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Bylines, paper authorship, correspondence addresses and the founder blurb under each post named an individual. They name the organisation that published the work instead: the brand on posts and pages, the research byline on papers, and research@ in place of a personal address. Both are what these repositories already used elsewhere — nothing new was coined. Co-authors are untouched. Where a paper named someone else alongside, they stay named; only the one byline changed. Bibliography entries, running heads, PDF metadata and affiliations move with it, so a citation still resolves to whoever the cited paper names. Sample and fixture data uses the placeholder name these tests already use elsewhere, so no assertion changed meaning. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
80 lines
3.5 KiB
TeX
80 lines
3.5 KiB
TeX
\documentclass[11pt,letterpaper]{article}
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\usepackage{shared/zoocover}
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% Packages
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\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
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% geometry loaded by zoocover
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\usepackage{amsmath,amssymb,amsthm}
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\usepackage{graphicx}
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\usepackage{hyperref}
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\usepackage{cite}
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\usepackage{booktabs}
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\usepackage{array}
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\usepackage{tikz}
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\usepackage{algorithm}
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\usepackage{algorithmic}
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\usepackage{enumitem}
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\usepackage{mathtools}
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\usepackage{xcolor}
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\usetikzlibrary{arrows.meta,positioning,shapes.geometric,fit}
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% Theorem environments
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\newtheorem{theorem}{Theorem}
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\newtheorem{lemma}[theorem]{Lemma}
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\newtheorem{proposition}[theorem]{Proposition}
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\newtheorem{corollary}[theorem]{Corollary}
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\theoremstyle{definition}
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\newtheorem{definition}{Definition}
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\theoremstyle{remark}
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\newtheorem{remark}{Remark}
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% Custom commands
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\newcommand{\Zoo}{\textsc{Zoo}}
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\newcommand{\Lux}{\textsc{Lux}}
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\newcommand{\KChain}{\textsc{K-Chain}}
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\newcommand{\TChain}{\textsc{T-Chain}}
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\newcommand{\IChain}{\textsc{I-Chain}}
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\newcommand{\KeyVM}{\textsc{KeyVM}}
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\newcommand{\MLKEM}{\textsc{ML-KEM}}
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\newcommand{\MLDSA}{\textsc{ML-DSA}}
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\newcommand{\SLHDSA}{\textsc{SLH-DSA}}
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\newcommand{\NTT}{\textsc{NTT}}
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% Title information
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\title{\textbf{Post-Quantum Distributed Key Management:\\ML-KEM and ML-DSA on Zoo Network's K-Chain}\\
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\large KeyVM: Replacing External KMS with Validator-Distributed Key Shares}
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\author{
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Zoo Labs Foundation Research\thanks{[email protected]}\\
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\textit{Zoo Labs Foundation}\\
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\texttt{[email protected]}
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}
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\date{October 2025}
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\begin{document}
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\zoocoverpage
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\begin{abstract}
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We present \KChain{} (\KeyVM{}), a chain-native distributed key management system for Zoo Network that replaces external Key Management Services (KMS) with validator-distributed key shares and post-quantum cryptographic primitives. \KChain{} implements ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key encapsulation and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) for digital signatures, providing quantum-resistant security for all key operations. Classical BLS12-381 keypairs are maintained in parallel for fast consensus signing where post-quantum latency is prohibitive. Key material is split into $t$-of-$n$ threshold shares across validators using Shamir's secret sharing over lattice-based schemes, ensuring no single validator possesses complete key material. GPU-accelerated Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) operations reduce ML-KEM encapsulation and ML-DSA signing latency by $14\times$ compared to CPU implementations, enabling practical post-quantum key operations at consensus timescales. Secure memory clearing with constant-time operations prevents side-channel key extraction. Formal verification of cryptographic correctness is established through Lean 4 proofs (\texttt{Crypto/MLKEM.lean}, \texttt{Crypto/MLDSA.lean}, \texttt{Crypto/SLHDSA.lean}, \texttt{GPU/ConsensusScaling.lean}). We demonstrate that distributed post-quantum key management achieves equivalent operational security to centralized KMS while eliminating single points of compromise and providing forward secrecy against quantum adversaries.
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\end{abstract}
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\tableofcontents
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\newpage
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\input{sections/01-introduction}
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\input{sections/02-key-types-and-lifecycle}
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\input{sections/03-ml-kem-post-quantum-key-encapsulation}
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\input{sections/04-ml-dsa-post-quantum-signatures}
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\input{sections/05-threshold-key-sharing}
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\input{sections/06-bls-keypairs-for-classical-consensus}
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\input{sections/07-gpu-ntt-acceleration}
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\input{sections/08-secure-memory-architecture}
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\input{sections/09-formal-verification}
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\input{sections/10-security-analysis}
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\input{sections/11-cross-chain-integration}
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\input{sections/99-conclusion}
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\end{document}
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