mirror of
https://github.com/luxfi/safe-magnetar.git
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73 lines
3.4 KiB
Solidity
73 lines
3.4 KiB
Solidity
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-only
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pragma solidity =0.8.29;
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import {Magnetar} from "./Magnetar.sol";
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import {IERC1271, ILegacyERC1271} from "./interfaces/IERC1271.sol";
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/// @title Safe Magnetar Signer
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/// @notice Safe smart-account owner that verifies Magnetar MPC-threshold
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/// SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) signatures through the `magnetarVerify` precompile, making
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/// a single Magnetar group public key a first-class Safe owner via EIP-1271.
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///
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/// @dev ONE key, ONE owner. The owner commits to a single `(mode, pubKeyHash)`
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/// pair at construction; both are `immutable`, so the contract holds NO mutable
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/// storage and `isValidSignature` is a pure `view` (side-stepping the Safe's
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/// state-changing-EIP-1271-validator guard entirely).
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///
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/// BINDING. We commit only `keccak256(pubkey)` (one 32-byte immutable); the full
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/// key is supplied at verify time and re-hashed against the commitment, closing
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/// the "attacker supplies an arbitrary public key" attack via second-preimage
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/// resistance.
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///
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/// REPLAY. The Safe passes the EIP-712 Safe-transaction hash, bound to this
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/// Safe / chain / nonce. The precompile additionally binds the
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/// `"lux-evm-precompile-magnetar-v1"` context, preventing cross-precompile
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/// replay against the single-party SLH-DSA slot.
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///
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/// SIGNATURE PAYLOAD: `abi.encode(bytes pubkey, bytes magnetarSignature)`.
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contract SafeMagnetarSigner is IERC1271, ILegacyERC1271 {
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/// @notice The Magnetar parameter-set byte this owner verifies under.
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uint8 private immutable _MODE;
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/// @notice keccak256 of the committed Magnetar group public key.
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bytes32 private immutable _PUBKEY_HASH;
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/// @notice The mode is not a recognised Magnetar parameter set.
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error InvalidMode();
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/// @notice The supplied public key length is wrong for the mode.
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error InvalidPublicKey();
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/// @param mode The Magnetar parameter-set byte (FIPS 205 parameter set).
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/// @param pubkey The full FIPS 205 group public key to bind this owner to.
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constructor(uint8 mode, bytes memory pubkey) {
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require(Magnetar.isValidMode(mode), InvalidMode());
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(uint256 pkLen,) = Magnetar.sizes(mode);
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require(pubkey.length == pkLen, InvalidPublicKey());
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_MODE = mode;
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_PUBKEY_HASH = keccak256(pubkey);
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}
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/// @notice Checks if the given signature is valid for the given message.
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/// @param message The message to be verified (the Safe tx hash).
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/// @param signature `abi.encode(bytes pubkey, bytes magnetarSignature)`.
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/// @return ok Whether or not the signature is valid.
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function _isValidSignature(bytes32 message, bytes calldata signature) public view returns (bool ok) {
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(bytes memory pubkey, bytes memory magnetarSignature) = abi.decode(signature, (bytes, bytes));
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if (keccak256(pubkey) != _PUBKEY_HASH) return false;
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return Magnetar.verify(message, _MODE, pubkey, magnetarSignature);
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}
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/// @inheritdoc IERC1271
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function isValidSignature(bytes32 message, bytes calldata signature) public view returns (bytes4 magicValue) {
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if (_isValidSignature(message, signature)) {
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magicValue = IERC1271.isValidSignature.selector;
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}
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}
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/// @inheritdoc ILegacyERC1271
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function isValidSignature(bytes memory message, bytes calldata signature) public view returns (bytes4 magicValue) {
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if (_isValidSignature(keccak256(message), signature)) {
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magicValue = ILegacyERC1271.isValidSignature.selector;
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}
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}
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}
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