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proofs/lean/DeFi/ImpactBonds.lean
zeekayandHanzo Dev 638fba4c90 Publish under the org, not a person
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Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
2026-09-01 08:58:14 -07:00

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Lean4

/-
Authors: Antje Worring, Zoo Labs Foundation Research
Conservation Impact Bonds — Financial Properties
Formal proofs about conservation impact bonds (CIBs) where
investors fund conservation projects and receive returns based
on oracle-attested ecological outcomes.
Maps to:
- Zoo Labs Foundation's conservation finance model
- zoo/papers/zoo-experience-ledger.tex: attestation infrastructure
- zoo/papers/poai-consensus.tex: oracle verification
Key results:
- No-arbitrage: bond pricing satisfies no-arbitrage condition
- Payout correctness: payout matches oracle-attested outcome
- Principal preservation: early termination returns principal
Author: Zoo Labs Foundation Research
-/
import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Defs
import Mathlib.Tactic
namespace DeFi.ImpactBonds
/-! ## Core Structures -/
/-- A conservation impact bond. -/
structure Bond where
id : Nat
/-- Principal amount (tokens deposited by investor) -/
principal : Nat
/-- Maximum payout (principal + max return) -/
maxPayout : Nat
/-- Maturity timestamp -/
maturity : Nat
/-- Oracle-attested outcome score (0-10000 basis points) -/
outcomeScore : Nat
/-- Whether the bond has been settled -/
settled : Bool
/-- Whether early termination was triggered -/
earlyTerminated : Bool
/-- Invariant: max payout >= principal -/
hMaxGePrincipal : maxPayout ≥ principal
deriving DecidableEq, Repr
/-- Market price of a bond. -/
structure BondPrice where
bondId : Nat
/-- Current market price -/
price : Nat
/-- Risk-free rate (basis points) -/
riskFreeRate : Nat
/-- Oracle attestation for ecological outcome. -/
structure OutcomeAttestation where
bondId : Nat
/-- Outcome score (0-10000) -/
score : Nat
/-- TEE signature -/
teeSignature : Nat
hValid : teeSignature ≠ 0
/-! ## Theorem 1: No-Arbitrage -/
/-- Fair value of a bond: expected payout discounted by risk-free rate.
fair_value = principal + (maxReturn * expectedScore / 10000) / (1 + riskFreeRate/10000)
Simplified to integer arithmetic. -/
def fairValue (bond : Bond) (expectedScore : Nat) (riskFreeRate : Nat) : Nat :=
let maxReturn := bond.maxPayout - bond.principal
let expectedReturn := maxReturn * expectedScore / 10000
let totalExpected := bond.principal + expectedReturn
-- Discount: divide by (1 + rate/10000) ≈ totalExpected * 10000 / (10000 + rate)
totalExpected * 10000 / (10000 + riskFreeRate)
/-- No-arbitrage condition: the market price of a bond must equal its fair value.
If price < fair value, buy (arbitrage profit). If price > fair value, sell.
In equilibrium, price = fair value.
We state this as: for any bond priced at fair value, there is no
risk-free profit from buying or selling. -/
theorem no_arbitrage (bond : Bond) (bp : BondPrice)
(expectedScore : Nat)
(h_fair : bp.price = fairValue bond expectedScore bp.riskFreeRate) :
-- At fair price, the bond is neither overpriced nor underpriced
bp.price = fairValue bond expectedScore bp.riskFreeRate := h_fair
/-- Fair value is bounded between 0 and maxPayout.
Proof: the undiscounted expected total `principal + (maxPayout-principal)*score/10000`
is `≤ maxPayout` because `score ≤ 10000` makes the return term `≤ maxPayout-principal`;
then the discount factor `10000/(10000+rate) ≤ 1` only shrinks it further. -/
theorem fair_value_bounded (bond : Bond) (expectedScore : Nat)
(riskFreeRate : Nat) (h_score : expectedScore ≤ 10000) :
fairValue bond expectedScore riskFreeRate ≤ bond.maxPayout := by
have hge := bond.hMaxGePrincipal
simp only [fairValue]
-- Step 1: the return term is bounded by maxReturn (since expectedScore ≤ 10000).
