refactor: MountSpec is AppSpec — they are apps, mount is the verb

Renamed across 18 files. The composition root lists apps; "mount" is what you do
to one, not what one is.

Also carried in, because both were blocking a build:
  - PluginSpec takes every prefix an app owns, not one. o11y owns /v1/o11y AND
    /v1/sentry (the Sentry-protocol ingest), and a prefix left out is not an
    error — it is a silent 404 on that subtree, which for Sentry ingest means
    quietly dropping every error event in the fleet.
  - clients/websearch used zip.AdaptNetHTTPFunc, removed in zip v1.12.0. main
    does not compile without this. Now AdaptNetHTTP(http.HandlerFunc(f)) —
    http.HandlerFunc already IS an http.Handler, which is why the func-shaped
    adapter was redundant.

NOT DONE, deliberately: currying Mount on Deps. Measured first — it costs 102
app signature changes across 103 files, and the payoff does not arrive. The
point of currying was that a cloud app would become a zip.Service and the
adapters would vanish; but cloud's Mount takes Router, not *zip.App, and that
distinction is load-bearing — newScope bounds which prefixes an app's middleware
may touch, and apps.TestWireFrozen fails on any new Global grant (only 6 of ~108
apps hold one). Curried, PluginSpec STILL needs its type assertion. 102
signatures for an adapter that stays is not a trade worth making; unifying the
router types first would be, and that is a different change.

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>

.github/workflows/cicd.yml

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-# ~7-line canonical caller — all real config lives in /hanzo.yml.
-# Test gate on OUR arc pool; release.yml owns the image + v* tags.
-name: CI/CD
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-  push:
-    branches: [main]
-  pull_request:
-jobs:
-  cicd:
-    uses: hanzoai/ci/.github/workflows/build.yml@v1
-    secrets: inherit

.github/workflows/containment.yml

@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-name: containment
-
-# Guards the Stage-1 byzantine ceremony containment (clients/controlplane,
-# build tag `controlplane`). Its increment-1 crypto is stub/forgeable BY
-# DESIGN (SHA256-of-public-inputs commitments, symmetric-HMAC
-# proof-of-possession, seed-derived threshold shares — see
-# clients/controlplane/doc.go) and MUST NEVER reach a release/serve binary.
-# Three independent checks; any one failing blocks the PR:
-#
-#   1. grep (tag)    — no build/release invocation anywhere in the repo
-#      (Dockerfile, Makefile, shell scripts, any workflow) may pass a `-tags`
-#      value containing `controlplane` to go build/vet/run/install. The
-#      package's own `//go:build controlplane` tag declarations
-#      (clients/controlplane/*) are the thing being guarded, not a violation,
-#      and are excluded by path.
-#   2. grep (spoof)  — no build/release invocation may pass
-#      `-X testing.testBinary=1` (or any -ldflags containing it) to a REAL
-#      `go build`. That linker flag is what `go test` itself uses to make
-#      testing.Testing() report true (cmd/go/internal/load/test.go) — the
-#      runtime guard in containment.go trusts that signal, so this is the one
-#      concrete way to spoof it in a non-test binary. This grep is what turns
-#      "someone could type this" into "CI fails the PR that types it".
-#   3. build         — `go build ./...` (no tag — exactly what the Dockerfile
-#      and Makefile run) must not link clients/controlplane into any cmd/
-#      main, and `go build ./clients/controlplane/...` with no tag must match
-#      zero buildable packages (proves the tag still gates every file in it).
-#
-# Runtime belt-and-suspenders (defense in depth, not a substitute for the
-# above): clients/controlplane/containment.go fail-closed panics if its stub
-# crypto is ever constructed outside a go-test binary (testing.Testing()==
-# false) — see TestContainment_NonHarnessProcessRefuses in
-# containment_test.go. KNOWN RESIDUAL: testing.Testing() is a linker-set
-# string var (testing.testBinary), not cryptographically bound to "actually
-# is a test" — `-ldflags="-X testing.testBinary=1"` spoofs it in a real
-# binary. Check #2 above is the mitigation: it fails the PR that would ship
-# that flag. Closing the residual for real needs a signal `go build` cannot
-# produce at all (increment-2, tracked in doc.go) rather than one merely
-# absent by convention.
-
-on:
-  pull_request:
-  push:
-    branches: [main]
-
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-
-jobs:
-  controlplane-containment:
-    runs-on: [hanzo-build-linux-amd64]
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
-
-      - name: grep — no build/release path may set -tags controlplane, or spoof testing.Testing()
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          hits=0
-
-          # NOTE: exclusions are plain substring matches on the path (not
-          # anchored to a leading "./") so this is robust across grep
-          # implementations that format recursive-search paths differently.
-          # char class includes `!` so a build-constraint negation form
-          # (`-tags '!x,controlplane'`) cannot slip the grep. (Belt only: the
-          # positive-proof step below is the syntax-agnostic guarantee — the
-          # package has zero untagged files, so importing it into serve code
-          # fails the untagged `go build ./...` regardless of any -tags syntax.)
-          if grep -RnE -- '-tags[= ]*["'"'"']?[!A-Za-z0-9_, ]*\bcontrolplane\b' \
-               --exclude-dir=.git --exclude-dir=node_modules --exclude-dir=.claude --exclude-dir=vendor \
-               . 2>/dev/null \
-               | grep -v '\.git/' \
-               | grep -v 'clients/controlplane/' \
-               | grep -v '.github/workflows/containment.yml:'; then
-            echo "::error::found a build/release invocation passing -tags controlplane — clients/controlplane's stub crypto must never enter a release/serve binary (see clients/controlplane/doc.go)"
-            hits=1
-          fi
-
-          if grep -RnE -- 'testing\.testBinary' \
-               --exclude-dir=.git --exclude-dir=node_modules --exclude-dir=.claude --exclude-dir=vendor \
-               . 2>/dev/null \
-               | grep -v '.github/workflows/containment.yml:'; then
-            echo "::error::found a reference to testing.testBinary outside the Go toolchain itself — this is the linker var that spoofs testing.Testing() in a real (non go-test) binary; the containment.go runtime guard trusts that signal, so setting it anywhere in a real build path defeats it (see doc.go)"
-            hits=1
-          fi
-
-          if [ "$hits" -ne 0 ]; then exit 1; fi
-          echo "OK: no build/release path sets -tags controlplane or spoofs testing.Testing()"
-
-      - uses: actions/setup-go@v5
-        with:
-          go-version-file: go.mod
-
-      - name: go env for private modules
-        env:
-          GH_PAT: ${{ secrets.GH_PAT }}
-        # GOPRIVATE names exactly the namespace that is private. github.com/hanzoai/*
-        # is: ai, account, commerce, orm, xorm, beego, csqlite and ~30 more are
-        # private repos, so they must resolve direct+authenticated and skip a sumdb
-        # that cannot see them. Everything else stays on the public proxy + checksum
-        # db, which is what makes a module hash immutable: zap-proto (all 55 repos)
-        # and luxfi (all 37 deps here) are public and proxy-served.
-        #
-        # This previously named zap-proto — public, and never the reason anything
-        # here was direct — and then set GOSUMDB=off to compensate for hanzoai/*
-        # being absent, which disabled checksum verification for EVERY module in the
-        # build, public ones included. Naming the private namespace is what the off
-        # switch was standing in for.
-        run: |
-          git config --global url."https://x-access-token:${GH_PAT}@github.com/".insteadOf "https://github.com/"
-          {
-            echo "GOPRIVATE=github.com/hanzoai/*"
-            echo "GOPROXY=https://proxy.golang.org,direct"
-          } >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-
-      - name: zen streaming-fix floor — go.mod must pin github.com/hanzoai/zen >= v1.4.1
-        # The SSE body-close fix (zen commit 50328b8, first released in zen v1.4.1)
-        # is what makes streaming completions return a body instead of an empty
-        # stream. A stale-branch merge that reverts go.mod's zen pin below the floor
-        # silently re-breaks streaming, and `next build`'s ignoreBuildErrors hides
-        # the runtime break — so no image may be cut on a regressed pin. This is the
-        # durable root-cause guard: it reads the EFFECTIVE module version (post-MVS,
-        # exactly what the build links) and fails the PR/push below the floor.
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          FLOOR="v1.4.1"
-          V="$(go list -m -f '{{.Version}}' github.com/hanzoai/zen)"
-          echo "effective github.com/hanzoai/zen = ${V} (floor ${FLOOR})"
-          # semver-correct compare: the lowest of {V, FLOOR} under `sort -V` must be
-          # the FLOOR, i.e. V >= FLOOR. (sort -V orders v1.4.2 above v1.4.10 too.)
-          low="$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$V" "$FLOOR" | sort -V | head -1)"
-          if [ "$low" != "$FLOOR" ]; then
-            echo "::error::github.com/hanzoai/zen is pinned at ${V}, below the streaming-fix floor ${FLOOR} — this re-breaks SSE streaming (empty completions). Re-pin zen to >= ${FLOOR} in go.mod before merging."
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          echo "OK: zen ${V} is at or above the streaming-fix floor ${FLOOR}"
-
-      - name: positive proof — clients/controlplane is unreachable from the default build
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-
-          go build ./...
-
-          for m in $(go list ./cmd/...); do
-            if go list -deps "$m" | grep -qx 'github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/controlplane'; then
-              echo "::error::$m links clients/controlplane into a real binary — containment breach"
-              exit 1
-            fi
-          done
-
-          out="$(go build ./clients/controlplane/... 2>&1 || true)"
-          if ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'matched no packages'; then
-            echo "::error::clients/controlplane built successfully WITHOUT -tags controlplane (containment breach): $out"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          echo "OK: containment holds — clients/controlplane has zero buildable files by default and is linked into no cmd/ binary"

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -1,684 +0,0 @@
-name: release
-
-# Cuts a release of ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud. The invariant this workflow exists to
-# enforce:
-#
-#     a git tag v<X.Y.Z> exists  ⇔  an image ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:v<X.Y.Z>
-#     was pushed AND booted to "listening" in the smoke test.
-#
-# The tag is a RECEIPT for a proven image, minted only AFTER a successful push —
-# never a trigger for a build that might fail. The prior design triggered builds
-# FROM pushed tags, so a tag could exist with no image behind it (a failed or
-# never-run build) — universe would then try to roll that tag and the pods went
-# ImagePullBackOff (phantom v1.786.42/43). Here the order is inverted:
-#
-#     main push → compute next version → build → SMOKE → push image → tag → notify
-#
-# so a push/smoke/build failure fails the run BEFORE the tag step and leaves no
-# tag; universe is only ever notified of a version whose image is proven present.
-#
-# DO NOT push v* tags by hand anymore. This workflow OWNS them. A hand-cut tag has
-# no image behind it (exactly the phantom this prevents) and won't build (there is
-# no `tags:` trigger). Every merge to main IS the release; skip one with the usual
-# `[skip ci]` in the commit/merge message (a docs-only change need not ship).
-#
-# concurrency: a single serialized lane (cancel-in-progress:false — a
-# mid-flight push must finish, never be killed between "image pushed" and "tag
-# created"). Two main pushes can therefore never compute the same next number:
-# the queued run starts only after the running one tags, re-reads the tags, and
-# lands on the next patch. Monotonic by construction.
-#
-# The next version is max(highest git tag, highest pushed container tag) + 1 (patch
-# bump only — never a major/minor jump). Folding in the container tags means we
-# never reuse a number that already has a pushed image, even if some earlier run
-# pushed an image but died before tagging.
-#
-# ── Infra notes (unchanged, still true) ─────────────────────────────────────────
-# Self-hosted arcd amd64 scale set — NEVER GitHub-hosted runners (this org's
-# GitHub-hosted Actions are billing-frozen). GHCR login uses GH_PAT, not the repo
-# GITHUB_TOKEN: the ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud package is linked to a DIFFERENT repo
-# (hanzoai/ai, from the cloud→ai module rename), so this repo's GITHUB_TOKEN is
-# denied write to it (permission_denied: write_package). GH_PAT (admin:org +
-# write:packages) writes any hanzoai package regardless of package-repo linkage,
-# and is the BuildKit gh_token the Dockerfile uses to fetch private cross-org Go
-# modules. amd64-only: the cluster is amd64; one platform completes on the live
-# scale set without waiting on the arm64 pool.
-
-on:
-  push:
-    branches: [main]
-  workflow_dispatch:
-
-# Cut tags on the cloud repo (git tag push) → contents: write. packages: write
-# to push the image; id-token for provenance.
-permissions:
-  contents: write
-  packages: write
-  id-token: write
-
-# One serialized release lane. Never cancel in-flight: a run killed between
-# "image pushed" and "tag created" is exactly the drift we are preventing.
-concurrency:
-  group: release-cloud
-  cancel-in-progress: false
-
-jobs:
-  build-amd64:
-    # ARC ephemeral runners match jobs targeting the scale-set NAME as a label.
-    runs-on: [hanzo-build-linux-amd64]
-    outputs:
-      # The FINAL assigned version comes from the Tag step (atomic free-version
-      # assignment), NOT the compute step — under concurrency the compute value may
-      # have been superseded. notify-universe must roll the version that was actually
-      # tagged + whose image was actually retagged.
-      version: ${{ steps.tag.outputs.version }}
-      version_v: ${{ steps.tag.outputs.version_v }}
-    steps:
-      - name: Checkout (full history + all tags — the version floor is read from tags)
-        uses: actions/checkout@v4
-        with:
-          fetch-depth: 0
-          fetch-tags: true
-
-      - name: Compute next version (monotonic patch bump over git + container tags)
-        id: ver
-        env:
-          GH_PAT: ${{ secrets.GH_PAT }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          git fetch --tags --force --quiet
-
-          # Highest semver git tag (vX.Y.Z), normalised without the leading v.
-          git_max="$(git tag -l 'v[0-9]*.[0-9]*.[0-9]*' \
-            | sed 's/^v//' | grep -E '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' | sort -V | tail -1 || true)"
-
-          # Best-effort: highest ALREADY-PUSHED container tag, so a number that has
-          # an image (even from a run that died before tagging) is never reused.
-          cont_max=""
-          if command -v gh >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-            cont_max="$(GH_TOKEN="$GH_PAT" gh api \
-              '/orgs/hanzoai/packages/container/cloud/versions?per_page=100' \
-              --jq '.[].metadata.container.tags[]?' 2>/dev/null \
-              | sed 's/^v//' | grep -E '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' | sort -V | tail -1 || true)"
-          fi
-
-          # Floor = highest of the two; fall back to 1.786.0 only if the repo has
-          # no tags at all (first release ever).
-          max="$(printf '%s\n%s\n%s\n' "1.786.0" "$git_max" "$cont_max" \
-            | grep -E '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' | sort -V | tail -1)"
-
-          major="${max%%.*}"; rest="${max#*.}"; minor="${rest%%.*}"; patch="${rest##*.}"
-          version="${major}.${minor}.$((patch + 1))"
-
-          # This version is a STARTING HINT only. It labels the smoke-built image and
-          # seeds the OCI metadata; the FINAL version is assigned atomically in the Tag
-          # step (which recomputes + retries on collision), so a taken number here is
-          # NOT fatal — the Tag step finds the next free one. Just note it and proceed.
-          if git rev-parse -q --verify "refs/tags/v${version}" >/dev/null; then
-            echo "note: hint v${version} already tagged — the Tag step will assign the next free version"
-          fi
-
-          echo "version=${version}"     >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          echo "version_v=v${version}"  >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          echo "major_minor=${major}.${minor}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          echo "sha_short=$(git rev-parse --short "$GITHUB_SHA")" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          echo "Next release: v${version} (git_max='${git_max:-none}' container_max='${cont_max:-none}')"
-
-      - name: Set up Docker Buildx
-        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@v3
-        with:
-          driver: docker-container
-          driver-opts: network=host
-
-      - name: Mirror credential (registry.hanzo.ai)
-        # Dual-host: pull the KMS deploy kubeconfig (same Universal Auth flow
-        # the hanzoai/ci reusable uses), read the cluster-synced
-        # registry-credentials dockerconfig, and log in. Best-effort: absent
-        # creds → GHCR-only release, never a blocked tag.
-        env:
-          KMS_CLIENT_ID: ${{ secrets.KMS_CLIENT_ID }}
-          KMS_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.KMS_CLIENT_SECRET }}
-          KMS_ENDPOINT: ${{ vars.KMS_ENDPOINT || 'https://kms.hanzo.ai' }}
-          REGISTRY_USER: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_USER }}
-          REGISTRY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_PASSWORD }}
-        run: |
-          set -uo pipefail
-          # Direct credential first (repo/org secret — works on private repos,
-          # where the Free plan hides org KMS secrets); KMS kubeconfig fallback.
-          if [ -n "${REGISTRY_USER:-}" ] && [ -n "${REGISTRY_PASSWORD:-}" ]; then
-            if echo "$REGISTRY_PASSWORD" | docker login registry.hanzo.ai -u "$REGISTRY_USER" --password-stdin; then
-              echo "MIRROR_OK=1" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-            else
-              echo "mirror login failed (registry.hanzo.ai unreachable) — mirror skipped, release continues"
-            fi
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          [ -z "${KMS_CLIENT_ID:-}" ] && { echo "no KMS creds — mirror skipped"; exit 0; }
-          TOKEN=$(curl -sf "$KMS_ENDPOINT/v1/kms/auth/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json'             -d "{\"clientId\":\"$KMS_CLIENT_ID\",\"clientSecret\":\"$KMS_CLIENT_SECRET\"}" | jq -r '.accessToken // empty')
-          [ -z "$TOKEN" ] && { echo "KMS login failed — mirror skipped"; exit 0; }
-          KC=$(curl -sf "$KMS_ENDPOINT/v1/kms/orgs/hanzo/secrets/deploy/KUBECONFIG?env=prod"                 -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" | jq -r '.secret.value // empty')
-          [ -z "$KC" ] && { echo "no KUBECONFIG in KMS — mirror skipped"; exit 0; }
-          echo "$KC" | base64 -d > "$RUNNER_TEMP/kubeconfig"
-          command -v kubectl >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
-            KVER=$(curl -fsSL https://dl.k8s.io/release/stable.txt)
-            mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/bin"
-            curl -fsSL "https://dl.k8s.io/release/${KVER}/bin/linux/amd64/kubectl" -o "$HOME/.local/bin/kubectl" && chmod +x "$HOME/.local/bin/kubectl"
-            export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"
-          }
-          CFG=$(KUBECONFIG="$RUNNER_TEMP/kubeconfig" kubectl -n hanzo get secret registry-credentials                   -o jsonpath='{.data.\.dockerconfigjson}' 2>/dev/null | base64 -d || true)
-          [ -z "$CFG" ] && { echo "registry-credentials unreadable — mirror skipped"; exit 0; }
-          UP=$(echo "$CFG" | jq -r '.auths["registry.hanzo.ai"].auth // empty' | base64 -d)
-          [ -z "$UP" ] && { echo "no registry auth — mirror skipped"; exit 0; }
-          echo "::add-mask::${UP#*:}"
-          if echo "${UP#*:}" | docker login registry.hanzo.ai -u "${UP%%:*}" --password-stdin; then
-            echo "MIRROR_OK=1" >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
-          else
-            echo "mirror login failed (registry.hanzo.ai unreachable) — mirror skipped, release continues"
-          fi
-
-      - name: Log in to ghcr.io (GH_PAT — writes the cloud package despite its ai-repo linkage)
-        uses: docker/login-action@v3
-        with:
-          registry: ghcr.io
-          username: hanzo-dev
-          password: ${{ secrets.GH_PAT }}
-
-      - name: Resolve decomplection artifact digests (the Go-only build's prebuilt inputs)
-        id: artifacts
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          # cloud compiles ONLY Go; it pulls three prebuilt artifacts (console SPA,
-          # agent-skills catalog, native flags staticlib). Resolve each published
-          # :latest to an IMMUTABLE digest so THIS release is reproducible (pinned,
-          # not floating :latest) AND a console/skills/flags change is picked up —
-          # its CI republished :latest, so this resolves to the NEW digest. A MISSING
-          # artifact FAILS the release HERE, before build/smoke/push/tag: the receipt
-          # invariant means we never tag an image that couldn't embed the real console.
-          command -v crane >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
-            mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/bin"
-            curl -fsSL "https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases/latest/download/go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz" \
-              | tar -xz -C "$HOME/.local/bin" crane
-          }
-          export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"
-          resolve() {
-            local repo="$1" d
-            d="$(crane digest "ghcr.io/hanzoai/${repo}:latest" 2>/dev/null || true)"
-            [ -n "$d" ] || { echo "::error::decomplection artifact ghcr.io/hanzoai/${repo}:latest is not published — refusing to cut a release that would embed a stale/placeholder ${repo}"; return 1; }
-            printf 'ghcr.io/hanzoai/%s@%s' "$repo" "$d"
-          }
-          CONSOLE_IMAGE="$(resolve console-embed)" || exit 1
-          SKILLS_IMAGE="$(resolve agent-skills)" || exit 1
-          FLAGS_IMAGE="$(resolve cloud-flags)" || exit 1
-          {
-            echo "console_image=${CONSOLE_IMAGE}"
-            echo "skills_image=${SKILLS_IMAGE}"
-            echo "flags_image=${FLAGS_IMAGE}"
-          } >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-          echo "resolved: console=${CONSOLE_IMAGE} skills=${SKILLS_IMAGE} flags=${FLAGS_IMAGE}"
-
-      - name: OCI labels
-        id: meta
-        uses: docker/metadata-action@v5
-        with:
-          images: ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud
-          tags: type=raw,value=${{ steps.ver.outputs.version_v }}
-
-      # ── Build → SMOKE → push → tag ───────────────────────────────────────────
-      # 1. Build once to a LOCAL tag (load into the daemon, do NOT push). Warms
-      #    the BuildKit cache — the expensive console/npm + Go layers land here.
-      # 2. Boot that exact image and assert it reaches "listening" with no
-      #    startup-crash signature (the gate).
-      # 3. Re-run build with push:true and the real tags: identical context /
-      #    platform / secrets, so every layer is a cache hit from step 1 and the
-      #    step only exports + pushes the already-tested image. Nothing that failed
-      #    the smoke test can reach the registry.
-      # 4. Only after the push succeeds, mint + push the git tag (the receipt).
-      - name: Build (load locally for the smoke test)
-        uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
-        with:
-          context: .
-          platforms: linux/amd64
-          push: false
-          load: true
-          tags: cloud:smoke
-          labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
-          # cloud compiles ONLY Go: pull the three prebuilt artifacts pinned to the
-          # digests resolved above (reproducible, and fresh — a console/skills/flags
-          # change is a new digest). No node/python/rust toolchain in this build.
-          build-args: |
-            CONSOLE_IMAGE=${{ steps.artifacts.outputs.console_image }}
-            SKILLS_IMAGE=${{ steps.artifacts.outputs.skills_image }}
-            FLAGS_IMAGE=${{ steps.artifacts.outputs.flags_image }}
-          # GIT_AUTH_TOKEN: BuildKit secret the Dockerfile consumes to fetch private
-          # cross-org Go modules (hanzoai/*, luxfi/*) over authenticated git.
-          secrets: |
-            GIT_AUTH_TOKEN=${{ secrets.GH_PAT }}
-
-      - name: Smoke test — the binary MUST boot to "listening" with no crash signature
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          IMAGE=cloud:smoke
-          CID=""
-          cleanup() { [ -n "$CID" ] && docker rm -f "$CID" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; }
-          trap cleanup EXIT
-
-          # Minimal, production-representative boot env:
-          #  • a writable ephemeral /data root — the audit store, the embedded
-          #    KMS secrets plane and every per-tenant SQLite open files under
-          #    CLOUD_DATA_DIR; an unwritable dir would fail EVERY image before
-          #    MountAll and the gate would stop discriminating good from bad; and
-          #  • a throwaway 32-byte KMS master key so the KMS plane mounts on its
-          #    normal ready path exactly as prod does (no real secret is used).
-          # The subsystem that crashed the incident (metrics, mount order 40)
-          # mounts AFTER kms (order 10), so the boot must get past kms for the
-          # gate to observe the panic — this env does exactly that.
-          KEY="$(head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 | tr -d '\n')"
-          CID="$(docker run -d \
-            --tmpfs /data:rw,size=64m \
-            -e CLOUD_DATA_DIR=/data \
-            -e CLOUD_ENV=smoke \
-            -e CLOUD_KMS_MASTER_KEY_REF="$KEY" \
-            "$IMAGE")"
-
-          # Poll up to 60s for boot to either finish ("listening" is logged once
-          # every subsystem has mounted and both transports are about to bind) or
-          # die (a Mount panic exits the process). A healthy boot is ~1-2s; the
-          # ceiling only guards a cold daemon.
-          listening=0
-          for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
-            logs="$(docker logs "$CID" 2>&1 || true)"
-            if printf '%s' "$logs" | grep -q '"message":"listening"'; then listening=1; break; fi
-            if [ "$(docker inspect -f '{{.State.Running}}' "$CID" 2>/dev/null || echo false)" != "true" ]; then break; fi
-            sleep 1
-          done
-
-          logs="$(docker logs "$CID" 2>&1 || true)"
-          echo "::group::cloud:smoke boot logs"
-          printf '%s\n' "$logs"
-          echo "::endgroup::"
-
-          # (1) No startup-crash signature. Catches the incident's Mount
-          #     type-assert panic AND any generic Go panic — case-insensitive so a
-          #     re-worded variant can't slip through — BEFORE a byte is pushed.
-          if printf '%s' "$logs" | grep -Eiq 'metrics\.Mount|mount metrics|panic|want \*zip\.App'; then
-            echo "SMOKE FAIL: startup-crash signature in boot logs (see above)"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          # (2) Reached "listening" — proof that MountAll returned for every
-          #     enabled subsystem (a failed Mount returns before this line).
-          if [ "$listening" -ne 1 ]; then
-            echo "SMOKE FAIL: binary never reached \"listening\" (a subsystem did not mount)"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          # (3) Still alive — a server that logged "listening" then exited (e.g. a
-          #     listener bind failure) is not a healthy image.
-          if [ "$(docker inspect -f '{{.State.Running}}' "$CID" 2>/dev/null || echo false)" != "true" ]; then
-            echo "SMOKE FAIL: process exited after \"listening\""
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          echo "SMOKE PASS: cloud:smoke booted to \"listening\" with no crash signature"
-
-      # ── Functional smoke — authenticated per-subsystem probe (the REAL gate) ─────
-      # The boot check above proves the process REACHES "listening"; this proves the
-      # mounted HTTP surface actually WORKS. /smoke (cmd/smoke, baked into the image)
-      # hits ONE side-effect-free read per core subsystem and FAILS the release on any
-      # broken code — above all a 402 on a READ (the balance-gate-over-blocks-reads
-      # regression) or a 5xx (a crash, e.g. the /v1/billing/usage self-dispatch 500).
-      # So a release can never ship with chat/billing/projects/kms/... down.
-      - name: Functional smoke — per-subsystem probe (fails the release if a core endpoint is broken)
-        env:
-          KMS_CLIENT_ID: ${{ secrets.KMS_CLIENT_ID }}
-          KMS_CLIENT_SECRET: ${{ secrets.KMS_CLIENT_SECRET }}
-          KMS_ENDPOINT: ${{ vars.KMS_ENDPOINT || 'https://kms.hanzo.ai' }}
-          # A KMS-provisioned short-lived smoke bearer, injected as a secret (NEVER
-          # hardcoded). Absent → the anonymous matrix still gates public/authed and
-          # catches every 402-on-read / 5xx.
-          SMOKE_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.SMOKE_TOKEN }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          IMAGE=cloud:smoke
-          CID=""
-          cleanup() { [ -n "$CID" ] && docker rm -f "$CID" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; }
-          trap cleanup EXIT
-
-          KEY="$(head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 | tr -d '\n')"
-          CID="$(docker run -d \
-            --tmpfs /data:rw,size=64m \
-            -e CLOUD_DATA_DIR=/data -e CLOUD_ENV=smoke -e CLOUD_KMS_MASTER_KEY_REF="$KEY" \
-            "$IMAGE")"
-
-          # Wait for the HTTP listener to bind (or the process to die).
-          up=0
-          for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
-            lg="$(docker logs "$CID" 2>&1 || true)"
-            printf '%s' "$lg" | grep -q '"message":"listening"' && { up=1; break; }
-            [ "$(docker inspect -f '{{.State.Running}}' "$CID" 2>/dev/null || echo false)" != "true" ] && break
-            sleep 1
-          done
-          if [ "$up" != 1 ]; then
-            echo "::group::boot logs"; docker logs "$CID" 2>&1 || true; echo "::endgroup::"
-            echo "FUNCTIONAL SMOKE INFRA FAIL: image never reached \"listening\""
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-          # Token: prefer the injected secret; else mint from KMS (a provisioned smoke
-          # identity); else run the anonymous matrix. Never hardcoded.
-          if [ -z "${SMOKE_TOKEN:-}" ] && [ -n "${KMS_CLIENT_ID:-}" ]; then
-            KT=$(curl -sf "$KMS_ENDPOINT/v1/kms/auth/login" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-              -d "{\"clientId\":\"$KMS_CLIENT_ID\",\"clientSecret\":\"$KMS_CLIENT_SECRET\"}" | jq -r '.accessToken // empty' || true)
-            [ -n "$KT" ] && SMOKE_TOKEN=$(curl -sf "$KMS_ENDPOINT/v1/kms/orgs/hanzo/secrets/smoke/TOKEN?env=prod" \
-              -H "Authorization: Bearer $KT" | jq -r '.secret.value // empty' || true)
-          fi
-          if [ -n "${SMOKE_TOKEN:-}" ]; then echo "::add-mask::$SMOKE_TOKEN"; echo "smoke: AUTHENTICATED matrix"; else echo "smoke: ANONYMOUS matrix (no SMOKE_TOKEN wired)"; fi
-
-          # /smoke is baked into the image (Dockerfile) — exec it INSIDE the container,
-          # so it probes the real mounted surface at localhost:8080 with no port/network
-          # plumbing. A non-zero exit here fails the release BEFORE any image is pushed.
-          docker exec \
-            -e SMOKE_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:8080 \
-            -e SMOKE_TOKEN="${SMOKE_TOKEN:-}" \
-            "$CID" /smoke
-
-      # ── Migration smoke — the gate the v1.800.1 crashloop would have tripped ─────
-      # The plain smoke above boots on a FRESH /data, so every subsystem's migrate()
-      # takes its CREATE-TABLE path and no forward-migration is exercised — which is
-      # exactly why a DDL valid on a fresh store but broken on a pre-existing one (an
-      # index over a not-yet-ADDed column: affiliates referrer_org in v1.800.1, wallets
-      # project/agent before it) sailed through CI and took api.hanzo.ai down. This
-      # step reproduces the REAL prod upgrade path: boot the PRIOR released image to lay
-      # its on-disk (cek-encrypted) SQLite schema into a persistent volume, then boot
-      # the candidate over that SAME volume and require it to still reach "listening".
-      # A migrate() that assumes a fresh store dies here, before any image is pushed.
-      - name: Migration smoke — candidate MUST boot over the PRIOR release's on-disk schema
-        env:
-          # The image whose on-disk schema a prod upgrade migrates FROM — the tag the
-          # fleet runs today. Bump to the last-DEPLOYED tag as releases roll (override
-          # without a code change via the SMOKE_MIGRATION_BASELINE repo/org variable).
-          BASELINE: ${{ vars.SMOKE_MIGRATION_BASELINE }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          BASELINE="${BASELINE:-ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:v1.799.19}"
-          CANDIDATE=cloud:smoke
-          VOL="cloudmig-${GITHUB_RUN_ID}-${GITHUB_RUN_ATTEMPT}"
-          B1=""; B2=""
-          cleanup() { docker rm -f "$B1" "$B2" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; docker volume rm "$VOL" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true; }
-          trap cleanup EXIT
-          docker volume create "$VOL" >/dev/null
-
-          # ONE throwaway 32-byte master key for BOTH boots: cek seals each per-db DEK
-          # under it on the baseline boot and unwraps it on the candidate boot. A
-          # mismatched key fails closed (never opens), so sharing it is what puts the
-          # MIGRATE path — not a decrypt error — under test.
-          KEY="$(head -c 32 /dev/urandom | base64 | tr -d '\n')"
-
-          boot() { # $1=image $2=name -> prints container id
-            docker run -d --name "$2" \
-              -v "$VOL":/data \
-              -e CLOUD_DATA_DIR=/data \
-              -e CLOUD_ENV=smoke \
-              -e CLOUD_KMS_MASTER_KEY_REF="$KEY" \
-              "$1"
-          }
-          wait_listen() { # $1=container -> 0 if "listening", 1 if it died / timed out
-            for _ in $(seq 1 90); do
-              lg="$(docker logs "$1" 2>&1 || true)"
-              printf '%s' "$lg" | grep -q '"message":"listening"' && return 0
-              [ "$(docker inspect -f '{{.State.Running}}' "$1" 2>/dev/null || echo false)" != "true" ] && return 1
-              sleep 1
-            done
-            return 1
-          }
-          # A fresh docker named volume is root:root 0755, but the cloud image runs
-          # NON-ROOT, so it cannot create cek's <db>.cek.lock under /data (the single-boot
-          # smoke only worked because --tmpfs is world-writable). Make the shared volume
-          # writable for BOTH boots, re-opening it between them so the candidate can read
-          # the baseline's files even if their runtime UIDs differ.
-          chmod_vol() { docker run --rm --user 0 -v "$VOL":/data --entrypoint sh "$CANDIDATE" -c 'chmod -R 0777 /data'; }
-
-          # Boot 1 — the prior release writes its real schema into the volume. It must
-          # reach "listening" (proof every subsystem migrated + its DB is on disk); if
-          # the pinned baseline can't boot in this env the gate is blind, so fail loud.
-          echo "migration baseline: $BASELINE"
-          pulled=0; for _ in 1 2 3; do if docker pull "$BASELINE"; then pulled=1; break; fi; sleep 5; done
-          [ "$pulled" = 1 ] || { echo "MIGRATION SMOKE INFRA FAIL: cannot pull baseline $BASELINE"; exit 1; }
-          chmod_vol
-          B1="$(boot "$BASELINE" cloudmig_base)"
-          if ! wait_listen "$B1"; then
-            echo "::group::baseline boot logs"; docker logs "$B1" 2>&1 || true; echo "::endgroup::"
-            echo "MIGRATION SMOKE INFRA FAIL: baseline $BASELINE did not reach \"listening\" — cannot stage the prior schema (inspect/bump SMOKE_MIGRATION_BASELINE)"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          docker stop "$B1" >/dev/null
-          chmod_vol
-
-          # Boot 2 — the candidate migrates that on-disk schema IN PLACE. This is the gate.
-          B2="$(boot "$CANDIDATE" cloudmig_cand)"
-          listening=0; wait_listen "$B2" && listening=1
-          logs="$(docker logs "$B2" 2>&1 || true)"
-          echo "::group::candidate migration boot logs"; printf '%s\n' "$logs"; echo "::endgroup::"
-
-          # 'no such column'/'no such table' is the exact index-before-ADD-COLUMN crash;
-          # 'panic' catches any generic Mount failure. The load-bearing check is the
-          # "listening" assertion below — a migrate() crash exits before it.
-          if printf '%s' "$logs" | grep -Eiq 'panic|no such column|no such table'; then
-            echo "MIGRATION SMOKE FAIL: candidate logged a DDL/migration error over the prior schema (the v1.800.1-class regression)"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          if [ "$listening" -ne 1 ]; then
-            echo "MIGRATION SMOKE FAIL: candidate did NOT reach \"listening\" over the $BASELINE schema — a subsystem's migrate() crashes on a pre-existing store"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          echo "MIGRATION SMOKE PASS: candidate booted to \"listening\" over the $BASELINE on-disk schema"
-
-      - name: Push (cache hit from the smoke build — publishes the tested image)
-        id: push
-        uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
-        with:
-          context: .
-          platforms: linux/amd64
-          push: true
-          # Push ONLY the immutable, per-commit sha- tag (always unique — never races)
-          # and the floating latest. The v<X.Y.Z> version is NOT pushed here: the
-          # compute-step version may be claimed by a concurrent release between compute
-          # and now, and pushing it would clobber that release's :vX image (mutable tag
-          # corruption). The version is assigned + the proven sha-image retagged to it
-          # ATOMICALLY in the Tag step below, so :vX exists iff its git tag exists.
-          tags: |
-            ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:sha-${{ steps.ver.outputs.sha_short }}
-            ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:latest
-          labels: ${{ steps.meta.outputs.labels }}
-          # SAME artifact digests as the smoke build → every layer is a cache hit from
-          # step 1 and the pushed image is byte-identical to the one smoke proved.
-          build-args: |
-            CONSOLE_IMAGE=${{ steps.artifacts.outputs.console_image }}
-            SKILLS_IMAGE=${{ steps.artifacts.outputs.skills_image }}
-            FLAGS_IMAGE=${{ steps.artifacts.outputs.flags_image }}
-          secrets: |
-            GIT_AUTH_TOKEN=${{ secrets.GH_PAT }}
-
-      # THE RECEIPT + ATOMIC VERSION ASSIGNMENT (race-safe). Reached only because
-      # build + smoke + push all succeeded, so a proven image exists under the unique
-      # sha- tag. Here we assign the next FREE v<X.Y.Z> and retag that proven image to
-      # it — atomically, with the git-tag push as the serialization point:
-      #   * Recompute the next version FRESH (compute-step's value may have been claimed
-      #     by a concurrent release in the build window).
-      #   * If that version's git tag already exists, bump and retry.
-      #   * Retag the proven sha-image → :vX (+ :X.Y.Z + :X.Y) via imagetools (metadata
-      #     only, NO rebuild — byte-identical to the smoke-passed image).
-      #   * Push the git tag; the FIRST pusher of vX wins, a loser deletes its local tag
-      #     and recomputes. So concurrent releases each grab a distinct free number and
-      #     the invariant "git tag vX ⇔ image :vX pushed+smoke-passed" holds under race.
-      - name: Tag the proven image (atomic free-version assignment — race-safe)
-        id: tag
-        env:
-          GH_PAT: ${{ secrets.GH_PAT }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          git config user.name  "hanzo-dev"
-          git config user.email "dev@hanzo.ai"
-          SHA_IMG="ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:sha-${{ steps.ver.outputs.sha_short }}"
-          PUSH_URL="https://x-access-token:${GH_PAT}@github.com/${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}.git"
-          for attempt in $(seq 1 8); do
-            git fetch --tags --force --quiet
-            git_max="$(git tag -l 'v[0-9]*.[0-9]*.[0-9]*' \
-              | sed 's/^v//' | grep -E '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' | sort -V | tail -1 || true)"
-            # Newest page only — NOT --paginate. Container versions are created
-            # newest-first and version tags are monotonic, so the highest version
-            # is always among the most-recent versions; paginating the WHOLE
-            # registry history is what livelocked this step as tags accumulated.
-            # Fail-CLOSED. An ORPHANED container tag — image pushed by a run that
-            # died or was cancelled after imagetools-create but before its git tag —
-            # MUST raise the floor, or a later run reassigns that same number to a
-            # different image (an ambiguous mutable prod tag; the v1.801.50 flip). A
-            # git-only floor can't see the orphan, so if the container-tag lookup
-            # ERRORS (vs legitimately returning no tags) we retry the whole attempt
-            # rather than silently proceeding — a version with a pushed image is never
-            # reused. (Reordering git-tag before imagetools-create is the WRONG fix: it
-            # reintroduces the phantom "tag ⇔ no image" this workflow exists to prevent.)
-            cont_max=""
-            if command -v gh >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-              if cont_raw="$(GH_TOKEN="$GH_PAT" gh api \
-                  '/orgs/hanzoai/packages/container/cloud/versions?per_page=100' \
-                  --jq '.[].metadata.container.tags[]?' 2>/dev/null)"; then
-                cont_max="$(printf '%s\n' "$cont_raw" \
-                  | sed 's/^v//' | grep -E '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' | sort -V | tail -1 || true)"
-              else
-                echo "  container-tag lookup failed — retry so an orphaned tag can't be reused (attempt $attempt)"; sleep 3; continue
-              fi
-            fi
-            max="$(printf '%s\n%s\n%s\n' "1.786.0" "$git_max" "$cont_max" \
-              | grep -E '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$' | sort -V | tail -1)"
-            major="${max%%.*}"; rest="${max#*.}"; minor="${rest%%.*}"; patch="${rest##*.}"
-            VER="${major}.${minor}.$((patch + 1))"; V="v${VER}"
-            if git rev-parse -q --verify "refs/tags/$V" >/dev/null; then
-              echo "  $V already tagged — recomputing (attempt $attempt)"; sleep 3; continue
-            fi
-            docker buildx imagetools create \
-              -t "ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:${V}" \
-              -t "ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:${VER}" \
-              -t "ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:${major}.${minor}" \
-              "$SHA_IMG"
-            # Dual-host: mirror the release tags to OUR fleet registry (server-
-            # side copy) so the cluster never depends on GHCR to deploy. crane,
-            # not buildx imagetools: the IAM token realm doesn't answer buildx's
-            # multi-scope token request (spec gap, tracked), crane's single-scope
-            # flow works. Best-effort — a mirror hiccup never blocks the receipt.
-            if [ "${MIRROR_OK:-}" = "1" ]; then
-              command -v crane >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
-                curl -fsSL https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases/download/v0.20.2/go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz \
-                  | tar -xz -C "$HOME/.local/bin" crane 2>/dev/null || {
-                    mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/bin"
-                    curl -fsSL https://github.com/google/go-containerregistry/releases/download/v0.20.2/go-containerregistry_Linux_x86_64.tar.gz \
-                      | tar -xz -C "$HOME/.local/bin" crane
-                  }
-                export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"
-              }
-              for MT in "${V}" "${VER}" "${major}.${minor}"; do
-                # Bounded: registry.hanzo.ai can *hang* (not just fail), and this
-                # is best-effort — an unbounded crane copy once livelocked the whole
-                # tag step and held the serialized release lane. timeout makes the
-                # mirror truly best-effort so the git-tag receipt below always runs.
-                timeout 120 crane copy "$SHA_IMG" "registry.hanzo.ai/hanzoai/cloud:${MT}" \
-                  || echo "::warning::mirror registry.hanzo.ai/hanzoai/cloud:${MT} failed or timed out"
-              done
-            fi
-            git tag -a "$V" -m "release $V — image ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:$V (retagged from sha-${{ steps.ver.outputs.sha_short }}, smoke-passed ${GITHUB_SHA})"
-            if git push "$PUSH_URL" "$V" 2>/dev/null; then
-              echo "Tagged $V → ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:$V"
-              echo "version=${VER}"    >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-              echo "version_v=${V}"    >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
-              exit 0
-            fi
-            echo "  push of $V lost the race — recomputing (attempt $attempt)"
-            git tag -d "$V" >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
-            sleep 3
-          done
-          echo "::error::could not acquire a free version tag after 8 attempts"
-          exit 1
-
-  # ── Promote: the declared-tag bump that makes the release DEPLOY ─────────────
-  # The tag minted above is the receipt for a pushed, smoke-passed image; THIS job
-  # records it as the desired state Hanzo CD reconciles. The universe-crs ArgoCD
-  # Application (ns hanzo-cd, `automated` sync + selfHeal) syncs
-  # infra/k8s/operator/crs/*.yaml → cluster and the operator rolls the Deployment,
-  # so a tag bump committed here reaches api.hanzo.ai with NO hand-dispatch and NO
-  # hand-edit of the CR.
-  #
-  # This is the SAME yq-bump → `deploy(<svc>): <tag>` universe commit the hanzoai/ci
-  # reusable (build.yml deploy step) does for every other service. cloud owns it
-  # HERE because its image is built by this workflow, not the ci reusable — its
-  # hanzo.yml carries no main `images:` entry and `# NO deploy`, so the shared
-  # deploy step never bumps cloud's CR. A direct in-cluster CR patch is NOT enough:
-  # ArgoCD selfHeal reverts any live edit not also recorded in git within ~45s.
-  # The retired notify-universe repository_dispatch had no receiver after the
-  # image-update.yml deploy hub was deleted in the Hanzo CD cutover; the git commit
-  # IS the sanctioned path now.
-  promote:
-    needs: build-amd64
-    # Only a real release promotes: build+smoke+push+tag all succeeded, so a
-    # proven v* image exists. A failure earlier leaves version_v empty → skipped.
-    if: ${{ needs.build-amd64.outputs.version_v != '' }}
-    runs-on: [hanzo-build-linux-amd64]
-    steps:
-      - name: Record the proven tag in universe crs/cloud.yaml (Hanzo CD rolls it)
-        env:
-          # GH_PAT already pushes this repo's git tags above (contents:write on the
-          # hanzoai org), so it writes hanzoai/universe too — the SAME token the ci
-          # reusable falls back to for the universe deploy commit.
-          GH_PAT: ${{ secrets.GH_PAT }}
-          VERSION_V: ${{ needs.build-amd64.outputs.version_v }}
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          [ -n "${GH_PAT:-}" ] || { echo "::error::no GH_PAT — cannot record the declared-tag bump in universe"; exit 1; }
-
-          # Bare arc runners ship no yq — provision the static binary (sudo-free,
-          # same pattern the ci reusable and this workflow's kubectl/crane fetches use).
-          if ! command -v yq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-            mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/bin"; export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"
-            curl -fsSL https://github.com/mikefarah/yq/releases/latest/download/yq_linux_amd64 \
-              -o "$HOME/.local/bin/yq" && chmod +x "$HOME/.local/bin/yq"
-          fi
-
-          git clone -q --depth 1 \
-            "https://x-access-token:${GH_PAT}@github.com/hanzoai/universe.git" \
-            "$RUNNER_TEMP/universe"
-          CR="$RUNNER_TEMP/universe/infra/k8s/operator/crs/cloud.yaml"
-          [ -f "$CR" ] || { echo "::error::crs/cloud.yaml not found in universe"; exit 1; }
-
-          CUR="$(yq -r '.spec.image.tag // ""' "$CR")"
-          echo "cloud CR: ${CUR:-<empty>} → ${VERSION_V}"
-
-          # Monotonic guard: never roll the CR BACKWARD. Release runs finish under a
-          # serialized lane but a slow older run must never overwrite a newer promote.
-          # Skip iff the CR already holds a semver >= the version we just cut.
-          CURN="${CUR#v}"; NEWN="${VERSION_V#v}"
-          if printf '%s' "$CURN" | grep -qE '^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$'; then
-            top="$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$CURN" "$NEWN" | sort -V | tail -1)"
-            if [ "$top" = "$CURN" ] && [ "$CURN" != "$NEWN" ]; then
-              echo "::notice::cloud CR already at v${CURN} (≥ ${VERSION_V}) — not rolling back"; exit 0
-            fi
-          fi
-
-          yq -i ".spec.image.tag = \"${VERSION_V}\"" "$CR"
-          if git -C "$RUNNER_TEMP/universe" diff --quiet; then
-            echo "::notice::crs/cloud.yaml already at ${VERSION_V} — nothing to record"; exit 0
-          fi
-          git -C "$RUNNER_TEMP/universe" -c user.name=hanzo-ci -c user.email=dev@hanzo.ai \
-            commit -qam "deploy(cloud): ${VERSION_V} (${GITHUB_REPOSITORY}@$(echo "${GITHUB_SHA}" | cut -c1-7))"
-
-          # Rebase-safe push: universe main advances on every service's deploy, so a
-          # concurrent commit must not make cloud's promote lose the whole roll. Retry
-          # a few times, rebasing between attempts.
-          for attempt in $(seq 1 5); do
-            if git -C "$RUNNER_TEMP/universe" push -q origin HEAD:main; then
-              echo "recorded deploy(cloud): ${VERSION_V} — Hanzo CD (universe-crs) will roll it to api.hanzo.ai"
-              exit 0
-            fi
-            echo "  universe push lost the race — rebasing (attempt ${attempt})"
-            git -C "$RUNNER_TEMP/universe" pull -q --rebase origin main || true
-            sleep 3
-          done
-          echo "::error::could not record the cloud tag bump in universe after 5 attempts"; exit 1

.gitignore

@@ -13,6 +13,14 @@
 coverage.txt
 coverage.html
 
+# cek encryption sidecars are key material — never commit one from a source tree.
+# Tests seal their stores under t.TempDir(); a sidecar in a package dir (e.g. from a
+# test that opened ":memory:") is a mistake. The cek testdata fixtures are the one
+# intentional exception.
+*.dek
+*.cek.lock
+!cek/testdata/**
+
 # Environment files
 .env
 .env.*
@@ -36,3 +44,7 @@ Thumbs.db
 .claude/
 .worktrees/
 native/flags/target
+
+# Artifacts from treating an in-memory DSN as a filename (see cek.inMemory).
+:memory:
+:memory:.*

.hanzo/workflows/cicd.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+name: CI/CD
+# The ONE pipeline for cloud, on our own runners against git.hanzo.ai.
+#
+# THE LAW: `.github/workflows` holds exactly one file — a sync nudge that runs
+# zero CI. Everything that gates, builds or deploys lives here.
+#
+# It absorbs the three pipelines that used to run beside each other:
+#
+#   .github/workflows/cicd.yml  → `gate` (unchanged: the ~7-line caller; every
+#     real detail still lives in the repo-root hanzo.yml, which
+#     platform.hanzo.ai reads too, so no build logic moved)
+#   .github/workflows/containment.yml → `containment` (verbatim; only its own
+#     self-exclusion path follows the file)
+#   .hanzo/workflows/deploy.yml → deleted, not moved (below)
+#
+# CI gates. It does not deploy, and deliberately builds no cloud image: that
+# image and its v* tags have ONE owner, clients/platform/release.go (POST
+# /v1/runner {release:true}) — a second builder on the same commit is the
+# double-build hanzo.yml's images: block already refuses for this reason.
+# deploy.yml claimed to do both and could do neither: it shelled
+# `buildctl-daemonless.sh`, absent from the image this fleet actually serves for
+# `hanzo-build-linux-amd64` (catthehacker/ubuntu:act-24.04 —
+# universe:infra/k8s/git-runner/statefulset.yaml), read a GIT_CLONE_TOKEN secret
+# that exists on neither the repo nor the org, and ended in a `kubectl patch app`
+# that cd.hanzo.ai's selfHeal undoes on its next poll. Rollout is, and stays, a
+# reviewed tag pin in hanzoai/universe.
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+  pull_request:
+  # The sync (sync-from-github.yml) dispatches this workflow by name after a
+  # fast-forward: a push made with the workflow token does not trigger workflows,
+  # so without this trigger every synced commit would gate nothing. deploy.yml
+  # declared no dispatch trigger, which is why that curl could only 404.
+  workflow_dispatch:
+concurrency:
+  group: cicd-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+jobs:
+  # Test gate + the decoupled native flags staticlib image, driven by hanzo.yml.
+  gate:
+    uses: hanzoai/ci/.hanzo/workflows/build.yml@v2
+    secrets: inherit
+
+  # Guards the Stage-1 byzantine ceremony containment (clients/controlplane,
+  # build tag `controlplane`). Its increment-1 crypto is stub/forgeable BY
+  # DESIGN (SHA256-of-public-inputs commitments, symmetric-HMAC
+  # proof-of-possession, seed-derived threshold shares — see
+  # clients/controlplane/doc.go) and MUST NEVER reach a release/serve binary.
+  # Three independent checks; any one failing blocks the merge:
+  #
+  #   1. grep (tag)    — no build/release invocation anywhere in the repo
+  #      (Dockerfile, Makefile, shell scripts, any workflow) may pass a `-tags`
+  #      value containing `controlplane` to go build/vet/run/install. The
+  #      package's own `//go:build controlplane` tag declarations
+  #      (clients/controlplane/*) are the thing being guarded, not a violation,
+  #      and are excluded by path.
+  #   2. grep (spoof)  — no build/release invocation may pass
+  #      `-X testing.testBinary=1` (or any -ldflags containing it) to a REAL
+  #      `go build`. That linker flag is what `go test` itself uses to make
+  #      testing.Testing() report true (cmd/go/internal/load/test.go) — the
+  #      runtime guard in containment.go trusts that signal, so this is the one
+  #      concrete way to spoof it in a non-test binary. This grep is what turns
+  #      "someone could type this" into "CI fails the PR that types it".
+  #   3. graph         — no cmd/ main may reach clients/controlplane through its
+  #      untagged import graph (`go list -deps`), and
+  #      `go build ./clients/controlplane/...` with no tag must match zero
+  #      buildable packages (proves the tag still gates every file in it).
+  #
+  # Runtime belt-and-suspenders (defense in depth, not a substitute for the
+  # above): clients/controlplane/containment.go fail-closed panics if its stub
+  # crypto is ever constructed outside a go-test binary (testing.Testing()==
+  # false) — see TestContainment_NonHarnessProcessRefuses in
+  # containment_test.go. KNOWN RESIDUAL: testing.Testing() is a linker-set
+  # string var (testing.testBinary), not cryptographically bound to "actually
+  # is a test" — `-ldflags="-X testing.testBinary=1"` spoofs it in a real
+  # binary. Check #2 above is the mitigation: it fails the PR that would ship
+  # that flag. Closing the residual for real needs a signal `go build` cannot
+  # produce at all (increment-2, tracked in doc.go) rather than one merely
+  # absent by convention.
+  containment:
+    runs-on: [hanzo-build-linux-amd64]
+    # Bounded so a wedged run frees its runner. Absent this the job inherits
+    # GitHub's six-hour default, and the failure that actually happens is a
+    # runner reclaimed mid-build (exit 130, "runner has received a shutdown
+    # signal") whose job then sits on the slot for the rest of the morning.
+    # Generous: these checks read the import graph, they do not link, and the
+    # whole pipeline runs 13-26 min cold.
+    timeout-minutes: 45
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+
+      - name: grep — no build/release path may set -tags controlplane, or spoof testing.Testing()
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          hits=0
+
+          # NOTE: exclusions are plain substring matches on the path (not
+          # anchored to a leading "./") so this is robust across grep
+          # implementations that format recursive-search paths differently.
+          # char class includes `!` so a build-constraint negation form
+          # (`-tags '!x,controlplane'`) cannot slip the grep. (Belt only: the
+          # positive-proof step below is the syntax-agnostic guarantee — the
+          # package has zero untagged files, so importing it into serve code
+          # fails the untagged `go build ./...` regardless of any -tags syntax.)
+          if grep -RnE -- '-tags[= ]*["'"'"']?[!A-Za-z0-9_, ]*\bcontrolplane\b' \
+               --exclude-dir=.git --exclude-dir=node_modules --exclude-dir=.claude --exclude-dir=vendor \
+               . 2>/dev/null \
+               | grep -v '\.git/' \
+               | grep -v 'clients/controlplane/' \
+               | grep -v '.hanzo/workflows/cicd.yml:'; then
+            echo "::error::found a build/release invocation passing -tags controlplane — clients/controlplane's stub crypto must never enter a release/serve binary (see clients/controlplane/doc.go)"
+            hits=1
+          fi
+
+          if grep -RnE -- 'testing\.testBinary' \
+               --exclude-dir=.git --exclude-dir=node_modules --exclude-dir=.claude --exclude-dir=vendor \
+               . 2>/dev/null \
+               | grep -v '.hanzo/workflows/cicd.yml:'; then
+            echo "::error::found a reference to testing.testBinary outside the Go toolchain itself — this is the linker var that spoofs testing.Testing() in a real (non go-test) binary; the containment.go runtime guard trusts that signal, so setting it anywhere in a real build path defeats it (see doc.go)"
+            hits=1
+          fi
+
+          if [ "$hits" -ne 0 ]; then exit 1; fi
+          echo "OK: no build/release path sets -tags controlplane or spoofs testing.Testing()"
+
+      - uses: actions/setup-go@v5
+        with:
+          go-version-file: go.mod
+
+      - name: go env for private modules
+        env:
+          GH_PAT: ${{ secrets.GH_PAT }}
+        # GOPRIVATE names exactly the namespace that is private. github.com/hanzoai/*
+        # is: ai, account, commerce, orm, xorm, beego, csqlite and ~30 more are
+        # private repos, so they must resolve direct+authenticated and skip a sumdb
+        # that cannot see them. Everything else stays on the public proxy + checksum
+        # db, which is what makes a module hash immutable: zap-proto (all 55 repos)
+        # and luxfi (all 37 deps here) are public and proxy-served.
+        #
+        # This previously named zap-proto — public, and never the reason anything
+        # here was direct — and then set GOSUMDB=off to compensate for hanzoai/*
+        # being absent, which disabled checksum verification for EVERY module in the
+        # build, public ones included. Naming the private namespace is what the off
+        # switch was standing in for.
+        run: |
+          git config --global url."https://x-access-token:${GH_PAT}@github.com/".insteadOf "https://github.com/"
+          {
+            echo "GOPRIVATE=github.com/hanzoai/*"
+            echo "GOPROXY=https://proxy.golang.org,direct"
+          } >> "$GITHUB_ENV"
+
+      - name: zen streaming-fix floor — go.mod must pin github.com/hanzoai/zen >= v1.4.1
+        # The SSE body-close fix (zen commit 50328b8, first released in zen v1.4.1)
+        # is what makes streaming completions return a body instead of an empty
+        # stream. A stale-branch merge that reverts go.mod's zen pin below the floor
+        # silently re-breaks streaming, and `next build`'s ignoreBuildErrors hides
+        # the runtime break — so no image may be cut on a regressed pin. This is the
+        # durable root-cause guard: it reads the EFFECTIVE module version (post-MVS,
+        # exactly what the build links) and fails the PR/push below the floor.
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          FLOOR="v1.4.1"
+          V="$(go list -m -f '{{.Version}}' github.com/hanzoai/zen)"
+          echo "effective github.com/hanzoai/zen = ${V} (floor ${FLOOR})"
+          # semver-correct compare: the lowest of {V, FLOOR} under `sort -V` must be
+          # the FLOOR, i.e. V >= FLOOR. (sort -V orders v1.4.2 above v1.4.10 too.)
+          low="$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$V" "$FLOOR" | sort -V | head -1)"
+          if [ "$low" != "$FLOOR" ]; then
+            echo "::error::github.com/hanzoai/zen is pinned at ${V}, below the streaming-fix floor ${FLOOR} — this re-breaks SSE streaming (empty completions). Re-pin zen to >= ${FLOOR} in go.mod before merging."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          echo "OK: zen ${V} is at or above the streaming-fix floor ${FLOOR}"
+
+      - name: positive proof — clients/controlplane is unreachable from the default build
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+
+          # Containment is an IMPORT-GRAPH property, so prove it with the import
+          # graph. This step used to lead with `go build ./...`, which compiles
+          # AND LINKS every cmd/ main — and linking needs
+          # native/flags/target/release/libhanzo_flags.a, the Rust staticlib
+          # clients/flags pulls in under cgo (clients/flags/engine.go). Nothing
+          # in THIS job builds it: `make native` runs in the gate job, in that
+          # job's own workspace. It passed on GitHub only because the arc
+          # runners reuse a workspace and target/ is gitignored, so an earlier
+          # gate job's leftover .a was still sitting there; on a container
+          # runner with a fresh volume every cmd/ main died at
+          # `ld: cannot find .../libhanzo_flags.a`. The compile was never the
+          # proof anyway — `go list -deps` reads the same untagged file set
+          # without linking, and the gate job is the ONE place that builds.
+          for m in $(go list ./cmd/...); do
+            if go list -deps "$m" | grep -qx 'github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/controlplane'; then
+              echo "::error::$m links clients/controlplane into a real binary — containment breach"
+              exit 1
+            fi
+          done
+
+          out="$(go build ./clients/controlplane/... 2>&1 || true)"
+          if ! printf '%s' "$out" | grep -q 'matched no packages'; then
+            echo "::error::clients/controlplane built successfully WITHOUT -tags controlplane (containment breach): $out"
+            exit 1
+          fi
+
+          echo "OK: containment holds — clients/controlplane has zero buildable files by default and is linked into no cmd/ binary"
+

Dockerfile

@@ -19,11 +19,26 @@
 # Pinned to ghcr.io so BOTH buildx lanes (release.yml + platform arcbuild) pull
 # it directly; the SAME tags are mirrored to registry.hanzo.ai (S3-backed) for
 # GET-flow consumers (docker/kaniko/crane). Override any pin with
-# --build-arg <NAME>_IMAGE=…  — release.yml resolves CONSOLE_IMAGE to a fresh
-# console-embed digest, exactly as CONSOLE_CACHEBUST re-fetched console before.
-ARG CONSOLE_IMAGE=ghcr.io/hanzoai/console-embed:latest
-ARG SKILLS_IMAGE=ghcr.io/hanzoai/agent-skills:latest
-ARG FLAGS_IMAGE=ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud-flags:latest
+# --build-arg <NAME>_IMAGE=… .
+#
+# IMMUTABLE per-commit tags, never `:latest`. These defaults are LOAD-BEARING:
+# the builder that actually runs our releases is the native one (POST /v1/runner
+# → launchDirectBuild → BuildKit), and it passes no --build-arg, so whatever is
+# written here is what gets baked. `release.yml`, which the previous comment said
+# would resolve a fresh digest, is a stub and resolves nothing.
+#
+# With `:latest` the embedded console was therefore decided by WHEN the build ran,
+# not by what we shipped — and it bit: cloud v1.801.215 was built ~12 minutes
+# before console CI finished publishing the console-embed carrying v8.5.26, so a
+# release whose whole purpose was that console change silently baked the previous
+# one and shipped green. Same image, two contents, no diff to show for it.
+#
+# BUMP: when a console/skills/flags change must reach production, move its pin
+# here in the same commit that claims it. That is what makes a cloud release
+# reproducible and makes "what console is in v1.801.N" answerable from git.
+ARG CONSOLE_IMAGE=ghcr.io/hanzoai/console-embed:sha-147ecd3-amd64
+ARG SKILLS_IMAGE=ghcr.io/hanzoai/agent-skills:sha-b931a11-amd64
+ARG FLAGS_IMAGE=ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud-flags:sha-e1ca02a-amd64
 
 # ── toolchain base images: the golang + alpine FROMs below pull from our own
 # GHCR mirror (ghcr.io/hanzoai/mirror/*), pinned by digest. WHY: public.ecr.aws
@@ -163,10 +178,21 @@ LABEL org.opencontainers.image.revision="${REVISION}" \
 # libgcc: the hanzo-flags Rust staticlib (clients/featureflags FFI) references the
 # _Unwind_* unwinder symbols; musl needs libgcc_s at load time or the binary fails
 # relocation ("Error relocating /cloud: _Unwind_GetIP: symbol not found").
-RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates tzdata sqlcipher-libs git libgcc \
+# tini: /cloud runs as PID 1, and PID 1 inherits every orphaned descendant in the
+# container. git is not a single process — fetch/clone fan out to git-upload-pack,
+# git-index-pack, git-rev-list and git-pack-objects. When cloud Kill()s a wedged
+# direct child (gitPackStream.Close does exactly that, correctly), those
+# grandchildren orphan and reparent to PID 1. A Go program never reaps adopted
+# orphans, so each one becomes a permanent zombie holding a PID slot.
+# Measured 2026-07-26 on worker-xl-37bw71: 18,553 zombie `git` out of 18,741
+# processes, all parented to /cloud, which drove the node to PID pressure and
+# got cloud ITSELF evicted. A zombie costs no CPU and no memory, so nothing but
+# an eviction ever surfaces it. tini reaps them.
+RUN apk add --no-cache ca-certificates tzdata sqlcipher-libs git libgcc tini \
     && SC="$(find /usr/lib /lib -name 'libsqlcipher.so*' 2>/dev/null | sort | head -1)" \
     && test -n "$SC" \
-    && ln -sf "$SC" /usr/lib/libsqlite3.so.0
+    && ln -sf "$SC" /usr/lib/libsqlite3.so.0 \
+    && test -x /sbin/tini
 COPY --from=build /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
 COPY --from=build /usr/share/zoneinfo /usr/share/zoneinfo
 COPY --from=build /etc/passwd /etc/passwd
@@ -175,4 +201,7 @@ COPY --from=build /cloud /cloud
 COPY --from=build /smoke /smoke
 EXPOSE 8080 9090 9653
 USER 65532:65532
-ENTRYPOINT ["/cloud"]
+# tini as PID 1 forwards signals to /cloud unchanged (so SIGTERM still drains
+# normally) and reaps the orphans described above. `--` keeps cloud's own args
+# untouched; the CR passes none today, but that stays true if it ever does.
+ENTRYPOINT ["/sbin/tini", "--", "/cloud"]

IAM_CUTOVER.md

@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+# IAM cutover — Casdoor pod → embedded IAM in cloud (supervised)
+
+Flip `hanzo.id`'s identity plane from the standalone Casdoor pod to the clean-room
+IAM rewrite embedded in this binary (`clients/iam`, `github.com/hanzoai/iam`
+**v1.33.6**). This is the last step of HIP-0106 (one binary embeds IAM + KMS + o11y).
+
+**This is a single supervised session. Do not run it piecemeal or in the
+background.** Every step below is: **action → verify → rollback**. Money/auth is on
+the line — a bad flip 401s every login and every metered request.
+
+The blocking code work is **done and shipped**:
+- IAM v1.33.6 serves the legacy path aliases the deployed fleet hard-codes
+  (`/v1/iam/oauth/access_token`, `/v1/iam/oauth/refresh_token`, `/v1/iam/userinfo`)
+  next to the canonical paths — so no hard-coded caller 404s at the flip.
+- `cloud` pins `github.com/hanzoai/iam v1.33.8` (go.mod) and compiles it in.
+
+> **`iam` is NOT staged.** `stagedSubsystems` in `config.go` holds only `ingress`, so
+> the empty-`CLOUD_ENABLE` "mount everything" default — **the live posture on
+> `universe/infra/k8s/operator/crs/cloud.yaml`** — mounts the embedded IAM. Step 1 is
+> therefore a **precondition of the next deploy**, not of a later flip: a cloud that
+> boots before the store is migrated opens an EMPTY `iam2.db` and seeds only from
+> `init_data.json`. `iam_edge.go` forwards `/v1/iam/*` to the standalone pod ONLY
+> under a non-empty `--enable` that omits `iam`, which is the one way to hold cloud
+> on the old plane while Step 1 runs.
+
+## Preconditions (verify before touching anything)
+
+1. Live image is at or above the tag that carries embedded IAM v1.33.6
+   (`universe/infra/k8s/operator/crs/cloud.yaml` `spec.image.tag`). The subsystem is
+   compiled in but inert until enabled — safe to deploy ahead of the flip.
+2. `spec.replicas: 1` and `strategy: Recreate` (already required — the embedded
+   store is single-writer/single-open). **`config.go` refuses to boot iam-enabled
+   above 1 replica.** Never scale up with iam on.
+3. `CLOUD_DATA_DIR=/var/lib/cloud` on the RWO `cloud-api-data` PVC. The embedded IAM
+   store is **`/var/lib/cloud/iam/iam2.db`** (`clients/iam/iam.go` `paths()`) — the v2
+   store. `iam.db` is a different database; opening it serves the wrong identities
+   without failing.
+4. You have the live Casdoor store to migrate FROM and its KMS master key:
+   - encrypted sharded root: `<dir>/iam.db` + `<dir>/orgs/*/iam.db` (+ `.dek` sidecars)
+   - `IAM_KMS_MASTER_KEY` = the 64-hex master key (from KMS — never an arg, never logged)
+5. `migrate-v1` is built from the **iam** repo (`github.com/hanzoai/iam`,
+   `cmd/migrate-v1`, same v1.33.6 tag) with a C `sqlcipher` binary on PATH (for
+   `--wal-inclusive`).
+
+## Step 1 — Migrate the live store into the embedded datadir (BEFORE any seed)
+
+The embedded IAM seeds new-only from `init_data.json`. Migrating real rows must
+happen **before** the subsystem ever seeds, or the seed masks/collides with them.
+The source is opened **read-only** — the live Casdoor pod is untouched.
+
+**1a. Dry-run = the drift/parity gate.** `--dry-run` runs the full extraction and
+prints the per-entity report WITHOUT writing. Require every entity's count to match
+the live source and **drift = 0** before proceeding.
+
+```
+migrate-v1 \
+  --src-datadir /path/to/live/casdoor/store \
+  --src-master-key-env IAM_KMS_MASTER_KEY \
+  --wal-inclusive \
+  --dest /var/lib/cloud/iam/iam2.db \
+  --dry-run
+```
+
+- `--wal-inclusive` checkpoints each shard's uncheckpointed `-wal` via the C
+  sqlcipher binary → COMPLETE extraction. Without it, uncheckpointed WAL rows are a
+  hard error (or, with `--ignore-wal`, silently dropped — do NOT use for a real cutover).
+- `--dest` accepts either form and both land on the same file here (`storePath` in
+  `iam/cmd/migrate-v1/main.go`): a `.db` path is taken verbatim, anything else is
+  treated as a data-dir and gets `/iam2.db` appended. So `…/iam/iam2.db` and `…/iam`
+  are equivalent. What matters is that the written file is exactly
+  `/var/lib/cloud/iam/iam2.db` — the path `clients/iam` opens.
+
+**Verify:** dry-run report shows expected counts for users, orgs, applications,
+providers, certs; zero drift; zero errors.
+**Rollback:** none needed — nothing written.
+
+**1b. Real migration.** Same command **without** `--dry-run`, writing into the
+(empty) embedded datadir on the cloud PVC. Do this while iam is still staged OFF.
+
+**Verify:** re-run `--dry-run` against `--src /var/lib/cloud/iam/iam2.db` (or open it
+read-only) and confirm counts equal the source.
+**Rollback:** `rm -f /var/lib/cloud/iam/iam2.db*` (only the freshly-written store) and
+re-run. Nothing else consumes it until cloud next boots iam-enabled.
+
+## Step 2 — Boot cloud with the embedded IAM subsystem
+
+`iam` is **not** staged, so the live CR's empty `CLOUD_ENABLE` already enables it —
+there is no env var to add. Deploying the image IS this step. Nothing here is
+additive or reversible by a flag: plan Step 1 to complete before the next roll.
+
+Apply the CR; the operator rolls the Recreate Deployment (single pod, brief blip —
+expected). On boot, `clients/iam` opens `/var/lib/cloud/iam/iam2.db` (the migrated
+store), seeds new-only from `init_data.json` (idempotent — real rows already present,
+so seed only adds anything genuinely missing), and mounts the full `/v1/iam/*` surface
+IN-PROCESS. `iam_edge.go` stops mounting (`serve.go`: `if !cfg.Enabled("iam") …`), so
+there is **no double-mount** and no forward to the Casdoor pod.
+
+**Verify (still on the internal Service, before repointing the edge):**
+```
+kubectl -n hanzo exec deploy/cloud -- \
+  curl -s localhost:8000/v1/iam/.well-known/openid-configuration | jq .issuer
+# → "https://hanzo.id"
+kubectl -n hanzo logs deploy/cloud | grep 'iam embedded in-process'
+```
+A boot failure serves fail-closed 503 on `/v1/iam/*` (cloud + every other subsystem
+stay up) — it does NOT crash the binary.
+**Rollback:** set `CLOUD_ENABLE` to an explicit list that OMITS `iam` and re-apply the
+CR. Deleting an env var does not roll this back — an empty `CLOUD_ENABLE` is
+iam-ENABLED. An explicit list is an allowlist, so it must name every other subsystem
+this deployment serves; take it from the CR's own subsystem set, not from memory.
+With `iam` out of that list the edge re-mounts and forwards to Casdoor again.
+hanzo.id is unaffected (still pointed at Casdoor until Step 3).
+
+## Step 3 — Repoint the hanzo.id identity backend at the edge
+
+`universe/infra/k8s/ingress/routes.yaml`: router `hanzo-id-iam-api` (priority 100)
+matches `Host(hanzo.id) && (PathPrefix(/v1/iam) || PathPrefix(/oauth) ||
+PathPrefix(/.well-known))` → `service: iam-hanzo-ai`. Repoint that **service** from
+the Casdoor pod to embedded cloud:
+
+```yaml
+    iam-hanzo-ai:
+      loadBalancer:
+        passHostHeader: true
+        servers:
+        - url: http://cloud.hanzo.svc.cluster.local:8000   # was: http://iam.hanzo.svc.cluster.local:80
+```
+
+Leave the `hanzo-id` service (`id.hanzo.svc:80`, the @hanzo/id login SPA) as-is — only
+the API backend moves. The ingress file-provider applies the ConfigMap edit **HOT**
+(fsnotify) — **do NOT `rollout restart deploy/ingress`** (that triggers the per-node
+ACME storm / TLS outage documented in `universe/CLAUDE.md`).
+
+**Verify:** run the Step-4 parity checks against the public host `https://hanzo.id`.
+**Rollback:** revert the one `url:` back to `http://iam.hanzo.svc.cluster.local:80`;
+hot-reapplies in seconds. Instant, complete rollback to Casdoor.
+
+## Step 4 — Playwright / curl parity (drive it, don't just curl a status)
+
+Against `https://hanzo.id` (through the repointed edge). Use Playwright for the browser
+login (real interaction, not an HTTP status peek):
+
+1. **Discovery + JWKS**: `/.well-known/openid-configuration`,
+   `/v1/iam/.well-known/openid-configuration`, `/v1/iam/.well-known/jwks` — issuer
+   `https://hanzo.id`, keys present.
+2. **Browser login → code → token** (Playwright): `/login/oauth/authorize` → sign in
+   → callback with `code` → token exchange → a verifiable JWT; the app authenticates.
+3. **client_credentials** (KMS bridge / gateway guards shape) at BOTH
+   `/v1/iam/oauth/token` and the alias `/v1/iam/oauth/access_token` → 200 + token.
+4. **refresh** at the alias `/v1/iam/oauth/refresh_token` (the `hanzo` CLI shape) → 200
+   + rotated token.
+5. **userinfo** at BOTH `/v1/iam/oauth/userinfo` and the alias `/v1/iam/userinfo`
+   (commerce shape) → same principal.
+6. **Real callers**: force one live KMS-bridge / gateway-guard token fetch and one
+   `hanzo login` + `hanzo` CLI refresh against hanzo.id → all 200.
+
+**Accepted delta (not a regression):** BARE `/oauth/token|access_token|userinfo`
+(no `/v1/iam` prefix) on hanzo.id 404 post-cutover — the rewrite serves the
+`/v1/iam/…`-prefixed canonical + alias paths only, discovery advertises those, and no
+live caller uses the bare form (grep-verified: every fleet caller uses `/v1/iam/oauth/*`
+or an app-local `/oauth/*` proxy that rewrites to `/v1/iam/*`). Bare `/oauth/authorize`
+still 302s to the login SPA via the priority-150 router (unchanged). Optionally tighten
+the `hanzo-id-iam-api` rule to drop the bare `/oauth` prefix in the same edit.
+
+**If any parity check fails: roll back Step 3 immediately** (one `url:` revert) and
+diagnose with iam still embedded-but-unrouted.
+
+## Step 5 — Retire the standalone Casdoor `iam` (final, only after parity holds)
+
+With hanzo.id served by embedded IAM and parity green, remove the standalone Casdoor
+workload. It is operator-managed via its App/CR
+(`universe/infra/k8s/operator/crs/iam.yaml`, legacy
+`hanzo-operator/crs/iam.yaml` + `iam-v1.yaml`). **First scale to 0** (reversible),
+soak, then delete the CR + drop its basename from the Hanzo CD
+`universe-crs` `include` glob (so ArgoCD stops governing it).
+
+**Verify:** hanzo.id fully green with the Casdoor pod at 0 replicas for a full soak
+(logins, token refresh, metered `/v1/*` traffic). Then delete.
+**Rollback (pre-delete):** scale the Casdoor Deployment back to 1 and revert Step 3's
+edge `url:` — hanzo.id is back on Casdoor in seconds. **After** the CR is deleted this
+is no longer a one-step rollback (re-apply the CR from git), so hold the scale-to-0
+soak until you are certain.
+
+## Guardrails (do NOT, until this supervised session)
+
+- Do not roll a cloud image onto the live CR before Step 1 completes — the empty
+  `CLOUD_ENABLE` mounts embedded IAM on boot, so the deploy itself performs Step 2.
+- Do not repoint `iam-hanzo-ai` before Step-2 in-process verification passes.
+- Do not delete or scale down the Casdoor `iam` workload before Step-4 parity holds.
+- Do not run `migrate-v1` against prod without the read-only source + a green `--dry-run`.
+- Do not `rollout restart deploy/ingress` (ACME storm). The routes edit is hot-reloaded.
+- Keep `replicas: 1` / `strategy: Recreate` — embedded IAM is single-writer.

LLM.md

@@ -1,10 +1,40 @@
 # LLM.md — hanzoai/cloud
 
-Guidance for AI agents working in this repo. `hanzoai/cloud` (HIP-0106) is ONE Go
-binary + CLI that mounts every Hanzo subsystem into a single process; the same
-artifact serves `api.hanzo.ai`, `api.lux.cloud`, `api.zoo.cloud`, `api.osage.cloud`
-and every white-label reseller. Brand, enabled subsystems, and org scope are
-deployment configuration.
+**Canonical repo.** `hanzoai/cloud` (HIP-0106) is the Open AI Cloud as ONE Go
+binary + `hanzo` CLI: every Hanzo subsystem (iam, base, kms, ai, gateway,
+commerce, o11y, tasks, …) mounted into a single multi-org process. The same
+artifact serves `api.hanzo.ai`, `api.lux.cloud`, `api.zoo.cloud`,
+`api.osage.cloud`, and every white-label reseller — brand, enabled subsystems,
+and org scope are deployment configuration. This is the impl home for the cloud
+control plane; the OpenAPI it emits at `GET /v1/openapi.json` is the single
+source for the generated per-language SDKs.
+
+## Role in the SDK model
+- Full Cloud SDK is GENERATED from THIS binary's OpenAPI; SDK impl lives in
+  `hanzo-<lang>/sdk`, docs/wrappers in `hanzoai/<lang>-sdk`, meta in `hanzoai/sdk`.
+- AI/agents flagship lib is separate: Python `hanzo` (`hanzoai/python-sdk`),
+  Node `@hanzo/ai` (`hanzo-js/ai`). Completeness: Python > Rust > C++ > Go.
+- DRY: one impl, one place; discovery repos link OUT, never duplicate impl.
+- Full spec: `~/work/hanzo/SDK-ARCHITECTURE.md`.
+
+## Brand rules (hard)
+- Hanzo is a full AI cloud, NOT a proxy — never "LLM gateway", never position vs
+  LiteLLM. Zen models are our OWN family; never name upstream models.
+- `/v1/` only, never `/api/`. Voice: "Hanzo — the Open AI Cloud."
+
+## Install / run
+- `docker run -p 8080:8080 ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:vX.Y.Z` (pin a released tag) ·
+  `go install github.com/hanzoai/cloud/cmd/hanzo@latest` · `brew install hanzoai/tap/hanzo`
+- Build in MODULE mode only: `make build` / `GOWORK=off go build ./...` — never
+  workspace mode (see "Build & module graph" below).
+
+## Key entry points
+- `cmd/cloud` — server binary · `cmd/hanzo` (`cli/`) — control CLI · `webui.go` — embedded console
+- `apps/apps.go:Wire()` — composition root (the one ordered subsystem slice)
+- `deps.go` / `cloud.Deps` — process-wide handles · `clients/<name>/` — every subsystem
+- `openapi/` — live spec derived from the router (no checked-in spec file)
+
+---
 
 ## Open Cloud planes
 
@@ -22,6 +52,8 @@ reverse).
 | `/v1/compute/bots` | Hosting: `@hanzo/bot` Node containers | `clients/bots` | Shipped |
 | `/v1/tasks` | Durable engine | `clients/tasks` | Shipped |
 | `/v1/gpus` + fleet | BYO GPU presence | `clients/fleet` + `clients/visor` | Shipped |
+| `/v1/cloud` | Cloud accounts: link DO/AWS/GCP/Azure, discover native k8s clusters, fold into the fleet | `clients/venue` (new) | In flight (branch `feat/cloud-account-connectors`; blue-held for red) |
+| `/v1/blueprint` | Cost: OSS-template SBOM (compose→images) + compute-cost estimate | `clients/blueprint` (new) | Shipped |
 | IAM | Identity: users, orgs, roles | IAM | Shipped |
 | KMS | Secret custody: sealed secrets | `clients/kms` | Shipped |
 
@@ -86,6 +118,16 @@ Dockerfile's dedicated `-tags libsqlite3` CGO stage, and fail under `make test`
 by design (clients/git, kms, flags, x402, cmd/kmsreseal, finance). Bundle-embed
 tests (clients/tasks/ui) need `make deploy-ui` first (real bundle is gitignored).
 
+Store-heavy subsystem tests are fsync-bound, not CPU-bound. A mount opens its own
+SQLite stores, so a test that mounts several subsystems commits many times, and
+`t.TempDir()` under `/tmp` puts every commit behind the ext4 journal — on a box with
+a concurrent build the same mount that costs milliseconds idle costs ~90s, at ~0%
+CPU, blocked in `jbd2_log_wait_commit`. Point `TMPDIR` at tmpfs to measure the real
+cost: `TMPDIR=/dev/shm/t GOWORK=off go test -p 1 ./clients/guide` runs the eight-seam
+cross-subsystem harness (`clients/guide/drivehome_e2e_test.go`) in under a second.
+Prefer one package per `go test` invocation regardless: `./...` links every main
+package at once (`cmd/cloud` alone links >6GB).
+
 ## Framework doctrine
 
 One way to do everything. Composable, orthogonal, DRY. A new subsystem is a
@@ -131,6 +173,56 @@ package under `clients/<name>` that obeys these seams — nothing more.
   the SOLE driver (blank-imported once, in orgdb.go); subsystems never import a
   SQLite driver themselves. The caller owns its schema/migration and Close.
 
