mirror of
https://github.com/luxfi/threshold.git
synced 2026-10-30 15:15:53 +00:00
zeekay
3fbffaa4f1
New package wires luxfi/mpc/{cc/attest, pkg/kms, pkg/hsm, pkg/approval}
into a Signer whose output is byte-identical to single-party FIPS 205
SLH-DSA SignDeterministic. The master seed lives sealed-at-rest in
hsm.Provider and is only ever unwrapped after:
* approval.ApprovalProvider.ApproveIntent (out-of-band executive gate)
* kms.ReleaseGate.Issue + Release (RIM + hardware allowlist, single-use
nonce, cc/attest chain verify of the SEV-SNP / TDX / NRAS quote)
* hsm.Provider.GetKey returns the wrapped seed inside the attested TEE
Composition (not inheritance):
Signer struct { gate kms.ReleaseGate; hsmP hsm.Provider;
appr approval.ApprovalProvider; cfg Config }
Permissionless paths (magnetar.ValidatorSign, magnetar.Combine THBS-SE)
are UNAFFECTED. This is the opt-in institutional-custody extension
binding key release to verifiable hardware attestation. Use cases:
M-Chain bridge custody, A-Chain confidential-compute oracle.
Test surface drives the full chain end-to-end with the same committed
AMD Milan SEV-SNP fixtures the cc/attest verifier_test uses (1184 B
report + 1360 B VCEK). 9 tests + 6 Config sub-tests; t.Parallel + a
package TestMain that exports MPC_LOCAL_APPROVAL=true.
67 lines
3.4 KiB
Go
67 lines
3.4 KiB
Go
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
|
|
|
|
// Package slhdsatee implements operator-controlled SLH-DSA threshold
|
|
// signing via TEE-gated master-seed reconstruction.
|
|
//
|
|
// This is NOT a public-BFT primitive. Magnetar v0.5's per-validator
|
|
// standalone path (and v0.1 reveal-and-aggregate THBS-SE for delegated
|
|
// custody) is the canonical permissionless path; THIS package is the
|
|
// institutional-custody-only extension that binds key release to:
|
|
//
|
|
// 1. a verifiable hardware TEE attestation (AMD SEV-SNP / Intel TDX /
|
|
// NVIDIA NRAS) chain-validated by github.com/luxfi/mpc/cc/attest;
|
|
// 2. a KMS release-gate (github.com/luxfi/mpc/pkg/kms.ReleaseGate)
|
|
// that pins the worker's RIM digest + hardware fingerprint and
|
|
// binds a single-use challenge nonce per-request;
|
|
// 3. an out-of-band human / programmatic approval signature
|
|
// (github.com/luxfi/mpc/pkg/approval.ApprovalProvider);
|
|
// 4. an HSM-resident wrap-key store
|
|
// (github.com/luxfi/mpc/pkg/hsm.Provider) so the master SLH-DSA
|
|
// seed lives sealed-at-rest and is only ever unwrapped inside the
|
|
// attested TEE.
|
|
//
|
|
// The sign call returns bytes byte-identical to single-party FIPS 205
|
|
// SLH-DSA SignDeterministic on (master_seed → KeyFromSeed → Sign(msg,
|
|
// ctx)). Any caller holding the published MAGG-framed group public key
|
|
// can verify with magnetar.VerifyBytes (or Verify) — no awareness of
|
|
// the threshold or TEE substrate is required.
|
|
//
|
|
// Threat model:
|
|
//
|
|
// - Adversary controls the operator process (compromised binary,
|
|
// malicious operator) outside the TEE. Without a valid attestation
|
|
// that chains to the pinned vendor root AND a fresh approval that
|
|
// matches the RIM/hardware policy, no sign is possible. The HSM
|
|
// never releases the master seed in plaintext — only the AEAD
|
|
// ciphertext sealed to the gate-issued ephemeral pubkey can leave
|
|
// the gate.
|
|
// - Adversary recovers an old sealed key. AAD binds (epoch, jobID,
|
|
// teePub, issuedNonce); replay across epoch or jobID is refused.
|
|
// - Adversary forges an attestation envelope whose Verify(nonce)
|
|
// returns true but whose evidence does not chain to the vendor
|
|
// root. ReleaseGate.Release calls CompositeAttestation.VerifyEvidence
|
|
// which dispatches every blob through cc/attest.Dispatch and
|
|
// refuses on chain-invalid; this package's Envelope ties the cc/attest
|
|
// verifier into that contract.
|
|
//
|
|
// What this package is NOT:
|
|
//
|
|
// - NOT a no-trusted-dealer DKG. The master seed is generated once
|
|
// under TEE attestation; subsequent signs only release the wrapped
|
|
// seed under the same attestation policy. A real DKG construction
|
|
// for SLH-DSA is the magnetar package's THBS-SE family — see
|
|
// magnetar/ref/go/pkg/magnetar/thbsse.go for the permissionless
|
|
// primitive that produces a FIPS 205 byte-identical signature
|
|
// without any party ever holding the master seed.
|
|
//
|
|
// - NOT a substitute for magnetar.ValidatorSign or magnetar.Combine
|
|
// on the public-BFT consensus surface. Use this ONLY when the
|
|
// threat model permits "trusted custody with attested release"
|
|
// (e.g. M-Chain bridge custody operator, A-Chain confidential
|
|
// compute oracle).
|
|
//
|
|
// Wire compatibility: output is a magnetar.Signature (mode default
|
|
// ModeM192s) — the same wire form the dispatcher emits today. The
|
|
// SDK / verifier path is unchanged.
|
|
package slhdsatee
|