-tiers}) inherits security via a
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\emph{succinct proof} of state transitions, not via co-validation
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membership. L3 chains MAY use Groth16 or STARKs for compression. PQ
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finality of an L3 inherits from the underlying L1/L2's Pulse + ML-DSA;
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the proof system itself is not the PQ root of trust
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(Remark~\ref{rem:groth16-wrapper}).
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\end{remark}
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