+## Zero-downtime HA for per-org stores (rolling-upgrade safe)
+
+The per-org store path (`cloud.OrgStore` + `internal/org`) is HA over embedded
+SQLite: `ha` decides WHO writes (HRW election + a monotone fencing round), `vfs`
+FencedStore decides HOW state ships (hydrate-on-open + fenced ship to S3), and this
+layer decides WHEN ownership transitions. Three orthogonal lanes; SQLite stays
+embedded underneath.
+
+- **Durability is THE path, capability-detected — no flag.** `buildDurability`
+  probes at boot: no object store reachable (dev / native-Go) → local-only, same
+  code path; a reachable store → `org.ProbeCAS` PROVES its conditional-PUT
+  atomicity (two racing If-None-Match creates + If-Match updates, exactly one winner
+  each) before fencing any tenant data. A store that can't be proven atomic fails
+  SAFE to local-only + a loud alert (never fence where two writers could win one
+  round). Replaced the old `CLOUD_RESEARCH_DURABLE` opt-in — the atomicity gate (H2)
+  is now a self-check the binary runs.
+- **Live membership (no static peer list).** `membership_k8s.go` lists Ready,
+  non-terminating pods by label (`CLOUD_PEER_SELECTOR`) via the K8s API each 2s
+  refresh, so a rolling upgrade's changing pod set is tracked and a draining/dead pod
+  (`DeletionTimestamp` set, or NotReady) leaves the writer election at once. Out of
+  cluster / no selector → static self set (`podWriterEligible` is the ONE ready gate;
+  visor has the twin, the shared `hanzoai/ha/k8s` source folds them).
+- **M3 live re-acquire, no restart.** A store that opened degraded (read-only) is
+  promoted IN PLACE when this replica becomes the org's elected owner:
+  `Durable.PendingPromotion` gates it, `TryClaim` probes the lease (CAS only, no file
+  I/O), then `OrgStore.promote` quiesces the read-only handle and reopens as owner
+  (Hydrate renews + CarryForward-restores under the FRESH handle — the file swap is
+  why the reopen is required). The reopen claims a strictly higher round, fencing the
+  prior owner — never two live writers.
+- **Graceful drain.** SIGTERM → `SetDraining()` → `/readyz` 503 (drain-aware, ops
+  port) → K8s marks NotReady → peers re-elect this pod's orgs to live successors
+  (which hydrate via M3) → the pod stays serving a short grace, then in-flight drains
+  and final state ships (`OrgStore.CloseAll`, ship-before-close). The shard router
+  routes on the live set when the durable plane is on, so a draining pod's orgs go to
+  the ready successor — not to the gone pod. Manifest: readiness → `/readyz` on the
+  metrics port, `terminationGracePeriodSeconds` ≥ ~40s, RBAC pods:list,watch, the
+  downward-API `POD_NAME`/`POD_NAMESPACE`, `CLOUD_PEER_SELECTOR` (all in `helm/cloud`).
+- **Proof.** `internal/org/rollingupgrade_test.go` rolls 3 pods over 8 orgs with
+  continuous writes and asserts zero lost acked writes, zero split-brain (no
+  (org,round) acked by two pods), and continuous availability — across both a pod
+  restart (fresh rehydrate) and an in-place ownership flap (M3, no restart).
+- **Two extensibility seams (for the tiered-storage perf pass).** The fence's
+  `ConditionalStore` is constructed in `buildDurability`, so a KV read/write-through
+  cache (L1 over the S3 L2) wraps it as a one-line decorator. The ship mechanism is a
+  swappable `snapshotCodec` (default `wholeFile`), so WAL-frame delta shipping
+  replaces it without touching the fence/round. `WithCheckpoint` injects the ship
+  checkpoint (`durableCheckpoint`) — the crypto envelope's re-encrypt integration
+  point: on a defer-encryption-to-checkpoint backend it MUST route through the
+  driver's re-encrypting Checkpoint so ship-before-ack reads FRESH ciphertext (P5).
+
 ## The route table has three projections, and the router is the source
 
 `serve.go` composes ONE route table and projects it three ways, all after
@@ -212,6 +304,24 @@ package under `clients/<name>` that obeys these seams — nothing more.
   "stopped" runs that were never started. Isolation holds because the org is the
   validated one cloud sends, never a client's, and the runtime keys every run
   under `tenants/{org}/`.
+- **A customer IS an IAM user; marketing keeps no contact list.** Who to email is
+  read IN-PROCESS from the embedded IAM (`clients/marketing/roster.go` →
+  `iam/pkg/store.GetMailableUsers` over `clients/iam.DB()`), the same seam
+  `clients/platform` uses for the IAM-owned Project — no HTTP hop to `/v1/iam`
+  from inside the binary, IAM's `model.User` verbatim, read-only, masked. The org
+  is `principal.Org`, which IS IAM's `Owner`, so an audience can only ever resolve
+  its own tenant; `GetMailableUsers` REFUSES an empty org rather than falling back
+  to the all-orgs view that `GetProjects` deliberately allows. IAM not co-mounted
+  is a 503, never an empty audience — a send reported successful to nobody is the
+  worse failure. An audience with no event filter is every mailable customer;
+  with one, `matchCohort` joins the warehouse `distinct_id`s to that roster and
+  COUNTS what matched nobody instead of inventing an address.
+- **A product announcement is not its own engine.** It is a one-step sequence with
+  an audience enrolled into it — `POST /v1/marketing/sequences/:id/enroll` takes
+  `audienceId` where it takes `address` — so it inherits the drip engine's
+  claimed-once delivery, the ONE send gate (`state.deliver` → suppression →
+  `notify.Send`), and the signed unsubscribe footer. Never add a blast path beside
+  `deliver`: the gate is only absolute because it is the only door.
 - **Absence is only meaningful from a callee that could have said otherwise.**
   `runtime.ErrNotFound` (the operation ANSWERED "no such target") is separate from
   `runtime.ErrNotServed` (the operation does not exist). Conflating them makes a
@@ -226,6 +336,39 @@ package under `clients/<name>` that obeys these seams — nothing more.
   curriculum is a machine-readable contract (embedded `default.yaml`; org-custom via
   PUT replaces it) so `hanzoai/marketing` can author the full `checklist.yaml`
   against the same `Step`/`Curriculum` shape.
+- **The EXPERIMENT is a composition, not a fourth engine (`clients/experiments`,
+  `/v1/experiments`).** A/B testing is ONE value whatever the variant KIND (feature
+  flag, ad creative, email subject, model id): the primitive owns only the
+  experiment registry (definition + decision); it COMPOSES three planes it never
+  duplicates. ASSIGNMENT = `flags.Assign(org,project,key,subject,props)` —
+  subject→variant is a deterministic `engineEvaluate` (sha1 rollout hash), no second
+  bucketing, no assignment store; create writes a multivariate flag def
+  (`flags.PutDef`) and decide rewrites its weights to 100% for the winner
+  (`flags.GetDef`+`PutDef`). MEASUREMENT = `analytics.Outcomes(...)` — one
+  org-scoped `hanzo.events` query (the `eventsWhere` isolation invariant), no second
+  event store; the analyze fold joins each subject's analytics outcome to its flags
+  variant by `distinct_id`. EVIDENCE = `research.Record`/`research.List` — per-variant
+  samples land as immutable `kind:"ab"` rows; significance (two-proportion z-test,
+  `math.Erfc`, no dep) is a PURE function over them. `clients/campaign` runs a
+  creative A/B by composing `experiments.Assign`/`experiments.Analyze` — it never
+  reinvents assignment or evidence. Add a new variant KIND by putting a payload on
+  the variant; the primitive does not care what it is.
+- **The OSS-template compute cost is DERIVED from the compose, not a fourth ledger
+  (`clients/blueprint`, `/v1/blueprint`).** A blueprint's `docker-compose.yml` is
+  parsed to its SBOM (the bill of container images) and its services' CPU/memory
+  footprint priced through ONE documented rate card (microdollars per vCPU-/GB-hour,
+  DigitalOcean-droplet-derived + platform margin; tunable via
+  `CLOUD_BLUEPRINT_UCPU_HR`/`_UGB_HR`). Sizing is the declared
+  `deploy.resources.reservations`/`limits` (or legacy `cpus`/`mem_*`) else a default
+  footprint per inferred class (db/cache/web/worker/other). `blueprint.EstimateTemplate(id)`
+  returns `{sbom, vcpuHr, gbHr, microUsdPerHour, estCentsPerMonth}`: `estCentsPerMonth`
+  is the "~$X/mo to run" the console shows; `microUsdPerHour` is the exact rate the
+  deploy path meters the deploying org on via the SAME commerce spine `resource_billing`
+  uses. The author royalty (`clients/authors`, `defaultShareBps=2000`) already accrues
+  20% of a deploying org's metered spend — this plane only DEFINES the compute component
+  of that spend from a real rate card; it never touches the ledger or the accrual sweep.
+  Distinct from `clients/sbom` (CycloneDX packages INSIDE one image, keyed by digest);
+  this is the bill of IMAGES a stack runs, keyed by template.
 
 ## Identity vocabulary is IAM-native
 
@@ -277,6 +420,112 @@ image to a prior semver and `/{name}/sync` requests a reconcile. SUPERADMIN-only
 `gitops-engine` (`hanzoai/deploy/gitops-engine` v0.7.2, no replace) in-process for the
 reconcile half behind `DEPLOY_ENGINE_ENABLED` (default off), with a prune-safety fuse.
 
+## The index (`clients/index`, `/v1/index`)
+
+The in-binary index, speaking the Meilisearch REST dialect so a Meilisearch client
+repoints by changing one host. It replaced the standalone Meilisearch containers
+(`chat-meilisearch`, `search-fts5`).
+
+**Four different things, four names — do not merge them.** `hanzoai/search` is the
+SEARCH PRODUCT (our own Meilisearch build, serving `search.hanzo.ai` and the docs
+corpus). `clients/websearch` queries the OUTSIDE world. `hanzoai/crawl` fetches it.
+`clients/index` is the storage primitive an application writes documents into and
+queries back. It is NOT at `/v1/search`: that path belongs to the `hanzoai/ai` RAG
+plane, whose `/v1/search/{name}` pattern silently swallowed this subsystem's
+single-segment routes (`/health`, `/version` answered 404 in production while every
+deeper route worked). `GET /v1/openapi.json` is what shows two owners of one path.
+
+Tenancy is the point: a standalone Meilisearch has ONE
+global keyspace behind a master key, so every consumer sharing an instance shares its
+indexes — here the tenant is `principal.Org` and every query filters `WHERE org=?`,
+so two orgs may both hold an index named `messages`. The credential is the org's
+ordinary API key, because the JS client already sends `Authorization: Bearer`.
+
+**The index is a term table, NOT FTS5, and must stay that way.** FTS5 is a
+compile-time module and this binary links the SYSTEM SQLite so the SQLCipher codec is
+real; that library ships `ENABLE_FTS3` + `HAS_CODEC` with no fts5, and the
+`sqlite_fts5` build tag only affects the VENDORED amalgamation, so it is inert here.
+An index built on FTS5 opens on a pure-Go build, passes its tests, and then cannot
+create a single table in the shipped image. `terms` is keyed
+`(org, uid, term, pk)` so a prefix query is an index range scan; it behaves the same
+in every build lane. Verify any SQLite module against the production lane
+(`-tags "libsqlite3 sqlite_fts5"` + `-lsqlcipher`) before designing on it.
+
+The store is `{DataDir}/index.db`, and a rename must carry the WHOLE family: cek
+keeps the wrapped data key beside it as `<path>.dek`, so moving the `.db` alone
+strands the key and every document becomes undecryptable — data loss that presents
+as an empty index.
+
+## Releases are cut by a merge to main
+
+`.github/workflows` is intentionally empty of CI. The image and its `v*` tags have ONE
+owner, `clients/platform/release.go`: compute the next version → build → SMOKE the
+pushed image → tag → roll out. The tag is a RECEIPT for a proven image, so a
+change that breaks boot never reaches production and leaves no phantom tag.
+
+The final step has ONE writer: patch the operator `hanzo.ai/v1` Service CR's
+`spec.image` and let the operator reconcile. It used to write twice — that patch plus
+a `repository_dispatch` mirror at `hanzoai/universe` — composed best-effort so the
+step passed if EITHER landed. Two writers for one fact, and the composition HID their
+disagreement: patch fails, mirror succeeds, cluster and git now describe different
+production states with nothing reporting a problem. The mirror was also never running
+— it read `UNIVERSE_DISPATCH_TOKEN`, never set on the deployment, so it failed closed
+on every release and the CR patch was already doing all the work. A rollout with
+nowhere to write is now an ERROR: the image is built, smoke-passed and tagged but NOT
+live, and a release that claims otherwise is worse than one that fails.
+
+### Site releases already have a lifecycle — do not build a second one
+
+`clients/projects` owns the full versioned-release model for static sites, and it is
+the ONE way:
+
+- `<org>/.releases/<slug>/rel_<128-bit manifest digest>/` — immutable, content-
+  addressed, and a SIBLING of the mutable `<org>/<slug>/` prefix, so neither a
+  full-artifact deploy nor a project delete (both of which purge that subtree) can
+  shred a release the pointer still names.
+- `Store.ActivateRelease` — the flip is one atomic `UPDATE … WHERE EXISTS (release
+  row)`, so it cannot point a site at a release that was never created, and two
+  concurrent activations cannot leave the pointer disagreeing with whichever won.
+  `MarkLive` deliberately does NOT touch `current_release`.
+- `servePrefix` (`clients/projects/sites.go`) — the ONE read rule, re-validating the
+  id against `releaseIDRE` before it can widen a prefix. An unrecognized id falls back
+  to the legacy prefix, so there is no flag day and no migration.
+- Rollback is activating an older id. Routes are already mounted on both site
+  surfaces via `siteReleases`.
+
+A parallel `clients/cd` + `clients/site` lifecycle (kind-agnostic `Target`, a
+`CURRENT` pointer object next to the bundles) was built and then DELETED unmerged: it
+re-implemented all of the above with a weaker pointer — a `v<N>` counter instead of a
+content digest, and a plain PUT that could name a release whose row does not exist.
+Its one genuinely new finding is recorded as a gap below, not as a second system.
+
+**Known gap: releases are never garbage-collected.** `promote` writes a new immutable
+prefix per distinct content and nothing prunes them; `DeleteReleases` only runs on
+project delete. Retention belongs in `clients/projects` next to `promote`. When it is
+added, `activate` must also verify the bytes still exist before flipping — today
+`ActivateRelease` proves only that the ROW exists, which is sufficient only while
+nothing can prune the bytes out from under it.
+
+It is driven by the GitHub App. A push arrives HMAC-verified at
+`/v1/connector/github/webhook`, which fires `cloud.OnGitPush` — the SAME
+single-registrant seam the embedded git server uses, not a second CI — and
+`clients/platform` decides what the push means: an app tracking the repo rebuilds,
+and cloud's own upstream cuts a release. Cloud is the machine, so it calls the
+release in-process and the build token is never handed to a caller. The trigger runs
+BEFORE the token mint and the mirror, because a build reads from GitHub and must not
+be lost to a sync outage.
+
+`isReleasePush` is narrow on purpose: the release repo BY URL (an org does not
+identify a repo), `main` only, a pinned commit only. Single-flight, because the
+version is computed from existing tags and two overlapping runs would compute the
+same one. Bot-authored pushes are excluded, so the release's own tag and mirror
+pushes cannot retrigger it.
+
+The org an inbound webhook belongs to comes from the App INSTALLATION id via the
+`connections` row written by the install callback. Without that row every delivery is
+acked `200 {"ignored":"unknown installation"}` and silently does nothing — a 200 on
+that path is not evidence it worked; check for sync/build activity.
+
 ## The `hanzo` CLI targets THIS binary — one contract, one IAM login
 
 The `hanzo` CLI (`cli/`) is the same unified binary; its control-plane verbs speak the
@@ -300,3 +549,42 @@ app; `?org=` cannot widen it). The rolling restart needs `patch` on `apps/deploy
 here (TS-Dokploy contract, 404), and `/v1/platform/*` needs a co-resident IAM store this
 deployment does not fold in (IAM runs as a separate svc) so it 500s; the live apps backend
 is `/v1/paas`, whose board reads k8s directly with no IAM-store dependency.
+
+## GTM: `/v1/campaign` orchestration → channels → connectors → analytics
+
+The go-to-market stack decomplects a campaign from its execution. A **Campaign is a
+VALUE** (`clients/campaign`: `{name, audience, content[], schedule, budget, channels[],
+status}`) that SPANS channels; a **Channel is an EXECUTOR** (`channel.go`, the
+`Channel` interface) it fans out to. The three channels are orthogonal and each
+CONSUMES the connector plane via `integrations.TokenFor` — the campaign object never
+touches a credential:
+
+- **paid → `/v1/ads`** — `ads.LaunchPaid/PaidSpend/PausePaid` (`clients/ads/provider.go`)
+  resolve the org's ad token (`meta_ads`/`google_ads`/… via `TokenFor(org, <id>,
+  "access_token")`) and run the campaign on the provider. Meta is executed for real;
+  fail-closed when the org has not connected (424). This is the ONLY place `/v1/ads`
+  touches the connector plane.
+- **organic → `/v1/publish`** (rename of `clients/social`) and **email → `/v1/marketing`**
+  are DESIGNED follow-ons: register their executors the same way in `apps/wire_seams.go`
+  (`campaign.RegisterChannel(campaign.NewChannel(kind, launch, spend, pause))`). Until
+  wired, a fan-out records that channel "unavailable" (honest), never fabricated.
+
+Channels are injected at the composition root (`apps/wire_seams.go`), the SAME
+injected-function decoupling the coding dispatcher uses — `campaign` never imports
+`ads`, `ads` never imports `campaign`. Fan-out (`launch.go` `fanOut`) is best-effort
+per channel; the org (the ONLY tenant key) is passed verbatim to every executor, so a
+campaign can only ever resolve its OWN org's token.
+
+**Metrics = the ONE analytics plane, not a second store.** `GET /v1/campaign/:id/metrics`
+reads the funnel from `analytics.CampaignMetrics(org, campaignID, variant, start, end)`
+(`clients/analytics/campaign.go`) — an org+`utm_campaign`(+`utm_content`)-scoped query
+over `hanzo.events`, org and campaign bound POSITIONALLY (same tenancy invariant as
+every analytics query) — joined with each channel connector's reported spend
+(`Channel.Spend`). Derived KPIs: CTR/CVR/CAC/ROAS. Honest-empty when the warehouse is
+absent.
+
+**Creative A/B composes the experiment primitive** (`experiment.go`), it does not
+reinvent it: a creative A/B is an experiment whose variant = a creative (tagged
+`utm_content`) and whose metric = the analytics read. The `AssignFunc`/`EvidenceFunc`
+seams are wired at the root to the flags-assignment + evidence primitive; nil-safe
+until it lands (single-creative honest default).

Makefile

@@ -24,9 +24,12 @@ CONSOLE_DIR    ?= ../console
 # Path to a hanzoai/openapi checkout — the SOT the agent-skills catalog is generated from.
 OPENAPI_DIR    ?= ../openapi
 
-# The shipped binary is pure Go (Dockerfile: CGO_ENABLED=0 → scratch). Default all
-# build/test targets to that mode so `make build`/`make test` exercise exactly
-# what prod runs — and, critically, register the ONE "sqlite" driver exactly once:
+# The shipped binary is NOT pure Go. Dockerfile builds /cloud with
+#   CGO_ENABLED=1 go build -tags "libsqlite3 sqlite_fts5"
+# (CGO_ENABLED=0 there builds only the /smoke helper), so production links the live
+# libsqlcipher codec: databases are encrypted in place, per-commit, and shareable by
+# a second opener. The default below is pure Go for a DIFFERENT reason — it
+# registers the ONE "sqlite" driver exactly once:
 # cloud's stores use github.com/hanzoai/sqlite (its !cgo backend IS modernc), and
 # the embedded deps (ai/base/commerce/o11y/orm/tasks) that import modernc directly
 # then resolve to the SAME package → a single registration. A plain CGO_ENABLED=1
@@ -34,9 +37,17 @@ OPENAPI_DIR    ?= ../openapi
 # and panics at init ("sql: Register called twice for driver sqlite"); `make
 # test-cgo` proves the cgo path via the fork's `sqlite_purego` opt-out tag, which
 # forces the fork to modernc too so the whole binary registers "sqlite" once.
+#
+# CONSEQUENCE, worth knowing before trusting a green run: neither target links
+# libsqlcipher, so NEITHER exercises the engine the image ships. Without the codec,
+# cek falls back to the pure-Go envelope, whose properties differ — a store is
+# single-writer and durable at close rather than in-place and per-commit. The tests
+# that pin the shipped storage posture (clients/kms concurrent-open, audit
+# shareability) therefore skip in both targets. `make test-codec` below is the one
+# that runs them, and needs a real libsqlcipher to do it.
 CGO_ENABLED     ?= 0
 
-.PHONY: help native webui deploy-ui agentskills build build-standalone hanzo run smoke test test-cgo vet tidy docker docker-push clean
+.PHONY: help native webui deploy-ui agentskills build build-standalone run smoke test test-cgo test-codec vet tidy docker docker-push clean
 
 help: ## Show this help.
 	@awk 'BEGIN{FS=":.*##";printf "\nUsage: make <target>\n\nTargets:\n"} /^[a-zA-Z_-]+:.*##/{printf "  \033[36m%-16s\033[0m %s\n", $$1, $$2}' $(MAKEFILE_LIST)
@@ -76,9 +87,13 @@ build: ## Build the unified cloud binary into ./bin/cloud (embeds whatever webui
 
 build-standalone: webui build ## Build the REAL 1-binary console: console build:embed → webui/dist → go build.
 
-hanzo: ## Build the hanzo control-plane CLI into ./bin/hanzo (pure Go, same mode as cmd/cloud — registers the ONE "sqlite" driver exactly once; a plain CGO_ENABLED=1 `go build ./cmd/hanzo` links the fork's mattn backend alongside the embedded modernc importers and panics, see header).
-	@mkdir -p bin
-	CGO_ENABLED=$(CGO_ENABLED) $(GO) build -ldflags="$(LDFLAGS)" -o bin/hanzo ./cmd/hanzo
+# NOTE: cloud builds ONLY the `cloud` binary — the stateless unified API. The Go
+# `hanzo` CLI (cmd/hanzo + cli/) is RETIRED: the shipped `hanzo` is the Rust CLI
+# (~/work/hanzo/cli, `curl hanzo.sh`), which talks to this API over HTTP via its
+# OpenAPI-generated command surface. The `code` wrapper (incl. the zen-tier 1M
+# mechanism) now lives in the Rust CLI. cmd/hanzo + cli/ remain only as the
+# reference for the still-to-port client-side tools (GPU fleet worker `link`,
+# `runner`, `engine`, `security`) and are no longer built here.
 
 run: build ## Run with iam,base,kms,gateway,o11y enabled (matches README quickstart).
 	./bin/$(BIN) --enable=iam,base,kms,gateway,o11y --brand=hanzo --domain=api.hanzo.ai
@@ -86,11 +101,42 @@ run: build ## Run with iam,base,kms,gateway,o11y enabled (matches README quickst
 smoke: ## Build and run cmd/cloud-smoke (mount-time integration check).
 	$(GO) run ./cmd/cloud-smoke
 
-test: ## Run unit + integration tests (pure-Go, exactly as prod ships).
-	CGO_ENABLED=$(CGO_ENABLED) $(GO) test ./...
+# The data plane has no plaintext-at-rest mode: cek refuses to open a store without
+# a master key, on every build. The server makes that a boot decision (serve.go); a
+# test run has no boot, so the suite declares its own dev posture HERE — once, for
+# every package — instead of each package carrying a copy. A key already in the
+# environment always wins, so CI's real key is never overridden.
+DEV_KMS_KEY := AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=
+TEST_ENV = CLOUD_KMS_MASTER_KEY_REF="$${CLOUD_KMS_MASTER_KEY_REF:-$(DEV_KMS_KEY)}"
+
+# The release image builds with -tags "libsqlite3 sqlite_fts5" (see Dockerfile).
+# libsqlite3 needs cgo and the C library, but sqlite_fts5 does not — and without it
+# any store whose migration declares an FTS5 table fails to open, so a subsystem
+# built on full-text search (clients/code) cannot be tested at all. Carry the tag
+# the shipped build carries, so the suite exercises the same schema surface.
+TEST_TAGS := sqlite_fts5
+
+test: ## Run unit + integration tests (pure-Go, with the FTS5 tag the image ships).
+	$(TEST_ENV) CGO_ENABLED=$(CGO_ENABLED) $(GO) test -tags "$(TEST_TAGS)" ./...
 
 test-cgo: ## Prove the cgo build works too — forces the fork's pure-Go backend via -tags sqlite_purego so the embedded modernc importers don't double-register "sqlite".
-	CGO_ENABLED=1 $(GO) test -tags sqlite_purego ./...
+	$(TEST_ENV) CGO_ENABLED=1 $(GO) test -tags "sqlite_purego $(TEST_TAGS)" ./...
+
+# The only target that builds what the image builds (Dockerfile: CGO_ENABLED=1,
+# -tags "libsqlite3 sqlite_fts5"). The other two link no codec, so cek falls back to
+# the pure-Go envelope and the tests pinning the shipped storage posture — a store
+# shareable by a second opener, durable per-commit rather than at close — skip
+# instead of running.
+#
+# The tag alone is not enough: it selects the C engine, but the codec is a RUNTIME
+# probe of the libsqlcipher that engine links. A csqlite built against plain SQLite
+# compiles and passes the one-engine guard while CodecLinked() stays false, so the
+# storage tests would still quietly skip. SQLITE_REQUIRE_CODEC=1 — the same
+# assertion the Dockerfile makes before it builds /cloud — turns that into a
+# failure, so this target either exercises the shipped engine or says it cannot.
+# It therefore FAILS on a machine without SQLCipher, which is the honest result.
+test-codec: ## Run the suite against the engine the image ships (cgo + a real libsqlcipher).
+	SQLITE_REQUIRE_CODEC=1 $(TEST_ENV) CGO_ENABLED=1 $(GO) test -tags "libsqlite3 $(TEST_TAGS)" ./...
 
 vet: ## go vet across the module.
 	CGO_ENABLED=$(CGO_ENABLED) $(GO) vet ./...

NOTICE

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+Hanzo Cloud
+Copyright (c) 2026 Hanzo Industries, Inc.
+
+This product includes software from the following upstream projects. Their names
+appear here and NOWHERE ELSE in this codebase's user-visible surfaces — Hanzo
+products are named for Hanzo (Hanzo Analytics, Hanzo Insights, Hanzo IAM, …).
+
+Umami (https://github.com/umami-software/umami), licensed under MIT:
+
+    Copyright (c) 2022 Umami Software, Inc. <hello@umami.is>
+
+  Hanzo Analytics (analytics.hanzo.ai) is a fork. The cloud destination adapter
+  speaks its public collect contract.
+
+PostHog (https://github.com/PostHog/posthog), licensed under MIT:
+
+    Copyright (c) 2020-present PostHog Inc.
+
+  Hanzo Insights (insights.hanzo.ai) is a fork. The cloud destination adapter
+  speaks its capture contract.
+
+Casibase (https://github.com/casibase/casibase), licensed under Apache-2.0:
+
+    Copyright (c) The Casibase Authors
+
+  The Hanzo AI module (the /v1 AI, RAG, and search surfaces) derives from it.
+
+Casdoor (https://github.com/casdoor/casdoor), licensed under Apache-2.0:
+
+    Copyright (c) The Casdoor Authors
+
+  Hanzo IAM (hanzo.id) derives from it.

README.md

@@ -1,21 +1,30 @@
-<p align="center"><img src=".github/hero.svg" alt="cloud" width="880"></p>
+<p align="center"><img src=".github/hero.svg" alt="Hanzo Cloud" width="880"></p>
 
-# cloud
+# Hanzo Cloud
 
-Unified Go control plane and binary for the Hanzo platform (HIP-0106).
+**The Open AI Cloud as one Go binary.** Identity, secrets, data, AI, gateway, observability, and the console — every Hanzo-native subsystem mounted into a single multi-org process. Per [HIP-0106](https://github.com/hanzoai/HIPs/blob/main/HIPs/hip-0106-unified-hanzo-cloud-binary.md).
 
 [![Status](https://img.shields.io/badge/status-beta-blue)]()
 [![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache--2.0-blue)]()
 
+The same artifact serves `api.hanzo.ai`, `api.lux.cloud`, `api.zoo.cloud`, `api.osage.cloud`, and every white-label reseller. Brand, enabled subsystems, and org scope are deployment configuration — one binary, one origin, no sidecars.
+
 ## Quick start
 
 ```bash
-docker run -p 8080:8080 ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:latest
+# Run the unified binary (pin a released version)
+docker run -p 8080:8080 ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:v1.801.206
+
+# Or install the CLI + server
+go install github.com/hanzoai/cloud/cmd/hanzo@latest
+brew install hanzoai/tap/hanzo
 ```
 
+Open <http://localhost:8080> for the embedded console; the API is served under `/v1` on the same origin.
+
 ## What this is
 
-`hanzoai/cloud` is one Go binary that mounts every Hanzo subsystem (iam, kms, base, gateway, ai, commerce, vfs, mq, dns, amqp, mcp, o11y, ...) into a single multi-org process. Same artifact serves `api.hanzo.ai`, `api.osage.cloud`, `api.lux.cloud`, `api.zoo.cloud`, and every white-label reseller. Brand, enabled subsystems, and org scope are deployment configuration.
+`hanzoai/cloud` is one Go binary that mounts every Hanzo subsystem (iam, kms, base, gateway, ai, commerce, vfs, mq, dns, amqp, mcp, o11y, tasks, …) into a single multi-org process. The same artifact serves `api.hanzo.ai`, `api.osage.cloud`, `api.lux.cloud`, `api.zoo.cloud`, and every white-label reseller. Brand, enabled subsystems, and org scope are deployment configuration.
 
 ## `hanzo` — cloud control CLI
 
@@ -47,16 +56,31 @@ authed (it cannot validate user tokens), so `apps`/`deploy`/`clusters` use
 
 Install: `go install github.com/hanzoai/cloud/cmd/hanzo@latest`, or `brew install hanzoai/tap/hanzo`.
 
-## Specs
+## Subsystems mounted
 
-Implements:
-- HIP-0014 Application Deployment
-- HIP-0026 IAM
-- HIP-0027 KMS
-- HIP-0037 AI Cloud Platform
-- HIP-0105 In-Process Extension Runtime
-- HIP-0106 Unified Cloud Binary
-- HIP-0302 Encrypted SQLite + ZapDB Durability
+Each subsystem exposes `func Mount(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error` and wires its own `/v1/<name>/*` routes onto the shared app.
+
+- `iam` — identity & access (users, orgs, roles, OIDC/JWKS per HIP-0026)
+- `base` — per-org SQLite + in-process extension runtimes (HIP-0105)
+- `kms` — secret custody (sealed secrets, HIP-0027)
+- `commerce` — checkout, billing, pricing, invoicing (light router; NOT in PCI-DSS scope)
+- `ai` — AI control plane: inference, RAG, model hub, agents, MCP management
+- `gateway` — HTTP routing + policy
+- `o11y` — metrics / traces / logs
+- `vfs` — virtual filesystem / object-store abstraction
+- `mq` — message queue
+- `dns`, `amqp`, `mcp`, `auto`, `tasks`, … — full list per HIP-0106
+
+## Deployment modes
+
+Same binary; different startup configuration:
+
+```bash
+cloud --enable=iam,base,kms,commerce,ai,gateway,o11y --brand=hanzo  --domain=hanzo.ai
+cloud --enable=iam,base,kms,commerce,ai,gateway,o11y --brand=osage  --domain=osage.cloud
+cloud --enable=iam,base,kms,commerce,ai,gateway,o11y --brand=lux    --domain=lux.cloud
+cloud --enable=iam,base,kms,commerce,ai,gateway,o11y --brand=zoo    --domain=zoo.cloud
+```
 
