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zeekayandHanzo Dev
6658236499
Leadership and team cards, board and founding prose, an AI persona modelled on a named individual, contributor and partner entries, and personal correspondence addresses all named one person. The organisation carries them now. Other people keep their names. Where a card, a board list or a founding line named someone else alongside, they stay exactly as they were; only the one entry was removed, and prose that listed two names now reads with one. Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use elsewhere, so the IAM username defect the notes describe still reads as written. The zoo/yapp MIT notice names the foundation that publishes it. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
70 lines
3.4 KiB
TeX
70 lines
3.4 KiB
TeX
\section{Introduction}
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\label{sec:introduction}
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Scientific research funding is one of the highest-leverage activities in
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human civilization, yet its governance mechanisms have not fundamentally
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changed since the establishment of the National Science Foundation in
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1950 \citep{bush1945science}. The system exhibits several well-documented
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failure modes:
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\begin{enumerate}[label=(\roman*)]
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\item \textbf{Conservatism bias}: Grant panels favor incremental
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research over transformative ideas, as novel proposals lack the
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preliminary data that reviewers demand \citep{boudreau2016looking}.
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\item \textbf{Geographic concentration}: 80\% of global R\&D spending
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occurs in 10 countries \citep{unesco2021science}, excluding
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researchers in developing nations from funding opportunities.
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\item \textbf{Slow cycles}: Grant application-to-funding timelines of
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6--18 months are misaligned with fast-moving research areas
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\citep{alberts2014rescuing}.
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\item \textbf{Peer review opacity}: Anonymous peer review enables
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arbitrary gatekeeping and bias \citep{lee2013bias}.
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\item \textbf{Misaligned incentives}: Researchers are rewarded for
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publication quantity rather than knowledge quality, producing a
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replication crisis \citep{ioannidis2005most}.
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\item \textbf{IP monopolization}: Publicly funded research generates
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proprietary patents, limiting knowledge diffusion
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\citep{heller1998can}.
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\end{enumerate}
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\subsection{Decentralized Science (DeSci)}
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The DeSci movement applies blockchain and decentralized governance
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principles to scientific research \citep{hamburg2019desci}. Key tenets
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include open access to research outputs, transparent funding allocation,
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community governance of research priorities, and token-incentivized
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contribution. Projects like VitaDAO (longevity research), LabDAO
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(computational biology), and Molecule (IP-NFTs for drug discovery)
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have demonstrated the viability of decentralized research coordination.
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Zoo Labs Foundation extends DeSci principles to conservation science,
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environmental research, and AI for biodiversity---domains that
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particularly benefit from global coordination and community governance.
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\subsection{Contributions}
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item A \textbf{complete governance framework} for decentralized
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research funding, encompassing proposal submission, review, voting,
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funding, and accountability.
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\item \textbf{Quadratic voting} adapted for research grant allocation,
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with formal analysis showing superior preference aggregation.
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\item A \textbf{sybil-resistant reputation system} that credentials
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researchers based on verified contributions.
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\item \textbf{Incentivized peer review} through reviewer staking,
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where reviewers commit tokens to their assessments.
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\item \textbf{Retroactive public goods funding} that rewards
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high-impact research after outcomes are demonstrated.
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\item \textbf{Empirical evaluation} from 18 months of Zoo DAO
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operation comparing outcomes to traditional funding mechanisms.
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\end{enumerate}
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