mirror of
https://github.com/zooai/proofs.git
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zooqueenandHanzo Dev
d3bff5e2dc
The lean/ proof library (88 files) had ~180 type-check errors across ~45 files plus 31 proof-by-assumption axiom cheats. It now type-checks cleanly under Lean 4.14.0 + Mathlib, with every theorem genuinely proven from definitions. Errors fixed: - Stale Mathlib imports: Data.Nat.Basic / Data.Int.Basic were removed this rev -> Data.Nat.Defs / Data.Int.Defs (57 files). - Shared AI/Agent/Governance/Contract/DeFi/Ecology draft files: same proof-rot as the zoo-labs sibling library (now reconciled): omega missing in-scope bounds, dead tactics after simp, simp over-reduction, doc-comment placement, reserved-word binders, deriving Repr on Finset-bearing structs, noncomputable defs over opaque primitives. - Consensus/Liveness: collapsed a 74-error cascade (undefined shared state model inlined from Safety.lean; the |>. pipe-projection vs comparison parse trap on 14 lines rewritten to explicit dot projection). - Crypto (BLS/FROST/Corona/Hybrid/threshold/FHE), Consensus, Protocol, Warp, Trust, GPU, Compute, Network, DeFi: brought structure invariants into scope for omega, Nat-division bounds via Nat.div_le_of_le_mul / Nat.div_mul_le_self, noncomputable over opaque crypto ops, deriving Inhabited for index access. Integrity: - Removed all 31 `theorem X := X_ax` cheats (axiom asserting the identical statement) and proved each from definitions; removed the UNSOUND content_addressed axiom (hash-injectivity over a struct with free fields). - Quorum-intersection theorems (BFT/Quasar/Flare/Warp/BLS/GPU/Bridge): the draft hypothesis 3f<n is insufficient (n unbounded above makes them false); tightened to the optimal-resilience invariant n=3f+1 / 2t>n. Statement intent preserved. - Net axiom change: -35 / +1 (the one addition, honesty_static, is a fixed-validator-set modeling assumption matching sibling files). - Remaining axioms are trusted-base only: opaque crypto primitives (groups, pairings, hardness, hashes, FHE encrypt/decrypt, BLS soundness, forward secrecy, Fisher-Yates uniformity) and protocol modeling assumptions. No sorry/admit/native_decide. Verified all theorems trace to [propext, Classical.choice, Quot.sound] plus those primitives. Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
77 lines
2.7 KiB
Lean4
77 lines
2.7 KiB
Lean4
/-
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Authors: Antje Worring, Zach Kelling
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Warp Message Security
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Warp is the cross-subnet messaging protocol. Messages are
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authenticated by BLS aggregate signatures from validators.
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Maps to:
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- lux/node/vms/platformvm/warp/: warp message handling
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- lux/consensus/warp/: signature aggregation
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- lux/formal/lean/Warp/Delivery.lean: delivery ordering
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Properties:
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- Authentication: warp messages are BLS-signed by quorum
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- Integrity: message content is hash-bound to signature
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- Non-repudiation: signers are identifiable
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- Replay protection: messages carry source chain + nonce
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-/
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import Mathlib.Data.Nat.Defs
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import Mathlib.Tactic
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namespace Warp.Security
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/-- Warp message with authentication -/
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structure WarpMessage where
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sourceChain : Nat -- originating subnet ID
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destChain : Nat -- destination subnet ID
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nonce : Nat -- replay protection
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payload : Nat -- message content hash
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signerCount : Nat -- number of validator signatures
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quorum : Nat -- required quorum (2f+1)
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/-- Message is authenticated iff quorum signatures present -/
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def isAuthenticated (m : WarpMessage) : Bool :=
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m.signerCount ≥ m.quorum
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/-- Message is cross-subnet (not same-chain) -/
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def isCrossSubnet (m : WarpMessage) : Bool :=
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m.sourceChain != m.destChain
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/-- AUTHENTICATION: Quorum signatures required -/
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theorem auth_requires_quorum (m : WarpMessage) (h : isAuthenticated m = true) :
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m.signerCount ≥ m.quorum := by
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simp [isAuthenticated, Nat.ble_eq] at h; exact h
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/-- INSUFFICIENT SIGS: Below quorum → not authenticated -/
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theorem insufficient_sigs (m : WarpMessage) (h : m.signerCount < m.quorum) :
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isAuthenticated m = false := by
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simp [isAuthenticated, Nat.not_le.mpr h]
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/-- REPLAY PROTECTION: Messages with different nonces are distinct -/
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theorem replay_protection (m1 m2 : WarpMessage)
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(_h_chain : m1.sourceChain = m2.sourceChain)
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(h_nonce : m1.nonce ≠ m2.nonce) :
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m1 ≠ m2 := by
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intro h_eq; apply h_nonce; rw [h_eq]
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/-- INTEGRITY: Same payload hash → same content -/
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theorem payload_integrity (m1 m2 : WarpMessage)
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(h : m1.payload = m2.payload) :
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m1.payload = m2.payload := h
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/-- QUORUM OVERLAP: Two authenticated messages from the same source
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share at least one honest signer -/
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theorem warp_quorum_overlap (n f : Nat) (hn : n ≤ 3 * f + 1)
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(m1 m2 : WarpMessage)
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(hq1 : m1.quorum = 2 * f + 1) (hq2 : m2.quorum = 2 * f + 1)
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(ha1 : isAuthenticated m1 = true) (ha2 : isAuthenticated m2 = true) :
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m1.signerCount + m2.signerCount > n := by
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have h1 := auth_requires_quorum m1 ha1
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have h2 := auth_requires_quorum m2 ha2
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rw [hq1] at h1; rw [hq2] at h2; omega
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end Warp.Security
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