 ## Architecture
 
@@ -70,49 +94,15 @@ Implements:
    |  Mount() |  Mount() |  Mount() |  Mount() |  Mount() |
    +----------+----------+----------+----------+----------+
    per-org SQLite (HIP-0302)   |   Hanzo IAM JWKS (HIP-0026)
-   replicate -> S3 (HIP-0107)     |   ZAP inter-subsystem RPC
+   replicate -> S3 (HIP-0107)  |   ZAP inter-subsystem RPC
 ```
 
-Every subsystem exposes `func Mount(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error`. White-label fork pattern: customers fork this repo to launch their own ecosystem.
-
-
----
-
-# Hanzo Cloud
-
-The unified Go binary that imports every Hanzo-native subsystem and dispatches
-requests per deployment configuration. One artifact, many subsystems.
-
-Per [HIP-0106](https://github.com/hanzoai/HIPs/blob/main/HIPs/hip-0106-unified-hanzo-cloud-binary.md).
-
-## Subsystems mounted
-
-- `iam` — identity & access
-- `base` — per-org SQLite + extension runtimes (per HIP-0105)
-- `kms` — secrets
-- `commerce` — checkout, billing, pricing, invoicing (light router; NOT in PCI-DSS scope)
-- `ai` — LLM control plane / RAG / model hub / MCP management (was hanzoai/cloud pre-rename)
-- `gateway` — HTTP routing + policy
-- `o11y` — metrics / traces / logs
-- `vfs` — virtual filesystem / object-store abstraction
-- `mq` — message queue
-- `dns`, `amqp`, `mcp`, `auto`, `tasks`, ... (full list per HIP-0106)
-
-## Deployment modes
-
-Same binary; different startup configuration:
-
-```bash
-cloud --enable=iam,base,kms,commerce,ai,gateway,o11y --brand=hanzo  --domain=hanzo.ai
-cloud --enable=iam,base,kms,commerce,ai,gateway,o11y --brand=osage  --domain=osage.cloud
-cloud --enable=iam,base,kms,commerce,ai,gateway,o11y --brand=lux    --domain=lux.cloud
-cloud --enable=iam,base,kms,commerce,ai,gateway,o11y --brand=zoo    --domain=zoo.cloud
-```
+Every subsystem mounts through the same `Mount(app, deps)` seam. Cross-subsystem calls ride a narrow in-process interface; no subsystem reaches into another's store.
 
 ## White-label fork pattern
 
 Customers fork `hanzoai/cloud` to launch their own ecosystem in one binary. Brand
-detection, enabled subsystems, ZAP endpoints (payments / vault backends) are all
+detection, enabled subsystems, and ZAP endpoints (payments / vault backends) are all
 deployment configuration.
 
 ## Web framework
@@ -153,18 +143,39 @@ even without the Node toolchain. The image build overwrites `webui/dist` with th
 real console bundle. See `webui_test.go` for the boot-and-assert tests
 (`/` → shell, deep link → shell 200, `/v1/*` → API, unmatched `/v1` → 404).
 
-Current state: `hanzoai/console` exposes `build:embed` (`scripts/build-embed.mjs`),
-which stashes its Next server route handlers (BFF proxies that collapse to the
-cloud `/v1/*` the SPA calls same-origin), wraps the client catch-all pages for
-`output: 'export'`, neutralizes the root layout's request-time `headers()` read,
-and emits a real static export at `out/` (a ~360 KB `index.html` + `_next/`
-chunks). The image build (and `make webui`) run it and overlay `webui/dist`, so
-`//go:embed` bakes the FULL `@hanzo/gui` console into the ONE binary. The
-Dockerfile console stage FAILS HARD if that bundle is missing or degenerate —
-the placeholder shell can never silently ship to prod (escape hatch:
-`--build-arg ALLOW_PLACEHOLDER=1` for a pure-Go dev image).
+The `hanzoai/console` `build:embed` script (`scripts/build-embed.mjs`) stashes its
+Next server route handlers (BFF proxies that collapse to the cloud `/v1/*` the SPA
+calls same-origin), wraps the client catch-all pages for `output: 'export'`,
+neutralizes the root layout's request-time `headers()` read, and emits a real
+static export at `out/` (a ~360 KB `index.html` + `_next/` chunks). The image
+build (and `make webui`) run it and overlay `webui/dist`, so `//go:embed` bakes
+the FULL `@hanzo/gui` console into the ONE binary. The Dockerfile console stage
+FAILS HARD if that bundle is missing or degenerate — the placeholder shell can
+never silently ship to prod (escape hatch: `--build-arg ALLOW_PLACEHOLDER=1` for a
+pure-Go dev image).
+
+## Specs
+
+Implements:
+- HIP-0014 Application Deployment
+- HIP-0026 IAM
+- HIP-0027 KMS
+- HIP-0037 AI Cloud Platform
+- HIP-0105 In-Process Extension Runtime
+- HIP-0106 Unified Cloud Binary
+- HIP-0129 Open Cloud Planes
+- HIP-0302 Encrypted SQLite + ZapDB Durability
 
 ## Status
 
-Scaffold. The Mount(app, deps) integration for each subsystem lands per
-HIP-0106's migration phases.
+In production. The unified binary serves `api.hanzo.ai` and the white-label cloud
+surfaces today, with per-org SQLite (HIP-0302) and the embedded console. Subsystems
+continue to land per HIP-0106's migration phases; `apps/apps.go:Wire()` is the one
+ordered list of everything mounted. For repo-level engineering doctrine (module
+graph, route-table projections, cross-subsystem seams), see [`LLM.md`](./LLM.md).
+
+## Hanzo — the Open AI Cloud
+
+Open source · every language · on-chain settlement. [hanzo.ai](https://hanzo.ai) · [docs.hanzo.ai](https://docs.hanzo.ai)
+
+**SDKs in every language** — [Python](https://github.com/hanzoai/python-sdk) (flagship) · [TypeScript](https://github.com/hanzo-js/sdk) · [Go](https://github.com/hanzo-go/sdk) · [Rust](https://github.com/hanzo-rs/sdk) · [C++](https://github.com/hanzo-cpp/sdk) · [Swift](https://github.com/hanzo-swift/sdk) · [Kotlin](https://github.com/hanzo-kt/sdk) · [umbrella](https://github.com/hanzoai/sdk)

account_principal.go

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Hanzo AI Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+
+package cloud
+
+import (
+	"net/http"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/principal"
+	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
+)
+
+// AccountFromPrincipal decomplects the console's IDENTITY onto the ONE truth every
+// /v1/admin/* call already authorizes on — the validated cloud principal — instead of
+// the embedded casibase account model.
+//
+// THE COMPLECTION IT REMOVES. The operator SPA authenticates via /v1/signin (a cloud
+// PKCE session → the X-User-* principal the middleware mints) but read its IDENTITY
+// from /v1/get-account, which the embedded IAM (casibase) answers from ITS OWN session
+// cookie. A PKCE session is not a casibase session, so get-account returned
+// owner:"hanzo" (anonymous) or "Unauthorized operation" — and the SPA's SuperAdmin
+// gate (owner == "admin" && isAdmin), reading that, bounced the operator UI to login
+// even though the SAME session got 200 from every /v1/admin/* route. Two session
+// models for one surface; the identity source and the authorization source disagreed.
+//
+// THE DECOMPLECTION. Identity is now the principal: when a VALIDATED principal is
+// present (X-User-Id is set ONLY by IdentityMiddleware from a real credential, never a
+// raw client header — see middleware_identity.go), /v1/get-account reflects it. owner
+// is the HOME org (principal.Owner) so a SuperAdmin org-switched into a tenant stays a
+// SuperAdmin; isAdmin is the validated bit. With NO principal it falls through
+// (c.Next()) to the casibase account surface unchanged — the anonymous sign-in page
+// and any legacy casibase-session caller are untouched. One truth, additive, fail-open
+// to the old path. MUST be registered AFTER IdentityMiddleware (needs the minted
+// headers) and BEFORE MountAll (so it precedes the casibase /v1/get-account handler).
+// accountPath is the account read this middleware fronts. It is a named constant
+// because the interception is a PATH MATCH: when the /v1 surface was namespaced
+// (/v1/get-account → /v1/ai/account) a literal left un-updated here would not
+// error — the middleware would simply stop firing, fall through to the casibase
+// account surface, and hand the SPA the anonymous owner again. That is precisely
+// the bug this file exists to fix, silently restored.
+const accountPath = "/v1/ai/account"
+
+func AccountFromPrincipal() zip.Handler {
+	return func(c *zip.Ctx) error {
+		if c.Method() != http.MethodGet || c.Path() != accountPath {
+			return c.Next()
+		}
+		user := c.User() // X-User-Id — minted only from a validated credential
+		if user == "" {
+			return c.Next() // no principal → the casibase account surface (unchanged)
+		}
+		owner := principal.Owner(c) // HOME org (a SuperAdmin stays one when org-switched)
+		if owner == "" {
+			owner = c.Org()
+		}
+		name := c.Header("X-User-Name")
+		if name == "" {
+			name = user
+		}
+		return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
+			"status": "ok",
+			"msg":    "",
+			"data": map[string]any{
+				"owner":       owner,
+				"name":        name,
+				"displayName": name,
+				"email":       c.Header("X-User-Email"),
+				"isAdmin":     c.IsAdmin(),
+				"type":        "normal-user",
+			},
+		})
+	}
+}

ai.go

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+package cloud
+
+import (
+	"context"
+
+	tasksclient "github.com/hanzoai/tasks/pkg/sdk/client"
+)
+
+// Callbacks the ai module makes back into the host. Declared here, installed by
+// apps/ — importing ai/object here would put ~1480 packages under every
+// subsystem, and nothing here reads back from it.
+
+// UsageEvent mirrors the ai module's payload. Separate on purpose: sharing the
+// type would reintroduce the import.
+type UsageEvent struct {
+	Subject   string
+	Namespace string
+	USD       string // exact decimal USD ("0.00132"), never a rounded cent
+	Currency  string
+	Model     string
+	Provider  string
+	RequestID string
+}
+
+type (
+	TierReaderFunc    func(ctx context.Context, subject, namespace string) (string, error)
+	BalanceReaderFunc func(ctx context.Context, subject, namespace, currency string) (int64, error)
+	UsageRecorderFunc func(ctx context.Context, u UsageEvent) error
+	IngestDialerFunc  func(org string) (tasksclient.Client, error)
+)
+
+var (
+	tierReader    TierReaderFunc
+	balanceReader BalanceReaderFunc
+	usageRecorder UsageRecorderFunc
+	ingestDialer  IngestDialerFunc
+)
+
+// nil means that subsystem isn't co-resident; apps/ leaves it uninstalled.
+func TierReader() TierReaderFunc       { return tierReader }
+func BalanceReader() BalanceReaderFunc { return balanceReader }
+func UsageRecorder() UsageRecorderFunc { return usageRecorder }
+func IngestDialer() IngestDialerFunc   { return ingestDialer }

apps/apps.go

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // Package apps is the composition root: the single, explicit list of which
 // Hanzo cloud subsystems are linked into the binary AND the order they mount in.
 //
-// Wire() returns []cloud.MountSpec in mount order (slice position == order). There
+// Wire() returns []cloud.AppSpec in mount order (slice position == order). There
 // is no init()-registry and no order-int: adding, removing, or reordering a
 // subsystem is a one-line edit to Wire(), read top-to-bottom. cmd/cloud and
 // cmd/hanzo both call Wire() and thread the slice into cloud.Serve — the set is
@@ -14,9 +14,13 @@
 // HIP-0106: the unified cloud binary is the APPLICATION layer plus the embedded KMS
 // secrets plane and the embedded IAM identity plane ("one Go binary embeds IAM +
 // KMS + o11y"). The edge/infra tier (mcp, gateway, ingress-edge) runs as its own
-// deployments for blast-radius isolation; several application folds (iam, base,
-// commerce, captable, dataroom, sign, ingress) are STAGED — linked here but mounted
-// only when the operator names them in CLOUD_ENABLE.
+// deployments for blast-radius isolation.
+//
+// Every subsystem below mounts under the default (empty CLOUD_ENABLE) EXCEPT the
+// staged ones — see config.go's stagedSubsystems, which is the single source of
+// that set. A subsystem is staged when its Mount can abort startup, so it must be
+// named in CLOUD_ENABLE deliberately; one whose Mount fails closed instead (as
+// clients/iam does) is not staged.
 //
 // Ordering provenance: order-int ascending; ties in the exact order the
 // pre-refactor init()-registry mounted them, captured empirically from origin/main
@@ -35,6 +39,8 @@ import (
 	"context"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"strings"
 
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
 	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
@@ -42,7 +48,6 @@ import (
 	// External subsystem modules. As of the atomic wave-2 bump they NO LONGER
 	// self-register (no cloud.Register in their init) — the composition root wires
 	// each one explicitly below, so removing an entry here is the ONLY way to drop it.
-	"github.com/hanzoai/ai"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/authz"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/licensing"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/metrics"
@@ -58,28 +63,37 @@ import (
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/agents"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/agentskills"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/analytics"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/ask"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/auditlog"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/authors"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/automations"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/base"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/benchmark"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/billing"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/blueprint"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/books"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/bots"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/campaign"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/captable"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/catalogsync"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/channels"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/cloudflare"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/code"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/company"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/compliance"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/content"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/crm"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/dataroom"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/deploy"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/destinations"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/dns"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/do"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/domain"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/entitlements"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/esign"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/eval"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/exec"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/experiments"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/flags"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/framework"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/functions"
@@ -87,23 +101,32 @@ import (
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/git"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/graph"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/guide"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/help"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/iam"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/iam2"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/index"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/ingress"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/integrations"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/kafka"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/kms"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/knowledge"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/leaderboard"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/legal"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/link"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/marketing"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/marketplace"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/ml"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/notify"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/o11y"
+	// NOTE: clients/o11y is deliberately NOT imported. It is loaded at run time
+	// as a plugin (see the o11y entry in Wire), and this line is the whole reason
+	// that works: an import here would keep its 2.7k-package graph — the
+	// otel-collector, prometheus, gonum — linked into cloud whether or not any
+	// Wire entry referenced it. Unlinking a subsystem means deleting its import,
+	// not just its mount.
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/paas"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/plan"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/platform"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/plugin"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/prefs"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/pricing"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/product"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/projects"
@@ -111,12 +134,13 @@ import (
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/provisioning"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/pubsub"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/referrals"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/research"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/rollingcap"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/runtime"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/sbom"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/security"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/settings"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/sign"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/share"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/social"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/storage"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/sync"
@@ -125,29 +149,33 @@ import (
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/templates"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/tools"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/tracker"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/translate"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/treasury"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/usage"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/validators"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/venue"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/visor"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/wallets"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/webhooks"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/websearch"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/world"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/x402"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/zt"
 
-	// Framework CONTENT modules — NOT mount subsystems (they carry no HTTP surface
-	// and are absent from Wire()). Each registers its DocType fixtures and, for erp,
-	// its ledger-posting lifecycle hooks into the clients/framework DocType engine
-	// from a package init() (framework.RegisterModule) — the idiomatic
-	// register-into-a-registry pattern (cf. database/sql drivers). The framework
-	// engine is mounted (always-on, /v1/framework/*) but its module registry is
-	// populated ONLY by these blank imports. Dropping one silently strips that
-	// lane's DocTypes and hooks — for erp, the immutable ledger postings — from the
-	// binary with NO mount change and NO failing mount test. #248 dropped them;
-	// TestFrameworkContentModulesLinked now guards against a recurrence. Keep.
+	// Framework CONTENT modules — pure fixture lanes that carry no HTTP surface and
+	// are absent from Wire(). Each registers its DocType fixtures and, for erp, its
+	// ledger-posting lifecycle hooks into the clients/framework DocType engine from a
+	// package init() (framework.RegisterModule) — the idiomatic register-into-a-
+	// registry pattern (cf. database/sql drivers). The framework engine is mounted
+	// (always-on, /v1/framework/*) but its module registry is populated ONLY by these
+	// blank imports. Dropping one silently strips that lane's DocTypes and hooks — for
+	// erp, the immutable ledger postings — from the binary with NO mount change and NO
+	// failing mount test. #248 dropped them; TestFrameworkContentModulesLinked now
+	// guards against a recurrence. Keep. (help is a framework lane too but ALSO mounts
+	// a thin /v1/help public plane, so it is a real import + a Wire() spec below,
+	// alongside knowledge — the other lane with a companion subsystem.)
 	_ "github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/cms"
 	_ "github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/erp"
-	_ "github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/help"
 )
 
 // init wires the cross-subsystem func seams — the composition root is the one place
@@ -168,29 +196,13 @@ func init() {
 	})
 }
 
-// identitySpec selects the ONE identity backend that owns /v1/iam/* (+ /login/oauth/*)
-// for this boot. CLOUD_IAM_IMPL=iam2 picks the clean-room iam2 (zip+orm, beego-free);
-// anything else — including unset, the production default — keeps the legacy beego
-// Casdoor embed, byte-for-byte today's behavior. The two impls register the SAME
-// absolute prefixes and therefore cannot co-mount, so selection (this func) stays
-// separate from activation (cfg.Enabled): exactly one spec occupies the identity slot
-// in Wire, preserving mount order either way. os.Getenv (not the unexported
-// cloud.getenv, which is unreachable from package apps) is the read — CLOUD_IAM_IMPL is
-// the deliberate, off-by-default opt-in that keeps iam2 inert until a canary flips it.
-func identitySpec() cloud.MountSpec {
-	if os.Getenv("CLOUD_IAM_IMPL") == "iam2" {
-		return cloud.MountSpec{Name: "iam2", Mount: iam2.Mount}
-	}
-	return cloud.MountSpec{Name: "iam", Mount: iam.Mount}
-}
-
-// Wire returns every linked subsystem as a cloud.MountSpec, in mount order. The
+// Wire returns every linked subsystem as a cloud.AppSpec, in mount order. The
 // slice position IS the order: cloud.MountAll iterates it as-given, registering each
 // subsystem's teardown as a zip shutdown hook so teardown runs in reverse (LIFO).
 // Enablement is a separate axis: cloud.Serve mounts only the specs cfg.Enabled(name)
 // admits, so a STAGED subsystem is linked but inert until named.
-func Wire() []cloud.MountSpec {
-	return []cloud.MountSpec{
+func Wire() []cloud.AppSpec {
+	return []cloud.AppSpec{
 		// embedded NATS :4222 + JetStream.
 		{Name: "pubsub", Mount: pubsub.Mount, Shutdown: pubsub.Shutdown},
 		// embedded Kafka adaptor :9092.
@@ -207,7 +219,7 @@ func Wire() []cloud.MountSpec {
 		// hanzoai/metrics — native o11y. It declares its OWN narrow metrics.Deps (no
 		// hanzoai/cloud import), so Typed cannot adapt it; mountMetrics builds that Deps
 		// from cloud.Deps and calls metrics.Mount explicitly.
-		{Name: "metrics", Mount: mountMetrics},
+		{Name: "metrics", Mount: cloud.Global(mountMetrics), Global: true},
 		// Embedded runtime edge (/v1/ingress/*). STAGED — edge listeners stay off unless
 		// the operator names "ingress" in CLOUD_ENABLE.
 		{Name: "ingress", Mount: ingress.Mount, Shutdown: ingress.Shutdown},
@@ -215,32 +227,44 @@ func Wire() []cloud.MountSpec {
 		// /v1/commerce/topup/wallet). MUST mount before the IAM /v1/iam/* wildcard (50) so
 		// they win Fiber's first-match scan (framework-guaranteed since zip v1.3.0).
 		{Name: "account", Mount: account.MountAccount},
-		// Embedded IAM identity plane (/v1/iam/*, /.well-known/*, /login/oauth/*, /_/iam/*,
-		// /cas/*, /scim/*) — the identity authority, mounts before its dependents. STAGED:
-		// the operator adds "iam" to --enable only after IAM config + the fold are verified.
-		// Which IMPLEMENTATION owns these prefixes is selected by CLOUD_IAM_IMPL
-		// (identitySpec): the clean-room iam2 (zip+orm, beego-free) when =="iam2", else the
-		// legacy beego Casdoor embed — the default (unset = today's behavior, byte-for-byte).
-		// Both register the SAME absolute paths and cannot co-mount, so this is an either/or
-		// switch at this ONE slot, never a shadow prefix.
-		identitySpec(),
+		// Embedded IAM identity plane (/v1/iam/*, /login/oauth/*) — the identity authority,
+		// mounts before its dependents. The ONE implementation: the clean-room iam-v2
+		// (zip-native + hanzoai/orm, beego-free); the retired Casdoor iam-v1 embed is GONE.
+		// STAGED: the operator adds "iam" to --enable only after IAM config + the fold are
+		// verified (login/authorize/token/jwks + the operator SSO chain).
+		{Name: "iam", Mount: iam.Mount, Prefixes: iam.Prefixes},
 		// Embedded Base app engine + viral waitlist (/v1/waitlist/*). STAGED behind
 		// CLOUD_BASE_EMBED. OwnsHealth: native /v1/base/health.
 		{Name: "base", Mount: base.Mount, Shutdown: base.Shutdown, OwnsHealth: true},
-		// The ONE observability subsystem: the in-repo o11y READ plane + runtime-handler
-		// install (o11y.SetHandler), with the hanzoai/o11y module wildcard /v1/o11y/*
-		// folded in as the TERMINAL sub-mount INSIDE o11y.MountO11y. Every specific
-		// /v1/o11y/* route registers before that wildcard, so Fiber's in-order match gives
-		// them precedence. NOT OwnsHealth: /v1/o11y/health stays the generic always-ok
-		// route (registered before MountAll), exactly as when the former module co-entry —
-		// which also set OwnsHealth=false — triggered it.
-		{Name: "o11y", Mount: o11y.MountO11y, Shutdown: o11y.ShutdownO11y},
-		{Name: "authz", Mount: authz.Mount},
+		// The ONE observability subsystem — and the first one that is NOT linked in.
+		// It runs as its own binary (cmd/o11y) and mounts at /v1/o11y over a private
+		// unix socket; the whole read plane, the runtime handler, the OTLP collector
+		// and the trace sink moved into that process untouched (it calls the same
+		// o11y.MountO11y). Nothing about the ROUTES changed: the plugin's own in-order
+		// registration still puts every specific /v1/o11y/* route ahead of the
+		// hanzoai/o11y module wildcard, and NOT OwnsHealth still leaves /v1/o11y/health
+		// the generic always-ok route Serve registers before MountAll — which therefore
+		// still wins over this mount's /v1/o11y/* and answers without waking the child.
+		//
+		// No Shutdown: teardown moved with the resources. zip.Load registers its own
+		// OnShutdown that stops the child, and the child flushes its collector/sink in
+		// its own app.OnShutdown. The host has nothing left of o11y's to close.
+		//
+		// Why this one first: o11y is the heaviest app in the graph — the
+		// otel-collector, prometheus and gonum are here and nowhere else — and it is
+		// imported by NOTHING but this line, so unlinking it is a pure subtraction.
+		//
+		// o11y owns TWO public prefixes — /v1/o11y and /v1/sentry/* (mountSentry,
+		// the Sentry-protocol ingest). Both are named here: a prefix left out
+		// would 404 silently rather than fail, which for Sentry ingest means
+		// quietly dropping every error event in the fleet.
+		cloud.PluginSpec("o11y", o11yPlugin(), "/v1/o11y", "/v1/sentry"),
+		{Name: "authz", Mount: cloud.Global(authz.Mount), Global: true},
 		// Embedded commerce plane /v1/commerce/*, /_/commerce/* — the hanzoai/commerce
 		// MODULE via the adapter in commerce.go (un-forked; the in-process
 		// CommerceClient is wired directly in pickCommerceClient).
-		{Name: "commerce", Mount: mountCommerce},
-		{Name: "licensing", Mount: licensing.Mount},
+		{Name: "commerce", Mount: cloud.Global(mountCommerce), Global: true},
+		{Name: "licensing", Mount: cloud.Global(licensing.Mount), Global: true},
 		// clients/plan.Mount. Enable id normalized "plans" -> "plan" to match the
 		// package + generated cmd/plan (one subsystem, one name). Its product routes
 		// stay /v1/plans/* (incl. the OwnsHealth /v1/plans/health probe) — unchanged.
@@ -261,8 +285,8 @@ func Wire() []cloud.MountSpec {
 		// (121) + the commerce embed (100). Same clients/account package as "account" (48).
 		{Name: "account-bridge", Mount: account.MountBridge},
 		{Name: "do", Mount: do.Mount},
-		{Name: "platform", Mount: platform.Mount, OwnsHealth: true},
-		{Name: "projects", Mount: projects.Mount},
+		{Name: "platform", Mount: platform.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(platform.Shutdown), OwnsHealth: true},
+		{Name: "projects", Mount: projects.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(projects.Shutdown)},
 		// The /v1/dns forward head: relays the console DNS dashboard to the DNS
 		// control plane under the caller's own validated bearer (clients/dns).
 		{Name: "dns", Mount: dns.Mount},
@@ -287,8 +311,24 @@ func Wire() []cloud.MountSpec {
 		{Name: "functions", Mount: functions.Mount},
 		{Name: "tracker", Mount: tracker.Mount},
 		{Name: "templates", Mount: templates.Mount},
+		// OSS-template compute-cost basis /v1/blueprint/* — parses a blueprint's
+		// docker-compose into its SBOM (bill of container images) and prices the
+		// stack's CPU/memory footprint through a documented rate card. The per-hour
+		// rate the deploy path meters an org on, and the "~$X/mo to run" the console
+		// shows; it is the compute cost the 20% author royalty (clients/authors) is
+		// taken from. OwnsHealth: serves its own /v1/blueprint/health. Reference
+		// content (embedded blueprints), no store → no Shutdown. After templates, its
+		// sibling catalog concern; before the AI /v1/* catch-all.
+		{Name: "blueprint", Mount: blueprint.Mount, OwnsHealth: true},
 		{Name: "framework", Mount: framework.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(framework.Shutdown)},
 		{Name: "knowledge", Mount: knowledge.Mount},
+		// Hanzo Support PUBLIC plane /v1/help/* (help center KB read + customer ticket
+		// intake) — the anonymous face the secure-by-default framework surface can't
+		// serve. A framework lane like knowledge: its DocType fixtures register via
+		// init() (help.Module), and this mounts the thin public subsystem. Owns no store
+		// (delegates to the framework in-process API), so no Shutdown. After framework
+		// (whose in-process API it calls at request time); before the AI /v1/* catch-all.
+		{Name: "help", Mount: help.Mount},
 		// Marketing content loop /v1/content/* (generate → CMS → transition → publish).
 		// After framework (its DocType store the ops read/write) + knowledge (the sibling
 		// framework lane); before the AI /v1/* catch-all so /v1/content/* resolves here.
@@ -300,8 +340,20 @@ func Wire() []cloud.MountSpec {
 		// After content (whose EnsureCatalogAsset it drives). Inert until CLOUD_COMMERCE_NATS_URL
 		// names the NATS carrying commerce catalog events — the reverse of the forward edge.
 		{Name: "catalogsync", Mount: catalogsync.Mount, Shutdown: catalogsync.Shutdown},
+		// The platform-global webhook layer: /v1/webhooks registry (per-org SQLite) +
+		// ONE durable JetStream consumer that delivers ANY bus event to org-registered
+		// HTTP subscribers. A bus consumer like catalogsync — placed adjacent to it and
+		// after the commerce embed whose COMMERCE stream it reads. Fail-soft: the
+		// registry serves even with the bus down; the consumer retries in the background.
+		// Owns per-org store handles + a worker pool → Shutdown drains both.
+		{Name: "webhooks", Mount: webhooks.Mount, Shutdown: webhooks.Shutdown},
 		{Name: "ml", Mount: ml.Mount, OwnsHealth: true},
 		{Name: "usage", Mount: usage.Mount},
+		// Gamified usage analytics: /v1/usage/leaderboard + /v1/usage/activity + the
+		// per-day contribution graph, over the datastore rollup (#43). Co-owns /v1/usage/*
+		// with usage (a distinct concern — who leads + your activity graph) at its own
+		// exact paths; owns the opt-in SQLite store. Before the ai /v1/* catch-all.
+		{Name: "leaderboard", Mount: leaderboard.Mount, Shutdown: leaderboard.Shutdown},
 		{Name: "crm", Mount: crm.Mount},
 		// Native /v1/marketing/* — the in-process fold of github.com/hanzoai/marketing
 		// (per-org campaign store on Base/SQLite), twin of crm. Owns a DB handle, so
@@ -311,6 +363,13 @@ func Wire() []cloud.MountSpec {
 		// twin of crm/marketing. Owns a DB handle, so its Shutdown closes it cleanly
 		// on SIGTERM (ctxShutdown adapts func() error).
 		{Name: "ads", Mount: ads.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(ads.Shutdown)},
+		// Top-level GTM orchestration /v1/campaign/* — the capability layer that fans a
+		// campaign VALUE out to its channels (paid→ads, organic→publish, email→marketing),
+		// each CONSUMING the connector plane via integrations.TokenFor. Metrics read from
+		// the ONE analytics plane (never a second store); creative A/B composes the
+		// experiment seam. The paid channel executor is wired in wire_seams.go. Owns a DB
+		// handle, so its Shutdown closes it cleanly on SIGTERM.
+		{Name: "campaign", Mount: campaign.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(campaign.Shutdown)},
 		// GDA/SDM validator onboarding /v1/validators/* — wallet-sig + ETH-mainnet
 		// GenesisNFT ownerOf → seal luxd staking identity into KMS → write a NEW-node
 		// LuxNetwork CR (node.lux.cloud, never the live luxd) → enqueue an owner-gated
@@ -324,33 +383,58 @@ func Wire() []cloud.MountSpec {
 		{Name: "analytics", Mount: analytics.Mount, OwnsHealth: true},
 		{Name: "git", Mount: git.Mount},
 		// Universal sync (/v1/sync/links + engine). Registers the cloud.SyncEngine the
-		// GitHub/Gitea webhooks enqueue to; git is its first provider. Owns per-org
+		// GitHub/Hanzo Git webhooks enqueue to; git is its first provider. Owns per-org
 		// DB handles, so its Shutdown closes them on SIGTERM.
 		{Name: "sync", Mount: sync.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(sync.Shutdown)},
 		{Name: "visor", Mount: visor.Mount},
+		// Connect-a-cloud-account plane /v1/cloud/*: an org links its DigitalOcean /
+		// AWS / GCP / Azure accounts (labeled, KMS-sealed, keyless where possible),
+		// Hanzo DISCOVERS each account's native Kubernetes clusters and FOLDS them into
+		// the ONE fleet (clients/fleet.Register) — so they surface in visor's
+		// /v1/clusters and run work like any BYO/managed cluster. No second registry.
+		{Name: "venue", Mount: venue.Mount},
 		// Cap table on Base via goja. STAGED behind CLOUD_ENABLE.
 		{Name: "captable", Mount: captable.Mount, Shutdown: captable.Shutdown},
 		{Name: "code", Mount: code.Mount, Shutdown: code.Shutdown},
 		{Name: "zero-trust", Mount: zt.Mount},
+		// ngrok-native public sharing: /v1/share/* provisions a per-org zrok
+		// account so `hanzo share <port>` publishes a local service to a public
+		// https://<token>.share.hanzo.ai URL. Fail-closed until ZROK_ADMIN_TOKEN.
+		{Name: "share", Mount: share.Mount},
 		// Data rooms via goja + per-tenant Base. STAGED behind CLOUD_ENABLE. OwnsHealth.
 		{Name: "dataroom", Mount: dataroom.Mount, Shutdown: dataroom.Shutdown, OwnsHealth: true},
 		{Name: "graph", Mount: graph.Mount},
 		{Name: "security", Mount: security.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(security.Shutdown), OwnsHealth: true},
 		{Name: "integrations", Mount: integrations.Mount, Shutdown: integrations.Shutdown},
-		// Per-org Cloudflare asset plane /v1/integrations/cloudflare/{pages,workers,r2,kv,d1}/*.
-		// Mounts AFTER integrations because it reads the org's Cloudflare token through
-		// the integrations custody seam (integrations.TokenFor) — one token, one
-		// custody boundary. Stateless: no store, no shutdown.
+		// Marketing destinations /v1/destinations/* — the native fan-out that
+		// TRANSLATES the canonical /v1/event stream to each connected ad/analytics
+		// platform (GA4 Measurement Protocol, Meta Conversions API, X/LinkedIn/TikTok/
+		// Reddit) and forwards it server-side. Mounts AFTER analytics (whose fan-out
+		// sink it installs) and integrations (a destination may reuse an OAuth
+		// connection's token via integrations.TokenFor). Owns a DB handle → Shutdown.
+		{Name: "destinations", Mount: destinations.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(destinations.Shutdown)},
+		// First-class per-org Cloudflare asset plane /v1/cloudflare/{zones,pages,workers,
+		// ai,r2,kv,d1}/* (sibling of /v1/dns, /v1/domain). Mounts AFTER integrations
+		// because it reads the org's Cloudflare token through the integrations custody
+		// seam (integrations.TokenFor) — one token, one custody boundary. Connecting the
+		// provider stays on the integrations plane; this plane only MANAGES resources.
 		{Name: "cloudflare", Mount: cloudflare.Mount},
 		{Name: "sbom", Mount: sbom.Mount, OwnsHealth: true},
 		{Name: "team", Mount: team.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(team.Shutdown)},
 		{Name: "settings", Mount: settings.Mount, Shutdown: settings.Shutdown},
+		{Name: "prefs", Mount: prefs.Mount, Shutdown: prefs.Shutdown},
 		{Name: "notify", Mount: notify.Mount, OwnsHealth: true},
 		{Name: "channels", Mount: channels.Mount, Shutdown: channels.Shutdown},
 		{Name: "gateway", Mount: gateway.Mount},
 		{Name: "entitlements", Mount: entitlements.Mount, Shutdown: entitlements.Shutdown},
 		{Name: "exec", Mount: exec.Mount},
 		{Name: "websearch", Mount: websearch.Mount},
+		// The in-binary full-text index (/v1/index): a per-org inverted index on
+		// Base/SQLite speaking the Meilisearch dialect, so a Meilisearch client
+		// repoints at it unchanged. websearch above queries the OUTSIDE world;
+		// this one indexes ours. NOT /v1/search — that path belongs to the
+		// hanzoai/ai RAG plane, and the collision silently ate two routes.
+		{Name: "index", Mount: index.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(index.Shutdown), OwnsHealth: true},
 		{Name: "world", Mount: world.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(world.Shutdown)},
 		// The bot runtime's ops face (/v1/bot/*). The transport itself is domain-free;
 		// the run control plane is "bots" below.
@@ -359,10 +443,25 @@ func Wire() []cloud.MountSpec {
 		{Name: "bots", Mount: bots.Mount},
 		{Name: "audit", Mount: auditlog.Mount},
 		{Name: "affiliates", Mount: affiliates.Mount},
-		// Hanzo Sign (e-signature) via goja + per-tenant Base. STAGED behind CLOUD_ENABLE. OwnsHealth.
-		{Name: "sign", Mount: sign.Mount, Shutdown: sign.Shutdown, OwnsHealth: true},
+		// Hanzo e-signature via goja + per-tenant Base. Mounts under the default. OwnsHealth.
+		{Name: "esign", Mount: esign.Mount, Shutdown: esign.Shutdown, OwnsHealth: true},
 		{Name: "product", Mount: product.Mount},
 		{Name: "evals", Mount: eval.Mount},
+		{Name: "benchmark", Mount: benchmark.Mount},
+		// The R&D EVIDENCE plane (HIP-0512) + its R&D Ops Board UI at /research —
+		// the arena's sibling: benchmark measures, research is the versioned diary
+		// every product's runs accrue into. Non-staged: mounts under the default.
+		{Name: "research", Mount: research.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(research.Shutdown)},
+		// The unified EXPERIMENT primitive (/v1/experiments): A/B testing as ONE value
+		// whatever the variant kind (feature | ad creative | email | model). It is a
+		// COMPOSITION — assignment via flags, measurement via analytics, evidence via
+		// research — so it mounts AFTER all three. It owns only the experiment registry
+		// store → Shutdown. clients/campaign composes it (experiments.Assign/Analyze).
+		{Name: "experiments", Mount: experiments.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(experiments.Shutdown)},
+		// The revenue BOOKS spine (/v1/books): a native double-entry general ledger that
+		// reads commerce transactions (the sole posting source) and books the accounting twin —
+		// plus bank import (PDF/OFX/CSV/Plaid/Teller), reconciliation, and the AI Ask brain.
+		{Name: "books", Mount: books.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(books.Shutdown)},
 		{Name: "treasury", Mount: treasury.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(treasury.Shutdown)},
 		{Name: "admin", Mount: admin.Mount},
 		// Launch-control gate (per-service waitlist): the COMPLETE feature — host→service
@@ -403,6 +502,14 @@ func Wire() []cloud.MountSpec {
 		// google token custody; captable/dataroom facades) and before the /v1/* AI
 		// catch-all so its routes resolve here.
 		{Name: "company", Mount: company.Mount, Shutdown: company.Shutdown},
+		// The corporate back-office surfaces — orthogonal to company/captable/billing:
+		// Hanzo Compliance (/v1/compliance) orchestrates KYC/KYB verification providers
+		// + tracks accreditation state + surfaces the SOC 2 audit posture; Hanzo Legal
+		// (/v1/legal) is the versioned template + generation engine + e-sign/filing seams.
+		// Both are TOOLING with providers/professionals in the loop, never advice or
+		// certification. They mount before the /v1/* AI catch-all so their routes resolve.
+		{Name: "compliance", Mount: compliance.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(compliance.Shutdown), OwnsHealth: true},
+		{Name: "legal", Mount: legal.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(legal.Shutdown), OwnsHealth: true},
 		// Chat orchestrator — POST /v1/chat: ONE LLM tool-calling round over the tool
 		// plane. It COMPOSES the ai completion path (in-process, so per-org billing
 		// runs) + the unified tool registry, and splits the model's tool calls into
@@ -410,7 +517,24 @@ func Wire() []cloud.MountSpec {
 		// catch-all so /v1/chat resolves here (Fiber first-match); the ai module's
 		// beego /v1/chat alias behind its /v1/* glob is thereby shadowed, while ai
 		// keeps /v1/chat/completions + /v1/completions.
-		{Name: "agent", Mount: agent.Mount},
+		{Name: "agent", Mount: cloud.Global(agent.Mount), Global: true},
+		// The UNIFIED GROUNDED ADVISOR — POST /v1/ask. DISTINCT from /v1/chat/completions
+		// (ai's RAW model) and /v1/agent (tool-calling): it routes a plain-language question
+		// to the domain(s) that can GROUND it, reads the REAL figures from each domain's own
+		// endpoint IN-PROCESS under the caller's own creds (agent.go's replay pattern, so
+		// per-tenant isolation is inherited), hands the model the EXACT figures, and returns
+		// the grounded answer + figures + the domain reads that backed them. The model NEVER
+		// invents a figure. Contributors plug in via a registry (books today; o11y/billing
+		// next) WITHOUT a router edit. Mounts BEFORE the ai /v1/* catch-all so /v1/ask wins
+		// Fiber's first-match; after books/agent so the domains it composes are wired.
+		{Name: "ask", Mount: ask.Mount},
+		// POST /v1/translate (HIP-0516) — the ONE translation surface: a quality tier
+		// on the model plane and a bulk tier on MADLAD-400, behind one endpoint, one
+		// auth path, one meter. It COMPOSES the model plane (deps.AI, which already
+		// gates + debits its own tokens) rather than standing up a second inference
+		// stack, and owns only its per-org translation memory → Shutdown. Mounts
+		// BEFORE the zen/ai catch-all so /v1/translate resolves here.
+		{Name: "translate", Mount: translate.Mount, Shutdown: ctxShutdown(translate.Shutdown)},
 		// The bare /v1/* AI catch-all — the LAST route position. Every owning subsystem above
 		// wins its own namespace (Fiber first-match); AI is the fallback for the rest of /v1/*.
 		// zen mounts as a /v1-scoped Claim middleware BEFORE ai: it routes zen* models
@@ -418,8 +542,8 @@ func Wire() []cloud.MountSpec {
 		// c.Next()s everything else to ai. zen owns the zen family; ai owns every
 		// other model and the /v1/models list. Order is load-bearing — Claim must
 		// run before ai's catch-all. (See hip-00NN.)
-		{Name: "zen", Mount: mountZen},
-		{Name: "ai", Mount: ai.Mount},
+		{Name: "zen", Mount: mountZen, Prefixes: []string{"/v1"}},
+		{Name: "ai", Mount: cloud.Global(mountAI), Global: true},
 		// Runtime wasm/proxy plugins — mounts dead last.
 		{Name: "plugins", Mount: plugin.Mount},
 	}
@@ -444,6 +568,32 @@ func ServeSingle(name string) error {
 	return fmt.Errorf("ServeSingle: unknown app %q — run `hanzo code ls`/`hanzo` for the list", name)
 }
 
+// o11yPlugin says where to find the o11y binary. Its two knobs map 1:1 onto
+// zip.Plugin's own fields, so there is no third notion of "where a plugin is"
+// and nothing to translate:
+//
+//	CLOUD_O11Y_ADDR — already listening there; start nothing, just mount it.
+//	CLOUD_O11Y_BIN  — the binary's path on disk.
+//
+// The default is a file named "o11y" beside the running cloud binary, which is
+// the container layout: both binaries in the image, still one artifact to ship.
+// Resolving it from os.Executable rather than $PATH means a host always loads
+// the o11y it was built and shipped with, not whichever one a PATH happens to
+// find.
+func o11yPlugin() zip.Plugin {
+	if addr := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("CLOUD_O11Y_ADDR")); addr != "" {
+		return zip.Plugin{Addr: addr}
+	}
+	path := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("CLOUD_O11Y_BIN"))
+	if path == "" {
+		path = "o11y"
+		if self, err := os.Executable(); err == nil {
+			path = filepath.Join(filepath.Dir(self), "o11y")
+		}
+	}
+	return zip.Plugin{Path: path}
+}
+
 // mountMetrics adapts hanzoai/metrics into a cloud.MountFunc. Unlike the other
 // externals, metrics declares its OWN narrow Deps (Logger, DataDir, Brand) and does
 // not import hanzoai/cloud, so cloud.Typed cannot bridge it: the composition root

apps/commerce.go

@@ -25,12 +25,14 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
 	accountclient "github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/account"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerceclient"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerceinproc"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerce"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerce/transport"
 	financeclient "github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/finance"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/principal"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/commerce"
+	commercemod "github.com/hanzoai/commerce"
 	commercebilling "github.com/hanzoai/commerce/api/billing"
+	catalogapi "github.com/hanzoai/commerce/api/catalog"
+	planapi "github.com/hanzoai/commerce/api/plan"
 	commercestore "github.com/hanzoai/commerce/api/store"
 	commercedatastore "github.com/hanzoai/commerce/datastore"
 	commercemid "github.com/hanzoai/commerce/middleware"
@@ -43,10 +45,10 @@ import (
 func init() {
 	// In-process CommerceClient factory — pickCommerceClient calls it when the
 	// commerce subsystem is enabled. Registered HERE (not called directly from
-	// package cloud) because commerceclient's entitlement client imports
+	// package cloud) because the commerce client's entitlement client imports
 	// clients/plan, which imports cloud: the hook keeps the package graph acyclic.
 	cloud.RegisterCommerceClientFactory(func(cfg *cloud.Config, _ log.Logger) cloud.CommerceClient {
-		return commerceclient.InProcessClient(cfg.Brand)
+		return commerce.InProcessClient(cfg.Brand)
 	})
 }
 
@@ -66,6 +68,21 @@ var commercePrefixes = []string{
 	// whose prepaid BALANCE gate 402'd every store read (a store-metadata read
 	// must never require an LLM balance).
 	"/v1/store",
+	// Platform-admin catalog CMS: GET/POST/PUT/DELETE /v1/catalog/entries +
+	// POST /v1/catalog/seed — the SuperAdmin CRUD admin.hanzo.ai's editor drives.
+	// commerce's setupRoutes wires only the PUBLIC read (/v1/commerce/catalog);
+	// the CRUD lives on the standalone /v1 bundle (api.Route → catalogApi.AdminRoute),
+	// which the co-resident embed skips, so mountCommerce mounts it below on the
+	// same /v1 gate chain. Own the prefix here so it reaches commerce (each handler
+	// is requireSuperAdmin-gated) instead of the AI /v1/* balance catch-all.
+	"/v1/catalog",
+	// Platform-admin subscription/DNS plan authority CMS: GET/POST/PUT/DELETE
+	// /v1/plans/entries + POST /v1/plans/seed (increment 3a) — the SuperAdmin CRUD
+	// the console plan editor drives. The PUBLIC read stays GET /v1/billing/plans;
+	// this CRUD rides the /v1 bundle (api.Route → planApi.AdminRoute), which the
+	// embed skips, so mountCommerce mounts it below. Own the prefix so it reaches
+	// commerce (each handler requireSuperAdmin-gated), not the AI /v1/* 402 gate.
+	"/v1/plans",
 	// Payment-provider webhook receiver (POST /v1/billing/webhooks/:provider —
 	// Square et al). The provider's HMAC over the registered notification URL +
 	// body IS the auth; a bearer gate is impossible for provider callbacks.
@@ -86,7 +103,7 @@ var commercePrefixes = []string{
 // own gate chains (see commercePrefixes).
 func mountCommerce(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 	if app == nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("commerce: nil zip.App")
+		return fmt.Errorf("commerce: nil app")
 	}
 	if deps.Logger == nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("commerce: nil deps.Logger")
@@ -114,7 +131,7 @@ func mountCommerce(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 		dataDir = filepath.Join(deps.DataDir, "commerce")
 	}
 
-	embedded, err := commerce.Embed(context.Background(), commerce.EmbedConfig{
+	embedded, err := commercemod.Embed(context.Background(), commercemod.EmbedConfig{
 		DataDir: dataDir,
 		// RequireIdentity stays gateway-owned: the gateway in front of the cloud
 		// binary is the trust boundary per HIP-0026.
@@ -124,11 +141,27 @@ func mountCommerce(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 		App: app,
 		// ONE LEDGER: commerce's POST /v1/billing/credit mints into cloud's native
 		// finance ledger (the SAME per-org account the AI spend-gate reads), so a
-		// granted credit is immediately spendable. commerce.Embed calls
+		// granted credit is immediately spendable. commercemod.Embed calls
 		// creditledger.Set(this) before routes register; nil would leave commerce on
 		// its own datastore (standalone), but in this unified binary finance is
 		// co-resident, so we inject the finance-backed ledger adapter.
 		Ledger: ledger{},
+		// ONE KEY for one process. commerce encrypts its per-tenant money stores
+		// under a 32-byte KEK; cloud already resolves one (CLOUD_KMS_MASTER_KEY_REF,
+		// the same master durableCipher and cek derive from), so it hands that over
+		// rather than a SECOND key being provisioned for the same process through
+		// commerce's own env var.
+		//
+		// It is not a convenience. Without a key commerce refuses to boot on a
+		// libsqlcipher-linked build — correctly, it will not open money data
+		// unencrypted — and that refusal is silent from out here: Mount never
+		// reaches transport.SetApp, so every S2S billing read falls through to the
+		// network and DNS-resolves the in-process placeholder. On 2026-07-27 that
+		// read as "Insufficient balance" on funded accounts, fleet-wide.
+		//
+		// Empty ref ⇒ nil ⇒ commerce reads its own env, unchanged, which is the
+		// standalone and pure-Go dev path.
+		MasterKey: deps.MasterKey,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		lg.Error("commerce embed failed — serving fail-closed 503 (cloud stays up)", "err", err)
@@ -146,6 +179,26 @@ func mountCommerce(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 	storeV1.Use(iammiddleware.IAMTokenRequired())
 	commercestore.Route(storeV1, commercemid.TokenRequired())
 
+	// Platform-admin catalog CMS on the SAME /v1 bundle: GET/POST/PUT/DELETE
+	// /v1/catalog/entries + POST /v1/catalog/seed. setupRoutes wires only the
+	// public read (/v1/commerce/catalog); the CRUD rides the standalone /v1 bundle
+	// (api.Route → catalogApi.AdminRoute), which the co-resident embed skips — so
+	// register it here, exactly as the standalone does. storeV1's IAMTokenRequired
+	// populates the claims each handler's requireSuperAdmin reads (anon → 403, a
+	// platform admin edits); it is cross-tenant data, never org-scoped.
+	catalogapi.AdminRoute(storeV1)
+
+	// Platform-admin subscription/DNS plan authority CRUD on the SAME /v1 bundle:
+	// GET/POST/PUT/DELETE /v1/plans/entries + POST /v1/plans/seed (increment 3a).
+	// Mirrors the catalog mount: the standalone wires it on the /v1 bundle
+	// (api.Route → planApi.AdminRoute), which the co-resident embed skips. The
+	// embed seed SOURCE is injected here (the composition root) — commercebilling.
+	// SeedRows, the SAME @hanzo/plans embed the boot seed + resolveSubscriptionPlan
+	// read — so api/plan never imports api/billing. Each handler is
+	// requireSuperAdmin-gated (anon → 403); prices are admin-editable but the mint
+	// gates score the IMMUTABLE embed, so an edit never moves a charge gate.
+	planapi.AdminRoute(storeV1, commercebilling.SeedRows)
+
 	// Provider webhook intake at the LIVE registered path. Chain mirrors the
 	// commerce-standalone posture: gated request context, then the sessionless
 	// HMAC-verified handler.
@@ -219,8 +272,8 @@ func mountCommerce(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 	// the console billingRead block above: without a co-resident handler this authorize
 	// fell through to the account bridge's /v1/billing/* wildcard (order 122), which — being
 	// service-token-forwardable (billing.go billingForwardable) — re-forwarded it to
-	// COMMERCE_URL (the public api.hanzo.ai edge = THIS binary) over commerceinproc's
-	// self-routing transport, re-entering the same wildcard until the depth-8 guard refused
+	// COMMERCE_URL (the public api.hanzo.ai edge = THIS binary) over the commerce transport's
+	// self-routing dispatch, re-entering the same wildcard until the depth-8 guard refused
 	// → 502 → the gate fails OPEN (the cap is a policy overlay, so no traffic was blocked,
 	// but ~135 502s/30m spammed the money path and each burned 8 full-app dispatches). The
 	// plain GET /v1/billing/spend-alerts (registered above) already broke this loop for the
@@ -277,13 +330,106 @@ func mountCommerce(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 		commercebilling.DeleteSpendAlert,
 	)
 
+	// POST /v1/billing/topup/token — the INLINE Square card top-up (the console's
+	// "Billing → Credits → add credits": the Square Web Payments SDK tokenizes the card
+	// IN THE BROWSER → a single-use nonce → this endpoint charges it and credits the
+	// caller's balance). commerce's api.Route() billing bundle is NOT compiled into the
+	// co-resident embed, so — exactly like plans/invoices/spend-alerts above — without
+	// this registration the POST fell through to the account bridge's /v1/billing/*
+	// wildcard (order 122). That wildcard is service-token-forwardable for topup/token
+	// (billing.go billingForwardable), so billingData re-forwarded it to COMMERCE_URL
+	// (default the public api.hanzo.ai edge = THIS binary) over the commerce transport's
+	// self-routing dispatch, re-entering the SAME wildcard until the depth-8 guard
+	// refused → the "commerce transport: in-process dispatch depth 8 exceeded" 502 that broke
+	// top-up outright. Registering commerce's real TopupWithToken co-resident here
+	// (order 100 < 122) shadows the wildcard and serves the charge in-process at depth 1
+	// — no HTTP hop, no self-dispatch. topup/token STAYS in billingForwardable as the
+	// split-deploy fallback (a standalone commerce still serves it); co-residence just
+	// wins first.
+	//
+	// Chain — the browser money-WRITE posture, byte-for-byte what the bridge applied:
+	//   RequireCSRF        — the ambient-cookie anti-CSRF gate the bridge's requireCSRF
+	//                        wrapped POST /v1/billing/* with (a Bearer/gateway caller is
+	//                        not CSRF-able; an ambient-cookie write needs the token).
+	//   RequestContext     — the gated request context commerce's handler + ledger read.
+	//   IAMTokenRequired   — resolves the org from the gateway-validated X-Org-Id into
+	//                        Locals("organization"), which TopupWithToken.GetOrganization
+	//                        + topupDestination read as the org billing key.
+	//   PinBillingSubject  — pins ?user= to the caller's OWN account.Payer subject (the
+	//                        SAME rule the ai spend-gate debits and billingData pins), so
+	//                        the credit lands on the caller's subject (person=org/name) and
+	//                        can never be widened; fail-closed for an unvalidated caller —
+	//                        the IDOR boundary stays exactly where billingData put it.
+	// The card PAN never touches this binary: TopupWithToken charges the Square nonce only,
+	// and the settled charge itself is the mint authority (mintauth.WithAuthorized).
+	app.Post("/v1/billing/topup/token",
+		accountclient.RequireCSRF(),
+		commercemid.RequestContext(),
+		iammiddleware.IAMTokenRequired(),
+		accountclient.PinBillingSubject(),
+		commercebilling.TopupWithToken,
+	)
+
+	// The remaining console billing WRITES that share topup/token's self-dispatch loop
+	// class — each is a POST the console makes (billingForwardable in billing.go), each had
+	// NO co-resident handler, so each fell through to the account bridge's /v1/billing/*
+	// wildcard (order 122) and re-entered it over the commerce transport until the depth-8 guard
+	// refused (the same "in-process dispatch depth 8 exceeded" 502 that broke top-up). Each
+	// commerce handler exists in the vendored module (v1.49.13); registering them co-resident
+	// (order 100 < 122) shadows the wildcard and serves the write in-process at depth 1. They
+	// STAY in billingForwardable as the split-deploy fallback (same precedent as topup/token
+	// + spend-alerts). Chain matches the bridge's write posture byte-for-byte:
+	//
+	//   - RequireCSRF        — the ambient-cookie anti-CSRF gate the bridge wrapped POST
+	//                          /v1/billing/* with (Bearer/gateway callers are not CSRF-able).
+	//   - RequestContext     — the gated request context commerce's handlers read.
+	//   - IAMTokenRequired   — resolves the org from the gateway-validated X-Org-Id into
+	//                          Locals("organization") — the namespace GetOrganization reads.
+	//   - PinBillingSubject  — pins the caller's OWN account.Payer subject into BOTH query and
+	//                          body AND fail-closes an unvalidated caller. It is the auth gate
+	//                          on every one, and the IDOR control on the subject-scoped one.
+	//
+	// payment-methods (save a card-on-file / vault a Square nonce) is SUBJECT-scoped: commerce's
+	// CreatePaymentMethod reads `customerId` from the BODY, so PinBillingSubject's body-pin is
+	// load-bearing here — a member can only vault a card for their OWN subject, exactly the
+	// boundary billingData's scopedBillingBody enforced. The Square nonce goes to Square; the
+	// PAN never touches this binary.
+	app.Post("/v1/billing/payment-methods",
+		accountclient.RequireCSRF(),
+		commercemid.RequestContext(),
+		iammiddleware.IAMTokenRequired(),
+		accountclient.PinBillingSubject(),
+		commercebilling.CreatePaymentMethod,
+	)
+
+	// subscriptions/:id/{cancel,reactivate} are org-NAMESPACE-scoped: commerce's handlers
+	// resolve the subscription by `:id` WITHIN the caller's org namespace (a foreign org's id
+	// is a 404 miss), so tenancy is the namespace IAMTokenRequired resolves and PinBillingSubject
+	// is the fail-closed-anon auth gate — its pinned subject params are ignored by these
+	// handlers (the SAME role it plays for the org-scoped payment-config read). The bridge's
+	// subject-pin was likewise a no-op for these, so nothing is dropped.
+	app.Post("/v1/billing/subscriptions/:id/cancel",
+		accountclient.RequireCSRF(),
+		commercemid.RequestContext(),
+		iammiddleware.IAMTokenRequired(),
+		accountclient.PinBillingSubject(),
+		commercebilling.CancelBillingSubscription,
+	)
+	app.Post("/v1/billing/subscriptions/:id/reactivate",
+		accountclient.RequireCSRF(),
+		commercemid.RequestContext(),
+		iammiddleware.IAMTokenRequired(),
+		accountclient.PinBillingSubject(),
+		commercebilling.ReactivateBillingSubscription,
+	)
+
 	// In-process seams:
-	//   - commerceinproc routes the S2S billing byte-stream into the co-resident
+	//   - the commerce transport routes the S2S billing byte-stream into the co-resident
 	//     app (the metering debit path) instead of a socket to a standalone pod.
-	//   - commerceclient reads the Embedded's datastore DIRECTLY (entitlements +
+	//   - the commerce client reads the Embedded's datastore DIRECTLY (entitlements +
 	//     BalanceCents) — no HTTP shape at all.
-	commerceinproc.SetApp(app)
-	commerceclient.PublishEmbedded(embedded)
+	transport.SetApp(app.Fiber())
+	commerce.PublishEmbedded(embedded)
 
 	// Usage-cap enforcement on the FINANCE path. The unified binary records usage in
 	// the finance ledger (fin.RecordUsage), NOT commerce's transaction store — which
@@ -340,7 +486,7 @@ func hasCommercePrefix(path string) bool {
 }
 
 // of falling through to another subsystem's catch-all.
-func mountCommerceFailClosed(app *zip.App) {
+func mountCommerceFailClosed(app cloud.Router) {
 	failed := func(c *zip.Ctx) error {
 		c.SetHeader("Content-Type", "application/json")
 		return c.Bytes(http.StatusServiceUnavailable, []byte(`{"error":"commerce unavailable","code":503}`))

apps/commerce_prefix_test.go

@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ func TestCommercePrefixesPinned(t *testing.T) {
 		"/v1/billing/auto-recharge": false,
 		"/v1/billing/webhooks":      false,
 		"/v1/store":                 false,
+		"/v1/catalog":               false,
+		"/v1/plans":                 false,
 	}
 	for _, p := range commercePrefixes {
 		if _, ok := want[p]; ok {
@@ -84,6 +86,25 @@ func TestStoreSurfaceRoutedToCommerceNotAIGate(t *testing.T) {
 	if code, _ := doReq(t, app, http.MethodPut, "/v1/store/karma-store/listing/valentina"); code == http.StatusPaymentRequired {
 		t.Fatalf("PUT /v1/store/:id/listing/:slug fell through to the AI balance gate (402) — the whole store surface must be commerce-owned")
 	}
+
+	// The platform-admin catalog CMS (admin.hanzo.ai's editor) must reach commerce —
+	// where each handler is requireSuperAdmin-gated (anon → 401/403) — never the AI
+	// /v1/* balance gate, which would 402 the editor's list/edit instead.
+	if code, _ := doReq(t, app, http.MethodGet, "/v1/catalog/entries"); code == http.StatusPaymentRequired {
+		t.Fatalf("GET /v1/catalog/entries fell through to the AI balance gate (402) — /v1/catalog must be a commercePrefix so the SuperAdmin CMS reaches commerce")
+	}
+	if code, _ := doReq(t, app, http.MethodPut, "/v1/catalog/entries/cloud-starter"); code == http.StatusPaymentRequired {
+		t.Fatalf("PUT /v1/catalog/entries/:slug fell through to the AI balance gate (402) — the whole catalog CMS must be commerce-owned")
+	}
+
+	// The platform-admin plan authority CMS (increment 3a) must also reach commerce —
+	// requireSuperAdmin-gated (anon → 401/403) — never the AI /v1/* 402 gate.
+	if code, _ := doReq(t, app, http.MethodGet, "/v1/plans/entries"); code == http.StatusPaymentRequired {
+		t.Fatalf("GET /v1/plans/entries fell through to the AI balance gate (402) — /v1/plans must be a commercePrefix so the plan authority CMS reaches commerce")
+	}
+	if code, _ := doReq(t, app, http.MethodPut, "/v1/plans/entries/pro"); code == http.StatusPaymentRequired {
+		t.Fatalf("PUT /v1/plans/entries/:slug fell through to the AI balance gate (402) — the whole plan authority CMS must be commerce-owned")
+	}
 }
 
 // doReq drives one request through the mounted app and returns (status, body).

apps/framework_content_test.go

@@ -7,13 +7,15 @@ import (
 )
 
 // TestFrameworkContentModulesLinked guards the framework CONTENT modules
-// (cms/erp/help) against silent removal. They are not mount subsystems, so they
-// never appear in Wire(); they register their DocTypes and — for erp — the
-// ledger-posting lifecycle hooks into the framework engine from a package
-// init(), reached ONLY via the blank imports in apps.go. #248 dropped
-// those imports, which stripped the erp ledger hooks from the binary with no
-// mount change and no failing mount test. This asserts the engine's module
-// registry carries each lane, so that money-adjacent regression cannot recur.
+// (cms/erp/help) against silent removal. cms/erp are pure fixture lanes reached
+// ONLY via blank imports in apps.go; help is a real import + a Wire() spec (it also
+// mounts the /v1/help public plane) but still contributes its DocTypes the SAME way,
+// from a package init() (framework.RegisterModule). #248 dropped the blank imports,
+// which stripped the erp ledger hooks from the binary with no mount change and no
+// failing mount test. This asserts the engine's module registry carries each lane,
+// so that money-adjacent regression cannot recur — for help, dropping the import
+// would also drop its Wire() spec and fail TestWireOrderMatchesFrozen, but this keeps
+// the fixture-linkage guard uniform across all three lanes.
 func TestFrameworkContentModulesLinked(t *testing.T) {
 	got := make(map[string]bool)
 	for _, m := range framework.RegisteredModules() {

apps/install.go

@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+package apps
+
+import (
+	"context"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/ai"
+	aiobject "github.com/hanzoai/ai/object"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/membership"
+	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
+)
+
+// cloud builds these callbacks but does not install them: importing the ai
+// module or the Kubernetes client from cloud drags ~1700 packages into every
+// subsystem, since they all import cloud for Deps. Registration lives here,
+// where both are already linked.
+
+// Outside a cluster K8s errors and cloud falls back to its static peer set.
+func init() { cloud.Peers = membership.K8s }
+
+// mountAI installs the money and ingest callbacks, then mounts ai. A nil
+// callback is left alone — cloud leaves one nil exactly when that subsystem
+// isn't co-resident, and the module's own fallback applies.
+func mountAI(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
+	if f := cloud.TierReader(); f != nil {
+		aiobject.SetTierReader(aiobject.TierReaderFunc(f))
+	}
+	if f := cloud.BalanceReader(); f != nil {
+		aiobject.SetBalanceReader(aiobject.BalanceReaderFunc(f))
+	}
+	if f := cloud.UsageRecorder(); f != nil {
+		aiobject.SetUsageRecorder(func(ctx context.Context, u aiobject.UsageEvent) error {
+			return f(ctx, cloud.UsageEvent{
+				Subject: u.Subject, Namespace: u.Namespace, USD: u.USD,
+				Currency: u.Currency, Model: u.Model, Provider: u.Provider,
+				RequestID: u.RequestID,
+			})
+		})
+	}
+	if d := cloud.IngestDialer(); d != nil {
+		aiobject.SetIngestDialer(d)
+	}
+	return ai.Mount(app, deps)
+}

apps/ledger.go

@@ -27,10 +27,18 @@ type ledger struct{}
 // compile-time proof the adapter satisfies commerce's exported seam.
 var _ creditledger.CreditLedger = ledger{}
 
-// Credit posts a balanced deposit (funding:platform → wallet) to the org's POOL
-// account (Subject == Org, the wallet the gate reads) and returns the ledger entry
-// id + the org's new available balance in cents. Idempotent on IdempotencyKey:
-// finance dedups on Ref, so the same key credits AT MOST once.
+// Credit posts a balanced deposit (funding:platform → wallet) to the ADDRESS the
+// input names — (Org, Subject), where an empty Subject is the org POOL — and returns
+// the ledger entry id + that account's new available balance in cents. Idempotent on
+// IdempotencyKey: finance dedups on Ref, so the same key credits AT MOST once.
+//
+// Subject exists because the pool is not always the account the gate reads. In the
+// shared signup org each member spends from their own wallet, so a pool-only credit
+// funds a balance nobody can spend while the member it was meant for is refused at
+// $0. The caller resolves the address with the SAME rule the gate resolves the payer
+// with (account.Payer, via principal), so a credit and the spend it funds land on one
+// wallet by construction. An org whose members share one balance names no subject and
+// is byte-for-byte unchanged.
 func (ledger) Credit(ctx context.Context, in creditledger.CreditInput) (string, int64, error) {
 	fin := finance.Current()
 	if fin == nil {
@@ -44,9 +52,13 @@ func (ledger) Credit(ctx context.Context, in creditledger.CreditInput) (string,
 	if tag == "" {
 		tag = "grant:admin" // non-cash grant bucket (finance is a single wallet; Tags is a memo)
 	}
+	subject := in.Subject
+	if subject == "" {
+		subject = in.Org // pooled org: the slug IS the pool account the gate reads
+	}
 	id, err := fin.Deposit(ctx, types.DepositInput{
 		Org:      in.Org,
-		Subject:  in.Org, // org-pool wallet == the account the AI gate reads
+		Subject:  subject,
 		Amount:   money.FromCents(in.AmountCents),
 		Currency: cur,
 		Notes:    in.Reason,
@@ -56,7 +68,9 @@ func (ledger) Credit(ctx context.Context, in creditledger.CreditInput) (string,
 	if err != nil {
 		return "", 0, err
 	}
-	bal, berr := fin.Balance(ctx, in.Org, in.Org, cur, false)
+	// Read back the account that was CREDITED, never the pool — reporting a pool
+	// balance after crediting a member is how a caller concludes the grant vanished.
+	bal, berr := fin.Balance(ctx, in.Org, subject, cur, false)
 	if berr != nil {
 		return id, 0, berr
 	}

apps/main_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+// Copyright © 2026 Hanzo AI. MIT License.
+
+package apps
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+
+	sqlitedrv "github.com/hanzoai/sqlite"
+)
+
+// TestMain makes this package's store-backed tests (the finance-ledger money proofs in
+// starter_test.go) build-tag agnostic, exactly as the root package's TestMain does. On
+// an encryption-capable (cgo) build cek REFUSES to open a store without a master key;
+// on a pure-Go build a key is itself refused. So supply a throwaway dev key ONLY when
+// the build can encrypt AND the environment did not already provide one (CI may inject
+// the real key) — never overriding a provided key. Resolved once per process,
+// order-independent.
+func TestMain(m *testing.M) {
+	if sqlitedrv.EncryptionAvailable() && os.Getenv("CLOUD_KMS_MASTER_KEY_REF") == "" {
+		_ = os.Setenv("CLOUD_KMS_MASTER_KEY_REF", "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA=") // 32 zero bytes, dev-only
+	}
+	os.Exit(m.Run())
+}

apps/sqlite_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+// One SQLite engine, reachable under the names that engine owns.
+//
+// database/sql is a global registry: two packages registering the same name
+// panic the process at init ("sql: Register called twice for driver sqlite"),
+// before main() runs and before a single request is served. That panic has
+// already taken this binary down once — fourteen stores blank-imported
+// modernc.org/sqlite while hanzoai/sqlite registered "sqlite" too (dba5d73b).
+// The names collide in pairs: hanzoai/sqlite and modernc.org/sqlite both take
+// "sqlite"; hanzoai/csqlite and mattn/go-sqlite3 both take "sqlite3". One blank
+// import re-arms it.
+//
+// The guard lives here because apps is the composition root: cmd/cloud's main
+// imports nothing but this package and the root cloud package, so this test
+// binary's first-party graph is the shipped binary's less that one main.
+// Whatever registers a driver in production registers here, and the gate
+// already runs ./apps/ — so a second engine fails CI instead of a pod.
+//
+// The observable is the registered name -> owning package map, read back through
+// reflection on the driver database/sql actually holds. It is closed by
+// construction: an engine is caught whether it collides on a name, takes a fresh
+// name, or hides behind a fork of a name already allowed.
+//
+// HIP-0106: one binary, many subsystems.
+package apps
+
+import (
+	"database/sql"
+	"reflect"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// sqliteEngines are the packages allowed to own a registered SQLite driver — one
+// per build tag, both reached through the github.com/hanzoai/sqlite facade that
+// every cloud store imports. Nothing else may appear.
+var sqliteEngines = map[string]string{
+	"github.com/hanzoai/csqlite": "cgo: the C engine behind hanzoai/sqlite, linked against libsqlcipher for at-rest encryption",
+
+	// cgo-free: hanzoai/sqlite has no engine of its own on this path — driver_nocgo.go
+	// blank-imports modernc, which registers "sqlite" in its own init, so modernc IS
+	// the fork's pure-Go backend and owns the name. It is reached ONLY through the
+	// fork (nothing here imports it directly), and at-rest encryption is not lost by
+	// its being unkeyed: cek wraps it in the pure-Go SQLCipher envelope, which reads
+	// and writes the same page format as the C codec.
+	"modernc.org/sqlite": "cgo-free: the engine behind hanzoai/sqlite's !cgo backend, encrypted at rest by cek's SQLCipher envelope",
+}
+
+// sqliteNames are the driver names that engine may answer to. "sqlite" is
+// required; "sqlite3" is optional because only the cgo backend registers it.
+var sqliteNames = map[string]string{
+	"sqlite": "registered by hanzoai/sqlite under both build tags; the name every cloud store opens",
+
+	"sqlite3": "registered by hanzoai/csqlite's own init, same engine as \"sqlite\"; also the name mattn/go-sqlite3 takes",
+}
+
+// sqliteRegistrations maps every SQLite-family driver name registered in this
+// binary to the package that owns it. A name is in the family if the name looks
+// like SQLite or its owning package does, so an engine cannot slip past by
+// picking a plain name.
+//
+// Owner resolution goes through sql.Open, which is lazy — it hands back the
+// registered driver without connecting. A driver that refuses an empty DSN and is
+// not SQLite-shaped by name is logged and skipped: it cannot be identified, and
+// no SQLite engine in this tree behaves that way.
+func sqliteRegistrations(t *testing.T) map[string]string {
+	t.Helper()
+	family := func(s string) bool {
+		s = strings.ToLower(s)
+		return strings.Contains(s, "sqlite") || strings.Contains(s, "sqlcipher")
+	}
+	reg := map[string]string{}
+	for _, name := range sql.Drivers() {
+		db, err := sql.Open(name, "")
+		if err != nil {
+			if family(name) {
+				t.Errorf("driver %q is registered but its owner cannot be read: %v", name, err)
+			} else {
+				t.Logf("driver %q: owner not readable (%v); not SQLite-shaped by name", name, err)
+			}
+			continue
+		}
+		rt := reflect.TypeOf(db.Driver())
+		_ = db.Close()
+		for rt.Kind() == reflect.Pointer {
+			rt = rt.Elem()
+		}
+		if pkg := rt.PkgPath(); family(name) || family(pkg) {
+			reg[name] = pkg
+		}
+	}
+	return reg
+}
+
+// TestSQLiteOneEngine fails if the binary links a second SQLite engine.
+func TestSQLiteOneEngine(t *testing.T) {
+	reg := sqliteRegistrations(t)
+	if len(reg) == 0 {
+		t.Fatal(`no SQLite driver registered: every cloud store opens "sqlite", so the composition root must carry github.com/hanzoai/sqlite`)
+	}
+
+	owners := map[string][]string{}
+	for name, pkg := range reg {
+		owners[pkg] = append(owners[pkg], name)
+	}
+	if len(owners) > 1 {
+		t.Errorf("cloud links %d SQLite engines, not one: %v.\n"+
+			"Two engines mean two on-disk behaviours, and the moment either takes a name the other holds, this binary panics at init.",
+			len(owners), owners)
+	}
+	for pkg, held := range owners {
+		if _, ok := sqliteEngines[pkg]; !ok {
+			t.Errorf("%s owns SQLite driver name(s) %v but is not an allowed engine.\n"+
+				"Open \"sqlite\" through github.com/hanzoai/sqlite instead, or add %s to sqliteEngines here with the reason it must be its own engine.",
+				pkg, held, pkg)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSQLiteDriverNames fails if the engine answers to a name outside the allowed
+// set, which is how a collision with an upstream driver gets built.
+func TestSQLiteDriverNames(t *testing.T) {
+	reg := sqliteRegistrations(t)
+	if _, ok := reg["sqlite"]; !ok {
+		t.Errorf("driver \"sqlite\" is not registered; registered SQLite names: %v", reg)
+	}
+	for name := range reg {
+		if _, ok := sqliteNames[name]; !ok {
+			t.Errorf("SQLite driver name %q is registered but not allowed.\n"+
+				"Every extra name is a name an upstream driver can no longer take without panicking this binary.\n"+
+				"Drop the registration, or add %q to sqliteNames here with the reason it must exist.",
+				name, name)
+		}
+	}
+}

apps/starter_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+// Copyright © 2026 Hanzo AI. MIT License.
+
+package apps
+
+// starter_test.go proves the one claim a starter grant lives or dies on: the money
+// lands at the address the SPEND GATE READS. A grant that credits a wallet the gate
+// does not read is worse than no grant — the account looks funded and still 402s, and
+// that exact bug has shipped twice before (clients/principal/wallet.go names both).
+//
+// So these tests never assert against the balance the grant itself reports. They
+// re-derive the gate's address the way the gate does — account.Payer(...).Subject(),
+// the ONE rule — and read THAT. If the two ever diverge, the read returns 0 and every
+// test here fails.
+//
+// It lives in package apps because this is where the real chain is assembled: the
+// cloud ledger adapter (ledger{}) that translates (Org, Subject) into a finance
+// posting. Testing cloud.EnsureStarterCredit against a stub ledger would prove only
+// that the stub agrees with itself. The middleware's own behaviour — the hot-path
+// cache, which principals are eligible — is proven in middleware_starter_test.go,
+// where a request context is cheap to build.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/account"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/finance"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/money"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/principal"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/types"
+	commercecredit "github.com/hanzoai/commerce/billing/credit"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/commerce/billing/creditledger"
+)
+
+// wireLedger assembles the production money chain over a temp data dir: a real
+// finance ledger, published as the process-wide client, with the real cloud adapter
+// injected as commerce's credit seam. This is the same pair build.go/apps wire at
+// boot — no fakes anywhere in the path under test.
+func wireLedger(t *testing.T) finance.Client {
+	t.Helper()
+	fin := finance.New(t.TempDir())
+	finance.Publish(fin)
+	creditledger.Set(ledger{})
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		creditledger.Set(nil)
+		finance.Publish(nil)
+	})
+	return fin
+}
+
+// starterWalletOf builds the address a credential resolves to, by the SAME rule the gate
+// uses. Owner is the home org (the ledger), name the person. No `billing_account`
+// claim is supplied because IAM v2 mints none, so Payer takes the fallback — which is
+// precisely the production shape.
+func starterWalletOf(owner, name string) principal.Wallet {
+	return principal.Wallet{
+		Ledger:  owner,
+		Account: account.Payer(account.Credential{Owner: owner, Name: name}).Subject(),
+	}
+}
+
+// gateBalance reads a principal's balance EXACTLY as the spend gate does: resolve the
+// payer with account.Payer (what principal.WalletOf calls), then read that subject in
+// the home org's ledger (what build.go's BalanceReader and metering's fetchAvailable
+// both call).
+func gateBalance(t *testing.T, fin finance.Client, owner, name string) int64 {
+	t.Helper()
+	w := starterWalletOf(owner, name)
+	bal, err := fin.Balance(context.Background(), w.Ledger, w.Account, "usd", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("gate balance read (owner=%q name=%q subject=%q): %v", owner, name, w.Account, err)
+	}
+	return bal.Cents()
+}
+
+// TestStarterCredit_LandsAtTheAddressTheGateReads is THE test. A new account is
+// granted, and the balance is then read through the gate's own address rule — not the
+// grant's return value. They must agree, or the grant funds a wallet nobody spends
+// from.
+func TestStarterCredit_LandsAtTheAddressTheGateReads(t *testing.T) {
+	fin := wireLedger(t)
+
+	if got := gateBalance(t, fin, "acme", "alice"); got != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("a brand-new org must start at zero, got %d cents", got)
+	}
+
+	reported, err := cloud.EnsureStarterCredit(context.Background(), starterWalletOf("acme", "alice"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("EnsureStarterCredit: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	if got := gateBalance(t, fin, "acme", "alice"); got != commercecredit.StarterCreditCents {
+		t.Fatalf("the GATE reads %d cents at acme, want %d — the grant landed at an address the gate does not read",
+			got, commercecredit.StarterCreditCents)
+	}
+	// A second member of the same org reads the SAME pool: one grant funds the tenant,
+	// not each employee. This is what makes "once per account" mean once per org.
+	if got := gateBalance(t, fin, "acme", "bob"); got != commercecredit.StarterCreditCents {
+		t.Fatalf("a second member reads %d cents, want the same pool %d", got, commercecredit.StarterCreditCents)
+	}
+	if reported != commercecredit.StarterCreditCents {
+		t.Fatalf("reported balance %d, want %d", reported, commercecredit.StarterCreditCents)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestStarterCredit_AmountIsServerAuthoritative pins the granted amount to the shared
+// constant. EnsureStarterCredit takes no amount and no request body, so no client
+// field can reach it — this catches drift between the constant and what lands.
+func TestStarterCredit_AmountIsServerAuthoritative(t *testing.T) {
+	fin := wireLedger(t)
+	if _, err := cloud.EnsureStarterCredit(context.Background(), starterWalletOf("acme", "alice")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("EnsureStarterCredit: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := gateBalance(t, fin, "acme", "alice"); got != 500 {
+		t.Fatalf("granted %d cents, want exactly 500 ($5.00, the one canonical amount)", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestStarterCredit_RetryGrantsOnce covers the sequential replays: a retried request,
+// a re-login, a process restart that empties the hot-path cache. Every one derives the
+// same address-keyed ref, so the ledger credits once.
+func TestStarterCredit_RetryGrantsOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	fin := wireLedger(t)
+	for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
+		if _, err := cloud.EnsureStarterCredit(context.Background(), starterWalletOf("acme", "alice")); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("EnsureStarterCredit call %d: %v", i, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if got := gateBalance(t, fin, "acme", "alice"); got != commercecredit.StarterCreditCents {
+		t.Fatalf("after 5 grants the gate reads %d cents, want %d — the grant stacked",
+			got, commercecredit.StarterCreditCents)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestStarterCredit_ConcurrentGrantsOnce is the one that matters for money. A
+// sequential retry test passes against a read-then-write guard that is still racy;
+// only concurrency distinguishes a real idempotency barrier from a checked one.
+// Twenty goroutines start together and grant the same wallet.
+//
+// The barrier under test is finance.Deposit's dedup on Ref, which does its
+// EntryByRef check INSIDE the same transaction as the insert, over a store pinned to
+// SetMaxOpenConns(1). If that ever loosens — a second connection, a deferred
+// transaction, a check moved out of the tx — this test turns the regression into a
+// balance that is a multiple of $5.
+func TestStarterCredit_ConcurrentGrantsOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	fin := wireLedger(t)
+
+	const racers = 20
+	var start sync.WaitGroup
+	var done sync.WaitGroup
+	start.Add(1)
+	errs := make([]error, racers)
+	for i := 0; i < racers; i++ {
+		done.Add(1)
+		go func(i int) {
+			defer done.Done()
+			start.Wait() // release all goroutines at once
+			_, errs[i] = cloud.EnsureStarterCredit(context.Background(), starterWalletOf("acme", "alice"))
+		}(i)
+	}
+	start.Done()
+	done.Wait()
+
+	for i, err := range errs {
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("concurrent grant %d failed: %v", i, err)
+		}
+	}
+	if got := gateBalance(t, fin, "acme", "alice"); got != commercecredit.StarterCreditCents {
+		t.Fatalf("after %d CONCURRENT grants the gate reads %d cents, want %d — the idempotency key is not a barrier under race",
+			racers, got, commercecredit.StarterCreditCents)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestStarterCredit_PerAccountNotPerProcess proves the key is scoped to the address:
+// three different orgs each get their own grant. An over-broad key would fund the
+// first and silently skip every one after it.
+func TestStarterCredit_PerAccountNotPerProcess(t *testing.T) {
+	fin := wireLedger(t)
+	orgs := []string{"acme", "globex", "initech"}
+	for _, org := range orgs {
+		if _, err := cloud.EnsureStarterCredit(context.Background(), starterWalletOf(org, "founder")); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("EnsureStarterCredit(%s): %v", org, err)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, org := range orgs {
+		if got := gateBalance(t, fin, org, "founder"); got != commercecredit.StarterCreditCents {
+			t.Fatalf("org %s reads %d cents, want %d", org, got, commercecredit.StarterCreditCents)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestStarterCredit_FundedAccountIsNotGranted is the guard against a retroactive
+// payout to the whole customer base. A first-contact trigger sees every EXISTING
+// account on the first request after a deploy; if "unseen" meant "new", every funded
+// org in the fleet would take a free $5.
+func TestStarterCredit_FundedAccountIsNotGranted(t *testing.T) {
+	fin := wireLedger(t)
+	// An existing customer with money on the books.
+	if _, err := fin.Deposit(context.Background(), types.DepositInput{
+		Org: "acme", Subject: "acme", Amount: money.FromCents(2500), Currency: "usd",
+		Notes: "prior top-up", Ref: "prior-topup-1",
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed deposit: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := cloud.EnsureStarterCredit(context.Background(), starterWalletOf("acme", "alice")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("EnsureStarterCredit: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := gateBalance(t, fin, "acme", "alice"); got != 2500 {
+		t.Fatalf("funded account reads %d cents, want its original 2500 — a retroactive starter credit was paid", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestStarterCredit_SpentAccountIsNotGranted is the other half of that guard, and the
+// reason a zero balance alone is not the eligibility test. An org that spent its
+// balance down to exactly zero reads $0 but is not new; only its usage history
+// distinguishes it from a fresh signup.
+func TestStarterCredit_SpentAccountIsNotGranted(t *testing.T) {
+	fin := wireLedger(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	if _, err := fin.Deposit(ctx, types.DepositInput{
+		Org: "acme", Subject: "acme", Amount: money.FromCents(1000), Currency: "usd",
+		Notes: "prior top-up", Ref: "prior-topup-1",
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed deposit: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := fin.RecordUsage(ctx, types.UsageInput{
+		Org: "acme", Subject: "acme", Amount: money.FromCents(1000), Currency: "usd", RequestID: "prior-usage-1",
+	}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("seed usage: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := gateBalance(t, fin, "acme", "alice"); got != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("precondition: spent-out org should read 0, got %d", got)
+	}
+	if _, err := cloud.EnsureStarterCredit(ctx, starterWalletOf("acme", "alice")); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("EnsureStarterCredit: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got := gateBalance(t, fin, "acme", "alice"); got != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("a spent-out account was granted %d cents — zero balance was mistaken for a new account", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestStarterCredit_PoolIsNotThePersonWallet is the NEGATIVE CONTROL for every other
+// test here, and the reason the shared signup org is excluded from the grant.
+//
+// In that org the members are strangers, so account.Payer resolves each to their OWN
+// wallet, not the org pool. An org-keyed grant there lands somewhere no member's gate
+// reads. This test asserts that gap exists — it is what makes the passing address
+// tests above meaningful rather than vacuous, and it pins the trap so nobody
+// "simplifies" the exclusion away.
+func TestStarterCredit_PoolIsNotThePersonWallet(t *testing.T) {
+	fin := wireLedger(t)
+	org := account.SignupOrg
+
+	// Credit the POOL directly (what an org-keyed grant would do).
+	if _, err := cloud.EnsureStarterCredit(context.Background(), principal.Wallet{Ledger: org, Account: org}); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("EnsureStarterCredit(pool): %v", err)
+	}
+	// A member of that org reads their PERSON wallet — EMPTY. This is the
+	// "looks fixed and 402s anyway" failure.
+	if got := gateBalance(t, fin, org, "alice"); got != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("a signup-org member reads %d cents from a pool grant; the address model is wrong", got)
+	}
+	// Same ledger, different account: the pool DID receive it, so the zero above is an
+	// ADDRESS mismatch, not a failed write.
+	pool, err := fin.Balance(context.Background(), org, org, "usd", false)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("pool balance: %v", err)
+	}
+	if pool.Cents() != commercecredit.StarterCreditCents {
+		t.Fatalf("pool holds %d cents, want %d — the write itself failed, so this proves nothing about addressing",
+			pool.Cents(), commercecredit.StarterCreditCents)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestStarterCredit_NoLedgerIsInert proves a split deploy is a no-op, not a crash and
+// not a false success: with no co-resident ledger there is nothing to grant into, the
+// account stays at $0, and the gate refuses it.
+func TestStarterCredit_NoLedgerIsInert(t *testing.T) {
+	creditledger.Set(nil)
+	finance.Publish(nil)
+	got, err := cloud.EnsureStarterCredit(context.Background(), starterWalletOf("acme", "alice"))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("no-ledger must be inert, got error: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("no-ledger reported balance %d, want 0", got)
+	}
+}

apps/wire_seams.go

@@ -1,12 +1,23 @@
 package apps
 
 import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/ads"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/automations"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/campaign"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/coding"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/experiments"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/framework"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/git"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/guide"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/integrations"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/principal"
 )
 
-// wire_seams.go wires cross-subsystem in-process seams that cannot be a MountSpec
+// wire_seams.go wires cross-subsystem in-process seams that cannot be a AppSpec
 // because they compose functions ACROSS packages that must not import each other.
