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41 lines
2.2 KiB
TeX
41 lines
2.2 KiB
TeX
\section{LSS Foundation}
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\label{sec:lss}
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\subsection{Linear Secret Sharing}
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All threshold protocols in \TChain{} rest on a common Linear Secret Sharing (\LSS{}) layer. A $(t, n)$-\LSS{} scheme distributes a secret $s$ into shares $(s_1, \ldots, s_n)$ via a degree-$(t{-}1)$ polynomial over $\mathbb{Z}_q$:
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\begin{equation}
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f(x) = s + a_1 x + a_2 x^2 + \cdots + a_{t-1} x^{t-1}, \quad s_i = f(i)
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\end{equation}
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Any $t$ shares reconstruct $s$ via Lagrange interpolation; fewer than $t$ shares reveal no information about $s$ (information-theoretic secrecy).
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\subsection{The Composition Theorem}
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The key insight enabling \TChain{}'s multi-protocol architecture is that protocols built on compatible \LSS{} instances can share the same access structure and secret shares.
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\begin{theorem}[LSS Composition]
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\label{thm:composition}
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Let $\Pi_1, \ldots, \Pi_m$ be threshold cryptographic protocols, each requiring a $(t, n)$-\LSS{} over the same finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$. If each $\Pi_j$ uses shares of the form $s_i^{(j)} = f^{(j)}(i)$ for independent polynomials $f^{(j)}$ but the same evaluation points $\{1, \ldots, n\}$, then a single keygen ceremony can produce correlated shares for all protocols simultaneously via a vector polynomial:
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\[
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\mathbf{f}(x) = (f^{(1)}(x), \ldots, f^{(m)}(x))
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\]
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The resulting combined scheme preserves the $t$-privacy and $t$-correctness guarantees of each individual protocol.
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\end{theorem}
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This theorem is formally verified in \texttt{Crypto/Threshold/Composition.lean} and underpins the following protocol combinations in \TChain{}:
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\begin{itemize}
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\item \textbf{FROST}: Schnorr threshold signatures (Ed25519, Ristretto)
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\item \textbf{CMP} (CGGMP21): ECDSA threshold signatures (secp256k1, secp256r1)
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\item \textbf{TFHE}: Threshold fully-homomorphic encryption decryption
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\item \textbf{Corona}: Ring signature scheme with threshold key generation
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\item \textbf{BLS}: BLS threshold signatures for beacon chain compatibility
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\end{itemize}
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All five protocols derive their shares from a single DKG ceremony, reducing validator coordination overhead from $O(m)$ independent DKGs to a single vectorized DKG.
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%% --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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