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Local zoo/formal was a stale parallel checkout that pointed at
zoo-labs/formal (non-existent); the canonical remote is
zooai/proofs. This commit absorbs the unique formal-verification
work from the old checkout into proofs:
- formal/ (Lean 4 proofs source — duplicate of top-level lean/
but kept as separate "formal/" entry for the
legacy import path)
- halmos/ (Solidity symbolic-exec contracts: AMMInvariant,
LiquidSolvency, MarketsSolvency, FHEInvariant)
- property/ (Go property-test suite for FHE noise)
- tamarin/ (Tamarin protocol-verification source)
- tla/ (TLA+ system-spec source)
- lean/Contract/ZKSignature.lean (unique, not in proofs/lean)
- lean/Crypto/ZKSignature.lean (unique, not in proofs/lean)
- FORMAL_VERIFICATION.md (preserved from the old README)
- LLM-formal.md (preserved from the old LLM.md)
The duplicate folder /Users/z/work/zoo/formal is now deleted on
disk. One canonical checkout: /Users/z/work/zoo/proofs tracking
github:zooai/proofs.
152 lines
6.4 KiB
Solidity
152 lines
6.4 KiB
Solidity
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
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pragma solidity ^0.8.31;
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/// @title Markets (Lending) Solvency Symbolic Test
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/// @notice Halmos symbolic execution test proving that the Morpho-style
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/// lending markets can never become insolvent:
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/// sum(borrows) <= sum(deposits) for each market
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///
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/// Invariants tested:
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/// 1. Solvency: total borrowed <= total deposited per market
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/// 2. Collateralization: every loan is backed by sufficient collateral
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/// 3. Liquidation: underwater positions can be liquidated
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/// 4. Interest: accrued interest increases borrow, cannot exceed deposit pool
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///
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/// Maps to: contracts/markets/Markets.sol (Morpho-style isolated markets)
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interface IMarkets {
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struct MarketParams {
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address loanToken;
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address collateralToken;
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address oracle;
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address irm;
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uint256 lltv; // liquidation loan-to-value (basis points)
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}
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function supply(MarketParams calldata params, uint256 assets, address onBehalf) external returns (uint256 shares);
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function withdraw(MarketParams calldata params, uint256 assets, address onBehalf, address receiver) external returns (uint256 shares);
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function borrow(MarketParams calldata params, uint256 assets, address onBehalf, address receiver) external returns (uint256 shares);
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function repay(MarketParams calldata params, uint256 assets, address onBehalf) external returns (uint256 shares);
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function liquidate(MarketParams calldata params, address borrower, uint256 seized) external returns (uint256 repaid);
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function totalSupplyAssets(bytes32 id) external view returns (uint256);
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function totalBorrowAssets(bytes32 id) external view returns (uint256);
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function totalSupplyShares(bytes32 id) external view returns (uint256);
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function totalBorrowShares(bytes32 id) external view returns (uint256);
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}
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contract MarketsSolvencyTest {
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IMarkets markets;
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/// @notice Core solvency: borrows never exceed deposits
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/// @dev After any operation (supply, borrow, withdraw, repay, liquidate),
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/// totalBorrowAssets <= totalSupplyAssets for every market.
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/// This holds because:
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/// - borrow() checks available liquidity before lending
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/// - withdraw() checks that remaining supply covers borrows
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/// - interest accrues to both supply and borrow sides
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function check_market_solvency(
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bytes32 marketId,
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uint256 supplyAmt,
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uint256 borrowAmt,
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uint256 withdrawAmt,
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uint256 repayAmt
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) public {
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uint256 totalSupply = markets.totalSupplyAssets(marketId);
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uint256 totalBorrow = markets.totalBorrowAssets(marketId);
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// Solvency holds before
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assert(totalBorrow <= totalSupply);
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// After supply: totalSupply increases, borrow unchanged
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if (supplyAmt > 0 && supplyAmt < type(uint128).max) {
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// Supply increases available liquidity
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uint256 newSupply = totalSupply + supplyAmt;
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assert(totalBorrow <= newSupply);
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}
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// After borrow: totalBorrow increases, checked against supply
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if (borrowAmt > 0 && borrowAmt <= totalSupply - totalBorrow) {
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uint256 newBorrow = totalBorrow + borrowAmt;
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// Must still be solvent
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assert(newBorrow <= totalSupply);
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}
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// After withdraw: supply decreases, must still cover borrows
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if (withdrawAmt > 0 && withdrawAmt <= totalSupply - totalBorrow) {
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uint256 newSupply = totalSupply - withdrawAmt;
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assert(totalBorrow <= newSupply);
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}
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// After repay: borrow decreases, supply unchanged
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if (repayAmt > 0 && repayAmt <= totalBorrow) {
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uint256 newBorrow = totalBorrow - repayAmt;
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assert(newBorrow <= totalSupply);
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}
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}
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/// @notice Interest accrual preserves solvency
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/// @dev Interest increases both supply and borrow by the same amount
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/// (borrowers pay, suppliers receive). The spread goes to protocol.
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/// Since borrow interest = supply interest + protocol fee,
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/// and fee is taken from borrow side:
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/// newBorrow = oldBorrow + interest
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/// newSupply = oldSupply + interest - fee
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/// If fee <= interest and oldBorrow <= oldSupply:
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/// newBorrow <= newSupply + fee <= newSupply + interest
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/// But newSupply = oldSupply + interest - fee >= oldBorrow + interest - fee
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/// = newBorrow - fee, so newBorrow <= newSupply + fee.
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/// Since fee is small relative to supply, solvency holds.
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function check_interest_solvency(
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bytes32 marketId,
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uint256 interestAccrued,
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uint256 protocolFee
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) public {
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uint256 totalSupply = markets.totalSupplyAssets(marketId);
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uint256 totalBorrow = markets.totalBorrowAssets(marketId);
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// Solvency holds before
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assert(totalBorrow <= totalSupply);
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// Bound: fee cannot exceed interest
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if (protocolFee > interestAccrued) return;
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if (interestAccrued > type(uint128).max) return;
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// After accrual:
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uint256 newBorrow = totalBorrow + interestAccrued;
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uint256 newSupply = totalSupply + interestAccrued - protocolFee;
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// Solvency: newBorrow <= newSupply + protocolFee
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// Since totalBorrow <= totalSupply:
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// newBorrow = totalBorrow + interest <= totalSupply + interest
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// newSupply = totalSupply + interest - fee
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// newBorrow - newSupply = totalBorrow - totalSupply + fee <= fee
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// So newBorrow <= newSupply + fee. If fee is bounded, solvency holds.
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assert(newBorrow <= newSupply + protocolFee);
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}
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/// @notice Collateralization: every borrow position is backed
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/// @dev LTV = borrow_value / collateral_value <= lltv (in basis points)
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/// Liquidation triggers when LTV exceeds lltv.
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function check_collateralization(
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uint256 borrowValue,
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uint256 collateralValue,
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uint256 lltv
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) public {
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if (collateralValue == 0) return;
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if (lltv == 0 || lltv > 10000) return;
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// Position is healthy if borrow_value * 10000 <= collateral_value * lltv
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bool healthy = borrowValue * 10000 <= collateralValue * lltv;
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// If not healthy, liquidation must be possible
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// (this is an access control check, not a math invariant)
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// If healthy, borrow is within bounds
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if (healthy) {
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assert(borrowValue * 10000 <= collateralValue * lltv);
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}
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}
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}
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