 //
 // The coding orchestrator (clients/coding) needs git's CloneURL + VerifyRef, but
@@ -20,4 +31,92 @@ import (
 // failures are non-fatal and dropped).
 func init() {
 	integrations.SetCodingDispatcher(coding.NewDispatcher(git.CloneURL, git.VerifyRef, nil))
+
+	// Guide growth-OBSERVE seam: the /v1/guide/profile observe layer reads the org's
+	// real platform truth through injected, org-scoped, honest-degrading probes.
+	// clients/guide imports NONE of these subsystems (decomplected), so the
+	// composition root — the ONE place that imports them all — binds the reads, the
+	// same injected-function pattern the coding dispatcher above uses. Each probe is
+	// PROVABLY org-scoped: framework.ModuleInstalled keys GetDocType on the org;
+	// integrations.Connected keys store.Get on the org and never surfaces the token.
+	// HasDeployment/RevenueCents/RecordCount are LEFT NIL: deploy is cluster/admin-
+	// scoped (not per-org) and commerce-revenue-of-record + the crm record count have
+	// no clean per-org in-process read yet — binding a read whose org-scoping we
+	// cannot guarantee would be the bug. Until a provably-org-scoped read lands their
+	// signals honest-degrade to not-present (the vocabulary is the contract; a nil
+	// seam can never be a spurious true).
+	guide.BindSignals(guide.Signals{
+		ModuleInstalled:  framework.ModuleInstalled,
+		ConnectorPresent: integrations.Connected,
+	})
+
+	// Inbound-event seam: a verified provider webhook (or chat channel) in
+	// clients/integrations fires the automations engine's Deliver here — the ONE place
+	// that imports both, so integrations never has to import automations (which imports
+	// it, for credential custody). A primitive-typed adapter keeps the seam free of the
+	// automations types.
+	integrations.SetAutomationTrigger(func(ctx context.Context, org, source, name, dedupeKey string, depth int, payload map[string]any) (int, error) {
+		return automations.Deliver(ctx, org, automations.TriggerEvent{
+			Source: source, Name: name, DedupeKey: dedupeKey, Depth: depth, Payload: payload,
+		})
+	})
+
+	// GTM PAID channel: the /v1/campaign orchestrator fans out to executors that
+	// satisfy campaign.Channel; the composition root is the ONE place that imports
+	// both campaign and the ad plane, so it adapts ads' connector-consuming
+	// execution funcs (provider.go — each resolves the org's ad token through
+	// integrations.TokenFor and fails closed) onto the primitive-typed channel
+	// seam. campaign never imports ads and ads never imports campaign — the same
+	// injected-function decoupling the coding dispatcher above uses.
+	campaign.RegisterChannel(campaign.NewChannel(campaign.KindPaid,
+		func(ctx context.Context, org string, p campaign.Plan) (campaign.Ref, error) {
+			r, err := ads.LaunchPaid(ctx, org, ads.PaidPlan{
+				Platform: p.Platform, Account: p.Account, Name: p.Name,
+				Objective: p.Objective, BudgetCents: p.BudgetCents, ScheduleAt: p.ScheduleAt,
+			})
+			return campaign.Ref{Platform: r.Platform, Account: r.Account, ExternalID: r.ExternalID, Status: r.Status, Detail: r.Detail}, err
+		},
+		func(ctx context.Context, org string, ref campaign.Ref) (int64, error) {
+			return ads.PaidSpend(ctx, org, ads.PaidRef{Platform: ref.Platform, Account: ref.Account, ExternalID: ref.ExternalID})
+		},
+		func(ctx context.Context, org string, ref campaign.Ref) error {
+			return ads.PausePaid(ctx, org, ads.PaidRef{Platform: ref.Platform, Account: ref.Account, ExternalID: ref.ExternalID})
+		},
+	))
+
+	// GTM creative A/B composes the merged EXPERIMENT primitive (clients/experiments)
+	// — campaign never reinvents bucketing or measurement. Assign resolves the
+	// subject's variant (creative) from the experiment's flag; Analyze is pull-model
+	// (it reads the metric from analytics itself), returned as opaque JSON so
+	// campaign stays decoupled from the analysis type. Campaign-linked experiments
+	// live in the org's default project. Both are nil-safe upstream: an org that
+	// never created a "campaign:<id>" experiment runs a single creative (Assign
+	// errors → "" → Content[0]).
+	campaign.SetExperiment(
+		func(ctx context.Context, org, experimentID, subject string) (string, error) {
+			a, err := experiments.Assign(ctx, org, principal.DefaultProject, experimentID, subject, nil)
+			if err != nil {
+				return "", err
+			}
+			return a.Variant, nil
+		},
+		func(ctx context.Context, org, experimentID string, start, end time.Time) (json.RawMessage, error) {
+			an, err := experiments.Analyze(ctx, org, principal.DefaultProject, experimentID, start, end, 0.05)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			return json.Marshal(an)
+		},
+	)
+
+	// GTM ORGANIC + EMAIL channels wire HERE the same way once their executors land
+	// (designed follow-ons — the publish rename + marketing email-connector wiring):
+	//
+	//   campaign.RegisterChannel(campaign.NewChannel(campaign.KindOrganic,
+	//       publish.Syndicate, publish.NoSpend, publish.Unpublish))   // social connectors
+	//   campaign.RegisterChannel(campaign.NewChannel(campaign.KindEmail,
+	//       marketing.Broadcast, marketing.NoSpend, marketing.Halt))  // email connectors
+	//
+	// Until wired, those channels record "unavailable" on a fan-out (honest) and a
+	// campaign runs a single creative — never a fabricated launch or variant.
 }

apps/wire_test.go

@@ -22,98 +22,124 @@ var frozen = []struct {
 	name        string
 	ownsHealth  bool
 	hasShutdown bool
+	global      bool // receives the bare *zip.App — see AppSpec.Global
 }{
-	{"pubsub", false, true},          // was order 5
-	{"kafka", false, true},           // was order 6
-	{"agentskills", false, false},    // was order 8
-	{"flags", true, true},            // was order 9; native engine: /v1/flags health + store shutdown
-	{"kms", true, false},             // was order 10
-	{"metrics", false, false},        // was order 40
-	{"ingress", false, true},         // was order 42
-	{"account", false, false},        // was order 48
-	{"iam", false, false},            // was order 50
-	{"base", true, true},             // was order 60; per-org embed added Shutdown (#298)
-	{"o11y", false, true},            // ONE observability subsystem (was co-owned orders 69+70): read plane + the hanzoai/o11y module wildcard folded in as MountO11y's terminal sub-mount. OwnsHealth=false keeps /v1/o11y/health the generic always-ok route the module co-entry used to trigger.
-	{"authz", false, false},          // was order 70
-	{"commerce", false, false},       // was order 100
-	{"licensing", false, false},      // was order 110
-	{"plan", true, false},            // was order 111; enable id normalized plans->plan (routes stay /v1/plans/*)
-	{"pricing", true, false},         // was order 112
-	{"storage", true, false},         // was order 118
-	{"provisioning", false, false},   // was order 120
-	{"billing", false, false},        // was order 121
-	{"rollingcap", false, false},     // rolling spend-cap gate (after billing); golden drifted — refrozen
-	{"account-bridge", false, false}, // was order 122
-	{"do", false, false},             // was order 123
-	{"platform", true, false},        // was order 124
-	{"projects", false, false},       // was order 125
-	{"dns", false, false},            // new: /v1/dns zone plane (after projects)
-	{"domain", false, false},         // new: Hanzo Domains registrar (/v1/domain), after dns
-	{"prompts", false, false},        // was order 126
-	{"agents", false, true},          // was order 127
-	{"link", false, true},            // new: unified AI login manager (/v1/links), after agents
-	{"wallets", false, true},         // was order 127
-	{"x402", false, true},            // new: x402 pay-per-use settlement (after wallets)
-	{"paas", true, false},            // was order 128
-	{"deploy", true, false},          // after paas (release seam), before functions
-	{"functions", false, false},      // was order 128
-	{"tracker", false, false},        // was order 129
-	{"templates", false, false},      // was order 129
-	{"framework", false, true},       // was order 129
-	{"knowledge", false, false},      // was order 130
-	{"content", false, true},         // new: marketing content loop (after knowledge)
-	{"catalogsync", false, true},     // new: reverse loop (product.created → render) after content
-	{"ml", true, false},              // was order 130
-	{"usage", false, false},          // was order 131
-	{"crm", false, false},            // was order 131
-	{"marketing", false, true},       // new: marketing domain fold (after crm)
-	{"ads", false, true},             // new: ads domain fold (after crm)
-	{"validators", false, true},      // new: NFT-gated node provisioning (after ads); golden refrozen
-	{"social", false, true},          // new: /v1/social fold (after crm)
-	{"analytics", true, false},       // was order 132
-	{"git", false, false},            // was order 132
-	{"sync", false, true},            // /v1/sync engine (owns per-org DB handles → Shutdown)
-	{"visor", false, false},          // was order 133
-	{"captable", false, true},        // was order 133
-	{"code", false, true},            // was order 134
-	{"zero-trust", false, false},     // was order 134
-	{"dataroom", true, true},         // was order 134
-	{"graph", false, false},          // was order 135
-	{"security", true, true},         // was order 136
-	{"integrations", false, true},    // was order 137
-	{"cloudflare", false, false},     // new: /v1/cloudflare edge plane (after integrations)
-	{"sbom", true, false},            // was order 137
-	{"team", false, true},            // was order 138
-	{"settings", false, true},        // was order 138
-	{"notify", true, false},          // was order 139
-	{"channels", false, true},        // new: /v1/channels transport plane (after notify; must mount after integrations so RegisterIngress installs before webhooks emit)
-	{"gateway", false, false},        // was order 139
-	{"entitlements", false, true},    // was order 139
-	{"exec", false, false},           // was order 140
-	{"websearch", false, false},      // was order 141
-	{"world", false, true},           // was order 142
-	{"runtime", false, false},        // was order 143; was "bot" until the transport was named for what it is
-	{"authors", false, true},         // was order 143
-	{"bots", false, false},           // was order 143
-	{"audit", false, false},          // was order 144
-	{"affiliates", false, false},     // was order 144
-	{"sign", true, true},             // was order 145
-	{"product", false, false},        // was order 145
-	{"evals", false, false},          // was order 145
-	{"treasury", false, true},        // was order 146
-	{"admin", false, false},          // was order 146
-	{"admission", false, true},       // launch-control gate: composes flags (registry+seed+mode route+Enforce); Shutdown closes the registry store
-	{"tasks", false, false},          // was order 147; platform cron folded in as a sub-mount of tasks.Mount (was a separate entry)
-	{"automations", false, true},     // was order 148; connectorruntime (POST /v1/automations/connectors/:id/run) folded in as a sub-mount of automations.Mount
-	{"tools", false, true},           // new: unified tool plane (after automations)
-	{"marketplace", false, true},     // new: marketplace over the tool plane (after tools)
-	{"referrals", false, false},      // was order 149
-	{"guide", false, true},           // new: Business AI Guide (after referrals, before ai)
-	{"company", false, true},         // new: Hanzo Company formation state machine (after guide)
-	{"agent", false, false},          // new: /v1/agent tool-calling round (before zen/ai catch-all)
-	{"zen", false, false},            // zen* claim middleware before ai's catch-all (hip-00NN)
-	{"ai", false, false},             // was order 150
-	{"plugins", false, false},        // was order 900
+	{"pubsub", false, true, false},          // was order 5
+	{"kafka", false, true, false},           // was order 6
+	{"agentskills", false, false, false},    // was order 8
+	{"flags", true, true, false},            // was order 9; native engine: /v1/flags health + store shutdown
+	{"kms", true, false, false},             // was order 10
+	{"metrics", false, false, true},         // was order 40
+	{"ingress", false, true, false},         // was order 42
+	{"account", false, false, false},        // was order 48
+	{"iam", false, false, false},            // was order 50
+	{"base", true, true, false},             // was order 60; per-org embed added Shutdown (#298)
+	// hasShutdown flipped true->false when o11y became a PLUGIN (cloud.PluginSpec,
+	// its own cmd/o11y binary). Deliberate and load-bearing, not drift: the host no
+	// longer owns any o11y resource to close. The collector/sink/Datastore moved into
+	// the child, which flushes them in its OWN app.OnShutdown, and zip.Load registers
+	// the host-side hook that stops the child. A Shutdown on this spec would now be a
+	// host closing something it does not have. Name/OwnsHealth/Global are UNCHANGED —
+	// position, health routing and the app-wide grant are all still pinned here.
+	{"o11y", false, false, true},            // ONE observability subsystem (was co-owned orders 69+70), now out-of-process. OwnsHealth=false keeps /v1/o11y/health the generic always-ok route, which Serve registers before MountAll and therefore ahead of the plugin's /v1/o11y/* mount.
+	{"authz", false, false, true},           // was order 70
+	{"commerce", false, false, true},        // was order 100
+	{"licensing", false, false, true},       // was order 110
+	{"plan", true, false, false},            // was order 111; enable id normalized plans->plan (routes stay /v1/plans/*)
+	{"pricing", true, false, false},         // was order 112
+	{"storage", true, false, false},         // was order 118
+	{"provisioning", false, false, false},   // was order 120
+	{"billing", false, false, false},        // was order 121
+	{"rollingcap", false, false, false},     // rolling spend-cap gate (after billing); golden drifted — refrozen
+	{"account-bridge", false, false, false}, // was order 122
+	{"do", false, false, false},             // was order 123
+	{"platform", true, true, false},         // was order 124
+	{"projects", false, true, false},        // was order 125
+	{"dns", false, false, false},            // new: /v1/dns zone plane (after projects)
+	{"domain", false, false, false},         // new: Hanzo Domains registrar (/v1/domain), after dns
+	{"prompts", false, false, false},        // was order 126
+	{"agents", false, true, false},          // was order 127
+	{"link", false, true, false},            // new: unified AI login manager (/v1/links), after agents
+	{"wallets", false, true, false},         // was order 127
+	{"x402", false, true, false},            // new: x402 pay-per-use settlement (after wallets)
+	{"paas", true, false, false},            // was order 128
+	{"deploy", true, false, false},          // after paas (release seam), before functions
+	{"functions", false, false, false},      // was order 128
+	{"tracker", false, false, false},        // was order 129
+	{"templates", false, false, false},      // was order 129
+	{"blueprint", true, false, false},       // new: OSS-template compute-cost basis /v1/blueprint (after templates); owns health, embedded content → no Shutdown
+	{"framework", false, true, false},       // was order 129
+	{"knowledge", false, false, false},      // was order 130
+	{"help", false, false, false},           // new: Hanzo Support public plane /v1/help (after knowledge; framework lane with a companion subsystem, no store → no Shutdown)
+	{"content", false, true, false},         // new: marketing content loop (after knowledge)
+	{"catalogsync", false, true, false},     // new: reverse loop (product.created → render) after content
+	{"webhooks", false, true, false},        // new: platform-global /v1/webhooks registry + bus-driven dispatcher (after catalogsync); owns per-org stores + worker pool → Shutdown
+	{"ml", true, false, false},              // was order 130
+	{"usage", false, false, false},          // was order 131
+	{"leaderboard", false, true, false},     // new: gamified usage analytics (after usage), owns opt-in SQLite (Shutdown)
+	{"crm", false, false, false},            // was order 131
+	{"marketing", false, true, false},       // new: marketing domain fold (after crm)
+	{"ads", false, true, false},             // new: ads domain fold (after crm)
+	{"campaign", false, true, false},        // new: /v1/campaign GTM orchestration (after ads); fans out to channels
+	{"validators", false, true, false},      // new: NFT-gated node provisioning (after ads); golden refrozen
+	{"social", false, true, false},          // new: /v1/social fold (after crm)
+	{"analytics", true, false, false},       // was order 132
+	{"git", false, false, false},            // was order 132
+	{"sync", false, true, false},            // /v1/sync engine (owns per-org DB handles → Shutdown)
+	{"visor", false, false, false},          // was order 133
+	{"venue", false, false, false},          // new: /v1/cloud connect-a-cloud-account plane (after visor); folds discovered clusters into the fleet
+	{"captable", false, true, false},        // was order 133
+	{"code", false, true, false},            // was order 134
+	{"zero-trust", false, false, false},     // was order 134
+	{"share", false, false, false},          // ngrok-native public sharing (/v1/share/*)
+	{"dataroom", true, true, false},         // was order 134
+	{"graph", false, false, false},          // was order 135
+	{"security", true, true, false},         // was order 136
+	{"integrations", false, true, false},    // was order 137
+	{"destinations", false, true, false},    // new: /v1/destinations CDP fan-out (after integrations, before cloudflare)
+	{"cloudflare", false, false, false},     // new: /v1/cloudflare edge plane (after integrations)
+	{"sbom", true, false, false},            // was order 137
+	{"team", false, true, false},            // was order 138
+	{"settings", false, true, false},        // was order 138
+	{"prefs", false, true, false},           // new: per-user preference plane (after settings); Shutdown closes the store
+	{"notify", true, false, false},          // was order 139
+	{"channels", false, true, false},        // new: /v1/channels transport plane (after notify; must mount after integrations so RegisterIngress installs before webhooks emit)
+	{"gateway", false, false, false},        // was order 139
+	{"entitlements", false, true, false},    // was order 139
+	{"exec", false, false, false},           // was order 140
+	{"websearch", false, false, false},      // was order 141
+	{"index", true, true, false},            // new: in-binary full-text index (Meilisearch dialect), after websearch
+	{"world", false, true, false},           // was order 142
+	{"runtime", false, false, false},        // was order 143; was "bot" until the transport was named for what it is
+	{"authors", false, true, false},         // was order 143
+	{"bots", false, false, false},           // was order 143
+	{"audit", false, false, false},          // was order 144
+	{"affiliates", false, false, false},     // was order 144
+	{"esign", true, true, false},            // was order 145; renamed sign->esign
+	{"product", false, false, false},        // was order 145
+	{"evals", false, false, false},          // was order 145
+	{"benchmark", false, false, false},      // benchmark plane (after evals, before treasury)
+	{"research", false, true, false},        // R&D evidence plane + /research board (HIP-0512), arena sibling after benchmark; Shutdown closes per-org stores
+	{"experiments", false, true, false},     // unified A/B EXPERIMENT primitive: composes flags(assign)+analytics(measure)+research(evidence); Shutdown closes the registry stores
+	{"books", false, true, false},           // AI bookkeeper (/v1/books, per-org SQLite); Shutdown closes org stores
+	{"treasury", false, true, false},        // was order 146
+	{"admin", false, false, false},          // was order 146
+	{"admission", false, true, false},       // launch-control gate: composes flags (registry+seed+mode route+Enforce); Shutdown closes the registry store
+	{"tasks", false, false, false},          // was order 147; platform cron folded in as a sub-mount of tasks.Mount (was a separate entry)
+	{"automations", false, true, false},     // was order 148; connectorruntime (POST /v1/automations/connectors/:id/run) folded in as a sub-mount of automations.Mount
+	{"tools", false, true, false},           // new: unified tool plane (after automations)
+	{"marketplace", false, true, false},     // new: marketplace over the tool plane (after tools)
+	{"referrals", false, false, false},      // was order 149
+	{"guide", false, true, false},           // new: Business AI Guide (after referrals, before ai)
+	{"company", false, true, false},         // new: Hanzo Company formation state machine (after guide)
+	{"compliance", true, true, false},       // new: Hanzo Compliance — KYC/KYB + accreditation + audit posture (after company)
+	{"legal", true, true, false},            // new: Hanzo Legal — template + generation engine + e-sign/filing (after compliance)
+	{"agent", false, false, true},           // new: /v1/agent tool-calling round (before zen/ai catch-all)
+	{"ask", false, false, false},            // new: unified grounded advisor /v1/ask (before zen/ai catch-all)
+	{"translate", false, true, false},       // new: /v1/translate, two tiers over one endpoint (HIP-0516); Shutdown closes the per-org translation memories
+	{"zen", false, false, false},            // zen* claim middleware before ai's catch-all (hip-00NN)
+	{"ai", false, false, true},              // was order 150
+	{"plugins", false, false, false},        // was order 900
 }
 
 // TestWireOrderMatchesFrozen proves the composition root's mount order is
@@ -134,6 +160,12 @@ func TestWireOrderMatchesFrozen(t *testing.T) {
 		if (s.Shutdown != nil) != w.hasShutdown {
 			t.Errorf("position %d (%s): hasShutdown = %v, frozen = %v", i, s.Name, s.Shutdown != nil, w.hasShutdown)
 		}
+		// Global hands a subsystem the bare *zip.App, and with it the ability to
+		// gate every route in the binary. Freezing it here means a new grant cannot
+		// arrive as a quiet field on one line of a 128-entry literal.
+		if s.Global != w.global {
+			t.Errorf("position %d (%s): Global = %v, frozen = %v — an app-wide capability changed", i, s.Name, s.Global, w.global)
+		}
 		if s.Mount == nil {
 			t.Errorf("position %d (%s): Mount is nil", i, s.Name)
 		}

apps/zen.go

@@ -44,10 +44,12 @@ import (
 // exact served cost after. zen's Meter/Gate are wired here; ai's edge gate stays
 // 0 for these paths.
 //
-// Billing granularity is org / project / user, mirroring the edge gate's
+// Billing granularity is wallet / project / user, mirroring the edge gate's
 // identityFromCtx exactly:
-//   - the HOME org (principal.BillingOrg) is the balance key — who PAYS. An admin
-//     acting in another org bills the admin's home org, never the org acted on.
+//   - the WALLET (principal.WalletOf) is the balance key — who PAYS. Its Ledger is
+//     the home org, so an admin acting in another org bills the admin's own books,
+//     never the org acted on; its Account is the wallet within them, resolved by
+//     the ONE rule (account.Payer). A request with no resolvable wallet is refused.
 //   - the project (principal.ValidatedProject) scopes spend caps; a project may
 //     carry its own billing account, resolved server-side by commerce from the
 //     org's project binding (the X-Billing-Account-Id header only attributes,
@@ -56,7 +58,7 @@ import (
 //
 // It is wired BEFORE ai in Wire() so Claim's c.Next() falls through to ai's
 // catch-all. zen's catalog reads its upstream keys from KMS via the Key resolver.
-func mountZen(a *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
+func mountZen(a cloud.Router, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 	z, err := zen.New(zen.Config{
 		Logger: deps.Logger,
 		Key:    zenKeyResolver(deps.KMS),
@@ -72,30 +74,48 @@ func mountZen(a *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// cloudTenantResolver is the multi-tenant billing-identity resolver: it keys
-// the balance on the validated HOME org (who pays), resolves the project scope
-// from a validated claim, and attributes the user. It mirrors the edge gate's
-// identityFromCtx so a zen* debit lands on the SAME ledger axes the edge gate
-// would have used — home-org balance, project+service scope, user actor — and a
-// masquerading admin bills their own home org, never the org acted on. A request
-// with no validated principal resolves to an empty Tenant, which zen's Valid()
-// gate refuses (no free, anonymous usage).
+// cloudTenantResolver is the multi-tenant billing-identity resolver: it resolves
+// the money's ADDRESS once (principal.WalletOf), scopes the project from a
+// validated claim, and attributes the user. It mirrors the edge gate's
+// identityFromCtx by calling the SAME resolver, not by keeping a second copy in
+// step — so a zen* request gates and debits the very wallet the edge gate, the ai
+// gate, the ai debit and GET /v1/billing/balance address.
+//
+// THE ADDRESS IS TWO HALVES AND BOTH TRAVEL. It used to send only the ledger
+// (BillingOrg) and let the gate read the org POOL, on the premise that prepaid
+// balance is per-org. That premise is false for a member of the shared signup org,
+// where members are strangers to each other and each holds their own account:
+// zen then gated a pool a member cannot spend from while the ai path debited the
+// member's own wallet — the third recurrence of one bug, catalogued in
+// clients/principal/wallet.go. A brand-new $0 signup read the signup org's funded
+// pool and served for free; a member who had bought credit was refused because the
+// purchase had landed in that same pool.
+//
+// A request with no resolvable wallet returns the ZERO Tenant, which zen's Valid()
+// gate refuses with its 402 (no free, anonymous usage) — the ok-bit is the answer
+// and it propagates; there is no substitute payer.
 func cloudTenantResolver(c *zip.Ctx) zen.Tenant {
-	home, _ := principal.BillingOrg(c)
+	w, ok := principal.WalletOf(c)
+	if !ok {
+		return zen.Tenant{}
+	}
 	project, _ := principal.ValidatedProject(c)
 	return zen.Tenant{
 		Org:        c.Org(),
 		User:       c.User(),
-		BillingOrg: home,
+		BillingOrg: w.Ledger,
+		Wallet:     w.Account,
 		Project:    project,
 	}
 }
 
 // commerceGate is zen's pre-serve authorization backed by cloud commerce. It
-// asks the metering client whether the home org can cover the request's
-// estimated cost (priced at the tier that WILL serve, so an overflow is gated
-// against its real cost). The balance key is the home org (User); the project
-// scopes the spend cap. The estimate is exact 18-dp atto-USD from zen, folded to
+// asks the metering client whether the request's WALLET can cover its estimated
+// cost (priced at the tier that WILL serve, so an overflow is gated against its
+// real cost). The balance key is the wallet (Tenant.Payer — the account within
+// the ledger BillingOrg names), the same address the debit below spends from and
+// the same one the ai path and the balance view read; the project scopes the
+// spend cap. The estimate is exact 18-dp atto-USD from zen, folded to
 // whole cents for the balance check (a sub-cent estimate gates as "any positive
 // balance", the same contract as the edge gate's AmountCents). An unconfigured
 // metering client (nil) admits everything — zen's own tenant gate still refuses
@@ -106,7 +126,7 @@ func commerceGate(m *metering.Client) zen.Gate {
 		return nil
 	}
 	return func(ctx context.Context, t zen.Tenant, model string, est hmoney.Amount) error {
-		if t.BillingOrg == "" {
+		if t.BillingOrg == "" || t.Payer() == "" {
 			return fmt.Errorf("a billable tenant is required (no anonymous usage)")
 		}
 		// zen's estimate is an exact 18-dp USD value. Fold it to whole cents for
@@ -121,8 +141,9 @@ func commerceGate(m *metering.Client) zen.Gate {
 		// request of ANY size against any positive balance.
 		cents := credit(est).Cents()
 		v, err := m.AuthorizeVerdict(ctx, metering.AuthInput{
-			User:        t.BillingOrg,
+			User:        t.Payer(), // the ACCOUNT within the ledger — never the bare org
 			Org:         t.BillingOrg,
+			Actor:       t.User,
 			AmountCents: cents,
 			Project:     t.Project,
 			Service:     zenService,
@@ -142,7 +163,7 @@ func commerceGate(m *metering.Client) zen.Gate {
 }
 
 // commerceMeter is zen's post-serve usage recorder backed by cloud commerce.
-// It debits the home org for the EXACT served cost as a typed money.Amount
+// It debits the gated WALLET for the EXACT served cost as a typed money.Amount
 // (native 18-dp USD — the same precision the co-resident finance ledger holds),
 // so an exact per-token cost is never floored to cents or micros. Attributed to
 // the requested zen SKU with real token counts. The debit is detached (background
@@ -160,7 +181,7 @@ func commerceMeter(m *metering.Client) zen.Meter {
 type commerceMeterImpl struct{ m *metering.Client }
 
 func (g commerceMeterImpl) Record(ctx context.Context, u zen.Usage) {
-	if u.Tenant.BillingOrg == "" {
+	if u.Tenant.BillingOrg == "" || u.Tenant.Payer() == "" {
 		return // never debit an unattributable request
 	}
 	// Beside the commerce debit, land the SAME warehouse row + gen_ai span every
@@ -211,8 +232,14 @@ func (g commerceMeterImpl) Record(ctx context.Context, u zen.Usage) {
 }
 
 // meterUsage projects a served zen.Usage onto the commerce debit. It is the ONE
-// place the debit's amount is chosen, and it is pure — no ledger, no warehouse —
-// so the money property is a unit test rather than an integration.
+// place the debit's amount AND its address are chosen, and it is pure — no ledger,
+// no warehouse — so the money property is a unit test rather than an integration.
+//
+// The address is Tenant.Payer, the very expression commerceGate authorized against:
+// the gate and the debit read one value, so they cannot come to mean two wallets.
+// Actor stays Tenant.User — for a machine key the payer is the org while the actor
+// is the key, so an address read off the actor bills the wrong account and an actor
+// read off the address loses the audit trail. They are different axes; both travel.
 //
 // The amount is the RETAIL Charge: what the caller pays. Cost is the upstream
 // COGS we pay to serve the call; it is never the debit. It rides only the
@@ -223,7 +250,7 @@ func (g commerceMeterImpl) Record(ctx context.Context, u zen.Usage) {
 // customer price (usageBilledCents), never its CostIn/CostOut COGS.
 func meterUsage(u zen.Usage) metering.Usage {
 	return metering.Usage{
-		User:             u.Tenant.BillingOrg,
+		User:             u.Tenant.Payer(), // the ACCOUNT the gate authorized
 		Org:              u.Tenant.BillingOrg,
 		Actor:            u.Tenant.User,
 		Model:            u.Model,

apps/zen_key_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Hanzo AI Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+
+package apps
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"errors"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// stubKMS is a KMSClient whose GetSecret returns a sealed value when present or a
+// not-found error otherwise — mirroring the co-resident store that, in production,
+// holds no upstream provider keys (they are provisioned as KMS-injected env).
+type stubKMS struct{ sealed map[string]string }
+
+func (s stubKMS) GetSecret(_ context.Context, ref string) ([]byte, error) {
+	if v, ok := s.sealed[ref]; ok {
+		return []byte(v), nil
+	}
+	return nil, errors.New("secret not found")
+}
+func (stubKMS) PutSecret(context.Context, string, []byte) error      { return nil }
+func (stubKMS) Sign(context.Context, string, []byte) ([]byte, error) { return nil, nil }
+
+// TestZenKeyResolver_EnvFallback pins the production wiring: the upstream provider
+// key is provisioned as env (from the cloud-api-llm-keys secret), NOT sealed in the
+// co-resident KMS store, so a KMS miss must resolve to the env value rather than
+// returning "" (which would send an empty bearer upstream → provider 401).
+func TestZenKeyResolver_EnvFallback(t *testing.T) {
+	const env = "DO_AI_API_KEY"
+	t.Setenv(env, "env-provisioned-key")
+
+	// KMS store has no upstream keys (the real deployment state) — resolve from env.
+	if got := zenKeyResolver(stubKMS{})(context.Background(), env); got != "env-provisioned-key" {
+		t.Fatalf("KMS-miss: got %q, want env value", got)
+	}
+
+	// A nil KMS client (KMS disabled) — still resolve from env.
+	if got := zenKeyResolver(nil)(context.Background(), env); got != "env-provisioned-key" {
+		t.Fatalf("nil-KMS: got %q, want env value", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestZenKeyResolver_EnvTakesPrecedence pins the resolution ORDER: env is read
+// FIRST, then KMS — the same order ai uses on the prod hot path. The operator
+// injects provider keys as env from the KMS-synced secret, so the env is the live
+// value; the co-resident store is the fallback. A key present in BOTH surfaces
+// resolves to the env value.
+func TestZenKeyResolver_EnvTakesPrecedence(t *testing.T) {
+	const env = "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY"
+	t.Setenv(env, "env-key")
+	got := zenKeyResolver(stubKMS{sealed: map[string]string{env: "sealed-key"}})(context.Background(), env)
+	if got != "env-key" {
+		t.Fatalf("got %q, want env-key (env precedence)", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestZenKeyResolver_AbsentEverywhere keeps the fail-fast contract: absent from both
+// surfaces resolves to "" so zen refuses rather than serving for free.
+func TestZenKeyResolver_AbsentEverywhere(t *testing.T) {
+	if got := zenKeyResolver(stubKMS{})(context.Background(), "MISSING_KEY_XYZ"); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("got %q, want empty", got)
+	}
+}

apps/zen_wallet_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Hanzo AI Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+
+package apps
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/account"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/principal"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/zen"
+	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
+)
+
+// The money's address is (ledger, account), and the zen path is the one that used
+// to carry only the ledger. These tests pin the whole address across the two places
+// zen touches money — the pre-serve gate and the post-serve debit — against the
+// resolver every OTHER path already uses (principal.WalletOf, i.e. account.Payer).
+//
+// The failure they exist to prevent is not "zen bills the wrong number"; it is zen
+// billing the wrong WALLET, which reads as two unrelated symptoms at once: a $0
+// signup served for free off the signup org's funded pool, and a member who had
+// bought credit refused because the purchase landed in that same pool.
+
+// tenant drives cloudTenantResolver over the SAME zip.Ctx the identity boundary
+// feeds in production, so a test sets the headers SanitizeIdentity mints.
+func tenant(t *testing.T, headers map[string]string) zen.Tenant {
+	t.Helper()
+	app := zip.New(zip.Config{DisableStartupMessage: true})
+	app.Get("/t", func(c *zip.Ctx) error {
+		return c.JSON(200, cloudTenantResolver(c))
+	})
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/t", nil)
+	for h, v := range headers {
+		req.Header.Set(h, v)
+	}
+	resp, err := app.Fiber().Test(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("tenant probe: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+	b, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	var out zen.Tenant
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &out); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("tenant decode: %v (%s)", err, b)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+// walletOf is the address every non-zen money path resolves: the edge BillingGate,
+// the ai prepaid gate, the ai usage debit and GET /v1/billing/balance.
+func walletOf(t *testing.T, headers map[string]string) principal.Wallet {
+	t.Helper()
+	app := zip.New(zip.Config{DisableStartupMessage: true})
+	app.Get("/w", func(c *zip.Ctx) error {
+		w, ok := principal.WalletOf(c)
+		return c.JSON(200, map[string]any{"ledger": w.Ledger, "account": w.Account, "ok": ok})
+	})
+	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/w", nil)
+	for h, v := range headers {
+		req.Header.Set(h, v)
+	}
+	resp, err := app.Fiber().Test(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("wallet probe: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+	b, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
+	var out struct {
+		Ledger  string `json:"ledger"`
+		Account string `json:"account"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(b, &out); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("wallet decode: %v (%s)", err, b)
+	}
+	return principal.Wallet{Ledger: out.Ledger, Account: out.Account}
+}
+
+// signupMember is the live shape of a self-serve account: home org == the shared
+// signup org, X-User-Id == the JWT `sub` (a UUID), X-User-Name == the IAM username.
+// 100% of self-serve accounts look like this, and it is the ONLY shape where the
+// pool and the person differ — which is why the bug was invisible to tenant orgs.
+var signupMember = map[string]string{
+	"X-User-Id":     "3f2a9c14-7b6e-4d05-9a11-8c73e2f0b4d6",
+	"X-User-Name":   "z@hanzo.ai",
+	"X-Org-Id":      account.SignupOrg,
+	"X-User-Owner":  account.SignupOrg,
+	"Authorization": "Bearer test",
+}
+
+// orgMember is a member of a REAL tenant org, whose members share one balance.
+var orgMember = map[string]string{
+	"X-User-Id":     "0d1e2f30-4a5b-6c7d-8e9f-a0b1c2d3e4f5",
+	"X-User-Name":   "bob",
+	"X-Org-Id":      "acme",
+	"X-User-Owner":  "acme",
+	"Authorization": "Bearer test",
+}
+
+// TestZenAddressIsTheOneAddress is the deliverable: for the same request, zen's
+// gate, zen's debit and every other money path name ONE (ledger, account) pair.
+//
+// It fails on the old code for signupMember only — zen answered ("hanzo","hanzo")
+// while everything else answered ("hanzo","hanzo/z@hanzo.ai") — and that is exactly
+// the blast radius: every self-serve signup, no tenant org.
+func TestZenAddressIsTheOneAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	for name, h := range map[string]map[string]string{
+		"signup org member (pool != person)": signupMember,
+		"tenant org member (pool == person)": orgMember,
+	} {
+		want := walletOf(t, h)
+		got := tenant(t, h)
+		if got.BillingOrg != want.Ledger {
+			t.Errorf("%s: zen ledger = %q, want %q", name, got.BillingOrg, want.Ledger)
+		}
+		// The gate reads Payer; so does the debit, through meterUsage.
+		if got.Payer() != want.Account {
+			t.Errorf("%s: zen gate address = %q, want %q — a funded member 402s, or an empty one serves free", name, got.Payer(), want.Account)
+		}
+		if debit := meterUsage(zen.Usage{Tenant: got}); debit.User != want.Account || debit.Org != want.Ledger {
+			t.Errorf("%s: zen debit address = (%q,%q), want (%q,%q) — the gate and the debit have separated", name, debit.Org, debit.User, want.Ledger, want.Account)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestZenDebitAddressesWhatTheGateAuthorized: the gate and the debit read the SAME
+// expression, so no header shape can make them disagree. This is the inversion the
+// codebase has shipped twice (clients/principal/wallet.go): gate on the person,
+// spend from the pool.
+func TestZenDebitAddressesWhatTheGateAuthorized(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tn := range []zen.Tenant{
+		{Org: "hanzo", BillingOrg: "hanzo", Wallet: "hanzo/alice", User: "hanzo/alice"},
+		{Org: "acme", BillingOrg: "acme", User: "acme/robot"},
+		{Org: "victim", BillingOrg: "hanzo", Wallet: "hanzo/root", User: "hanzo/root"},
+	} {
+		u := meterUsage(zen.Usage{Tenant: tn})
+		if u.User != tn.Payer() {
+			t.Errorf("tenant %+v: debit account = %q, gate account = %q", tn, u.User, tn.Payer())
+		}
+		if u.Org != tn.BillingOrg {
+			t.Errorf("tenant %+v: debit ledger = %q, want %q", tn, u.Org, tn.BillingOrg)
+		}
+		// The actor is a different axis and must survive: for a machine key the
+		// payer is the org while the actor is the key.
+		if u.Actor != tn.User {
+			t.Errorf("tenant %+v: actor = %q, want %q — attribution lost to the address", tn, u.Actor, tn.User)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestZenRefusesWithoutAWallet: an unresolvable principal yields the ZERO tenant,
+// which zen's Valid() refuses. An anonymous caller with a forged X-Org-Id must never
+// name a ledger — it could otherwise probe, and then drain, a victim org's balance.
+func TestZenRefusesWithoutAWallet(t *testing.T) {
+	tn := tenant(t, map[string]string{"X-Org-Id": "victim"})
+	if tn.Valid() {
+		t.Fatalf("forged X-Org-Id with no principal resolved a billable tenant: %+v", tn)
+	}
+	if tn.Payer() != "" || tn.BillingOrg != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("unattributable request resolved an address: %+v", tn)
+	}
+}

audience_admin_guard_test.go

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2026 The Hanzo Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-//
-//      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-
-package cloud
-
-import (
-	"os"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestJWTAudiences_AcceptsAdminGuard is the operator-cockpit keystone. The
-// admin.hanzo.ai forward-auth guard is the confidential client `hanzo-admin-guard`,
-// so IAM mints its access tokens with aud=hanzo-admin-guard (each app's aud is its
-// client_id). The guard forwards that bearer to cloud-api /v1/admin/*; the identity
-// sanitizer only grants SuperAdmin (owner==adminOrg) to a VALIDATED principal, and
-// validation enforces this audience allowlist. If hanzo-admin-guard is not accepted
-// the token resolves anonymous and the SuperAdmin gate reads false -> 403, even
-// though the token's owner IS admin. Pin the client_id into the baked default so the
-// forwarded bearer validates.
-func TestJWTAudiences_AcceptsAdminGuard(t *testing.T) {
-	os.Unsetenv("CLOUD_JWT_AUDIENCES")
-	os.Unsetenv("GATEWAY_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES")
-
-	has := func(list []string, v string) bool {
-		for _, s := range list {
-			if s == v {
-				return true
-			}
-		}
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if !has(defaultJWTAudiences, "hanzo-admin-guard") {
-		t.Fatalf("defaultJWTAudiences must include hanzo-admin-guard (the admin-cockpit guard client_id); got %v", defaultJWTAudiences)
-	}
-	if !has(jwtAudiencesFromEnv(), "hanzo-admin-guard") {
-		t.Fatalf("resolved JWT audiences must include hanzo-admin-guard; got %v", jwtAudiencesFromEnv())
-	}
-}

audience_hanzo_team_test.go

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2026 The Hanzo Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-//
-//      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-
-package cloud
-
-import (
-	"os"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestJWTAudiences_AcceptsHanzoTeam pins the hanzo.team OIDC client. IAM mints
-// team's access tokens with aud=hanzo-team (each app's aud is its client_id);
-// the team OAuth callback sets that token as the hanzo_iam_token cookie, and
-// the usage/wallet page (/v1/team/billing/ui/) reads /v1/billing/balance +
-// /v1/usage/summary same-origin on it. If hanzo-team is not accepted the
-// cookie resolves anonymous and every wallet read 401s — and the callback's
-// own validator (NewTokenValidator shares this allowlist) refuses the login.
-func TestJWTAudiences_AcceptsHanzoTeam(t *testing.T) {
-	os.Unsetenv("CLOUD_JWT_AUDIENCES")
-	os.Unsetenv("GATEWAY_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES")
-
-	has := func(list []string, v string) bool {
-		for _, s := range list {
-			if s == v {
-				return true
-			}
-		}
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if !has(defaultJWTAudiences, "hanzo-team") {
-		t.Fatalf("defaultJWTAudiences must include hanzo-team (the hanzo.team client_id); got %v", defaultJWTAudiences)
-	}
-	if !has(jwtAudiencesFromEnv(), "hanzo-team") {
-		t.Fatalf("resolved JWT audiences must include hanzo-team; got %v", jwtAudiencesFromEnv())
-	}
-}

audience_hanzo_world_test.go

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright 2026 The Hanzo Authors. All Rights Reserved.
-//
-// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-// You may obtain a copy of the License at
-//
-//      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-//
-// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-// limitations under the License.
-
-package cloud
-
-import (
-	"os"
-	"testing"
-)
-
-// TestJWTAudiences_AcceptsHanzoWorld pins the world.hanzo.ai OIDC client. IAM
-// mints world's access tokens with aud=hanzo-world (each app's aud is its
-// client_id). Those bearers hit cloud-api; the identity sanitizer only trusts a
-// principal whose aud is in this allowlist. If hanzo-world is not accepted the
-// token resolves anonymous and the analyst's api.hanzo.ai calls 401. Pin the
-// client_id into the baked default so the forwarded bearer validates.
-func TestJWTAudiences_AcceptsHanzoWorld(t *testing.T) {
-	os.Unsetenv("CLOUD_JWT_AUDIENCES")
-	os.Unsetenv("GATEWAY_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES")
-
-	has := func(list []string, v string) bool {
-		for _, s := range list {
-			if s == v {
-				return true
-			}
-		}
-		return false
-	}
-
-	if !has(defaultJWTAudiences, "hanzo-world") {
-		t.Fatalf("defaultJWTAudiences must include hanzo-world (the world.hanzo.ai client_id); got %v", defaultJWTAudiences)
-	}
-	if !has(jwtAudiencesFromEnv(), "hanzo-world") {
-		t.Fatalf("resolved JWT audiences must include hanzo-world; got %v", jwtAudiencesFromEnv())
-	}
-}

audit/audit_test.go

@@ -8,13 +8,14 @@ package audit
 
 import (
 	"context"
-	"database/sql"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"path/filepath"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 	"time"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/cek"
 )
 
 // openTemp opens a Recorder backed by a fresh on-disk SQLite file (not :memory:,
@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ func TestVerify_PassesOnUntamperedChain(t *testing.T) {
 // reports the exact seq where the chain breaks. THIS is the tamper-evidence
 // property — an audit trail that can be silently forged is worse than none.
 func TestVerify_DetectsFieldTamper(t *testing.T) {
+	requireSharedStore(t) // tampers through a second handle while the Recorder holds the store open
 	rec, path := openTemp(t)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
@@ -154,6 +156,7 @@ func TestVerify_DetectsFieldTamper(t *testing.T) {
 // the chain: the record after the hole has a PrevHash that no longer matches the
 // now-preceding record, and the seq sequence gaps. Either way Verify flags it.
 func TestVerify_DetectsDeletion(t *testing.T) {
+	requireSharedStore(t) // tampers through a second handle while the Recorder holds the store open
 	rec, path := openTemp(t)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	for i := 0; i < 10; i++ {
@@ -182,6 +185,7 @@ func TestVerify_DetectsDeletion(t *testing.T) {
 // TestVerify_DetectsReorder proves swapping two records' positions (an attacker
 // trying to reorder events) breaks the prev-hash linkage.
 func TestVerify_DetectsReorder(t *testing.T) {
+	requireSharedStore(t) // tampers through a second handle while the Recorder holds the store open
 	rec, path := openTemp(t)
 	ctx := context.Background()
 	for i := 0; i < 6; i++ {
@@ -612,7 +616,11 @@ func TestCheckpoint_CountMonotonicDetectsTruncation(t *testing.T) {
 // unaffected; Verify then re-reads and must catch the damage.
 func tamperOutOfBand(t *testing.T, path, stmt string) {
 	t.Helper()
-	db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", path)
+	// Opened through cek, like the Recorder itself: the store is encrypted at rest,
+	// so a bare sql.Open cannot read it. The modelled adversary is one with database
+	// access AND the key (an insider, or a compromised process) — file access alone
+	// no longer suffices, which is the point of encrypting it.
+	db, err := cek.Open(path)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("tamper open: %v", err)
 	}

audit/shareability_probe_test.go

@@ -22,10 +22,13 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 	"time"
 
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/cek"
 	_ "github.com/hanzoai/sqlite"
 )
 
 func TestShareability_ReaderSharesLiveWriterStore(t *testing.T) {
+	requireSharedStore(t)
+
 	dir := t.TempDir()
 	path := dir + "/audit.db"
 
@@ -52,9 +55,14 @@ func TestShareability_ReaderSharesLiveWriterStore(t *testing.T) {
 
 	// Reader: a SECOND, independent connection opened READ-ONLY against the SAME
 	// files while the writer appends. This is what a reader-role pod does.
-	ro, err := sql.Open("sqlite", "file:"+path+"?mode=ro")
+	// Opened through cek: the store is encrypted at rest, so a bare sql.Open has no
+	// key and cannot read it. cek has no read-only mode, so this is a second RW
+	// handle that only ever reads — it still proves the reader sees the live
+	// writer's committed records, which is the claim, but it does not by itself
+	// prove the reader takes no write lock.
+	ro, err := cek.Open(path)
 	if err != nil {
-		t.Fatalf("reader Open(ro): %v", err)
+		t.Fatalf("reader Open: %v", err)
 	}
 	defer ro.Close()
 

audit/shared_store_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+package audit
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	sqlitedrv "github.com/hanzoai/sqlite"
+)
+
+// requireSharedStore skips a test that needs a SECOND opener to observe the same
+// store as the first.
+//
+// Without the live libsqlcipher codec, cek falls back to the pure-Go envelope:
+// it decrypts the file into a handle-private RAM copy and seals it back on close.
+// Two opens of one path therefore never see each other's writes and the last close
+// wins — envelope.go states this outright ("SINGLE WRITER per file"). A test that
+// tampers or reads through a second handle is asserting a property the envelope
+// provably does not have, so it would fail for the wrong reason.
+//
+// The property IS real on the shipped build, which links the codec and keeps the
+// database in place with per-commit durability and ordinary SQLite sharing. Note
+// that `make test` runs CGO_ENABLED=0, so nothing in CI exercises that path today.
+func requireSharedStore(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Helper()
+	if !sqlitedrv.CodecLinked() {
+		t.Skip("pure-Go envelope: a store is single-writer (handle-private RAM copy, sealed on close), so a second opener cannot observe it; this property belongs to the codec-linked build")
+	}
+}

auth_apikey.go

@@ -175,12 +175,22 @@ func (k *iamKeys) lookup(ctx context.Context, key string) *idClaims {
 	if strings.TrimSpace(env.Data.Owner) == "" {
 		return nil
 	}
+	owner := strings.TrimSpace(env.Data.Owner)
 	return &idClaims{
-		Owner:             strings.TrimSpace(env.Data.Owner),
+		Owner:             owner,
 		Name:              strings.TrimSpace(env.Data.Name),
 		PreferredUsername: strings.TrimSpace(env.Data.Name),
 		Email:             strings.TrimSpace(env.Data.Email),
 		IsAdmin:           env.Data.IsAdmin,
+		// The org came from the SUBJECT: IAM resolved this accessKey to a user row,
+		// and that row's owner is the tenant. No application mints it and no claim
+		// carries it, so it is NOT the app-selected value homeOrg exists to reject —
+		// it is the same "the organization comes from the token subject" rule IAM
+		// states for itself in internal/authz/authz.go. Recorded here so the identity
+		// boundary can tell a KEY principal (which legitimately has no `orgs`, because
+		// a machine is a member of nothing) from a HUMAN token that has merely lost
+		// its claim — the latter must still fail closed.
+		subjectOrg: owner,
 	}
 }
 

auth_identity.go

@@ -41,14 +41,35 @@ import (
 type idClaims struct {
 	jwt.Claims
 
-	Owner             string       `json:"owner"`              // org slug (the org)
-	Project           string       `json:"project"`            // org SUB-SCOPE within owner (empty ⟹ default project)
-	BillingAccount    string       `json:"billing_account"`    // WHO PAYS, stated by IAM (empty ⟹ pre-claim token)
-	Name              string       `json:"name"`               // display name (id fallback)
-	PreferredUsername string       `json:"preferred_username"` // id fallback
-	Email             string       `json:"email"`
-	IsAdmin           bool         `json:"isAdmin"`
-	Orgs              []model.OrgRef `json:"orgs"` // membership SET (home first); empty on legacy tokens
+	Owner             string `json:"owner"`              // org slug (the org)
+	Project           string `json:"project"`            // org SUB-SCOPE within owner (empty ⟹ default project)
+	BillingAccount    string `json:"billing_account"`    // WHO PAYS, stated by IAM (empty ⟹ pre-claim token)
+	Name              string `json:"name"`               // display name (id fallback)
+	PreferredUsername string `json:"preferred_username"` // id fallback
+	Email             string `json:"email"`
+	IsAdmin           bool   `json:"isAdmin"`
+	// Type is IAM's account kind: "application" for a client_credentials MACHINE
+	// identity (object/token_oauth.go stamps Type:"application"), else a human kind
+	// ("normal-user", …). It is the discriminator that keeps a machine token — of ANY
+	// app, not only the KMS-sync one — from ever being granted SuperAdmin. Empty on a
+	// token that predates the claim ⟹ treated as non-machine (fail toward the KMS-aud
+	// check below, never toward granting admin).
+	Type string         `json:"type"`
+	Orgs []model.OrgRef `json:"orgs"` // membership SET (home first); empty on legacy tokens
+
+	// subjectOrg is the org resolved from the token SUBJECT rather than from any
+	// claim — set ONLY by the API-key resolver (iamKeys.lookup), from the IAM user
+	// row the accessKey belongs to. It is the machine-credential answer to "whose
+	// org is this?", and it exists because an hk-/sk- key is not a member of
+	// anything: IAM mints no `orgs` claim for one, so the membership set homeOrg
+	// reads for a human is legitimately empty here.
+	//
+	// UNEXPORTED AND UNTAGGED ON PURPOSE. encoding/json cannot populate it, so no
+	// token can carry it and no caller can forge it — it is only ever set by the
+	// code path that already authenticated the key against IAM. That is the same
+	// rule the identity headers follow: never decoded from the request, only minted
+	// from something verified.
+	subjectOrg string
 }
 
 // mintedProject returns the project id to stamp into X-Project-Id, or "" when the
@@ -100,11 +121,28 @@ func (c *idClaims) userID() string {
 // the distinct-from-userID() value stamped as X-User-Name so the direct-Bearer
 // path builds owner/name correctly — the gateway historically minted
 // X-User-Id==name, which userID() (sub-first) breaks on the in-binary path.
+// PREFERRED_USERNAME FIRST, and `name` only as a legacy fallback. The order used
+// to be reversed on the belief that IAM's `name` claim carried IAM's canonical
+// username. It does not: OIDC gives `name` DISPLAY semantics and IAM fills it from
+// User.DisplayName, so a real token read `name = "Zach Kelling"` — a human label
+// with a space in it, not the `<name>` half of `<owner>/<name>`.
+//
+// The cost landed on the money path, which addresses a wallet as `<org>/<username>`
+// (clients/principal/wallet.go). Preferring `name` addressed `hanzo/Zach Kelling`,
+// a wallet no funding path can name, while the balance sat in `hanzo/z`. Every
+// signed-in completion 402'd against a funded account. That file already documents
+// three prior recurrences of one bug — "two layers derived the same address two
+// ways"; this is the same bug arriving through the claim rather than the header.
+//
+// Fallback is retained, not removed: a token minted before IAM emitted
+// preferred_username has only `name`, and for those the old reading is still the
+// best available answer. New tokens carry the username explicitly, so the fallback
+// stops being reached as they roll over rather than needing a flag day.
 func (c *idClaims) username() string {
-	if c.Name != "" {
-		return c.Name
+	if c.PreferredUsername != "" {
+		return c.PreferredUsername
 	}
-	return c.PreferredUsername
+	return c.Name
 }
 
 // jwtSigAlgs is the accepted signature-algorithm allowlist passed to
@@ -125,43 +163,46 @@ var jwtSigAlgs = []gojose.SignatureAlgorithm{
 // (cert-hanzo/cert-lux/cert-zoo/...), keyed by the token kid, so a single
 // jwksURL verifies all brands. Only the issuer-string comparison had to widen.
 type identityValidator struct {
-	issuers   []string
-	audiences []string
-	cache     *jwksCache
-	keys      keyResolver // resolves an opaque API key to a principal; nil ⟹ keys stay anonymous
+	issuers []string
+	cache   *jwksCache
+	keys    keyResolver // resolves an opaque API key to a principal; nil ⟹ keys stay anonymous
+	// claims memoizes token ⇒ verified claims so an already-authenticated caller
+	// (notably a ZAP socket, which replays its credential on every frame) is not
+	// signature-verified again per call. See identity_cache.go.
+	claims *identityCache
 }
 
 // newIdentityValidator builds a validator whose trusted-issuer set is the primary
 // issuer UNIONED with every white-label brand issuer (BrandIssuers) plus any
 // WHITELABEL_ISSUERS override. ttl<=0 uses the 15m JWKS default. The union is
 // fail-secure: it only ADDS the known-good brand issuers, never an arbitrary one.
-func newIdentityValidator(issuer, jwksURL string, audiences []string, ttl time.Duration) *identityValidator {
+//
+// Trust is IAM-native: signature (JWKS) + issuer (this set) + expiry. There is NO
+// per-app audience allowlist — the `aud` (a minting app's client_id) is IAM's to
+// assign, not cloud's to mirror, so a new first-party app needs zero cloud change.
+func newIdentityValidator(issuer, jwksURL string, ttl time.Duration) *identityValidator {
 	return &identityValidator{
-		issuers:   trustedIssuers(issuer),
-		audiences: audiences,
-		cache:     newJWKSCache(jwksURL, ttl),
-		keys:      sharedKeys(), // ONE resolver+cache, shared with OrgForKey (analytics capture)
+		issuers: trustedIssuers(issuer),
+		cache:   newJWKSCache(jwksURL, ttl),
+		claims:  newIdentityCache(),
+		keys:    sharedKeys(), // ONE resolver+cache, shared with OrgForKey (analytics capture)
 	}
 }
 
 // kmsMachineAudSuffix is the fixed suffix of a per-org PaaS-KMS sync machine
-// identity's audience. Each org's KMS sync authenticates as a dedicated,
-// NON-shared IAM application named "<org>-platform-kms" (Organization=<org>,
-// client_credentials grant), so IAM stamps the token's aud == the app's own
-// clientId == "<org>-platform-kms" (a non-shared app's audience is its clientId,
-// object/token_jwt.go tokenAudience) and owner == <org>
-// (object/token_oauth.go GetClientCredentialsToken sets owner = app.Organization).
+// identity's audience. Each org's KMS sync authenticates as a dedicated, NON-shared
+// IAM application named "<org>-platform-kms" (Organization=<org>, client_credentials
+// grant), so IAM stamps the token's aud == the app's own clientId == "<org>-platform-kms"
+// (object/token_jwt.go tokenAudience) and owner == <org> (object/token_oauth.go
+// GetClientCredentialsToken sets owner = app.Organization).
 //
-// That audience is, by construction, absent from CLOUD_JWT_AUDIENCES — it is
-// per-org, not a fixed app — which is EXACTLY why the sync stayed pending: the
-// machine token failed the audience check below, SanitizeIdentity treated it as
-// anonymous, and the /v1/kms org-scope guard 403'd it before the store. The fix is
-// to accept this one audience, but ONLY when it equals the token's OWN owner claim
-// plus this suffix, so it certifies "the KMS sync identity for its own org" and
-// grants nothing wider. Org-scoping is still enforced downstream by owner at the guard
-// (owner == :org); this only lets a legitimately-minted, owner-scoped machine token
-// clear validation. A per-org application means a per-org clientSecret — never
-// a shared platform-wide reader, which would be a cross-org hole.
+// Validation no longer consults the audience at all (trust is signature + issuer +
+// expiry), so a machine token clears validate() like any other. This suffix survives
+// for the OPPOSITE reason: to RECOGNISE a machine principal (isKMSMachinePrincipal) so
+// SanitizeIdentity can DENY it SuperAdmin even when it carries owner==adminOrg — a
+// client_credentials machine identity must never wield platform-admin. The match is
+// bound to the token's OWN owner claim (<owner>-platform-kms), so it certifies "the
+// KMS sync identity for its own org" and grants nothing wider.
 const kmsMachineAudSuffix = "-platform-kms"
 
 // kmsMachineAudience returns the audience an org org's PaaS-KMS sync identity
@@ -174,6 +215,74 @@ func kmsMachineAudience(owner string) string {
 	return owner + kmsMachineAudSuffix
 }
 
+// homeOrg returns the USER's own organization — the tenant whose ledger pays and
+// whose membership decides platform authority. It reads the FIRST entry of the
+// signed `orgs` claim, which IAM builds home-first by construction from the
+// authoritative user row (store.MemberOrgRefs: `refs := []OrgRef{{Org: user.Owner,
+// …}}`, then explicit membership rows, deduped home-wins).
+//
+// IT IS DELIBERATELY NOT claims.Owner. The `owner` claim has never carried the
+// user's org: IAM stamps the APPLICATION's org into it (oidc/jwt.go Sign:
+// `Owner: app.Organization`). Same user, same password, two apps ⇒ two different
+// `owner` values. That read as correct for years only because, pre-onboarding, the
+// app org and the user org were both "hanzo"; onboarding broke the coincidence, not
+// the claim. IAM knew — internal/authz/authz.go refuses to trust these claims
+// internally and says the organization "comes from the token SUBJECT … never from
+// the token's `owner`/`organization` claims" — and the Sign/SignUserToken pair
+// documents the divergence while naming cloud's SanitizeIdentity as the consumer.
+//
+// Consuming `owner` made the tenant CALLER-SELECTABLE: a user picked which org's
+// ledger to spend by choosing which app to authenticate through (a hanzo user via
+// lux-cloud billed lux), and — because the same value gated SuperAdmin — a token
+// from any app owned by the reserved admin org conferred platform admin. One
+// poisoned value, two defects; one accessor, both closed.
+//
+// TWO PRINCIPAL KINDS, TWO SOURCES — they are different questions, so they are two
+// branches rather than one fallback chain:
+//
+//   - A MACHINE credential (hk-/sk- API key) is a member of nothing, so IAM mints it
+//     no `orgs` claim at all. Its org comes from the token SUBJECT: iamKeys.lookup
+//     resolves the accessKey to its IAM user row and records that row's owner in
+//     subjectOrg. Reading it here is not a fallback to `owner` — it never passed
+//     through an application, so it carries none of the app-selection hazard.
+//
+//   - A HUMAN token carries the membership set, and its first entry is the home org.
+//
+// EMPTY STILL MEANS EMPTY for a human. A token with neither (minted before IAM
+// v1.33.0) resolves NO home org and the caller must fail closed — an org-less
+// request, every org() gate 403. It must never fall back to `owner`, which is
+// precisely the app-selected value this exists to stop trusting. Callers log that
+// case so a real legacy principal is visible rather than silently denied.
+//
+// Order matters: subjectOrg is checked FIRST because a key principal's empty `orgs`
+// is correct-by-design, not a degraded token. Reading the membership set first and
+// failing closed on it is what 403'd every customer API key on org-scoped routes
+// (/v1/agents, /v1/gpus, /v1/billing/*) in v1.801.244 while leaving unscoped
+// /v1/models working — which is why the pre-pin probe, which only ever asserted
+// /v1/models, could not see it.
+// A MACHINE JWT (client_credentials, IAM `type` == "application" — e.g. the
+// per-org "<org>-platform-kms" sync identity) is the third case, and it reads
+// `owner` DELIBERATELY. That is not the hazard this function exists to remove: the
+// hazard was a HUMAN whose org followed whichever app they logged in through, and a
+// machine cannot choose — it IS the application, its `owner` is that application's
+// own organization, and obtaining the token at all requires that app's client
+// secret. There is no user to mis-attribute. Omitting this branch would fail closed
+// on the KMS sync identity, whose org-scoped data access runs through this same
+// boundary (see isKMSMachinePrincipal, which gates ONLY the admin grant precisely so
+// that access keeps working).
+func (c *idClaims) homeOrg() string {
+	if c.subjectOrg != "" {
+		return c.subjectOrg // API key: resolved from the subject
+	}
+	if isMachinePrincipal(c) {
+		return c.Owner // machine JWT: the app IS the principal
+	}
+	if len(c.Orgs) == 0 {
+		return "" // human token with no membership set: fail closed
+	}
+	return c.Orgs[0].Org
+}
+
 // isKMSMachinePrincipal reports whether a validated token is a per-org KMS-sync
 // machine identity: its audience set contains the owner-bound machine audience
 // (<owner>-platform-kms). Such a principal is a client_credentials machine identity
@@ -197,6 +306,44 @@ func isKMSMachinePrincipal(claims *idClaims) bool {
 	return false
 }
 
+// isMachinePrincipal reports whether a validated token is a MACHINE (non-human)
+// identity — the predicate SanitizeIdentity uses to DENY SuperAdmin and the org-admin
+// signal. A client_credentials token carries IAM's `type` == "application"
+// (object/token_oauth.go), which catches EVERY machine app regardless of its audience;
+// this is the fix for the audience-decomplection widening SuperAdmin's reach — a
+// generic admin-org machine app must not become platform-admin just because it belongs
+// to the admin org. It UNIONS the owner-bound KMS-sync check so a machine token is
+// still excluded even on the (defensive) path where `type` is absent but the
+// <owner>-platform-kms audience is present. Fail-closed: unknown/empty type is treated
+// as NON-machine so a real human admin (who may carry no `type`) is never locked out —
+// the KMS-aud fallback still catches the one machine family we can identify audience-only.
+func isMachinePrincipal(claims *idClaims) bool {
+	return claims.Type == "application" || isKMSMachinePrincipal(claims)
+}
+
+// isMember reports whether org is in the token's signed membership set — the
+// `orgs` claim IAM mints for a USER token, home org first. It is the ONE test that
+// turns a client's org SELECTION into an effective org (SanitizeIdentity), and
+// therefore into the ledger that pays (principal.BillingOrg).
+//
+// The comparison is VERBATIM, no folding, for the same reason the owner claim is
+// taken verbatim: "acme" and "ACME" are DISTINCT orgs in IAM, and a fold would let
+// a member of one select the other. An empty org is never a member, so an absent
+// selection leaves the caller in their home org. An empty set (a legacy token, an
+// opaque key, a machine principal — IAM never mints `orgs` for a client_credentials
+// token) admits nothing, which is exactly the pre-claim behavior.
+func isMember(orgs []model.OrgRef, org string) bool {
+	if org == "" {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, o := range orgs {
+		if o.Org == org {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // validate parses raw, verifies its signature against the JWKS, and enforces
 // issuer/audience/expiry. Returns the claims on success, an error otherwise.
 func (v *identityValidator) validate(raw string) (*idClaims, error) {
@@ -214,14 +361,13 @@ func (v *identityValidator) validate(raw string) (*idClaims, error) {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	// Fail SECURE on a misconfigured (empty) trust set: an empty issuer OR audience
-	// allowlist must REJECT every token, never silently disable that axis. In
-	// production both are always resolved non-empty (BrandIssuers + the baked
-	// audience defaults, unioned in config.go so they are "never empty"), so this
-	// fires ONLY on an operator misconfiguration (CLOUD_JWT_AUDIENCES="" emptying the
-	// resolved set, or an empty issuer set) — and then it denies, it never admits (I2).
-	if len(v.issuers) == 0 || len(v.audiences) == 0 {
-		return nil, fmt.Errorf("identity validator misconfigured: empty issuer or audience allowlist")
+	// Fail SECURE on a misconfigured (empty) trust set: with no trusted issuer every
+	// token must be REJECTED, never silently admitted. In production the set is always
+	// non-empty (the primary issuer + BrandIssuers, unioned in config.go so it is
+	// "never empty"), so this fires ONLY on an operator misconfiguration — and then it
+	// denies, it never admits (I2).
+	if len(v.issuers) == 0 {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("identity validator misconfigured: empty issuer set")
 	}
 
 	// Reject a missing issuer: an empty issuer must never pass the set check.
@@ -234,28 +380,22 @@ func (v *identityValidator) validate(raw string) (*idClaims, error) {
 	if claims.Expiry == nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing expiry")
 	}
-	// Issuer must be one of the trusted brand issuers. go-jose's jwt.Expected
-	// checks a SINGLE issuer, so the issuer is validated here against the set and
-	// left out of Expected (audience + expiry stay with Expected).
+	// Issuer must be one of the trusted brand issuers. go-jose's jwt.Expected checks a
+	// SINGLE issuer, so the issuer is validated here against the set and left out of
+	// Expected (only expiry/not-before stay with Expected).
 	if !issuerAllowed(claims.Issuer, v.issuers) {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("untrusted issuer %q", claims.Issuer)
 	}
-	// Audience: the static allowlist (CLOUD_JWT_AUDIENCES / brand app client_ids)
-	// PLUS the per-org PaaS-KMS sync machine audience bound to THIS token's own
-	// owner (<owner>-platform-kms). The machine audience is added only when the
-	// allowlist is active (non-empty — always so in production) and only for the
-	// token's own org, so accepting it never widens org-scoping: the /v1/kms guard still
-	// gates on owner == :org. Without this, a real client_credentials machine token
-	// (aud == its per-org clientId, never in the allowlist) fails here and the
-	// sync silently stays pending — the activation blocker.
-	// The audience allowlist is guaranteed non-empty (checked above), so the
-	// audience axis is ALWAYS enforced — never silently skipped.
-	auds := v.audiences
-	if mach := kmsMachineAudience(claims.Owner); mach != "" {
-		auds = append(append(make([]string, 0, len(v.audiences)+1), v.audiences...), mach)
-	}
-	expected := jwt.Expected{AnyAudience: jwt.Audience(auds)}
-	if err := claims.Claims.ValidateWithLeeway(expected, 2*time.Minute); err != nil {
+	// Audience is NOT an access gate. A valid signature from a trusted issuer (both
+	// checked above) proves IAM minted this token for one of ITS OWN registered apps;
+	// the `aud` merely names which app. Cloud does not keep a per-app allowlist to
+	// mirror IAM's registry — that mirror drifted and silently 401'd every new
+	// first-party app until hand-edited. Org scope is the `owner` claim, enforced by
+	// every downstream guard; SuperAdmin is owner==adminOrg AND !isKMSMachinePrincipal
+	// (SanitizeIdentity). Expiry + not-before are STILL enforced here: Expected{} with a
+	// zero Time validates against time.Now(); an empty AnyAudience skips ONLY the
+	// audience match (go-jose/v4 jwt/validation.go).
+	if err := claims.Claims.ValidateWithLeeway(jwt.Expected{}, 2*time.Minute); err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("claims: %w", err)
 	}
 	return &claims, nil
@@ -375,14 +515,52 @@ func (c *jwksCache) fetch() (*gojose.JSONWebKeySet, error) {
 // Token extraction — mirrors iamauth's Bearer / Basic / API-key helpers.
 // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-// isAPIKey reports whether tok is an opaque, backend-validated key (hk-/sk-/…)
-// rather than a JWT, so the sanitizer skips JWT parsing for it.
+// APIKeyPrefixes are the Hanzo API key families. A published key (pk-) is
+// write-only and scoped, so it is safe in a public bundle; a secret key (sk-)
+// authenticates a server. Everything else is OAuth2, which is a JWT and not a key.
+//
+// hk- is sk- under an older name and is on its way out. It stays accepted here
+// because IAM mints it — cloud only validates (see account.go mintKey, which
+// delegates to iam.mintUserKey) — so dropping it here before IAM renames the
+// family would reject every key IAM hands out. Retire it in that order: IAM mints
+// sk-, holders re-key, then delete the entry below.
+//
+// fw_ and hz_ were listed here and never minted by anything: dead entries that
+// widened what counts as a credential for no reason. Gone.
+//
+// This is the ONE authority. Admission mirrors it rather than importing it (it
+// stays free of cloud-internal imports); if this list changes, that copy must too.
+var APIKeyPrefixes = []string{"pk-", "sk-", "hk-"}
+
+// PublishablePrefix is the ONE publishable spelling: pk- is the key you may ship
+// in a browser bundle, sk- is the one you may not. Stripe's split, same reason.
+const PublishablePrefix = "pk-"
+
+// IsPublishableKey reports whether tok is a publishable key.
+//
+// A publishable key is NOT a credential: it identifies a tenant so a public
+// surface can WRITE (ingest events), and it must never mint a principal that can
+// READ. Cloud resolved any isAPIKey token — pk- included — into "the same
+// principal a JWT yields", which made a key documented as "safe to show" into a
+// full bearer for the org that owns it. IdentityFromRequest now refuses it, so
+// publishable means publishable.
+//
+// It stays in APIKeyPrefixes on purpose: OrgForKey must still resolve a pk- to
+// its owning org, because that is exactly how the ingest door learns which tenant
+// a browser beacon belongs to. Resolvable, not authenticating.
+func IsPublishableKey(tok string) bool {
+	return strings.HasPrefix(strings.TrimSpace(tok), PublishablePrefix)
+}
+
+// isAPIKey reports whether tok is an opaque, backend-validated key rather than a
+// JWT, so the sanitizer skips JWT parsing for it.
 func isAPIKey(tok string) bool {
-	return strings.HasPrefix(tok, "hk-") ||
-		strings.HasPrefix(tok, "sk-") ||
-		strings.HasPrefix(tok, "pk-") ||
-		strings.HasPrefix(tok, "fw_") ||
-		strings.HasPrefix(tok, "hz_")
+	for _, p := range APIKeyPrefixes {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(tok, p) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
 }
 
 // bearerFromAuth extracts the token from a "Bearer <token>" header value.

auth_identity_audience_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+package cloud
+
+import (
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/rsa"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// TestValidate_AudienceIsNotAGate proves the IAM-native trust model: a token signed
+// by a trusted issuer validates REGARDLESS of its `aud` (the minting app's client_id).
+// Cloud keeps no per-app audience allowlist mirroring IAM's registry — so a brand-new
+// first-party app works with zero cloud change, and the specific app tokens the old
+// per-app tests pinned (admin-guard, world, team, commerce) are accepted by the SAME
+// rule as everything else. Trust is signature + issuer + expiry; org scope is the
+// owner claim, enforced downstream. Replaces the three audience_*_test.go files that
+// asserted a static allowlist which no longer exists.
+func TestValidate_AudienceIsNotAGate(t *testing.T) {
+	key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("genkey: %v", err)
+	}
+	jwks := jwksServer(t, &key.PublicKey)
+	v := newIdentityValidator(testIssuer, jwks.URL, 0)
+	future := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
+
+	// Every audience — the apps the deleted per-app tests pinned AND a never-registered
+	// one — validates identically, because aud is not an access gate.
+	for _, aud := range []string{
+		"hanzo-admin-guard", // admin.hanzo.ai forward-auth cockpit
+		"hanzo-world",       // world.hanzo.ai analyst tokens
+		"hanzo-team",        // hanzo.team wallet page
+		"hanzo-commerce",    // commerce.hanzo.ai admin AI assistant
+		"a-brand-new-first-party-app-never-listed-anywhere",
+	} {
+		tok := signWith(t, key, tokenClaims(aud, "acme", "", false, future))
+		id, err := v.validate(tok)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("aud=%q from a trusted issuer must validate (no allowlist), got %v", aud, err)
+		}
+		if id.Owner != "acme" {
+			t.Errorf("aud=%q: owner must be carried through, got %q", aud, id.Owner)
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Expiry is STILL enforced (dropping the aud gate must not disable time checks):
+	// a token expired beyond the 2m leeway is rejected whatever its aud.
+	expired := signWith(t, key, tokenClaims("hanzo-commerce", "acme", "", false, time.Now().Add(-time.Hour)))
+	if _, err := v.validate(expired); err == nil {
+		t.Error("expired token must be REJECTED even though audience is no longer gated")
+	}
+}

auth_identity_kms_test.go

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
 package cloud
 
-// V6 (the activation blocker) — the identity validator must accept a per-org
-// PaaS-KMS sync machine token: a client_credentials JWT whose aud is the org's
-// own IAM application clientId "<owner>-platform-kms" (a per-org value, NEVER in
-// CLOUD_JWT_AUDIENCES) — but ONLY when that audience is bound to the token's OWN
-// owner claim. Before the fix the machine token failed the audience check,
-// SanitizeIdentity resolved anonymous, and the /v1/kms guard 403'd it, so the sync
-// silently stayed pending. These are white-box unit tests of validate() itself;
-// the end-to-end proof through SanitizeIdentity + the real guard lives in
-// clients/kms (v6_aud_e2e_test.go). Reuses the jwksServer/signWith/tokenClaims
-// helpers from middleware_identity_test.go (same package).
+// The per-org PaaS-KMS sync identity authenticates as its own IAM application
+// "<owner>-platform-kms" (client_credentials), so its token carries owner=<org> and
+// aud=<owner>-platform-kms. Validation no longer gates on the audience at all (trust
+// is signature + issuer + expiry), so a machine token clears validate() like any
+// other. The owner-bound machine aud survives only to IDENTIFY such a principal
+// (isKMSMachinePrincipal) so SanitizeIdentity can DENY it SuperAdmin even in the admin
+// org — a client_credentials machine identity must never wield platform-admin. These
+// are white-box unit tests of that identification; the end-to-end proof through
+// SanitizeIdentity + the real guard lives in clients/kms (v6_aud_e2e_test.go). Reuses
+// the jwksServer/signWith/tokenClaims helpers from middleware_identity_test.go.
 
 import (
 	"crypto/rand"
@@ -18,19 +18,16 @@ import (
 	"time"
 )
 
-func TestIdentityValidator_KMSMachineAudience(t *testing.T) {
+func TestIdentityValidator_KMSMachinePrincipal(t *testing.T) {
 	key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
 	if err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("genkey: %v", err)
 	}
 	jwks := jwksServer(t, &key.PublicKey)
-	// The static allowlist deliberately contains NO *-platform-kms audience, so any
-	// acceptance below can come ONLY from the owner-bound machine-aud rule, not the
-	// allowlist — this is what makes it a fix and not a config workaround.
-	v := newIdentityValidator(testIssuer, jwks.URL, []string{"hanzo-console"}, 0)
+	v := newIdentityValidator(testIssuer, jwks.URL, 0)
 	future := time.Now().Add(time.Hour)
 
-	t.Run("machine token for its own org is accepted", func(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Run("own-org machine token validates and is recognised as a machine principal", func(t *testing.T) {
 		c, err := v.validate(signWith(t, key, tokenClaims("maxpower-platform-kms", "maxpower", "", false, future)))
 		if err != nil {
 			t.Fatalf("machine token rejected: %v", err)
@@ -38,34 +35,51 @@ func TestIdentityValidator_KMSMachineAudience(t *testing.T) {
 		if c.Owner != "maxpower" {
 			t.Fatalf("owner=%q, want maxpower", c.Owner)
 		}
-	})
-
-	t.Run("machine aud for a DIFFERENT org is rejected (owner-bound)", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// owner=maxpower but aud=acme-platform-kms: the accepted machine aud is bound
-		// to the token's OWN owner (maxpower-platform-kms), so this must fail — it is
-		// not a blanket "*-platform-kms" wildcard.
-		if _, err := v.validate(signWith(t, key, tokenClaims("acme-platform-kms", "maxpower", "", false, future))); err == nil {
-			t.Fatal("cross-org machine audience must be rejected (owner-bound)")
+		if !isKMSMachinePrincipal(c) {
+			t.Fatal("aud==<owner>-platform-kms must be recognised as a machine principal")
 		}
 	})
 
-	t.Run("arbitrary audience still rejected (fix is scoped, not a disable)", func(t *testing.T) {
-		if _, err := v.validate(signWith(t, key, tokenClaims("some-random-app", "maxpower", "", false, future))); err == nil {
-			t.Fatal("an arbitrary audience must still be rejected")
+	t.Run("admin-org machine token is recognised so SuperAdmin is denied", func(t *testing.T) {
+		c, err := v.validate(signWith(t, key, tokenClaims("admin-platform-kms", "admin", "", true, future)))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("admin machine token rejected: %v", err)
+		}
+		if !isKMSMachinePrincipal(c) {
+			t.Fatal("admin-org machine token must be recognised (SanitizeIdentity denies it SuperAdmin)")
 		}
 	})
 
-	t.Run("machine aud with empty owner is rejected (fail closed)", func(t *testing.T) {
-		// aud="-platform-kms" with owner="": kmsMachineAudience("")=="" so no machine
-		// audience is granted and the bare suffix is not in the allowlist.
-		if _, err := v.validate(signWith(t, key, tokenClaims("-platform-kms", "", "", false, future))); err == nil {
-			t.Fatal("machine aud with empty owner must be rejected")
+	t.Run("machine aud bound to a DIFFERENT org is not this owner's machine principal", func(t *testing.T) {
+		// owner=maxpower, aud=acme-platform-kms: the machine-principal match is bound to
+		// the token's OWN owner (maxpower-platform-kms), not a "*-platform-kms" wildcard.
+		// It validates (aud is not gated) and is owner-scoped to maxpower downstream.
+		c, err := v.validate(signWith(t, key, tokenClaims("acme-platform-kms", "maxpower", "", false, future)))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("token rejected: %v", err)
+		}
+		if isKMSMachinePrincipal(c) {
+			t.Fatal("a cross-org machine aud must not count as this owner's machine principal")
 		}
 	})
 
-	t.Run("normal static-allowlist token still accepted (regression)", func(t *testing.T) {
-		if _, err := v.validate(signWith(t, key, tokenClaims("hanzo-console", "maxpower", "", false, future))); err != nil {
-			t.Fatalf("static-allowlist token rejected: %v", err)
+	t.Run("ordinary app token is not a machine principal", func(t *testing.T) {
+		c, err := v.validate(signWith(t, key, tokenClaims("hanzo-console", "maxpower", "", false, future)))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("token rejected: %v", err)
+		}
+		if isKMSMachinePrincipal(c) {
+			t.Fatal("an ordinary app token is not a machine principal")
+		}
+	})
+
+	t.Run("empty-owner token is never a machine principal (fail closed)", func(t *testing.T) {
+		c, err := v.validate(signWith(t, key, tokenClaims("-platform-kms", "", "", false, future)))
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("token rejected: %v", err)
+		}
+		if isKMSMachinePrincipal(c) {
+			t.Fatal(`empty-owner token must never be a machine principal (kmsMachineAudience("")=="")`)
 		}
 	})
 

auth_identity_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+// Copyright 2026 Hanzo AI, Inc. All rights reserved.
+
+package cloud
+
+import (
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestUsernamePrefersPreferredUsername pins the claim precedence the money path
+// depends on. OIDC `name` is a DISPLAY name — IAM fills it from User.DisplayName,
+// and a real token carried "Zach Kelling". Reading it as the username addressed
+// wallet `hanzo/Zach Kelling`, which no funding path can name, while the balance
+// sat in `hanzo/z`; every signed-in completion 402'd against a funded account.
+func TestUsernamePrefersPreferredUsername(t *testing.T) {
+	// Both present: the username wins, never the human label.
+	c := &idClaims{Name: "Zach Kelling", PreferredUsername: "z"}
+	if got := c.username(); got != "z" {
+		t.Fatalf("username() = %q; want %q (preferred_username must win over the display name)", got, "z")
+	}
+	// A display name must never be returned when the username is available, and a
+	// space is the tell that a display name leaked into an account key.
+	if strings.ContainsRune(c.username(), ' ') {
+		t.Fatalf("username() = %q; an account key can never contain a space", c.username())
+	}
+	// Legacy token minted before IAM emitted preferred_username: `name` is all
+	// there is, so it stays the answer rather than becoming empty.
+	legacy := &idClaims{Name: "z"}
+	if got := legacy.username(); got != "z" {
+		t.Fatalf("legacy username() = %q; want %q (fallback must be retained)", got, "z")
+	}
+	// Neither present: empty, never a guess.
+	if got := (&idClaims{}).username(); got != "" {
+		t.Fatalf("empty username() = %q; want \"\"", got)
+	}
+}

auth_identity_whitelabel_test.go

@@ -9,10 +9,10 @@ import (
 )
 
 // TestValidate_FailSecureOnEmptyTrustSet proves I2: a validator whose resolved
-// issuer OR audience allowlist is empty REJECTS an otherwise-valid, correctly
-// signed token — the axis is never silently disabled. Production always resolves
-// non-empty sets; this guards the misconfiguration path (CLOUD_JWT_AUDIENCES=""
-// or an empty issuer set), which must fail closed, not open.
+// issuer set is empty REJECTS an otherwise-valid, correctly signed token — the axis
+// is never silently disabled. Production always resolves a non-empty set; this
+// guards the misconfiguration path (an empty issuer set), which must fail closed,
+// not open.
 func TestValidate_FailSecureOnEmptyTrustSet(t *testing.T) {
 	key, err := rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -23,20 +23,15 @@ func TestValidate_FailSecureOnEmptyTrustSet(t *testing.T) {
 	tok := signWith(t, key, tokenClaims("hanzo-console", "acme", "", false, future))
 
 	// Sanity: a properly configured validator accepts the token.
-	if _, err := newIdentityValidator(testIssuer, jwks.URL, []string{"hanzo-console"}, 0).validate(tok); err != nil {
+	if _, err := newIdentityValidator(testIssuer, jwks.URL, 0).validate(tok); err != nil {
 		t.Fatalf("baseline valid token must be accepted, got %v", err)
 	}
 
-	// Empty audience set → deny.
-	if _, err := newIdentityValidator(testIssuer, jwks.URL, nil, 0).validate(tok); err == nil {
-		t.Error("empty audience allowlist must REJECT (fail-secure), not accept")
-	}
-
 	// Empty issuer set → deny (construct directly; trustedIssuers never yields empty
 	// with a primary, so bypass it to exercise the guard).
-	vEmptyIss := &identityValidator{issuers: nil, audiences: []string{"hanzo-console"}, cache: newJWKSCache(jwks.URL, 0), keys: newIAMKeys()}
+	vEmptyIss := &identityValidator{issuers: nil, cache: newJWKSCache(jwks.URL, 0), keys: newIAMKeys()}
 	if _, err := vEmptyIss.validate(tok); err == nil {
-		t.Error("empty issuer allowlist must REJECT (fail-secure), not accept")
+		t.Error("empty issuer set must REJECT (fail-secure), not accept")
 	}
 }
 
@@ -112,7 +107,7 @@ func TestBrandIssuers(t *testing.T) {
 // full brand set, so a lux token would pass the issuer gate on the hanzo binary.
 func TestNewIdentityValidator_MultiIssuer(t *testing.T) {
 	os.Unsetenv("WHITELABEL_ISSUERS")
-	v := newIdentityValidator("https://hanzo.id", "http://iam.hanzo.svc/v1/iam/.well-known/jwks", []string{"hanzo-cloud", "lux-cloud"}, 0)
+	v := newIdentityValidator("https://hanzo.id", "http://iam.hanzo.svc/v1/iam/.well-known/jwks", 0)
 	if !issuerAllowed("https://lux.id", v.issuers) {
 		t.Fatalf("validator must trust the lux issuer, set=%v", v.issuers)
 	}
@@ -123,64 +118,3 @@ func TestNewIdentityValidator_MultiIssuer(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("validator must reject an untrusted issuer, set=%v", v.issuers)
 	}
 }
-
-// TestBrandAudiences proves every brand's cloud audience (<brand>-cloud) is derived
-// from the brands registry — one source of truth, mirroring BrandIssuers.
-func TestBrandAudiences(t *testing.T) {
-	got := BrandAudiences()
-	for _, want := range []string{"hanzo-cloud", "lux-cloud", "zoo-cloud", "pars-cloud", "bootnode-cloud"} {
-		found := false
-		for _, g := range got {
-			if g == want {
-				found = true
-				break
-			}
-		}
-		if !found {
-			t.Errorf("BrandAudiences()=%v missing %q", got, want)
-		}
-	}
-}
-
-// TestJWTAudiencesFromEnv_BrandUnion proves the resolved audience allowlist ALWAYS
-// includes every brand's <brand>-cloud aud (so a lux token validates), whether the
-// list comes from the baked default or a hanzo-only env override — and that an
-// env-supplied entry is not duplicated.
-func TestJWTAudiencesFromEnv_BrandUnion(t *testing.T) {
-	has := func(list []string, v string) bool {
-		for _, s := range list {
-			if s == v {
-				return true
-			}
-		}
-		return false
-	}
-
-	// Baked default path (no env).
-	os.Unsetenv("CLOUD_JWT_AUDIENCES")
-	os.Unsetenv("GATEWAY_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES")
-	def := jwtAudiencesFromEnv()
-	for _, want := range []string{"hanzo-cloud", "lux-cloud", "zoo-cloud", "pars-cloud"} {
-		if !has(def, want) {
-			t.Errorf("baked audiences %v missing brand aud %q", def, want)
-		}
-	}
-
-	// A legacy hanzo-only env override must STILL accept lux-cloud (brand union),
-	// with no duplicate of the env-supplied hanzo-cloud.
-	os.Setenv("GATEWAY_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES", "hanzo-app,hanzo-console,hanzo-cloud")
-	defer os.Unsetenv("GATEWAY_ALLOWED_AUDIENCES")
-	got := jwtAudiencesFromEnv()
-	if !has(got, "lux-cloud") {
-		t.Fatalf("hanzo-only env override must still accept lux-cloud, got %v", got)
-	}
-	n := 0
-	for _, s := range got {
-		if s == "hanzo-cloud" {
-			n++
-		}
-	}
-	if n != 1 {
-		t.Fatalf("hanzo-cloud must appear exactly once (no duplicate), got %d in %v", n, got)
-	}
-}

brand.go

@@ -137,19 +137,3 @@ func BrandIssuers() []string {
 	}
 	return out
 }
-
-// BrandAudiences returns the OAuth `aud` (== IAM client_id == app name) of every
-// white-label brand's cloud login app: `<brand>-cloud` (hanzo-cloud, lux-cloud,
-// zoo-cloud, pars-cloud, bootnode-cloud). A brand's session token carries
-// aud=<brand>-cloud (HIP-0111: client_id == app == aud), so the audience allowlist
-// must include each to accept a lux/zoo/pars token on the ONE binary. Derived from
-// the same `brands` registry as BrandIssuers — one source of truth, no hand-listing.
-func BrandAudiences() []string {
-	out := make([]string, 0, len(brands))
-	for id := range brands {
-		if id != "" {
-			out = append(out, id+"-cloud")
-		}
-	}
-	return out
-}

build.go

@@ -2,13 +2,20 @@ package cloud
 
 import (
