mirror of
https://github.com/luxfi/relay.git
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zeekay
75f7c1dca3
Adds pkg/profile โ the single function `profile.Verify(policy, scheme, pub, msg, sig)` that gates every intra-Lux operator-receipt signature. ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204, NIST Level 3) is the default scheme; Ed25519 is opt-in only via Policy.LegacyClassicalEnabled and refused otherwise with ErrClassicalRefused before any classical math runs. Domain-separation context "luxfi.relay.v1" is bound into every signature (FIPS 204 ยง5.2 ctx for ML-DSA-65; prepended bytes for Ed25519) so a relay receipt cannot be replayed as an oracle observation (which uses "luxfi.oracle.v1") or any other Lux artifact. 5 tests cover happy path, strict-PQ classical refusal, legacy opt-in, tampered-sig rejection, and unknown-scheme rejection. External-chain interactions (Bitcoin / Ethereum / OP_NET RPC, FROST/Taproot handoff to luxfi/mpc) are NOT in this package's scope and continue using each chain's native primitive.
95 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
95 lines
2.6 KiB
Go
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
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// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
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package profile
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import (
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"crypto/ed25519"
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"crypto/rand"
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"testing"
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)
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func TestMLDSA65_DefaultSignVerify(t *testing.T) {
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s, err := NewMLDSA65Signer(rand.Reader)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("new signer: %v", err)
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}
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if s.Scheme() != SchemeMLDSA65 {
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t.Fatalf("scheme = %s, want ml-dsa-65", s.Scheme())
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}
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msg := []byte("hello relay receipt")
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sig, err := s.Sign(msg)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("sign: %v", err)
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}
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if len(sig) != MLDSA65SignatureSize {
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t.Fatalf("sig size %d != %d", len(sig), MLDSA65SignatureSize)
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}
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if err := Verify(Default(), SchemeMLDSA65, s.PublicKey(), msg, sig); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("verify: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestStrictPQ_RefusesEd25519(t *testing.T) {
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pub, _, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("gen ed25519: %v", err)
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}
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// Under default (strict-PQ) policy, classical must be refused even before
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// signature math runs.
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err = Verify(Default(), SchemeEd25519, pub, []byte("x"), make([]byte, ed25519.SignatureSize))
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if err != ErrClassicalRefused {
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t.Fatalf("strict-PQ: expected ErrClassicalRefused, got %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestLegacyEnabled_PermitsEd25519(t *testing.T) {
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pub, sk, err := ed25519.GenerateKey(rand.Reader)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("gen ed25519: %v", err)
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}
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s := NewEd25519Signer(sk)
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msg := []byte("classical receipt")
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sig, err := s.Sign(msg)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("sign: %v", err)
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}
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legacy := Policy{LegacyClassicalEnabled: true}
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if err := Verify(legacy, SchemeEd25519, pub, msg, sig); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("verify legacy: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestMLDSA65_TamperedSigRejected(t *testing.T) {
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s, _ := NewMLDSA65Signer(rand.Reader)
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msg := []byte("tamper target")
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sig, _ := s.Sign(msg)
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sig[0] ^= 0x01
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if err := Verify(Default(), SchemeMLDSA65, s.PublicKey(), msg, sig); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected tampered ml-dsa-65 sig to fail")
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}
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}
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func TestDomainSeparation_DifferentCtx(t *testing.T) {
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// Sanity: a signature produced with our ContextTag does not verify under
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// an empty ctx via the underlying primitive โ this guards against
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// accidental removal of domain separation.
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s, _ := NewMLDSA65Signer(rand.Reader)
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msg := []byte("ds test")
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sig, _ := s.Sign(msg)
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// Same scheme, same key, same msg, but verify path always re-applies tag.
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if err := Verify(Default(), SchemeMLDSA65, s.PublicKey(), msg, sig); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("matched ctx must verify: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestPermit_UnknownScheme(t *testing.T) {
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if err := Default().Permit(Scheme(0xFF)); err == nil {
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t.Fatalf("expected unknown scheme to fail")
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}
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}
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