zeekayandhanzo-dev 5b533e58fe fix: complete the TypeScript 7 tsconfig migration
The first pass left three classes of config that BOTH tsc 5.9 and tsc 7
reject. Each was proven against both compilers before changing:

  TS5090  A `paths` target must be relative once `baseUrl` is gone. The
          first pass skipped the "./" prefix wherever baseUrl pointed at
          the config's own directory, reasoning it was semantically
          equivalent. It is not — without baseUrl a non-relative target
          is rejected outright, by 5.9 as well as 7.

  TS5110  `moduleResolution: node16` requires `module: node16`. The first
          pass mapped commonjs projects to node16 resolution alone, which
          BROKE those configs for the current toolchain. Both are now set.

  TS5102  `downlevelIteration` is also removed in TS7; it was missing from
          the dead-flag list.

Verified: repos that tsc 7 previously refused (base-studio, js-sdk, kv-js)
now report zero config errors on tsc 7 AND tsc 5.9.

Co-Authored-By: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>
2026-07-27 17:41:19 -07:00
2026-07-27 16:18:10 -07:00

Hanzo KMS

Hanzo KMS

Secrets, keys, and threshold signing for the Hanzo platform — per-org namespaces, IAM-gated, ZAP-native, MPC-backed. A thin Go server over the canonical luxfi/kms primitives.

Status License Go

What this is

Hanzo KMS is the canonical secret store and signing service for every Hanzo deployment. It holds the per-tenant DEKs that back Hanzo Base, the provider API keys the AI and gateway services consume, certificate material, and validator signing keys.

AI agents are first-class identities: every secret carries a policy that controls whether an agent may read it — auto-approve, requires-approval, or blocked — with a full per-agent audit trail.

All server logic lives in luxfi/kms. This module wires those primitives with Hanzo defaults (IAM at hanzo.id, encrypted-at-rest storage, S3 replication) and adds JWT verification, the audit ledger, version CAS, and header hygiene. It mounts into the unified cloud binary (kms.Mount) and also ships as a standalone daemon.

Quick start

Build from source — pure Go, no database toolchain required:

make kmsd kms          # builds ./kmsd (daemon) and ./kms (admin CLI)
KMS_ENV=dev ./kmsd     # HTTP on :8443, ZAP on :9999

Or run the container image (pin a released tag — never :latest):

docker run -p 8443:8443 ghcr.io/hanzoai/kms:vX.Y.Z

In any non-dev environment the daemon refuses to boot without full JWT config (KMS_EXPECTED_ISSUER, KMS_EXPECTED_AUDIENCE, KMS_JWKS_URL) — fail-closed by design.

AI access control

Your secrets, your rules. AI agents are first-class citizens — and so is your ability to block them.

  • Per-secret policies — mark any secret requires-approval; a read from any agent triggers a real-time approval prompt.
  • Auto-approve mode — move fast in development, escalate specific secrets to manual sign-off before production.
  • Identity tracking — see exactly which model, tool, or agent accessed which secret, and when.
  • Full audit trail — every AI-originated read is logged with agent identity, timestamp, and reason.
Secret: STRIPE_LIVE_KEY
  policy:  requires-approval
  reader:  agent via hanzo-mcp
  status:  waiting for approval → [approve] [deny]

API surface

Everything is served under /v1/kms — one canonical path per operation, no aliases, no /api/. Every endpoint requires a Hanzo IAM JWT (RS/ES/PS/EdDSA — never HS*, never none) or an explicit admin role.

Group Endpoints
Auth POST /v1/kms/auth/login — machine-identity client credentials → IAM token
Secrets (per-org) GET / POST / PATCH / DELETE /v1/kms/orgs/{org}/secrets/…env is a first-class key component; writes require an explicit env; PATCH requires version CAS via If-Match
MPC keys POST /v1/kms/keys/generate · /{id}/sign · /{id}/rotate · GET /v1/kms/keys · /v1/kms/status — threshold BLS / round signing via luxfi/mpc
Health GET /healthz — liveness, no auth

A sub-100µs binary ZAP transport (default :9999) mirrors the HTTP surface for in-cluster callers under the identical JWT + role model. The Go client at sdk/go (HTTP with ZAP fallback) is what every other Hanzo service uses to fetch secrets at runtime.

Storage & durability

  • At rest — ZapDB (LSM) at $KMS_DATA_DIR; per-secret 256-bit DEK wrapped under the master key (AES-256-GCM).
  • Replication — age-encrypted incremental + snapshot backups streamed to S3 (off when unset).
  • Audit — buffered SQLite side-table; single writer, never blocks the request path.

Specs

  • HIP-0027 — KMS
  • HIP-0106 — Unified Cloud Binary (kms subsystem)
  • HIP-0302 — Encrypted SQLite + ZapDB durability (DEK source)

Security

Please do not open public GitHub issues for security vulnerabilities. Email security@hanzo.ai with a description and, ideally, a reproduction. We respond quickly.

License

MIT — see LICENSE. Portions are derived from Infisical (MIT, © 2022 Infisical Inc.); see NOTICE. The current request path is a thin wrapper over luxfi/kms; no original upstream server code remains on the wire.


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Description
Canonical source. Mirrored from github.com/hanzoai/kms-v1
Readme MIT
1.2 GiB
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TypeScript 14.1%
Python 2.1%
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