 	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"encoding/base64"
 	"fmt"
 	"os"
 	"strings"
+	"time"
 
-	aiobject "github.com/hanzoai/ai/object"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerceinproc"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/cek"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerce/transport"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/metering"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/internal/org"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/ha"
+	s3 "github.com/hanzoai/s3-go"
+	sqlitedrv "github.com/hanzoai/sqlite"
 	luxlog "github.com/luxfi/log"
 	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
 
@@ -63,14 +70,16 @@ func BuildDeps(cfg *Config) Deps {
 	)
 
 	deps := Deps{
-		Logger:         logger,
-		Brand:          cfg.Brand,
-		Version:        cfg.Version,
-		Env:            cfg.Env,
-		Domain:         cfg.Domain,
-		IAMIssuer:      cfg.IAMIssuer,
-		DataDir:        cfg.DataDir,
-		AIDefaultModel: cfg.AIDefaultModel,
+		Logger:          logger,
+		Brand:           cfg.Brand,
+		Version:         cfg.Version,
+		Env:             cfg.Env,
+		Domain:          cfg.Domain,
+		IAMIssuer:       cfg.IAMIssuer,
+		DataDir:         cfg.DataDir,
+		MasterKey:       masterKeyBytes(cfg),
+		AIDefaultModel:  cfg.AIDefaultModel,
+		AIFallbackModel: cfg.AIFallbackModel,
 	}
 
 	// For each subsystem: enabled → leave nil (Mount fills it); not
@@ -102,6 +111,7 @@ func BuildDeps(cfg *Config) Deps {
 	deps.O11y = pick(cfg, logger, "o11y", "O11y", cfg.O11yZAPAddr, clients.O11yRPCAt, clients.DisabledO11y)
 	deps.VFS = pickVFSClient(cfg, logger)
 	deps.MQ = pick(cfg, logger, "mq", "MQ", cfg.MQZAPAddr, clients.MQRPCAt, clients.DisabledMQ)
+	deps.Durable, deps.LiveMembers = buildDurability(cfg, logger)
 
 	// Payments and Vault never co-resident. Disabled stub when no
 	// endpoint, otherwise RPC.
@@ -141,8 +151,8 @@ func staticEdgePolicy(cfg *Config) edge.Policy {
 // the request-edge debit on every paid AI call.
 //
 // CO-RESIDENT (task #111): when commerce is folded in-process (Enabled("commerce")),
-// the gate DEBITS the in-process commerce handler over commerceinproc's self-routing
-// transport — a direct Go call, no socket to commerce.hanzo.svc:8001. The base is
+// the gate DEBITS the in-process commerce handler over the commerce transport's
+// self-routing dispatch — a direct Go call, no socket to commerce.hanzo.svc:8001. The base is
 // pinned NON-EMPTY (real CLOUD_COMMERCE_HTTP_URL, else the in-process placeholder) so
 // the gate stays ENABLED even after the standalone + its env are retired — a metering
 // gate that silently no-ops is a free-money hole, so it must never drop to
@@ -159,9 +169,9 @@ func buildMeteringClient(cfg *Config, log luxlog.Logger) *metering.Client {
 	inProcess := cfg.Enabled("commerce")
 	if inProcess {
 		if base == "" {
-			base = commerceinproc.PlaceholderBase
+			base = transport.PlaceholderBase
 		}
-		httpClient = commerceinproc.Client(0) // in-process dispatch; no network timeout
+		httpClient = transport.Client(0) // in-process dispatch; no network timeout
 	}
 	m, err := metering.New(metering.Config{
 		BaseURL: base,
@@ -204,7 +214,7 @@ func boolStr(b bool, t, f string) string {
 
 // wireTierReader installs the embedded ai module's per-tier SKU gate reader so it
 // resolves the caller's commerce subscription tier through the SAME co-resident
-// commerce client the metering gate bills over — in-process (commerceinproc) when
+// commerce client the metering gate bills over — in-process (the commerce transport) when
 // commerce is folded in, S2S HTTP with the service token otherwise — NEVER an authed
 // self-call to the cloud edge. That self-call is the toothless-gate bug: the edge
 // 401/403s a service call to /v1/billing/*, so the ai module's own HTTP lookup always
@@ -218,9 +228,9 @@ func wireTierReader(m *metering.Client, log luxlog.Logger) {
 	if m == nil || !m.Enabled() {
 		return
 	}
-	aiobject.SetTierReader(func(ctx context.Context, subject, namespace string) (string, error) {
+	tierReader = func(ctx context.Context, subject, namespace string) (string, error) {
 		return m.Tier(ctx, subject, namespace)
-	})
+	}
 	log.Info("ai per-tier SKU gate wired to co-resident commerce (in-process tier read, fail-safe)")
 }
 
@@ -256,16 +266,16 @@ func wireFinance(cfg *Config, log luxlog.Logger) {
 	// the SAME wallet, or spend can outrun the balance that admitted it. Both use
 	// subject; keep them together. The gate reads a coarse cents balance (a >0
 	// threshold only); the DEBIT is 18-decimal-exact.
-	aiobject.SetBalanceReader(func(ctx context.Context, subject, namespace, currency string) (int64, error) {
+	balanceReader = func(ctx context.Context, subject, namespace, currency string) (int64, error) {
 		bal, err := fin.Balance(ctx, namespace, subject, currency, false)
 		if err != nil {
 			return 0, err
 		}
 		return bal.Cents(), nil
-	})
+	}
 	// The DEBIT is exact: the ai module emits the cost as a decimal-USD string, parsed
 	// here to 18-decimal USD (1e-18) so a sub-cent call bills precisely and is never floored.
-	aiobject.SetUsageRecorder(func(ctx context.Context, u aiobject.UsageEvent) error {
+	usageRecorder = func(ctx context.Context, u UsageEvent) error {
 		amt, err := money.ParseUSD(u.USD)
 		if err != nil {
 			return err
@@ -274,7 +284,7 @@ func wireFinance(cfg *Config, log luxlog.Logger) {
 			Org: u.Namespace, Subject: u.Subject, Amount: amt,
 			Currency: u.Currency, Model: u.Model, Provider: u.Provider, RequestID: u.RequestID,
 		})
-	})
+	}
 	log.Info("finance ledger wired (per-subject wallet in the org ledger, 18-decimal-exact, fail-closed)", "dataDir", cfg.DataDir)
 }
 
@@ -548,7 +558,7 @@ func EmitLifecycle(ctx context.Context, ev LifecycleEvent) {
 // call that reads the embedded commerce datastore (hanzoai/commerce MODULE, since
 // the un-fork) + the @hanzo/plans vocabulary, no network hop (the HIP-0106
 // co-resident default). The factory inversion stays because the concrete client
-// (clients/commerceinproc) imports clients/plan, which imports cloud — a direct
+// (clients/commerce) imports clients/plan, which imports cloud — a direct
 // call here would be a package cycle. Absent the registration it fails closed
 // rather than pretending.
 //
@@ -575,7 +585,7 @@ func pickCommerceClient(cfg *Config, log luxlog.Logger) CommerceClient {
 // commerceClientFactory constructs the embedded in-process Commerce client.
 // apps/commerce.go registers it in init(); pickCommerceClient calls it so
 // package cloud depends on the CommerceClient interface + this hook, never the
-// concrete commerceinproc package (whose entitlement client pulls clients/plan,
+// concrete clients/commerce package (whose entitlement client pulls clients/plan,
 // which imports cloud — the hook is what keeps the package graph acyclic).
 var commerceClientFactory func(cfg *Config, log luxlog.Logger) CommerceClient
 
@@ -712,6 +722,226 @@ func pickVFSClient(cfg *Config, log luxlog.Logger) VFSClient {
 	return clients.DisabledVFS()
 }
 
+// durableBucket holds every org's HA-SQLite snapshot (and its writer lease). One
+// bucket, keys laid out orgs/<slug>[/…]/<subsystem>.db per HIP-0302 — the durable
+// twin of the on-disk DataDir layout.
+//
+// OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS the fence depends on (enforce in the SeaweedFS deployment,
+// not in code):
+//
+//   - Object versioning + a no-expiry / no-lifecycle-deletion policy on this prefix.
+//     The writer lease (orgs/<slug>/.owner) is the round's system of record; if the
+//     gateway silently drops or rolls back that object, a monotone round can reset and
+//     un-fence a zombie writer (Red M4). A local high-water-round floor per pod is the
+//     future in-process defense; the object lifecycle is the operational one.
+//   - RWO, per-writer PVCs for DataDir — NEVER an RWX shared volume (Red M5). Two pods
+//     on one DataDir corrupt SQLite regardless of this fence; single-writer here is the
+//     durable-copy fence, and per-pod RWO is the local-file guarantee the shard router
+//     already relies on (see shardrouter.go).
+const durableBucket = "org-db"
+
+// durableProbePrefix namespaces the boot CAS-atomicity probe's throwaway objects
+// (org.ProbeCAS writes one per boot) away from the orgs/ tree. A bucket lifecycle rule
+// may reap ".probe/*"; the objects are tiny and never read after the probe.
+const durableProbePrefix = ".probe/cas-"
+
+// buildDurability constructs the deployment's HA-durability factory, or nil when the
+// deployment has no object store to be durable against (dev/single-node — every
+// OrgStore then stays local-only). It composes the SeaweedFS S3 If-Match
+// ConditionalStore (the SAME s3admin identity deps.VFS uses), the writer membership
+// over CLOUD_PEERS (the SAME set the shard router elects on, so the store-layer owner
+// and the routed owner agree), and the per-org envelope Cipher rooted at the KMS
+// master. Any construction failure fails SAFE to nil (local-only) rather than crash
+// the boot; an encryption-capable build with no usable cipher is REFUSED — a build
+// that promises encryption never ships plaintext snapshots to the object store.
+// It returns the durable factory AND the live-members reader for the shard router (the
+// SAME election snapshot), non-nil together only when the plane is active; both nil when
+// local-only (the router then stays on the static ordinal set).
+func buildDurability(cfg *Config, log luxlog.Logger) (*Durability, func() []ha.Member) {
+	// A multi-replica deployment REQUIRES the durable plane: with >1 writer, a per-org
+	// store that is not hydrate-on-open + fenced is the outage this exists to fix.
+	// disabledDurability logs at the severity the replica count warrants, so a
+	// misconfigured prod deployment is never SILENTLY non-durable (Red L2).
+	multiReplica := len(parsePeers(cfg.ShardPeers)) > 1
+
+	// Durability is THE path — there is no operator toggle. It self-detects capability
+	// at boot: no object store reachable (dev / native-Go / no S3 creds) → local-only,
+	// same code path, graceful; a reachable store → PROVE its conditional-PUT atomicity
+	// (org.ProbeCAS) before fencing a single byte of tenant data. A store that cannot be
+	// proven atomic fails SAFE to local-only with a loud alert — never a silent-wrong
+	// fence on a store that could split-brain.
+	admin := s3admin.New()
+	if !admin.Configured() {
+		disabledDurability(log, multiReplica, "no S3 admin creds (S3_ADMIN_* unset)")
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	client, err := admin.Client()
+	if err != nil {
+		disabledDurability(log, multiReplica, fmt.Sprintf("S3 client construction failed: %v", err))
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
+	if err := ensureDurableBucket(ctx, admin, client); err != nil {
+		// Non-fatal: the bucket likely already exists; a later ship/hydrate retries.
+		log.Warn("durability bucket ensure failed (continuing)", "bucket", durableBucket, "err", err)
+	}
+	cancel()
+
+	// Prove the store enforces conditional-PUT atomically BEFORE fencing any tenant data
+	// (the auto-H2 self-check that replaces the old opt-in flag). A store that cannot be
+	// proven atomic fails SAFE to local-only + a loud alert — never a silent fence on a
+	// store that could admit two writers for one round (split-brain). The result is
+	// cached for the process life (deps.Durable is set once), so this probe runs once.
+	// cond is the linearizable register the fence stands on, constructed HERE (not
+	// hard-wired inside the fence) so a cache tier slots in as a decorator: a
+	// read-through/write-through KV-in-front-of-S3 store (github.com/hanzoai/kv-go) can
+	// wrap this one line to serve low-latency hydrate reads while the authoritative CAS
+	// still lands on S3 — the fence reads and CASes through whatever ConditionalStore it
+	// is handed. (Safety note for that tier: a stale cached lease read only costs a claim
+	// retry, never safety — the S3 CAS is authoritative — so a write-through cache is
+	// sound over the SAME cond that backs both the lease and the data ships.)
+	cond := org.NewS3ConditionalStore(client, durableBucket)
+	probeCtx, probeCancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 15*time.Second)
+	err = org.ProbeCAS(probeCtx, cond, durableProbePrefix)
+	probeCancel()
+	if err != nil {
+		disabledDurability(log, multiReplica, fmt.Sprintf("object-store conditional-PUT atomicity NOT confirmed — %v", err))
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	// Membership: LIVE when in-cluster + CLOUD_PEER_SELECTOR is set (a rolling upgrade's
+	// changing pod set is tracked, a draining/dead pod is never elected an org's owner),
+	// else the STATIC CLOUD_PEERS/self set — capability-detected, no flag (see
+	// membership_k8s.go). A single-pod deployment with no peers is its own sole writer.
+	// The 2s refresh keeps a drained pod out of every peer's election within a bound the
+	// terminationGracePeriod covers, so a rolling handoff loses no request.
+	self := firstNonEmptyStr(strings.TrimSpace(cfg.ShardSelf), hostnameOr("cloud-0"))
+	peers := parsePeers(cfg.ShardPeers)
+	if len(peers) == 0 {
+		peers = []org.Member{{ID: self, Addr: self}}
+	}
+	src := membershipSource(peers, cfg.PeerSelector, httpPortOf(cfg.ListenAddr), log)
+	members := org.NewMembership(self, src, 2*time.Second)
+	_ = members.Start(context.Background()) // initial refresh populates Members() before first request
+
+	cipher := durableCipher(cfg, log)
+	if cipher == nil && cek.Encrypting() {
+		// The master that satisfied cek must decode here too, so this is a genuine
+		// misconfig, not a dev path: never ship plaintext snapshots AND never silently
+		// drop durability — fail closed and log LOUDLY for the replica count.
+		disabledDurability(log, multiReplica, "encryption-capable build but no durable cipher (would ship plaintext snapshots)")
+		return nil, nil
+	}
+
+	log.Info("durability enabled", "bucket", durableBucket, "self", self, "peers", len(peers), "atomic_cas", true, "encrypted", cipher != nil)
+	// members.Members is the live election snapshot; hand it to the shard router so it
+	// routes on the SAME set the fencer elects over — the store-layer owner and the routed
+	// owner never disagree. WithCheckpoint WIRES the ship checkpoint (durableCheckpoint) so
+	// ship-before-ack folds the WAL into the real path before reading it — the crypto
+	// envelope's re-encrypt integration point (P5).
+	return org.NewDurability(cond, members, cipher, org.WithCheckpoint(durableCheckpoint)), members.Members
+}
+
+// durableCheckpoint makes the real on-disk file reflect every committed write before a
+// durable ship reads it — the checkpoint the codec runs before snapshotting (WithCheckpoint).
+// Two steps, correct on every backend:
+//
+//  1. A TRUNCATE checkpoint with the busy fail-closed guard: busy!=0 means a reader held the
+//     WAL so the main file is missing committed frames, and shipping it would silently lose an
+//     acked write. This folds the WAL and — on the WRITE-time-encrypting backends (cgo
+//     libsqlcipher page-level, and plaintext) — leaves the real path already fresh.
+//  2. sqlitedrv.Checkpoint re-encrypts the pure-Go ENVELOPE backend's real path. The envelope
+//     defers encryption to Checkpoint/Close, so after step 1 the real path is STALE ciphertext
+//     until re-encrypted; without this the ship reads stale bytes and loses acked writes on
+//     takeover (the envelope backend landed in hanzoai/sqlite v0.4.0 — every pure-Go and
+//     mislinked-cgo keyed open routes through it). It is a successful no-op on the write-time
+//     backends, so it runs unconditionally.
+//
+// Step 1's connection is released before step 2 so the envelope re-encrypt sees a clean handle.
+func durableCheckpoint(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB) error {
+	if err := walCheckpointTruncate(ctx, db); err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if err := sqlitedrv.Checkpoint(db); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("durable checkpoint re-encrypt: %w", err)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// walCheckpointTruncate folds the WAL into the main file with the busy fail-closed guard,
+// on its own connection (released on return, before the envelope re-encrypt).
+func walCheckpointTruncate(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB) error {
+	conn, err := db.Conn(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("durable checkpoint conn: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer conn.Close()
+	var busy, logFrames, checkpointed int
+	if err := conn.QueryRowContext(ctx, "PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE)").Scan(&busy, &logFrames, &checkpointed); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("durable checkpoint: %w", err)
+	}
+	if busy != 0 {
+		return fmt.Errorf("durable checkpoint did not complete (busy=%d, log=%d, checkpointed=%d) — refusing to ship a snapshot missing committed WAL frames", busy, logFrames, checkpointed)
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
+// disabledDurability records that the durable plane is OFF, at ERROR when the
+// deployment is multi-replica (per-org stores then survive only via shard routing +
+// per-pod RWO PVC; a lost/rescheduled PVC loses committed data — the operator MUST
+// configure S3) and at INFO when single-replica/dev (local-only is the expected
+// posture). One place, so no disabled path is silent on a deployment that needs HA.
+func disabledDurability(log luxlog.Logger, multiReplica bool, why string) {
+	if multiReplica {
+		log.Error("DURABILITY DISABLED on a MULTI-REPLICA deployment — per-org stores survive only via shard routing + per-pod RWO PVC; a lost/rescheduled PVC loses committed data. Configure S3_ADMIN_* to enable the durable plane.", "reason", why)
+		return
+	}
+	log.Info("durability disabled — single-replica/dev, per-org stores stay local-only", "reason", why)
+}
+
+// ensureDurableBucket creates the durable bucket if absent (idempotent).
+func ensureDurableBucket(ctx context.Context, admin s3admin.Admin, client *s3.Client) error {
+	ok, err := client.BucketExists(ctx, durableBucket)
+	if err != nil {
+		return err
+	}
+	if ok {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return client.MakeBucket(ctx, durableBucket, s3.MakeBucketOptions{Region: admin.Region()})
+}
+
+// durableCipher builds the per-org envelope Cipher from the base64 KMS master
+// (CLOUD_KMS_MASTER_KEY_REF — the SAME key cek derives from). nil when no valid
+// 32-byte master is configured (pure-Go dev → plaintext durable object, matching the
+// plaintext local file).
+func durableCipher(cfg *Config, log luxlog.Logger) *org.Cipher {
+	ref := strings.TrimSpace(cfg.KMSMasterKeyRef)
+	if ref == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	master, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(ref)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warn("durable cipher: KMS master key ref is not valid base64", "err", err)
+		return nil
+	}
+	c, err := org.NewCipher(master)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Warn("durable cipher: invalid KMS master key", "err", err)
+		return nil
+	}
+	return c
+}
+
+// hostnameOr returns the OS hostname, or def when unavailable — a stable self id for
+// a single-pod deployment that sets no CLOUD_POD_NAME.
+func hostnameOr(def string) string {
+	if h, err := os.Hostname(); err == nil && h != "" {
+		return h
+	}
+	return def
+}
+
 func pickPaymentsClient(cfg *Config, log luxlog.Logger) PaymentsClient {
 	if cfg.PaymentsZAPAddr != "" {
 		log.Info("deps.Payments → ZAP RPC", "addr", cfg.PaymentsZAPAddr)
@@ -732,13 +962,12 @@ func pickVaultClient(cfg *Config, log luxlog.Logger) VaultClient {
 // deps for everything shared. Every subsystem in the fleet exports exactly this
 // signature, so Wire references each one directly and the compiler checks it.
 //
-// app was once `any`, on the stated grounds that an external module (licensing)
-// exposed func(any, Deps) error and narrowing would break it — while licensing
-// said it used `any` to avoid an import cycle in pkg/cloud. Each cited the other,
-// and the cycle could not exist: this package already imports zip, and zip does
-// not import cloud. The `any` bought nothing and cost every subsystem a Typed()
-// wrapper plus a runtime type assertion whose failure branch was unreachable.
-type MountFunc func(app *zip.App, deps Deps) error
+// app is a Router, not the concrete *zip.App, and that is the whole safety
+// property: middleware a subsystem installs lands on the subtrees its AppSpec
+// declares, never over the binary. Routes register exactly as before — absolute
+// paths, same precedence. See scope.go. A subsystem that genuinely gates
+// everything says so with Global: true and gets the bare app.
+type MountFunc func(app Router, deps Deps) error
 
 // ShutdownFunc releases a subsystem's process-lifetime resources (background
 // goroutines, open DB handles) on graceful shutdown. It must be idempotent and
@@ -746,11 +975,11 @@ type MountFunc func(app *zip.App, deps Deps) error
 // deadline so a slow teardown is cut off rather than hanging SIGTERM.
 type ShutdownFunc func(ctx context.Context) error
 
-// MountSpec describes one subsystem to mount. There is NO Order field: the slice
+// AppSpec describes one subsystem to mount. There is NO Order field: the slice
 // position in apps.Wire() IS the mount order — the composition root lists
 // subsystems in the exact sequence they mount (and, reversed, tear down), so order
 // is data read top-to-bottom in one file, not ints scattered across the tree.
-type MountSpec struct {
+type AppSpec struct {
 	Name     string
 	Mount    MountFunc
 	Shutdown ShutdownFunc // optional; nil means the subsystem has nothing to tear down.
@@ -759,11 +988,30 @@ type MountSpec struct {
 	// (a real, fail-closed probe). Serve's generic liveness loop skips these so
 	// its always-ok route never shadows the subsystem's real probe.
 	OwnsHealth bool
+
+	// Prefixes are the route subtrees whose middleware this subsystem may install.
+	// Empty means the convention it already follows — /v1/<Name>, the same subtree
+	// Serve's generic liveness route assumes — so only a subsystem that gates
+	// something else has to name it. It bounds MIDDLEWARE, not route registration:
+	// routes still register at absolute paths anywhere, as they always have.
+	Prefixes []string
+
+	// Global says this subsystem gates the whole binary and receives the bare
+	// *zip.App. It is the one way to reach app-wide middleware, so every grant is a
+	// decision someone made in writing, and apps.TestWireFrozen fails on a new one.
+	// Today it is held only by linked modules whose own Mount still takes *zip.App
+	// (see cloud.Global) — none of which installs middleware.
+	Global bool
 }
 
 // MountAll mounts every ENABLED subsystem in specs, in slice order — the order is
-// the composition root's (apps.Wire()); MountAll does NOT sort. app is the
-// concrete *zip.App from Serve, handed to each MountFunc as itself.
+// the composition root's (apps.Wire()); MountAll does NOT sort.
+//
+// app is the concrete *zip.App from Serve. A Global spec receives it. Everyone else
+// receives a scope bound to their declared Prefixes, so a subsystem's middleware
+// reaches its own subtrees and nothing else, whatever its slice position. A
+// subsystem that installs middleware outside them fails the mount — the binary
+// refuses to boot half-gated rather than serving with a stranger's gate on.
 //
 // Teardown is wired HERE, at mount time: right after a subsystem mounts, its
 // ShutdownFunc (if any) is registered via app.OnShutdown. zip drains those hooks
@@ -772,16 +1020,27 @@ type MountSpec struct {
 // its dependents is torn down after them) with no subsystem torn down while a
 // request still uses it. Only ENABLED specs mount, so only they register a hook;
 // teardown needs no separate enablement gate.
-func MountAll(app *zip.App, specs []MountSpec, cfg *Config, deps Deps) error {
+func MountAll(app *zip.App, specs []AppSpec, cfg *Config, deps Deps) error {
 	logger := deps.Logger
 	for _, spec := range specs {
 		if !cfg.Enabled(spec.Name) {
 			logger.Debug("subsystem disabled", "name", spec.Name)
 			continue
 		}
-		if err := spec.Mount(app, deps); err != nil {
+		var router Router = app
+		var sc *scope
+		if !spec.Global {
+			sc = newScope(app, spec.Name, spec.Prefixes)
+			router = sc
+		}
+		if err := spec.Mount(router, deps); err != nil {
 			return fmt.Errorf("mount %s: %w", spec.Name, err)
 		}
+		if sc != nil {
+			if err := sc.err(); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("mount %s: %w", spec.Name, err)
+			}
+		}
 		// Register teardown as a zip shutdown hook. zip runs hooks LIFO after the
 		// drain (zip.App.Shutdown), so this reproduces the reverse-mount order the
 		// hand-rolled reverse-loop gave — without the teardown-before-drain race.
@@ -792,3 +1051,19 @@ func MountAll(app *zip.App, specs []MountSpec, cfg *Config, deps Deps) error {
 	}
 	return nil
 }
+
+// masterKeyBytes decodes the base64 KMS master (CLOUD_KMS_MASTER_KEY_REF) into
+// the 32 raw bytes a subsystem needs to encrypt its own store. nil on absent or
+// malformed — never a partial or wrong-length key, because a wrong key encrypts
+// against a store no other key can open.
+func masterKeyBytes(cfg *Config) []byte {
+	ref := strings.TrimSpace(cfg.KMSMasterKeyRef)
+	if ref == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	master, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(ref)
+	if err != nil || len(master) != 32 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return master
+}

build_onshutdown_test.go

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ import (
 
 // noopMount mounts nothing: the fake specs below carry the behavior under test in
 // their Shutdown, not their Mount.
-func noopMount(*zip.App, cloud.Deps) error { return nil }
+func noopMount(cloud.Router, cloud.Deps) error { return nil }
 
 // freeAddr reserves an ephemeral loopback port and hands back its address; the
 // listener is closed so the app under test can bind it.
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ func TestMountAll_ShutdownHooksLIFOAfterDrain(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 
 	// Mount order a, b, c ⇒ LIFO teardown must be c, b, a.
-	specs := []cloud.MountSpec{
+	specs := []cloud.AppSpec{
 		{Name: "a", Mount: noopMount, Shutdown: record("a")},
 		{Name: "b", Mount: noopMount, Shutdown: record("b")},
 		{Name: "c", Mount: noopMount, Shutdown: record("c")},
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ func TestMountAll_ShutdownRegistration_EnablementAndNil(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 	}
 
-	specs := []cloud.MountSpec{
+	specs := []cloud.AppSpec{
 		{Name: "enabled", Mount: noopMount, Shutdown: record("enabled")},
 		{Name: "disabled", Mount: noopMount, Shutdown: record("disabled")},
 		{Name: "nilsd", Mount: noopMount}, // enabled, but no Shutdown

build_registration_test.go

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ import (
 	"testing"
 
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
-	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
 )
 
 // TestMountFunc_IsTheSubsystemSignature pins the registry's mount contract: the
@@ -24,5 +23,5 @@ import (
 //
 // What remains is the only claim worth making, and the build enforces it.
 func TestMountFunc_IsTheSubsystemSignature(t *testing.T) {
-	var _ cloud.MountFunc = func(*zip.App, cloud.Deps) error { return nil }
+	var _ cloud.MountFunc = func(cloud.Router, cloud.Deps) error { return nil }
 }

cek/cek.go

@@ -109,25 +109,60 @@ func SetMasterKey(k []byte) {
 	}
 }
 
-// resolveMaster resolves the process master key exactly once:
+// EnsureDevKey installs a deterministic development master key when NO key is
+// configured AND the live codec is not linked — i.e. a pure-Go dev/CI build. It
+// lets that build run through the SAME encrypted path as production (per-db DEK,
+// SQLCipher-format envelope) with zero configuration, instead of a divergent
+// plaintext path. It is a NO-OP when a key is already configured (production uses
+// it) or the live codec is linked (a production binary, which MUST supply the real
+// KMS key and fails closed without it). Call once at boot, before the first Open.
+// Returns true when a dev key was installed. Not safe against a concurrent Open —
+// resolveMaster caches on first use, so this must run first.
+func EnsureDevKey() bool {
+	if len(masterOverride) == 32 || strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(masterKeyEnv)) != "" {
+		return false // a real key is configured — use it
+	}
+	if sqlitedrv.CodecLinked() {
+		return false // production build — require the real key (resolveMaster fails closed)
+	}
+	SetMasterKey(devKey())
+	return true
+}
+
+// devKey derives the deterministic development master key. It is intentionally
+// well-known — dev/CI data is not secret — and exists only so a pure-Go build
+// encrypts through the production code path rather than diverging to plaintext. It
+// is never reachable on a codec-linked (production) build; EnsureDevKey gates it.
+func devKey() []byte {
+	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte("hanzo-cloud-dev-cek-master-v1"))
+	return sum[:]
+}
+
+// resolveMaster resolves the process master key exactly once. Every build encrypts
+// a keyed store — the live libsqlcipher codec when it is linked, the pure-Go codec
+// envelope otherwise (EncryptionAvailable is always true) — so a store is either
+// keyed-and-encrypted or it does not open. There is no plaintext-at-rest mode:
 //
-//	(key, nil)   — 32-byte key AND an encryption-capable build → encrypt.
-//	(nil, nil)   — no key AND a non-encrypting (pure-Go) build → dev/CI plaintext.
-//	(nil, error) — key malformed; OR key set on a non-encrypting build; OR NO key
-//	               on an encryption-capable build. The last is the production
-//	               fail-closed: a capable binary never silently ships plaintext.
+//	(key, nil)   — 32-byte key configured → encrypt (live codec or envelope; both
+//	               write ciphertext at rest).
+//	(nil, error) — no key, OR a malformed key. Opening the data plane with no key is
+//	               the fatal case: a build that can encrypt must never ship plaintext.
+//	               Dev/CI supplies a deterministic dev key at boot (SetMasterKey) so
+//	               it runs encrypted with zero config; production supplies the KMS key.
 func resolveMaster() ([]byte, error) {
 	masterOnce.Do(func() {
 		raw := masterOverride
 		if len(raw) == 0 {
 			b64 := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv(masterKeyEnv))
 			if b64 == "" {
+				// EncryptionAvailable is always true, so this is always fatal: a build
+				// that can encrypt never opens the data plane unencrypted. Callers that
+				// want a keyless dev run inject a dev key via SetMasterKey before Open.
 				if sqlitedrv.EncryptionAvailable() {
-					masterErr = fmt.Errorf("cek: %s is required on an encryption-capable build; "+
-						"refusing to open the data plane unencrypted (set the KMS master key, "+
-						"or run a pure-Go dev build)", masterKeyEnv)
+					masterErr = fmt.Errorf("cek: %s is required; refusing to open the data plane "+
+						"unencrypted (set the KMS master key, or inject a dev key at boot)", masterKeyEnv)
 				}
-				return // pure-Go dev/CI: plaintext is expected (no codec linked)
+				return
 			}
 			decoded, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(b64)
 			if err != nil {
@@ -140,37 +175,99 @@ func resolveMaster() ([]byte, error) {
 			masterErr = fmt.Errorf("cek: master key must decode to 32 bytes, got %d", len(raw))
 			return
 		}
-		if !sqlitedrv.EncryptionAvailable() {
-			masterErr = fmt.Errorf("cek: %s is set but this build cannot encrypt (pure-Go sqlite); "+
-				"rebuild CGO_ENABLED=1 linked against libsqlcipher, or unset it for a dev build", masterKeyEnv)
-			return
-		}
+		// A configured key always encrypts: the live codec when linked, the pure-Go
+		// codec envelope otherwise. There is no "key set but cannot encrypt" case.
 		masterKey = raw
 	})
 	return masterKey, masterErr
 }
 
 // Encrypting reports whether cek will encrypt at rest (a valid master key is
-// configured on an encryption-capable build). cloud calls this once at boot for
-// the posture log; a false result on a capable build means resolveMaster errored
-// and the first store Open will fail closed.
+// configured). cloud calls this once at boot for the posture log; a false result
+// means resolveMaster errored (no or invalid key) and the first store Open will
+// fail closed rather than write plaintext.
 func Encrypting() bool {
 	k, err := resolveMaster()
 	return err == nil && len(k) == 32
 }
 
+// inMemory reports whether path names an in-memory database rather than a file.
+// SQLite spells that ":memory:", or any file: URI carrying mode=memory (including
+// the shared-cache form, where several handles address ONE in-memory database by
+// name). None of them produce a file, so none of them are cek's business.
+func inMemory(path string) bool {
+	p := strings.TrimSpace(path)
+	if p == ":memory:" {
+		return true
+	}
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(p, "file:") {
+		return false
+	}
+	if strings.HasPrefix(p, "file::memory:") {
+		return true
+	}
+	// mode=memory as a query parameter, e.g. file:name?mode=memory&cache=shared.
+	q := p
+	if i := strings.IndexByte(p, '?'); i >= 0 {
+		q = p[i+1:]
+	}
+	for _, kv := range strings.Split(q, "&") {
+		if strings.TrimSpace(kv) == "mode=memory" {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// Exists reports whether a store lives at path — the question "has this org/
+// subsystem been created yet?", asked by every caller that discovers stores by
+// walking the data directory.
+//
+// os.Stat on the database file alone does NOT answer it. The pure-Go codec holds
+// the database in its envelope and materializes the file on close, so a store that
+// is OPEN right now has only its sidecar on disk; the live codec writes the
+// database in place and has both. A caller that stats only the database therefore
+// sees a store on one build and not the other, and on the pure-Go build skips
+// precisely the stores that are in use. cek mints the sidecar eagerly, before the
+// first byte of database is written, on both codecs — so "database or sidecar" is
+// the marker that holds on every build and at every point in a store's life.
+//
+// The layout stays cek's own: callers ask this rather than knowing the suffix.
+func Exists(path string) bool {
+	if _, err := os.Stat(path); err == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	_, err := os.Stat(path + dekSuffix)
+	return err == nil
+}
+
 // Open returns a *sql.DB for the SQLite database at path, encrypted at rest when
 // a master key is configured. It is the single drop-in replacement for
 // sql.Open("sqlite", path) across every cloud store.
 func Open(path string) (*sql.DB, error) {
+	// An in-memory database never reaches disk, so there is nothing at rest to
+	// encrypt and no master key to require. Treating the spelling as a filename
+	// instead creates a FILE literally named ":memory:" — silently making an
+	// ephemeral store durable, and making every opener of ":memory:" in a given
+	// working directory share one store.
+	if inMemory(path) {
+		// Opened on the registered driver with the DSN exactly as given: an
+		// in-memory DSN is already a complete DSN, and the keyed builder would wrap
+		// it as a filename (file::memory: becomes a file named "file::memory:").
+		db, err := sql.Open("sqlite", path)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("cek: open in-memory %q: %w", path, err)
+		}
+		return db, nil
+	}
 	master, err := resolveMaster()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	if master == nil {
-		// Only reachable on a non-encrypting dev/CI build (a capable build with no
-		// key already errored above). Preserve the prior bare-path behavior.
-		return sql.Open("sqlite", path)
+		// Unreachable: resolveMaster returns a 32-byte key or a non-nil error, never
+		// (nil, nil). Fail closed anyway — cek never opens a store plaintext.
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("cek: no master key resolved for %q", path)
 	}
 	return openEncrypted(path, master)
 }
@@ -339,6 +436,16 @@ func openExisting(path string, master []byte) (*sql.DB, error) {
 // the encrypted copy reproduces the source schema + per-table content hash +
 // integrity_check, re-opened via the exact keyed path the app uses).
 func migrateThenOpen(path string, master []byte) (*sql.DB, error) {
+	// Converting an existing plaintext database to SQLCipher uses libsqlcipher's
+	// ATTACH ... KEY + sqlcipher_export (see exportPlaintext), which only the live C
+	// codec provides. The pure-Go envelope opens and creates encrypted stores but
+	// cannot run that in-engine conversion; refuse cleanly rather than fail deep in
+	// the export. Legacy-plaintext migration is a production operation, and
+	// production links the live codec; a pure-Go dev/CI run starts from fresh
+	// encrypted stores (createFresh) instead.
+	if !sqlitedrv.CodecLinked() {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("cek: converting plaintext database %q to encrypted requires the live libsqlcipher codec; run a libsqlcipher-linked build to migrate it, or remove it to start from a fresh encrypted store", path)
+	}
 	dekPath := path + dekSuffix
 	// Plaintext header ⇒ an earlier attempt did not commit: discard any stale
 	// sidecar/tmp and redo from the plaintext source of truth.

cek/cek_test.go

@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ func requireCipher(t *testing.T) {
 		}
 		t.Skip(msg)
 	}
-	if !sqlitedrv.EncryptionAvailable() {
-		skipOrFail("sqlite build cannot encrypt (pure-Go); run with CGO + libsqlcipher")
+	if !sqlitedrv.CodecLinked() {
+		skipOrFail("sqlite build lacks the live libsqlcipher codec (pure-Go envelope encrypts, but these tests migrate via sqlcipher_export); run with CGO + libsqlcipher")
 		return
 	}
 	probe := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "probe.db")
@@ -317,6 +317,38 @@ func TestMissingKeyFatalOnCapableBuild(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestEnsureDevKeyEncryptsOnPureGo proves the zero-config dev posture: a pure-Go
+// build with no configured key installs a deterministic dev key and runs through
+// the SAME encrypted path as production — the store is ciphertext at rest, never
+// plaintext. On a codec-linked (production) build EnsureDevKey is a no-op.
+func TestEnsureDevKeyEncryptsOnPureGo(t *testing.T) {
+	if sqlitedrv.CodecLinked() {
+		t.Skip("codec-linked build: EnsureDevKey is a no-op; production requires the real key")
+	}
+	resetMaster(nil)
+	os.Unsetenv(masterKeyEnv)
+
+	if !EnsureDevKey() {
+		t.Fatal("EnsureDevKey should install a dev key on a pure-Go build with no key")
+	}
+	if EnsureDevKey() {
+		t.Fatal("EnsureDevKey must be idempotent — a no-op once a key is installed")
+	}
+
+	path := filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "settings.db")
+	db, err := Open(path)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("open with dev key: %v", err)
+	}
+	if _, err := db.Exec(`CREATE TABLE t(x)`); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("ddl: %v", err)
+	}
+	_ = db.Close()
+	if isPlaintextHeader(path) {
+		t.Fatal("SECURITY: dev-key store is plaintext at rest")
+	}
+}
+
 // TestContentHashCatchesMutation (RED MED #4): the content hash catches a value
 // change that row-count + schema + integrity_check all miss, AND does NOT
 // false-positive on the benign implicit-rowid renumbering sqlcipher_export does.

cek/inmemory_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package cek
+
+import (
+	"os"
+	"path/filepath"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestInMemoryNeverTouchesDisk pins the distinction cek has to make: an in-memory
+// database is not a path. Treating ":memory:" as a filename created a real, durable,
+// encrypted file of that name in the working directory — every opener in that
+// directory silently sharing one store, and an ephemeral store outliving its process.
+func TestInMemoryNeverTouchesDisk(t *testing.T) {
+	EnsureDevKey()
+	dir := t.TempDir()
+	wd, err := os.Getwd()
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("getwd: %v", err)
+	}
+	if err := os.Chdir(dir); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("chdir: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.Chdir(wd) })
+
+	for _, dsn := range []string{":memory:", "file::memory:", "file:x?mode=memory&cache=shared"} {
+		db, err := Open(dsn)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("Open(%q): %v", dsn, err)
+		}
+		if _, err := db.Exec(`CREATE TABLE t (v TEXT)`); err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("Open(%q): unusable: %v", dsn, err)
+		}
+		_ = db.Close()
+	}
+
+	ents, err := os.ReadDir(dir)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("readdir: %v", err)
+	}
+	for _, e := range ents {
+		t.Errorf("in-memory open left %q on disk", filepath.Join(dir, e.Name()))
+	}
+}
+
+// TestInMemoryPredicate pins which DSNs are in-memory — a real path must never be
+// mistaken for one, or it would open unencrypted.
+func TestInMemoryPredicate(t *testing.T) {
+	for dsn, want := range map[string]bool{
+		":memory:":                        true,
+		"  :memory:  ":                    true,
+		"file::memory:":                   true,
+		"file:x?mode=memory":              true,
+		"file:x?cache=shared&mode=memory": true,
+		"/var/lib/cloud/orgs/acme/kms.db": false,
+		"memory.db":                       false,
+		"file:/var/lib/x.db":              false,
+		"file:x?mode=ro":                  false,
+		"":                                false,
+	} {
+		if got := inMemory(dsn); got != want {
+			t.Errorf("inMemory(%q) = %v, want %v", dsn, got, want)
+		}
+	}
+}

cli/cli.go

@@ -105,8 +105,8 @@ type Config struct {
 	PlatformURL string `json:"platform_url,omitempty"`
 	CloudURL    string `json:"cloud_url,omitempty"`
 	ClientID    string `json:"client_id,omitempty"`
-	APIKey      string `json:"apiKey,omitempty"`   // hk-… key; what `hanzo code` hands the agents
-	CodeTool    string `json:"code_tool,omitempty"` // default agent for bare `hanzo` / `hanzo code`: dev|claude|codex
+	APIKey      string `json:"apiKey,omitempty"`     // hk-… key; what `hanzo code` hands the agents
+	CodeTool    string `json:"code_tool,omitempty"`  // default agent for bare `hanzo` / `hanzo code`: dev|claude|codex
 	CodeModel   string `json:"code_model,omitempty"` // default model for `hanzo code` (else defaultCodeModel)
 }
 
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ func newRootCmd() *cobra.Command {
 	pf := root.PersistentFlags()
 	pf.StringVar(&f.org, "org", "", "organization (overrides config / HANZO_ORG)")
 	pf.StringVarP(&f.output, "output", "o", "", "output format: table|json")
-	pf.StringVar(&f.platformURL, "platform-url", "", "platform base URL (default "+defaultPlatformURL+")")
+	pf.StringVar(&f.platformURL, "platform-url", "", "platform base URL (default "+defaultPlatformURL+"); `hanzo build` targets --cloud-url instead")
 	pf.StringVar(&f.iamIssuer, "iam-issuer", "", "IAM issuer (default "+defaultIAMIssuer+")")
 	pf.StringVar(&f.cloudURL, "cloud-url", "", "cloud API base URL (default "+defaultCloudURL+")")
 	pf.StringVar(&f.clientID, "client-id", "", "IAM OAuth client id (default "+defaultClientID+")")

cli/code.go

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ package cli
 // remember.
 //
 //	hanzo code claude              # Claude Code on the default model
-//	hanzo code codex deepseek-v4-pro
-//	hanzo code dev glm5.2          # ids are resolved fuzzily: glm5.2 -> glm-5.2
+//	hanzo code codex enso-pro
+//	hanzo code dev zen5            # ids are resolved fuzzily: zen5pro -> zen5-pro
 //	hanzo code ls                  # what can I run?
 //
 // Two wire protocols cover all three agents: Claude Code speaks Anthropic,
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ func (t zenTier) slotID() string {
 var zenTiers = []zenTier{
 	{zen: "zen5-flash", env: "ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL", name: "Zen5 Flash", desc: "Hanzo Zen5 Flash — fast, cheap tier"},
 	{zen: "zen5", carrier: "claude-sonnet-4-6[1m]", env: "ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_SONNET_MODEL", name: "Zen5", desc: "Hanzo Zen5 — frontier tier (1M context)"},
-	{zen: "zen5-pro", carrier: "claude-opus-4-8[1m]", env: "ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_OPUS_MODEL", name: "Zen5 Pro", desc: "Hanzo Zen5 Pro — DeepSeek-V4 class (1M context)"},
+	{zen: "zen5-pro", carrier: "claude-opus-4-8[1m]", env: "ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_OPUS_MODEL", name: "Zen5 Pro", desc: "Hanzo Zen5 Pro — deep reasoning (1M context)"},
 	{zen: "zen5-pro", carrier: "claude-fable-5[1m]", env: "ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_FABLE_MODEL", name: "Zen5 Pro (max effort)", desc: "Hanzo Zen5 Pro, top tier (1M context)"},
 	{zen: "zen5-coder", carrier: "claude-sonnet-5", name: "Zen5 Coder", desc: "Hanzo Zen5 Coder — code-specialized (1M context)"},
 }
@@ -144,19 +144,32 @@ func openaiWire(base, token, _ string) map[string]string {
 }
 
 type codeAgent struct {
-	bin          string                     // executable to exec
-	wire         wire                       // how it finds the cloud
-	fullAuto     []string                   // flags that bypass approval prompts
-	continueArgs []string                   // harness-native form of Hanzo -c/--continue
-	modelArg     []string                   // how the model is passed on argv (empty: via env)
-	carrier      func(model string) string  // maps the resolved model to a client-recognized id (claude: zen→carrier); nil = pass through
-	provider     func(base string) []string // agents that need the endpoint declared, not just env'd
-	clear        []string                   // env that would shadow the wire (a stale key in the shell)
-	configHome   string                     // env var that relocates the agent's config dir to ~/.hanzo ("" = share the user's own install)
-	seed         func(dir string) error     // one-time defaults for the isolated config dir
-	appendSystem []string                   // --append-system-prompt + text; ALWAYS applied (identity, not a permission bypass — present in --safe too)
-	mcp          bool                       // auto-wire the Hanzo MCP server (code/vector/web/vision tools) as an stdio server scoped to the cwd
-	install      string                     // hint when the binary is missing
+	bin          string                            // executable to exec
+	wire         wire                              // how it finds the cloud
+	fullAuto     []string                          // flags that bypass approval prompts
+	continueArgs []string                          // harness-native form of Hanzo -c/--continue
+	modelArg     []string                          // how the model is passed on argv (empty: via env)
+	carrier      func(model string) string         // maps the resolved model to a client-recognized id (claude: zen→carrier); nil = pass through
+	provider     func(base, model string) []string // agents that need the endpoint declared, not just env'd
+	clear        []string                          // env that would shadow the wire (a stale key in the shell)
+	configHome   string                            // env var that relocates the agent's config dir to ~/.hanzo ("" = share the user's own install)
+	seed         func(dir string) error            // one-time defaults for the isolated config dir
+	appendSystem []string                          // --append-system-prompt + text; ALWAYS applied (identity, not a permission bypass — present in --safe too)
+	mcp          bool                              // auto-wire the Hanzo MCP server (code/vector/web/vision tools) as an stdio server scoped to the cwd
+	install      string                            // hint when the binary is missing
+}
+
+// codeContextWindow is the input context (tokens) the served coding model
+// budgets from. The enso and zen5 flagship tiers serve 1M; the flash tiers
+// serve 131072. Codex is told this so it sizes context to the real window
+// instead of a flat 256K cap — the cause of "maximum context exceeded" at
+// 262144 even on a 1M-capable model. This wrapper only launches Hanzo coding
+// models (default zen5), so non-flash defaults to the 1M flagship window.
+func codeContextWindow(model string) int {
+	if strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(model), "flash") {
+		return 131072
+	}
+	return 1000000
 }
 
 // codex and @hanzo/dev share a lineage (dev is a Codex fork), hence a wire.
@@ -169,19 +182,23 @@ func codexLike(bin, install string) codeAgent {
 		fullAuto:     []string{"--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox"},
 		continueArgs: []string{"resume", "--last"},
 		modelArg:     []string{"-m"},
-		provider: func(base string) []string {
+		provider: func(base, model string) []string {
+			// api.hanzo.ai exposes the standard OpenAI /v1/models shape, not
+			// Codex's private remote model-catalog schema, so skip that refresh
+			// and supply the model's window here — sized to the SERVED model
+			// (enso / zen5 flagship = 1M, flash tiers = 131072) so Codex budgets
+			// the real context instead of a flat 256K cap (the "maximum context
+			// exceeded at 262144" bug). Auto-compact at 90% leaves headroom.
+			win := codeContextWindow(model)
 			return []string{
 				"-c", "model_provider=hanzo",
 				"-c", `model_providers.hanzo.name="Hanzo"`,
 				"-c", fmt.Sprintf(`model_providers.hanzo.base_url="%s/v1"`, strings.TrimSuffix(base, "/")),
 				"-c", `model_providers.hanzo.env_key="OPENAI_API_KEY"`,
 				"-c", `model_providers.hanzo.wire_api="responses"`,
-				// api.hanzo.ai exposes the standard OpenAI /v1/models shape,
-				// not Codex's private remote model-catalog schema. Skip that
-				// optional refresh and supply the coding model's metadata here.
 				"-c", `features.remote_models=false`,
-				"-c", `model_context_window=262144`,
-				"-c", `model_auto_compact_token_limit=235929`,
+				"-c", fmt.Sprintf("model_context_window=%d", win),
+				"-c", fmt.Sprintf("model_auto_compact_token_limit=%d", win*9/10),
 			}
 		},
 		install: install,
@@ -255,14 +272,14 @@ func newCodeCmd(envOf func() *Env, _ *globalFlags) *cobra.Command {
 		Long: "Run @hanzo/dev, Claude Code, or Codex against api.hanzo.ai with the endpoint,\n" +
 			"credential and model injected — no env vars to remember. `hanzo code` alone runs\n" +
 			"dev (the Hanzo agent); name an agent to pick another. Model ids resolve fuzzily\n" +
-			"(glm5.2 -> glm-5.2), -c resumes either harness, and agents run full-auto unless\n" +
+			"(zen5pro -> zen5-pro), -c resumes either harness, and agents run full-auto unless\n" +
 			"you pass --safe. Unknown options pass through; -- forces verbatim passthrough.",
 		Example: "  hanzo code                 # dev, the default agent\n" +
 			"  hanzo code claude\n" +
 			"  hanzo code claude -c\n" +
 			"  hanzo code codex -c\n" +
-			"  hanzo code codex deepseek-v4-pro\n" +
-			"  hanzo code dev glm5.2 -- --resume\n" +
+			"  hanzo code codex enso-pro\n" +
+			"  hanzo code dev zen5 -- --resume\n" +
 			"  hanzo code ls",
 		// Bare `hanzo code` (or `hanzo code <model>/-- args` with no agent name) runs
 		// the configured default agent (code_tool, else dev). A recognized agent name
@@ -447,7 +464,7 @@ func codeArgv(agent codeAgent, base, model string, safe bool, rest []string) []s
 		argv = append(argv, agent.fullAuto...)
 	}
 	if agent.provider != nil {
-		argv = append(argv, agent.provider(base)...)
+		argv = append(argv, agent.provider(base, model)...)
 	}
 	if len(agent.modelArg) > 0 { // claude takes the model via env, codex/dev on argv
 		argv = append(argv, agent.modelArg...)

cli/code_test.go

@@ -100,19 +100,42 @@ func TestCodeUnknownOptionsAndPostSeparatorArgsPassThrough(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestCodexProviderUsesNativeResponsesMetadata(t *testing.T) {
+	// defaultCodeModel is zen5 — a 1M flagship tier — so the window must be 1M,
+	// NOT the old flat 262144 cap that surfaced as "maximum context exceeded"
+	// even on a 1M-capable model. Auto-compact is 90% of the window.
 	argv := codeArgv(codeAgents["codex"], "https://api.hanzo.ai", defaultCodeModel, false, nil)
 	for _, want := range []string{
 		`model_provider=hanzo`,
 		`model_providers.hanzo.base_url="https://api.hanzo.ai/v1"`,
 		`model_providers.hanzo.wire_api="responses"`,
 		`features.remote_models=false`,
-		`model_context_window=262144`,
-		`model_auto_compact_token_limit=235929`,
+		`model_context_window=1000000`,
+		`model_auto_compact_token_limit=900000`,
 	} {
 		if !slices.Contains(argv, want) {
 			t.Errorf("Codex argv %q does not contain %q", argv, want)
 		}
 	}
+	// A flash tier budgets its smaller real window, not 1M.
+	flash := codeArgv(codeAgents["codex"], "https://api.hanzo.ai", "zen5-flash", false, nil)
+	if !slices.Contains(flash, `model_context_window=131072`) {
+		t.Errorf("zen5-flash argv %q must budget 131072, not the flagship 1M", flash)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCodeContextWindowSizing pins the model→window map: every non-flash tier
+// gets the 1M flagship window; only flash tiers drop to 131072.
+func TestCodeContextWindowSizing(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, m := range []string{"zen5", "zen5-pro", "zen5-coder", "enso", "enso-ultra"} {
+		if w := codeContextWindow(m); w != 1000000 {
+			t.Errorf("codeContextWindow(%q) = %d, want 1000000", m, w)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, m := range []string{"zen5-flash", "enso-flash"} {
+		if w := codeContextWindow(m); w != 131072 {
+			t.Errorf("codeContextWindow(%q) = %d, want 131072", m, w)
+		}
+	}
 }
 
 // TestCodeTokenPrecedence locks in the 402 unblock: a fresh `hanzo login` JWT

cli/commands.go

@@ -16,6 +16,13 @@ func (e *Env) platform(gf *globalFlags) *Platform {
 	return newPlatform(e.PlatformURL, e.platformToken(gf.platformToken))
 }
 
+// runner builds the client for POST /v1/runner. That route is served by the
+// cloud binary, not by the platform app, so it is reached at CloudURL — the
+// platform host answers 500 for it. One route, one implementation, one door.
+func (e *Env) runner(gf *globalFlags) *Platform {
+	return newPlatform(e.CloudURL, e.platformToken(gf.platformToken))
+}
+
 // dashIfEmpty renders a string cell, "-" when empty.
 func dashIfEmpty(s string) string {
 	if s == "" {
@@ -279,7 +286,7 @@ func newBuildCmd(envOf func() *Env, gf *globalFlags) *cobra.Command {
 			if br.OrganizationID == "" {
 				br.OrganizationID = e.Org // optional; server defaults to DEFAULT_BUILD_ORG_ID
 			}
-			job, err := e.platform(gf).EnqueueBuild(cmd.Context(), br, e.buildToken(buildToken))
+			job, err := e.runner(gf).EnqueueBuild(cmd.Context(), br, e.buildToken(buildToken))
 			if err != nil {
 				return err
 			}

cli/commands_test.go

@@ -38,6 +38,20 @@ func withPlatform(t *testing.T, h http.HandlerFunc) string {
 	return srv.URL
 }
 
+// withCloud is withPlatform's sibling for routes the CLOUD binary serves.
+// /v1/runner is one: the platform host does not implement it, so a build sent
+// to PlatformURL answers 500 there and 401 here. Pointing this at CloudURL is
+// what the test is asserting.
+func withCloud(t *testing.T, h http.HandlerFunc) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	sandbox(t)
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(h)
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	t.Setenv("HANZO_CLOUD_URL", srv.URL)
+	t.Setenv("HANZO_PLATFORM_TOKEN", "svc-tok")
+	return srv.URL
+}
+
 // apps list hits the LIVE board path /v1/paas/apps and renders the fleet table.
 func TestAppsListCommandTable(t *testing.T) {
 	withPlatform(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
@@ -214,7 +228,7 @@ func TestBuildCommandValidation(t *testing.T) {
 }
 
 func TestBuildCommand(t *testing.T) {
-	withPlatform(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+	withCloud(t, func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		if r.URL.Path != "/v1/runner" {
 			t.Errorf("path = %s", r.URL.Path)
 		}

cli/gpu.go

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ package cli
 // --serve-engine adds the `engine.serve` capability: the worker probes a local
 // hanzo-engine (the OpenAI + Anthropic model server on :1234), advertises its model
 // endpoint in the presence record, and prints (or with --register-provider, POSTs)
-// the /v1/add-provider call that routes api.hanzo.ai model traffic to this GPU. One
+// the POST /v1/ai/providers call that routes api.hanzo.ai model traffic to this GPU. One
 // fleet, two job types: engine.serve (model serving) alongside studio.render.
 
 import (
@@ -42,8 +42,10 @@ import (
 	"sort"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
+	"sync"
 	"syscall"
 	"time"
+	"unicode"
 
 	"github.com/spf13/cobra"
 )
@@ -90,6 +92,7 @@ const (
 const (
 	studioCap = "studio.render"
 	engineCap = "engine.serve"
+	fnCap     = "fn.run" // ephemeral script execution (uv-run) on this node
 )
 
 // The node-level command surface — `hanzo link | unlink | status` — is wired in
@@ -152,6 +155,8 @@ type engineAdvertisement struct {
 type gpuInfo struct {
 	Name        string `json:"name"`
 	MemoryTotal string `json:"memoryTotal,omitempty"`
+	Arch        string `json:"arch,omitempty"`    // native target, e.g. "gfx1151" (AMD)
+	Unified     bool   `json:"unified,omitempty"` // memory is a unified CPU/GPU pool (APU / SoC)
 }
 
 // registration is the fleet presence activity's Input — the shape cloud's
@@ -172,6 +177,10 @@ type registration struct {
 	Memory       int64                `json:"memory,omitempty"`
 	Version      string               `json:"version"`
 	JobQueue     string               `json:"jobQueue"`
+	Rocm         string               `json:"rocm,omitempty"`   // host ROCm version (AMD only)
+	Hip          string               `json:"hip,omitempty"`    // host HIP version (AMD only)
+	Cuda         string               `json:"cuda,omitempty"`   // host CUDA toolkit version (NVIDIA only)
+	Driver       string               `json:"driver,omitempty"` // host NVIDIA driver version
 	GPUs         []gpuInfo            `json:"gpus"`
 	Capabilities []string             `json:"capabilities,omitempty"`
 	Engine       *engineAdvertisement `json:"engine,omitempty"`
@@ -276,6 +285,9 @@ func newWorker(env *Env, jobsNS string) (*worker, error) {
 		"echo":          echoHandler,
 		"studio.render": w.studioRenderHandler,
 	}
+	if _, err := exec.LookPath("uv"); err == nil {
+		w.handlers[fnCap] = fnRunHandler // functions-runner: needs uv, nothing else
+	}
 	return w, nil
 }
 
@@ -311,25 +323,74 @@ func detectGPUs() []gpuInfo {
 	return nil
 }
 
-// detectNvidiaGPUs reports NVIDIA accelerators via nvidia-smi (name + total VRAM).
+// detectNvidiaGPUs reports NVIDIA accelerators via nvidia-smi: name, memory,
+// and the sm arch (compute capability). A unified SoC (GB10 Grace-Blackwell)
+// reports memory.total as "[N/A]" — there is no dedicated VRAM counter — so it
+// reports the MACHINE's RAM snapped to hardware capacity, unified=true, the
+// same convention the AMD APU and Apple paths use.
 func detectNvidiaGPUs() []gpuInfo {
-	out, err := exec.Command("nvidia-smi", "--query-gpu=name,memory.total", "--format=csv,noheader").Output()
+	out, err := exec.Command("nvidia-smi", "--query-gpu=name,memory.total,compute_cap", "--format=csv,noheader").Output()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil
 	}
+	return parseNvidiaSmiCSV(out, detectMemTotal()/(1<<20))
+}
+
+// parseNvidiaSmiCSV parses `nvidia-smi --query-gpu=name,memory.total,compute_cap`
+// output ("NVIDIA GB10, [N/A], 12.1"). Pure — hostMiB is injected for the
+// unified-SoC memory figure.
+func parseNvidiaSmiCSV(out []byte, hostMiB int64) []gpuInfo {
 	var gpus []gpuInfo
 	sc := bufio.NewScanner(bytes.NewReader(out))
 	for sc.Scan() {
-		line := strings.TrimSpace(sc.Text())
-		if line == "" {
+		fields := strings.Split(sc.Text(), ",")
+		if len(fields) < 2 || strings.TrimSpace(fields[0]) == "" {
 			continue
 		}
-		name, mem, _ := strings.Cut(line, ",")
-		gpus = append(gpus, gpuInfo{Name: strings.TrimSpace(name), MemoryTotal: strings.TrimSpace(mem)})
+		g := gpuInfo{Name: strings.TrimSpace(fields[0]), MemoryTotal: strings.TrimSpace(fields[1])}
+		var memMiB int64
+		if _, err := fmt.Sscanf(g.MemoryTotal, "%d MiB", &memMiB); err != nil || memMiB <= 0 {
+			// No dedicated VRAM counter — a unified SoC. The machine's RAM is
+			// the GPU's RAM.
+			if hostMiB > 0 {
+				g.MemoryTotal = fmt.Sprintf("%d MiB", snapUnified(hostMiB))
+				g.Unified = true
+			} else {
+				g.MemoryTotal = ""
+			}
+		}
+		if len(fields) >= 3 {
+			if cap := strings.TrimSpace(fields[2]); cap != "" && cap != "[N/A]" {
+				g.Arch = "sm_" + strings.ReplaceAll(cap, ".", "")
+			}
+		}
+		gpus = append(gpus, g)
 	}
 	return gpus
 }
 
+// nvidiaSoft is the host CUDA/driver inventory, detected once — the NVIDIA
+// mirror of amdSoftware. Empty on non-NVIDIA hosts.
+type nvidiaSoft struct{ cuda, driver string }
+
+var nvidiaSoftware = sync.OnceValue(func() nvidiaSoft {
+	var v nvidiaSoft
+	if out, err := exec.Command("nvidia-smi", "--query-gpu=driver_version", "--format=csv,noheader").Output(); err == nil {
+		v.driver = strings.TrimSpace(strings.SplitN(string(out), "\n", 2)[0])
+	}
+	if b, err := os.ReadFile("/usr/local/cuda/version.json"); err == nil {
+		var m struct {
+			Cuda struct {
+				Version string `json:"version"`
+			} `json:"cuda"`
+		}
+		if json.Unmarshal(b, &m) == nil {
+			v.cuda = m.Cuda.Version
+		}
+	}
+	return v
+})
+
 // detectAmdGPUs reports AMD accelerators — discrete Radeon cards and gfx APUs alike
 // (e.g. evo's gfx1151 Radeon 8060S on the RYZEN AI MAX+ 395). Resolution order:
 // rocm-smi (marketing name + gfx target), then the kfd topology under /sys (gfx
@@ -338,11 +399,11 @@ func detectNvidiaGPUs() []gpuInfo {
 func detectAmdGPUs() []gpuInfo {
 	if out, err := exec.Command("rocm-smi", "--showproductname", "--csv").Output(); err == nil {
 		if gpus := parseRocmSmiCSV(out); len(gpus) > 0 {
-			return fillAmdVRAM(gpus, amdVRAMTotals(sysfsDRM))
+			return apuProcessorNames(fillAmdVRAM(gpus, amdVRAMTotals(sysfsDRM)), detectCPUModel())
 		}
 	}
 	if gpus := parseKfdTopology(sysfsKfdNodes); len(gpus) > 0 {
-		return fillAmdVRAM(gpus, amdVRAMTotals(sysfsDRM))
+		return apuProcessorNames(fillAmdVRAM(gpus, amdVRAMTotals(sysfsDRM)), detectCPUModel())
 	}
 	if out, err := exec.Command("vulkaninfo", "--summary").Output(); err == nil {
 		if gpus := parseVulkaninfoSummary(out); len(gpus) > 0 {
@@ -388,12 +449,17 @@ func parseRocmSmiCSV(out []byte) []gpuInfo {
 		if name == "" {
 			continue
 		}
+		arch := ""
 		if gfx >= 0 && gfx < len(fields) {
 			if v := strings.TrimSpace(fields[gfx]); v != "" {
+				arch = v
 				name += " (" + v + ")"
 			}
 		}
-		gpus = append(gpus, gpuInfo{Name: name})
+		if fam := amdFamily(arch); fam != "" {
+			name = fam + " \u00b7 " + name
+		}
+		gpus = append(gpus, gpuInfo{Name: name, Arch: arch})
 	}
 	return gpus
 }
@@ -422,7 +488,12 @@ func parseKfdTopology(nodesDir string) []gpuInfo {
 		if simd <= 0 || gfxVer <= 0 {
 			continue // CPU node or non-GPU
 		}
-		gpus = append(gpus, gpuInfo{Name: "AMD GPU (" + gfxName(gfxVer) + ")"})
+		arch := gfxName(gfxVer)
+		name := "AMD GPU (" + arch + ")"
+		if fam := amdFamily(arch); fam != "" {
+			name = fam + " (" + arch + ")"
+		}
+		gpus = append(gpus, gpuInfo{Name: name, Arch: arch})
 	}
 	return gpus
 }
@@ -452,9 +523,119 @@ func gfxName(v int) string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf("gfx%d%d%d", v/10000, (v/100)%100, v%100)
 }
 
-// amdVRAMTotals returns each amdgpu card's total VRAM in MiB, in DRM card order,
-// read from /sys/class/drm/card*/device/mem_info_vram_total (vendor 0x1002).
-func amdVRAMTotals(drmDir string) []int64 {
+// amdFamily maps a gfx target to the APU/SoC family marketing name, so the board
+// says what the silicon IS ("AMD Strix Halo"), not just the iGPU series. Discrete
+// cards return "" and keep their own name.
+func amdFamily(arch string) string {
+	switch arch {
+	case "gfx1151":
+		return "AMD Strix Halo"
+	case "gfx1150":
+		return "AMD Strix Point"
+	case "gfx1103":
+		return "AMD Phoenix"
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// apuProcessorNames renders a unified-memory APU as the PROCESSOR it is — the
+// cpuinfo marketing name ("AMD Ryzen AI Max+ 395 w/ Radeon 8060S") beats the
+// iGPU series, because that is the product the owner bought. Discrete cards and
+// non-Ryzen hosts keep their existing names.
+func apuProcessorNames(gpus []gpuInfo, cpuModel string) []gpuInfo {
+	name := amdAPUName(cpuModel)
+	if name == "" {
+		return gpus
+	}
+	for i, g := range gpus {
+		if !g.Unified {
+			continue
+		}
+		if g.Arch != "" {
+			gpus[i].Name = name + " (" + g.Arch + ")"
+		} else {
+			gpus[i].Name = name
+		}
+	}
+	return gpus
+}
+
+// amdAPUName normalizes an AMD APU cpuinfo model into its marketing name:
+// "AMD RYZEN AI MAX+ 395 w/ Radeon 8060S" -> "AMD Ryzen AI Max+ 395 w/ Radeon
+// 8060S". BIOS strings shout; the board should not. Non-Ryzen models return "".
+func amdAPUName(cpuModel string) string {
+	m := strings.Join(strings.Fields(cpuModel), " ")
+	if !strings.Contains(strings.ToLower(m), "ryzen") {
+		return ""
+	}
+	words := strings.Split(m, " ")
+	for i, w := range words {
+		if w == "AMD" || w == "AI" || w != strings.ToUpper(w) {
+			continue // brand/initialism stays; mixed-case is already right
+		}
+		if strings.ContainsFunc(w, unicode.IsDigit) {
+			continue // model numbers ("8060S", "395") keep their casing
+		}
+		if r := []rune(w); len(r) > 1 && strings.ContainsFunc(w, unicode.IsLetter) {
+			words[i] = string(r[0]) + strings.ToLower(string(r[1:]))
+		}
+	}
+	return strings.Join(words, " ")
+}
+
+// amdSoft is the host ROCm/HIP toolchain inventory, detected once: ROCm from
+// /opt/rocm/.info/version, HIP from `hipconfig --version` (which exists even on
+// TheRock-style installs that lack the .info file). Empty on non-AMD hosts.
+type amdSoft struct{ rocm, hip string }
+
+var amdSoftware = sync.OnceValue(func() amdSoft {
+	var v amdSoft
+	if b, err := os.ReadFile("/opt/rocm/.info/version"); err == nil {
+		v.rocm = strings.TrimSpace(string(b))
+	}
+	if out, err := exec.Command("hipconfig", "--version").Output(); err == nil {
+		v.hip = strings.TrimSpace(string(out))
+	}
+	return v
+})
+
+// pickAmdMem chooses the honest memory figure for a card: dedicated VRAM for a
+// discrete GPU; for an APU whose "VRAM" is a token carve-out (Strix Halo: 1 GiB
+// VRAM beside a ~118 GiB GTT pool) the figure is the MACHINE's unified RAM —
+// the same convention Apple silicon reports (an M4 Max says 128 GiB, not the
+// wired-down remainder) — snapped to hardware capacity. Unified when GTT wins.
+func pickAmdMem(vramMiB, gttMiB, hostMiB int64) (miB int64, unified bool) {
+	if gttMiB > vramMiB*4 {
+		m := gttMiB
+		if hostMiB > m {
+			m = hostMiB
+		}
+		return snapUnified(m), true
+	}
+	return vramMiB, false
+}
+
+// snapUnified rounds a kernel-visible unified-memory figure up to the hardware
+// DIMM capacity (the next 16 GiB multiple) when the gap is a plausible firmware
+// reservation (≤ 6 GiB): a 128 GiB Strix Halo shows 124.4 GiB to Linux because
+// BIOS + the VRAM carve-out are invisible to the OS. A larger gap (say a 16 GiB
+// carve-out) is real capacity the pool lost — reported as-is, never invented.
+func snapUnified(miB int64) int64 {
+	const step = 16 << 10 // 16 GiB in MiB
+	next := ((miB + step - 1) / step) * step
+	if next-miB <= 8<<10 {
+		return next
+	}
+	return miB
+}
+
+// amdMem is one card's memory inventory in MiB: dedicated VRAM plus the GTT
+// (system-memory) pool an APU actually computes in.
+type amdMem struct{ vramMiB, gttMiB int64 }
+
+// amdVRAMTotals returns each amdgpu card's memory totals in MiB, in DRM card order,
+// read from /sys/class/drm/card*/device/mem_info_{vram,gtt}_total (vendor 0x1002).
+func amdVRAMTotals(drmDir string) []amdMem {
 	entries, err := os.ReadDir(drmDir)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil
@@ -469,32 +650,44 @@ func amdVRAMTotals(drmDir string) []int64 {
 	sort.Slice(cards, func(i, j int) bool {
 		return atoiSafe(strings.TrimPrefix(cards[i], "card")) < atoiSafe(strings.TrimPrefix(cards[j], "card"))
 	})
-	var mems []int64
+	readMiB := func(path string) int64 {
+		b, err := os.ReadFile(path)
+		if err != nil {
+			return 0
+		}
+		var n int64
+		if _, err := fmt.Sscan(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)), &n); err != nil || n <= 0 {
+			return 0
+		}
+		return n / (1024 * 1024)
+	}
+	var mems []amdMem
 	for _, c := range cards {
 		dev := filepath.Join(drmDir, c, "device")
 		if vendor, _ := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dev, "vendor")); strings.TrimSpace(string(vendor)) != "0x1002" {
 			continue
 		}
-		b, err := os.ReadFile(filepath.Join(dev, "mem_info_vram_total"))
-		if err != nil {
+		vram := readMiB(filepath.Join(dev, "mem_info_vram_total"))
+		if vram == 0 {
 			continue
 		}
-		var bytesTotal int64
-		if _, err := fmt.Sscan(strings.TrimSpace(string(b)), &bytesTotal); err == nil && bytesTotal > 0 {
-			mems = append(mems, bytesTotal/(1024*1024))
-		}
+		mems = append(mems, amdMem{vramMiB: vram, gttMiB: readMiB(filepath.Join(dev, "mem_info_gtt_total"))})
 	}
 	return mems
 }
 
-// fillAmdVRAM attaches VRAM totals to the GPU list positionally when the counts
+// fillAmdVRAM attaches memory totals to the GPU list positionally when the counts
 // match (the common single-GPU case always does); otherwise the names stand alone.
-func fillAmdVRAM(gpus []gpuInfo, memsMiB []int64) []gpuInfo {
-	if len(memsMiB) != len(gpus) {
+// An APU reports its unified GTT pool, not the token VRAM carve-out.
+func fillAmdVRAM(gpus []gpuInfo, mems []amdMem) []gpuInfo {
+	if len(mems) != len(gpus) {
 		return gpus
 	}
+	hostMiB := detectMemTotal() / (1 << 20)
 	for i := range gpus {
-		gpus[i].MemoryTotal = fmt.Sprintf("%d MiB", memsMiB[i])
+		miB, unified := pickAmdMem(mems[i].vramMiB, mems[i].gttMiB, hostMiB)
+		gpus[i].MemoryTotal = fmt.Sprintf("%d MiB", miB)
+		gpus[i].Unified = unified
 	}
 	return gpus
 }
@@ -742,9 +935,10 @@ type connectOpts struct {
 	serveEngine      bool
 	engineURL        string // local URL to probe hanzo-engine
 	engineEndpoint   string // public URL to advertise (defaults to engineURL)
-	registerProvider bool   // auto POST /v1/add-provider for the engine
+	registerProvider bool   // auto POST /v1/ai/providers for the engine
 	studioDir        string // local Studio checkout to launch + supervise on :8188
 	studioURL        string // studio base the render mirror uploads finished images to
+	mirror           bool   // sweep local renders into the org studio library (default on)
 }
 
 func runConnect(cmd *cobra.Command, env *Env, opts connectOpts) error {
@@ -819,7 +1013,7 @@ func runConnect(cmd *cobra.Command, env *Env, opts connectOpts) error {
 	mirrorDir := ""
 	seen := map[string]int64{}
 	var mirC <-chan time.Time
-	if opts.studioDir != "" {
+	if opts.studioDir != "" && opts.mirror {
 		mirrorDir = filepath.Join(opts.studioDir, "output")
 		mir := time.NewTicker(heartbeatEvery)
 		defer mir.Stop()
@@ -878,11 +1072,16 @@ func runConnect(cmd *cobra.Command, env *Env, opts connectOpts) error {
 // presence record (activityId==runId==identity, no requestId so a reconnect
 // overwrites any prior/terminal record with a fresh online row).
 func (w *worker) register(ctx context.Context) error {
+	// Ensuring the namespaces is BEST-EFFORT: they already exist in any live org, so a
+	// transient API blip here must not kill the worker. It used to be fatal, and with
+	// systemd Restart=always/RestartSec=5 one 503 turned into an infinite crash-loop
+	// (observed at 141 restarts, machine offline the whole time). If a namespace truly
+	// is missing, the presence write below fails and surfaces the real error.
 	for _, ns := range []string{fleetNS, w.jobsNS} {
 		if _, err := w.call(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/v1/tasks/namespaces", map[string]any{
 			"namespaceInfo": map[string]any{"name": ns},
 		}, nil); err != nil {
-			return fmt.Errorf("ensure namespace %q: %w", ns, err)
+			fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "ensure namespace %q (continuing): %v\n", ns, err)
 		}
 	}
 	_, err := w.call(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/v1/tasks/namespaces/"+fleetNS+"/activities", map[string]any{
@@ -908,6 +1107,10 @@ func (w *worker) buildRegistration() registration {
 		Memory:       w.memory,
 		Version:      Version,
 		JobQueue:     w.jobsNS,
+		Rocm:         amdSoftware().rocm,
+		Hip:          amdSoftware().hip,
+		Cuda:         nvidiaSoftware().cuda,
+		Driver:       nvidiaSoftware().driver,
 		GPUs:         w.gpus,
 		Capabilities: w.capabilities(),
 		Engine:       w.engine,
@@ -926,9 +1129,23 @@ func (w *worker) capabilities() []string {
 	if w.serveEngine {
 		caps = append(caps, engineCap)
 	}
+	if _, ok := w.handlers[fnCap]; ok {
+		caps = append(caps, fnCap)
+	}
 	return caps
 }
 
+// hasNonRenderLane reports whether this worker serves any lane beyond the render
+// path (echo is a smoke type, not a lane).
+func (w *worker) hasNonRenderLane() bool {
+	for name := range w.handlers {
+		if name != "echo" && name != studioCap {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
 // studioReachable probes the local studio's /queue (bounded), authenticated. A node
 // that can answer it is up enough to accept a render.
 func (w *worker) studioReachable(ctx context.Context) bool {
@@ -1023,10 +1240,12 @@ func (w *worker) claimFrom(ctx context.Context, taskQueue string) (claimedActivi
 // queue name, so one worker never steals another GPU's targeted job (an empty
 // taskQueue on claim would match any lane and do exactly that).
 func (w *worker) claimAndRun(ctx context.Context, out io.Writer) error {
-	// Poison-loop guard: a node that can't serve renders must not claim render lanes —
-	// it would only fail every claimed job on the gated execute seam. It still
-	// heartbeats presence (shows in the fleet), just idle, until it becomes ready.
-	if !w.studioReady {
+	// Poison-loop guard, per-LANE: a node that can't serve renders must not sit on
+	// render jobs — but a node with other lanes (fn.run) still claims. When renders
+	// are this worker's only real lane and the studio isn't ready, stay idle; a
+	// claimed render on a non-ready node is declined below so an eligible worker
+	// takes it.
+	if !w.studioReady && !w.hasNonRenderLane() {
 		return nil
 	}
 	act, claimed, err := w.claimFrom(ctx, w.gpuQueue())
@@ -1052,6 +1271,12 @@ func (w *worker) claimAndRun(ctx context.Context, out io.Writer) error {
 		return nil
 	}
 
+	if act.Type.Name == studioCap && !w.studioReady {
+		cause := "studio not ready on this node — declined so a render-capable worker takes it"
+		_, _ = w.call(ctx, http.MethodPost, w.actPath(wf, run, "fail"), map[string]any{"cause": cause, "identity": w.identity}, nil)
+		fmt.Fprintf(out, "  → declined (%s)\n", cause)
+		return nil
+	}
 	h, ok := w.handlers[act.Type.Name]
 	if !ok {
 		cause := fmt.Sprintf("no handler for job type %q", act.Type.Name)
@@ -1370,6 +1595,117 @@ func echoHandler(_ context.Context, input json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
 	return map[string]any{"echo": v}, nil
 }
 
+// fnRunInput is the fn.run job payload: an inline script executed on this node in
+// an ephemeral `uv run` environment. The queue is org-scoped, so the submitter is
+// running code on their OWN fleet — same trust domain as a CI runner.
+type fnRunInput struct {
+	Name           string            `json:"name,omitempty"`           // label for logs
+	Script         string            `json:"script"`                   // Python source (required)
+	Requirements   []string          `json:"requirements,omitempty"`   // uv --with deps, e.g. ["numpy", "torch==2.5.*"]
+	Env            map[string]string `json:"env,omitempty"`            // extra environment
+	TimeoutSeconds int               `json:"timeoutSeconds,omitempty"` // default 3600, cap 21600
+}
+
+const (
+	fnDefaultTimeout = time.Hour
+	fnMaxTimeout     = 6 * time.Hour
+	fnOutputTail     = 128 << 10 // keep the LAST 128 KiB of combined output
+)
+
+// fnValidate parses and bounds an fn.run payload. Requirements must look like
+// package specs — a leading dash would inject uv flags.
+func fnValidate(input json.RawMessage) (fnRunInput, error) {
+	var in fnRunInput
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(input, &in); err != nil {
+		return in, fmt.Errorf("fn.run: bad input: %w", err)
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(in.Script) == "" {
+		return in, fmt.Errorf("fn.run: input needs a `script`")
+	}
+	for _, r := range in.Requirements {
+		if r == "" || strings.HasPrefix(r, "-") {
+			return in, fmt.Errorf("fn.run: bad requirement %q", r)
+		}
+	}
+	if in.TimeoutSeconds <= 0 {
+		in.TimeoutSeconds = int(fnDefaultTimeout / time.Second)
+	}
+	if in.TimeoutSeconds > int(fnMaxTimeout/time.Second) {
+		in.TimeoutSeconds = int(fnMaxTimeout / time.Second)
+	}
+	return in, nil
+}
+
+// tailBuffer keeps the last cap bytes written — a training loop can log gigabytes;
+// the activity result carries the end, where the outcome lives.
+type tailBuffer struct {
+	cap       int
+	buf       []byte
+	truncated bool
+}
+
+func (t *tailBuffer) Write(p []byte) (int, error) {
+	t.buf = append(t.buf, p...)
+	if len(t.buf) > t.cap {
+		t.buf = t.buf[len(t.buf)-t.cap:]
+		t.truncated = true
+	}
+	return len(p), nil
+}
+
+// fnRunHandler executes an fn.run job: write the script to an ephemeral dir, run
+// it under `uv run` (which resolves requirements into a throwaway env — ROCm/CUDA
+// wheels included), and return the output tail + exit code. Nonzero exit fails
+// the activity with the tail as the cause, so the submitter sees the traceback.
+func fnRunHandler(ctx context.Context, input json.RawMessage) (any, error) {
+	in, err := fnValidate(input)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	dir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "fnrun-*")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("fn.run: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer os.RemoveAll(dir)
+	script := filepath.Join(dir, "main.py")
+	if err := os.WriteFile(script, []byte(in.Script), 0o600); err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("fn.run: %w", err)
+	}
+	runCtx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, time.Duration(in.TimeoutSeconds)*time.Second)
+	defer cancel()
+	args := []string{"run", "--no-project", "--quiet"}
+	for _, r := range in.Requirements {
+		args = append(args, "--with", r)
+	}
+	args = append(args, script)
+	cmd := exec.CommandContext(runCtx, "uv", args...)
+	cmd.Dir = dir
+	cmd.Env = os.Environ()
+	for k, v := range in.Env {
+		cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, k+"="+v)
+	}
+	tail := &tailBuffer{cap: fnOutputTail}
+	cmd.Stdout = tail
+	cmd.Stderr = tail
+	start := time.Now()
+	runErr := cmd.Run()
+	dur := time.Since(start)
+	out := string(tail.buf)
+	if runCtx.Err() == context.DeadlineExceeded {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("fn.run: timed out after %ds\n%s", in.TimeoutSeconds, out)
+	}
+	if runErr != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("fn.run: %v\n%s", runErr, out)
+	}
+	return map[string]any{
+		"name":       in.Name,
+		"exitCode":   0,
+		"durationMs": dur.Milliseconds(),
+		"output":     out,
+		"truncated":  tail.truncated,
+	}, nil
+}
+
 // workerToken is the KMS-sourced STUDIO_WORKER_TOKEN this box holds — the credential
 // the local studio's --worker-mode gate checks. Empty on an unconfigured box (the
 // render preflight refuses such a node before it ever claims a render lane).
@@ -1897,7 +2233,7 @@ func describeEngine(adv *engineAdvertisement) string {
 	return fmt.Sprintf("ready · %d models", n)
 }
 
-// providerBody is the POST /v1/add-provider payload registering this node's engine
+// providerBody is the POST /v1/ai/providers payload registering this node's engine
 // as an org model provider. hanzo-engine is OpenAI-compatible, so Type=Local: the
 // gateway speaks the OpenAI wire format to it and auto-appends /v1 to providerUrl.
 func (w *worker) providerBody() map[string]any {
@@ -1929,20 +2265,20 @@ func (w *worker) printEngineHint(out io.Writer) {
 	fmt.Fprintf(out, "serving hanzo-engine (OpenAI + Anthropic) at %s — %s\n", adv.URL, describeEngine(adv))
 	body, _ := json.Marshal(w.providerBody())
 	fmt.Fprintln(out, "  route api.hanzo.ai model calls to this GPU by registering it as an org provider:")
-	fmt.Fprintf(out, "    curl -sS %s/v1/add-provider -H \"Authorization: Bearer $HANZO_TOKEN\" \\\n", w.baseURL)
+	fmt.Fprintf(out, "    curl -sS %s/v1/ai/providers -H \"Authorization: Bearer $HANZO_TOKEN\" \\\n", w.baseURL)
 	fmt.Fprintf(out, "      -H 'Content-Type: application/json' -d '%s'\n", body)
 	fmt.Fprintln(out, "  (or pass --register-provider. The endpoint must be reachable from api.hanzo.ai —")
 	fmt.Fprintln(out, "   a cloud GPU is in-cluster; a BYO node needs a public URL/tunnel. add-provider needs a platform-admin token today.)")
 }
 
-// registerProvider POSTs /v1/add-provider so the gateway routes model calls to this
+// registerProvider POSTs /v1/ai/providers so the gateway routes model calls to this
 // node's engine. Requires the engine to be reachable and (today) a platform-admin
 // token; both failures are reported clearly rather than swallowed.
 func (w *worker) registerProvider(ctx context.Context, adv *engineAdvertisement) error {
 	if adv == nil || adv.Status != "ready" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("engine not ready at %s — start hanzo-engine, then retry", w.engineURL)
 	}
-	code, err := w.call(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/v1/add-provider", w.providerBody(), nil)
+	code, err := w.call(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/v1/ai/providers", w.providerBody(), nil)
 	if err != nil {
 		if code == http.StatusForbidden {
 			return fmt.Errorf("add-provider is gated to a platform-admin token today; register from the console or with an admin token: %w", err)
@@ -1990,6 +2326,9 @@ func installDaemon(cmd *cobra.Command, opts connectOpts) error {
 	if opts.studioDir != "" {
 		args += " --studio-dir " + opts.studioDir
 	}
+	if !opts.mirror {
+		args += " --mirror=false"
+	}
 	unit := fmt.Sprintf(`[Unit]
 Description=Hanzo node (compute worker)
 After=network-online.target

cli/gpu_amd_test.go

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ func TestParseRocmSmiCSV(t *testing.T) {
 	if len(gpus) != 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("want 1 AMD GPU, got %d (%+v)", len(gpus), gpus)
 	}
-	if got, want := gpus[0].Name, "Radeon 8060S Graphics (gfx1151)"; got != want {
+	if got, want := gpus[0].Name, "AMD Strix Halo \u00b7 Radeon 8060S Graphics (gfx1151)"; got != want {
 		t.Errorf("name = %q, want %q", got, want)
 	}
 }
@@ -49,9 +49,12 @@ func TestParseKfdTopology(t *testing.T) {
 	if len(gpus) != 1 {
 		t.Fatalf("want 1 GPU node (CPU node 0 skipped), got %d (%+v)", len(gpus), gpus)
 	}
-	if got, want := gpus[0].Name, "AMD GPU (gfx1151)"; got != want {
+	if got, want := gpus[0].Name, "AMD Strix Halo (gfx1151)"; got != want {
 		t.Errorf("name = %q, want %q", got, want)
 	}
+	if got, want := gpus[0].Arch, "gfx1151"; got != want {
+		t.Errorf("arch = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
 }
 
 // TestParseVulkaninfoSummary — the last resort keeps only AMD/Radeon devices so it
@@ -78,3 +81,77 @@ func writeNode(t *testing.T, root, id, props string) {
 		t.Fatal(err)
 	}
 }
+
+// TestPickAmdMemUnified — an APU whose VRAM is a token carve-out reports the
+// machine's unified RAM snapped to hardware capacity (evo: 1 GiB VRAM, 118 GiB
+// GTT, 124.4 GiB kernel-visible of 128 GiB physical → 128 GiB); a discrete card
+// keeps its VRAM.
+func TestPickAmdMemUnified(t *testing.T) {
+	if miB, unified := pickAmdMem(1024, 120832, 127411); !unified || miB != 131072 {
+		t.Errorf("APU: got (%d, %v), want (131072, true)", miB, unified)
+	}
+	if miB, unified := pickAmdMem(24576, 8192, 127411); unified || miB != 24576 {
+		t.Errorf("discrete: got (%d, %v), want (24576, false)", miB, unified)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSnapUnified — a small firmware gap snaps up to the DIMM capacity; a big
+// carve-out is real lost capacity and stays as-is; exact multiples stand.
+func TestSnapUnified(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, c := range []struct{ in, want int64 }{
+		{127411, 131072}, // evo: 124.4 GiB visible of 128 GiB physical
+		{124610, 131072}, // spark GB10: 121.7 GiB visible of 128 GiB physical (~6.3 GiB firmware)
+		{131072, 131072}, // exact 128 GiB
+		{119194, 119194}, // ~116 GiB visible (16 GiB BIOS carve) — 11.6 GiB gap, keep honest
+		{63488, 65536},   // 62 GiB visible of 64 GiB
+	} {
+		if got := snapUnified(c.in); got != c.want {
+			t.Errorf("snapUnified(%d) = %d, want %d", c.in, got, c.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestAmdAPUName — the board renders the APU as the processor the owner bought,
+// normalized from the BIOS shouting; non-Ryzen hosts opt out.
+func TestAmdAPUName(t *testing.T) {
+	if got, want := amdAPUName("AMD RYZEN AI MAX+ 395 w/ Radeon 8060S"), "AMD Ryzen AI Max+ 395 w/ Radeon 8060S"; got != want {
+		t.Errorf("amdAPUName = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+	if got := amdAPUName("Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-14900K"); got != "" {
+		t.Errorf("non-Ryzen host must opt out, got %q", got)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestApuProcessorNames — only unified-memory cards are renamed; a discrete
+// card on the same host keeps its own identity.
+func TestApuProcessorNames(t *testing.T) {
+	gpus := []gpuInfo{
+		{Name: "AMD Strix Halo \u00b7 Radeon 8060S Graphics (gfx1151)", Arch: "gfx1151", Unified: true},
+		{Name: "Radeon RX 7900 XTX (gfx1100)", Arch: "gfx1100"},
+	}
+	out := apuProcessorNames(gpus, "AMD RYZEN AI MAX+ 395 w/ Radeon 8060S")
+	if got, want := out[0].Name, "AMD Ryzen AI Max+ 395 w/ Radeon 8060S (gfx1151)"; got != want {
+		t.Errorf("APU name = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+	if got, want := out[1].Name, "Radeon RX 7900 XTX (gfx1100)"; got != want {
+		t.Errorf("discrete name = %q, want %q", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestParseNvidiaSmiCSV — a GB10-class unified SoC ("[N/A]" VRAM) reports the
+// machine RAM snapped to capacity + its sm arch; a discrete card keeps its VRAM.
+func TestParseNvidiaSmiCSV(t *testing.T) {
+	out := []byte("NVIDIA GB10, [N/A], 12.1\n")
+	gpus := parseNvidiaSmiCSV(out, 124610)
+	if len(gpus) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("want 1 GPU, got %d", len(gpus))
+	}
+	g := gpus[0]
+	if g.Name != "NVIDIA GB10" || g.MemoryTotal != "131072 MiB" || !g.Unified || g.Arch != "sm_121" {
+		t.Errorf("GB10 = %+v", g)
+	}
+	disc := parseNvidiaSmiCSV([]byte("NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4090, 24564 MiB, 8.9\n"), 124610)
+	if d := disc[0]; d.MemoryTotal != "24564 MiB" || d.Unified || d.Arch != "sm_89" {
+		t.Errorf("discrete = %+v", d)
+	}
+}

cli/gpu_fnrun_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+package cli
+
+import (
+	"encoding/json"
+	"os/exec"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestFnValidate — payload bounds: script required, flag-injection via
+// requirements refused, timeout defaulted and capped.
+func TestFnValidate(t *testing.T) {
+	if _, err := fnValidate(json.RawMessage(`{}`)); err == nil {
+		t.Error("empty script must be refused")
+	}
+	if _, err := fnValidate(json.RawMessage(`{"script":"print(1)","requirements":["--index-url=evil"]}`)); err == nil {
+		t.Error("flag-shaped requirement must be refused")
+	}
+	in, err := fnValidate(json.RawMessage(`{"script":"print(1)"}`))
+	if err != nil || in.TimeoutSeconds != 3600 {
+		t.Errorf("default timeout: got %d, err %v", in.TimeoutSeconds, err)
+	}
+	in, _ = fnValidate(json.RawMessage(`{"script":"print(1)","timeoutSeconds":999999}`))
+	if in.TimeoutSeconds != 21600 {
+		t.Errorf("timeout cap: got %d, want 21600", in.TimeoutSeconds)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestTailBuffer — a chatty training loop keeps only the LAST bytes, flagged.
+func TestTailBuffer(t *testing.T) {
+	tb := &tailBuffer{cap: 8}
+	tb.Write([]byte("0123456789"))
+	if string(tb.buf) != "23456789" || !tb.truncated {
+		t.Errorf("tail = %q truncated=%v", tb.buf, tb.truncated)
+	}
+	tb2 := &tailBuffer{cap: 8}
+	tb2.Write([]byte("abc"))
+	if string(tb2.buf) != "abc" || tb2.truncated {
+		t.Errorf("small write mangled: %q %v", tb2.buf, tb2.truncated)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestHasNonRenderLane — echo and studio.render alone keep the render-only
+// poison guard; a registered fn.run lane lifts it.
+func TestHasNonRenderLane(t *testing.T) {
+	w := &worker{handlers: map[string]jobHandler{"echo": echoHandler, studioCap: nil}}
+	if w.hasNonRenderLane() {
+		t.Error("render-only worker must report no extra lane")
+	}
+	w.handlers[fnCap] = fnRunHandler
+	if !w.hasNonRenderLane() {
+		t.Error("fn.run lane must lift the guard")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestFnRunSmoke — the real handler end-to-end against the local uv: a script
+// that prints and exits 0. Skipped where uv is absent.
+func TestFnRunSmoke(t *testing.T) {
+	if !uvPresent() {
+		t.Skip("uv not installed")
+	}
+	res, err := fnRunHandler(t.Context(), json.RawMessage(`{"script":"print(2+2)","timeoutSeconds":120}`))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("fn.run: %v", err)
+	}
+	m := res.(map[string]any)
+	if !strings.Contains(m["output"].(string), "4") {
+		t.Errorf("output = %q, want it to contain 4", m["output"])
+	}
+}
+
+func uvPresent() bool {
+	_, err := exec.LookPath("uv")
+	return err == nil
+}

cli/gpu_register_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+package cli
+
+// gpu_register_test.go — registration resilience. Ensuring the fleet/jobs namespaces
+// is best-effort: those namespaces already exist in any live org, so a transient API
+// failure there must NOT abort registration. It used to be fatal, and with systemd
+// Restart=always/RestartSec=5 a single 503 became an infinite crash-loop (observed at
+// 141 restarts with the machine offline throughout). The presence write is the step
+// that actually matters, so a real failure there must still surface.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// stubRegisterCloud fails every namespace-ensure with the given status, and answers
+// the presence-activity write with presenceStatus.
+func stubRegisterCloud(t *testing.T, nsStatus, presenceStatus int, sawPresence *bool) *httptest.Server {
+	t.Helper()
+	return httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		switch {
+		case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/v1/tasks/namespaces"):
+			w.WriteHeader(nsStatus)
+		case r.Method == http.MethodPost && strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/activities"):
+			*sawPresence = true
+			w.WriteHeader(presenceStatus)
+		default:
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
+		}
+	}))
+}
+
+// A flaky namespace-ensure must not abort registration: the worker still writes its
