Files
threshold/protocols/slhdsa-tee/envelope.go
zeekay 3fbffaa4f1 protocols/slhdsa-tee: institutional-custody FIPS 205 via TEE-gated seed reconstruction
New package wires luxfi/mpc/{cc/attest, pkg/kms, pkg/hsm, pkg/approval}
into a Signer whose output is byte-identical to single-party FIPS 205
SLH-DSA SignDeterministic. The master seed lives sealed-at-rest in
hsm.Provider and is only ever unwrapped after:

  * approval.ApprovalProvider.ApproveIntent (out-of-band executive gate)
  * kms.ReleaseGate.Issue + Release (RIM + hardware allowlist, single-use
    nonce, cc/attest chain verify of the SEV-SNP / TDX / NRAS quote)
  * hsm.Provider.GetKey returns the wrapped seed inside the attested TEE

Composition (not inheritance):
  Signer struct { gate kms.ReleaseGate; hsmP hsm.Provider;
                  appr approval.ApprovalProvider; cfg Config }

Permissionless paths (magnetar.ValidatorSign, magnetar.Combine THBS-SE)
are UNAFFECTED. This is the opt-in institutional-custody extension
binding key release to verifiable hardware attestation. Use cases:
M-Chain bridge custody, A-Chain confidential-compute oracle.

Test surface drives the full chain end-to-end with the same committed
AMD Milan SEV-SNP fixtures the cc/attest verifier_test uses (1184 B
report + 1360 B VCEK). 9 tests + 6 Config sub-tests; t.Parallel + a
package TestMain that exports MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL=true.
2026-06-01 12:17:40 -07:00

