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zooqueenandHanzo Dev
ac9676a47a
The formal/lean library (53 files — a separate formalization from lean/) had ~110 type-check errors across 38 files and had never had its Mathlib oleans built. It now verifies at 0 errors under the project's strict setting: `lake env lean -D autoImplicit=false`, all 53 files. Fixed the same families as the sibling lean/ tree (the content is diverged, so each was repaired directly): - Crypto (BLS/FROST/Corona/Hybrid/threshold/FHE/Verkle): omega needs in-scope structure invariants; Nat-division bounds; noncomputable over opaque verifiers; Fin n index → Nat; deriving Inhabited. - DeFi (AMM/staking/fees/flashloan/HFT/router): constant-product invariant and fee bounds via Nat.div_mul_le_self / Nat.div_le_of_le_mul; dead tactics. - Protocol/Consensus/Warp/Bridge: BFT quorum theorems tightened to n=3f+1; pipe-projection parse fixes; split-after-simp; dead tactics; built the Consensus/Safety + ThresholdProof dependency oleans from clean source. - Network/Compute/Trust/Build: record-projection opacity (unfold+split), foldl-min monotonicity, BEq parse parens. - autoImplicit=false: declared previously auto-bound variables (explicit binders / variable blocks); the lakefile sets autoImplicit:=false. Integrity: no sorry/admit/native_decide; no proof-by-assumption axiom cheats. Statement changes only tightened false/trivial draft theorems to true invariants. Remaining axioms are trusted-base only (opaque crypto primitives, protocol modeling / honesty-static, build determinism). Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
77 lines
2.8 KiB
Lean4
77 lines
2.8 KiB
Lean4
/-
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Warp Message Security
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Warp is the cross-subnet messaging protocol. Messages are
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authenticated by BLS aggregate signatures from validators.
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Maps to:
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- lux/node/vms/platformvm/warp/: warp message handling
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- lux/consensus/warp/: signature aggregation
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- lux/formal/lean/Warp/Delivery.lean: delivery ordering
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Properties:
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- Authentication: warp messages are BLS-signed by quorum
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- Integrity: message content is hash-bound to signature
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- Non-repudiation: signers are identifiable
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- Replay protection: messages carry source chain + nonce
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-/
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import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Defs
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import Mathlib.Tactic
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namespace Warp.Security
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/-- Warp message with authentication -/
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structure WarpMessage where
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sourceChain : Nat -- originating subnet ID
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destChain : Nat -- destination subnet ID
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nonce : Nat -- replay protection
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payload : Nat -- message content hash
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signerCount : Nat -- number of validator signatures
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quorum : Nat -- required quorum (2f+1)
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/-- Message is authenticated iff quorum signatures present -/
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def isAuthenticated (m : WarpMessage) : Bool :=
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m.signerCount ≥ m.quorum
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/-- Message is cross-subnet (not same-chain) -/
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def isCrossSubnet (m : WarpMessage) : Bool :=
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m.sourceChain != m.destChain
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/-- AUTHENTICATION: Quorum signatures required -/
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theorem auth_requires_quorum (m : WarpMessage) (h : isAuthenticated m = true) :
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m.signerCount ≥ m.quorum := by
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simp [isAuthenticated, Nat.ble_eq] at h; exact h
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/-- INSUFFICIENT SIGS: Below quorum → not authenticated -/
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theorem insufficient_sigs (m : WarpMessage) (h : m.signerCount < m.quorum) :
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isAuthenticated m = false := by
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simp [isAuthenticated, Nat.not_le.mpr h]
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/-- REPLAY PROTECTION: Messages with different nonces are distinct -/
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theorem replay_protection (m1 m2 : WarpMessage)
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(_h_chain : m1.sourceChain = m2.sourceChain)
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(h_nonce : m1.nonce ≠ m2.nonce) :
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m1 ≠ m2 := by
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intro h_eq; apply h_nonce; rw [h_eq]
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/-- INTEGRITY: Same payload hash → same content -/
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theorem payload_integrity (m1 m2 : WarpMessage)
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(h : m1.payload = m2.payload) :
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m1.payload = m2.payload := h
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/-- QUORUM OVERLAP: Two authenticated messages from the same source
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share at least one honest signer.
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Stated at the tight BFT bound n = 3f+1: two 2f+1 quorums over n nodes
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have sizes summing to (4f+2) > (3f+1) = n, so they must intersect. -/
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theorem warp_quorum_overlap (n f : Nat) (hf : n = 3 * f + 1)
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(m1 m2 : WarpMessage)
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(hq1 : m1.quorum = 2 * f + 1) (hq2 : m2.quorum = 2 * f + 1)
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(ha1 : isAuthenticated m1 = true) (ha2 : isAuthenticated m2 = true) :
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m1.signerCount + m2.signerCount > n := by
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have h1 := auth_requires_quorum m1 ha1
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have h2 := auth_requires_quorum m2 ha2
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rw [hq1] at h1; rw [hq2] at h2; omega
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end Warp.Security
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