+// presence record and stays online. This is the crash-loop regression guard.
+func TestRegisterSurvivesNamespaceEnsureFailure(t *testing.T) {
+	var sawPresence bool
+	srv := stubRegisterCloud(t, http.StatusServiceUnavailable, http.StatusOK, &sawPresence)
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	if err := testWorker(t, srv.URL).register(context.Background()); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("register() = %v, want nil (namespace-ensure is best-effort)", err)
+	}
+	if !sawPresence {
+		t.Fatal("register() never wrote the presence record")
+	}
+}
+
+// The presence write is the load-bearing step — when it fails, register must fail so
+// the operator sees a real error instead of a silently-offline machine.
+func TestRegisterFailsWhenPresenceWriteFails(t *testing.T) {
+	var sawPresence bool
+	srv := stubRegisterCloud(t, http.StatusOK, http.StatusInternalServerError, &sawPresence)
+	defer srv.Close()
+
+	if err := testWorker(t, srv.URL).register(context.Background()); err == nil {
+		t.Fatal("register() = nil, want an error when the presence write fails")
+	}
+}

cli/link.go

@@ -72,9 +72,10 @@ func newLinkCmd(envOf func() *Env, _ *globalFlags) *cobra.Command {
 	f.BoolVar(&opts.serveEngine, "serve-engine", false, "also advertise a hanzo-engine model server (OpenAI + Anthropic) running on this node")
 	f.StringVar(&opts.engineURL, "engine-url", defaultEngineURL, "local URL where hanzo-engine is probed (GET /v1/models)")
 	f.StringVar(&opts.engineEndpoint, "engine-endpoint", "", "public URL to advertise for gateway routing (defaults to --engine-url; a node behind NAT needs a reachable URL/tunnel)")
-	f.BoolVar(&opts.registerProvider, "register-provider", false, "auto-register the engine endpoint as an org model provider (POST /v1/add-provider)")
+	f.BoolVar(&opts.registerProvider, "register-provider", false, "auto-register the engine endpoint as an org model provider (POST /v1/ai/providers)")
 	f.StringVar(&opts.studioDir, "studio-dir", os.Getenv("HANZO_STUDIO_DIR"), "local Hanzo Studio checkout; when set, link launches and supervises the render backend on 127.0.0.1:8188")
 	f.StringVar(&opts.studioURL, "studio-url", firstNonEmpty(os.Getenv("HANZO_STUDIO_UPLOAD_URL"), defaultStudioUploadURL), "studio base URL the render mirror uploads finished images to (POST /v1/library/upload)")
+	f.BoolVar(&opts.mirror, "mirror", true, "sweep local renders into the org studio library; --mirror=false serves jobs only")
 	return cmd
 }
 

cli/studio.go

@@ -32,8 +32,33 @@ const (
 	studioProbeEvery  = 45 * time.Second
 	studioGraceWait   = 8 * time.Second
 	studioStartWindow = 180 * time.Second
+
+	// studioBootGrace is how long a freshly launched studio may stay silent before
+	// the liveness counter is allowed to call it dead. It exists because a booting
+	// studio and a dead one look IDENTICAL to the probes: while the 41GB Qwen-Edit
+	// model pages in, the HTTP server is not listening, so studioBusy() reports
+	// ok=false and the "alive-busy" guard cannot protect it either. With only
+	// studioStartWindow (180s) plus three 45s ticks, the supervisor killed the
+	// process ~5min into a load that needs 5-11min on a loaded box — then relaunched
+	// it into the same fate. A silent loop that renders nothing and never converges
+	// (observed: 5 restarts in 30 minutes, zero output, jobs failing "engine not up").
+	//
+	// This only defers the verdict for a process that is still ALIVE. One that has
+	// actually exited is restarted immediately, grace or not — see the loop below.
+	studioBootGrace = 15 * time.Minute
 )
 
+// studioExited reports whether the supervised child is gone (crashed or was
+// killed). Liveness may fire immediately in that case; boot grace is only ever
+// extended to a process that still exists and is presumably loading its model.
+// Signal 0 performs the permission/existence check without delivering anything.
+func studioExited(cmd *exec.Cmd) bool {
+	if cmd == nil || cmd.Process == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	return cmd.Process.Signal(syscall.Signal(0)) != nil
+}
+
 func studioHealthy(ctx context.Context) bool {
 	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, 5*time.Second)
 	defer cancel()
@@ -72,9 +97,17 @@ func launchStudio(dir string) (*exec.Cmd, error) {
 	// (localComfyUI) so binding wider bought nothing but an open, unauthenticated
 	// /prompt — the hidden-run hole. --worker-mode makes the studio gate its submit
 	// seam (/v1/worker/execute + X-Worker-Token) so only the worker can start a render.
+	// VRAM mode: default --normalvram (safe for smaller BYO GPUs); override with
+	// HANZO_STUDIO_VRAM (e.g. "--highvram") on big-memory boxes (GB10 128G unified) so
+	// the Qwen text-encoder stays resident on-GPU instead of non-deterministically
+	// offloading to CPU — offload makes renders CPU-bound and ~8x slower.
+	vramMode := os.Getenv("HANZO_STUDIO_VRAM")
+	if vramMode == "" {
+		vramMode = "--normalvram"
+	}
 	cmd := exec.Command(studioPython(dir), "main.py",
 		"--listen", "127.0.0.1", "--port", "8188", "--worker-mode",
-		"--normalvram", "--disable-auto-launch",
+		vramMode, "--disable-auto-launch",
 		"--output-directory", filepath.Join(dir, "output"))
 	cmd.Dir = dir
 	cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(),
@@ -160,6 +193,7 @@ func studioBusy(ctx context.Context) (busy, ok bool) {
 // ends. Quiet by design: one line per restart event, not a probe firehose.
 func superviseStudio(ctx context.Context, dir string, out io.Writer) {
 	var cmd *exec.Cmd
+	var launchedAt time.Time
 	restart := func(reason string) {
 		stopStudio(cmd)
 		c, err := launchStudio(dir)
@@ -168,6 +202,7 @@ func superviseStudio(ctx context.Context, dir string, out io.Writer) {
 			return
 		}
 		cmd = c
+		launchedAt = time.Now()
 		deadline := time.Now().Add(studioStartWindow)
 		for time.Now().Before(deadline) && ctx.Err() == nil {
 			if studioHealthy(ctx) {
@@ -219,6 +254,12 @@ func superviseStudio(ctx context.Context, dir string, out io.Writer) {
 				unhealthy = 0
 				continue
 			}
+			// A live process still inside its boot grace is LOADING, not dead: the
+			// model takes minutes to page in and serves nothing until it lands.
+			// Killing it here restarts the same slow load and never converges.
+			if !studioExited(cmd) && time.Since(launchedAt) < studioBootGrace {
+				continue
+			}
 			// Sustained silence with an idle or unreadable queue = actually dead.
 			unhealthy++
 			if unhealthy < 3 {

cli/studio_bootgrace_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+package cli
+
+// studio_bootgrace_test.go — a studio that is still loading its model must not be
+// mistaken for a dead one.
+//
+// The probes cannot tell the two apart: while the 41GB Qwen-Edit model pages in, the
+// HTTP server is not listening, so studioHealthy() is false AND studioBusy() returns
+// ok=false, which disqualifies the "alive-busy" guard. The supervisor therefore killed
+// the process ~5 minutes into a load that needs 5-11 minutes and relaunched it into the
+// same fate — 5 restarts in 30 minutes with zero renders. The distinguishing fact is
+// whether the process still EXISTS, which is what studioExited answers.
+
+import (
+	"os/exec"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+)
+
+// A live-but-silent child inside the grace window must be left alone; the same child
+// once the grace has elapsed must be declared dead so a truly wedged studio recovers.
+func TestBootGraceSpareLiveStudioNotDeadOne(t *testing.T) {
+	cmd := exec.Command("sleep", "300")
+	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("start stub studio: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = cmd.Process.Kill(); _, _ = cmd.Process.Wait() }()
+
+	if studioExited(cmd) {
+		t.Fatal("studioExited = true for a running process, want false")
+	}
+
+	// This is the exact predicate the supervisor uses to skip the death counter.
+	spared := func(launchedAt time.Time) bool {
+		return !studioExited(cmd) && time.Since(launchedAt) < studioBootGrace
+	}
+	if !spared(time.Now()) {
+		t.Error("a live studio that just launched was not spared — this is the restart loop")
+	}
+	if spared(time.Now().Add(-studioBootGrace - time.Minute)) {
+		t.Error("a live studio past its boot grace was spared — a wedged studio would never recover")
+	}
+}
+
+// A process that actually died must be restartable immediately, regardless of grace,
+// so a crash is not papered over for 15 minutes.
+func TestExitedStudioIsNeverSpared(t *testing.T) {
+	cmd := exec.Command("true")
+	if err := cmd.Run(); err != nil { // Run waits, so it has definitely exited
+		t.Fatalf("run stub: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !studioExited(cmd) {
+		t.Fatal("studioExited = false for an exited process, want true")
+	}
+	if !studioExited(nil) {
+		t.Fatal("studioExited(nil) = false, want true (nothing launched yet)")
+	}
+	// Freshly "launched" yet already dead => must NOT be spared.
+	if !studioExited(cmd) && time.Since(time.Now()) < studioBootGrace {
+		t.Error("an exited studio was spared by boot grace; a crash would stall the worker")
+	}
+}

clients/account/account.go

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 // gateway-minted, IAM-verified X-User-Id; a client-forged X-Org-Id on the bearer-less
 // path is refused):
 //
-//	GET    /v1/iam/keys              — whether the caller has an `hk-` key (+ prefix/mtime); no secret.
+//	GET    /v1/iam/keys              — whether the caller has a Cloud API key (+ prefix/mtime); no secret.
 //	POST   /v1/iam/keys              — mint/rotate the key; returns { accessKey } ONCE.
 //	DELETE /v1/iam/keys              — revoke the key.
 //	POST   /v1/iam/onboard           — create the caller's org (+ move them in on first run).
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 package account
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"encoding/base64"
 	"errors"
 	"fmt"
@@ -103,9 +104,9 @@ func newService(deps cloud.Deps) *cloud.Service[state] {
 
 // MountAccount wires the SPECIFIC self-service routes (order 48) — the ones that must
 // win over the IAM /v1/iam/* wildcard (50) and the commerce embed (100).
-func MountAccount(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
+func MountAccount(app cloud.Router, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 	if app == nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("account.MountAccount: nil zip.App")
+		return fmt.Errorf("account.MountAccount: nil app")
 	}
 	if deps.Logger == nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("account.MountAccount: nil deps.Logger")
@@ -119,9 +120,9 @@ func MountAccount(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 
 // MountBridge wires the CATCH-ALL data bridges (order 122) — the /v1/billing/* and
 // /v1/commerce/* proxies that must sit AFTER clients/billing (121) + the commerce embed.
-func MountBridge(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
+func MountBridge(app cloud.Router, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 	if app == nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("account.MountBridge: nil zip.App")
+		return fmt.Errorf("account.MountBridge: nil app")
 	}
 	if deps.Logger == nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("account.MountBridge: nil deps.Logger")
@@ -133,11 +134,11 @@ func MountBridge(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 }
 
 // routesAccount wires the specific self-service routes (order 48).
-func routesAccount(s *cloud.Service[state], app *zip.App) {
+func routesAccount(s *cloud.Service[state], app cloud.Router) {
 	// GET /v1/csrf issues the anti-CSRF token the embedded SPA echoes as X-CSRF-Token on
 	// every money write (csrf.go). Safe (read-only), same-origin.
 	app.Get("/v1/csrf", cloud.Handle(s, issueCSRFToken))
-	// The caller's own `hk-` Cloud API key — IAM self-service. These SPECIFIC routes MUST
+	// The caller's own Cloud API key — IAM self-service. These SPECIFIC routes MUST
 	// register before clients/iam's /v1/iam/* wildcard (order 50 > 48) so Fiber's
 	// first-match scan hits the native handler, not the wildcard (TestIAMKeysBeatsWildcard).
 	// Reads are open; every state-changing WRITE is wrapped: requireCSRF blocks a
@@ -153,10 +154,15 @@ func routesAccount(s *cloud.Service[state], app *zip.App) {
 	// that must beat the /v1/commerce/* bridge (122) AND the commerce embed (100) — so it
 	// mounts here at 48, ahead of both.
 	app.Post("/v1/commerce/topup/wallet", rateLimit(s, s.State.writesRL, requireCSRF(s, cloud.Handle(s, walletTopup))))
+	// The accepted rails are public on-chain data (chain, token, treasury), read by
+	// the browser to render the send UI. A GET with no side effects and no secret,
+	// so it needs neither CSRF nor the write limiter — but it MUST sit beside the
+	// POST at this priority, or the /v1/commerce/* bridge swallows it.
+	app.Get("/v1/commerce/topup/rails", cloud.Handle(s, topupRails))
 }
 
 // routesBridge wires the per-tenant catch-all data bridges (order 122).
-func routesBridge(s *cloud.Service[state], app *zip.App) {
+func routesBridge(s *cloud.Service[state], app cloud.Router) {
 	// Per-tenant billing DATA bridge — the canonical /v1/billing/* the statically-exported
 	// console calls, forwarded to commerce with the admin service token and SCOPED to the
 	// validated caller's own subject (billing.go). Registered AFTER clients/billing's
@@ -243,7 +249,7 @@ func resolveCaller(c *zip.Ctx, requireOwner bool) (caller, bool) {
 	return caller{id: id, owner: owner, name: name, username: username}, true
 }
 
-// ── keys (the per-user `hk-` Cloud API key) ──────────────────────────────────
+// ── keys (the per-user Cloud API key) ────────────────────────────────────────
 
 type keyStatus struct {
 	HasKey    bool   `json:"hasKey"`
@@ -251,7 +257,7 @@ type keyStatus struct {
 	CreatedAt string `json:"createdAt,omitempty"`
 }
 
-// getKey reports whether the caller has an `hk-` key, its public prefix, and when
+// getKey reports whether the caller has a Cloud API key, its public prefix, and when
 // the key row last changed — NO secret material. Reads IAM authoritatively (not the
 // session claim, which lags a fresh key). Mirrors GET app/keys/route.ts.
 func getKey(s *cloud.Service[state], c *zip.Ctx) error {
@@ -280,7 +286,7 @@ func getKey(s *cloud.Service[state], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, keyStatus{HasKey: true, KeyPrefix: prefix, CreatedAt: uk.UpdatedTime})
 }
 
-// mintKey (re)generates the caller's `hk-` key and returns it ONCE (show-once). A
+// mintKey (re)generates the caller's Cloud API key and returns it ONCE (show-once). A
 // real IAM failure surfaces as 502 (never a fabricated key). Mirrors POST app/keys.
 func mintKey(s *cloud.Service[state], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	cr, ok := resolveCaller(c, true)
@@ -297,7 +303,7 @@ func mintKey(s *cloud.Service[state], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"accessKey": key})
 }
 
-// revokeKey clears the caller's `hk-` key. Mirrors DELETE app/keys.
+// revokeKey clears the caller's Cloud API key. Mirrors DELETE app/keys.
 func revokeKey(s *cloud.Service[state], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	cr, ok := resolveCaller(c, true)
 	if !ok {
@@ -367,18 +373,58 @@ func onboard(s *cloud.Service[state], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 		return herr
 	}
 
-	// Create the org (cloning the caller's current org for password/locale
-	// compatibility), then — first-run only — move the zero-org user in as admin.
+	// ADDITIONAL org (caller already has a home): create it WITHOUT moving them —
+	// they reach it via the OrgSwitcher (a move would strip their SuperAdmin / orphan
+	// their current org).
+	if additional {
+		org := buildOrg(s, c, slug, displayName, body.Personal, cr.owner)
+		if err := s.State.iam.createOrganization(c.Context(), org); err != nil {
+			return zip.Errorf(http.StatusBadGateway, "could not create the organization: %v", err)
+		}
+		return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, onboardResp{Org: slug, DisplayName: displayName, Additional: true})
+	}
+
+	// FIRST-RUN: drive the ONE atomic IAM provision (org + admin move + hashed
+	// org-scoped credential), replacing the create-org + move-user pair — a mid-flight
+	// retry now converges on the founder's own org instead of orphaning it. The org
+	// starts at a zero balance (usage is pre-paid). Prefer it whenever the
+	// service-token path is wired; fall back to the legacy pair only when it is not,
+	// so a partial deploy still onboards.
+	if s.State.iam.provisionReady() {
+		resp, err := onboardFirstRun(c.Context(), s.State.iam, cr.id, slug, displayName, body.Personal)
+		if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+		return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, resp)
+	}
+
+	// Legacy fallback (service token unset): create then move — the non-atomic pair.
 	org := buildOrg(s, c, slug, displayName, body.Personal, cr.owner)
 	if err := s.State.iam.createOrganization(c.Context(), org); err != nil {
 		return zip.Errorf(http.StatusBadGateway, "could not create the organization: %v", err)
 	}
-	if !additional {
-		if err := s.State.iam.moveUserToOrg(c.Context(), cr.id, slug); err != nil {
-			return zip.Errorf(http.StatusBadGateway, "org created but could not assign you to it: %v", err)
-		}
+	if err := s.State.iam.moveUserToOrg(c.Context(), cr.id, slug); err != nil {
+		return zip.Errorf(http.StatusBadGateway, "org created but could not assign you to it: %v", err)
 	}
-	return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, onboardResp{Org: slug, DisplayName: displayName, Additional: additional})
+	return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, onboardResp{Org: slug, DisplayName: displayName, Additional: false})
+}
+
+// onboardFirstRun drives the ONE atomic IAM provision for a zero-org caller (create
+// org + move them in as admin + mint the hashed org-scoped credential), replacing
+// the create-org + move-user pair so a mid-flight retry converges on the founder's
+// own org instead of orphaning it. The org starts at a ZERO balance — usage is
+// pre-paid, so there is no signup grant. Split out so the provisioning glue is
+// unit-tested against mock IAM without the CSRF/routing/principal shell.
+func onboardFirstRun(ctx context.Context, iam *iamClient, callerID, slug, displayName string, personal bool) (onboardResp, error) {
+	row, err := iam.getUserRow(ctx, callerID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return onboardResp{}, zip.Errorf(http.StatusBadGateway, "could not resolve the user: %v", err)
+	}
+	res, err := iam.provision(ctx, row.Owner, row.Name, slug, personal)
+	if err != nil {
+		return onboardResp{}, zip.Errorf(http.StatusBadGateway, "could not provision the organization: %v", err)
+	}
+	return onboardResp{Org: res.Org, DisplayName: displayName, Additional: false}, nil
 }
 
 // resolveOnboardName derives the base slug + display name from the request, or a

clients/account/billing.go

@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ func billingData(s *cloud.Service[state], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 // could not otherwise wield. Safety rests on the edge: the gateway 401s a public Bearer
 // that is not an IAM JWT / hk-|pk-|sk- API key (the 64-hex service token is a JWT
 // candidate that fails to parse), so an EXTERNAL client can never reach this handler
-// holding it — only in-proc commerceinproc dispatch does. Constant-time compare; the token
+// holding it — only in-proc commerce-transport dispatch does. Constant-time compare; the token
 // is never logged.
 func s2sBillingCall(c *zip.Ctx) bool {
 	_, token := commerceCreds()

clients/account/billing_coresident.go

@@ -46,8 +46,12 @@ import (
 //   - Neither: refuse. A bearer-less request with a forged X-Org-Id has no validated
 //     principal and is fail-closed here, before the read handler runs.
 //
-// The pin rewrites the request URI's query string in place; fasthttp's SetQueryString
-// resets the parsed-args cache, so the handler's later c.Query() reads the pinned values.
+// The pin rewrites the request URI's query string AND (on a write) the JSON body in place;
+// fasthttp's SetQueryString resets the parsed-args cache and SetBody replaces the body
+// bytes, so the handler's later c.Query() / c.Bind() read the pinned values. Pinning the
+// body is what keeps a co-resident WRITE handler that reads its subject from the body
+// (commerce's CreatePaymentMethod reads customerId from the JSON body) IDOR-safe — query-only
+// pinning would leave a client-named customerId/userId in the body untouched.
 func PinBillingSubject() zip.Handler {
 	return func(c *zip.Ctx) error {
 		inQuery, _ := url.ParseQuery(string(c.Fiber().Request().URI().QueryString()))
@@ -69,7 +73,17 @@ func PinBillingSubject() zip.Handler {
 			Account: principal.BillingAccount(c),
 		}).Subject()
 
+		// Pin the subject on BOTH the query AND the write body — the SAME two-helper
+		// scoping billingData applies (scopedBillingSearch + scopedBillingBody). A
+		// co-resident WRITE handler that reads its subject from the body (commerce's
+		// CreatePaymentMethod → customerId) is only IDOR-safe if the body is pinned too.
+		// scopedBillingBody overwrites the subject keys and preserves every other field
+		// (card, type, sourceId, …); a non-JSON / empty body is returned unchanged, so a
+		// GET read carries no body and is unaffected.
 		c.Fiber().Request().URI().SetQueryString(scopedBillingSearch(inQuery, subject).Encode())
+		if len(c.Body()) > 0 {
+			c.Fiber().Request().SetBody(scopedBillingBody(c.Body(), subject))
+		}
 		return c.Next()
 	}
 }

clients/account/billing_coresident_test.go

@@ -29,6 +29,17 @@ func echoQuery(c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	})
 }
 
+// echoBody is the downstream stand-in for a commerce WRITE handler (e.g. CreatePaymentMethod)
+// that reads its subject from the JSON BODY: it reports the body it observes AFTER the pin, so
+// a test can assert the subject the handler would persist and that non-subject fields survive.
+func echoBody(c *zip.Ctx) error {
+	var got map[string]any
+	if len(c.Body()) > 0 {
+		_ = json.Unmarshal(c.Body(), &got)
+	}
+	return c.JSON(200, got)
+}
+
 func pinApp(t *testing.T) *zip.App {
 	t.Helper()
 	app := zip.New(zip.Config{Logger: luxlog.New("test")})
@@ -38,6 +49,7 @@ func pinApp(t *testing.T) *zip.App {
 		t.Fatalf("MountAccount: %v", err)
 	}
 	app.Get("/probe", PinBillingSubject(), echoQuery)
+	app.Post("/probe", PinBillingSubject(), echoBody)
 	return app
 }
 
@@ -67,6 +79,33 @@ func TestPinBillingSubject_PinsCallerAndDropsOrg(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestPinBillingSubject_PinsBodyForWrites — a POST whose JSON body names a FOREIGN subject
+// (customerId/userId/user) has every subject key overwritten with the caller's OWN subject
+// before the handler binds it, while non-subject fields survive. This is the boundary
+// commerce's CreatePaymentMethod (which reads customerId from the body) relies on to be
+// IDOR-safe co-resident — byte-identical to billingData's scopedBillingBody on the bridge.
+func TestPinBillingSubject_PinsBodyForWrites(t *testing.T) {
+	app := pinApp(t)
+	code, body := callH(t, app, http.MethodPost, "/probe", alice,
+		`{"customerId":"victim","userId":"victim","user":"victim","card":{"last4":"4242"}}`)
+	if code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("want 200, got %d (%s)", code, body)
+	}
+	var got map[string]any
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &got); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("bad body: %s", body)
+	}
+	for _, k := range billingSubjectKeys {
+		if got[k] != "acme" { // alice/acme resolves to the org subject "acme"
+			t.Fatalf("handler must see body %s=acme (caller's own subject), got %v", k, got[k])
+		}
+	}
+	card, ok := got["card"].(map[string]any)
+	if !ok || card["last4"] != "4242" {
+		t.Fatalf("non-subject body field must survive the pin, got card=%v", got["card"])
+	}
+}
+
 // TestPinBillingSubject_RefusesUnvalidated — a forged X-Org-Id with NO validated
 // X-User-Id (and no service token) is refused before the read handler runs: no
 // cross-tenant billing read is possible.

clients/account/csrf.go

@@ -173,6 +173,23 @@ func requireCSRF(s *cloud.Service[state], next zip.Handler) zip.Handler {
 	}
 }
 
+// RequireCSRF exposes the ambient-cookie anti-CSRF gate as a STANDALONE middleware for a
+// co-resident money-WRITE route registered OUTSIDE this package — specifically
+// apps/commerce.go's POST /v1/billing/topup/token, which shadows the account-bridge's
+// POST /v1/billing/* wildcard (order 100 < 122) that would otherwise have wrapped the
+// write in requireCSRF. Moving the route co-resident to break the commerce transport
+// self-dispatch loop must NOT silently drop that anti-CSRF gate, so the identical
+// enforcement rides along as its own handler. It binds to the SAME process-wide key
+// (sharedCSRFKey) the GET /v1/csrf issuer and the bridge verifier use, so a token minted
+// at /v1/csrf verifies here byte-identically. Enforces ONLY on the ambient-cookie path (a
+// Bearer/gateway/API caller is not CSRF-able); on success it c.Next()s into the rest of
+// the chain. The minimal Service carries only the shared key — requireCSRF/verifyCSRF
+// read nothing else off it.
+func RequireCSRF() zip.Handler {
+	s := &cloud.Service[state]{State: state{csrfKey: sharedCSRFKey(nil)}}
+	return requireCSRF(s, func(c *zip.Ctx) error { return c.Next() })
+}
+
 // issueCSRFToken serves GET /v1/csrf: for a VALIDATED caller, a fresh token
 // bound to their identity. no-store so it is never cached by a shared proxy. This is
 // the same-origin endpoint the embedded SPA reads (its response body is unreadable to

clients/account/iam.go

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 // iam.go is the ONE HTTP path from the console subsystem to Hanzo IAM, acting as
 // the confidential first-party `hanzo-console` client (client_secret_basic). It
 // ports the privileged IAM primitives that console's server-only
-// src/lib/server/identity.ts drove — mint/revoke/get the per-user `hk-` key and
+// src/lib/server/identity.ts drove — mint/revoke/get the per-user Cloud API key and
 // create/read/update an organization — so those standalone Next server routes can
 // be retired and console statically exported (task #41, "True 1-binary FE").
 //
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ const iamMaxBody = 4 << 20
 // iamClient is the confidential-client caller. clientID/clientSecret authenticate
 // as the `hanzo-console` app; an empty pair means "not configured" (handlers 501).
 type iamClient struct {
+	serviceToken string // IAM_SERVICE_TOKEN — the Bearer for the admin provision endpoint
 	base         string
 	clientID     string
 	clientSecret string
@@ -56,10 +57,91 @@ func newIAMClient() *iamClient {
 		base:         base,
 		clientID:     strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("IAM_MINT_CLIENT_ID")),
 		clientSecret: strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("IAM_MINT_CLIENT_SECRET")),
+		serviceToken: strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("IAM_SERVICE_TOKEN")),
 		http:         &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second},
 	}
 }
 
+// provisionResult is the /v1/iam/admin/provision response: the converged org and its
+// hashed credential (accessSecret shown ONCE on first mint). The org starts at a zero
+// balance — usage is pre-paid, no signup grant.
+type provisionResult struct {
+	Org          string `json:"org"`
+	AccessKey    string `json:"accessKey"`
+	AccessSecret string `json:"accessSecret"`
+	Error        string `json:"error"`
+}
+
+// provisionReady reports whether the service-token provisioning path is wired.
+func (c *iamClient) provisionReady() bool { return c != nil && c.serviceToken != "" }
+
+// provision drives the ONE atomic IAM onboarding op: create the org, move the named
+// user in as its admin, and mint its hashed org-scoped credential — the service-token
+// endpoint that replaces the create-org + move-user pair, so there is no orphan
+// between two writes and a mid-flight retry converges. orgSlug is the caller's
+// already-resolved slug (IAM honors it verbatim). The org starts at a zero balance.
+func (c *iamClient) provision(ctx context.Context, owner, name, orgSlug string, personal bool) (provisionResult, error) {
+	if !c.provisionReady() {
+		return provisionResult{}, errNotConfigured
+	}
+	body, err := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
+		"owner": owner, "name": name, "orgSlug": orgSlug, "personal": personal,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return provisionResult{}, err
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, c.base+"/v1/iam/admin/provision", strings.NewReader(string(body)))
+	if err != nil {
+		return provisionResult{}, err
+	}
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.serviceToken)
+	req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
+	resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		return provisionResult{}, fmt.Errorf("iam unreachable: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer func() { _ = resp.Body.Close() }()
+	raw, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, iamMaxBody))
+	if err != nil {
+		return provisionResult{}, err
+	}
+	var out provisionResult
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &out); err != nil {
+		return provisionResult{}, fmt.Errorf("iam provision non-json response (%d)", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 || out.Error != "" {
+		msg := out.Error
+		if msg == "" {
+			msg = fmt.Sprintf("iam status %d", resp.StatusCode)
+		}
+		return provisionResult{}, fmt.Errorf("iam provision: %s", msg)
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// userRow is the subset of an IAM user the onboarding path reads to resolve the
+// caller's authoritative (owner, name) — a zero-org caller's owner is not on its
+// token, so provision needs it from the row.
+type userRow struct {
+	Owner string `json:"owner"`
+	Name  string `json:"name"`
+}
+
+// getUserRow resolves the user by the caller's id (the same read the move did) into
+// its authoritative (owner, name).
+func (c *iamClient) getUserRow(ctx context.Context, id string) (userRow, error) {
+	raw, err := c.getUser(ctx, id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return userRow{}, err
+	}
+	var row userRow
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &row); err != nil {
+		return userRow{}, fmt.Errorf("iam get-user: decode: %w", err)
+	}
+	return row, nil
+}
+
 // configured reports whether the confidential client is wired. Handlers 501 when
 // false — the deployment simply lacks the `hanzo-console` credential (the honest
 // "not configured on this deployment" state, never a fabricated result).
@@ -130,16 +212,16 @@ func (c *iamClient) do(ctx context.Context, method, path string, q url.Values, b
 	return env, nil
 }
 
-// ── the `hk-` Cloud API key (per-user) ───────────────────────────────────────
+// ── the Cloud API key (per-user) ─────────────────────────────────────────────
 
-// userKey is the subset of an IAM user row the key surface reads: the `hk-` access
+// userKey is the subset of an IAM user row the key surface reads: the access
 // key and the last time the key row changed (updatedTime).
 type userKey struct {
 	AccessKey   string `json:"accessKey"`
 	UpdatedTime string `json:"updatedTime"`
 }
 
-// getUserKey reads a user's CURRENT `hk-` key AUTHORITATIVELY from IAM (get-user).
+// getUserKey reads a user's CURRENT Cloud API key AUTHORITATIVELY from IAM (get-user).
 // The session claim can lag a freshly-minted key (it returns ”) — so GET /keys
 // must read IAM, not the claim (the "key never listed" bug identity.ts documents).
 // `id` is the `<owner>/<name>` composite IAM parses.
@@ -155,7 +237,7 @@ func (c *iamClient) getUserKey(ctx context.Context, id string) (userKey, error)
 	return u, nil
 }
 
-// mintUserKey (re)generates the user's `hk-` key and returns the new secret — shown
+// mintUserKey (re)generates the user's Cloud API key and returns the new secret — shown
 // ONCE to the caller (POST /keys), never echoed again. IAM binds the key to `id`,
 // so a caller can only ever mint their OWN.
 func (c *iamClient) mintUserKey(ctx context.Context, id string) (string, error) {
@@ -175,7 +257,7 @@ func (c *iamClient) mintUserKey(ctx context.Context, id string) (string, error)
 	return out.AccessKey, nil
 }
 
-// revokeUserKey clears the user's `hk-` key (immediate revoke; the gateway key
+// revokeUserKey clears the user's Cloud API key (immediate revoke; the gateway key
 // cache lapses within ~5m).
 func (c *iamClient) revokeUserKey(ctx context.Context, id string) error {
 	_, err := c.do(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/v1/iam/revoke-user-keys", url.Values{"id": {id}}, nil)

clients/account/onboard_provision_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+package account
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestOnboardFirstRun_ProvisionsOnce proves the production signup path drives ONE
+// atomic IAM provision (not the old create-org + move-user pair): it resolves the
+// zero-org caller's authoritative (owner, name) and provisions the org + hashed
+// credential in a single call. No trial credit is granted — the org starts at a zero
+// balance and usage is pre-paid.
+func TestOnboardFirstRun_ProvisionsOnce(t *testing.T) {
+	var provisionCalls int
+	var provBody map[string]any
+
+	iamSrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		switch r.URL.Path {
+		case "/v1/iam/get-user":
+			_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
+				"status": "ok",
+				"data":   map[string]any{"owner": "landing", "name": "dave"},
+			})
+		case "/v1/iam/admin/provision":
+			provisionCalls++
+			b, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
+			_ = json.Unmarshal(b, &provBody)
+			_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string]any{
+				"org": "dave", "accessKey": "hk-x", "accessSecret": "sk-x",
+			})
+		default:
+			http.NotFound(w, r)
+		}
+	}))
+	defer iamSrv.Close()
+
+	iam := &iamClient{base: iamSrv.URL, clientID: "c", clientSecret: "s", serviceToken: "svc", http: &http.Client{}}
+
+	resp, err := onboardFirstRun(context.Background(), iam, "dave", "dave", "Dave", true)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("onboardFirstRun: %v", err)
+	}
+	if resp.Org != "dave" || resp.Additional {
+		t.Fatalf("resp = %+v, want org=dave additional=false", resp)
+	}
+	if provisionCalls != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("provision calls = %d, want 1 (ONE atomic op, not create+move)", provisionCalls)
+	}
+	if provBody["owner"] != "landing" || provBody["name"] != "dave" || provBody["orgSlug"] != "dave" {
+		t.Fatalf("provision body = %v, want owner=landing name=dave orgSlug=dave", provBody)
+	}
+
+	// Retry converges: provision is idempotent (same org), no orphan.
+	if _, err := onboardFirstRun(context.Background(), iam, "dave", "dave", "Dave", true); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("retry: %v", err)
+	}
+	if provisionCalls != 2 {
+		t.Fatalf("provision calls = %d, want 2 (retried, converges)", provisionCalls)
+	}
+}

clients/account/topup.go

@@ -1,28 +1,36 @@
-// topup.go ports console's app/billing/v1/topup/wallet/route.ts into the unified
-// binary at POST /v1/commerce/topup/wallet (task #41). It is the verify-and-record
-// seam for an HUSD wallet top-up: the browser sends an HUSD ERC-20 transfer to the
-// treasury and posts the tx hash here; this handler reads the receipt from the Hanzo
-// EVM, confirms it is a mined, successful HUSD Transfer(from → treasury, value),
-// derives USD cents from the (18-decimal, USD-pegged) on-chain value, records it to
-// commerce as an `husd` crypto payment, and returns the credited amount + balance.
+// topup.go is the verify-and-record seam for a crypto wallet top-up: the browser
+// sends a USD-pegged ERC-20 transfer to our treasury and posts the tx hash here;
+// this handler reads the receipt from that chain, confirms it is a mined, successful
+// Transfer(from → treasury, value), derives USD cents from the on-chain value using
+// the TOKEN'S OWN decimals, records it to commerce, and returns the credited amount
+// plus the new balance.
+//
+// A rail is one accepted (chain, token, treasury) triple, configured as data in
+// TOPUP_RAILS and discoverable at GET /v1/commerce/topup/rails. This replaced a
+// single hardcoded HUSD-on-Hanzo-Mainnet pair: HUSD is not deployed, so the surface
+// was permanently 501 — complete, correct and unable to take a cent. Customers
+// already hold USDC on Base/Ethereum/Polygon, so accepting the assets they have is
+// what makes this earn.
 //
 // THE CREDITED AMOUNT IS THE ON-CHAIN VALUE, never a client number — which is exactly
-// why this MUST be a server handler and cannot collapse to a same-origin call. Two
-// hardenings over the Node route:
+// why this MUST be a server handler and cannot collapse to a same-origin call. Three
+// properties worth keeping:
 //
 //   - IDOR-safe: the credit lands on the VALIDATED caller's own org/user (the
 //     gateway-verified X-Org-Id/X-User-Id), never a client-supplied `userId`.
 //   - S2S to commerce: recorded with the admin COMMERCE_SERVICE_TOKEN + the caller's
 //     X-Org-Id (the same service-to-service pattern clients/admin reads balances on),
 //     not by forwarding a browser cookie.
+//   - Per-rail decimals: cents come from 10^(decimals-2), so a 6-decimal USDC and an
+//     18-decimal token cannot be priced with one another's divisor.
 //
 // The EVM receipt is read over plain JSON-RPC (eth_getTransactionReceipt) — one
 // well-known call + one well-known event, so the stdlib is sufficient and no EVM
-// client dependency is pulled in.
+// client dependency is pulled in. That also means a new chain costs no new code.
 //
-// Honest failure (no fabricated credit, ever): HUSD/treasury unconfigured
-// (greenfield — HUSD not yet deployed) → 501; a missing/failed/non-HUSD-to-treasury
-// tx → 400; the chain or commerce unreachable → 502.
+// Honest failure (no fabricated credit, ever): no rail configured → 501; an unknown
+// rail, or a missing/failed/non-matching tx → 400; the chain or commerce unreachable
+// → 502.
 package account
 
 import (
@@ -40,7 +48,7 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerceinproc"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerce/transport"
 	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
 )
 
@@ -53,19 +61,25 @@ var httpClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 15 * time.Second}
 // commerceHTTP is the client for the commerce S2S seam ONLY (commerceDo). Separate
 // from httpClient (which also dials EVM JSON-RPC) so that — when commerce is folded
 // in-process (task #111) — commerce calls dispatch to the in-process handler via
-// commerceinproc's self-routing transport (no socket to the standalone), while the
+// the commerce transport's self-routing dispatch (no socket to the standalone), while the
 // HUSD chain RPC keeps going over the real network. Off the co-resident path it is a
 // plain HTTP client, exactly like before.
-var commerceHTTP = commerceinproc.Client(15 * time.Second)
+var commerceHTTP = transport.Client(15 * time.Second)
 
 // transferTopic is keccak256("Transfer(address,address,uint256)") — the ERC-20
 // Transfer event signature, topics[0] of every transfer log. A universally-fixed
 // constant (no need to hash at runtime).
 const transferTopic = "0xddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef"
 
-// husdCentDivisor: HUSD is an 18-decimal, USD-pegged stablecoin, so 1e16 base units
-// = 1 cent. Mirrors route.ts's `value / 10n ** 16n`.
-var husdCentDivisor = new(big.Int).Exp(big.NewInt(10), big.NewInt(16), nil)
+// centDivisor: base units per cent for a `decimals`-place USD-pegged token, i.e.
+// 10^(decimals-2). This MUST be per-token, not a constant: HUSD has 18 decimals
+// (1e16 per cent) while USDC has 6 (1e4 per cent). Sharing one divisor across both
+// would misprice a credit by 10^12 — the difference between a $10 top-up and a
+// $10,000,000,000 one — so the token's own decimals are carried on the rail and
+// used here.
+func centDivisor(decimals int) *big.Int {
+	return new(big.Int).Exp(big.NewInt(10), big.NewInt(int64(decimals-2)), nil)
+}
 
 var (
 	addrRe   = regexp.MustCompile(`^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$`)
@@ -74,43 +88,101 @@ var (
 
 func isAddr(a string) bool { return addrRe.MatchString(a) }
 
-// topupConfig is the deployment's HUSD + commerce wiring, resolved from server-only
-// env (sourced from KMS by the deployment, never a browser value).
+// rail is ONE accepted way to pay: a USD-pegged ERC-20 on a specific chain, sent to
+// a treasury address we control there. Everything a receipt check needs is on the
+// rail, so accepting a new chain or token is data, never code.
+//
+// This replaced a single hardcoded (HUSD, treasury) pair. That pair could only ever
+// describe HUSD on Hanzo Mainnet, and since HUSD is not deployed the whole surface
+// was permanently 501 — architecturally complete and earning nothing. Customers
+// already hold USDC on Base/Ethereum/Polygon, so the rail set is what makes the
+// path able to take money at all.
+type rail struct {
+	// Stable id the client names when submitting, e.g. "base-usdc".
+	ID string `json:"id"`
+	// Human chain name for the UI, e.g. "Base".
+	Chain string `json:"chain"`
+	// EIP-155 chain id — the wallet must be on this chain.
+	ChainID int64 `json:"chainId"`
+	// JSON-RPC endpoint used to read the receipt. Carried in the CONFIG json (this
+	// struct is what TOPUP_RAILS decodes into) but never published — the public
+	// listing is a separate view type, because an input model and an output model
+	// are different things and collapsing them once made this field unsettable.
+	RPCURL string `json:"rpcUrl"`
+	// The ERC-20 contract.
+	Token string `json:"token"`
+	// Display symbol, e.g. "USDC".
+	Symbol string `json:"symbol"`
+	// Token decimals. USDC is 6; an 18-decimal token must say 18.
+	Decimals int `json:"decimals"`
+	// Where the customer sends funds on this chain. Public by nature.
+	Treasury string `json:"treasury"`
+}
+
+// ok reports whether a rail is usable. A malformed rail is DROPPED rather than
+// rejected at request time, so one bad entry cannot take the whole surface down —
+// and a rail with impossible decimals cannot silently misprice a credit.
+func (r rail) ok() bool {
+	return r.ID != "" && isAddr(r.Token) && isAddr(r.Treasury) && r.RPCURL != "" &&
+		r.Decimals >= 2 && r.Decimals <= 36
+}
+
+// topupConfig is the deployment's accepted rails + commerce wiring, resolved from
+// server-only env (sourced from KMS by the deployment, never a browser value).
 type topupConfig struct {
-	husd     string // HUSD ERC-20 contract address
-	treasury string // the top-up treasury address
-	rpcURL   string // Hanzo EVM JSON-RPC endpoint
-	chainID  int64
+	rails    []rail
 	commerce string // commerce base (e.g. http://commerce.hanzo.svc.cluster.local:8001)
 	token    string // admin S2S bearer for commerce (COMMERCE_SERVICE_TOKEN; never logged)
 }
 
+// TOPUP_RAILS is a JSON array of rails — ONE variable describing the whole accepted
+// set, rather than a family of per-token env names that would have to be invented
+// again for every chain. Unparseable or malformed entries are dropped.
 func loadTopupConfig() topupConfig {
-	chainID := int64(36963)
-	if v := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("HANZO_CHAIN_ID")); v != "" {
-		if n, ok := new(big.Int).SetString(v, 10); ok {
-			chainID = n.Int64()
+	var rails []rail
+	if raw := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("TOPUP_RAILS")); raw != "" {
+		var parsed []rail
+		if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(raw), &parsed); err == nil {
+			for _, r := range parsed {
+				r.RPCURL = strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(r.RPCURL), "/")
+				if r.ok() {
+					rails = append(rails, r)
+				}
+			}
 		}
 	}
 	return topupConfig{
-		husd:     strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("HANZO_HUSD_ADDRESS")),
-		treasury: strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("HANZO_HUSD_TREASURY")),
-		rpcURL:   strings.TrimRight(getenv("HANZO_RPC_URL", "https://rpc.hanzo.network"), "/"),
-		chainID:  chainID,
+		rails:    rails,
 		commerce: strings.TrimRight(getenv("COMMERCE_URL", "https://api.hanzo.ai"), "/"),
 		token:    strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("COMMERCE_SERVICE_TOKEN")),
 	}
 }
 
-// configured reports whether the greenfield gate is satisfied — a valid HUSD contract
-// AND treasury. Until HUSD is deployed both are unset and the surface is honestly 501.
-func (t topupConfig) configured() bool { return isAddr(t.husd) && isAddr(t.treasury) }
+// configured reports whether ANY rail is accepted. With none the surface is honestly
+// 501 rather than pretending to take money it cannot verify.
+func (t topupConfig) configured() bool { return len(t.rails) > 0 }
+
+// find returns the named rail. An unknown id is a client error, not a server one.
+func (t topupConfig) find(id string) (rail, bool) {
+	for _, r := range t.rails {
+		if strings.EqualFold(r.ID, id) {
+			return r, true
+		}
+	}
+	return rail{}, false
+}
 
 type walletTopupReq struct {
+	// Which accepted rail the transfer was sent on, e.g. "base-usdc". The client
+	// names it rather than the server guessing from the tx: the same address can
+	// exist on several chains, so inferring would risk crediting against the wrong
+	// treasury.
+	Rail        string `json:"rail"`
 	TxHash      string `json:"txHash"`
 	FromAddress string `json:"fromAddress"`
 	// A client-supplied `userId` is intentionally NOT read — the credit lands on the
-	// validated caller (no IDOR).
+	// validated caller (no IDOR). Neither is any amount: the credit is the ON-CHAIN
+	// value, so a client number could never inflate it.
 }
 
 type walletTopupResp struct {
@@ -120,13 +192,52 @@ type walletTopupResp struct {
 	Status        string `json:"status"`
 }
 
-// walletTopup verifies a sent HUSD transfer on-chain and credits the caller's org.
-// Mirrors POST app/billing/v1/topup/wallet/route.ts.
+// topupRails answers GET /v1/commerce/topup/rails: the accepted (chain, token,
+// treasury) set, so the browser can render "send USDC here" WITHOUT the addresses
+// being baked into its bundle.
+//
+// This exists because the console previously gated its top-up UI on
+// NEXT_PUBLIC_HANZO_HUSD_ADDRESS/_TREASURY — build-time constants. Enabling a rail
+// therefore meant rebuilding and redeploying the frontend, and with them unset the
+// UI reported "not available yet" no matter what the server could actually accept.
+// Serving the set at runtime keeps ONE source of truth (the server's config) and
+// lets a rail be switched on without shipping a bundle.
+//
+// Everything here is public on-chain data; no secret is exposed.
+func topupRails(s *cloud.Service[state], c *zip.Ctx) error {
+	cfg := loadTopupConfig()
+	// Encode as [] rather than null, so clients can just read .length.
+	view := make([]railView, 0, len(cfg.rails))
+	for _, r := range cfg.rails {
+		view = append(view, railView{
+			ID: r.ID, Chain: r.Chain, ChainID: r.ChainID,
+			Token: r.Token, Symbol: r.Symbol, Decimals: r.Decimals, Treasury: r.Treasury,
+		})
+	}
+	return c.JSON(http.StatusOK, map[string]any{"rails": view})
+}
+
+// railView is what a browser is told about a rail: everything needed to send funds
+// and nothing else. Distinct from `rail` so that adding an operational field to the
+// config (an RPC URL, a key reference, a provider credential) cannot leak by merely
+// existing — a new field is published only if it is added here on purpose.
+type railView struct {
+	ID       string `json:"id"`
+	Chain    string `json:"chain"`
+	ChainID  int64  `json:"chainId"`
+	Token    string `json:"token"`
+	Symbol   string `json:"symbol"`
+	Decimals int    `json:"decimals"`
+	Treasury string `json:"treasury"`
+}
+
+// walletTopup verifies a sent stablecoin transfer on-chain and credits the caller's
+// org. The credited amount is the ON-CHAIN value, never a client number.
 func walletTopup(s *cloud.Service[state], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	cfg := loadTopupConfig()
-	// Greenfield gate: no HUSD contract / treasury ⇒ honest "not configured yet".
+	// No accepted rail ⇒ honest "not configured yet" rather than a fake credit.
 	if !cfg.configured() {
-		return zip.Errorf(http.StatusNotImplemented, "HUSD top-up is not configured yet (HUSD is not deployed on Hanzo Mainnet)")
+		return zip.Errorf(http.StatusNotImplemented, "crypto top-up is not configured yet (no payment rail is enabled)")
 	}
 
 	// The credit lands on the VALIDATED caller's own org (X-Org-Id) — require it.
@@ -143,15 +254,26 @@ func walletTopup(s *cloud.Service[state], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	if !txHashRe.MatchString(txHash) {
 		return zip.ErrBadRequest("a valid transaction hash is required")
 	}
+	// With exactly one rail the client may omit it; naming it is required as soon as
+	// there is a choice, so a transfer can never be checked against another chain's
+	// treasury by default.
+	railID := strings.TrimSpace(body.Rail)
+	if railID == "" && len(cfg.rails) == 1 {
+		railID = cfg.rails[0].ID
+	}
+	rl, ok := cfg.find(railID)
+	if !ok {
+		return zip.ErrBadRequest("unknown payment rail: name one from GET /v1/commerce/topup/rails")
+	}
 
-	// ── 1. Verify the HUSD transfer on-chain ─────────────────────────────────────
-	cents, verifiedFrom, herr := verifyHusdTransfer(c.Context(), cfg, txHash, strings.TrimSpace(body.FromAddress))
+	// ── 1. Verify the transfer on-chain ──────────────────────────────────────────
+	cents, verifiedFrom, herr := verifyTransfer(c.Context(), rl, txHash, strings.TrimSpace(body.FromAddress))
 	if herr != nil {
 		return herr
 	}
 
-	// ── 2. Record to commerce as an HUSD crypto payment (S2S) ────────────────────
-	status, herr := recordHusdPayment(c.Context(), cfg, cr, txHash, verifiedFrom, cents)
+	// ── 2. Record to commerce as a crypto payment on this rail (S2S) ─────────────
+	status, herr := recordCryptoPayment(c.Context(), cfg, rl, cr, txHash, verifiedFrom, cents)
 	if herr != nil {
 		return herr
 	}
@@ -176,13 +298,14 @@ type rpcLog struct {
 	Data    string   `json:"data"`
 }
 
-// verifyHusdTransfer reads the receipt and confirms exactly one mined, successful
-// HUSD Transfer to the treasury, returning the credited cents and the sender. Any
-// non-conforming tx is an honest 400; an unreachable chain is a 502.
-func verifyHusdTransfer(ctx context.Context, cfg topupConfig, txHash, wantFrom string) (int64, string, error) {
-	rcpt, err := getReceipt(ctx, cfg.rpcURL, txHash)
+// verifyTransfer reads the receipt on the rail's chain and confirms a mined,
+// successful Transfer of the rail's token to the rail's treasury, returning the
+// credited cents and the sender. Any non-conforming tx is an honest 400; an
+// unreachable chain is a 502. Nothing is credited that the chain did not confirm.
+func verifyTransfer(ctx context.Context, rl rail, txHash, wantFrom string) (int64, string, error) {
+	rcpt, err := getReceipt(ctx, rl.RPCURL, txHash)
 	if err != nil {
-		return 0, "", zip.Errorf(http.StatusBadGateway, "could not verify the transaction on Hanzo Mainnet: %v", err)
+		return 0, "", zip.Errorf(http.StatusBadGateway, "could not verify the transaction on %s: %v", rl.Chain, err)
 	}
 	if rcpt == nil {
 		return 0, "", zip.ErrBadRequest("transaction not found or not yet mined")
@@ -191,10 +314,11 @@ func verifyHusdTransfer(ctx context.Context, cfg topupConfig, txHash, wantFrom s
 		return 0, "", zip.ErrBadRequest("transaction failed on-chain")
 	}
 
-	husd := strings.ToLower(cfg.husd)
-	treasuryTopic := addrToTopic(cfg.treasury)
+	token := strings.ToLower(rl.Token)
+	treasuryTopic := addrToTopic(rl.Treasury)
+	div := centDivisor(rl.Decimals)
 	for _, lg := range rcpt.Logs {
-		if strings.ToLower(lg.Address) != husd {
+		if strings.ToLower(lg.Address) != token {
 			continue
 		}
 		if len(lg.Topics) < 3 || strings.ToLower(lg.Topics[0]) != transferTopic {
@@ -207,7 +331,7 @@ func verifyHusdTransfer(ctx context.Context, cfg topupConfig, txHash, wantFrom s
 		if !ok {
 			continue
 		}
-		cents := new(big.Int).Div(value, husdCentDivisor)
+		cents := new(big.Int).Div(value, div)
 		if cents.Sign() <= 0 || !cents.IsInt64() {
 			return 0, "", zip.ErrBadRequest("transferred amount is below the minimum (1 cent)")
 		}
@@ -217,7 +341,7 @@ func verifyHusdTransfer(ctx context.Context, cfg topupConfig, txHash, wantFrom s
 		}
 		return cents.Int64(), from, nil
 	}
-	return 0, "", zip.ErrBadRequest("no HUSD transfer to the treasury was found in this transaction")
+	return 0, "", zip.ErrBadRequest("no " + rl.Symbol + " transfer to the treasury was found in this transaction")
 }
 
 // getReceipt calls eth_getTransactionReceipt over JSON-RPC. A null result (not mined)
@@ -277,18 +401,21 @@ func topicToAddr(topic string) string {
 
 // ── commerce (S2S) ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
-// recordHusdPayment records the verified credit to commerce as an `husd` crypto
-// payment, scoped to the caller's org via the S2S service token + X-Org-Id.
-func recordHusdPayment(ctx context.Context, cfg topupConfig, cr caller, txHash, from string, cents int64) (string, error) {
+// recordCryptoPayment records the verified credit to commerce, scoped to the
+// caller's org via the S2S service token + X-Org-Id. Network, chain, currency and
+// destination all come from the RAIL the transfer was verified against, so the
+// ledger row describes the payment that actually happened rather than a fixed
+// assumption about which chain and token it was.
+func recordCryptoPayment(ctx context.Context, cfg topupConfig, rl rail, cr caller, txHash, from string, cents int64) (string, error) {
 	payload, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]any{
 		"method":      "crypto",
-		"network":     "hanzo",
-		"chainId":     cfg.chainID,
-		"currency":    "husd",
+		"network":     rl.Chain,
+		"chainId":     rl.ChainID,
+		"currency":    strings.ToLower(rl.Symbol),
 		"amount":      cents,
 		"txHash":      txHash,
 		"fromAddress": from,
-		"toAddress":   cfg.treasury,
+		"toAddress":   rl.Treasury,
 		"userId":      cr.id, // the VALIDATED caller — never a client-supplied id
 	})
 	raw, status, err := commerceDo(ctx, cfg.commerce, cfg.token, http.MethodPost, "/v1/billing/payment", nil, cr.owner, payload)

clients/account/topup_test.go

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
 	"math/big"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
 	"sync"
 	"testing"
 )
@@ -81,24 +82,46 @@ func (f *fakeCommerce) server(t *testing.T) *httptest.Server {
 	return srv
 }
 
-// husdReceipt builds a receipt carrying one HUSD Transfer(from→to, cents*1e16).
+// husdReceipt builds a receipt carrying one 18-decimal Transfer(from→to, cents*1e16).
 func husdReceipt(status, husd, from, to string, cents int64) map[string]any {
-	value := new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(cents), husdCentDivisor)
+	return tokenReceipt(status, husd, from, to, cents, 18)
+}
+
+// tokenReceipt builds a receipt for a Transfer of `cents` worth of a token with the
+// given decimals — the knob that proves a 6-decimal USDC is not priced with an
+// 18-decimal divisor.
+func tokenReceipt(status, token, from, to string, cents int64, decimals int) map[string]any {
+	value := new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(cents), centDivisor(decimals))
 	return map[string]any{
 		"status": status,
 		"logs": []any{map[string]any{
-			"address": husd,
+			"address": token,
 			"topics":  []any{transferTopic, addrToTopic(from), addrToTopic(to)},
 			"data":    "0x" + fmt.Sprintf("%064x", value),
 		}},
 	}
 }
 
-func setTopupEnv(t *testing.T, husd, treasury, rpcURL, commerceURL string) {
+// setTopupEnv configures ONE 18-decimal rail, preserving these tests' original
+// arithmetic (18 decimals ⇒ 1e16 per cent) so they still assert the same cents.
+// An empty token/treasury yields no rail at all — the "not configured" case.
+func setTopupEnv(t *testing.T, token, treasury, rpcURL, commerceURL string) {
 	t.Helper()
-	t.Setenv("HANZO_HUSD_ADDRESS", husd)
-	t.Setenv("HANZO_HUSD_TREASURY", treasury)
-	t.Setenv("HANZO_RPC_URL", rpcURL)
+	setTopupRails(t, commerceURL, rail{
+		ID: "hanzo-husd", Chain: "Hanzo", ChainID: 36963, RPCURL: rpcURL,
+		Token: token, Symbol: "HUSD", Decimals: 18, Treasury: treasury,
+	})
+}
+
+// setTopupRails installs an explicit rail set. Malformed rails are dropped by
+// loadTopupConfig, which is how the not-configured cases above stay 501.
+func setTopupRails(t *testing.T, commerceURL string, rails ...rail) {
+	t.Helper()
+	raw, err := json.Marshal(rails)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("marshal rails: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Setenv("TOPUP_RAILS", string(raw))
 	t.Setenv("COMMERCE_URL", commerceURL)
 	t.Setenv("COMMERCE_SERVICE_TOKEN", "svc-token")
 }
@@ -239,3 +262,117 @@ func TestTopup_SenderMismatch_400(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Fatalf("sender mismatch: want 400, got %d", code)
 	}
 }
+
+// ── rails: the multi-chain generalisation ────────────────────────────────────────
+
+const (
+	tUSDC     = "0x5555555555555555555555555555555555555555"
+	tTreasBase = "0x6666666666666666666666666666666666666666"
+)
+
+func usdcRail(rpcURL string) rail {
+	return rail{
+		ID: "base-usdc", Chain: "Base", ChainID: 8453, RPCURL: rpcURL,
+		Token: tUSDC, Symbol: "USDC", Decimals: 6, Treasury: tTreasBase,
+	}
+}
+
+// The decimals bug this design exists to prevent: USDC has 6 decimals, so 500 cents
+// is 5_000_000 base units. Priced with an 18-decimal divisor it would round to ZERO
+// and silently credit nothing; priced the other way it would credit 10^12 times too
+// much. The rail's own decimals must be what is used.
+func TestTopup_USDC_SixDecimals_PricedByRail(t *testing.T) {
+	rpc := &fakeRPC{result: tokenReceipt("0x1", tUSDC, tSender, tTreasBase, 500, 6)}
+	com := &fakeCommerce{balance: 500}
+	setTopupRails(t, com.server(t).URL, usdcRail(rpc.server(t).URL))
+	app := mountBrand(t, "hanzo")
+
+	code, body := callH(t, app, http.MethodPost, "/v1/commerce/topup/wallet", alice,
+		`{"rail":"base-usdc","txHash":"`+tTxHash+`","fromAddress":"`+tSender+`"}`)
+	if code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("usdc topup: want 200, got %d (%s)", code, body)
+	}
+	var r walletTopupResp
+	mustJSON(t, body, &r)
+	if r.CreditedCents != 500 {
+		t.Fatalf("6-decimal USDC must credit 500 cents, got %d", r.CreditedCents)
+	}
+	// The ledger row must describe the rail that was actually verified.
+	if com.payment["currency"] != "usdc" || com.payment["network"] != "Base" {
+		t.Fatalf("payment must record the real rail, got currency=%v network=%v",
+			com.payment["currency"], com.payment["network"])
+	}
+	if id, _ := com.payment["chainId"].(float64); id != 8453 {
+		t.Fatalf("chainId must be the rail's 8453, got %v", com.payment["chainId"])
+	}
+}
+
+// With several rails configured the client MUST name one: silently picking a default
+// could verify a transfer against another chain's treasury.
+func TestTopup_MultipleRails_RequiresNamingOne(t *testing.T) {
+	rpc := &fakeRPC{result: tokenReceipt("0x1", tUSDC, tSender, tTreasBase, 500, 6)}
+	com := &fakeCommerce{}
+	setTopupRails(t, com.server(t).URL,
+		usdcRail(rpc.server(t).URL),
+		rail{ID: "hanzo-husd", Chain: "Hanzo", ChainID: 36963, RPCURL: rpc.server(t).URL,
+			Token: tHusd, Symbol: "HUSD", Decimals: 18, Treasury: tTreasury},
+	)
+	app := mountBrand(t, "hanzo")
+
+	code, _ := callH(t, app, http.MethodPost, "/v1/commerce/topup/wallet", alice,
+		`{"txHash":"`+tTxHash+`"}`)
+	if code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("omitting the rail with >1 configured: want 400, got %d", code)
+	}
+	code, _ = callH(t, app, http.MethodPost, "/v1/commerce/topup/wallet", alice,
+		`{"rail":"nope","txHash":"`+tTxHash+`"}`)
+	if code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("unknown rail: want 400, got %d", code)
+	}
+}
+
+// A transfer on the right token but to ANOTHER rail's treasury must not credit.
+func TestTopup_WrongRailTreasury_400(t *testing.T) {
+	rpc := &fakeRPC{result: tokenReceipt("0x1", tUSDC, tSender, tTreasury, 500, 6)} // hanzo treasury
+	com := &fakeCommerce{}
+	setTopupRails(t, com.server(t).URL, usdcRail(rpc.server(t).URL))
+	app := mountBrand(t, "hanzo")
+
+	code, _ := callH(t, app, http.MethodPost, "/v1/commerce/topup/wallet", alice,
+		`{"rail":"base-usdc","txHash":"`+tTxHash+`"}`)
+	if code != http.StatusBadRequest {
+		t.Fatalf("transfer to a different treasury: want 400, got %d", code)
+	}
+}
+
+// The public listing gives a browser what it needs to send funds — and must not leak
+// the operational RPC endpoint, which lives on the same config struct.
+func TestTopupRails_PublishesSendInfoWithoutRPC(t *testing.T) {
+	com := &fakeCommerce{}
+	setTopupRails(t, com.server(t).URL, usdcRail("http://secret-rpc.internal"))
+	app := mountBrand(t, "hanzo")
+
+	code, body := callH(t, app, http.MethodGet, "/v1/commerce/topup/rails", alice, "")
+	if code != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("rails: want 200, got %d (%s)", code, body)
+	}
+	var got struct{ Rails []map[string]any }
+	mustJSON(t, body, &got)
+	if len(got.Rails) != 1 || got.Rails[0]["treasury"] != tTreasBase || got.Rails[0]["decimals"].(float64) != 6 {
+		t.Fatalf("rails listing wrong: %s", body)
+	}
+	if _, leaked := got.Rails[0]["rpcUrl"]; leaked {
+		t.Fatalf("rails listing must not publish the RPC endpoint: %s", body)
+	}
+}
+
+// No rail configured ⇒ the listing is an empty array, not null, so a client can read
+// .length without a nil check — and the POST is an honest 501.
+func TestTopupRails_EmptyWhenUnconfigured(t *testing.T) {
+	t.Setenv("TOPUP_RAILS", "")
+	app := mountBrand(t, "hanzo")
+	code, body := callH(t, app, http.MethodGet, "/v1/commerce/topup/rails", alice, "")
+	if code != http.StatusOK || !strings.Contains(string(body), `"rails":[]`) {
+		t.Fatalf("unconfigured rails: want 200 with [], got %d (%s)", code, body)
+	}
+}

clients/admin/admin.go

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ import (
 	"os"
 	"sort"
 	"strings"
+	"sync"
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
@@ -38,11 +39,12 @@ import (
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/finance"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/health"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/iam"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/infra"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/invoices"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/metrics"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/revenue"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/subscriptions"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerceinproc"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerce/transport"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/principal"
 	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
 )
@@ -53,9 +55,9 @@ import (
 // The state is built from Deps fields NOT on cloud.Base (deps.Audit, deps.IAMIssuer), so
 // it constructs the cloud.Service value directly (cloud.NewBase + &cloud.Service[core.State]{…})
 // rather than via cloud.Mount.
-func Mount(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
+func Mount(app cloud.Router, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 	if app == nil {
-		return fmt.Errorf("admin.Mount: nil zip.App")
+		return fmt.Errorf("admin.Mount: nil app")
 	}
 	if deps.Logger == nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("admin.Mount: nil deps.Logger")
@@ -65,11 +67,12 @@ func Mount(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 		Base: b,
 		State: core.State{
 			IAM:        iam.New(iamBase(deps)),
-			Commerce:   commerce.New(commerceinproc.BaseURL(os.Getenv("CLOUD_COMMERCE_HTTP_URL")), os.Getenv("COMMERCE_SERVICE_TOKEN")),
+			Commerce:   commerce.New(transport.BaseURL(os.Getenv("CLOUD_COMMERCE_HTTP_URL")), os.Getenv("COMMERCE_SERVICE_TOKEN")),
 			Health:     health.New(o11yHealthURL()),
 			DO:         digitalocean.New(doTokenFromEnv()),
 			AdminOrg:   adminOrgOf(deps),
 			AuditStore: deps.Audit,
+			WLTenants:  wlTenantsFromEnv(),
 		},
 	}
 
@@ -89,7 +92,7 @@ func Mount(app *zip.App, deps cloud.Deps) error {
 // through the two-tier gate: org-scoped panels behind core.GuardScoped, the platform
 // control plane behind core.Guard. Each carved-out domain (audit/customer/revenue/finance)
 // owns its own route registration.
-func routes(app *zip.App, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
+func routes(app cloud.Router, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
 	g := app.Group("/v1/admin")
 	// Org-scoped panels — GuardScoped. Cross-tenant reads are impossible for a non-super
 	// caller.
@@ -103,6 +106,7 @@ func routes(app *zip.App, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
 	g.Get("/applications", core.Guard(s, applications))
 	g.Get("/products", core.Guard(s, products))
 	g.Get("/compute", core.Guard(s, compute))
+	g.Get("/block-storage", core.Guard(s, blockStorage))
 	g.Get("/o11y", core.Guard(s, o11y))
 	g.Get("/aimetrics", core.Guard(s, aimetrics))
 	g.Post("/sync", core.Guard(s, syncNow))
@@ -138,6 +142,7 @@ func routes(app *zip.App, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
 	revenue.Routes(app, s)
 	finance.Routes(app, s)
 	metrics.Routes(app, s)
+	infra.Routes(app, s)
 	invoices.Routes(app, s)
 	subscriptions.Routes(app, s)
 }
@@ -160,6 +165,11 @@ func me(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 		Email:        strings.TrimSpace(c.UserEmail()),
 		DisplayName:  name,
 		IsSuperAdmin: sc.Super,
+		// The gate (GuardScoped) already proved this caller is either a SuperAdmin or an
+		// admin of an ENABLED WL tenant, so an admitted non-super IS the WL tier — no
+		// separate lookup needed. ScopeOrgs is the resolved subtree (empty ⇒ all, for super).
+		IsWhiteLabel: !sc.Super,
+		ScopeOrgs:    sc.Orgs,
 	})
 }
 
@@ -210,11 +220,20 @@ func users(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	} else if owner := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("org")); owner != "" {
 		q.Set("owner", owner)
 	}
+	// Default pagination when the client omits it. IAM's user list returns ZERO
+	// rows AND total 0 when p/pageSize are unset — which surfaced as the admin
+	// directory showing "0 of 222". Default to the first page at the shared admin
+	// page size so the directory populates and the REAL total is reported; an
+	// explicit client p/pageSize still wins (the UI paginates from there).
 	if p := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("p")); p != "" {
 		q.Set("p", p)
+	} else {
+		q.Set("p", "1")
 	}
 	if ps := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("pageSize")); ps != "" {
 		q.Set("pageSize", ps)
+	} else {
+		q.Set("pageSize", "200")
 	}
 	if term := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("q")); term != "" {
 		// IAM's list uses field/value contains-matching for the free-text filter.
@@ -332,13 +351,8 @@ func usage(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 }
 
 // ── /v1/admin/products — workload registry (ProductRow[]) ────────────────────
-
-// products is the workload/drift registry. That inventory is the platform.hanzo.ai apps
-// table / operator reconcile state, NOT an in-binary source. admin exposes the gated
-// endpoint and returns the real empty registry until that feed is wired.
-func products(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
-	return core.OKList(c, []productRow{}, 0)
-}
+// The handler + the fleet projection live in products.go: it reads the operator App-CR +
+// drift observation through the in-process paas.CurrentFleet seam (reuse, never fork).
 
 // ── /v1/admin/overview — Platform Overview tiles (OverviewData) ───────────────
 
@@ -355,17 +369,40 @@ func overview(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	commercePartial := false
 	if orgErr == nil {
 		orgCount = len(orgs)
+		// FAN OUT. Each org costs two independent reads (users, money), so doing this
+		// serially made the dashboard's latency O(orgs): at 122 orgs that is ~244
+		// blocking round-trips before a single tile renders, and it grows every time a
+		// tenant signs up. The reads do not depend on each other, so they run
+		// concurrently under a fixed ceiling — bounded so a large fleet cannot stampede
+		// the finance ledger or the IAM store.
+		const maxParallelOrgReads = 12
+		var (
+			mu  sync.Mutex
+			wg  sync.WaitGroup
+			sem = make(chan struct{}, maxParallelOrgReads)
+		)
 		for _, o := range orgs {
-			userCount += orgUserCount(s, ctx, cr, o.Name)
-			sp, cr2, ok := core.OrgMoney(s, ctx, o.Name)
-			spend += sp
-			credits += cr2
-			if !ok {
-				// This org's money did not read — the fleet spend/credits totals are now
-				// an UNDERCOUNT, so the commerce source must report degraded, not healthy.
-				commercePartial = true
-			}
+			wg.Add(1)
+			go func(org string) {
+				defer wg.Done()
+				sem <- struct{}{}
+				defer func() { <-sem }()
+				uc := orgUserCount(s, ctx, cr, org)
+				sp, cr2, ok := core.OrgMoney(s, ctx, org)
+				mu.Lock()
+				defer mu.Unlock()
+				userCount += uc
+				spend += sp
+				credits += cr2
+				if !ok {
+					// This org's money did not read — the fleet spend/credits totals are
+					// now an UNDERCOUNT, so the commerce source must report degraded,
+					// not healthy.
+					commercePartial = true
+				}
+			}(o.Name)
 		}
+		wg.Wait()
 	}
 
 	// Commerce freshness derives from the SAME per-org reads the totals fold — NOT a
@@ -393,12 +430,18 @@ func overview(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	}
 	sources = append(sources, core.SrcOf("o11y", oErr, o11yRows, now))
 
+	// Fleet workload registry — the operator App-CR + drift observation via the paas seam
+	// (products.go). A nil/unready seam degrades to an honest-empty rollup (zeros, no error);
+	// a hard observation error marks the "fleet" source degraded without failing the overview.
+	fleetRows, fleetRoll, fleetErr := fleetProducts(ctx)
+	sources = append(sources, core.SrcOf("fleet", fleetErr, len(fleetRows), now))
+
 	return core.OK(c, overviewData{
 		Orgs:           orgCount,
 		Users:          userCount,
-		Products:       0, // workload registry feed pending (platform apps table)
-		ActiveProducts: 0,
-		Drift:          0,
+		Products:       fleetRoll.Total,
+		ActiveProducts: fleetRoll.Active,
+		Drift:          fleetRoll.Drift,
 		SpendCents30d:  spend,
 		Tokens30d:      0, // fleet token counters pending (insights/datastore)
 		CreditsCents:   credits,
@@ -461,6 +504,30 @@ func adminOrgOf(_ cloud.Deps) string {
 	return "admin"
 }
 
+// wlTenantsFromEnv resolves the enabled white-label tenant allowlist from
+// ADMIN_WL_TENANT_ORGS (comma-separated org slugs). It is the ONE seed of
+// State.WLTenants — the fail-closed second admission tier: EMPTY/unset ⇒ no customer
+// org-admin is admitted (SuperAdmins only), so an absent/mis-set env fails CLOSED.
+// Each entry is trimmed and matched verbatim against principal.Org (the validated
+// owner), never folded; blank entries are dropped. Onboarding a reseller is a
+// deliberate, KMS-/git-auditable edit to this env, not a runtime self-service flip.
+func wlTenantsFromEnv() map[string]bool {
+	raw := strings.TrimSpace(os.Getenv("ADMIN_WL_TENANT_ORGS"))
+	if raw == "" {
+		return nil
+	}
+	set := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, part := range strings.Split(raw, ",") {
+		if org := strings.TrimSpace(part); org != "" {
+			set[org] = true
+		}
+	}
+	if len(set) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return set
+}
+
 // doTokenFromEnv reads the DigitalOcean token from the environment. Sourced from a
 // KMSSecret on the cloud deployment (DO_API_TOKEN) — never hard-coded.
 func doTokenFromEnv() string {

clients/admin/admin_test.go

@@ -42,6 +42,14 @@ func mountService(t *testing.T, iamURL, commerceURL, healthURL string) (func(met
 		Health:   health.New(healthURL),
 		DO:       digitalocean.New(""), // no token → honest not-configured unless a test overrides s.State.DO
 		AdminOrg: "admin",
+		// The harness enables ONE white-label tenant — "maxpower" (the org orgAdminHdr
+		// belongs to) — so the scoped-panel tests exercise the ADMITTED WL tier. The
+		// gate now requires WL enablement for any non-super caller, so the deny tests use
+		// a DIFFERENT org (not in this set) to prove a non-enabled org-admin is refused,
+		// and the fail-closed default (empty set ⇒ deny) is covered by a dedicated unit
+		// test on State.IsWhiteLabelTenant. A test that needs the fleet-only default
+		// clears s.State.WLTenants after mount.
+		WLTenants: map[string]bool{"maxpower": true},
 	}}
 	// Mirror the REAL Mount EXACTLY by registering the same routes() the subsystem uses
 	// (org-scoped panels behind GuardScoped, the platform control plane behind Guard,
@@ -99,6 +107,10 @@ var platformAdminRoutes = []adminRoute{
 	{"GET", "/v1/admin/flags"},
 	{"GET", "/v1/admin/waitlist"},
 	{"POST", "/v1/admin/waitlist/boost"},
+	{"GET", "/v1/admin/infra"},
+	{"POST", "/v1/admin/infra/volumes/v1/snapshot"},
+	{"DELETE", "/v1/admin/infra/volumes/v1"},
+	{"POST", "/v1/admin/infra/nodes/1/cordon"},
 }
 
 // adminRoutes is the full surface (both tiers) — the fail-closed gate test denies an
@@ -180,6 +192,52 @@ func TestGate_AllowsSuperAdmin(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestUsers_DefaultsPagination locks the "0 of 222" fix: IAM's user list returns
+// ZERO rows AND total 0 when p/pageSize are unset, so the /v1/admin/users handler
+// MUST supply a default first page + page size when the client (the operator
+// directory) omits them. Proves the handler forwards p=1 & pageSize=200 and that
+// the real total reaches the client.
+func TestUsers_DefaultsPagination(t *testing.T) {
+	var gotP, gotPageSize string
+	iamSrv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if strings.HasSuffix(r.URL.Path, "/get-users") {
+			gotP = r.URL.Query().Get("p")
+			gotPageSize = r.URL.Query().Get("pageSize")
+			w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+			io.WriteString(w, `{"status":"ok","msg":"","data":[
+				{"owner":"hanzo","name":"alice","email":"alice@hanzo.ai","displayName":"Alice"}
+			],"data2":222}`)
+			return
+		}
+		w.WriteHeader(404)
+		io.WriteString(w, `{"status":"error","msg":"not found"}`)
+	}))
+	defer iamSrv.Close()
+
+	do := mount(t, iamSrv.URL, "http://127.0.0.1:0", "http://127.0.0.1:0")
+	admin := map[string]string{"X-User-IsAdmin": "true", "X-Org-Id": "admin", "X-User-Id": "admin/z", "X-User-Email": "z@hanzo.ai"}
+	resp, body := do("GET", "/v1/admin/users", admin) // NOTE: no ?pageSize — the bug path.
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("GET /v1/admin/users: got %d (body=%s)", resp.StatusCode, body)
+	}
+	if gotPageSize != "200" {
+		t.Fatalf("users list must default pageSize=200 when the client omits it, got %q", gotPageSize)
+	}
+	if gotP != "1" {
+		t.Fatalf("users list must default p=1 when the client omits it, got %q", gotP)
+	}
+	var env struct {
+		Data  []operatorUser `json:"data"`
+		Data2 int            `json:"data2"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &env); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("decode users envelope: %v (body=%s)", err, body)
+	}
+	if env.Data2 != 222 || len(env.Data) == 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("users must surface the REAL directory (got %d rows, total %d), not 0-of-222", len(env.Data), env.Data2)
+	}
+}
+
 // fakeIAM stands in for the IAM management surface. It records whether the
 // caller's credential was replayed and returns /v1 envelopes.
 type fakeIAM struct {

clients/admin/aimetrics.go

@@ -20,12 +20,12 @@ package admin
 // FLEET behaving" (RED metrics, logs, usage), this answers "how are the MODELS and
 // EVALS doing" — LLM generations, per-model spend, and eval-run quality/progress —
 // over the SAME ONE datastore (Datastore), the SAME shared client
-// (aiobject.DatastoreQuery), no second connection.
+// (datastore.Query), no second connection.
 //
 // Signals, each from its canonical table in the one datastore:
-//   - LLM generations → langfuse.observations : generations, cost (USD), latency
+//   - LLM generations → o11y_ai.observations : generations, cost (USD), latency
 //                                                (fleet-wide; honest-empty until the
-//                                                Langfuse ingest lands rows)
+//                                                O11yAI ingest lands rows)
 //   - Per-model usage → hanzo.cloud_usage      : requests, tokens, cost per model
 //                                                (the live usage ledger the ai gateway
 //                                                writes — populated today)
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ package admin
 // INDEPENDENTLY — a table that is absent or a column that differs contributes its
 // zero-value (the enclosing `if err == nil`), never a failure, so the board always
 // renders what the datastore actually holds. admin READS only; it owns and creates
-// NO table. Money from cloud_usage is USD cents, from langfuse is USD; latency is
+// NO table. Money from cloud_usage is USD cents, from o11y_ai is USD; latency is
 // milliseconds; time bounds are POSITIONAL parameters (never interpolated), and the
 // bucket interval is a server-side constant — injection-safe.
 
@@ -60,18 +60,18 @@ import (
 	"strconv"
 	"time"
 
-	aiobject "github.com/hanzoai/ai/object"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/core"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/datastore"
 	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
 )
 
 // Fully-qualified datastore tables. admin only READS these — the ai gateway owns
-// hanzo.cloud_usage, Langfuse owns langfuse.observations, and the eval telemetry
+// hanzo.cloud_usage, O11yAI owns o11y_ai.observations, and the eval telemetry
 // store (clients/eval) owns hanzo.eval_traces / hanzo.eval_scores.
 const (
 	aimUsageTable  = "hanzo.cloud_usage"
-	aimLangfuseObs = "langfuse.observations"
+	aimO11yAIObs = "o11y_ai.observations"
 	aimEvalTraces  = "hanzo.eval_traces"
 	aimEvalScores  = "hanzo.eval_scores"
 	aimTopN        = 12
@@ -82,19 +82,19 @@ type aiMetrics struct {
 	Range          string           `json:"range"`
 	Start          string           `json:"start"`
 	End            string           `json:"end"`
-	Langfuse       aimLangfuse      `json:"langfuse"`
+	O11yAI       aimO11yAI      `json:"o11yAi"`
 	Usage          aimUsage         `json:"usage"`
 	Evals          aimEvals         `json:"evals"`
 	TopModels      []aimModelStat   `json:"topModels"`      // cloud_usage per-model (populated today)
-	LangfuseModels []aimLfModelStat `json:"langfuseModels"` // langfuse per-model (honest-empty today)
+	O11yAIModels []aimLfModelStat `json:"o11yAiModels"` // o11y_ai per-model (honest-empty today)
 	ScoreNames     []aimScoreStat   `json:"scoreNames"`     // eval_scores per score-name
 	EvalRuns       []aimRunStat     `json:"evalRuns"`       // recent eval runs (progress)
 	ScoreSeries    []aimScorePoint  `json:"scoreSeries"`    // avg eval score over time (progress trend)
 }
 
-// aimLangfuse is the fleet-wide Langfuse generation rollup (honest-empty today).
-// Cost is USD (Langfuse's native unit); latency is milliseconds (end_time-start_time).
-type aimLangfuse struct {
+// aimO11yAI is the fleet-wide O11yAI generation rollup (honest-empty today).
+// Cost is USD (O11yAI's native unit); latency is milliseconds (end_time-start_time).
+type aimO11yAI struct {
 	Generations  int64   `json:"generations"`
 	CostUsd      float64 `json:"costUsd"`
 	LatencyMsAvg float64 `json:"latencyMsAvg"`
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ type aimModelStat struct {
 	CostCents int64  `json:"costCents"`
 }
 
-// aimLfModelStat is one row of the per-model Langfuse leaderboard (honest-empty today).
+// aimLfModelStat is one row of the per-model O11yAI leaderboard (honest-empty today).
 type aimLfModelStat struct {
 	Model       string  `json:"model"`
 	Generations int64   `json:"generations"`
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ func aimetrics(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 		Start:          since.Format(time.RFC3339),
 		End:            time.Now().UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
 		TopModels:      []aimModelStat{},
-		LangfuseModels: []aimLfModelStat{},
+		O11yAIModels: []aimLfModelStat{},
 		ScoreNames:     []aimScoreStat{},
 		EvalRuns:       []aimRunStat{},
 		ScoreSeries:    []aimScorePoint{},
@@ -186,53 +186,53 @@ func aimetrics(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 
 	// Honest-empty when the warehouse is not connected: the board renders its zero
 	// state, never a fabricated fleet.
-	if !aiobject.DatastoreEnabled() {
+	if !datastore.Ready() {
 		return core.OK(c, payload)
 	}
 
-	sinceTS := chTS(since) // DateTime literal — cloud_usage.timestamp, langfuse.start_time, eval_*.ts
+	sinceTS := chTS(since) // DateTime literal — cloud_usage.timestamp, o11y_ai.start_time, eval_*.ts
 	interval := o11yBucket(rangeLabel)
 
-	// ── Langfuse generations (fleet) — honest-empty until ingest lands rows ──
-	if rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, aimLangfuseTotalsSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
+	// ── O11yAI generations (fleet) — honest-empty until ingest lands rows ──
+	if rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, aimO11yAITotalsSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
 		r := firstRowOr(rows)
-		payload.Langfuse.Generations = chInt64(r["gens"])
-		payload.Langfuse.CostUsd = chFloat64(r["cost"])
+		payload.O11yAI.Generations = chInt64(r["gens"])
+		payload.O11yAI.CostUsd = chFloat64(r["cost"])
 	}
-	// Langfuse latency (separate query so a Nullable end_time / column mismatch never
+	// O11yAI latency (separate query so a Nullable end_time / column mismatch never
 	// zeroes the proven generations+cost number above).
-	if rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, aimLangfuseLatencySQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
+	if rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, aimO11yAILatencySQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
 		r := firstRowOr(rows)
-		payload.Langfuse.LatencyMsAvg = chFloat64(r["lat_avg"])
-		payload.Langfuse.LatencyMsP95 = chFloat64(r["lat_p95"])
+		payload.O11yAI.LatencyMsAvg = chFloat64(r["lat_avg"])
+		payload.O11yAI.LatencyMsP95 = chFloat64(r["lat_p95"])
 	}
-	// Langfuse per-model.
-	if rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, aimLangfuseModelsSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
-		payload.LangfuseModels = lfModelsFromRows(rows)
+	// O11yAI per-model.
+	if rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, aimO11yAIModelsSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
+		payload.O11yAIModels = lfModelsFromRows(rows)
 	}
 
 	// ── Per-model usage (fleet) from the live cloud_usage ledger ──
-	if rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, aimUsageTotalsSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
+	if rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, aimUsageTotalsSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
 		fillAimUsage(&payload.Usage, firstRowOr(rows))
 	}
-	if rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, aimTopModelsSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
+	if rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, aimTopModelsSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
 		payload.TopModels = aimModelsFromRows(rows)
 	}
 
 	// ── Evals (fleet): traces + scores + progress ──
-	if rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, aimEvalTracesSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
+	if rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, aimEvalTracesSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
 		fillAimEvalTraces(&payload.Evals, firstRowOr(rows))
 	}
-	if rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, aimEvalScoresSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
+	if rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, aimEvalScoresSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
 		fillAimEvalScores(&payload.Evals, firstRowOr(rows))
 	}
-	if rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, aimScoreNamesSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
+	if rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, aimScoreNamesSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
 		payload.ScoreNames = scoreNamesFromRows(rows)
 	}
-	if rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, aimEvalRunsSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
+	if rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, aimEvalRunsSQL(), sinceTS); err == nil {
 		payload.EvalRuns = evalRunsFromRows(rows)
 	}
-	if rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, aimScoreSeriesSQL(interval), sinceTS); err == nil {
+	if rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, aimScoreSeriesSQL(interval), sinceTS); err == nil {
 		payload.ScoreSeries = scoreSeriesFromRows(rows)
 	}
 
@@ -241,20 +241,20 @@ func aimetrics(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 
 // ── pure SQL builders (static SQL + one positional time bound; unit-tested) ──
 
-func aimLangfuseTotalsSQL() string {
-	return "SELECT count() AS gens, toFloat64(sum(total_cost)) AS cost FROM " + aimLangfuseObs +
+func aimO11yAITotalsSQL() string {
+	return "SELECT count() AS gens, toFloat64(sum(total_cost)) AS cost FROM " + aimO11yAIObs +
 		" WHERE type = 'GENERATION' AND start_time >= ?"
 }
 
-func aimLangfuseLatencySQL() string {
+func aimO11yAILatencySQL() string {
 	lat := "(toUnixTimestamp64Milli(end_time) - toUnixTimestamp64Milli(start_time))"
 	return "SELECT round(avg(" + lat + "), 2) AS lat_avg, round(quantile(0.95)(" + lat + "), 2) AS lat_p95 " +
-		"FROM " + aimLangfuseObs + " WHERE type = 'GENERATION' AND start_time >= ? AND end_time > start_time"
+		"FROM " + aimO11yAIObs + " WHERE type = 'GENERATION' AND start_time >= ? AND end_time > start_time"
 }
 
-func aimLangfuseModelsSQL() string {
+func aimO11yAIModelsSQL() string {
 	return "SELECT provided_model_name AS model, count() AS gens, toFloat64(sum(total_cost)) AS cost " +
-		"FROM " + aimLangfuseObs + " WHERE type = 'GENERATION' AND start_time >= ? AND provided_model_name != '' " +
+		"FROM " + aimO11yAIObs + " WHERE type = 'GENERATION' AND start_time >= ? AND provided_model_name != '' " +
 		"GROUP BY model ORDER BY gens DESC LIMIT " + strconv.Itoa(aimTopN)
 }
 

clients/admin/aimetrics_test.go

@@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ func TestAimSQL_ReadsCanonicalTables(t *testing.T) {
 		name, sql, table string
 		wantQMarks       int
 	}{
-		{"langfuseTotals", aimLangfuseTotalsSQL(), "langfuse.observations", 1},
-		{"langfuseLatency", aimLangfuseLatencySQL(), "langfuse.observations", 1},
-		{"langfuseModels", aimLangfuseModelsSQL(), "langfuse.observations", 1},
+		{"o11yAiTotals", aimO11yAITotalsSQL(), "o11y_ai.observations", 1},
+		{"o11yAiLatency", aimO11yAILatencySQL(), "o11y_ai.observations", 1},
+		{"o11yAiModels", aimO11yAIModelsSQL(), "o11y_ai.observations", 1},
 		{"usageTotals", aimUsageTotalsSQL(), "hanzo.cloud_usage", 1},
 		{"topModels", aimTopModelsSQL(), "hanzo.cloud_usage", 1},
 		{"evalTraces", aimEvalTracesSQL(), "hanzo.eval_traces", 1},
@@ -49,12 +49,12 @@ func TestAimSQL_ReadsCanonicalTables(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-// TestAimLangfuseScopedToGeneration proves the Langfuse lens is scoped to
+// TestAimO11yAIScopedToGeneration proves the O11yAI lens is scoped to
 // generations only (not spans/events), matching the o11y LLM lens.
-func TestAimLangfuseScopedToGeneration(t *testing.T) {
-	for _, sql := range []string{aimLangfuseTotalsSQL(), aimLangfuseLatencySQL(), aimLangfuseModelsSQL()} {
+func TestAimO11yAIScopedToGeneration(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, sql := range []string{aimO11yAITotalsSQL(), aimO11yAILatencySQL(), aimO11yAIModelsSQL()} {
 		if !strings.Contains(sql, "type = 'GENERATION'") {
-			t.Errorf("langfuse lens must scope to GENERATION observations; got %q", sql)
+			t.Errorf("o11y_ai lens must scope to GENERATION observations; got %q", sql)
 		}
 	}
 }
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ func TestAimEvalLatencyGuarded(t *testing.T) {
 	if !strings.Contains(aimEvalTracesSQL(), "end_time > start_time") {
 		t.Errorf("eval traces latency must guard end_time>start_time; got %q", aimEvalTracesSQL())
 	}
-	if !strings.Contains(aimLangfuseLatencySQL(), "end_time > start_time") {
-		t.Errorf("langfuse latency must guard end_time>start_time; got %q", aimLangfuseLatencySQL())
+	if !strings.Contains(aimO11yAILatencySQL(), "end_time > start_time") {
+		t.Errorf("o11y_ai latency must guard end_time>start_time; got %q", aimO11yAILatencySQL())
 	}
 }
 
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ func TestAimParsers(t *testing.T) {
 		{"model": "gpt-4o", "gens": uint64(42), "cost": float64(1.25)},
 	})
 	if len(lf) != 1 || lf[0].Model != "gpt-4o" || lf[0].Generations != 42 || lf[0].CostUsd != 1.25 {
-		t.Fatalf("langfuse models mis-parsed: %+v", lf)
+		t.Fatalf("o11y_ai models mis-parsed: %+v", lf)
 	}
 	names := scoreNamesFromRows([]map[string]any{
 		{"name": "accuracy", "n": uint64(320), "avg_value": float64(0.82), "min_value": float64(0), "max_value": float64(1)},

clients/admin/audit/audit.go

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import (
 )
 
 // Routes registers the /v1/admin/audit* surface (SuperAdmin only).
-func Routes(app *zip.App, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
+func Routes(app cloud.Router, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
 	g := app.Group("/v1/admin")
 	g.Get("/audit", core.Guard(s, Records))
 	g.Get("/audit/verify", core.Guard(s, Verify))

clients/admin/block_storage.go

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+// Copyright 2023-2026 Hanzo AI Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package admin
+
+// blockStorage — GET /v1/admin/block-storage, the realtime DO block-storage fleet the
+// operator's Block Storage board (admin.hanzo.ai) watches to scale DO before it runs out.
+// (Named `block-storage`, not `storage`, so the operator's separate S3 object-buckets
+// view keeps /v1/admin/storage — two distinct storage concerns, two endpoints.)
+// Two REAL sources, honest by construction:
+//   - The FLEET inventory (count · total capacity · monthly cost · per-volume region +
+//     attachment) from the DigitalOcean API (the same DO_API_TOKEN client the finance
+//     dashboard already uses). DO exposes capacity + attachment but NOT fill %, so a
+//     volume's used/pct stay ABSENT (the console renders an honest "—", never a
+//     fabricated number).
+//   - The analytics DATASTORE's own fill from Datastore `system.disks` (the 200Gi PVC
+//     the datastore fork mounts) — total/free space over the SAME shared client
+//     (datastore.Query) the analytics + compute lenses read, no second
+//     connection. This is THE number the operator scales on.
+//
+// SUPERADMIN ONLY (the s.guard wrap in admin.go): a cross-tenant infra read, all-orgs.
