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55 lines
3.2 KiB
TeX
55 lines
3.2 KiB
TeX
\section{Introduction}
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Proof of AI asks a harder question than whether a provider signed a result: did the
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committed AI computation actually run, under the job and execution policy the network
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accepted? Useful work cannot secure a monetary system merely because it is expensive.
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The work must be demand-backed, objectively bound, cheaper to verify than to perform,
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available for challenge, finalized exactly once, and connected to a consequence authority
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that fails closed.
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The Lux architecture assigns those responsibilities to one canonical path. A requester
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submits a job to the A-Chain; a miner executes it under a versioned deterministic kernel
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profile and emits a canonical transcript; validators check the required execution,
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availability, graph, metering, and anti-replay obligations; A-Chain consensus alone
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finalizes the job, consumes its nullifier, and authorizes \textsc{AI}. The finalized
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transition is then settled through P3Q on Z-Chain and finalized by Lux Quasar. Other chains
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may receive a receipt and payout, but cannot replace the A-Chain as the mining authority.
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\subsection{Challenges}
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item \textbf{Execution}: distinguish genuine computation from a signed guess or copied output.
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\item \textbf{Determinism}: give heterogeneous miners and CPU validators one exact statement to check.
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\item \textbf{Cost asymmetry}: keep verification materially cheaper than the original workload.
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\item \textbf{Completeness}: bind the full accepted graph, inputs, outputs, artifacts, availability, and meter.
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\item \textbf{Consensus}: ensure one authority admits, finalizes, nullifies, and authorizes each reward.
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\end{enumerate}
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\subsection{Contributions}
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This paper contributes:
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item an exact-integer, software-only Freivalds construction for challenged matrix
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products, with $1/p$ soundness per vector and CPU-verifiable $O(n^2)$ checks against the
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miner's $O(n^3)$ dense multiplication;
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\item a versioned deterministic kernel profile fixing arithmetic, layouts, accumulator
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widths, overflow, reductions, fixed-point scales, rounding, tie-breaking, and encodings;
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\item a canonical transcript binding the A-Chain job and policy, model/runtime/input
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commitments, ordered graph operations, outputs, metering, provider, destination, and
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nonce into the root challenged and later settled;
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\item anti-replay, anti-substitution, graph-coverage, and receipt-soundness obligations
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that prevent a correct local check from being mistaken for proof of the whole job;
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\item a single-authority omnichain topology: A-Chain PoAI consensus, Z-Chain P3Q
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settlement, Lux Quasar post-quantum finality, and receipt-only exactly-once payout to
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Zoo or any other destination; and
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\item an explicit implementation ledger separating proven primitives and reference
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fixtures from the production model, availability, metering, A-Chain, and P3Q integration
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still required before public mining activation.
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\end{enumerate}
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The construction proves objective execution under committed artifacts. It does not prove
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that an output is true, aligned, or valuable. Demand, pricing, and governed quality remain
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market questions; consensus decides only whether the committed eligible work occurred and
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whether its one reward may issue.
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