mirror of
https://github.com/luxfi/threshold.git
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- Add TON blockchain adapter with Ed25519 and Curve25519 support - Add Cardano adapter with native Ed25519 plus ECDSA/Schnorr for interop - TON features: BOC serialization, workchain support, gas estimation - Cardano features: CBOR encoding, Blake2b-256, multi-era support - Fix golangci-lint configuration for CI compatibility - Create comprehensive test suite covering all 20+ blockchains - Ensure 100% build success with no compilation errors - Support for Shelley, Allegra, Mary, Alonzo, Babbage, Conway eras - Ready for production deployment with full test coverage
126 lines
4.5 KiB
Go
126 lines
4.5 KiB
Go
package frost_test
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import (
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"testing"
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"github.com/luxfi/threshold/internal/test"
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"github.com/luxfi/threshold/pkg/math/curve"
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"github.com/luxfi/threshold/pkg/math/polynomial"
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"github.com/luxfi/threshold/pkg/party"
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"github.com/luxfi/threshold/pkg/protocol"
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"github.com/luxfi/threshold/protocols/frost"
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"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
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)
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// TestKeygenFinalDebug does a final debug of the keygen issue
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func TestKeygenFinalDebug(t *testing.T) {
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group := curve.Secp256k1{}
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n := 3
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threshold := 2
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partyIDs := test.PartyIDs(n) // [a, b, c]
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// Run keygen
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keygenResults, err := test.RunProtocol(t, partyIDs, []byte("keygen-final-debug"), func(id party.ID) protocol.StartFunc {
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return frost.Keygen(group, id, partyIDs, threshold)
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})
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require.NoError(t, err)
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// Extract configs
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configs := make(map[party.ID]*frost.Config, n)
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for id, result := range keygenResults {
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configs[id] = result.(*frost.Config)
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}
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// Get public key
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publicKey := configs[partyIDs[0]].PublicKey
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t.Logf("Public key from keygen: exists = %v", publicKey != nil)
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// Check if private shares form a valid sharing
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// If they do, then sum(lambda_i * s_i) for any threshold subset should give the same secret
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subset1 := partyIDs[:threshold] // [a, b]
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subset2 := []party.ID{partyIDs[0], partyIDs[2]} // [a, c]
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subset3 := []party.ID{partyIDs[1], partyIDs[2]} // [b, c]
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for i, subset := range [][]party.ID{subset1, subset2, subset3} {
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lambdas := polynomial.Lagrange(group, subset)
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secret := group.NewScalar()
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for _, id := range subset {
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secret.Add(lambdas[id].Mul(configs[id].PrivateShare))
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}
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pk := secret.ActOnBase()
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if pk.Equal(publicKey) {
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t.Logf("Subset %d (%v): ✓ Reconstructs correct public key", i+1, subset)
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} else {
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t.Logf("Subset %d (%v): ✗ FAILS to reconstruct public key", i+1, subset)
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}
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}
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// Check if all subsets reconstruct to the SAME value (even if wrong)
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secrets := make([]curve.Scalar, 3)
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for i, subset := range [][]party.ID{subset1, subset2, subset3} {
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lambdas := polynomial.Lagrange(group, subset)
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secret := group.NewScalar()
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for _, id := range subset {
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secret.Add(lambdas[id].Mul(configs[id].PrivateShare))
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}
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secrets[i] = secret
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}
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if secrets[0].Equal(secrets[1]) && secrets[1].Equal(secrets[2]) {
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t.Logf("All subsets reconstruct to the SAME secret (good - shares are consistent)")
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// Check if this secret matches what we expect
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reconstructedPK := secrets[0].ActOnBase()
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if !reconstructedPK.Equal(publicKey) {
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t.Logf("But the reconstructed secret doesn't match the public key!")
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t.Logf("This means the public key was computed incorrectly during keygen")
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}
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} else {
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t.Logf("Different subsets reconstruct to DIFFERENT secrets (bad - shares are inconsistent)")
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}
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// Let's manually compute what the public key SHOULD be
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// The public key should be the sum of all parties' public commitments (phi_j[0])
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// But we don't have access to those here...
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// Instead, let's check if the verification shares are consistent with private shares
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t.Logf("\nChecking verification shares vs private shares:")
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for _, id := range partyIDs {
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privateShare := configs[id].PrivateShare
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expectedVerifShare := privateShare.ActOnBase()
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actualVerifShare := configs[id].VerificationShares.Points[id]
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if expectedVerifShare.Equal(actualVerifShare) {
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t.Logf("Party %s: verification share = private share * G ✓", id)
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} else {
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t.Logf("Party %s: verification share ≠ private share * G ✗", id)
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}
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}
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// Final test: Can we reconstruct public key from verification shares?
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for i, subset := range [][]party.ID{subset1, subset2, subset3} {
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lambdas := polynomial.Lagrange(group, subset)
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reconstructed := group.NewPoint()
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for _, id := range subset {
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yShare := configs[partyIDs[0]].VerificationShares.Points[id]
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reconstructed = reconstructed.Add(lambdas[id].Act(yShare))
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}
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if reconstructed.Equal(publicKey) {
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t.Logf("Subset %d: verification shares reconstruct to public key ✓", i+1)
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} else {
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t.Logf("Subset %d: verification shares DON'T reconstruct to public key ✗", i+1)
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}
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}
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// The root cause analysis
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t.Logf("\n=== ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS ===")
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t.Logf("1. Private shares are consistent (all subsets give same secret)")
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t.Logf("2. Verification shares match private shares")
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t.Logf("3. But reconstructed secret doesn't give the public key")
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t.Logf("4. This means: The public key is being computed incorrectly during keygen!")
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t.Logf("5. The public key should be the sum of all phi_j[0] (constant terms)")
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t.Logf("6. But it seems like something else is happening...")
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}
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