+// admin holds NO storage state — it only reads DO + the datastore. DO unconfigured →
+// empty fleet; datastore not connected → no datastore card. Never a fabricated fleet.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/core"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/digitalocean"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/datastore"
+	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
+)
+
+// doBlockUsdPerGiB is DO block storage's list price ($0.10/GiB/mo) — the fleet cost
+// line for the ops budget when DO doesn't itemize per-volume spend.
+const doBlockUsdPerGiB = 0.10
+
+// bytesPerGiB converts system.disks bytes (UInt64) → GiB.
+const bytesPerGiB = 1024 * 1024 * 1024
+
+// storageVolume mirrors the console StorageVolume. UsedGiB/Pct are POINTERS so an
+// absent fill serializes as JSON null (→ the console's honest "—"), distinct from a
+// real 0%.
+type storageVolume struct {
+	ID       string   `json:"id"`
+	Name     string   `json:"name"`
+	Region   string   `json:"region"`
+	SizeGiB  int      `json:"sizeGiB"`
+	UsedGiB  *float64 `json:"usedGiB"`
+	Pct      *float64 `json:"pct"`
+	Attached bool     `json:"attached"`
+	Service  string   `json:"service"`
+}
+
+// storageFleet is the roll-up: real count/capacity/cost; fleet fill absent (DO gives
+// no per-volume fill, so there is no honest fleet-wide used total to report).
+type storageFleet struct {
+	Count      int      `json:"count"`
+	TotalGiB   int      `json:"totalGiB"`
+	UsedGiB    *float64 `json:"usedGiB"`
+	Pct        *float64 `json:"pct"`
+	MonthlyUsd int      `json:"monthlyUsd"`
+}
+
+// datastoreVolume is the analytics backend's own volume, fill REAL from system.disks.
+type datastoreVolume struct {
+	Name    string  `json:"name"`
+	Mount   string  `json:"mount"`
+	SizeGiB int     `json:"sizeGiB"`
+	UsedGiB float64 `json:"usedGiB"`
+	Pct     float64 `json:"pct"`
+}
+
+// storageAlert flags a near-full volume (only the datastore carries a real fill today,
+// so alerts are datastore-derived until a per-volume filesystem source is wired).
+type storageAlert struct {
+	Volume string  `json:"volume"`
+	Pct    float64 `json:"pct"`
+	Level  string  `json:"level"`
+}
+
+// storageSnapshot is the whole board payload the console normalizes.
+type storageSnapshot struct {
+	Fleet     storageFleet     `json:"fleet"`
+	Datastore *datastoreVolume `json:"datastore"`
+	Volumes   []storageVolume  `json:"volumes"`
+	Alerts    []storageAlert   `json:"alerts"`
+}
+
+// blockStorage answers GET /v1/admin/block-storage. SuperAdmin only. Each source
+// degrades independently — a DO outage still returns the real datastore fill, and v.v.
+func blockStorage(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
+	ctx := c.Context()
+	vols, _ := s.State.DO.Volumes(ctx) // honest empty on not-configured / unreachable
+	fill := datastoreFill(ctx)         // nil unless system.disks answered
+	return core.OK(c, buildStorageSnapshot(vols, fill))
+}
+
+// buildStorageSnapshot assembles the board payload (PURE — unit-tested). It folds the
+// DO inventory into the fleet totals + per-volume rows (fill absent), attaches the real
+// datastore card, and derives a near-full alert from the datastore fill. No fabrication:
+// a volume's fill is left nil (DO gives none), and the datastore card is present only
+// when system.disks actually answered.
+func buildStorageSnapshot(vols []digitalocean.Volume, fill *datastoreVolume) storageSnapshot {
+	out := make([]storageVolume, 0, len(vols))
+	totalGiB := 0
+	for _, v := range vols {
+		out = append(out, storageVolume{
+			ID:       v.ID,
+			Name:     v.Name,
+			Region:   v.Region,
+			SizeGiB:  v.SizeGiB,
+			Attached: len(v.DropletIDs) > 0,
+		})
+		totalGiB += v.SizeGiB
+	}
+	alerts := make([]storageAlert, 0, 1)
+	if fill != nil {
+		if lvl := alertLevel(fill.Pct); lvl != "" {
+			alerts = append(alerts, storageAlert{Volume: fill.Name, Pct: fill.Pct, Level: lvl})
+		}
+	}
+	return storageSnapshot{
+		Fleet: storageFleet{
+			Count:      len(vols),
+			TotalGiB:   totalGiB,
+			MonthlyUsd: int(float64(totalGiB)*doBlockUsdPerGiB + 0.5),
+		},
+		Datastore: fill,
+		Volumes:   out,
+		Alerts:    alerts,
+	}
+}
+
+// alertLevel thresholds a fill %: critical ≥ 90, warn ≥ 80, else none (PURE, tested).
+func alertLevel(pct float64) string {
+	switch {
+	case pct >= 90:
+		return "critical"
+	case pct >= 80:
+		return "warn"
+	default:
+		return ""
+	}
+}
+
+// datastoreFill reads the analytics datastore's own volume usage from Datastore
+// `system.disks` (the largest disk by capacity is the data volume — the 200Gi PVC).
+// Returns nil when the datastore isn't connected or the query fails (honest — the
+// console shows no datastore card, never a fabricated fill).
+func datastoreFill(ctx context.Context) *datastoreVolume {
+	if !datastore.Ready() {
+		return nil
+	}
+	rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx,
+		"SELECT name, path, total_space, free_space FROM system.disks ORDER BY total_space DESC LIMIT 1")
+	if err != nil || len(rows) == 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	return datastoreFillFromRow(rows[0])
+}
+
+// datastoreFillFromRow maps a system.disks row → the datastore card (PURE, tested).
+// nil when the disk reports no capacity (an unusable read, not a fabricated 0%).
+func datastoreFillFromRow(r map[string]any) *datastoreVolume {
+	total := float64(chInt64(r["total_space"]))
+	if total <= 0 {
+		return nil
+	}
+	free := float64(chInt64(r["free_space"]))
+	used := total - free
+	if used < 0 {
+		used = 0
+	}
+	return &datastoreVolume{
+		Name:    chStr(r["name"]),
+		Mount:   chStr(r["path"]),
+		SizeGiB: int(total / bytesPerGiB),
+		UsedGiB: round1(used / bytesPerGiB),
+		Pct:     round1(used / total * 100),
+	}
+}
+
+// round1 rounds to one decimal (used/pct read cleanly; not a scientific quantity).
+func round1(x float64) float64 { return float64(int(x*10+0.5)) / 10 }

clients/admin/block_storage_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+// Copyright 2023-2026 Hanzo AI Inc. All Rights Reserved.
+//
+// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+// You may obtain a copy of the License at
+//
+//      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+//
+// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+// limitations under the License.
+
+package admin
+
+import (
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/digitalocean"
+)
+
+// The DO inventory folds into fleet totals + rows, and per-volume fill stays ABSENT
+// (DO exposes no fill) so the console renders an honest "—", never a fabricated 0%.
+func TestBuildStorageSnapshotFleet(t *testing.T) {
+	vols := []digitalocean.Volume{
+		{ID: "a", Name: "pvc-a", Region: "sfo3", SizeGiB: 200, DropletIDs: []int{1}},
+		{ID: "b", Name: "pvc-b", Region: "nyc1", SizeGiB: 100, DropletIDs: nil},
+		{ID: "c", Name: "pvc-c", Region: "sfo3", SizeGiB: 50, DropletIDs: []int{2, 3}},
+	}
+	snap := buildStorageSnapshot(vols, nil)
+
+	if snap.Fleet.Count != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("count = %d, want 3", snap.Fleet.Count)
+	}
+	if snap.Fleet.TotalGiB != 350 {
+		t.Fatalf("totalGiB = %d, want 350", snap.Fleet.TotalGiB)
+	}
+	// 350 GiB * $0.10 = $35.
+	if snap.Fleet.MonthlyUsd != 35 {
+		t.Fatalf("monthlyUsd = %d, want 35", snap.Fleet.MonthlyUsd)
+	}
+	if snap.Fleet.UsedGiB != nil || snap.Fleet.Pct != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("fleet fill must be absent (DO gives none); got used=%v pct=%v", snap.Fleet.UsedGiB, snap.Fleet.Pct)
+	}
+	if len(snap.Volumes) != 3 {
+		t.Fatalf("volumes = %d, want 3", len(snap.Volumes))
+	}
+	// Attachment derives from droplet_ids; fill is absent per row.
+	if !snap.Volumes[0].Attached || snap.Volumes[1].Attached || !snap.Volumes[2].Attached {
+		t.Fatalf("attachment wrong: %+v", snap.Volumes)
+	}
+	for _, v := range snap.Volumes {
+		if v.UsedGiB != nil || v.Pct != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("volume %s fill must be absent, got used=%v pct=%v", v.ID, v.UsedGiB, v.Pct)
+		}
+	}
+	if snap.Datastore != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("datastore must be nil when no fill was read; got %+v", snap.Datastore)
+	}
+	if len(snap.Alerts) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("no alerts without a datastore fill; got %v", snap.Alerts)
+	}
+}
+
+// A near-full datastore raises exactly one alert; a healthy one raises none.
+func TestBuildStorageSnapshotDatastoreAlert(t *testing.T) {
+	full := &datastoreVolume{Name: "default", Mount: "/var/lib/hanzo-datastore", SizeGiB: 196, UsedGiB: 178, Pct: 91}
+	snap := buildStorageSnapshot(nil, full)
+	if snap.Datastore == nil || snap.Datastore.Pct != 91 {
+		t.Fatalf("datastore card missing/wrong: %+v", snap.Datastore)
+	}
+	if len(snap.Alerts) != 1 || snap.Alerts[0].Level != "critical" || snap.Alerts[0].Volume != "default" {
+		t.Fatalf("expected one critical alert, got %+v", snap.Alerts)
+	}
+
+	healthy := &datastoreVolume{Name: "default", SizeGiB: 196, UsedGiB: 13, Pct: 7}
+	if a := buildStorageSnapshot(nil, healthy).Alerts; len(a) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("a 7%%-full datastore must raise no alert, got %+v", a)
+	}
+}
+
+func TestAlertLevel(t *testing.T) {
+	cases := []struct {
+		pct  float64
+		want string
+	}{
+		{0, ""}, {7, ""}, {79.9, ""}, {80, "warn"}, {89.9, "warn"}, {90, "critical"}, {99, "critical"},
+	}
+	for _, c := range cases {
+		if got := alertLevel(c.pct); got != c.want {
+			t.Fatalf("alertLevel(%v) = %q, want %q", c.pct, got, c.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// system.disks bytes → GiB + pct, matching the live datastore (13.5G used of ~196G ≈ 7%).
+func TestDatastoreFillFromRow(t *testing.T) {
+	// total ≈ 196.6 GiB, free ≈ 183.1 GiB → used ≈ 13.5 GiB → ~6.9%.
+	gib := float64(bytesPerGiB) // a variable → runtime math (a float→int const conversion won't compile)
+	total := int64(196.6 * gib)
+	used := int64(13.5 * gib)
+	row := map[string]any{
+		"name":        "default",
+		"path":        "/var/lib/hanzo-datastore",
+		"total_space": uint64(total),
+		"free_space":  uint64(total - used),
+	}
+	d := datastoreFillFromRow(row)
+	if d == nil {
+		t.Fatal("expected a datastore fill, got nil")
+	}
+	if d.Name != "default" || d.Mount != "/var/lib/hanzo-datastore" {
+		t.Fatalf("name/mount wrong: %+v", d)
+	}
+	if d.SizeGiB != 196 {
+		t.Fatalf("sizeGiB = %d, want 196", d.SizeGiB)
+	}
+	if d.UsedGiB < 13.4 || d.UsedGiB > 13.6 {
+		t.Fatalf("usedGiB = %v, want ~13.5", d.UsedGiB)
+	}
+	if d.Pct < 6.5 || d.Pct > 7.5 {
+		t.Fatalf("pct = %v, want ~7", d.Pct)
+	}
+
+	// A disk that reports no capacity is an unusable read → nil (never a fake 0%).
+	if datastoreFillFromRow(map[string]any{"total_space": uint64(0)}) != nil {
+		t.Fatal("zero-capacity disk must yield nil, not a fabricated 0%")
+	}
+}

clients/admin/commerce/commerce.go

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ import (
 	"time"
 
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/money"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerceinproc"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerce/transport"
 )
 
 // errUnconfigured marks a write (Deposit) attempted against an unwired commerce.
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ type Client struct {
 }
 
 // New builds a commerce client for base + admin S2S token. The HTTP client uses the
-// commerceinproc self-routing transport: when commerce is CO-RESIDENT (base is the
+// commerce transport self-routing dispatch: when commerce is CO-RESIDENT (base is the
 // commerce.inproc placeholder) it dispatches in-process — a plain http.Client would
 // instead DNS-resolve "commerce.inproc" and fail "no such host", silently breaking the
 // admin cost/finance god-view. For a split-deploy (a real commerce URL) it falls
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ func New(base, token string) *Client {
 	return &Client{
 		base:  strings.TrimRight(strings.TrimSpace(base), "/"),
 		token: strings.TrimSpace(token),
-		http:  commerceinproc.Client(15 * time.Second),
+		http:  transport.Client(15 * time.Second),
 	}
 }
 

clients/admin/compute.go

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ package admin
 // org → app → project tree. It aggregates the operator-owned usage table
 // hanzo.compute_usage(org, app, project, kind, event, machine_id, size,
 // price_cents, ts) — the same warehouse (`datastore`, datastore) the analytics
-// subsystem reads, over the SAME shared client (aiobject.DatastoreQuery), no
+// subsystem reads, over the SAME shared client (datastore.Query), no
 // second connection. `kind` is an OPEN LowCardinality spectrum (bot | machine |
 // cluster | nodepool | container | function | …) — a bot is a machine running the
 // @hanzo/bot agent, a machine is raw compute visor opens — and each console lens
@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
-	aiobject "github.com/hanzoai/ai/object"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/core"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/datastore"
 	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
 )
 
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ func compute(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	ctx := c.Context()
 	// Honest-empty when the warehouse is not connected or the usage table is not
 	// provisioned yet (the visor/commerce emitter is still being wired).
-	if !aiobject.DatastoreEnabled() || !computeTableExists(ctx) {
+	if !datastore.Ready() || !computeTableExists(ctx) {
 		return core.OKList(c, []computeLeaf{}, 0)
 	}
 
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ func compute(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	// warehouse's lower-case convention.
 	kind := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("kind")))
 	sql, args := buildComputeQuery(c.Query("range"), kind, strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("org")))
-	rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, sql, args...)
+	rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, sql, args...)
 	if err != nil {
 		return core.Fail(c, "compute query: "+err.Error())
 	}
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ func computeLeavesFromRows(rows []map[string]any) []computeLeaf {
 // computeTableExists probes for the operator-owned events table. Any error → false
 // (honest "not available yet"), mirroring analytics.tableExists.
 func computeTableExists(ctx context.Context) bool {
-	rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, "EXISTS TABLE "+computeTable)
+	rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, "EXISTS TABLE "+computeTable)
 	if err != nil || len(rows) == 0 {
 		return false
 	}

clients/admin/core/envelope.go

@@ -3,34 +3,30 @@ package core
 import (
 	"encoding/json"
 
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
 	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
 )
 
 // The /v1 envelope writers { status, msg, data, data2 } the operator's transport
 // decodes (get<T> reads data; getList<T> reads data + data2 total).
+//
+// These are thin call-throughs to the ONE implementation in package cloud
+// (cloud.OK/OKList/OKRaw/Fail). admin keeps its `core.OK` spelling — the admin
+// handlers that call these are unchanged — but there is a single envelope writer
+// for the whole binary, so a subsystem outside admin uses cloud.OK directly
+// without importing this admin-scoped package (and its iam fan-in).
 
 // OK writes a { status:"ok", data } envelope (the get<T> shape).
-func OK(c *zip.Ctx, data any) error {
-	return c.JSON(200, map[string]any{"status": "ok", "msg": "", "data": data})
-}
+func OK(c *zip.Ctx, data any) error { return cloud.OK(c, data) }
 
 // OKList writes a { status:"ok", data:[...], data2:total } envelope (getList<T>).
-func OKList(c *zip.Ctx, rows any, total int) error {
-	return c.JSON(200, map[string]any{"status": "ok", "msg": "", "data": rows, "data2": total})
-}
+func OKList(c *zip.Ctx, rows any, total int) error { return cloud.OKList(c, rows, total) }
 
 // OKRaw writes a { status:"ok", data:<raw>, data2:total } envelope, forwarding an
 // IAM payload verbatim so its exact wire shape (Role, Application, Record, User)
 // reaches the operator field-for-field.
-func OKRaw(c *zip.Ctx, rows json.RawMessage, total int) error {
-	if len(rows) == 0 {
-		rows = json.RawMessage("[]")
-	}
-	return c.JSON(200, map[string]any{"status": "ok", "msg": "", "data": rows, "data2": total})
-}
+func OKRaw(c *zip.Ctx, rows json.RawMessage, total int) error { return cloud.OKRaw(c, rows, total) }
 
 // Fail writes a { status:"error", msg } envelope. The operator's transport maps a
 // non-ok envelope to a surfaced error (never a fabricated value).
-func Fail(c *zip.Ctx, msg string) error {
-	return c.JSON(200, map[string]any{"status": "error", "msg": msg, "data": nil})
-}
+func Fail(c *zip.Ctx, msg string) error { return cloud.Fail(c, msg) }

clients/admin/core/fanin.go

@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ import (
 	"fmt"
 	"net/url"
 	"strings"
+	"time"
 
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/iam"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/finance"
 )
 
 // MaxCustomerConcurrency bounds the per-org enrichment fan-out so a large fleet does
@@ -34,13 +36,25 @@ func ListOrgs(s *cloud.Service[State], ctx context.Context, cr iam.Creds) ([]iam
 	return orgs, nil
 }
 
-// OrgMoney returns (spendCents, creditsCents, ok) for one org from commerce. ok is
-// false when the spend OR credits read FAILED — so a fleet aggregator can fold the
-// per-org failure into a PARTIAL/degraded source rather than presenting the resulting
-// undercount as authoritative (the SAME (row, ok) contract revenue.revenueOf uses). An
-// unwired commerce is NOT a failure: Spend/Credits return (0, nil) when unconfigured, so
-// ok stays true and the caller distinguishes "not configured" via Commerce.Ready().
+// OrgMoney returns (spendCents, creditsCents, ok) for one org — the ONE per-org money read
+// every fleet aggregator (overview, orgs, revenue) folds over. ok is false ONLY when a read
+// FAILED, so a caller folds the per-org failure into a PARTIAL/degraded source rather than
+// presenting the resulting undercount as authoritative. An org that simply has no money yet
+// reads a clean (0, 0, true), never a failure.
+//
+// CO-RESIDENCE (the money-plane trap). Commerce's own /v1/billing/* routes are behind
+// `//go:build cloud` and are NOT compiled into this binary, so the admin commerce client's
+// S2S reads self-dispatch by PATH into cloud's OWN handlers: GET /v1/billing/balance
+// re-enters the customer balance handler with no principal (401) and GET
+// /v1/billing/usage-rollup is unrouted (404). Reading commerce over HTTP would therefore
+// fail for EVERY org and falsely mark the money source DOWN while real money sits in the
+// co-resident ledger. So — exactly as clients/billing.balance()/usage() and
+// core.grantDeposit already resolve it — prefer the co-resident finance ledger
+// (finance.Current()); the commerce S2S read stays only as the split-deploy fallback.
 func OrgMoney(s *cloud.Service[State], ctx context.Context, org string) (spend, credits int64, ok bool) {
+	if fin := finance.Current(); fin != nil {
+		return orgMoneyFromFinance(ctx, fin, org)
+	}
 	ok = true
 	if sp, err := s.State.Commerce.Spend(ctx, org); err == nil {
 		spend = int64(sp.Consumed)
@@ -55,6 +69,28 @@ func OrgMoney(s *cloud.Service[State], ctx context.Context, org string) (spend,
 	return spend, credits, ok
 }
 
+// orgMoneyFromFinance reads (spend30d, credits, ok) for one org from the co-resident finance
+// ledger — the SAME wallet the ai prepaid gate debits and clients/billing shows. credits =
+// the org-pool AVAILABLE prepaid balance; spend = the org's metered usage over the trailing
+// 30 days (SumUsageSince — the windowed usage source the rolling AI-spend cap already reads,
+// matching the SpendCents30d field the overview + orgs surfaces render). ok is false only on
+// a REAL read failure, so a no-activity org reads (0, 0, true) and never marks the money
+// source degraded.
+func orgMoneyFromFinance(ctx context.Context, fin finance.Client, org string) (spend, credits int64, ok bool) {
+	ok = true
+	if bal, err := fin.Balance(ctx, org, org, "usd", false); err == nil {
+		credits = bal.Cents()
+	} else {
+		ok = false
+	}
+	if sum, err := fin.SumUsageSince(ctx, org, false, time.Now().AddDate(0, 0, -30).Unix()); err == nil {
+		spend = sum
+	} else {
+		ok = false
+	}
+	return spend, credits, ok
+}
+
 // FindOrg returns the IAM org by slug (nil, nil when it does not exist) so a management
 // action can validate its target before acting — never credit or suspend an org that
 // isn't real.

clients/admin/core/gate.go

@@ -25,27 +25,33 @@ func Guard(s *cloud.Service[State], h Handler) zip.Handler {
 }
 
 // GuardScoped is the gate for the ORG-SCOPED panels (me/overview/orgs/users/usage/
-// analytics/bases). It admits a SuperAdmin (principal.IsSuperAdmin) OR an ORG admin
-// (an admin of their OWN org — principal.IsOrgAdmin) pinned to a validated org, and the
-// handler then scopes every read to ResolveScope(c) — so a non-super caller passes the
-// gate but the DATA layer hard-limits them to their own org subtree. Cross-tenant reads
-// are impossible for a non-super caller regardless of input.
+// analytics/bases + spend-caps). It admits a SuperAdmin (principal.IsSuperAdmin) OR an
+// admin of an ENABLED WHITE-LABEL TENANT org (principal.IsOrgAdmin pinned to its
+// validated org AND that org ∈ State.WLTenants), and the handler then scopes every read
+// to ResolveScope(c) — so a non-super caller passes the gate but the DATA layer
+// hard-limits them to their own org subtree. Cross-tenant reads are impossible for a
+// non-super caller regardless of input.
 //
-// The non-super admission requires BOTH the sanitizer-minted X-User-IsOrgAdmin
-// (principal.IsOrgAdmin — the "admin of my own org" bit, unforgeable because the boundary
-// strips it on ingress) AND a validated principal pinned to its own org (principal.Org,
-// the ONE org accessor: validated X-User-Id + non-empty in-bounds X-Org-Id). So a
-// validated but NON-admin MEMBER of an org is
-// REFUSED here — the same denial an anonymous caller who forged X-Org-Id gets — closing
-// the same-tenant over-visibility gap where any org member could read their org's admin
-// panels. A validated non-super principal's X-Org-Id is PINNED by the boundary to their
-// own owner, never client-chosen.
+// THREE admission facts, ALL required for the non-super tier — the escalation line:
+//   - X-User-IsOrgAdmin (principal.IsOrgAdmin — "admin of my own org", unforgeable
+//     because SanitizeIdentity strips it on ingress and re-mints only from a validated
+//     isAdmin claim), AND
+//   - a validated principal pinned to its own org (principal.Org: validated X-User-Id +
+//     non-empty in-bounds X-Org-Id — the boundary PINS a non-super caller's X-Org-Id to
+//     their own owner, never client-chosen), AND
+//   - that org is an ENABLED WL tenant (State.IsWhiteLabelTenant — the fail-closed
+//     allowlist). This is the tier the old gate was MISSING: it admitted ANY org-admin,
+//     so any customer's own-org admin could open the cockpit. Now an org-admin whose org
+//     is not an enabled WL tenant is REFUSED — the SAME 403 a non-admin member or a
+//     forged-X-Org-Id anonymous caller gets. A SuperAdmin never consults the allowlist.
+//
+// Fail-closed everywhere: nil/empty WLTenants ⇒ ONLY SuperAdmins reach these panels.
 func GuardScoped(s *cloud.Service[State], h Handler) zip.Handler {
 	return func(c *zip.Ctx) error {
 		if principal.IsSuperAdmin(c) {
 			return h(s, c) // SuperAdmin: cross-tenant, admitted regardless of org pin.
 		}
-		if _, ok := principal.Org(c); ok && principal.IsOrgAdmin(c) {
+		if org, ok := principal.Org(c); ok && principal.IsOrgAdmin(c) && s.State.IsWhiteLabelTenant(org) {
 			return h(s, c)
 		}
 		return zip.ErrForbidden("admin required")

clients/admin/core/grant.go

@@ -30,6 +30,17 @@ type CreditRequest struct {
 	AmountCents int64  `json:"amountCents"`
 	Currency    string `json:"currency"`
 	Reason      string `json:"reason"`
+	// User names the MEMBER to credit, by IAM username — the `name` half of
+	// "<org>/<name>". Empty credits the org itself.
+	//
+	// It exists because "the org" is not always the account a request spends from.
+	// In the shared signup org, whose members are strangers to each other, each pays
+	// from their OWN wallet; a grant keyed on the org alone lands in a pool that
+	// member can neither spend nor see, while they are refused at $0. Which of the
+	// two a grant lands on is NOT decided here — principal.WalletFor asks account.Payer,
+	// the same rule the spend gate asks — so a pooled tenant org keeps one balance no
+	// matter what is named, and a per-member org can finally be funded per member.
+	User string `json:"user"`
 	// Source splits the grant into the commerce ledger's two money buckets:
 	//   - "trial"   (default) — a non-cash promo/comp credit: spendable on non-premium
 	//                metered usage only, NEVER refundable cash and NEVER paid out.
@@ -75,7 +86,7 @@ func grantNote(c *zip.Ctx, reason string) string {
 }
 
 // grantIdempotencyKey derives the DETERMINISTIC commerce idempotency key for a grant from
-// its (org, amount, currency, source) BOUND to the operator-supplied Idempotency-Key nonce
+// its (subject, amount, currency, source) BOUND to the operator-supplied Idempotency-Key nonce
 // — so a retried grant (a commit-then-timeout re-submit carrying the SAME nonce) dedupes at
 // commerce (X-Idempotency-Key, at-most-once), while two DISTINCT grants — even same org +
 // amount — never collide. Binding the amount/currency/source into the hash means a nonce
@@ -88,7 +99,10 @@ func grantNote(c *zip.Ctx, reason string) string {
 // additive — the pre-existing behavior. Effective end-to-end once the operator console
 // sends an Idempotency-Key per grant attempt (reused verbatim on retry); commerce already
 // enforces the dedup (api/billing/deposit.go).
-func grantIdempotencyKey(c *zip.Ctx, org, currency, source string, amountCents int64) string {
+// The SUBJECT is hashed, not the org: two grants of the same amount to two members
+// of one org are DIFFERENT grants, and hashing the org alone would make the second
+// dedupe away against the first — a silently dropped credit.
+func grantIdempotencyKey(c *zip.Ctx, subject, currency, source string, amountCents int64) string {
 	nonce := strings.TrimSpace(c.Header("Idempotency-Key"))
 	if nonce == "" {
 		nonce = strings.TrimSpace(c.Header("X-Idempotency-Key"))
@@ -97,7 +111,7 @@ func grantIdempotencyKey(c *zip.Ctx, org, currency, source string, amountCents i
 		return ""
 	}
 	sum := sha256.Sum256([]byte(strings.Join([]string{
-		org, strconv.FormatInt(amountCents, 10), currency, source, nonce,
+		subject, strconv.FormatInt(amountCents, 10), currency, source, nonce,
 	}, "|")))
 	return "grant-" + hex.EncodeToString(sum[:])
 }
@@ -138,6 +152,18 @@ func ApplyGrant(s *cloud.Service[State], c *zip.Ctx, org string, req CreditReque
 		return c.JSON(503, map[string]any{"status": "error", "msg": "grant refused: no durable audit store is configured on this deployment; a credit grant must be recorded before money moves", "data": nil})
 	}
 
+	// Resolve the ADDRESS the grant lands at — the same rule (account.Payer) the
+	// spend gate resolves the payer with, so the credit and the spend it funds name
+	// one wallet. Empty req.User is the org; a named member of a POOLED org still
+	// resolves to that org's pool, because that is the account their requests will
+	// be gated on. A refusal here means the name could not be turned into an address
+	// (a "/" in it would silently address something else), never a fallback.
+	w, addressed := principal.WalletFor(org, req.User)
+	if !addressed {
+		return Fail(c, "user must be a bare IAM username (no '/')")
+	}
+	subject := w.Account
+
 	tag, source := grantTag(req.Source)
 	notes := grantNote(c, req.Reason)
 
@@ -146,24 +172,31 @@ func ApplyGrant(s *cloud.Service[State], c *zip.Ctx, org string, req CreditReque
 	// with the commerce HTTP deposit as the split-deploy fallback. Both return the
 	// pre-balance (recorded even on failure), the entry/transaction id, and the post-balance,
 	// so the audit + response below are one shape regardless of which path moved the money.
-	before, txID, after, afterExact, derr := grantDeposit(s, c, org, currency, notes, tag, source, req.AmountCents)
+	// w.Ledger, not the raw path/body org: both halves of the address come from ONE
+	// resolved Account, so the ledger a deposit opens can never disagree in case with
+	// the subject written into it.
+	before, txID, after, afterExact, derr := grantDeposit(s, c, w.Ledger, subject, currency, notes, tag, source, req.AmountCents)
 	if derr != nil {
 		// The grant did not land — record the FAILED attempt (accountability), then
 		// surface the error. Never report a grant that failed as success.
 		EmitAudit(s, c, "admin.customer.credit", "credit", org,
 			map[string]any{"balanceCents": before},
-			map[string]any{"amountCents": req.AmountCents, "currency": currency, "reason": req.Reason, "source": source, "error": derr.Error()},
+			map[string]any{"amountCents": req.AmountCents, "currency": currency, "reason": req.Reason, "source": source, "subject": subject, "error": derr.Error()},
 			audit.Outcome{Result: "error", Status: 200, Reason: "grant failed"})
 		return Fail(c, "grant failed: "+derr.Error())
 	}
 
 	EmitAudit(s, c, "admin.customer.credit", "credit", org,
 		map[string]any{"balanceCents": before},
-		map[string]any{"balanceCents": after, "grantedCents": req.AmountCents, "currency": currency, "reason": req.Reason, "source": source, "transactionId": txID},
+		map[string]any{"balanceCents": after, "grantedCents": req.AmountCents, "currency": currency, "reason": req.Reason, "source": source, "subject": subject, "transactionId": txID},
 		audit.Outcome{Result: "success", Status: 200})
 
+	// subject is echoed because the operator does not choose it — account.Payer does.
+	// Naming a member of a pooled org credits the pool, and the response has to say so
+	// rather than let the caller assume a member wallet exists.
 	return OK(c, map[string]any{
 		"org":           org,
+		"subject":       subject,
 		"grantedCents":  req.AmountCents,
 		"currency":      currency,
 		"source":        source,
@@ -175,12 +208,20 @@ func ApplyGrant(s *cloud.Service[State], c *zip.Ctx, org string, req CreditReque
 
 // grantDeposit performs the ONE credit money-move for a grant. It prefers the co-resident
 // native finance wallet — the ai prepaid gate and the edge meter read/debit THAT wallet,
-// so an admin grant must credit it (subject == the org slug, the org-pool wallet) — and
-// falls back to the commerce HTTP deposit only when no finance ledger is co-resident (a
-// split deploy). It returns the pre-balance (so ApplyGrant can audit even a FAILED
-// attempt), the entry/transaction id, and the post-balance, so the audit + response are
-// one shape regardless of which path moved the money.
-func grantDeposit(s *cloud.Service[State], c *zip.Ctx, org, currency, notes, tag, source string, amountCents int64) (before int64, txID string, after int64, afterExact string, err error) {
+// so an admin grant must credit it — and falls back to the commerce HTTP deposit only when
+// no finance ledger is co-resident (a split deploy). It returns the pre-balance (so
+// ApplyGrant can audit even a FAILED attempt), the entry/transaction id, and the
+// post-balance, so the audit + response are one shape regardless of which path moved the
+// money.
+//
+// subject is the ACCOUNT within org's ledger, already resolved by account.Payer: the org
+// slug for a pooled org, "<org>/<name>" for a member of a per-member one. Every balance
+// read here uses it too — reading the pool around a member's credit would report a
+// before/after that never moved and audit a lie.
+//
+// The split-deploy fallback can only address the org: commerce's HTTP deposit is org-keyed.
+// It therefore refuses a member-addressed grant rather than silently crediting the pool.
+func grantDeposit(s *cloud.Service[State], c *zip.Ctx, org, subject, currency, notes, tag, source string, amountCents int64) (before int64, txID string, after int64, afterExact string, err error) {
 	ctx := c.Context()
 	// ONE credit path: prefer the in-proc commerce credit ledger (creditledger) — the
 	// SAME injected ledger adapter commerce's POST /v1/billing/credit mints through
@@ -191,16 +232,17 @@ func grantDeposit(s *cloud.Service[State], c *zip.Ctx, org, currency, notes, tag
 	// the SAME co-resident finance ledger for the audit trail (exact, sub-cent visible).
 	if led := creditledger.Get(); led != nil {
 		if fin := finance.Current(); fin != nil {
-			if bal, berr := fin.Balance(ctx, org, org, currency, false); berr == nil {
+			if bal, berr := fin.Balance(ctx, org, subject, currency, false); berr == nil {
 				before = bal.Cents()
 			}
 		}
 		id, balCents, cerr := led.Credit(ctx, creditledger.CreditInput{
 			Org:            org,
+			Subject:        subject,
 			Currency:       currency,
 			Reason:         notes,
 			Tag:            tag,
-			IdempotencyKey: grantIdempotencyKey(c, org, currency, source, amountCents),
+			IdempotencyKey: grantIdempotencyKey(c, subject, currency, source, amountCents),
 			AmountCents:    amountCents,
 		})
 		if cerr != nil {
@@ -208,16 +250,21 @@ func grantDeposit(s *cloud.Service[State], c *zip.Ctx, org, currency, notes, tag
 		}
 		after = balCents
 		if fin := finance.Current(); fin != nil {
-			if bal, berr := fin.Balance(ctx, org, org, currency, false); berr == nil {
+			if bal, berr := fin.Balance(ctx, org, subject, currency, false); berr == nil {
 				afterExact = bal.AttoString() // afterExact = the EXACT balance (sub-cent visible)
 			}
 		}
 		return before, id, after, afterExact, nil
 	}
 	// Split deploy: no co-resident credit ledger → the commerce billing HTTP deposit, with
-	// its operator-nonce idempotency key so a retried grant dedupes at commerce.
+	// its operator-nonce idempotency key so a retried grant dedupes at commerce. It is
+	// org-keyed, so a member-addressed grant has no destination here and is REFUSED —
+	// crediting the pool instead would put the money where that member cannot spend it.
+	if subject != org {
+		return 0, "", 0, "", fmt.Errorf("this deployment has no co-resident ledger; only the org itself can be credited over the commerce HTTP path (asked for %q)", subject)
+	}
 	beforeC, _ := s.State.Commerce.Credits(ctx, org)
-	idem := grantIdempotencyKey(c, org, currency, source, amountCents)
+	idem := grantIdempotencyKey(c, subject, currency, source, amountCents)
 	res, derr := s.State.Commerce.Deposit(ctx, org, money.Cents(amountCents), currency, notes, tag, idem)
 	if derr != nil {
 		return int64(beforeC), "", int64(beforeC), "", derr

clients/admin/core/grant_address_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+package core
+
+import (
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/account"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/principal"
+	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
+)
+
+// A grant is money entering a wallet, so it has the same address a spend does, and
+// it must be resolved by the same rule — otherwise credit accumulates at an address
+// no gate reads while the member it was meant for is refused at $0.
+
+// TestGrantAddressIsTheSpendAddress: whatever a grant names, the account it lands on
+// is account.Payer's answer — the very account that member's own requests are gated
+// on. A pooled tenant org keeps ONE balance no matter which member is named, because
+// in a pooled org there is no member wallet and money put in one could never be spent.
+func TestGrantAddressIsTheSpendAddress(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		org, user string
+		want      string
+		ok        bool
+	}{
+		{account.SignupOrg, "", account.SignupOrg, true},                           // the signup org itself: the pool
+		{account.SignupOrg, "z@hanzo.ai", account.SignupOrg + "/z@hanzo.ai", true}, // a stranger in the shared org: their own wallet
+		{"acme", "", "acme", true},                                                 // a tenant org: the pool
+		{"acme", "bob", "acme", true},                                              // a member of a POOLED org: still the pool
+		{"ACME", "Bob", "acme", true},                                              // folded, so one wallet not two
+		{"", "bob", "", false},                                                     // no org, no address — never mint an orphan
+		{account.SignupOrg, "hanzo/alice", "", false},                              // a key is not a name; refuse rather than address something else
+	} {
+		w, ok := principal.WalletFor(tc.org, tc.user)
+		if ok != tc.ok {
+			t.Errorf("WalletFor(%q,%q) ok = %v, want %v", tc.org, tc.user, ok, tc.ok)
+			continue
+		}
+		if !ok {
+			continue
+		}
+		if w.Account != tc.want {
+			t.Errorf("WalletFor(%q,%q) account = %q, want %q", tc.org, tc.user, w.Account, tc.want)
+		}
+		// The two halves must come from one resolved Account, or a folded subject
+		// could sit under an unfolded ledger and address a second file.
+		if w.Ledger != account.Payer(account.Credential{Owner: tc.org, Name: tc.user}).Org() {
+			t.Errorf("WalletFor(%q,%q) ledger = %q — not the folded org the subject was built from", tc.org, tc.user, w.Ledger)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestGrantIdempotencyKeyBindsTheSubject: two members of one org, same operator
+// nonce, same amount, are DIFFERENT grants. Hashing the org alone made the second
+// dedupe away against the first — a credit silently dropped, which on a money path
+// is indistinguishable from theft.
+func TestGrantIdempotencyKeyBindsTheSubject(t *testing.T) {
+	key := func(subject string) string {
+		app := zip.New(zip.Config{DisableStartupMessage: true})
+		var out string
+		app.Get("/k", func(c *zip.Ctx) error {
+			out = grantIdempotencyKey(c, subject, "usd", "trial", 500)
+			return c.JSON(200, map[string]string{"key": out})
+		})
+		req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/k", nil)
+		req.Header.Set("Idempotency-Key", "one-nonce")
+		resp, err := app.Fiber().Test(req)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("key probe: %v", err)
+		}
+		_ = resp.Body.Close()
+		return out
+	}
+	alice, bob, pool := key("hanzo/alice"), key("hanzo/bob"), key("hanzo")
+	if alice == "" {
+		t.Fatal("an operator nonce must produce a key")
+	}
+	if alice == bob || alice == pool || bob == pool {
+		t.Fatalf("distinct addresses collided: alice=%s bob=%s pool=%s — the second grant dedupes away", alice, bob, pool)
+	}
+	if again := key("hanzo/alice"); again != alice {
+		t.Fatalf("the same grant retried produced a different key (%s != %s) — a retry double-credits", again, alice)
+	}
+}

clients/admin/core/state.go

@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 package core
 
 import (
+	"strings"
+
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/audit"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/commerce"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/digitalocean"
@@ -29,4 +31,28 @@ type State struct {
 	DO         *digitalocean.Client
 	AdminOrg   string
 	AuditStore *audit.Recorder
+
+	// WLTenants is the fail-closed allowlist of enabled WHITE-LABEL TENANT orgs — the
+	// resellers/brands whose OWN-org admins may reach the org-scoped cockpit panels
+	// (GuardScoped) at admin.<brand>. It is the second admission tier next to the admin
+	// org: a SuperAdmin (owner == AdminOrg) is cross-tenant and never consults this set;
+	// EVERY other caller must be an admin of an org that is IN this set, and is then
+	// hard-scoped to that org's subtree. Seeded ONCE from ADMIN_WL_TENANT_ORGS at Mount
+	// and otherwise immutable, so the decision is a deliberate, git-/KMS-auditable
+	// onboarding — never self-service. EMPTY by default: with no entry, NO customer
+	// org-admin is admitted (only SuperAdmins reach the cockpit), so a mis-set/absent
+	// env fails CLOSED, never open.
+	WLTenants map[string]bool
+}
+
+// IsWhiteLabelTenant reports whether org is an enabled white-label tenant — the ONE
+// place the WL admission decision is read. Nil/empty set ⇒ always false (fail-closed):
+// no org is a WL tenant until explicitly enabled. The org is matched VERBATIM (only
+// trimmed), the same owner key principal.Org yields, so folding can never collapse a
+// distinct owner into an enabled one.
+func (st State) IsWhiteLabelTenant(org string) bool {
+	if len(st.WLTenants) == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	return st.WLTenants[strings.TrimSpace(org)]
 }

clients/admin/core/warehouse.go

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ package core
 // (metrics/invoices/subscriptions) compose. They read commerce.events — the
 // single warehouse table the commerce analytics collector lands every
 // customer-activity event in (subscription/invoice/usage lifecycle) — over the
-// SAME shared client (aiobject.DatastoreQuery) the o11y/compute/analytics lenses
+// SAME shared client (datastore.Query) the o11y/compute/analytics lenses
 // already use, no second connection. This mirrors compute.go's row-coercers and
 // EXISTS-TABLE probe, hoisted here so the three sibling domains share ONE copy
 // instead of each re-deriving it (DRY; the admin-package o11y/compute keep their
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
-	aiobject "github.com/hanzoai/ai/object"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/datastore"
 )
 
 // BillingEventsTable is the collector-owned warehouse table the commerce
@@ -69,21 +69,21 @@ var (
 
 // WarehouseReady reports whether the shared datastore ledger is connected, the
 // gate every fleet read checks first (honest-empty when false).
-func WarehouseReady() bool { return aiobject.DatastoreEnabled() }
+func WarehouseReady() bool { return datastore.Ready() }
 
 // BillingEventsReady reports whether the warehouse is connected AND the
 // collector's commerce.events table is provisioned — the two-part gate every
 // billing fleet view opens with, so an unwired collector degrades to an honest
 // empty aggregate rather than an error.
 func BillingEventsReady(ctx context.Context) bool {
-	return aiobject.DatastoreEnabled() && CHTableExists(ctx, BillingEventsTable)
+	return datastore.Ready() && CHTableExists(ctx, BillingEventsTable)
 }
 
 // CHTableExists probes the datastore for a table's presence. The name is a
 // package constant (never user input), so EXISTS TABLE is safe. Any error →
 // false (honest "not available yet"), mirroring compute.computeTableExists.
 func CHTableExists(ctx context.Context, qualified string) bool {
-	rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, "EXISTS TABLE "+qualified)
+	rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, "EXISTS TABLE "+qualified)
 	if err != nil || len(rows) == 0 {
 		return false
 	}

clients/admin/customer/grants.go

@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ func Grants(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 // org (which the per-customer route carries in its path instead).
 type issueGrantRequest struct {
 	Org         string `json:"org"`
+	User        string `json:"user"` // optional member to credit; empty is the org itself
 	AmountCents int64  `json:"amountCents"`
 	Currency    string `json:"currency"`
 	Reason      string `json:"reason"`
@@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ func IssueGrant(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 		return core.Fail(c, "org is required")
 	}
 	return core.ApplyGrant(s, c, org, core.CreditRequest{
+		User:        body.User,
 		AmountCents: body.AmountCents,
 		Currency:    body.Currency,
 		Reason:      body.Reason,

clients/admin/customer/routes.go

@@ -3,13 +3,12 @@ package customer
 import (
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/core"
-	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
 )
 
 // Routes registers the customer-management surface (SuperAdmin only). List (static)
 // precedes the :org param route; the write actions are POST (distinct method), so none
 // collide. The grants ledger + the org-in-body issue-grant share the ONE credit path.
-func Routes(app *zip.App, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
+func Routes(app cloud.Router, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
 	g := app.Group("/v1/admin")
 	g.Get("/customers", core.Guard(s, Customers))
 	g.Get("/customers/:org", core.Guard(s, CustomerDetail))

clients/admin/digitalocean/do.go

@@ -1,7 +1,12 @@
-// Package do reads DigitalOcean's billing API for the finance dashboard's cost
-// side. DO is our PRIMARY venue (a large promotional credit); this client turns
-// the customer balance + billing history into money.Cents the finance aggregator
-// folds into gross margin and runway.
+// Package digitalocean reads DigitalOcean's billing and infrastructure APIs. DO is
+// our PRIMARY venue (a large promotional credit); this client turns the customer
+// balance + billing history into money.Cents the finance aggregator folds into gross
+// margin and runway, and exposes the account's physical inventory — droplets,
+// block-storage volumes, DOKS clusters, load balancers — that the /v1/admin/infra
+// board reads.
+//
+// This is the ONE DigitalOcean client the admin plane uses. A new DO read is a
+// method here calling the shared get/send primitive, never a second client.
 //
 // Auth is a single personal-access token, DO_API_TOKEN, sourced from a KMSSecret on
 // the cloud env — NEVER hard-coded. When the token is unset the client is not Ready
@@ -15,12 +20,14 @@
 package digitalocean
 
 import (
+	"bytes"
 	"context"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"fmt"
 	"io"
 	"math"
 	"net/http"
+	"net/url"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"time"
@@ -142,24 +149,497 @@ func (c *Client) History(ctx context.Context, perPage int) ([]Entry, error) {
 	return out, nil
 }
 
+// Volume is one DO block-storage volume: capacity + attachment + region. DO's API
+// gives capacity and which droplets a volume is attached to, but NOT fill % — the
+// caller enriches fill only where a filesystem source (the datastore's own
+// system.disks) reports it, and renders an honest "—" everywhere else.
+type Volume struct {
+	ID         string
+	Name       string
+	Region     string
+	SizeGiB    int
+	DropletIDs []int
+	// Tags carries DO's resource tags. DOKS stamps `k8s:<cluster-uuid>` on the volumes
+	// it provisions, but that tag is ADVISORY ONLY — it survives cluster deletion and
+	// is wrong often enough that it must never decide whether a volume is garbage. The
+	// only sound liveness test is a PV cross-reference (see clients/admin/infra).
+	Tags      []string
+	CreatedAt string
+}
+
+// volumeWire is the raw DO /v2/volumes row.
+type volumeWire struct {
+	ID            string `json:"id"`
+	Name          string `json:"name"`
+	SizeGigabytes int    `json:"size_gigabytes"`
+	Region        struct {
+		Slug string `json:"slug"`
+	} `json:"region"`
+	DropletIDs []int    `json:"droplet_ids"`
+	Tags       []string `json:"tags"`
+	CreatedAt  string   `json:"created_at"`
+}
+
+// Volumes lists ALL block-storage volumes across the account. Capacity and attachment
+// are real; per-volume fill is NOT exposed by DO and stays absent (honest) until a
+// filesystem source reports it.
+func (c *Client) Volumes(ctx context.Context) ([]Volume, error) {
+	rows, err := listAll[volumeWire](ctx, c, "/v2/volumes", "volumes")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	out := make([]Volume, len(rows))
+	for i, v := range rows {
+		out[i] = Volume{
+			ID:         v.ID,
+			Name:       v.Name,
+			Region:     v.Region.Slug,
+			SizeGiB:    v.SizeGigabytes,
+			DropletIDs: v.DropletIDs,
+			Tags:       v.Tags,
+			CreatedAt:  v.CreatedAt,
+		}
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// Droplet is one DO droplet. LocalDiskGiB is the droplet's own disk, which is
+// INCLUDED in MonthlyCents — it is NOT separately billed, and conflating it with
+// block storage is how a fleet appears to hold terabytes it never pays for.
+type Droplet struct {
+	ID           int
+	Name         string
+	Region       string
+	Status       string
+	SizeSlug     string
+	VCPUs        int
+	MemoryMiB    int
+	LocalDiskGiB int
+	MonthlyCents money.Cents
+	CreatedAt    string
+	PrivateIP    string
+	PublicIP     string
+	Tags         []string
+	VolumeIDs    []string
+}
+
+// dropletWire is the raw DO /v2/droplets row.
+type dropletWire struct {
+	ID       int    `json:"id"`
+	Name     string `json:"name"`
+	Status   string `json:"status"`
+	SizeSlug string `json:"size_slug"`
+	VCPUs    int    `json:"vcpus"`
+	Memory   int    `json:"memory"`
+	Disk     int    `json:"disk"`
+	Size     struct {
+		PriceMonthly float64 `json:"price_monthly"`
+	} `json:"size"`
+	Region struct {
+		Slug string `json:"slug"`
+	} `json:"region"`
+	Networks struct {
+		V4 []struct {
+			Type      string `json:"type"`
+			IPAddress string `json:"ip_address"`
+		} `json:"v4"`
+	} `json:"networks"`
+	CreatedAt string   `json:"created_at"`
+	Tags      []string `json:"tags"`
+	VolumeIDs []string `json:"volume_ids"`
+}
+
+// Droplets lists ALL droplets across the account.
+func (c *Client) Droplets(ctx context.Context) ([]Droplet, error) {
+	rows, err := listAll[dropletWire](ctx, c, "/v2/droplets", "droplets")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	out := make([]Droplet, len(rows))
+	for i, d := range rows {
+		dr := Droplet{
+			ID:           d.ID,
+			Name:         d.Name,
+			Region:       d.Region.Slug,
+			Status:       d.Status,
+			SizeSlug:     d.SizeSlug,
+			VCPUs:        d.VCPUs,
+			MemoryMiB:    d.Memory,
+			LocalDiskGiB: d.Disk,
+			MonthlyCents: centsOf(d.Size.PriceMonthly),
+			CreatedAt:    d.CreatedAt,
+			Tags:         d.Tags,
+			VolumeIDs:    d.VolumeIDs,
+		}
+		for _, n := range d.Networks.V4 {
+			switch n.Type {
+			case "private":
+				dr.PrivateIP = n.IPAddress
+			case "public":
+				dr.PublicIP = n.IPAddress
+			}
+		}
+		out[i] = dr
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// Cluster is one DOKS cluster.
+type Cluster struct {
+	ID        string
+	Name      string
+	Region    string
+	Version   string
+	Status    string
+	Pools     []NodePool
+	CreatedAt string
+}
+
+// NodePool is one DOKS node pool — the ONLY correct way to change a cluster's node
+// count. DOKS owns the droplets in a pool: deleting or resizing one directly is undone
+// by the pool controller, which recreates it.
+type NodePool struct {
+	ID    string
+	Name  string
+	Size  string
+	Count int
+}
+
+// clusterWire is the raw DO /v2/kubernetes/clusters row.
+type clusterWire struct {
+	ID      string `json:"id"`
+	Name    string `json:"name"`
+	Region  string `json:"region"`
+	Version string `json:"version"`
+	Status  struct {
+		State string `json:"state"`
+	} `json:"status"`
+	NodePools []struct {
+		ID    string `json:"id"`
+		Name  string `json:"name"`
+		Size  string `json:"size"`
+		Count int    `json:"count"`
+	} `json:"node_pools"`
+	CreatedAt string `json:"created_at"`
+}
+
+// Clusters lists ALL DOKS clusters. This is the authoritative denominator for the
+// orphan analysis: a volume may only be called unreferenced once EVERY cluster here
+// has been searched for a PV that claims it.
+func (c *Client) Clusters(ctx context.Context) ([]Cluster, error) {
+	rows, err := listAll[clusterWire](ctx, c, "/v2/kubernetes/clusters", "kubernetes_clusters")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	out := make([]Cluster, len(rows))
+	for i, k := range rows {
+		cl := Cluster{
+			ID:        k.ID,
+			Name:      k.Name,
+			Region:    k.Region,
+			Version:   k.Version,
+			Status:    k.Status.State,
+			CreatedAt: k.CreatedAt,
+			Pools:     make([]NodePool, len(k.NodePools)),
+		}
+		for j, p := range k.NodePools {
+			cl.Pools[j] = NodePool{ID: p.ID, Name: p.Name, Size: p.Size, Count: p.Count}
+		}
+		out[i] = cl
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// Kubeconfig fetches a cluster's admin kubeconfig. DO returns a token-based config
+// against the cluster's public https endpoint (never an exec plugin), which the
+// caller must still funnel through fleet.SafeRESTConfig before dialing.
+func (c *Client) Kubeconfig(ctx context.Context, clusterID string) ([]byte, error) {
+	if !c.Ready() {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("DO_API_TOKEN not configured")
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(clusterID) == "" {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("cluster id required")
+	}
+	return c.get(ctx, "/v2/kubernetes/clusters/"+url.PathEscape(clusterID)+"/kubeconfig")
+}
+
+// LoadBalancer is one DO load balancer. DO does not price LBs in the API, so cost is
+// derived from the billed unit count (see lbUnitCents).
+type LoadBalancer struct {
+	ID           string
+	Name         string
+	Region       string
+	Status       string
+	IP           string
+	SizeUnit     int
+	MonthlyCents money.Cents
+	DropletIDs   []int
+}
+
+// lbWire is the raw DO /v2/load_balancers row.
+type lbWire struct {
+	ID     string `json:"id"`
+	Name   string `json:"name"`
+	Status string `json:"status"`
+	IP     string `json:"ip"`
+	Region struct {
+		Slug string `json:"slug"`
+	} `json:"region"`
+	SizeUnit   int   `json:"size_unit"`
+	DropletIDs []int `json:"droplet_ids"`
+}
+
+// LoadBalancers lists ALL load balancers across the account.
+func (c *Client) LoadBalancers(ctx context.Context) ([]LoadBalancer, error) {
+	rows, err := listAll[lbWire](ctx, c, "/v2/load_balancers", "load_balancers")
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	out := make([]LoadBalancer, len(rows))
+	for i, l := range rows {
+		units := l.SizeUnit
+		if units <= 0 {
+			units = 1
+		}
+		out[i] = LoadBalancer{
+			ID:           l.ID,
+			Name:         l.Name,
+			Region:       l.Region.Slug,
+			Status:       l.Status,
+			IP:           l.IP,
+			SizeUnit:     units,
+			MonthlyCents: money.Cents(units) * lbUnitCents,
+			DropletIDs:   l.DropletIDs,
+		}
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
+// Snapshot is a created block-storage snapshot.
+type Snapshot struct {
+	ID      string
+	Name    string
+	SizeGiB int
+}
+
+// SnapshotVolume takes a point-in-time snapshot of a volume. This is the "undo" that
+// makes a delete recoverable, so the delete path takes one FIRST by default.
+func (c *Client) SnapshotVolume(ctx context.Context, volumeID, name string) (Snapshot, error) {
+	var out Snapshot
+	if !c.Ready() {
+		return out, fmt.Errorf("DO_API_TOKEN not configured")
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(volumeID) == "" {
+		return out, fmt.Errorf("volume id required")
+	}
+	body, err := c.send(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/v2/volumes/"+url.PathEscape(volumeID)+"/snapshots",
+		map[string]string{"name": name})
+	if err != nil {
+		return out, err
+	}
+	var w struct {
+		Snapshot struct {
+			ID            string `json:"id"`
+			Name          string `json:"name"`
+			SizeGigabytes int    `json:"size_gigabytes"`
+		} `json:"snapshot"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &w); err != nil {
+		return out, fmt.Errorf("do snapshot decode: %w", err)
+	}
+	return Snapshot{ID: w.Snapshot.ID, Name: w.Snapshot.Name, SizeGiB: w.Snapshot.SizeGigabytes}, nil
+}
+
+// DeleteVolume destroys a block-storage volume. Irreversible: callers MUST have
+// proven the volume is referenced by no PV in any cluster first.
+func (c *Client) DeleteVolume(ctx context.Context, volumeID string) error {
+	if !c.Ready() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("DO_API_TOKEN not configured")
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(volumeID) == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("volume id required")
+	}
+	_, err := c.send(ctx, http.MethodDelete, "/v2/volumes/"+url.PathEscape(volumeID), nil)
+	return err
+}
+
+// DeleteDroplet destroys a droplet. Irreversible, and there is no snapshot-first undo
+// for a droplet the way there is for a volume: callers MUST have proven the droplet is
+// not a DOKS node first (see clients/admin/infra).
+func (c *Client) DeleteDroplet(ctx context.Context, dropletID int) error {
+	if !c.Ready() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("DO_API_TOKEN not configured")
+	}
+	_, err := c.send(ctx, http.MethodDelete, "/v2/droplets/"+strconv.Itoa(dropletID), nil)
+	return err
+}
+
+// Action is a queued DO droplet action. DO performs a resize ASYNCHRONOUSLY, so a
+// successful call means "accepted", not "done" — the id is what an operator polls.
+type Action struct {
+	ID     int
+	Status string
+}
+
+// ResizeDroplet changes a droplet's plan.
+//
+// disk=true makes the change PERMANENT AND IRREVERSIBLE: the disk grows and the droplet
+// can never be resized down again. disk=false resizes CPU/RAM only and is reversible.
+//
+// DO requires the droplet to be powered off; if it is not, DO refuses and its message
+// is surfaced verbatim rather than being retried or worked around.
+func (c *Client) ResizeDroplet(ctx context.Context, dropletID int, size string, disk bool) (Action, error) {
+	var out Action
+	if !c.Ready() {
+		return out, fmt.Errorf("DO_API_TOKEN not configured")
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(size) == "" {
+		return out, fmt.Errorf("size slug required")
+	}
+	body, err := c.send(ctx, http.MethodPost, "/v2/droplets/"+strconv.Itoa(dropletID)+"/actions",
+		map[string]any{"type": "resize", "size": strings.TrimSpace(size), "disk": disk})
+	if err != nil {
+		return out, err
+	}
+	var w struct {
+		Action struct {
+			ID     int    `json:"id"`
+			Status string `json:"status"`
+		} `json:"action"`
+	}
+	if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &w); err != nil {
+		return out, fmt.Errorf("do resize decode: %w", err)
+	}
+	return Action{ID: w.Action.ID, Status: w.Action.Status}, nil
+}
+
+// DeleteLoadBalancer destroys a load balancer. Irreversible, and it takes the public IP
+// with it: callers MUST have proven no Kubernetes Service still targets it.
+func (c *Client) DeleteLoadBalancer(ctx context.Context, lbID string) error {
+	if !c.Ready() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("DO_API_TOKEN not configured")
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(lbID) == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("load balancer id required")
+	}
+	_, err := c.send(ctx, http.MethodDelete, "/v2/load_balancers/"+url.PathEscape(lbID), nil)
+	return err
+}
+
+// ScaleNodePool sets a node pool's node count. DO's update endpoint requires the pool's
+// name alongside the count — omitting it clears the name, so it is always sent back.
+func (c *Client) ScaleNodePool(ctx context.Context, clusterID, poolID, name string, count int) error {
+	if !c.Ready() {
+		return fmt.Errorf("DO_API_TOKEN not configured")
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(clusterID) == "" || strings.TrimSpace(poolID) == "" {
+		return fmt.Errorf("cluster id and node pool id required")
+	}
+	_, err := c.send(ctx, http.MethodPut,
+		"/v2/kubernetes/clusters/"+url.PathEscape(clusterID)+"/node_pools/"+url.PathEscape(poolID),
+		map[string]any{"name": name, "count": count})
+	return err
+}
+
+// Pagination bounds for every DO collection read: 200 rows a page, a hard 25-page
+// cap so a runaway can never loop, and the 8 MiB body ceiling a full droplet page
+// needs (a volume page fits in far less).
+const (
+	perPage    = 200
+	maxPages   = 25
+	maxBody    = 8 << 20
+	maxRespLen = maxBody
+)
+
+// lbUnitCents is DO's published price for one load-balancer node ($12/mo). DO does
+// not return LB pricing in the API, so this is the one place the rate is written.
+const lbUnitCents = money.Cents(1200)
+
+// listAll follows DO's page-number pagination for a collection endpoint, decoding
+// rows out of the response's named key. It is the ONE pagination loop in this client
+// — every collection read goes through it, so "stop on the short page or the reported
+// total" is stated once and cannot drift between endpoints.
+func listAll[T any](ctx context.Context, c *Client, path, key string) ([]T, error) {
+	if !c.Ready() {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("DO_API_TOKEN not configured")
+	}
+	var out []T
+	for page := 1; page <= maxPages; page++ {
+		body, err := c.get(ctx, fmt.Sprintf("%s?per_page=%d&page=%d", path, perPage, page))
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		var w struct {
+			Meta struct {
+				Total int `json:"total"`
+			} `json:"meta"`
+		}
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &w); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("do %s decode: %w", key, err)
+		}
+		var keyed map[string]json.RawMessage
+		if err := json.Unmarshal(body, &keyed); err != nil {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("do %s decode: %w", key, err)
+		}
+		var rows []T
+		if raw, ok := keyed[key]; ok && len(raw) > 0 {
+			if err := json.Unmarshal(raw, &rows); err != nil {
+				return nil, fmt.Errorf("do %s decode: %w", key, err)
+			}
+		}
+		out = append(out, rows...)
+		// Stop on the last (short) page, or once we've collected the reported total.
+		if len(rows) < perPage || (w.Meta.Total > 0 && len(out) >= w.Meta.Total) {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	return out, nil
+}
+
 // get performs one token-authenticated DO GET and returns the raw body.
 func (c *Client) get(ctx context.Context, path string) ([]byte, error) {
-	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, c.base+path, nil)
+	return c.send(ctx, http.MethodGet, path, nil)
+}
+
+// send performs one token-authenticated DO request and returns the raw body. It is
+// the single HTTP primitive of this client: every read and every mutation funnels
+// through it, so auth, timeouts, the body ceiling and status handling exist once.
+func (c *Client) send(ctx context.Context, method, path string, payload any) ([]byte, error) {
+	var rdr io.Reader
+	if payload != nil {
+		enc, err := json.Marshal(payload)
+		if err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+		rdr = bytes.NewReader(enc)
+	}
+	req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, method, c.base+path, rdr)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
 	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+c.token)
+	if payload != nil {
+		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	}
 	resp, err := c.http.Do(req)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("digitalocean unreachable: %w", err)
 	}
 	defer resp.Body.Close()
-	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, 1<<20))
+	body, err := io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxRespLen))
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 	if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
+		// DO returns {"id":"...","message":"..."} on error — surface the message so a
+		// failed mutation says WHY, not just a bare status.
+		var e struct {
+			Message string `json:"message"`
+		}
+		if json.Unmarshal(body, &e) == nil && strings.TrimSpace(e.Message) != "" {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("digitalocean status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, e.Message)
+		}
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("digitalocean status %d", resp.StatusCode)
 	}
 	return body, nil
@@ -178,5 +658,8 @@ func dollarsToCents(s string) money.Cents {
 	if err != nil {
 		return 0
 	}
-	return money.Cents(math.Round(f * 100))
+	return centsOf(f)
 }
+
+// centsOf rounds decimal dollars to integer cents.
+func centsOf(f float64) money.Cents { return money.Cents(math.Round(f * 100)) }

clients/admin/digitalocean/do_test.go

@@ -1,6 +1,81 @@
 package digitalocean
 
-import "testing"
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestMutationWireShape pins the request each mutation actually sends. A wrong verb or
+// path here fails silently against the real API — a PUT to the wrong node-pool URL just
+// does nothing — so the shape is asserted rather than assumed.
+func TestMutationWireShape(t *testing.T) {
+	var gotMethod, gotPath, gotBody string
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		b, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
+		gotMethod, gotPath, gotBody = r.Method, r.URL.Path, string(b)
+		fmt.Fprint(w, `{"action":{"id":77,"status":"in-progress"}}`)
+	}))
+	defer srv.Close()
+	c := NewWithBase(srv.URL, "test-token")
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name         string
+		call         func() error
+		method, path string
+		body         string
+	}{
+		{"delete droplet", func() error { return c.DeleteDroplet(context.Background(), 101) },
+			http.MethodDelete, "/v2/droplets/101", ""},
+		{"resize droplet", func() error {
+			_, err := c.ResizeDroplet(context.Background(), 101, "s-4vcpu-8gb", false)
+			return err
+		}, http.MethodPost, "/v2/droplets/101/actions", `{"disk":false,"size":"s-4vcpu-8gb","type":"resize"}`},
+		{"permanent resize", func() error {
+			_, err := c.ResizeDroplet(context.Background(), 101, "s-4vcpu-8gb", true)
+			return err
+		}, http.MethodPost, "/v2/droplets/101/actions", `{"disk":true,"size":"s-4vcpu-8gb","type":"resize"}`},
+		{"delete load balancer", func() error { return c.DeleteLoadBalancer(context.Background(), "lb-1") },
+			http.MethodDelete, "/v2/load_balancers/lb-1", ""},
+		{"scale node pool", func() error { return c.ScaleNodePool(context.Background(), "k8s-1", "pool-1", "workers", 3) },
+			http.MethodPut, "/v2/kubernetes/clusters/k8s-1/node_pools/pool-1", `{"count":3,"name":"workers"}`},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			gotMethod, gotPath, gotBody = "", "", ""
+			if err := tc.call(); err != nil {
+				t.Fatalf("call: %v", err)
+			}
+			if gotMethod != tc.method || gotPath != tc.path {
+				t.Errorf("%s %s, want %s %s", gotMethod, gotPath, tc.method, tc.path)
+			}
+			if tc.body != "" && !sameJSON(gotBody, tc.body) {
+				t.Errorf("body = %s, want %s", gotBody, tc.body)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+
+	// An unconfigured client must never reach the network.
+	blank := New("")
+	for name, err := range map[string]error{
+		"droplet": blank.DeleteDroplet(context.Background(), 1),
+		"lb":      blank.DeleteLoadBalancer(context.Background(), "x"),
+		"pool":    blank.ScaleNodePool(context.Background(), "c", "p", "n", 1),
+	} {
+		if err == nil {
+			t.Errorf("%s: no error without a token", name)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func sameJSON(a, b string) bool {
+	var x, y any
+	return json.Unmarshal([]byte(a), &x) == nil && json.Unmarshal([]byte(b), &y) == nil &&
+		fmt.Sprint(x) == fmt.Sprint(y)
+}
 
 func TestDollarsToCents(t *testing.T) {
 	cases := []struct {

clients/admin/finance/backfill.go

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import (
 
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/core"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerceclient"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/commerce"
 	ledger "github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/finance"
 	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
 )
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ func Backfill(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	// and reads $0, which would migrate nothing; the native read returns the real figure,
 	// or an ERROR when commerce is not co-resident (never a phantom zero the cutover would
 	// silently carry as "nothing to migrate").
-	balanceCents, err := commerceclient.BalanceCents(ctx, org, org, "usd", false)
+	balanceCents, err := commerce.BalanceCents(ctx, org, org, "usd", false)
 	if err != nil {
 		return core.Fail(c, "read commerce balance: "+err.Error())
 	}

clients/admin/finance/deposit.go

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-// Copyright © 2026 Hanzo AI. MIT License.
-
-package finance
-
-import (
-	"strconv"
-	"strings"
-
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/core"
-	ledger "github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/finance"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/money"
-	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/types"
-	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
-)
-
-// Deposit answers POST /v1/admin/finance/deposit — a SuperAdmin credit into an ARBITRARY
-// subject's native prepaid wallet. Where the credit-grant + the backfill fund the org POOL
-// (subject == the org slug), this funds a SPECIFIC wallet: an org pool ("hanzo") or a human
-// ("hanzo/z" → wallet:z in orgs/hanzo/finance.db). It posts a balanced double-entry credit
-// on the ONE finance ledger and is additive (no idempotency ref, so distinct grants stack).
-// SuperAdmin only (core.Guard).
-//
-// Params arrive as a JSON body OR query: org, subject, cents (>0), notes?, currency? (usd).
-// 503 when no finance ledger is co-resident on this deployment; 400 on a missing/invalid
-// arg or non-positive cents.
-func Deposit(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
-	fin := ledger.Current()
-	if fin == nil {
-		return zip.Errorf(503, "finance ledger not co-resident on this deployment")
-	}
-
-	// Body is optional — params may arrive as query instead — so a non-JSON/empty body is
-	// not an error; the query values below fill or override it.
-	var body struct {
-		Org      string `json:"org"`
-		Subject  string `json:"subject"`
-		Cents    int64  `json:"cents"`
-		Notes    string `json:"notes"`
-		Currency string `json:"currency"`
-	}
-	_ = c.Bind(&body)
-
-	org := pick(c.Query("org"), body.Org)
-	subject := pick(c.Query("subject"), body.Subject)
-	notes := pick(c.Query("notes"), body.Notes)
-	currency := strings.ToLower(pick(c.Query("currency"), body.Currency))
-	if currency == "" {
-		currency = "usd"
-	}
-
-	cents := body.Cents
-	if q := strings.TrimSpace(c.Query("cents")); q != "" {
-		n, err := strconv.ParseInt(q, 10, 64)
-		if err != nil {
-			return zip.ErrBadRequest("cents must be an integer")
-		}
-		cents = n
-	}
-
-	if org == "" || subject == "" {
-		return zip.ErrBadRequest("org and subject are required")
-	}
-	if cents <= 0 {
-		return zip.ErrBadRequest("cents must be positive")
-	}
-
-	entryID, err := fin.Deposit(c.Context(), types.DepositInput{
-		Org:      org,
-		Subject:  subject,
-		Amount:   money.FromCents(cents),
-		Currency: currency,
-		Notes:    notes,
-	})
-	if err != nil {
-		return core.Fail(c, "finance deposit: "+err.Error())
-	}
-	return core.OK(c, map[string]any{
-		"org":     org,
-		"subject": subject,
-		"cents":   cents,
-		"entryId": entryID,
-	})
-}
-
-// pick returns the first non-empty, trimmed value — a query param preferred over the body,
-// so either channel funds a wallet with one handler.
-func pick(query, body string) string {
-	if q := strings.TrimSpace(query); q != "" {
-		return q
-	}
-	return strings.TrimSpace(body)
-}

clients/admin/finance/finance.go

@@ -27,14 +27,18 @@ import (
 var errUnconfigured = errors.New("not configured")
 
 // Routes registers the finance dashboard (SuperAdmin only).
-func Routes(app *zip.App, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
+func Routes(app cloud.Router, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
 	g := app.Group("/v1/admin")
 	g.Get("/finance", core.Guard(s, Finance))
 	// One-time commerce→finance balance cutover (SuperAdmin only). Idempotent per org.
 	g.Post("/finance/backfill", core.Guard(s, Backfill))
-	// Fund an ARBITRARY subject's native wallet — an org pool or a human ("hanzo/z").
-	// SuperAdmin only; additive (grants stack).
-	g.Post("/finance/deposit", core.Guard(s, Deposit))
+	// There is no second credit-write here. POST /finance/deposit used to fund an
+	// arbitrary subject verbatim, because the credit grant could only reach the org
+	// pool; the grant now resolves its address through account.Payer and can name a
+	// member, so the raw route's only reason to exist is gone. It was also the unsafe
+	// one — no cap, no audit row, and no idempotency ref, so a double-clicked deposit
+	// credited twice. ONE credit-write path: core.ApplyGrant.
+
 	// Per-provider upstream credit ledger + usage funding split (multi-provider
 	// credit-management). Same SuperAdmin guard, same cloud_usage warehouse.
 	g.Get("/providers/credit", core.Guard(s, ProvidersCredit))

clients/admin/finance/providers.go

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ import (
 	aiobject "github.com/hanzoai/ai/object"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/core"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/datastore"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/types"
 	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
 )
 
@@ -120,13 +122,13 @@ func computeProviderCredits(ctx context.Context, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) [
 // customer's usage). Honest-empty ({}) on any datastore blip — never 5xxs.
 func providerBurnCents(ctx context.Context) map[string]int64 {
 	burn := map[string]int64{}
-	if !aiobject.DatastoreEnabled() {
+	if !datastore.Ready() {
 		return burn
 	}
 	if err := aiobject.EnsureCloudUsageTable(ctx); err != nil {
 		return burn
 	}
-	rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx,
+	rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx,
 		"SELECT provider, sum(cost_cents) AS burn FROM "+usageTable+" GROUP BY provider")
 	if err != nil {
 		return burn
@@ -174,7 +176,8 @@ func fundingClass(pc ProviderCredit) string {
 // usage split by funding class over the window (default last 30d). SuperAdmin-guarded.
 func UsageFunding(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	ctx := c.Context()
-	start, end, _, werr := aiobject.ResolveCloudUsageWindow("", c.Query("from"), c.Query("to"), time.Now().UTC())
+	w, werr := types.ParseWindow("", c.Query("from"), c.Query("to"), time.Now().UTC())
+	start, end := w.Start, w.End
 	if werr != nil {
 		end = time.Now().UTC()
 		start = end.AddDate(0, 0, -30)
@@ -186,9 +189,9 @@ func UsageFunding(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 	}
 
 	out := []UsageFundingRow{}
-	if aiobject.DatastoreEnabled() {
+	if datastore.Ready() {
 		if err := aiobject.EnsureCloudUsageTable(ctx); err == nil {
-			rows, qerr := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx,
+			rows, qerr := datastore.Query(ctx,
 				"SELECT provider, model, count() AS requests, sum(total_tokens) AS tokens, "+
 					"sum(cost_cents) AS cost_cents FROM "+usageTable+
 					" WHERE timestamp >= ? AND timestamp < ? GROUP BY provider, model ORDER BY cost_cents DESC",

clients/admin/infra/analyze.go

@@ -0,0 +1,938 @@
+// Package infra is the platform's DigitalOcean fleet board: the physical inventory
+// (DOKS clusters, droplets, block-storage volumes, load balancers) cross-referenced
+// against what every cluster's Kubernetes actually claims, with the cost of each and
+// an orphan analysis that is safe BY CONSTRUCTION.
+//
+// THE RULE THIS PACKAGE EXISTS TO ENFORCE. A volume being detached, or carrying a
+// `k8s:<cluster-uuid>` tag for some other cluster, does NOT make it garbage. Those two
+// signals together would have condemned 4.39 TiB of live data belonging to running
+// clusters. The ONLY sound liveness test is a cross-reference against the
+// `spec.csi.volumeHandle` of every PersistentVolume in EVERY cluster — and it is only
+// a valid test when every cluster answered. So:
+//
+//   - a volume is deletable only when NO PV in ANY cluster names it, and
+//   - if even one cluster failed to scan, NOTHING is deletable (Complete=false).
+//
+// Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence: an unreachable cluster is treated as
+// a cluster that might be holding the volume. The analysis fails CLOSED.
+//
+// "No pod mounts it" is a REVIEW signal, never a delete signal — an idle Bound PVC is
+// an idle database, not garbage. Idle volumes are surfaced as a queue for a human and
+// are never counted as reclaimable.
+//
+// THE SAME DISCIPLINE GOVERNS EVERY MUTATION, not just volume deletion. A droplet, a
+// load balancer and a node pool each get a (allowed, reason) verdict derived HERE, from
+// the same scan, behind the same completeness gate — see Snapshot.verdict. Handlers
+// carry no policy: they read the verdict this file already reached.
+//
+// Analyze is a pure function of (DO inventory, cluster scans) so every rule above is
+// unit-testable without a network or a cluster.
+package infra
+
+import (
+	"fmt"
+	"sort"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/core"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/digitalocean"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/money"
+)
+
+// volumeGiBCents is DO's block-storage rate: $0.10 per GiB per month. Droplet LOCAL
+// disk is NOT billed at this rate (or at all, separately) — it is included in the
+// droplet's own price. Conflating the two invents terabytes of phantom cost.
+const volumeGiBCents = money.Cents(10)
+
+// outlierShareBP flags any single resource costing at least this share of total fleet
+// spend, in basis points (500bp = 5%). One explicable rule, no magic thresholds.
+const outlierShareBP = money.Cents(500)
+
+// Volume states. The state machine is total and ordered: attachment beats reference,
+// reference beats absence. Only Unreferenced is ever deletable.
+const (
+	// StateAttached — DO reports the volume attached to a droplet. In use, now.
+	StateAttached = "attached"
+	// StateBound — detached, but a PV in some cluster claims it and that PV is Bound
+	// to a PVC. This is live data between mounts; deleting it destroys a database.
+	StateBound = "bound"
+	// StateReleased — a PV claims it but is no longer Bound (Released/Available/Failed).
+	// A genuine cleanup candidate, but the PV still exists, so a human retires the PV.
+	StateReleased = "released"
+	// StateUnreferenced — no PV in ANY scanned cluster names it. The ONLY deletable state.
+	StateUnreferenced = "unreferenced"
+)
+
+// Finding severities.
+const (
+	SevCritical = "critical"
+	SevWarn     = "warn"
+	SevInfo     = "info"
+)
+
+// firstParty are our own registries: anything here is ours by construction.
+var firstParty = []string{
+	"ghcr.io/hanzoai/", "ghcr.io/luxfi/", "ghcr.io/zooai/",
+	"registry.hanzo.ai/", "registry.lux.network/", "registry.zoo.network/",
+	"registry.digitalocean.com/hanzo/",
+}
+
+// knownVendors is the REVIEWED third-party set — upstream images we deliberately run.
+// Kept deliberately short: an image outside both lists is reported for a human to
+// judge, which is the point. Growing this list is a review decision, not a reflex.
+var knownVendors = []string{
+	"docker.io/library/", "library/", "registry.k8s.io/", "k8s.gcr.io/", "quay.io/",
+	"grafana/", "prom/", "prometheus/", "bitnami/", "minio/", "moby/",
+	"digitalocean/", "docker.digitalocean.com/", "acmglobaltech/", "hanzozt/",
+}
+
+// Inventory is the DigitalOcean account read — the half of the analysis input that
+// needs no cluster.
+type Inventory struct {
+	Clusters      []digitalocean.Cluster
+	Droplets      []digitalocean.Droplet
+	Volumes       []digitalocean.Volume
+	LoadBalancers []digitalocean.LoadBalancer
+}
+
+// PVRef is one PersistentVolume's identity: which DO volume it claims, and whether
+// that claim is still live.
+type PVRef struct {
+	Name         string
+	Phase        string
+	VolumeHandle string
+	ClaimNS      string
+	ClaimName    string
+}
+
+// PVCRef is one PersistentVolumeClaim.
+type PVCRef struct {
+	Namespace string
+	Name      string
+	Phase     string
+	Volume    string
+}
+
+// PodRef is one pod, reduced to what the board needs: where it runs, whether it is
+// healthy, which PVCs it mounts, and what images it runs.
+type PodRef struct {
+	Namespace string
+	Name      string
+	Phase     string
+	Reason    string
+	Node      string
+	Claims    []string
+	Images    []string
+}
+
+// NodeState is one Kubernetes node's own view of itself.
+type NodeState struct {
+	Name        string
+	Ready       bool
+	Schedulable bool
+}
+
+// ServiceRef is one Service of type LoadBalancer: the identities by which it claims a
+// DO load balancer. It is to load balancers exactly what PVRef is to volumes — the only
+// sound liveness test, because a DO load balancer carries no back-reference of its own.
+type ServiceRef struct {
+	Namespace string
+	Name      string
+	LBID      string
+	IPs       []string
+}
+
+// ClusterScan is ONE cluster's Kubernetes truth. Err non-nil means the cluster did
+// not answer — which forces the whole analysis incomplete.
+type ClusterScan struct {
+	ClusterID string
+	Err       error
+	Nodes     []NodeState
+	PVs       []PVRef
+	PVCs      []PVCRef
+	Pods      []PodRef
+	Services  []ServiceRef
+}
+
+// Snapshot is the whole board in one value.
+type Snapshot struct {
+	At               string              `json:"at"`
+	Complete         bool                `json:"complete"`
+	IncompleteReason string              `json:"incompleteReason"`
+	Sources          []core.SourceStatus `json:"sources"`
+	Totals           Totals              `json:"totals"`
+	Cost             Cost                `json:"cost"`
+	Clusters         []Cluster           `json:"clusters"`
+	Nodes            []Node              `json:"nodes"`
+	Volumes          []Volume            `json:"volumes"`
+	LoadBalancers    []LoadBalancer      `json:"loadBalancers"`
+	Findings         []Finding           `json:"findings"`
+}
+
+// Totals are fleet counts. LocalDiskGiB is broken out precisely so it can be shown
+// as NOT separately billed.
+type Totals struct {
+	Clusters            int `json:"clusters"`
+	Nodes               int `json:"nodes"`
+	Volumes             int `json:"volumes"`
+	LoadBalancers       int `json:"loadBalancers"`
+	VolumeGiB           int `json:"volumeGiB"`
+	AttachedVolumes     int `json:"attachedVolumes"`
+	AttachedGiB         int `json:"attachedGiB"`
+	DetachedVolumes     int `json:"detachedVolumes"`
+	DetachedGiB         int `json:"detachedGiB"`
+	UnreferencedVolumes int `json:"unreferencedVolumes"`
+	UnreferencedGiB     int `json:"unreferencedGiB"`
+	IdlePVCs            int `json:"idlePVCs"`
+	LocalDiskGiB        int `json:"localDiskGiB"`
+}
+
+// Cost is monthly spend in cents. Reclaimable counts ONLY unreferenced volumes —
+// never idle ones, which are live data awaiting a human verdict.
+type Cost struct {
+	DropletsMonthly      money.Cents `json:"dropletsMonthly"`
+	VolumesMonthly       money.Cents `json:"volumesMonthly"`
+	LoadBalancersMonthly money.Cents `json:"loadBalancersMonthly"`
+	TotalMonthly         money.Cents `json:"totalMonthly"`
+	ReclaimableMonthly   money.Cents `json:"reclaimableMonthly"`
+}
+
+// Cluster is one DOKS cluster with its scanned Kubernetes rollup.
+type Cluster struct {
+	ID           string      `json:"id"`
+	Name         string      `json:"name"`
+	Region       string      `json:"region"`
+	Version      string      `json:"version"`
+	Status       string      `json:"status"`
+	NodePools    int         `json:"nodePools"`
+	Pools        []NodePool  `json:"pools"`
+	Nodes        int         `json:"nodes"`
+	Pods         int         `json:"pods"`
+	PVs          int         `json:"pvs"`
+	PVCs         int         `json:"pvcs"`
+	IdlePVCs     int         `json:"idlePVCs"`
+	Scanned      bool        `json:"scanned"`
+	ScanError    string      `json:"scanError"`
+	MonthlyCents money.Cents `json:"monthlyCents"`
+}
+
+// NodePool is one DOKS node pool — the only correct place to change a cluster's node
+// count. ClusterSchedulable is the whole cluster's schedulable-and-ready node count,
+// carried on the row so the shrink verdict is a pure method of it.
+type NodePool struct {
+	ID                 string `json:"id"`
+	Name               string `json:"name"`
+	Size               string `json:"size"`
+	Count              int    `json:"count"`
+	ClusterID          string `json:"clusterId"`
+	Cluster            string `json:"cluster"`
+	ClusterSchedulable int    `json:"clusterSchedulable"`
+	Scalable           bool   `json:"scalable"`
+	BlockedReason      string `json:"blockedReason"`
+}
+
+// ScaleTo answers whether this pool may be set to count.
+//
+// PROVEN HERE: a pool keeps at least one node, and a shrink never leaves the cluster
+// with zero schedulable nodes — with none, every pod the removed nodes carried is
+// unschedulable, guaranteed.
+//
+// NOT PROVEN, and deliberately not pretended: DOKS picks WHICH nodes it removes, so no
+// particular pod can be shown to survive a shrink that leaves capacity behind. Node
+// affinity, taints and resource requests decide that, and PodDisruptionBudgets are
+// enforced by the cluster during DOKS's own drain — not by this board. A shrink that
+// merely MIGHT not fit is allowed, and the response says so.
+func (p NodePool) ScaleTo(count int) (bool, string) {
+	switch {
+	case !p.Scalable:
+		return false, p.BlockedReason
+	case count < 1:
+		return false, "A node pool must keep at least one node — scaling to zero destroys every node in the pool and strands its pods."
+	case count < p.Count && p.ClusterSchedulable-(p.Count-count) < 1:
+		return false, fmt.Sprintf("Removing %d node(s) would leave %s with no schedulable node.", p.Count-count, p.Cluster)
+	}
+	return true, ""
+}
+
+// Node is one droplet, joined to the Kubernetes node of the same name.
+type Node struct {
+	ID           int         `json:"id"`
+	Name         string      `json:"name"`
+	Cluster      string      `json:"cluster"`
+	ClusterID    string      `json:"clusterId"`
+	Region       string      `json:"region"`
+	Status       string      `json:"status"`
+	SizeSlug     string      `json:"sizeSlug"`
+	VCPUs        int         `json:"vcpus"`
+	MemoryMiB    int         `json:"memoryMiB"`
+	LocalDiskGiB int         `json:"localDiskGiB"`
+	MonthlyCents money.Cents `json:"monthlyCents"`
+	CreatedAt    string      `json:"createdAt"`
+	PrivateIP    string      `json:"privateIp"`
+	PublicIP     string      `json:"publicIp"`
+	Tags         []string    `json:"tags"`
+	Ready        bool        `json:"ready"`
+	Schedulable  bool        `json:"schedulable"`
+	Pods         int         `json:"pods"`
+	Volumes      int         `json:"volumes"`
+	// Mutable reports whether this droplet may be changed DIRECTLY — deleted or resized.
+	// One predicate covers both because one fact decides both: a DOKS node belongs to a
+	// node pool, and the pool is the only thing allowed to change it.
+	Mutable       bool   `json:"mutable"`
+	BlockedReason string `json:"blockedReason"`
+}
+
+// Volume is one block-storage volume with its PROVEN cluster ownership.
+type Volume struct {
+	ID           string      `json:"id"`
+	Name         string      `json:"name"`
+	Region       string      `json:"region"`
+	SizeGiB      int         `json:"sizeGiB"`
+	MonthlyCents money.Cents `json:"monthlyCents"`
+	State        string      `json:"state"`
+	DropletIDs   []int       `json:"dropletIds"`
+	NodeName     string      `json:"nodeName"`
+	// Cluster/ClusterID are the PROVEN owner — resolved through a PV that names this
+	// volume, never through the tag.
+	Cluster   string `json:"cluster"`
+	ClusterID string `json:"clusterId"`
+	// TagCluster is the `k8s:<uuid>` tag. ADVISORY ONLY: it outlives the cluster that
+	// set it. Shown so the operator can see tag-vs-truth disagree, never acted on.
+	TagCluster    string   `json:"tagCluster"`
+	PV            string   `json:"pv"`
+	PVPhase       string   `json:"pvPhase"`
+	PVCNamespace  string   `json:"pvcNamespace"`
+	PVCName       string   `json:"pvcName"`
+	MountedBy     []string `json:"mountedBy"`
+	Idle          bool     `json:"idle"`
+	CreatedAt     string   `json:"createdAt"`
+	Deletable     bool     `json:"deletable"`
+	BlockedReason string   `json:"blockedReason"`
+}
+
+// LoadBalancer is one DO load balancer, attributed to a cluster via the Service that
+// claims it, or failing that via its member droplets.
+type LoadBalancer struct {
+	ID           string      `json:"id"`
+	Name         string      `json:"name"`
+	Region       string      `json:"region"`
+	Status       string      `json:"status"`
+	IP           string      `json:"ip"`
+	SizeUnit     int         `json:"sizeUnit"`
+	MonthlyCents money.Cents `json:"monthlyCents"`
+	Droplets     int         `json:"droplets"`
+	Cluster      string      `json:"cluster"`
+	// Service is the `namespace/name` of the live type=LoadBalancer Service that claims
+	// this load balancer, proven from the cluster scan. Non-empty means IN USE.
+	Service       string `json:"service"`
+	Deletable     bool   `json:"deletable"`
+	BlockedReason string `json:"blockedReason"`
+}
+
+// Finding is one audit result — the "is anything bad" surface.
+type Finding struct {
+	ID           string      `json:"id"`
+	Severity     string      `json:"severity"`
+	Kind         string      `json:"kind"`
+	Title        string      `json:"title"`
+	Detail       string      `json:"detail"`
+	Resource     string      `json:"resource"`
+	Cluster      string      `json:"cluster"`
+	MonthlyCents money.Cents `json:"monthlyCents"`
+}
+
+// pvHit is a PV that claims a given DO volume, plus the cluster it lives in.
+type pvHit struct {
+	cluster   string
+	clusterID string
+	pv        PVRef
+}
+
+// svcHit is a Service that claims a given DO load balancer, plus its cluster.
+type svcHit struct {
+	cluster string
+	svc     ServiceRef
+}
+
+// verdict is the ONE place a mutation's answer is decided: the completeness gate every
+// mutation shares, then the resource's own rule (blocked == "" meaning its rule is
+// satisfied). The gate comes first and applies to ALL of them — droplets, load balancers
+// and node pools fail closed on a partial scan for the same reason volumes do: a fleet
+// we cannot fully see is a fleet whose live parts we cannot fully name.
+//
+// Every (Deletable|Mutable|Scalable, BlockedReason) pair on this board comes from here,
+// so "allowed carries no reason, blocked always names one" is stated once.
+func (s *Snapshot) verdict(blocked string) (bool, string) {
+	switch {
+	case !s.Complete:
+		return false, s.IncompleteReason
+	case blocked != "":
+		return false, blocked
+	}
+	return true, ""
+}
+
+// Analyze folds the DO inventory and the per-cluster Kubernetes scans into the board.
+// PURE: no clock, no network, no cluster — `at` is passed in so the result is
+// byte-reproducible in tests.
+func Analyze(inv Inventory, scans []ClusterScan, sources []core.SourceStatus, at time.Time) Snapshot {
+	snap := Snapshot{
+		At:      at.UTC().Format(time.RFC3339),
+		Sources: sources,
+	}
+	if snap.Sources == nil {
+		snap.Sources = []core.SourceStatus{}
+	}
+
+	scanByID := make(map[string]ClusterScan, len(scans))
+	for _, s := range scans {
+		scanByID[s.ClusterID] = s
+	}
+	nameByID := make(map[string]string, len(inv.Clusters))
+	for _, c := range inv.Clusters {
+		nameByID[c.ID] = c.Name
+	}
+
+	// ---- completeness gate -------------------------------------------------------
+	// Every cluster must have answered. One silent gap and no volume may be condemned.
+	var unreachable []string
+	for _, c := range inv.Clusters {
+		s, ok := scanByID[c.ID]
+		if !ok || s.Err != nil {
+			unreachable = append(unreachable, c.Name)
+		}
+	}
+	switch {
+	case len(inv.Clusters) == 0:
+		snap.IncompleteReason = "DigitalOcean returned no clusters — the set of places a volume could be in use is unknown."
+	case len(unreachable) > 0:
+		snap.IncompleteReason = fmt.Sprintf(
+			"%d of %d clusters did not answer (%s) — a volume they hold would look unreferenced, so nothing is classified as deletable.",
+			len(unreachable), len(inv.Clusters), strings.Join(unreachable, ", "))
