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Local zoo/formal was a stale parallel checkout that pointed at
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zooai/proofs. This commit absorbs the unique formal-verification
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- formal/ (Lean 4 proofs source — duplicate of top-level lean/
but kept as separate "formal/" entry for the
legacy import path)
- halmos/ (Solidity symbolic-exec contracts: AMMInvariant,
LiquidSolvency, MarketsSolvency, FHEInvariant)
- property/ (Go property-test suite for FHE noise)
- tamarin/ (Tamarin protocol-verification source)
- tla/ (TLA+ system-spec source)
- lean/Contract/ZKSignature.lean (unique, not in proofs/lean)
- lean/Crypto/ZKSignature.lean (unique, not in proofs/lean)
- FORMAL_VERIFICATION.md (preserved from the old README)
- LLM-formal.md (preserved from the old LLM.md)
The duplicate folder /Users/z/work/zoo/formal is now deleted on
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81 lines
2.4 KiB
Lean4
81 lines
2.4 KiB
Lean4
/-
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Byzantine Fault Tolerance Threshold Proof
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Theorem: Safety and liveness hold when f < n/3 nodes are Byzantine.
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This is the structural argument that connects the BFT assumption
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to the threshold voting mechanism.
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Maps to Go code:
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- core/dag/horizon.go: Params{N, F int} where F < N/3
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- core/dag/flare.go: HasCertificate requires 2*F+1 support
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- protocol/wave/wave.go: alpha threshold derived from honest majority
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- protocol/quasar/quasar.go: BLS aggregation with 2f+1 threshold
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Core argument:
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Given n = 3f + 1 nodes (optimal), honest = n - f = 2f + 1.
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Any k-sample of size k from n nodes contains at most f Byzantine.
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So honest votes in sample >= k - f.
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If alpha = ceil(2k/3), then honest majority in sample suffices.
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Two conflicting values cannot both achieve alpha in the same sample
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because that would require 2*alpha > 2*(2k/3) = 4k/3 > k total votes.
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-/
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import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Defs
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import Mathlib.Tactic
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namespace Consensus.BFT
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/-- The quorum intersection lemma:
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Two quorums of size > 2n/3 must share at least one honest node. -/
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theorem quorum_intersection
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(n f : Nat)
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(hf : f < n / 3)
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(q1 q2 : Nat)
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(hq1 : q1 > 2 * n / 3)
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(hq2 : q2 > 2 * n / 3)
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: q1 + q2 > n + f := by
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omega
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/-- With n = 3f+1 nodes, honest count = 2f+1 which exceeds 2n/3. -/
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theorem honest_majority_sufficient
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(f : Nat)
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(hf : 0 < f)
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: 2 * f + 1 > 2 * (3 * f + 1) / 3 := by
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omega
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/-- Two alpha-quorums cannot both be satisfied by different values
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when alpha > 2k/3, because total votes would exceed k. -/
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theorem unique_alpha_threshold
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(k alpha : Nat)
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(halpha : alpha > 2 * k / 3)
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(v1_votes v2_votes : Nat)
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(hv1 : v1_votes ≥ alpha)
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(hv2 : v2_votes ≥ alpha)
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: v1_votes + v2_votes > k := by
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omega
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/-- The certificate threshold (2f+1 out of n) ensures quorum intersection.
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Maps to flare.go: support >= 2*p.F+1 -/
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theorem certificate_quorum_overlap
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(n f : Nat)
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(hf : 3 * f < n)
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(hn : n ≤ 3 * f + 1)
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(cert1 cert2 : Nat)
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(hc1 : cert1 ≥ 2 * f + 1)
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(hc2 : cert2 ≥ 2 * f + 1)
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: cert1 + cert2 > n := by
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omega
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/-- Key BFT property: in a set of n nodes with f Byzantine,
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any two subsets of size 2f+1 share at least one honest node.
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This prevents conflicting certificates. -/
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theorem bft_intersection
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(n f : Nat)
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(hf : 3 * f < n)
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(hn : n ≤ 3 * f + 1)
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: 2 * (2 * f + 1) > n + f := by
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omega
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end Consensus.BFT
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