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zeekay
f6093e719b
Sibling of protocols/{slhdsa,mldsa}-tee for the corona Ring-LWE
primitive. Master trusted-dealer key (32 B, sign.KeySize) lives
sealed-at-rest in hsm.Provider; per-Sign the TEE attestation
authorizes release and then the dealer's GenerateKeys + the n-party
Round1 / Round2 / Finalize all run inside the attested process.
Composition (not inheritance):
Signer { gate kms.ReleaseGate; hsmP hsm.Provider;
appr approval.ApprovalProvider; cfg Config }
corona.threshold.GenerateKeys writes package-level globals
(sign.K, sign.Threshold) — coronaSerializer wraps every entry point
into corona so two concurrent Signers on the same process do not race
through that shared state. Workaround for an upstream constraint; not
a security boundary.
Permissionless path (corona.keyera.BootstrapPedersen — no party ever
holds the master) UNAFFECTED. This is the opt-in institutional-
custody extension. Use cases: foundation HSM ceremonies, single-
operator bridge custody.
11 tests + 9 Config sub-tests; t.Parallel; depends on luxfi/corona
v0.7.6 (canonical Signature/GroupKey/VerifyBytes wire codec).
99 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
99 lines
3.5 KiB
Go
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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package rlwetee
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import (
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"errors"
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"github.com/luxfi/corona/sign"
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)
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// Config carries the operator-side policy + provider configuration.
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//
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// Every field is required; New refuses on any zero value.
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type Config struct {
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// Threshold is the corona t in t-of-n. corona requires 1 <= t < n.
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Threshold int
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// Participants is the corona n. Each Sign call drives all n
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// parties in-process under the attested TEE; the dispatcher
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// surface remains single-shot.
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Participants int
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// RequiredRIM is the set of acceptable RIM digests.
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RequiredRIM map[[32]byte]struct{}
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// AllowedHardware is the set of acceptable hardware fingerprints.
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AllowedHardware map[[32]byte]struct{}
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// Require* flags mirror kms.ReleasePolicy.Require*.
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RequireSEVSNP bool
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RequireTDX bool
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RequireNVNRAS bool
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// KMSKeyID is the HSM key for the audit signature over
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// (jobID || msgDigest || epoch || RIM).
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KMSKeyID string
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// WrappedSeedKeyID is the HSM-stored blob identifier for the
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// wrapped 32-byte master trusted-dealer key.
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WrappedSeedKeyID string
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// ApprovalRequired determines whether ApprovalProvider must
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// produce a non-deny ApprovalSignature before Issue().
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ApprovalRequired bool
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// ApproverID is the canonical identifier whose approval is
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// required.
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ApproverID string
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}
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// Errors surfaced by Config.Validate and the Sign flow.
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var (
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ErrInvalidThreshold = errors.New("rlwe-tee: invalid threshold (requires 1 <= Threshold < Participants)")
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ErrEmptyRIM = errors.New("rlwe-tee: RequiredRIM must be non-empty (default-deny posture)")
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ErrEmptyHardware = errors.New("rlwe-tee: AllowedHardware must be non-empty (default-deny posture)")
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ErrNoRequireFlag = errors.New("rlwe-tee: at least one Require* TEE flag must be true")
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ErrMissingKMSKeyID = errors.New("rlwe-tee: KMSKeyID required for audit signature")
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ErrMissingSeedKeyID = errors.New("rlwe-tee: WrappedSeedKeyID required for HSM seed storage")
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ErrApproverMissing = errors.New("rlwe-tee: ApproverID required when ApprovalRequired is true")
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ErrApprovalDenied = errors.New("rlwe-tee: approval provider denied or returned mismatched signature")
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ErrAttestationRequired = errors.New("rlwe-tee: attestation envelope required")
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ErrPolicyRefused = errors.New("rlwe-tee: release gate refused")
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ErrKMSReleaseUnreachable = errors.New("rlwe-tee: release gate unreachable")
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ErrHSMUnreachable = errors.New("rlwe-tee: HSM provider unreachable")
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ErrCorruptWrappedSeed = errors.New("rlwe-tee: wrapped seed blob fails authenticated decryption")
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ErrCoronaProtocol = errors.New("rlwe-tee: corona threshold protocol failed")
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)
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// MasterKeySize is the corona trusted-dealer key length the HSM
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// stores. Exported so embedders can size buffers consistently with
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// the corona kernel.
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const MasterKeySize = sign.KeySize // 32
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// Validate reports the first structural error in cfg.
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func (cfg *Config) Validate() error {
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if cfg.Threshold < 1 || cfg.Participants < 2 || cfg.Threshold >= cfg.Participants {
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return ErrInvalidThreshold
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}
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if len(cfg.RequiredRIM) == 0 {
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return ErrEmptyRIM
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}
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if len(cfg.AllowedHardware) == 0 {
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return ErrEmptyHardware
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}
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if !cfg.RequireSEVSNP && !cfg.RequireTDX && !cfg.RequireNVNRAS {
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return ErrNoRequireFlag
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}
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if cfg.KMSKeyID == "" {
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return ErrMissingKMSKeyID
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}
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if cfg.WrappedSeedKeyID == "" {
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return ErrMissingSeedKeyID
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}
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if cfg.ApprovalRequired && cfg.ApproverID == "" {
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return ErrApproverMissing
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}
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return nil
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}
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