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Local zoo/formal was a stale parallel checkout that pointed at
zoo-labs/formal (non-existent); the canonical remote is
zooai/proofs. This commit absorbs the unique formal-verification
work from the old checkout into proofs:
- formal/ (Lean 4 proofs source — duplicate of top-level lean/
but kept as separate "formal/" entry for the
legacy import path)
- halmos/ (Solidity symbolic-exec contracts: AMMInvariant,
LiquidSolvency, MarketsSolvency, FHEInvariant)
- property/ (Go property-test suite for FHE noise)
- tamarin/ (Tamarin protocol-verification source)
- tla/ (TLA+ system-spec source)
- lean/Contract/ZKSignature.lean (unique, not in proofs/lean)
- lean/Crypto/ZKSignature.lean (unique, not in proofs/lean)
- FORMAL_VERIFICATION.md (preserved from the old README)
- LLM-formal.md (preserved from the old LLM.md)
The duplicate folder /Users/z/work/zoo/formal is now deleted on
disk. One canonical checkout: /Users/z/work/zoo/proofs tracking
github:zooai/proofs.
88 lines
2.7 KiB
Lean4
88 lines
2.7 KiB
Lean4
/-
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SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) Hash-Based Signature Correctness
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The conservative backup in the hybrid scheme. SLH-DSA's security
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relies ONLY on hash function properties — no lattice assumptions.
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If ML-DSA falls to quantum or classical attack, SLH-DSA survives.
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Based on SPHINCS+ (stateless hash-based signatures).
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Maps to:
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- luxfi/crypto: slhdsa package
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- lux/node: validator hybrid identity (third signature)
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Properties:
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- Correctness: sign then verify succeeds
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- Hash-only security: no lattice/group assumptions
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- Stateless: no state tracking between signatures (unlike XMSS)
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-/
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import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Defs
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import Mathlib.Tactic
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namespace Crypto.SLHDSA
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/-- SLH-DSA parameter sets (FIPS 205) -/
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inductive ParamSet where
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| slh128s -- SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s (small, slow)
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| slh128f -- SLH-DSA-SHA2-128f (fast, larger)
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| slh192s -- SLH-DSA-SHA2-192s
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| slh256s -- SLH-DSA-SHA2-256s (maximum security)
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deriving DecidableEq, Repr
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/-- Signature sizes (bytes) -/
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def sigSize : ParamSet → Nat
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| .slh128s => 7856
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| .slh128f => 17088
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| .slh192s => 16224
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| .slh256s => 29792
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/-- Public key sizes (bytes) -/
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def pkSize : ParamSet → Nat
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| .slh128s => 32
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| .slh128f => 32
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| .slh192s => 48
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| .slh256s => 64
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/-- Security level (bits) -/
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def securityBits : ParamSet → Nat
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| .slh128s => 128
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| .slh128f => 128
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| .slh192s => 192
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| .slh256s => 256
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/-- Sign and verify (axiomatized) -/
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axiom slhdsa_sign : ParamSet → Nat → Nat → Nat
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axiom slhdsa_verify : ParamSet → Nat → Nat → Nat → Bool
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/-- Correctness: valid keypair sign-then-verify succeeds -/
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axiom slhdsa_correctness :
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∀ (ps : ParamSet) (sk pk msg : Nat),
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slhdsa_verify ps pk msg (slhdsa_sign ps sk msg) = true
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/-- Hash-only security: security reduces to hash function properties.
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No lattice, no discrete log, no factoring assumption. -/
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axiom slhdsa_hash_only_security :
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∀ (ps : ParamSet) (pk msg forgery : Nat),
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slhdsa_verify ps pk msg forgery = true →
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∃ (sk : Nat), forgery = slhdsa_sign ps sk msg
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/-- 128s is the smallest signature -/
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theorem slh128s_smallest : ∀ ps : ParamSet, sigSize .slh128s ≤ sigSize ps := by
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intro ps; cases ps <;> simp [sigSize]
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/-- All parameter sets have ≥ 128-bit security -/
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theorem min_security_128 : ∀ ps : ParamSet, securityBits ps ≥ 128 := by
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intro ps; cases ps <;> simp [securityBits]
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/-- Public keys are compact (≤ 64 bytes) -/
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theorem pk_compact : ∀ ps : ParamSet, pkSize ps ≤ 64 := by
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intro ps; cases ps <;> simp [pkSize]
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/-- Statelessness: signing is a pure function of (params, sk, msg).
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No counter, no state tree updates. This is rfl by construction. -/
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theorem stateless_signing (ps : ParamSet) (sk msg : Nat) :
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slhdsa_sign ps sk msg = slhdsa_sign ps sk msg := rfl
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end Crypto.SLHDSA
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