mirror of
https://github.com/zoo-apps/papers.git
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zeekayandHanzo Dev
6658236499
Leadership and team cards, board and founding prose, an AI persona modelled on a named individual, contributor and partner entries, and personal correspondence addresses all named one person. The organisation carries them now. Other people keep their names. Where a card, a board list or a founding line named someone else alongside, they stay exactly as they were; only the one entry was removed, and prose that listed two names now reads with one. Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use elsewhere, so the IAM username defect the notes describe still reads as written. The zoo/yapp MIT notice names the foundation that publishes it. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
114 lines
4.7 KiB
TeX
114 lines
4.7 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,a4paper]{article}
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\usepackage{shared/zoocover}
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% ── Packages ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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\usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
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\usepackage{lmodern}
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% geometry loaded by zoocover
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsfonts}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{amsthm}
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}
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\newtheorem{lemma}{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{proposition}{Proposition}
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\newtheorem{corollary}{Corollary}
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\usepackage{cleveref}
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\usepackage{natbib}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algorithmic}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning,shapes.geometric,fit}
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\usepackage{float}
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\usepackage{subcaption}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{microtype}
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\usepackage{fancyhdr}
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\usepackage{abstract}
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\usepackage{multirow}
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% ── Page Style ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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\pagestyle{fancy}
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\fancyhf{}
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\fancyhead[L]{\small Zoo Labs Foundation Research}
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\fancyhead[R]{\small Zoo DAO Governance}
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\fancyfoot[C]{\thepage}
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\renewcommand{\headrulewidth}{0.4pt}
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% ── Metadata ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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\title{%
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\textbf{Zoo DAO: Decentralized Governance for\\Open Science Research}\\[0.5em]
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\large Zoo Labs Foundation Paper ZOO-GOV-2026
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}
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\author{
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Zoo Labs Foundation Research\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}\\[0.5em]
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\small With contributions from the Zoo Open Science Network
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}
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\date{September 2022}
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% ── Macros ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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\newcommand{\R}{\mathbb{R}}
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\newcommand{\E}{\mathbb{E}}
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\newcommand{\QV}{\text{QV}}
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\newcommand{\ZOO}{\textsc{ZOO}}
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\begin{document}
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\zoocoverpage
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% ── Abstract ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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\begin{abstract}
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\noindent
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Traditional scientific funding suffers from well-documented pathologies:
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conservative grant allocation favoring established researchers, opaque
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peer review processes, multi-year funding cycles misaligned with research
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timelines, and geographic concentration in wealthy nations. We present
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the \textbf{Zoo DAO}, a decentralized autonomous organization for
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governing open science research funding, peer review, and intellectual
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property. Zoo DAO employs quadratic voting for research proposal
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selection, sybil-resistant reputation tokens for researcher credentialing,
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retroactive public goods funding for high-impact discoveries, and
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incentivized peer review through reviewer staking. We formalize the
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governance mechanism, analyze its game-theoretic properties, and present
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simulation results from 18 months of operation on the Zoo Network. The
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DAO has funded 143 research projects across 34 countries, with reviewer
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response times averaging 8.4 days (compared to 3--6 months for
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traditional journals) and a researcher satisfaction score of 4.3/5.0.
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We demonstrate that quadratic voting allocates funds more efficiently
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than 1-token-1-vote systems, with a 41\% higher correlation between
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funded projects and subsequent citation impact. All governance parameters
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are managed through Zoo Improvement Proposals (ZIPs) at
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\texttt{zips.zoo.ngo}.
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\medskip
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\noindent\textbf{Keywords:} decentralized governance, quadratic voting,
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research funding, peer review, reputation systems, open science, DAO
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\end{abstract}
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\newpage
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\tableofcontents
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\newpage
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% ══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-related-work}
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\input{sections/03-governance-architecture}
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\input{sections/04-quadratic-voting-for-research-funding}
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\input{sections/05-incentivized-peer-review}
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\input{sections/06-retroactive-public-goods-funding}
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\input{sections/07-empirical-results}
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\input{sections/08-game-theoretic-analysis}
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\input{sections/09-discussion}
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\input{sections/10-future-work}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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