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157 lines
6.4 KiB
TeX
157 lines
6.4 KiB
TeX
\section{Homomorphic / Holographic Consensus DAO}
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\label{sec:dao}
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\subsection{Two adjectives, two distinct properties}
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The \Zoo{} \DAO{} is described as both \emph{homomorphic} and
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\emph{holographic}. They are independent properties:
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\begin{itemize}[nosep,leftmargin=1.2em]
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\item \textbf{Homomorphic} means votes are tallied while still encrypted.
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Tallying happens under fully homomorphic encryption (\FHE{})
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on \Lux{} F-Chain (\Lux{} \textsc{lp-013}~\cite{lp-013-fchain}).
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The aggregate result is decryptable; individual ballots are not.
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\item \textbf{Holographic} means every part of the \DAO{} encodes the
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whole's intent. Nested sub-\DAO{}s (per-\textsc{llm} chains, per
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research vertical, per regional chapter) inherit governance
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topology from the meta-\DAO{} but can also propose and ratify
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locally. Each shard is structurally a small copy of the whole.
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\end{itemize}
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\subsection{Homomorphic vote tallying}
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A vote is encoded as a ciphertext under an F-Chain
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\FHE{} public key. The protocol:
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\begin{enumerate}[nosep,leftmargin=1.4em]
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\item Each participant submits $\mathrm{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(v_i \cdot w_i)$
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where $v_i \in \{-1, 0, +1\}$ is the vote (against / abstain / for)
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and $w_i$ is the participant's voting weight (\S\ref{sec:weighted}).
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\item F-Chain~\cite{lp-013-fchain} computes $\sum_i \mathrm{Enc}(v_i w_i)$
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homomorphically. The encrypted sum is published on-chain.
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\item Decryption of the aggregate is performed only by the
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M-Chain MPC custodial threshold (\Lux{} \textsc{lp-019}~\cite{lp-019-mchain})
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after the voting window closes.
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\item Individual ballots remain encrypted forever. Aggregate result
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is published with a Quasar 3.0 finality proof.
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\end{enumerate}
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This eliminates voter coercion: a participant cannot prove how they
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voted to a coercer because nobody --- not even the M-Chain custodians
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acting jointly --- can decrypt an individual ciphertext. Only the sum
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is decryptable.
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\subsection{Holographic structure}
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The meta-\DAO{} is the apex. Sub-\DAO{}s exist for:
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\begin{itemize}[nosep,leftmargin=1.2em]
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\item Each per-\textsc{llm} chain (one sub-\DAO{} per Zen model;
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see~\cite{zoo-per-llm-chains}).
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\item Each research vertical (Conservation AI, Educational AI,
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Frontier AI, DeSci).
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\item Each regional chapter (geographic conservation cells).
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\end{itemize}
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Each sub-\DAO{} inherits the meta-\DAO{}'s governance topology
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(weighted voting, \FHE{} tally, M-Chain custody) and can propose and
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ratify locally on issues scoped to its shard. Issues that cross shards
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escalate to the meta-\DAO{}. The structural property is
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\emph{self-similarity}: a sub-\DAO{} looks like a smaller meta-\DAO{}
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in every governance dimension.
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This is what we mean by \emph{holographic}: every part contains the
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whole's pattern. A sub-\DAO{} can fork into its own chain with the same
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governance machinery and remain interoperable with the meta-\DAO{}
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without bespoke integration.
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\subsection{Weighted voting}
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\label{sec:weighted}
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Voting weight is computed as a weighted sum across four axes:
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\begin{itemize}[nosep,leftmargin=1.2em]
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\item \textbf{Advocacy} --- public posts, citations, and social
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engagement, attested through Z-Chain (anti-Sybil; see below).
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\item \textbf{Involvement} --- contributor activity: commits, code
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reviews, training submissions, ceremony participation, validator
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uptime.
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\item \textbf{Contribution} --- landmark research artifacts, model
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releases, novel architectures, dataset curation, reproducibility
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attestations.
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\item \textbf{Token stake} --- locked $\$$ZOO stake. Always present
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but deliberately the smallest weight, to prevent plutocracy.
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\end{itemize}
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The formula:
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\begin{equation}
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\text{weight}(p) \;=\; \alpha \cdot a_p \;+\; \beta \cdot i_p \;+\; \gamma \cdot c_p \;+\; \delta \cdot s_p
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\end{equation}
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\noindent subject to $\alpha + \beta + \gamma + \delta = 1$, where
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$a_p, i_p, c_p, s_p$ are the participant's normalized advocacy,
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involvement, contribution, and token-stake scores respectively.
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Default initial weights at activation (2025-12-25) are governed by the
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meta-\DAO{} and start as:
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\[
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(\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta) \;=\; (0.20,\ 0.30,\ 0.40,\ 0.10)
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\]
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\noindent i.e.\ 20\% advocacy, 30\% involvement, 40\% contribution,
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10\% token stake. These weights can be adjusted by meta-\DAO{} vote
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(itself a homomorphic, weighted vote).
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\subsection{Anti-Sybil}
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Each input score is gated by attestation:
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\begin{itemize}[nosep,leftmargin=1.2em]
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\item Advocacy ($a_p$) requires the social platform to be
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attestation-rooted (i.e.\ the platform itself runs an attestation
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endpoint anchored on Z-Chain). Posts on un-rooted platforms do not
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count.
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\item Involvement ($i_p$) is computed from the contribution-graph
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attestation pipeline anchored on \Lux{} A-Chain
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(\Lux{} \textsc{lp-134}~\cite{lp-134-topology}). Each commit and
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review is signed by a \textsc{tee}-attested identity.
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\item Contribution ($c_p$) requires reproducibility attestation
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(per ZIP-0606 in the Zoo \textsc{zip} corpus); a paper, model, or
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dataset must verify before it confers contribution weight.
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\item Token stake ($s_p$) is unforgeable on-chain by definition but
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is rate-limited by the $\delta = 0.10$ default to bound plutocracy.
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\end{itemize}
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A purely token-rich attacker can buy at most $\delta = 0.10$ of total
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voting weight. To dominate, the attacker must also generate provable
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advocacy, involvement, and contribution --- which the attestation
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pipeline rejects unless backed by real activity.
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\subsection{Threshold custody of governance keys}
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Governance keys (the master key for upgrade proposals, treasury
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movements above policy thresholds, and emergency halts) are held in
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threshold custody on M-Chain (\Lux{} \textsc{lp-019}~\cite{lp-019-mchain}).
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A successful proposal pulls a threshold partial signature from each
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custodian; the resulting Corona \textsc{pq} aggregate signature
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authorizes the on-chain action. No single custodian can act
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unilaterally; no custodian can be compelled by physical coercion of
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one party.
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\subsection{Cross-references}
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\begin{itemize}[nosep,leftmargin=1.2em]
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\item \Lux{} \textsc{lp-013} --- F-Chain FHE substrate (vote
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tally)~\cite{lp-013-fchain}.
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\item \Lux{} \textsc{lp-019} --- M-Chain MPC (governance key
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custody)~\cite{lp-019-mchain}.
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\item \Lux{} \textsc{lp-134} --- A/B/M/F topology (contributor
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attestation on A-Chain)~\cite{lp-134-topology}.
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\item \textsc{zip-0017} --- DAO Governance Framework (Zoo \textsc{zip}
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corpus).
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\item \textsc{zip-0026} --- Ecosystem Reputation System (the
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involvement-score input).
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\end{itemize}
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