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31 lines
1.4 KiB
TeX
31 lines
1.4 KiB
TeX
\section{Security Analysis}
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\subsection{Encryption Security}
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\begin{theorem}[Semantic Security]
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Zoo FHE achieves IND-CPA security under the Ring-LWE assumption with parameters providing 128-bit post-quantum security.
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\end{theorem}
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The parameters ($N = 2^{14}$, $\log Q = 438$) are chosen according to the Homomorphic Encryption Standard~\cite{albrecht2018hes} and provide security against both classical and quantum adversaries.
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\subsection{Threshold Security}
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\begin{theorem}[Threshold Robustness]
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Under the $(5, 9)$-threshold scheme, an adversary controlling up to 4 committee members cannot decrypt any ciphertext.
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\end{theorem}
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\begin{proof}
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Shamir secret sharing over the key space ensures that fewer than $t = 5$ shares reveal no information about the secret key. Each partial decryption is verified by a zero-knowledge proof, preventing malicious shares from corrupting the reconstruction.
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\end{proof}
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\subsection{Data Privacy Guarantees}
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item \textbf{Input privacy}: Data providers encrypt locally; the Zoo network never sees plaintext inputs.
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\item \textbf{Model privacy}: Model weights are encrypted; neither validators nor users learn the model parameters.
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\item \textbf{Output privacy}: Inference results remain encrypted until threshold decryption is authorized.
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\item \textbf{Gradient privacy}: Individual training contributions are encrypted; only the aggregate is revealed.
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\end{enumerate}
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