mirror of
https://github.com/zooai/proofs.git
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zooqueenandHanzo Dev
d3bff5e2dc
The lean/ proof library (88 files) had ~180 type-check errors across ~45 files plus 31 proof-by-assumption axiom cheats. It now type-checks cleanly under Lean 4.14.0 + Mathlib, with every theorem genuinely proven from definitions. Errors fixed: - Stale Mathlib imports: Data.Nat.Basic / Data.Int.Basic were removed this rev -> Data.Nat.Defs / Data.Int.Defs (57 files). - Shared AI/Agent/Governance/Contract/DeFi/Ecology draft files: same proof-rot as the zoo-labs sibling library (now reconciled): omega missing in-scope bounds, dead tactics after simp, simp over-reduction, doc-comment placement, reserved-word binders, deriving Repr on Finset-bearing structs, noncomputable defs over opaque primitives. - Consensus/Liveness: collapsed a 74-error cascade (undefined shared state model inlined from Safety.lean; the |>. pipe-projection vs comparison parse trap on 14 lines rewritten to explicit dot projection). - Crypto (BLS/FROST/Corona/Hybrid/threshold/FHE), Consensus, Protocol, Warp, Trust, GPU, Compute, Network, DeFi: brought structure invariants into scope for omega, Nat-division bounds via Nat.div_le_of_le_mul / Nat.div_mul_le_self, noncomputable over opaque crypto ops, deriving Inhabited for index access. Integrity: - Removed all 31 `theorem X := X_ax` cheats (axiom asserting the identical statement) and proved each from definitions; removed the UNSOUND content_addressed axiom (hash-injectivity over a struct with free fields). - Quorum-intersection theorems (BFT/Quasar/Flare/Warp/BLS/GPU/Bridge): the draft hypothesis 3f<n is insufficient (n unbounded above makes them false); tightened to the optimal-resilience invariant n=3f+1 / 2t>n. Statement intent preserved. - Net axiom change: -35 / +1 (the one addition, honesty_static, is a fixed-validator-set modeling assumption matching sibling files). - Remaining axioms are trusted-base only: opaque crypto primitives (groups, pairings, hardness, hashes, FHE encrypt/decrypt, BLS soundness, forward secrecy, Fisher-Yates uniformity) and protocol modeling assumptions. No sorry/admit/native_decide. Verified all theorems trace to [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound] plus those primitives. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
83 lines
2.6 KiB
Lean4
83 lines
2.6 KiB
Lean4
/-
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Authors: Antje Worring, Zach Kelling
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ML-DSA (FIPS 204) Signature Correctness
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Models the ML-DSA precompile (src/precompiles/mldsa/).
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ML-DSA is the NIST post-quantum digital signature standard,
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based on the Fiat-Shamir with Aborts paradigm over module lattices.
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Maps to:
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- src/precompiles/mldsa/: Go implementation
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- luxfi/crypto: ML-DSA package
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Properties:
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- Correctness: sign then verify always succeeds
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- EUF-CMA: existential unforgeability under chosen message attack
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- Signature size: 3309 bytes for ML-DSA-65 (security level 3)
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-/
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import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Defs
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import Mathlib.Tactic
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namespace Crypto.MLDSA
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/-- ML-DSA security levels -/
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inductive SecurityLevel where
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| level2 : SecurityLevel -- ML-DSA-44 (128-bit)
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| level3 : SecurityLevel -- ML-DSA-65 (192-bit)
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| level5 : SecurityLevel -- ML-DSA-87 (256-bit)
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/-- Signature sizes by security level -/
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def sigSize (l : SecurityLevel) : Nat :=
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match l with
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| .level2 => 2420
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| .level3 => 3309
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| .level5 => 4627
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/-- Public key sizes -/
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def pkSize (l : SecurityLevel) : Nat :=
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match l with
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| .level2 => 1312
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| .level3 => 1952
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| .level5 => 2592
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/-- Abstract sign and verify functions for ML-DSA -/
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axiom mldsa_sign : SecurityLevel → Nat → Nat → Nat
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axiom mldsa_verify : SecurityLevel → Nat → Nat → Nat → Bool
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axiom mldsa_correctness :
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∀ (l : SecurityLevel) (sk pk msg : Nat),
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-- For a valid key pair (sk, pk), sign then verify always succeeds
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mldsa_verify l pk msg (mldsa_sign l sk msg) = true
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/-- EUF-CMA security under Module-LWE assumption -/
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axiom mldsa_euf_cma :
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∀ (l : SecurityLevel) (pk msg : Nat) (forgery : Nat),
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-- No PPT/quantum adversary can forge a signature on a new message
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-- even after seeing signatures on chosen messages (Module-LWE hardness)
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mldsa_verify l pk msg forgery = true →
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∃ (sk : Nat), forgery = mldsa_sign l sk msg
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/-- Signature size is bounded -/
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theorem sig_size_bounded (l : SecurityLevel) :
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sigSize l ≤ 5000 := by
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cases l <;> simp [sigSize]
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/-- ML-DSA-65 is the default for Lux (NIST Level 3, 192-bit security) -/
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theorem default_level_3 : sigSize .level3 = 3309 := rfl
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/-- Public key size at level 3 -/
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theorem pk_size_level3 : pkSize .level3 = 1952 := rfl
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/-- Security levels are ordered -/
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theorem level2_lt_level3 : sigSize .level2 < sigSize .level3 := by simp [sigSize]
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theorem level3_lt_level5 : sigSize .level3 < sigSize .level5 := by simp [sigSize]
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/-- All signature sizes fit in a network packet (< 5KB) -/
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theorem all_sigs_bounded : ∀ l : SecurityLevel, sigSize l < 5000 := by
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intro l; cases l <;> simp [sigSize]
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end Crypto.MLDSA
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