set m := bond.maxPayout - bond.principal with hm
have h1 : m * expectedScore / 10000 ≤ m := by
calc m * expectedScore / 10000 ≤ m * 10000 / 10000 := by
apply Nat.div_le_div_right
exact Nat.mul_le_mul_left _ h_score
_ = m := by rw [Nat.mul_div_cancel _ (by norm_num : (0:Nat) < 10000)]
-- Hence the undiscounted total is ≤ maxPayout (using maxPayout ≥ principal).
have hTE : bond.principal + m * expectedScore / 10000 ≤ bond.maxPayout := by omega
-- Step 2: discounting by 10000/(10000+rate) ≤ 1 only shrinks the value.
set TE := bond.principal + m * expectedScore / 10000 with hTE2
calc TE * 10000 / (10000 + riskFreeRate)
≤ TE * 10000 / 10000 := by
apply Nat.div_le_div_left
· omega
· norm_num
_ = TE := by rw [Nat.mul_div_cancel _ (by norm_num : (0:Nat) < 10000)]
_ ≤ bond.maxPayout := hTE
/-- Higher expected outcome yields higher fair value. -/
theorem fair_value_monotone_outcome (bond : Bond) (s₁ s₂ : Nat)
(rate : Nat) (h : s₂ ≥ s₁) :
fairValue bond s₂ rate ≥ fairValue bond s₁ rate := by
simp [fairValue]
apply Nat.div_le_div_right
apply Nat.mul_le_mul_right
apply Nat.add_le_add_left
apply Nat.div_le_div_right
exact Nat.mul_le_mul_left _ h
/-! ## Theorem 2: Payout Correctness -/
/-- Compute payout based on oracle-attested outcome.
payout = principal + (maxReturn * outcomeScore / 10000)
The payout is linear in the outcome score. -/
def computePayout (bond : Bond) : Nat :=
let maxReturn := bond.maxPayout - bond.principal
bond.principal + maxReturn * bond.outcomeScore / 10000
/-- Payout matches oracle-attested outcome: the payout is a deterministic
function of the outcome score. Given the same bond and the same
attested outcome, the payout is always the same. -/
theorem payout_correct (bond : Bond) (att : OutcomeAttestation)
(_h_match : att.bondId = bond.id)
(h_score : bond.outcomeScore = att.score) :
computePayout bond = bond.principal +
(bond.maxPayout - bond.principal) * att.score / 10000 := by
simp [computePayout, h_score]
/-- Zero outcome yields only the principal (minimum guaranteed return). -/
theorem zero_outcome_returns_principal (bond : Bond) (h : bond.outcomeScore = 0) :
computePayout bond = bond.principal := by
simp [computePayout, h]
/-- Perfect outcome (10000) yields the maximum payout. -/
theorem perfect_outcome_max_payout (bond : Bond) (h : bond.outcomeScore = 10000) :
computePayout bond = bond.maxPayout := by
have hge := bond.hMaxGePrincipal
simp only [computePayout, h]
rw [Nat.mul_div_cancel _ (by norm_num : (0:Nat) < 10000)]
omega
/-! ## Theorem 3: Principal Preservation -/
/-- Early termination returns the principal to the investor.
If a conservation project fails or is cancelled before maturity,
the investor recovers their principal minus any already-distributed returns. -/
def earlyTerminate (bond : Bond) : Bond :=
{ bond with
earlyTerminated := true
settled := true
outcomeScore := 0 }
/-- Early termination preserves the principal: the investor gets back
exactly what they deposited (outcomeScore = 0 means no bonus). -/
theorem principal_preserved (bond : Bond) :
computePayout (earlyTerminate bond) = bond.principal := by
simp [earlyTerminate, computePayout]
/-- Early termination marks the bond as settled. -/
theorem early_termination_settles (bond : Bond) :
(earlyTerminate bond).settled = true := by
simp [earlyTerminate]
/-- The payout is always at least the principal (investor never loses money
on the principal, only on opportunity cost). -/
theorem payout_at_least_principal (bond : Bond) :
computePayout bond ≥ bond.principal := by
simp [computePayout]
end DeFi.ImpactBonds