179 lines
6.7 KiB
Go

// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
package slhdsatee
import (
"context"
"crypto/sha256"
"crypto/subtle"
"errors"
"fmt"
"github.com/luxfi/mpc/cc/attest"
"github.com/luxfi/mpc/pkg/kms"
)
// Envelope is the minimal kms.CompositeAttestation implementation this
// package consumes. It wraps an attested evidence blob (the bytes the
// worker captured via SNP_GUEST_REQUEST / TDREPORT ioctls / NRAS JWT)
// plus the operator-supplied RIM digest, hardware fingerprint, and
// TEE pubkey.
//
// One Envelope per Sign call — no caching. The release gate calls
// Verify(nonce) (cheap nonce check) then VerifyEvidence(ctx, opts...)
// (full chain check via cc/attest). Both must pass.
//
// Wire-form is intentionally NOT defined here: this is a per-process
// composition. The bridge / oracle wire layer that ships attested
// evidence between TEE and operator (or operator and KMS) is the
// responsibility of the calling subsystem. Magnetar's THBS-SE is the
// public-BFT wire spec; this package's Envelope is the institutional-
// custody in-process composition.
type Envelope struct {
// Kind is the cc/attest evidence kind matching EvidenceBytes
// framing. Used by Dispatch to route to the right verifier.
Kind attest.Kind
// EvidenceBytes is the raw vendor-framed evidence (SEV-SNP report
// ABI bytes, TDX TDREPORT bytes, NRAS JWT bytes).
EvidenceBytes []byte
// ExpectedNonce is the gate-issued challenge nonce the TEE bound
// into REPORT_DATA before capturing the evidence. Compared by
// Verify against the kms-supplied expectedNonce.
ExpectedNonce [32]byte
// RIM is the operator-asserted RIM digest the TEE measured. The
// release gate compares RIM against ReleasePolicy.RequiredRIM.
RIM [32]byte
// Hardware is the operator-asserted hardware fingerprint
// (sha256(model||driver||vbios) or platform/chip ID).
Hardware [32]byte
// TEEPub is the X25519 public key sealed against — the private
// half lives only inside the attested TEE.
TEEPub [32]byte
// VerifyOpts are forwarded to attest.Dispatch by VerifyEvidence
// (e.g. WithKDSGetter for offline tests, WithNow for fixed-clock
// reproducibility, WithExpectedMeasurement to pin the launch
// digest beyond RIM membership).
VerifyOpts []attest.Option
// rimChecker is an optional override used to pin the launch
// measurement against the verified report. When nil the package
// uses the default rule: VerifiedReport.Measurement must lie in
// the operator-supplied RequiredRIM allowlist. This is the
// orthogonal hook the dispatcher uses to wire RIM membership into
// the cc/attest chain layer without duplicating policy in two
// places.
rimChecker func(*attest.VerifiedReport) error
}
var _ kms.CompositeAttestation = (*Envelope)(nil)
// Verify implements kms.CompositeAttestation.Verify. Returns true iff
// the gate-issued nonce equals the nonce the operator embedded in the
// evidence at TEE-capture time.
//
// This is the cheap pre-chain check. It does NOT prove the evidence
// chains to the vendor root — VerifyEvidence does that. The gate
// calls both in order.
func (e *Envelope) Verify(expectedNonce [32]byte) (bool, error) {
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(e.ExpectedNonce[:], expectedNonce[:]) != 1 {
return false, nil
}
return true, nil
}
// VerifyEvidence implements kms.CompositeAttestation.VerifyEvidence.
//
// Dispatches the single evidence blob to cc/attest, returns the
// verified report on success, surfaces any chain / signature / policy
// failure via ErrChainInvalid / ErrSignatureInvalid / ErrPolicy. The
// gate translates these into ErrAttestationChain wrapped under
// ErrPolicyRefused.
//
// Additionally enforces that the operator-asserted RIM equals the
// VerifiedReport.Measurement after chain validation. This is the
// composition step: the gate checks RIM membership in its allowlist;
// VerifyEvidence checks the report Measurement equals the operator-
// asserted RIM. Together: a chain-validated report whose Measurement
// is in the gate's RequiredRIM set.
func (e *Envelope) VerifyEvidence(ctx context.Context, opts ...attest.Option) ([]*attest.VerifiedReport, error) {
if len(e.EvidenceBytes) == 0 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("%w: empty evidence", attest.ErrInvalidEvidence)
}
allOpts := append([]attest.Option{}, e.VerifyOpts...)
allOpts = append(allOpts, opts...)
rep, err := attest.Dispatch(ctx, e.Kind, e.EvidenceBytes, allOpts...)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if e.rimChecker != nil {
if err := e.rimChecker(rep); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
} else {
if err := defaultRIMCheck(rep, e.RIM); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
return []*attest.VerifiedReport{rep}, nil
}
// RIMDigest implements kms.CompositeAttestation.RIMDigest.
func (e *Envelope) RIMDigest() [32]byte { return e.RIM }
// HardwareFingerprint implements kms.CompositeAttestation.HardwareFingerprint.
func (e *Envelope) HardwareFingerprint() [32]byte { return e.Hardware }
// TEEPublicKey implements kms.CompositeAttestation.TEEPublicKey.
func (e *Envelope) TEEPublicKey() [32]byte { return e.TEEPub }
// EvidenceIssuers implements kms.CompositeAttestation.EvidenceIssuers.
//
// One issuer per envelope (this construction binds one TEE quote per
// sign request). If composite (CPU TEE + GPU NRAS) is required, the
// operator MUST run Sign once per quorum member and combine results;
// for the institutional-custody case here, one CPU TEE quote is the
// canonical posture.
func (e *Envelope) EvidenceIssuers() []string {
switch e.Kind {
case attest.KindSEVSNP:
return []string{kms.IssuerSEVSNP}
case attest.KindTDX:
return []string{kms.IssuerTDX}
case attest.KindNRAS:
return []string{kms.IssuerNVNRAS}
default:
return nil
}
}
// defaultRIMCheck verifies the cc/attest verified-report Measurement
// matches the operator-asserted RIM digest. We sha256-fold the raw
// measurement bytes (variable-length per evidence kind: 48 bytes for
// SEV-SNP, MRTD for TDX, derived for NRAS) into the 32-byte RIM
// digest convention used by the gate's allowlist.
//
// Folding is one-way and stable: sha256(measurement) is the operator-
// asserted RIM identifier; the release gate's RequiredRIM is the
// allowlist of such identifiers; the worker that captured this
// evidence claimed to be measuring RIM X; defaultRIMCheck enforces
// that X equals sha256(measurement) of the chain-validated report.
//
// Constant-time compare to avoid timing leaks on partial-RIM match.
func defaultRIMCheck(rep *attest.VerifiedReport, expected [32]byte) error {
if rep == nil {
return errors.New("slhdsa-tee: defaultRIMCheck: nil verified report")
}
got := sha256.Sum256(rep.Measurement)
if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(got[:], expected[:]) != 1 {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: report measurement does not fold to operator-asserted RIM", attest.ErrPolicy)
}
return nil
}