luxfi/tee

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zeekay b50de9cebd luxfi/tee: optional TEE-backed threshold custody extension

Extracted verbatim from luxfi/threshold/protocols/{mldsa,rlwe,slhdsa}-tee
to decomplect optional TEE custody from the threshold core. The cores
(pulsar/corona/magnetar/mpc) never depend on this module; the dependency
points tee -> core only. The permissionless dealerless signing path in
luxfi/threshold has zero dependency on TEE.

Packages:
  mldsa-tee   ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204) TEE custody signer
  rlwe-tee    Corona Ring-LWE TEE custody signer
  slhdsa-tee  SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) TEE custody signer + t-of-n CombinerPool

Full end-to-end attestation suites (committed AMD Milan SEV-SNP vectors,
HSM release-gate, byte-identity with FIPS reference) moved with the
packages and pass: go build/vet/test ./... all green.

2026-06-27 11:19:11 -07:00

1.7 KiB

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rlwe-tee

Operator-controlled Ring-LWE threshold signing via TEE-gated trusted-dealer-key reconstruction.

What this is

Sibling of protocols/slhdsa-tee and protocols/mldsa-tee for the corona Ring-LWE primitive. The master trusted-dealer key (32 bytes) lives sealed-at-rest in the HSM; per sign call the TEE attestation authorizes release, then the dealer's GenerateKeys + the n-party Round1/Round2/Finalize all run inside the attested process. The resulting corona.threshold.Signature is structurally identical to a permissionless corona threshold signature on the same (GroupKey, message).

When to use

Foundation HSM ceremonies that need a single-operator dealer with attested release.
Bridge custody operators that hold a corona PQ threshold signing key and require executive approval per signature.

When NOT to use

Permissionless threshold custody: use corona.keyera.BootstrapPedersen — no party ever holds the master trusted-dealer key.
Single-operator dev: use corona.threshold.GenerateKeys directly.

Layering

caller
  └── rlwetee.Signer.Sign(ctx, env, jobID, msg)
        ├── approval.ApprovalProvider.ApproveIntent
        ├── kms.ReleaseGate.Issue / Release
        │     └── cc/attest.Dispatch
        ├── hsm.Provider.GetKey
        ├── corona.threshold.GenerateKeys → Round1 → Round2 → Finalize
        └── hsm.Provider.Sign (audit)

Compatibility

Wire output is corona.threshold.Signature.MarshalBinary. Verifiers holding the published GroupKey bytes validate via corona.threshold.VerifyBytes(gkBytes, msg, sigBytes) — no awareness of the TEE substrate required.

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