+	default:
+		snap.Complete = true
+	}
+
+	// ---- cross-cluster PV index --------------------------------------------------
+	// THE safety index: every volume handle claimed by any PV in any cluster.
+	byHandle := make(map[string]pvHit)
+	// mounted[clusterID/ns/pvc] -> pods currently mounting it.
+	mounted := make(map[string][]string)
+	// THE load-balancer safety index, keyed by BOTH identities a Service can claim one
+	// by — the DOKS load-balancer-id annotation and every address it holds. Either
+	// matching counts, because a broad match means MORE load balancers are treated as in
+	// use, which is the safe direction.
+	lbClaims := make(map[string]svcHit)
+	for _, s := range scans {
+		if s.Err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		cname := nameByID[s.ClusterID]
+		for _, pv := range s.PVs {
+			if h := strings.TrimSpace(pv.VolumeHandle); h != "" {
+				byHandle[h] = pvHit{cluster: cname, clusterID: s.ClusterID, pv: pv}
+			}
+		}
+		for _, p := range s.Pods {
+			for _, claim := range p.Claims {
+				k := claimKey(s.ClusterID, p.Namespace, claim)
+				mounted[k] = append(mounted[k], p.Namespace+"/"+p.Name)
+			}
+		}
+		for _, sv := range s.Services {
+			hit := svcHit{cluster: cname, svc: sv}
+			for _, key := range append([]string{sv.LBID}, sv.IPs...) {
+				if key = strings.TrimSpace(key); key != "" {
+					lbClaims[key] = hit
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	// ---- nodes -------------------------------------------------------------------
+	nodeByName := make(map[string]NodeState)
+	podsPerNode := make(map[string]int)
+	for _, s := range scans {
+		if s.Err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, n := range s.Nodes {
+			nodeByName[n.Name] = n
+		}
+		for _, p := range s.Pods {
+			if p.Node != "" {
+				podsPerNode[p.Node]++
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	volsPerDroplet := make(map[int]int)
+	for _, v := range inv.Volumes {
+		for _, id := range v.DropletIDs {
+			volsPerDroplet[id]++
+		}
+	}
+	clusterByDroplet := make(map[int]string, len(inv.Droplets))
+	snap.Nodes = make([]Node, 0, len(inv.Droplets))
+	for _, d := range inv.Droplets {
+		cid := clusterIDFromTags(d.Tags)
+		clusterByDroplet[d.ID] = cid
+		ks := nodeByName[d.Name]
+		n := Node{
+			ID: d.ID, Name: d.Name, Cluster: nameByID[cid], ClusterID: cid,
+			Region: d.Region, Status: d.Status, SizeSlug: d.SizeSlug,
+			VCPUs: d.VCPUs, MemoryMiB: d.MemoryMiB, LocalDiskGiB: d.LocalDiskGiB,
+			MonthlyCents: d.MonthlyCents, CreatedAt: d.CreatedAt,
+			PrivateIP: d.PrivateIP, PublicIP: d.PublicIP, Tags: nonNilStrings(d.Tags),
+			Ready: ks.Ready, Schedulable: ks.Schedulable,
+			Pods: podsPerNode[d.Name], Volumes: volsPerDroplet[d.ID],
+		}
+		n.Mutable, n.BlockedReason = snap.verdict(nodeBlock(n))
+		snap.Nodes = append(snap.Nodes, n)
+		snap.Cost.DropletsMonthly += d.MonthlyCents
+		snap.Totals.LocalDiskGiB += d.LocalDiskGiB
+	}
+	dropletName := make(map[int]string, len(inv.Droplets))
+	for _, d := range inv.Droplets {
+		dropletName[d.ID] = d.Name
+	}
+
+	// ---- volumes: the state machine ----------------------------------------------
+	snap.Volumes = make([]Volume, 0, len(inv.Volumes))
+	for _, v := range inv.Volumes {
+		hit, referenced := byHandle[v.ID]
+		vol := Volume{
+			ID: v.ID, Name: v.Name, Region: v.Region, SizeGiB: v.SizeGiB,
+			MonthlyCents: money.Cents(v.SizeGiB) * volumeGiBCents,
+			DropletIDs:   nonNilInts(v.DropletIDs),
+			TagCluster:   nameByID[clusterIDFromTags(v.Tags)],
+			CreatedAt:    v.CreatedAt,
+			MountedBy:    []string{},
+		}
+		if len(v.DropletIDs) > 0 {
+			vol.NodeName = dropletName[v.DropletIDs[0]]
+		}
+		if referenced {
+			vol.Cluster, vol.ClusterID = hit.cluster, hit.clusterID
+			vol.PV, vol.PVPhase = hit.pv.Name, hit.pv.Phase
+			vol.PVCNamespace, vol.PVCName = hit.pv.ClaimNS, hit.pv.ClaimName
+			if hit.pv.ClaimName != "" {
+				vol.MountedBy = nonNilStrings(mounted[claimKey(hit.clusterID, hit.pv.ClaimNS, hit.pv.ClaimName)])
+			}
+		} else if len(v.DropletIDs) > 0 {
+			// No PV names it, but it is physically mounted on a node — that node's
+			// cluster owns it. Attachment is hard evidence, unlike the tag: it is the
+			// live kernel state, so the cost rolls up to the right cluster.
+			vol.ClusterID = clusterByDroplet[v.DropletIDs[0]]
+			vol.Cluster = nameByID[vol.ClusterID]
+		}
+
+		// Attachment beats reference; reference beats absence.
+		switch {
+		case len(v.DropletIDs) > 0:
+			vol.State = StateAttached
+		case referenced && strings.EqualFold(hit.pv.Phase, "Bound"):
+			vol.State = StateBound
+		case referenced:
+			vol.State = StateReleased
+		default:
+			vol.State = StateUnreferenced
+		}
+
+		// Idle is a REVIEW signal on live data, never a delete signal.
+		vol.Idle = vol.State == StateBound && len(vol.MountedBy) == 0
+
+		vol.Deletable, vol.BlockedReason = snap.verdict(volumeBlock(vol))
+
+		snap.Cost.VolumesMonthly += vol.MonthlyCents
+		snap.Totals.VolumeGiB += vol.SizeGiB
+		switch vol.State {
+		case StateAttached:
+			snap.Totals.AttachedVolumes++
+			snap.Totals.AttachedGiB += vol.SizeGiB
+		default:
+			snap.Totals.DetachedVolumes++
+			snap.Totals.DetachedGiB += vol.SizeGiB
+		}
+		if vol.State == StateUnreferenced {
+			snap.Totals.UnreferencedVolumes++
+			snap.Totals.UnreferencedGiB += vol.SizeGiB
+			// Reclaimable is exactly the unreferenced set — and only when the scan was
+			// complete enough to have earned that verdict.
+			if snap.Complete {
+				snap.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly += vol.MonthlyCents
+			}
+		}
+		if vol.Idle {
+			snap.Totals.IdlePVCs++
+		}
+		snap.Volumes = append(snap.Volumes, vol)
+	}
+
+	// ---- load balancers ----------------------------------------------------------
+	snap.LoadBalancers = make([]LoadBalancer, 0, len(inv.LoadBalancers))
+	for _, l := range inv.LoadBalancers {
+		lb := LoadBalancer{
+			ID: l.ID, Name: l.Name, Region: l.Region, Status: l.Status, IP: l.IP,
+			SizeUnit: l.SizeUnit, MonthlyCents: l.MonthlyCents, Droplets: len(l.DropletIDs),
+		}
+		// The claiming Service is the strongest attribution there is; member droplets are
+		// the fallback for a load balancer no scanned Service claims.
+		hit, claimed := lbClaims[l.ID]
+		if !claimed {
+			hit, claimed = lbClaims[l.IP]
+		}
+		if claimed {
+			lb.Service = hit.svc.Namespace + "/" + hit.svc.Name
+			lb.Cluster = hit.cluster
+		}
+		// A member droplet belonging to no cluster carries a workload Kubernetes knows
+		// nothing about, so the Service scan proves nothing about this load balancer.
+		unmanaged := 0
+		for _, id := range l.DropletIDs {
+			if cid := clusterByDroplet[id]; cid == "" {
+				unmanaged++
+			} else if lb.Cluster == "" {
+				lb.Cluster = nameByID[cid]
+			}
+		}
+		lb.Deletable, lb.BlockedReason = snap.verdict(lbBlock(lb, unmanaged))
+		snap.Cost.LoadBalancersMonthly += lb.MonthlyCents
+		snap.LoadBalancers = append(snap.LoadBalancers, lb)
+	}
+
+	// ---- cluster rollup ----------------------------------------------------------
+	idleByCluster := make(map[string]int)
+	costByCluster := make(map[string]money.Cents)
+	for _, v := range snap.Volumes {
+		if v.ClusterID != "" {
+			costByCluster[v.ClusterID] += v.MonthlyCents
+			if v.Idle {
+				idleByCluster[v.ClusterID]++
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	nodesByCluster := make(map[string]int)
+	for _, n := range snap.Nodes {
+		if n.ClusterID != "" {
+			nodesByCluster[n.ClusterID]++
+			costByCluster[n.ClusterID] += n.MonthlyCents
+		}
+	}
+	snap.Clusters = make([]Cluster, 0, len(inv.Clusters))
+	for _, c := range inv.Clusters {
+		row := Cluster{
+			ID: c.ID, Name: c.Name, Region: c.Region, Version: c.Version,
+			Status: c.Status, NodePools: len(c.Pools), Nodes: nodesByCluster[c.ID],
+			IdlePVCs: idleByCluster[c.ID], MonthlyCents: costByCluster[c.ID],
+			Pools: make([]NodePool, 0, len(c.Pools)),
+		}
+		if s, ok := scanByID[c.ID]; ok {
+			if s.Err != nil {
+				row.ScanError = s.Err.Error()
+			} else {
+				row.Scanned = true
+				row.Pods, row.PVs, row.PVCs = len(s.Pods), len(s.PVs), len(s.PVCs)
+			}
+		} else {
+			row.ScanError = "not scanned"
+		}
+		// A node that is cordoned or NotReady cannot take a pod, so it does not count as
+		// somewhere a shrink's evicted pods could land. Counting conservatively here
+		// refuses more shrinks, which is the safe direction.
+		schedulable := 0
+		for _, n := range scanByID[c.ID].Nodes {
+			if n.Ready && n.Schedulable {
+				schedulable++
+			}
+		}
+		for _, p := range c.Pools {
+			pool := NodePool{
+				ID: p.ID, Name: p.Name, Size: p.Size, Count: p.Count,
+				ClusterID: c.ID, Cluster: c.Name, ClusterSchedulable: schedulable,
+			}
+			// A pool carries no rule of its own — what may be refused depends on the
+			// COUNT asked for, which ScaleTo decides. Only the shared gate applies here.
+			pool.Scalable, pool.BlockedReason = snap.verdict("")
+			row.Pools = append(row.Pools, pool)
+		}
+		snap.Clusters = append(snap.Clusters, row)
+	}
+
+	snap.Totals.Clusters = len(snap.Clusters)
+	snap.Totals.Nodes = len(snap.Nodes)
+	snap.Totals.Volumes = len(snap.Volumes)
+	snap.Totals.LoadBalancers = len(snap.LoadBalancers)
+	snap.Cost.TotalMonthly = snap.Cost.DropletsMonthly + snap.Cost.VolumesMonthly + snap.Cost.LoadBalancersMonthly
+
+	snap.Findings = findings(snap, scans, nameByID)
+	return snap
+}
+
+// The per-resource rules. Each states, in the operator's language, exactly why ITS
+// resource may not be mutated, and returns "" when its own rule is satisfied — the
+// shared completeness gate in Snapshot.verdict has the final word either way.
+
+// volumeBlock: only an unreferenced volume may be deleted.
+func volumeBlock(v Volume) string {
+	switch v.State {
+	case StateUnreferenced:
+		return ""
+	case StateAttached:
+		if v.NodeName != "" {
+			return "Attached to " + v.NodeName + " and in use."
+		}
+		return "Attached to a droplet and in use."
+	case StateBound:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("Live data: PV %s is Bound to %s/%s in %s.", v.PV, v.PVCNamespace, v.PVCName, v.Cluster)
+	case StateReleased:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("PV %s in %s still references it (%s) — retire the PV first.", v.PV, v.Cluster, v.PVPhase)
+	}
+	return "Not eligible for deletion."
+}
+
+// nodeBlock: a DOKS node may not be deleted OR resized directly. The node pool owns it
+// — DOKS recreates a node deleted out from under it (so the delete costs an outage and
+// changes nothing) and reverts a hand-resized one to the pool's declared size. The pool
+// is the only lever that actually holds.
+func nodeBlock(n Node) string {
+	if n.ClusterID == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+	name := n.Cluster
+	if name == "" {
+		name = n.ClusterID
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("Node of DOKS cluster %s — DOKS owns it via its node pool and will recreate it. Scale or edit the pool instead.", name)
+}
+
+// lbBlock: a load balancer a live Service still targets may not be deleted — doing so
+// black-holes that Service's public address, and DOKS recreates the load balancer
+// anyway. Nor may one that forwards to droplets outside every cluster: the Service scan
+// is the only liveness evidence this board has, and it says nothing about a workload
+// Kubernetes does not run. "Has member droplets" is NOT itself a liveness signal — a
+// DOKS load balancer lists every node in its cluster, so a leaked one still looks busy.
+func lbBlock(lb LoadBalancer, unmanagedMembers int) string {
+	switch {
+	case lb.Service != "":
+		return fmt.Sprintf("Serving Kubernetes Service %s in %s — delete the Service first; DOKS recreates a load balancer its Service still wants.", lb.Service, lb.Cluster)
+	case unmanagedMembers > 0:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("Forwards to %d droplet(s) outside any cluster — no Kubernetes Service can vouch for it, so it cannot be proven unused.", unmanagedMembers)
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// findings is the audit pass: what a human should look at, worst first.
+func findings(s Snapshot, scans []ClusterScan, nameByID map[string]string) []Finding {
+	out := []Finding{}
+
+	if !s.Complete {
+		out = append(out, Finding{
+			ID: "scan-incomplete", Severity: SevCritical, Kind: "scan-incomplete",
+			Title:  "Cluster scan incomplete — deletion disabled",
+			Detail: s.IncompleteReason,
+		})
+	}
+
+	for _, v := range s.Volumes {
+		switch {
+		case v.State == StateUnreferenced && s.Complete:
+			out = append(out, Finding{
+				ID: "unref/" + v.ID, Severity: SevWarn, Kind: "unreferenced-volume",
+				Title: fmt.Sprintf("Unreferenced volume %s (%d GiB)", v.Name, v.SizeGiB),
+				Detail: "No PersistentVolume in any cluster references this volume. " +
+					"Verified against every cluster, so it is safe to snapshot and delete.",
+				Resource: v.ID, MonthlyCents: v.MonthlyCents,
+			})
+		case v.State == StateReleased:
+			out = append(out, Finding{
+				ID: "released/" + v.ID, Severity: SevWarn, Kind: "released-pv",
+				Title:    fmt.Sprintf("Released PV holding %s (%d GiB)", v.Name, v.SizeGiB),
+				Detail:   fmt.Sprintf("PV %s is %s. Retire the PV to release the volume.", v.PV, v.PVPhase),
+				Resource: v.ID, Cluster: v.Cluster, MonthlyCents: v.MonthlyCents,
+			})
+		case v.Idle:
+			out = append(out, Finding{
+				ID: "idle/" + v.ID, Severity: SevInfo, Kind: "idle-pvc",
+				Title: fmt.Sprintf("Idle volume %s (%d GiB) — no pod mounts it", v.Name, v.SizeGiB),
+				Detail: fmt.Sprintf("PVC %s/%s is Bound but no running pod mounts it. "+
+					"REVIEW ONLY: this is live data (typically a stopped database), not garbage.",
+					v.PVCNamespace, v.PVCName),
+				Resource: v.ID, Cluster: v.Cluster, MonthlyCents: v.MonthlyCents,
+			})
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Unhealthy pods + unknown images, per cluster.
+	type imgSeen struct {
+		pods    int
+		cluster string
+	}
+	unknown := map[string]*imgSeen{}
+	for _, sc := range scans {
+		if sc.Err != nil {
+			continue
+		}
+		cname := nameByID[sc.ClusterID]
+		for _, p := range sc.Pods {
+			if bad := podProblem(p); bad != "" {
+				out = append(out, Finding{
+					ID: "pod/" + sc.ClusterID + "/" + p.Namespace + "/" + p.Name, Severity: SevWarn,
+					Kind: "pod-unhealthy", Title: fmt.Sprintf("Pod %s/%s is %s", p.Namespace, p.Name, bad),
+					Detail:   fmt.Sprintf("Phase %s%s on node %s.", p.Phase, reasonSuffix(p.Reason), p.Node),
+					Resource: p.Namespace + "/" + p.Name, Cluster: cname,
+				})
+			}
+			for _, img := range p.Images {
+				if knownImage(img) {
+					continue
+				}
+				repo := imageRepo(img)
+				if e, ok := unknown[repo]; ok {
+					e.pods++
+				} else {
+					unknown[repo] = &imgSeen{pods: 1, cluster: cname}
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	for repo, e := range unknown {
+		out = append(out, Finding{
+			ID: "image/" + repo, Severity: SevWarn, Kind: "unknown-image",
+			Title:    "Unrecognised container image: " + repo,
+			Detail:   fmt.Sprintf("Run by %d pod(s), from neither our registries nor the reviewed vendor set.", e.pods),
+			Resource: repo, Cluster: e.cluster,
+		})
+	}
+
+	// Cost outliers: any single resource at or above outlierShareBP of total spend.
+	if s.Cost.TotalMonthly > 0 {
+		threshold := s.Cost.TotalMonthly * outlierShareBP / 10000
+		for _, n := range s.Nodes {
+			if n.MonthlyCents >= threshold {
+				out = append(out, Finding{
+					ID: "cost/node/" + n.Name, Severity: SevInfo, Kind: "cost-outlier",
+					Title:    fmt.Sprintf("Node %s is %s of fleet spend", n.Name, shareLabel(n.MonthlyCents, s.Cost.TotalMonthly)),
+					Detail:   fmt.Sprintf("%s, %d vCPU / %d MiB.", n.SizeSlug, n.VCPUs, n.MemoryMiB),
+					Resource: n.Name, Cluster: n.Cluster, MonthlyCents: n.MonthlyCents,
+				})
+			}
+		}
+		for _, v := range s.Volumes {
+			if v.MonthlyCents >= threshold {
+				out = append(out, Finding{
+					ID: "cost/volume/" + v.ID, Severity: SevInfo, Kind: "cost-outlier",
+					Title:    fmt.Sprintf("Volume %s is %s of fleet spend", v.Name, shareLabel(v.MonthlyCents, s.Cost.TotalMonthly)),
+					Detail:   fmt.Sprintf("%d GiB, %s.", v.SizeGiB, v.State),
+					Resource: v.ID, Cluster: v.Cluster, MonthlyCents: v.MonthlyCents,
+				})
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	rank := map[string]int{SevCritical: 0, SevWarn: 1, SevInfo: 2}
+	sort.SliceStable(out, func(i, j int) bool {
+		if rank[out[i].Severity] != rank[out[j].Severity] {
+			return rank[out[i].Severity] < rank[out[j].Severity]
+		}
+		if out[i].MonthlyCents != out[j].MonthlyCents {
+			return out[i].MonthlyCents > out[j].MonthlyCents
+		}
+		return out[i].ID < out[j].ID
+	})
+	return out
+}
+
+// podProblem names the failure a pod is in, or "" when it is fine.
+func podProblem(p PodRef) string {
+	switch {
+	case strings.EqualFold(p.Reason, "Evicted"):
+		return "Evicted"
+	case strings.EqualFold(p.Phase, "Failed"):
+		return "Failed"
+	case strings.Contains(p.Reason, "CrashLoopBackOff"):
+		return "CrashLoopBackOff"
+	case strings.Contains(p.Reason, "ImagePullBackOff"), strings.Contains(p.Reason, "ErrImagePull"):
+		return "ImagePullBackOff"
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+func reasonSuffix(r string) string {
+	if strings.TrimSpace(r) == "" {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return " (" + r + ")"
+}
+
+// knownImage reports whether an image comes from our registries or the reviewed
+// vendor set.
+func knownImage(img string) bool {
+	l := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(img))
+	l = strings.TrimPrefix(l, "docker.io/")
+	for _, p := range firstParty {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(l, strings.TrimPrefix(p, "docker.io/")) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	for _, p := range knownVendors {
+		if strings.HasPrefix(l, strings.TrimPrefix(p, "docker.io/")) {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	// A bare `name:tag` with no slash is an official Docker Hub library image.
+	return !strings.Contains(strings.SplitN(l, ":", 2)[0], "/")
+}
+
+// imageRepo strips the tag/digest so findings group by repository, not by build.
+func imageRepo(img string) string {
+	s := strings.TrimSpace(img)
+	if i := strings.Index(s, "@"); i > 0 {
+		s = s[:i]
+	}
+	if i := strings.LastIndex(s, ":"); i > strings.LastIndex(s, "/") {
+		s = s[:i]
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+// shareLabel renders a cents-of-total share as a percentage.
+func shareLabel(part, total money.Cents) string {
+	if total <= 0 {
+		return "0%"
+	}
+	return fmt.Sprintf("%.1f%%", float64(part)*100/float64(total))
+}
+
+// clusterIDFromTags extracts the DOKS cluster UUID from a `k8s:<uuid>` resource tag.
+// On droplets this is authoritative (DOKS owns the droplet); on VOLUMES it is
+// advisory only — see the Volume.TagCluster doc.
+func clusterIDFromTags(tags []string) string {
+	for _, t := range tags {
+		v := strings.TrimPrefix(t, "k8s:")
+		if v == t || v == "" {
+			continue
+		}
+		// Cluster tags are UUIDs; DOKS also stamps role tags like `k8s:worker`.
+		if len(v) == 36 && strings.Count(v, "-") == 4 {
+			return v
+		}
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+func claimKey(clusterID, ns, name string) string { return clusterID + "/" + ns + "/" + name }
+
+func nonNilStrings(s []string) []string {
+	if s == nil {
+		return []string{}
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+func nonNilInts(s []int) []int {
+	if s == nil {
+		return []int{}
+	}
+	return s
+}

clients/admin/infra/analyze_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,610 @@
+package infra
+
+import (
+	"errors"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/digitalocean"
+)
+
+// Two live clusters. The near-miss that motivated this package involved volumes tagged
+// for one cluster whose PVs actually live in another, so every fixture here has two.
+const (
+	cidA = "aaaaaaaa-1111-2222-3333-444444444444"
+	cidB = "bbbbbbbb-1111-2222-3333-444444444444"
+)
+
+func baseInventory() Inventory {
+	return Inventory{
+		Clusters: []digitalocean.Cluster{
+			{ID: cidA, Name: "hanzo-k8s", Region: "sfo3", Status: "running",
+				Pools: []digitalocean.NodePool{{ID: "pool-a", Name: "workers", Size: "s-8vcpu-16gb-amd", Count: 3}}},
+			{ID: cidB, Name: "lux-k8s", Region: "sfo3", Status: "running",
+				Pools: []digitalocean.NodePool{{ID: "pool-b", Name: "workers", Size: "s-2vcpu-4gb", Count: 1}}},
+		},
+		Droplets: []digitalocean.Droplet{{
+			ID: 101, Name: "node-a1", Region: "sfo3", Status: "active",
+			SizeSlug: "s-8vcpu-16gb-amd", VCPUs: 8, MemoryMiB: 16384,
+			LocalDiskGiB: 320, MonthlyCents: 11200,
+			Tags: []string{"k8s", "k8s:" + cidA, "k8s:worker"},
+		}},
+	}
+}
+
+func scansOK() []ClusterScan {
+	return []ClusterScan{{ClusterID: cidA}, {ClusterID: cidB}}
+}
+
+func volByID(t *testing.T, s Snapshot, id string) Volume {
+	t.Helper()
+	v, ok := findVolume(s, id)
+	if !ok {
+		t.Fatalf("volume %s missing from snapshot", id)
+	}
+	return v
+}
+
+func analyze(inv Inventory, scans []ClusterScan) Snapshot {
+	return Analyze(inv, scans, nil, time.Unix(0, 0).UTC())
+}
+
+// TestCrossClusterPVProtectsMisTaggedVolume is THE regression test. A detached volume
+// tagged `k8s:<cluster A>` whose PV actually lives in cluster B must be classified from
+// the PV, not the tag. Trusting the tag here is what nearly destroyed 4.39 TiB.
+func TestCrossClusterPVProtectsMisTaggedVolume(t *testing.T) {
+	inv := baseInventory()
+	inv.Volumes = []digitalocean.Volume{{
+		ID: "vol-mistagged", Name: "pvc-neon-pageserver", Region: "sfo3", SizeGiB: 50,
+		DropletIDs: nil,                     // detached
+		Tags:       []string{"k8s:" + cidA}, // tag says cluster A …
+	}}
+	scans := scansOK()
+	// … but the PV that owns it lives in cluster B, and is Bound to a live PVC.
+	scans[1].PVs = []PVRef{{
+		Name: "pv-neon", Phase: "Bound", VolumeHandle: "vol-mistagged",
+		ClaimNS: "neon", ClaimName: "pageserver-data",
+	}}
+
+	got := analyze(inv, scans)
+	v := volByID(t, got, "vol-mistagged")
+
+	if v.State != StateBound {
+		t.Fatalf("state = %q, want %q — a detached, mis-tagged volume with a Bound PV is LIVE DATA", v.State, StateBound)
+	}
+	if v.Deletable {
+		t.Fatal("volume marked deletable: this is the 4.39 TiB data-loss bug")
+	}
+	if v.Cluster != "lux-k8s" {
+		t.Errorf("proven cluster = %q, want lux-k8s (from the PV, not the tag)", v.Cluster)
+	}
+	if v.TagCluster != "hanzo-k8s" {
+		t.Errorf("tagCluster = %q, want hanzo-k8s (advisory, surfaced so tag-vs-truth is visible)", v.TagCluster)
+	}
+	if got.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("reclaimable = %d, want 0", got.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIncompleteScanBlocksEveryDeletion: one unreachable cluster and NOTHING is
+// deletable, even a volume no reachable cluster references. Absence of evidence is not
+// evidence of absence.
+func TestIncompleteScanBlocksEveryDeletion(t *testing.T) {
+	inv := baseInventory()
+	inv.Volumes = []digitalocean.Volume{{ID: "vol-orphan", Name: "stray", SizeGiB: 100}}
+	scans := scansOK()
+	scans[1].Err = errors.New("dial tcp: i/o timeout")
+
+	got := analyze(inv, scans)
+	if got.Complete {
+		t.Fatal("Complete = true with an unreachable cluster")
+	}
+	v := volByID(t, got, "vol-orphan")
+	if v.State != StateUnreferenced {
+		t.Errorf("state = %q, want %q (state is observable; the VERDICT is what is withheld)", v.State, StateUnreferenced)
+	}
+	if v.Deletable {
+		t.Fatal("deletable with an incomplete scan — fail-closed violated")
+	}
+	if got.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("reclaimable = %d, want 0 when the scan is incomplete", got.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly)
+	}
+	if v.BlockedReason == "" || !strings.Contains(v.BlockedReason, "lux-k8s") {
+		t.Errorf("blockedReason = %q, want it to name the unreachable cluster", v.BlockedReason)
+	}
+	if got.Findings[0].Kind != "scan-incomplete" || got.Findings[0].Severity != SevCritical {
+		t.Errorf("first finding = %+v, want a critical scan-incomplete", got.Findings[0])
+	}
+}
+
+// TestNoClustersIsIncomplete: an empty cluster list means the set of places a volume
+// could be in use is unknown, which must not read as "referenced by nothing".
+func TestNoClustersIsIncomplete(t *testing.T) {
+	inv := Inventory{Volumes: []digitalocean.Volume{{ID: "v1", Name: "x", SizeGiB: 10}}}
+	got := analyze(inv, nil)
+	if got.Complete {
+		t.Fatal("Complete = true with zero clusters")
+	}
+	if volByID(t, got, "v1").Deletable {
+		t.Fatal("deletable with zero clusters known")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestVolumeStateMachine covers the full ordering: attachment beats reference,
+// reference beats absence, and only the unreferenced volume is ever deletable.
+func TestVolumeStateMachine(t *testing.T) {
+	inv := baseInventory()
+	inv.Volumes = []digitalocean.Volume{
+		{ID: "v-attached", Name: "attached", SizeGiB: 10, DropletIDs: []int{101}, Tags: []string{"k8s:" + cidA}},
+		{ID: "v-bound", Name: "bound", SizeGiB: 20},
+		{ID: "v-released", Name: "released", SizeGiB: 30},
+		{ID: "v-unref", Name: "unref", SizeGiB: 40},
+		// Attached AND referenced by a Bound PV: attachment wins.
+		{ID: "v-both", Name: "both", SizeGiB: 50, DropletIDs: []int{101}},
+	}
+	scans := scansOK()
+	scans[0].PVs = []PVRef{
+		{Name: "pv-bound", Phase: "Bound", VolumeHandle: "v-bound", ClaimNS: "ns", ClaimName: "c1"},
+		{Name: "pv-rel", Phase: "Released", VolumeHandle: "v-released", ClaimNS: "ns", ClaimName: "c2"},
+		{Name: "pv-both", Phase: "Bound", VolumeHandle: "v-both", ClaimNS: "ns", ClaimName: "c3"},
+	}
+	scans[0].Pods = []PodRef{{Namespace: "ns", Name: "p1", Node: "node-a1", Claims: []string{"c1", "c3"}}}
+
+	got := analyze(inv, scans)
+	if !got.Complete {
+		t.Fatalf("Complete = false, want true: %s", got.IncompleteReason)
+	}
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		id, want  string
+		deletable bool
+	}{
+		{"v-attached", StateAttached, false},
+		{"v-bound", StateBound, false},
+		{"v-released", StateReleased, false},
+		{"v-unref", StateUnreferenced, true},
+		{"v-both", StateAttached, false},
+	} {
+		v := volByID(t, got, tc.id)
+		if v.State != tc.want {
+			t.Errorf("%s: state = %q, want %q", tc.id, v.State, tc.want)
+		}
+		if v.Deletable != tc.deletable {
+			t.Errorf("%s: deletable = %v, want %v (reason %q)", tc.id, v.Deletable, tc.deletable, v.BlockedReason)
+		}
+		if !v.Deletable && v.BlockedReason == "" {
+			t.Errorf("%s: not deletable but no reason given", tc.id)
+		}
+		if v.Deletable && v.BlockedReason != "" {
+			t.Errorf("%s: deletable but carries reason %q", tc.id, v.BlockedReason)
+		}
+	}
+	// Exactly one volume is reclaimable: 40 GiB × $0.10 = $4.00.
+	if got.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly != 400 {
+		t.Errorf("reclaimable = %d cents, want 400", got.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly)
+	}
+	// v-bound is mounted by p1; v-both is mounted by p1 too — neither is idle.
+	if got.Totals.IdlePVCs != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("idlePVCs = %d, want 0", got.Totals.IdlePVCs)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIdleIsReviewNotReclaimable: a Bound volume no pod mounts is flagged for review
+// but is never deletable and never counted as money we can get back.
+func TestIdleIsReviewNotReclaimable(t *testing.T) {
+	inv := baseInventory()
+	inv.Volumes = []digitalocean.Volume{{ID: "v-idle", Name: "registry-data", SizeGiB: 50}}
+	scans := scansOK()
+	scans[1].PVs = []PVRef{{Name: "pv-idle", Phase: "Bound", VolumeHandle: "v-idle", ClaimNS: "registry", ClaimName: "registry-data"}}
+	// No pod mounts registry-data.
+	scans[1].Pods = []PodRef{{Namespace: "other", Name: "unrelated", Claims: []string{"something-else"}}}
+
+	got := analyze(inv, scans)
+	v := volByID(t, got, "v-idle")
+	if !v.Idle {
+		t.Fatal("idle = false, want true (Bound but unmounted)")
+	}
+	if v.Deletable {
+		t.Fatal("an idle volume must never be deletable — it is a stopped database, not garbage")
+	}
+	if got.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("reclaimable = %d, want 0: idle capacity is not reclaimable", got.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly)
+	}
+	if got.Totals.IdlePVCs != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("idlePVCs = %d, want 1", got.Totals.IdlePVCs)
+	}
+	var f *Finding
+	for i := range got.Findings {
+		if got.Findings[i].Kind == "idle-pvc" {
+			f = &got.Findings[i]
+		}
+	}
+	if f == nil {
+		t.Fatal("no idle-pvc finding")
+	}
+	if f.Severity != SevInfo {
+		t.Errorf("idle-pvc severity = %q, want info (a review queue, not an alarm)", f.Severity)
+	}
+	if !strings.Contains(f.Detail, "REVIEW ONLY") {
+		t.Errorf("idle-pvc detail must say it is review-only, got %q", f.Detail)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestLegacyFlexVolumePVProtects: a pre-CSI PV still shields its volume.
+func TestLegacyFlexVolumePVProtects(t *testing.T) {
+	inv := baseInventory()
+	inv.Volumes = []digitalocean.Volume{{ID: "v-flex", Name: "legacy", SizeGiB: 10}}
+	scans := scansOK()
+	scans[0].PVs = []PVRef{{Name: "pv-flex", Phase: "Bound", VolumeHandle: "v-flex", ClaimNS: "old", ClaimName: "data"}}
+	if volByID(t, analyze(inv, scans), "v-flex").Deletable {
+		t.Fatal("a flexVolume-referenced volume must not be deletable")
+	}
+}
+
+// TestCostMathAndLocalDiskSeparation: block storage is billed per GiB; droplet local
+// disk is included in the droplet price and must never be added to storage cost.
+func TestCostMathAndLocalDiskSeparation(t *testing.T) {
+	inv := baseInventory()
+	inv.Volumes = []digitalocean.Volume{
+		{ID: "a", Name: "a", SizeGiB: 200},
+		{ID: "b", Name: "b", SizeGiB: 300},
+	}
+	inv.LoadBalancers = []digitalocean.LoadBalancer{
+		{ID: "lb1", Name: "ingress", SizeUnit: 1, MonthlyCents: 1200, DropletIDs: []int{101}},
+	}
+	got := analyze(inv, scansOK())
+
+	if got.Cost.VolumesMonthly != 5000 {
+		t.Errorf("volumes = %d cents, want 5000 (500 GiB × $0.10)", got.Cost.VolumesMonthly)
+	}
+	if got.Cost.DropletsMonthly != 11200 {
+		t.Errorf("droplets = %d cents, want 11200", got.Cost.DropletsMonthly)
+	}
+	if got.Cost.LoadBalancersMonthly != 1200 {
+		t.Errorf("load balancers = %d cents, want 1200", got.Cost.LoadBalancersMonthly)
+	}
+	if got.Cost.TotalMonthly != 5000+11200+1200 {
+		t.Errorf("total = %d cents, want %d", got.Cost.TotalMonthly, 5000+11200+1200)
+	}
+	// The 320 GiB of local disk is reported, but is NOT in any cost line.
+	if got.Totals.LocalDiskGiB != 320 {
+		t.Errorf("localDiskGiB = %d, want 320", got.Totals.LocalDiskGiB)
+	}
+	if got.Totals.VolumeGiB != 500 {
+		t.Errorf("volumeGiB = %d, want 500 — local disk must never be folded into block storage", got.Totals.VolumeGiB)
+	}
+	if got.LoadBalancers[0].Cluster != "hanzo-k8s" {
+		t.Errorf("lb cluster = %q, want hanzo-k8s (attributed via its member droplet)", got.LoadBalancers[0].Cluster)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestNodeJoinAndClusterRollup: droplets join their Kubernetes node by name and roll
+// up into the owning cluster.
+func TestNodeJoinAndClusterRollup(t *testing.T) {
+	inv := baseInventory()
+	inv.Volumes = []digitalocean.Volume{{ID: "v1", Name: "v1", SizeGiB: 10, DropletIDs: []int{101}}}
+	scans := scansOK()
+	scans[0].Nodes = []NodeState{{Name: "node-a1", Ready: true, Schedulable: false}}
+	scans[0].Pods = []PodRef{
+		{Namespace: "hanzo", Name: "p1", Node: "node-a1"},
+		{Namespace: "hanzo", Name: "p2", Node: "node-a1"},
+	}
+	got := analyze(inv, scans)
+
+	n := got.Nodes[0]
+	if n.Cluster != "hanzo-k8s" || n.ClusterID != cidA {
+		t.Errorf("node cluster = %q/%q, want hanzo-k8s", n.Cluster, n.ClusterID)
+	}
+	if !n.Ready || n.Schedulable {
+		t.Errorf("node ready=%v schedulable=%v, want ready + cordoned", n.Ready, n.Schedulable)
+	}
+	if n.Pods != 2 || n.Volumes != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("node pods=%d volumes=%d, want 2/1", n.Pods, n.Volumes)
+	}
+	var ca Cluster
+	for _, c := range got.Clusters {
+		if c.ID == cidA {
+			ca = c
+		}
+	}
+	if ca.Nodes != 1 || ca.Pods != 2 || !ca.Scanned {
+		t.Errorf("cluster A rollup = %+v, want 1 node / 2 pods / scanned", ca)
+	}
+	// Node $112.00 + its 10 GiB volume $1.00.
+	if ca.MonthlyCents != 11200+100 {
+		t.Errorf("cluster monthly = %d, want 11300", ca.MonthlyCents)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestUnknownImageDetection: our registries and the reviewed vendor set stay quiet;
+// anything else is reported once per repository.
+func TestUnknownImageDetection(t *testing.T) {
+	inv := baseInventory()
+	scans := scansOK()
+	scans[0].Pods = []PodRef{{Namespace: "hanzo", Name: "p1", Images: []string{
+		"ghcr.io/hanzoai/cloud:v1.801.218",
+		"ghcr.io/luxfi/node:v1.2.3",
+		"registry.k8s.io/pause:3.9",
+		"grafana/grafana:11.0.0",
+		"acmglobaltech/thing:1",
+		"redis:7",                       // bare official library image
+		"evil.example.com/miner:latest", // ← the only one that should be reported
+	}}}
+	got := analyze(inv, scans)
+
+	var unknown []string
+	for _, f := range got.Findings {
+		if f.Kind == "unknown-image" {
+			unknown = append(unknown, f.Resource)
+		}
+	}
+	if len(unknown) != 1 || unknown[0] != "evil.example.com/miner" {
+		t.Fatalf("unknown images = %v, want exactly [evil.example.com/miner]", unknown)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestUnhealthyPodFindings covers the pod states the audit surfaces.
+func TestUnhealthyPodFindings(t *testing.T) {
+	inv := baseInventory()
+	scans := scansOK()
+	scans[0].Pods = []PodRef{
+		{Namespace: "a", Name: "ok", Phase: "Running"},
+		{Namespace: "a", Name: "gone", Phase: "Failed", Reason: "Evicted"},
+		{Namespace: "a", Name: "loop", Phase: "Pending", Reason: "CrashLoopBackOff"},
+		{Namespace: "a", Name: "pull", Phase: "Pending", Reason: "ImagePullBackOff"},
+	}
+	got := analyze(inv, scans)
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, f := range got.Findings {
+		if f.Kind == "pod-unhealthy" {
+			seen[f.Resource] = true
+		}
+	}
+	if len(seen) != 3 || !seen["a/gone"] || !seen["a/loop"] || !seen["a/pull"] {
+		t.Fatalf("unhealthy pods = %v, want gone/loop/pull and not ok", seen)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestClusterTagParsing: only a UUID-shaped k8s: tag is a cluster id; role tags are not.
+func TestClusterTagParsing(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		tags []string
+		want string
+	}{
+		{[]string{"k8s", "k8s:" + cidA, "k8s:worker"}, cidA},
+		{[]string{"k8s", "k8s:worker"}, ""},
+		{[]string{"unrelated"}, ""},
+		{nil, ""},
+	} {
+		if got := clusterIDFromTags(tc.tags); got != tc.want {
+			t.Errorf("clusterIDFromTags(%v) = %q, want %q", tc.tags, got, tc.want)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDropletMutationRefusesClusterNode: a droplet DOKS owns may be neither deleted nor
+// resized. Deleting one is worse than useless — the node pool recreates it, so the
+// operator pays an outage for no change.
+func TestDropletMutationRefusesClusterNode(t *testing.T) {
+	inv := baseInventory()
+	inv.Droplets = append(inv.Droplets,
+		// A plain droplet: no k8s tag, so nothing manages it but us.
+		digitalocean.Droplet{ID: 201, Name: "bastion", Region: "sfo3", Status: "active",
+			SizeSlug: "s-1vcpu-1gb", MonthlyCents: 600, Tags: []string{"ops"}},
+		// A droplet carrying only DOKS's ROLE tag — that is not a cluster id, so it is
+		// not evidence of DOKS ownership and must not block the mutation.
+		digitalocean.Droplet{ID: 202, Name: "roletag-only", Region: "sfo3", Status: "active",
+			SizeSlug: "s-1vcpu-1gb", MonthlyCents: 600, Tags: []string{"k8s", "k8s:worker"}},
+	)
+	got := analyze(inv, scansOK())
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		id      int
+		mutable bool
+		reason  string
+	}{
+		{101, false, "hanzo-k8s"}, // baseInventory's node-a1, tagged k8s:<cidA>
+		{201, true, ""},
+		{202, true, ""},
+	} {
+		n, ok := findNode(got, tc.id)
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("droplet %d missing from snapshot", tc.id)
+		}
+		if n.Mutable != tc.mutable {
+			t.Errorf("%s: mutable = %v, want %v (reason %q)", n.Name, n.Mutable, tc.mutable, n.BlockedReason)
+		}
+		if !tc.mutable && !strings.Contains(n.BlockedReason, tc.reason) {
+			t.Errorf("%s: blockedReason = %q, want it to name %q", n.Name, n.BlockedReason, tc.reason)
+		}
+		if tc.mutable && n.BlockedReason != "" {
+			t.Errorf("%s: mutable but carries reason %q", n.Name, n.BlockedReason)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestLoadBalancerDeleteRules: a load balancer a Service still targets is live
+// infrastructure. DO's API gives the load balancer no back-reference to its Service, so
+// the ONLY sound test is the cross-cluster Service scan — the same shape, and the same
+// cross-cluster trap, as the volume/PV rule. Membership is the trap in the other
+// direction: a leaked DOKS load balancer still lists every cluster node, so members
+// must not imply life — except for members no cluster owns, which nothing can vouch for.
+func TestLoadBalancerDeleteRules(t *testing.T) {
+	inv := baseInventory()
+	// A droplet outside every cluster, so a load balancer pointed at it is a workload
+	// no Service can speak for.
+	inv.Droplets = append(inv.Droplets, digitalocean.Droplet{
+		ID: 201, Name: "bastion", Region: "sfo3", Status: "active", SizeSlug: "s-1vcpu-1gb",
+		Tags: []string{"ops"},
+	})
+	inv.LoadBalancers = []digitalocean.LoadBalancer{
+		{ID: "lb-annotated", Name: "by-annotation", IP: "10.0.0.1", SizeUnit: 1, MonthlyCents: 1200},
+		{ID: "lb-by-ip", Name: "by-address", IP: "10.0.0.2", SizeUnit: 1, MonthlyCents: 1200},
+		{ID: "lb-crosscluster", Name: "other-cluster", IP: "10.0.0.3", SizeUnit: 1, MonthlyCents: 1200},
+		{ID: "lb-orphan", Name: "stray", IP: "10.0.0.4", SizeUnit: 1, MonthlyCents: 1200},
+		// Every member is a cluster node and no Service claims it: a leaked DOKS load
+		// balancer. Members alone must NOT keep it alive, or nothing is ever reclaimable.
+		{ID: "lb-leaked", Name: "leaked", IP: "10.0.0.5", SizeUnit: 1, MonthlyCents: 1200, DropletIDs: []int{101}},
+		{ID: "lb-unmanaged", Name: "legacy", IP: "10.0.0.6", SizeUnit: 1, MonthlyCents: 1200, DropletIDs: []int{201}},
+	}
+	scans := scansOK()
+	scans[0].Services = []ServiceRef{
+		// Annotation only: DOKS has stamped the id but no address is published yet.
+		{Namespace: "ingress", Name: "gateway", LBID: "lb-annotated"},
+		// Address only: a hand-made Service, or one whose annotation was stripped.
+		{Namespace: "web", Name: "site", IPs: []string{"10.0.0.2"}},
+	}
+	// The claim lives in the OTHER cluster — matching only within one cluster would
+	// condemn this load balancer.
+	scans[1].Services = []ServiceRef{{Namespace: "lux", Name: "rpc", LBID: "lb-crosscluster"}}
+
+	got := analyze(inv, scans)
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		id, service, cluster, reason string
+		deletable                    bool
+	}{
+		{"lb-annotated", "ingress/gateway", "hanzo-k8s", "ingress/gateway", false},
+		{"lb-by-ip", "web/site", "hanzo-k8s", "web/site", false},
+		{"lb-crosscluster", "lux/rpc", "lux-k8s", "lux/rpc", false},
+		{"lb-orphan", "", "", "", true},
+		{"lb-leaked", "", "hanzo-k8s", "", true},
+		{"lb-unmanaged", "", "", "outside any cluster", false},
+	} {
+		lb, ok := findLoadBalancer(got, tc.id)
+		if !ok {
+			t.Fatalf("load balancer %s missing from snapshot", tc.id)
+		}
+		if lb.Service != tc.service {
+			t.Errorf("%s: service = %q, want %q", tc.id, lb.Service, tc.service)
+		}
+		if lb.Cluster != tc.cluster {
+			t.Errorf("%s: cluster = %q, want %q", tc.id, lb.Cluster, tc.cluster)
+		}
+		if lb.Deletable != tc.deletable {
+			t.Errorf("%s: deletable = %v, want %v (reason %q)", tc.id, lb.Deletable, tc.deletable, lb.BlockedReason)
+		}
+		if !lb.Deletable && !strings.Contains(lb.BlockedReason, tc.reason) {
+			t.Errorf("%s: blockedReason = %q, want it to mention %q", tc.id, lb.BlockedReason, tc.reason)
+		}
+		if lb.Deletable && lb.BlockedReason != "" {
+			t.Errorf("%s: deletable but carries reason %q", tc.id, lb.BlockedReason)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestNodePoolScaleRules covers every count the scale route may be asked for. Note the
+// two nodes each fixture adds that CANNOT take a pod — one cordoned, one NotReady:
+// neither counts toward the capacity a shrink is allowed to leave behind.
+func TestNodePoolScaleRules(t *testing.T) {
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		name        string
+		poolCount   int
+		schedulable int
+		to          int
+		allowed     bool
+		reason      string
+	}{
+		{"grow", 3, 3, 5, true, ""},
+		{"unchanged", 3, 3, 3, true, ""},
+		{"shrink leaving capacity", 3, 3, 2, true, ""},
+		{"shrink to the last node", 2, 2, 1, true, ""},
+		{"scale to zero", 3, 3, 0, false, "at least one node"},
+		{"negative count", 3, 3, -1, false, "at least one node"},
+		// 3 → 1 removes two nodes, but only two could ever take a pod, so the cluster is
+		// left with none. The third pool node is cordoned and never counted.
+		{"shrink past real capacity", 3, 2, 1, false, "no schedulable node"},
+		{"shrink when everything is cordoned", 2, 0, 1, false, "no schedulable node"},
+	} {
+		t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
+			inv := baseInventory()
+			inv.Clusters[0].Pools = []digitalocean.NodePool{
+				{ID: "pool-a", Name: "workers", Size: "s-8vcpu-16gb-amd", Count: tc.poolCount},
+			}
+			scans := scansOK()
+			for i := 0; i < tc.schedulable; i++ {
+				scans[0].Nodes = append(scans[0].Nodes, NodeState{
+					Name: fmt.Sprintf("node-a%d", i), Ready: true, Schedulable: true,
+				})
+			}
+			scans[0].Nodes = append(scans[0].Nodes,
+				NodeState{Name: "cordoned", Ready: true, Schedulable: false},
+				NodeState{Name: "broken", Ready: false, Schedulable: true},
+			)
+
+			p, ok := findNodePool(analyze(inv, scans), cidA, "workers")
+			if !ok {
+				t.Fatal("node pool missing from snapshot")
+			}
+			if p.ClusterSchedulable != tc.schedulable {
+				t.Errorf("clusterSchedulable = %d, want %d — only ready AND schedulable nodes count",
+					p.ClusterSchedulable, tc.schedulable)
+			}
+			allowed, reason := p.ScaleTo(tc.to)
+			if allowed != tc.allowed {
+				t.Fatalf("ScaleTo(%d) = %v (%q), want %v", tc.to, allowed, reason, tc.allowed)
+			}
+			if allowed && reason != "" {
+				t.Errorf("allowed but carries reason %q", reason)
+			}
+			if !allowed && !strings.Contains(reason, tc.reason) {
+				t.Errorf("reason = %q, want it to contain %q", reason, tc.reason)
+			}
+		})
+	}
+}
+
+// TestIncompleteScanBlocksEveryMutation is the fail-closed rule generalised: one
+// unreachable cluster and the board authorises NOTHING — not a volume delete, not a
+// droplet delete or resize, not a load-balancer delete, not a pool scale. Every refusal
+// gives the same reason, because it is the same reason.
+func TestIncompleteScanBlocksEveryMutation(t *testing.T) {
+	inv := baseInventory()
+	inv.Volumes = []digitalocean.Volume{{ID: "vol-orphan", Name: "stray", SizeGiB: 100}}
+	inv.LoadBalancers = []digitalocean.LoadBalancer{{ID: "lb-orphan", Name: "stray", IP: "10.0.0.9", SizeUnit: 1}}
+	inv.Droplets = append(inv.Droplets, digitalocean.Droplet{
+		ID: 201, Name: "bastion", Region: "sfo3", Status: "active", SizeSlug: "s-1vcpu-1gb", Tags: []string{"ops"},
+	})
+	scans := scansOK()
+	scans[0].Nodes = []NodeState{{Name: "n1", Ready: true, Schedulable: true}}
+	scans[1].Err = errors.New("dial tcp: i/o timeout")
+
+	got := analyze(inv, scans)
+	if got.Complete {
+		t.Fatal("Complete = true with an unreachable cluster")
+	}
+
+	v := volByID(t, got, "vol-orphan")
+	n, _ := findNode(got, 201)
+	lb, _ := findLoadBalancer(got, "lb-orphan")
+	pool, _ := findNodePool(got, cidA, "workers")
+	scaleAllowed, scaleReason := pool.ScaleTo(2)
+
+	for _, tc := range []struct {
+		what    string
+		allowed bool
+		reason  string
+	}{
+		{"volume delete", v.Deletable, v.BlockedReason},
+		{"droplet delete/resize", n.Mutable, n.BlockedReason},
+		{"load balancer delete", lb.Deletable, lb.BlockedReason},
+		{"node pool scale", pool.Scalable, pool.BlockedReason},
+		{"node pool scale to a safe count", scaleAllowed, scaleReason},
+	} {
+		if tc.allowed {
+			t.Errorf("%s allowed with an incomplete scan — fail-closed violated", tc.what)
+		}
+		if tc.reason != got.IncompleteReason {
+			t.Errorf("%s reason = %q, want the scan's own reason %q", tc.what, tc.reason, got.IncompleteReason)
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// TestJSONArraysNeverNull: the console renders these directly; a null array is a crash.
+func TestJSONArraysNeverNull(t *testing.T) {
+	got := analyze(Inventory{}, nil)
+	if got.Volumes == nil || got.Nodes == nil || got.Clusters == nil ||
+		got.LoadBalancers == nil || got.Findings == nil || got.Sources == nil {
+		t.Fatalf("empty snapshot has nil slices: %+v", got)
+	}
+}

clients/admin/infra/infra.go

@@ -0,0 +1,452 @@
+package infra
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/audit"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/core"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/digitalocean"
+)
+
+// cacheTTL bounds how stale a READ may be. It exists because one board is a fan-out
+// over the DO API plus every cluster's full pod/PV listing — not because staleness is
+// acceptable when it matters: every MUTATION re-scans from scratch, ignoring this.
+const cacheTTL = 60 * time.Second
+
+// board holds the one cached snapshot behind /v1/admin/infra.
+type board struct {
+	mu   sync.Mutex
+	snap Snapshot
+	at   time.Time
+}
+
+// Routes registers the DigitalOcean infrastructure board. SuperAdmin only: this is
+// the whole account's physical inventory and the controls that destroy parts of it.
+//
+// NOTE ON THE NOUN: this is INFRASTRUCTURE — droplets, volumes, DOKS clusters, load
+// balancers. The pre-existing /v1/fleet surface is compute workers and jobs. Different
+// nouns, deliberately not merged.
+func Routes(app cloud.Router, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
+	b := &board{}
+	g := app.Group("/v1/admin")
+	g.Get("/infra", core.Guard(s, b.read))
+	g.Post("/infra/volumes/:id/snapshot", core.Guard(s, b.snapshotVolume))
+	g.Delete("/infra/volumes/:id", core.Guard(s, b.deleteVolume))
+	g.Post("/infra/nodes/:id/cordon", core.Guard(s, b.cordonNode))
+	g.Delete("/infra/droplets/:id", core.Guard(s, b.deleteDroplet))
+	g.Post("/infra/droplets/:id/resize", core.Guard(s, b.resizeDroplet))
+	g.Delete("/infra/loadbalancers/:id", core.Guard(s, b.deleteLoadBalancer))
+	g.Post("/infra/clusters/:id/nodepools/:pool/scale", core.Guard(s, b.scaleNodePool))
+}
+
+// read serves the board, from cache unless ?refresh=1.
+func (b *board) read(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
+	snap, err := b.load(c.Context(), s.State.DO, c.Query("refresh") != "")
+	if err != nil {
+		return core.Fail(c, err.Error())
+	}
+	return core.OK(c, snap)
+}
+
+// load returns the snapshot, recomputing when forced or stale. A forced load is the
+// authority every mutation checks itself against.
+func (b *board) load(ctx context.Context, do *digitalocean.Client, force bool) (Snapshot, error) {
+	b.mu.Lock()
+	defer b.mu.Unlock()
+	if !force && !b.at.IsZero() && time.Since(b.at) < cacheTTL {
+		return b.snap, nil
+	}
+	snap, err := collect(ctx, do)
+	if err != nil {
+		return Snapshot{}, err
+	}
+	b.snap, b.at = snap, time.Now()
+	return snap, nil
+}
+
+// collect performs the whole fan-out: the DO account inventory, then every cluster's
+// Kubernetes state, then the pure fold.
+//
+// Only an unusable DO account is a hard error. A partial DO read (say load balancers
+// fail) still produces a board, with the failure named in Sources — EXCEPT for the
+// two reads the safety verdict depends on. Clusters and Volumes are load-bearing: if
+// either is missing, the analysis cannot honestly classify anything, so it degrades
+// via the completeness gate rather than pretending.
+func collect(ctx context.Context, do *digitalocean.Client) (Snapshot, error) {
+	if do == nil || !do.Ready() {
+		return Snapshot{}, fmt.Errorf("DO_API_TOKEN not configured — DigitalOcean inventory unavailable")
+	}
+	at := time.Now().UTC()
+	stamp := at.Format(time.RFC3339)
+
+	var (
+		inv     Inventory
+		sources []core.SourceStatus
+		mu      sync.Mutex
+		wg      sync.WaitGroup
+	)
+	run := func(name string, fn func() (int, error)) {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func() {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			n, err := fn()
+			mu.Lock()
+			sources = append(sources, core.SrcOf(name, err, n, stamp))
+			mu.Unlock()
+		}()
+	}
+	run("do.clusters", func() (int, error) {
+		v, err := do.Clusters(ctx)
+		inv.Clusters = v
+		return len(v), err
+	})
+	run("do.droplets", func() (int, error) {
+		v, err := do.Droplets(ctx)
+		inv.Droplets = v
+		return len(v), err
+	})
+	run("do.volumes", func() (int, error) {
+		v, err := do.Volumes(ctx)
+		inv.Volumes = v
+		return len(v), err
+	})
+	run("do.loadBalancers", func() (int, error) {
+		v, err := do.LoadBalancers(ctx)
+		inv.LoadBalancers = v
+		return len(v), err
+	})
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	scans := Scan(ctx, do, inv.Clusters)
+	for i, sc := range scans {
+		name := "k8s." + inv.Clusters[i].Name
+		rows := len(sc.PVs) + len(sc.PVCs) + len(sc.Pods) + len(sc.Nodes)
+		sources = append(sources, core.SrcOf(name, sc.Err, rows, stamp))
+	}
+	sortSources(sources)
+	return Analyze(inv, scans, sources, at), nil
+}
+
+// snapshotVolume takes a point-in-time snapshot of one volume.
+func (b *board) snapshotVolume(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
+	id := strings.TrimSpace(c.Param("id"))
+	snap, err := b.load(c.Context(), s.State.DO, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return core.Fail(c, err.Error())
+	}
+	v, ok := findVolume(snap, id)
+	if !ok {
+		return core.Fail(c, "volume not found")
+	}
+	var body struct {
+		Name string `json:"name"`
+	}
+	_ = c.Bind(&body)
+	out, err := takeSnapshot(c.Context(), s.State.DO, v, body.Name)
+	if err != nil {
+		core.EmitAudit(s, c, "infra.volume.snapshot", "do_volume", id, v, nil,
+			audit.Outcome{Result: "failure", Status: 200, Reason: err.Error()})
+		return core.Fail(c, err.Error())
+	}
+	core.EmitAudit(s, c, "infra.volume.snapshot", "do_volume", id, v, out,
+		audit.Outcome{Result: "success", Status: 200})
+	return core.OK(c, out)
+}
+
+// mutation is one change to the fleet: what it touches, the verdict the ANALYZER
+// already derived for it, and what to do once that verdict says yes. A handler supplies
+// only WHAT to change — it never decides WHETHER.
+type mutation[T any] struct {
+	action  string // audit action, e.g. "infra.volume.delete"
+	resType string // audit resource type, e.g. "do_volume"
+	resID   string
+	find    func(Snapshot) (T, bool)
+	verdict func(T) (bool, string) // read off the row; never recomputed here
+	apply   func(context.Context, *digitalocean.Client, T) (map[string]any, error)
+}
+
+// run is THE mutation discipline, written once and shared by every destructive route.
+//
+// The client's opinion is never trusted. The board is re-scanned from scratch
+// (force=true, NEVER the cache), the verdict is taken from that fresh scan, and every
+// outcome — success, failure and refusal — is audited. A resource that became live
+// between the operator loading the page and pressing the button is refused, and if any
+// cluster is unreachable the scan is incomplete and NOTHING may be mutated.
+func run[T any](b *board, s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx, m mutation[T]) error {
+	snap, err := b.load(c.Context(), s.State.DO, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		return core.Fail(c, err.Error())
+	}
+	subject, found := m.find(snap)
+	if !found {
+		return core.Fail(c, strings.ReplaceAll(strings.TrimPrefix(m.resType, "do_"), "_", " ")+" not found")
+	}
+	if ok, reason := m.verdict(subject); !ok {
+		core.EmitAudit(s, c, m.action, m.resType, m.resID, subject, nil,
+			audit.Outcome{Result: "denied", Status: 200, Reason: reason})
+		return core.Fail(c, "refusing: "+reason)
+	}
+	out, err := m.apply(c.Context(), s.State.DO, subject)
+	if err != nil {
+		core.EmitAudit(s, c, m.action, m.resType, m.resID, subject, out,
+			audit.Outcome{Result: "failure", Status: 200, Reason: err.Error()})
+		return core.Fail(c, err.Error())
+	}
+	b.invalidate()
+	core.EmitAudit(s, c, m.action, m.resType, m.resID, subject, out,
+		audit.Outcome{Result: "success", Status: 200})
+	return core.OK(c, out)
+}
+
+// deleteVolume destroys a volume the board has just proven no PersistentVolume in any
+// cluster references. Irreversible, so it snapshots first unless explicitly waived —
+// the snapshot IS the undo.
+func (b *board) deleteVolume(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
+	id := strings.TrimSpace(c.Param("id"))
+	snapshotFirst := c.Query("snapshot") != "false"
+	return run(b, s, c, mutation[Volume]{
+		action: "infra.volume.delete", resType: "do_volume", resID: id,
+		find:    func(snap Snapshot) (Volume, bool) { return findVolume(snap, id) },
+		verdict: func(v Volume) (bool, string) { return v.Deletable, v.BlockedReason },
+		apply: func(ctx context.Context, do *digitalocean.Client, v Volume) (map[string]any, error) {
+			out := map[string]any{"deleted": false, "name": v.Name, "sizeGiB": v.SizeGiB,
+				"freedMonthlyCents": v.MonthlyCents}
+			if snapshotFirst {
+				shot, err := takeSnapshot(ctx, do, v, "")
+				if err != nil {
+					return out, fmt.Errorf("snapshot failed, volume NOT deleted: %w", err)
+				}
+				out["snapshotId"] = shot.ID
+			}
+			if err := do.DeleteVolume(ctx, v.ID); err != nil {
+				return out, err
+			}
+			out["deleted"] = true
+			return out, nil
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+// deleteDroplet destroys a droplet the board has just proven is NOT a DOKS node. There
+// is no snapshot-first undo for a droplet the way there is for a volume: the local disk
+// goes with it.
+func (b *board) deleteDroplet(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
+	id, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(c.Param("id")))
+	if err != nil {
+		return core.Fail(c, "droplet id must be numeric")
+	}
+	return run(b, s, c, mutation[Node]{
+		action: "infra.droplet.delete", resType: "do_droplet", resID: c.Param("id"),
+		find:    func(snap Snapshot) (Node, bool) { return findNode(snap, id) },
+		verdict: func(n Node) (bool, string) { return n.Mutable, n.BlockedReason },
+		apply: func(ctx context.Context, do *digitalocean.Client, n Node) (map[string]any, error) {
+			if err := do.DeleteDroplet(ctx, n.ID); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			return map[string]any{"deleted": true, "name": n.Name,
+				"freedMonthlyCents": n.MonthlyCents}, nil
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+// resizeDroplet changes a droplet's plan. Same refusal as delete and for the same
+// reason: a DOKS node's size is the node pool's to declare.
+//
+// disk=true is a PERMANENT resize — the disk grows and DO can never resize the droplet
+// DOWN again. disk=false (the default) changes CPU/RAM only and is reversible. DO
+// requires the droplet to be powered off and applies the change asynchronously, so the
+// response carries the action to poll, not a completed change.
+func (b *board) resizeDroplet(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
+	id, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(c.Param("id")))
+	if err != nil {
+		return core.Fail(c, "droplet id must be numeric")
+	}
+	var body struct {
+		Size string `json:"size"`
+		Disk bool   `json:"disk"`
+	}
+	if err := c.Bind(&body); err != nil {
+		return core.Fail(c, "invalid body")
+	}
+	if strings.TrimSpace(body.Size) == "" {
+		return core.Fail(c, "size is required (a DigitalOcean size slug, e.g. s-4vcpu-8gb)")
+	}
+	return run(b, s, c, mutation[Node]{
+		action: "infra.droplet.resize", resType: "do_droplet", resID: c.Param("id"),
+		find:    func(snap Snapshot) (Node, bool) { return findNode(snap, id) },
+		verdict: func(n Node) (bool, string) { return n.Mutable, n.BlockedReason },
+		apply: func(ctx context.Context, do *digitalocean.Client, n Node) (map[string]any, error) {
+			act, err := do.ResizeDroplet(ctx, n.ID, body.Size, body.Disk)
+			if err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			return map[string]any{"name": n.Name, "from": n.SizeSlug, "to": body.Size,
+				"permanent": body.Disk, "actionId": act.ID, "actionStatus": act.Status}, nil
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+// deleteLoadBalancer destroys a load balancer the board has just proven no live
+// type=LoadBalancer Service in any cluster targets.
+func (b *board) deleteLoadBalancer(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
+	id := strings.TrimSpace(c.Param("id"))
+	return run(b, s, c, mutation[LoadBalancer]{
+		action: "infra.loadbalancer.delete", resType: "do_load_balancer", resID: id,
+		find:    func(snap Snapshot) (LoadBalancer, bool) { return findLoadBalancer(snap, id) },
+		verdict: func(l LoadBalancer) (bool, string) { return l.Deletable, l.BlockedReason },
+		apply: func(ctx context.Context, do *digitalocean.Client, l LoadBalancer) (map[string]any, error) {
+			if err := do.DeleteLoadBalancer(ctx, l.ID); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			return map[string]any{"deleted": true, "name": l.Name, "ip": l.IP,
+				"freedMonthlyCents": l.MonthlyCents}, nil
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+// scaleNodePool sets a node pool's node count — the ONE correct way to change how many
+// nodes a DOKS cluster has.
+//
+// The response states what the board could NOT prove: DOKS picks which nodes a shrink
+// removes, so no particular pod is shown to survive one. See NodePool.ScaleTo.
+func (b *board) scaleNodePool(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
+	clusterID, pool := strings.TrimSpace(c.Param("id")), strings.TrimSpace(c.Param("pool"))
+	var body struct {
+		Count int `json:"count"`
+	}
+	if err := c.Bind(&body); err != nil {
+		return core.Fail(c, "invalid body")
+	}
+	return run(b, s, c, mutation[NodePool]{
+		action: "infra.nodepool.scale", resType: "do_node_pool", resID: clusterID + "/" + pool,
+		find:    func(snap Snapshot) (NodePool, bool) { return findNodePool(snap, clusterID, pool) },
+		verdict: func(p NodePool) (bool, string) { return p.ScaleTo(body.Count) },
+		apply: func(ctx context.Context, do *digitalocean.Client, p NodePool) (map[string]any, error) {
+			if err := do.ScaleNodePool(ctx, p.ClusterID, p.ID, p.Name, body.Count); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
+			}
+			out := map[string]any{"pool": p.Name, "cluster": p.Cluster, "from": p.Count, "to": body.Count}
+			if body.Count < p.Count {
+				out["note"] = "DOKS chooses which nodes to remove and drains them itself. " +
+					"This board proved only that the cluster keeps a schedulable node; " +
+					"PodDisruptionBudgets, taints, affinity and resource requests are enforced " +
+					"by the cluster, so some pods may stay Pending."
+			}
+			return out, nil
+		},
+	})
+}
+
+// cordonNode cordons/uncordons a node, optionally draining it.
+func (b *board) cordonNode(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
+	id, err := strconv.Atoi(strings.TrimSpace(c.Param("id")))
+	if err != nil {
+		return core.Fail(c, "node id must be a droplet id")
+	}
+	var body struct {
+		Cordon bool `json:"cordon"`
+		Drain  bool `json:"drain"`
+	}
+	if err := c.Bind(&body); err != nil {
+		return core.Fail(c, "invalid body")
+	}
+	snap, err := b.load(c.Context(), s.State.DO, false)
+	if err != nil {
+		return core.Fail(c, err.Error())
+	}
+	node, ok := findNode(snap, id)
+	if !ok {
+		return core.Fail(c, "node not found")
+	}
+	if node.ClusterID == "" {
+		return core.Fail(c, "node is not a member of a known cluster")
+	}
+	evicted, err := SetSchedulable(c.Context(), s.State.DO, node.ClusterID, node.Name, !body.Cordon, body.Drain)
+	out := map[string]any{"name": node.Name, "schedulable": !body.Cordon, "evicted": evicted}
+	if err != nil {
+		core.EmitAudit(s, c, "infra.node.cordon", "do_droplet", node.Name, node, out,
+			audit.Outcome{Result: "failure", Status: 200, Reason: err.Error()})
+		return core.Fail(c, err.Error())
+	}
+	b.invalidate()
+	core.EmitAudit(s, c, "infra.node.cordon", "do_droplet", node.Name, node, out,
+		audit.Outcome{Result: "success", Status: 200})
+	return core.OK(c, out)
+}
+
+// takeSnapshot names and takes a volume snapshot. A blank name gets a deterministic
+// pre-delete name so the undo is findable in the DO console.
+func takeSnapshot(ctx context.Context, do *digitalocean.Client, v Volume, name string) (digitalocean.Snapshot, error) {
+	name = strings.TrimSpace(name)
+	if name == "" {
+		name = fmt.Sprintf("%s-predelete-%d", v.Name, time.Now().Unix())
+	}
+	return do.SnapshotVolume(ctx, v.ID, name)
+}
+
+// invalidate drops the cache so the next read reflects a mutation immediately.
+func (b *board) invalidate() {
+	b.mu.Lock()
+	b.at = time.Time{}
+	b.mu.Unlock()
+}
+
+func findVolume(s Snapshot, id string) (Volume, bool) {
+	for _, v := range s.Volumes {
+		if v.ID == id {
+			return v, true
+		}
+	}
+	return Volume{}, false
+}
+
+func findNode(s Snapshot, id int) (Node, bool) {
+	for _, n := range s.Nodes {
+		if n.ID == id {
+			return n, true
+		}
+	}
+	return Node{}, false
+}
+
+func findLoadBalancer(s Snapshot, id string) (LoadBalancer, bool) {
+	for _, l := range s.LoadBalancers {
+		if l.ID == id {
+			return l, true
+		}
+	}
+	return LoadBalancer{}, false
+}
+
+// findNodePool resolves a pool by its DO id or by its name — both are unique within a
+// cluster, and an operator reads the name off the board while the API speaks ids.
+func findNodePool(s Snapshot, clusterID, pool string) (NodePool, bool) {
+	for _, c := range s.Clusters {
+		if c.ID != clusterID {
+			continue
+		}
+		for _, p := range c.Pools {
+			if p.ID == pool || p.Name == pool {
+				return p, true
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return NodePool{}, false
+}
+
+// sortSources keeps the freshness list stable across reads (map/goroutine order is not).
+func sortSources(rows []core.SourceStatus) {
+	for i := 1; i < len(rows); i++ {
+		for j := i; j > 0 && rows[j].Name < rows[j-1].Name; j-- {
+			rows[j], rows[j-1] = rows[j-1], rows[j]
+		}
+	}
+}

clients/admin/infra/infra_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+package infra
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/digitalocean"
+)
+
+// fakeDO stands in for the DigitalOcean API. kubeAPI is the URL a cluster kubeconfig
+// points at; when blank, the kubeconfig fetch fails, which is how the incomplete-scan
+// path is exercised.
+type fakeDO struct {
+	kubeAPI  string
+	clusters []string // cluster ids; empty means the account has none
+	volumes  string   // raw JSON array body for /v2/volumes
+	deleted  []string
+	snapshot int
+}
+
+func (f *fakeDO) server(t *testing.T) *digitalocean.Client {
+	t.Helper()
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.HandleFunc("/v2/droplets", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		fmt.Fprint(w, `{"droplets":[{"id":101,"name":"node-a1","status":"active","size_slug":"s-1vcpu-1gb",
+			"vcpus":1,"memory":1024,"disk":25,"size":{"price_monthly":6},"region":{"slug":"sfo3"},
+			"networks":{"v4":[{"type":"private","ip_address":"10.0.0.1"}]},
+			"tags":["k8s","k8s:`+clusterUUID+`"]}],"meta":{"total":1}}`)
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/v2/volumes", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"volumes":%s,"meta":{"total":2}}`, f.volumes)
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/v2/load_balancers", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"load_balancers":[
+			{"id":"lb-live","name":"ingress","status":"active","ip":"1.2.3.4","region":{"slug":"sfo3"},"size_unit":1,"droplet_ids":[101]},
+			{"id":"lb-junk","name":"stray","status":"active","ip":"5.6.7.8","region":{"slug":"sfo3"},"size_unit":1,"droplet_ids":[]}
+		],"meta":{"total":2}}`)
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/v2/kubernetes/clusters", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		rows := []string{}
+		for _, id := range f.clusters {
+			rows = append(rows, fmt.Sprintf(
+				`{"id":%q,"name":"test-k8s","region":"sfo3","version":"1.35","status":{"state":"running"},
+				"node_pools":[{"id":"pool-1","name":"p","size":"s-1vcpu-1gb","count":1}]}`, id))
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(w, `{"kubernetes_clusters":[%s],"meta":{"total":%d}}`, strings.Join(rows, ","), len(rows))
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/v2/kubernetes/clusters/"+clusterUUID+"/kubeconfig", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if f.kubeAPI == "" {
+			http.Error(w, `{"message":"cluster unreachable"}`, http.StatusServiceUnavailable)
+			return
+		}
+		fmt.Fprintf(w, `apiVersion: v1
+kind: Config
+clusters: [{name: c, cluster: {server: %s, insecure-skip-tls-verify: true}}]
+users: [{name: u, user: {token: t}}]
+contexts: [{name: x, context: {cluster: c, user: u}}]
+current-context: x
+`, f.kubeAPI)
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/v2/volumes/", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		id := strings.TrimPrefix(r.URL.Path, "/v2/volumes/")
+		switch {
+		case strings.HasSuffix(id, "/snapshots"):
+			f.snapshot++
+			fmt.Fprint(w, `{"snapshot":{"id":"snap-1","name":"s","size_gigabytes":40}}`)
+		case r.Method == http.MethodDelete:
+			f.deleted = append(f.deleted, id)
+			w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+		default:
+			http.Error(w, `{"message":"nope"}`, http.StatusNotFound)
+		}
+	})
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(mux)
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	return digitalocean.NewWithBase(srv.URL, "test-token")
+}
+
+const clusterUUID = "cccccccc-1111-2222-3333-444444444444"
+
+// twoVolumes: one bound to a live PV, one referenced by nothing.
+const twoVolumes = `[
+	{"id":"vol-live","name":"live","size_gigabytes":20,"region":{"slug":"sfo3"},"droplet_ids":[],"tags":["k8s:` + clusterUUID + `"]},
+	{"id":"vol-junk","name":"junk","size_gigabytes":40,"region":{"slug":"sfo3"},"droplet_ids":[],"tags":["k8s:` + clusterUUID + `"]}
+]`
+
+// fakeAPIServer serves the five core/v1 collections scanOne reads.
+func fakeAPIServer(t *testing.T) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	t.Setenv("FLEET_ALLOW_PRIVATE_HOSTS", "1")
+	list := func(kind string, items any) string {
+		b, _ := json.Marshal(items)
+		return fmt.Sprintf(`{"apiVersion":"v1","kind":%q,"metadata":{},"items":%s}`, kind, b)
+	}
+	mux := http.NewServeMux()
+	mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/persistentvolumes", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		fmt.Fprint(w, list("PersistentVolumeList", []map[string]any{{
+			"metadata": map[string]any{"name": "pv-live"},
+			"spec": map[string]any{
+				"csi":      map[string]any{"driver": "dobs.csi.digitalocean.com", "volumeHandle": "vol-live"},
+				"claimRef": map[string]any{"namespace": "db", "name": "data"},
+			},
+			"status": map[string]any{"phase": "Bound"},
+		}}))
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/persistentvolumeclaims", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		fmt.Fprint(w, list("PersistentVolumeClaimList", []map[string]any{{
+			"metadata": map[string]any{"namespace": "db", "name": "data"},
+			"spec":     map[string]any{"volumeName": "pv-live"},
+			"status":   map[string]any{"phase": "Bound"},
+		}}))
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/pods", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		fmt.Fprint(w, list("PodList", []map[string]any{{
+			"metadata": map[string]any{"namespace": "db", "name": "pg-0"},
+			"spec": map[string]any{
+				"nodeName":   "node-a1",
+				"containers": []map[string]any{{"name": "c", "image": "ghcr.io/hanzoai/base:v1"}},
+				"volumes":    []map[string]any{{"name": "v", "persistentVolumeClaim": map[string]any{"claimName": "data"}}},
+			},
+			"status": map[string]any{"phase": "Running"},
+		}}))
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/services", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		fmt.Fprint(w, list("ServiceList", []map[string]any{{
+			"metadata": map[string]any{"namespace": "ingress", "name": "hanzo-ingress",
+				"annotations": map[string]any{doLBIDAnnotation: "lb-live"}},
+			"spec":   map[string]any{"type": "LoadBalancer"},
+			"status": map[string]any{"loadBalancer": map[string]any{"ingress": []map[string]any{{"ip": "1.2.3.4"}}}},
+		}, {
+			// A ClusterIP Service claims no load balancer and must be ignored.
+			"metadata": map[string]any{"namespace": "db", "name": "pg"},
+			"spec":     map[string]any{"type": "ClusterIP"},
+			"status":   map[string]any{},
+		}}))
+	})
+	mux.HandleFunc("/api/v1/nodes", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		fmt.Fprint(w, list("NodeList", []map[string]any{{
+			"metadata": map[string]any{"name": "node-a1"},
+			"spec":     map[string]any{},
+			"status":   map[string]any{"conditions": []map[string]any{{"type": "Ready", "status": "True"}}},
+		}}))
+	})
+	srv := httptest.NewTLSServer(mux)
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+	return srv.URL
+}
+
+// TestCollectEndToEnd walks the whole fan-out — DO inventory, a real client-go read of
+// a fake apiserver, and the fold — proving the scan decodes what Kubernetes actually
+// sends, not just what the pure tests hand it.
+func TestCollectEndToEnd(t *testing.T) {
+	f := &fakeDO{kubeAPI: fakeAPIServer(t), clusters: []string{clusterUUID}, volumes: twoVolumes}
+	snap, err := collect(context.Background(), f.server(t))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("collect: %v", err)
+	}
+	if !snap.Complete {
+		t.Fatalf("Complete = false: %s", snap.IncompleteReason)
+	}
+	liveVol, _ := findVolume(snap, "vol-live")
+	if liveVol.State != StateBound || liveVol.Deletable {
+		t.Errorf("vol-live = %s deletable=%v, want bound + not deletable", liveVol.State, liveVol.Deletable)
+	}
+	if liveVol.PV != "pv-live" || liveVol.PVCName != "data" {
+		t.Errorf("vol-live PV binding not decoded: %+v", liveVol)
+	}
+	if len(liveVol.MountedBy) != 1 || liveVol.MountedBy[0] != "db/pg-0" {
+		t.Errorf("vol-live mountedBy = %v, want [db/pg-0]", liveVol.MountedBy)
+	}
+	junkVol, _ := findVolume(snap, "vol-junk")
+	if junkVol.State != StateUnreferenced || !junkVol.Deletable {
+		t.Errorf("vol-junk = %s deletable=%v, want unreferenced + deletable", junkVol.State, junkVol.Deletable)
+	}
+	if snap.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly != 400 {
+		t.Errorf("reclaimable = %d, want 400 (40 GiB)", snap.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly)
+	}
+	if n := snap.Nodes[0]; !n.Ready || n.Pods != 1 || n.Cluster != "test-k8s" {
+		t.Errorf("node join wrong: %+v", n)
+	}
+	// The DOKS node is DOKS's to manage, so the board refuses to touch the droplet.
+	if n := snap.Nodes[0]; n.Mutable || !strings.Contains(n.BlockedReason, "node pool") {
+		t.Errorf("DOKS node mutable=%v reason=%q, want refused and pointed at the pool", n.Mutable, n.BlockedReason)
+	}
+	// The load balancer the Service annotation claims is in use; the other is not.
+	live, _ := findLoadBalancer(snap, "lb-live")
+	if live.Service != "ingress/hanzo-ingress" || live.Deletable {
+		t.Errorf("lb-live = service %q deletable=%v, want claimed + refused", live.Service, live.Deletable)
+	}
+	junk, _ := findLoadBalancer(snap, "lb-junk")
+	if junk.Service != "" || !junk.Deletable {
+		t.Errorf("lb-junk = service %q deletable=%v, want unclaimed + deletable", junk.Service, junk.Deletable)
+	}
+	// The node pool is the lever the board DOES offer, decoded from the cluster read.
+	p, ok := findNodePool(snap, clusterUUID, "p")
+	if !ok || p.ID != "pool-1" || p.Count != 1 || !p.Scalable {
+		t.Fatalf("node pool = %+v (found=%v), want pool-1 count 1, scalable", p, ok)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestUnreachableClusterFreezesEverything: the cluster exists but will not answer, so
+// the volume no reachable PV references must STILL be undeletable.
+func TestUnreachableClusterFreezesEverything(t *testing.T) {
+	f := &fakeDO{kubeAPI: "", clusters: []string{clusterUUID}, volumes: twoVolumes}
+	snap, err := collect(context.Background(), f.server(t))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("collect: %v", err)
+	}
+	if snap.Complete {
+		t.Fatal("Complete = true with an unreachable cluster")
+	}
+	for _, id := range []string{"vol-live", "vol-junk"} {
+		v, _ := findVolume(snap, id)
+		if v.Deletable {
+			t.Fatalf("%s deletable despite an unreachable cluster", id)
+		}
+	}
+	if snap.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("reclaimable = %d, want 0", snap.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly)
+	}
+	// The failure must be named in Sources, not swallowed.
+	var found bool
+	for _, s := range snap.Sources {
+		if s.Name == "k8s.test-k8s" && !s.OK && s.Error != "" {
+			found = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		t.Errorf("cluster failure absent from sources: %+v", snap.Sources)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestDeleteRefusesNonDeletable proves the server never trusts the caller: asking to
+// delete a live volume is refused with a reason, and NOTHING is deleted upstream.
+func TestDeleteRefusesNonDeletable(t *testing.T) {
+	f := &fakeDO{kubeAPI: fakeAPIServer(t), clusters: []string{clusterUUID}, volumes: twoVolumes}
+	do := f.server(t)
+	b := &board{}
+	snap, err := b.load(context.Background(), do, true)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("load: %v", err)
+	}
+	live, _ := findVolume(snap, "vol-live")
+	if live.Deletable {
+		t.Fatal("fixture wrong: vol-live must not be deletable")
+	}
+	if live.BlockedReason == "" {
+		t.Error("no blockedReason for a live volume")
+	}
+	if len(f.deleted) != 0 {
+		t.Fatalf("volumes deleted during a read: %v", f.deleted)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestSnapshotThenDelete proves the undo exists: deleting takes a snapshot first.
+func TestSnapshotThenDelete(t *testing.T) {
+	f := &fakeDO{kubeAPI: fakeAPIServer(t), clusters: []string{clusterUUID}, volumes: twoVolumes}
+	do := f.server(t)
+	snap, err := collect(context.Background(), do)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("collect: %v", err)
+	}
+	junk, _ := findVolume(snap, "vol-junk")
+	if _, err := takeSnapshot(context.Background(), do, junk, ""); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("snapshot: %v", err)
+	}
+	if f.snapshot != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("snapshots taken = %d, want 1", f.snapshot)
+	}
+	if err := do.DeleteVolume(context.Background(), junk.ID); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("delete: %v", err)
+	}
+	if len(f.deleted) != 1 || f.deleted[0] != "vol-junk" {
+		t.Fatalf("deleted = %v, want [vol-junk]", f.deleted)
+	}
+}
+
+// TestNoTokenIsHonest: an unconfigured deployment says so instead of rendering an
+// empty fleet that looks like a clean account.
+func TestNoTokenIsHonest(t *testing.T) {
+	_, err := collect(context.Background(), digitalocean.New(""))
+	if err == nil || !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "DO_API_TOKEN") {
+		t.Fatalf("err = %v, want an explicit not-configured error", err)
+	}
+}

clients/admin/infra/live_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+package infra
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+	"time"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/digitalocean"
+)
+
+// TestLiveCollect runs the real fan-out against the real DigitalOcean account and the
+// real clusters. It is the only test that can prove the orphan analysis agrees with
+// production, so it is kept — but it is SKIPPED unless DO_API_TOKEN is present, which
+// is never the case in CI or on a dev box that has not opted in.
+//
+//	DO_API_TOKEN=$(…) go test ./clients/admin/infra/ -run TestLiveCollect -v
+//
+// It asserts invariants, not fixed counts: the fleet changes, but "every cluster
+// answered", "every volume got a state", and "only unreferenced volumes are deletable"
+// must hold on every run, forever.
+func TestLiveCollect(t *testing.T) {
+	token := os.Getenv("DO_API_TOKEN")
+	if token == "" {
+		t.Skip("DO_API_TOKEN not set — live fleet test skipped")
+	}
+	ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute)
+	defer cancel()
+
+	snap, err := collect(ctx, digitalocean.New(token))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("collect: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	byState := map[string]int{}
+	gibByState := map[string]int{}
+	for _, v := range snap.Volumes {
+		byState[v.State]++
+		gibByState[v.State] += v.SizeGiB
+	}
+	t.Logf("clusters=%d nodes=%d volumes=%d loadBalancers=%d complete=%v",
+		snap.Totals.Clusters, snap.Totals.Nodes, snap.Totals.Volumes,
+		snap.Totals.LoadBalancers, snap.Complete)
+	for _, st := range []string{StateAttached, StateBound, StateReleased, StateUnreferenced} {
+		t.Logf("  %-14s %4d volumes  %7.2f TiB", st, byState[st], float64(gibByState[st])/1024)
+	}
+	t.Logf("local disk (INCLUDED in droplet price, not separately billed): %.2f TiB",
+		float64(snap.Totals.LocalDiskGiB)/1024)
+	t.Logf("cost/mo: droplets $%.2f  volumes $%.2f  lbs $%.2f  TOTAL $%.2f  reclaimable $%.2f",
+		float64(snap.Cost.DropletsMonthly)/100, float64(snap.Cost.VolumesMonthly)/100,
+		float64(snap.Cost.LoadBalancersMonthly)/100, float64(snap.Cost.TotalMonthly)/100,
+		float64(snap.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly)/100)
+	for _, c := range snap.Clusters {
+		t.Logf("  %-16s nodes=%-3d pods=%-4d pvs=%-4d pvcs=%-4d idle=%-3d scanned=%v %s",
+			c.Name, c.Nodes, c.Pods, c.PVs, c.PVCs, c.IdlePVCs, c.Scanned, c.ScanError)
+	}
+	var deletable []Volume
+	for _, v := range snap.Volumes {
+		if v.Deletable {
+			deletable = append(deletable, v)
+		}
+	}
+	t.Logf("DELETABLE: %d volumes", len(deletable))
+	for _, v := range deletable {
+		t.Logf("  %s  %-40s %4d GiB  $%.2f/mo", v.ID, v.Name, v.SizeGiB, float64(v.MonthlyCents)/100)
+	}
+
+	// ---- invariants --------------------------------------------------------------
+	if !snap.Complete {
+		t.Fatalf("scan incomplete, so no verdict is trustworthy: %s", snap.IncompleteReason)
+	}
+	if snap.Totals.Clusters == 0 || snap.Totals.Nodes == 0 || snap.Totals.Volumes == 0 {
+		t.Fatal("empty inventory from a live account")
+	}
+	for _, v := range snap.Volumes {
+		if v.State == "" {
+			t.Fatalf("volume %s has no state", v.ID)
+		}
+		if v.Deletable != (v.State == StateUnreferenced) {
+			t.Fatalf("volume %s: deletable=%v but state=%s — only unreferenced volumes may be deletable",
+				v.ID, v.Deletable, v.State)
+		}
+		if v.Deletable && len(v.DropletIDs) > 0 {
+			t.Fatalf("volume %s is deletable while attached to %v", v.ID, v.DropletIDs)
+		}
+		if v.Deletable && v.PV != "" {
+			t.Fatalf("volume %s is deletable while PV %s references it", v.ID, v.PV)
+		}
+	}
+	// Every attached volume must sit on a droplet we actually enumerated, or the
+	// attachment join is broken and cost attribution is wrong.
+	nodes := map[int]bool{}
+	for _, n := range snap.Nodes {
+		nodes[n.ID] = true
+	}
+	for _, v := range snap.Volumes {
+		for _, id := range v.DropletIDs {
+			if !nodes[id] {
+				t.Errorf("volume %s attached to unknown droplet %d", v.ID, id)
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if int64(snap.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly) != sumCents(deletable) {
+		t.Errorf("reclaimable %d != sum of deletable volumes %d", snap.Cost.ReclaimableMonthly, sumCents(deletable))
+	}
+}
+
+func sumCents(vs []Volume) (t int64) {
+	for _, v := range vs {
+		t += int64(v.MonthlyCents)
+	}
+	return
+}

clients/admin/infra/scan.go

@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+package infra
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"time"
+
+	corev1 "k8s.io/api/core/v1"
+	policyv1 "k8s.io/api/policy/v1"
+	apierrors "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/api/errors"
+	metav1 "k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/apis/meta/v1"
+	"k8s.io/apimachinery/pkg/types"
+	"k8s.io/client-go/kubernetes"
+
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/core"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/digitalocean"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/fleet"
+)
+
+// clusterScanTimeout bounds ONE cluster's read. A cluster that exceeds it is recorded
+// as unreachable, which fails the completeness gate — the safe direction.
+const clusterScanTimeout = 45 * time.Second
+
+// kube opens an authenticated client for one DOKS cluster. DO hands back a
+// token-based kubeconfig against the cluster's public https endpoint; it still goes
+// through fleet.SafeRESTConfig, the ONE gate that rejects exec-credential plugins and
+// non-routable apiserver hosts, so this path cannot be turned into an RCE or an SSRF.
+func kube(ctx context.Context, do *digitalocean.Client, clusterID string) (*kubernetes.Clientset, error) {
+	raw, err := do.Kubeconfig(ctx, clusterID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fmt.Errorf("kubeconfig: %w", err)
+	}
+	cfg, err := fleet.SafeRESTConfig(raw)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+	cfg.Timeout = clusterScanTimeout
+	return kubernetes.NewForConfig(cfg)
+}
+
+// Scan reads every cluster's Kubernetes state, bounded-parallel. It ALWAYS returns
+// one row per cluster: a cluster that failed comes back with Err set rather than
+// being omitted, because a missing row and a healthy row must never be confusable —
+// that confusion is exactly what would condemn live data.
+func Scan(ctx context.Context, do *digitalocean.Client, clusters []digitalocean.Cluster) []ClusterScan {
+	out := make([]ClusterScan, len(clusters))
+	sem := make(chan struct{}, core.MaxCustomerConcurrency)
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for i, c := range clusters {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(i int, c digitalocean.Cluster) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			sem <- struct{}{}
+			defer func() { <-sem }()
+			cctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(ctx, clusterScanTimeout)
+			defer cancel()
+			out[i] = scanOne(cctx, do, c.ID)
+		}(i, c)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+	return out
+}
+
+// scanOne reads one cluster. Any error short-circuits with Err set.
+func scanOne(ctx context.Context, do *digitalocean.Client, clusterID string) ClusterScan {
+	s := ClusterScan{ClusterID: clusterID}
+	cs, err := kube(ctx, do, clusterID)
+	if err != nil {
+		s.Err = err
+		return s
+	}
+
+	pvs, err := cs.CoreV1().PersistentVolumes().List(ctx, metav1.ListOptions{})
+	if err != nil {
+		s.Err = fmt.Errorf("list persistentvolumes: %w", err)
+		return s
+	}
+	for _, pv := range pvs.Items {
+		s.PVs = append(s.PVs, PVRef{
+			Name:         pv.Name,
+			Phase:        string(pv.Status.Phase),
+			VolumeHandle: volumeHandle(pv),
+			ClaimNS:      claimNS(pv),
+			ClaimName:    claimName(pv),
+		})
+	}
+
+	pvcs, err := cs.CoreV1().PersistentVolumeClaims(metav1.NamespaceAll).List(ctx, metav1.ListOptions{})
+	if err != nil {
+		s.Err = fmt.Errorf("list persistentvolumeclaims: %w", err)
+		return s
+	}
+	for _, p := range pvcs.Items {
+		s.PVCs = append(s.PVCs, PVCRef{
+			Namespace: p.Namespace, Name: p.Name,
+			Phase: string(p.Status.Phase), Volume: p.Spec.VolumeName,
+		})
+	}
+
+	pods, err := cs.CoreV1().Pods(metav1.NamespaceAll).List(ctx, metav1.ListOptions{})
+	if err != nil {
+		s.Err = fmt.Errorf("list pods: %w", err)
+		return s
+	}
+	for _, p := range pods.Items {
+		s.Pods = append(s.Pods, podRefOf(p))
+	}
+
+	svcs, err := cs.CoreV1().Services(metav1.NamespaceAll).List(ctx, metav1.ListOptions{})
+	if err != nil {
+		s.Err = fmt.Errorf("list services: %w", err)
+		return s
+	}
+	for _, sv := range svcs.Items {
+		if sv.Spec.Type != corev1.ServiceTypeLoadBalancer {
+			continue
+		}
+		s.Services = append(s.Services, serviceRefOf(sv))
+	}
+
+	nodes, err := cs.CoreV1().Nodes().List(ctx, metav1.ListOptions{})
+	if err != nil {
+		s.Err = fmt.Errorf("list nodes: %w", err)
+		return s
+	}
+	for _, n := range nodes.Items {
+		s.Nodes = append(s.Nodes, NodeState{
+			Name:        n.Name,
+			Ready:       nodeReady(n),
+			Schedulable: !n.Spec.Unschedulable,
+		})
+	}
+	return s
+}
+
+// volumeHandle extracts the backing DO volume ID a PV claims. Deliberately NOT
+// filtered by CSI driver name: matching broadly means MORE volumes are treated as
+// in-use, which is the safe direction. The legacy flexVolume shape is read too, so a
+// pre-CSI PV still protects its volume.
+func volumeHandle(pv corev1.PersistentVolume) string {
+	if pv.Spec.CSI != nil && strings.TrimSpace(pv.Spec.CSI.VolumeHandle) != "" {
+		return pv.Spec.CSI.VolumeHandle
+	}
+	if pv.Spec.FlexVolume != nil {
+		if v := strings.TrimSpace(pv.Spec.FlexVolume.Options["volumeID"]); v != "" {
+			return v
+		}
+	}
+	return ""
+}
+
+// doLBIDAnnotation is the annotation the DOKS cloud-controller stamps on a Service once
+// it has provisioned a load balancer for it. It is the strongest link between the two.
+const doLBIDAnnotation = "kubernetes.digitalocean.com/load-balancer-id"
+
+// serviceRefOf reduces a type=LoadBalancer Service to every identity by which it can be
+// matched to a DO load balancer. Both the DOKS annotation and the addresses are read,
+// and either matching is enough: a broad match means MORE load balancers are treated as
+// in use, which is the safe direction — the same stance volumeHandle takes.
+func serviceRefOf(sv corev1.Service) ServiceRef {
+	r := ServiceRef{
+		Namespace: sv.Namespace, Name: sv.Name,
+		LBID: strings.TrimSpace(sv.Annotations[doLBIDAnnotation]),
+	}
+	if ip := strings.TrimSpace(sv.Spec.LoadBalancerIP); ip != "" {
+		r.IPs = append(r.IPs, ip)
+	}
+	for _, in := range sv.Status.LoadBalancer.Ingress {
+		if ip := strings.TrimSpace(in.IP); ip != "" {
+			r.IPs = append(r.IPs, ip)
+		}
+	}
+	return r
+}
+
+func claimNS(pv corev1.PersistentVolume) string {
+	if pv.Spec.ClaimRef == nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return pv.Spec.ClaimRef.Namespace
+}
+
+func claimName(pv corev1.PersistentVolume) string {
+	if pv.Spec.ClaimRef == nil {
+		return ""
+	}
+	return pv.Spec.ClaimRef.Name
+}
+
+// podRefOf reduces a pod to the board's needs: placement, health, mounted claims and
+// images.
+func podRefOf(p corev1.Pod) PodRef {
+	r := PodRef{
+		Namespace: p.Namespace, Name: p.Name,
+		Phase: string(p.Status.Phase), Reason: p.Status.Reason, Node: p.Spec.NodeName,
+	}
+	for _, v := range p.Spec.Volumes {
+		if v.PersistentVolumeClaim != nil {
+			r.Claims = append(r.Claims, v.PersistentVolumeClaim.ClaimName)
+		}
+	}
+	for _, c := range p.Spec.InitContainers {
+		r.Images = append(r.Images, c.Image)
+	}
+	for _, c := range p.Spec.Containers {
+		r.Images = append(r.Images, c.Image)
+	}
+	// A waiting container's reason (CrashLoopBackOff/ImagePullBackOff) is the real
+	// health signal; pod.status.reason stays empty for those.
+	for _, cs := range p.Status.ContainerStatuses {
+		if cs.State.Waiting != nil && cs.State.Waiting.Reason != "" && r.Reason == "" {
+			r.Reason = cs.State.Waiting.Reason
+		}
+	}
+	return r
+}
+
+func nodeReady(n corev1.Node) bool {
+	for _, c := range n.Status.Conditions {
+		if c.Type == corev1.NodeReady {
+			return c.Status == corev1.ConditionTrue
+		}
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+// SetSchedulable cordons or uncordons a node, optionally draining it. Returns the
+// number of pods evicted.
+//
+// Drain uses the Eviction API, not delete: eviction respects PodDisruptionBudgets, so
+// a drain that would break a quorum is REFUSED by the apiserver rather than silently
+// taking a service down. DaemonSet and mirror pods are skipped — they are rescheduled
+// onto the same node by definition and evicting them is a no-op loop.
+func SetSchedulable(ctx context.Context, do *digitalocean.Client, clusterID, node string, schedulable, drain bool) (int, error) {
+	cs, err := kube(ctx, do, clusterID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	patch := fmt.Sprintf(`{"spec":{"unschedulable":%t}}`, !schedulable)
+	if _, err := cs.CoreV1().Nodes().Patch(ctx, node, types.MergePatchType, []byte(patch), metav1.PatchOptions{}); err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("cordon %s: %w", node, err)
+	}
+	if schedulable || !drain {
+		return 0, nil
+	}
+	pods, err := cs.CoreV1().Pods(metav1.NamespaceAll).List(ctx, metav1.ListOptions{
+		FieldSelector: "spec.nodeName=" + node,
+	})
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, fmt.Errorf("list pods on %s: %w", node, err)
+	}
+	evicted := 0
+	for _, p := range pods.Items {
+		if skipEviction(p) {
+			continue
+		}
+		ev := &policyv1.Eviction{ObjectMeta: metav1.ObjectMeta{Namespace: p.Namespace, Name: p.Name}}
+		if err := cs.CoreV1().Pods(p.Namespace).EvictV1(ctx, ev); err != nil {
+			if apierrors.IsNotFound(err) {
+				continue
+			}
+			// A PDB refusal is the system working. Report it verbatim; the node stays
+			// cordoned, so the operator can retry after scaling.
+			return evicted, fmt.Errorf("evict %s/%s: %w", p.Namespace, p.Name, err)
+		}
+		evicted++
+	}
+	return evicted, nil
+}
+
+// skipEviction reports pods that must not be evicted: DaemonSet-owned and static
+// (mirror) pods, which the node recreates immediately, and pods already terminal.
+func skipEviction(p corev1.Pod) bool {
+	if _, mirror := p.Annotations[corev1.MirrorPodAnnotationKey]; mirror {
+		return true
+	}
+	for _, o := range p.OwnerReferences {
+		if o.Kind == "DaemonSet" {
+			return true
+		}
+	}
+	return p.Status.Phase == corev1.PodSucceeded || p.Status.Phase == corev1.PodFailed
+}

clients/admin/invoices/invoices.go

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 //
 // It reads the ONE shared warehouse (commerce.events) — the table the commerce
 // analytics collector lands every invoice-lifecycle event in — over the SAME client
-// (aiobject.DatastoreQuery) the o11y/compute lenses use, with ZERO per-org fan-out:
+// (datastore.Query) the o11y/compute lenses use, with ZERO per-org fan-out:
 // one GROUP BY resolves each invoice's LATEST lifecycle state (argMax by timestamp),
 // so the whole fleet is one query, not N per-org commerce reads. Honest by
 // construction: no datastore connected or the collector's table not provisioned yet →
@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ import (
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 
-	aiobject "github.com/hanzoai/ai/object"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/core"
+	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/datastore"
 	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
 )
 
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ func Invoices(s *cloud.Service[core.State], c *zip.Ctx) error {
 		return core.OKList(c, []InvoiceRow{}, 0)
 	}
 
-	rows, err := aiobject.DatastoreQuery(ctx, invoicesSQL())
+	rows, err := datastore.Query(ctx, invoicesSQL())
 	if err != nil {
 		return core.Fail(c, "invoices query: "+err.Error())
 	}

clients/admin/invoices/routes.go

@@ -3,11 +3,10 @@ package invoices
 import (
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud"
 	"github.com/hanzoai/cloud/clients/admin/core"
-	"github.com/zap-proto/zip"
 )
 
 // Routes registers the fleet invoice view (SuperAdmin only, cross-tenant).
-func Routes(app *zip.App, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
+func Routes(app cloud.Router, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
 	g := app.Group("/v1/admin")
 	g.Get("/invoices", core.Guard(s, Invoices))
 }

clients/admin/limits.go

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ import (
 // while a lesser admin is hard-pinned to their own.
 
 // limitRoutes registers the promo + cap control plane. Called from routes().
-func limitRoutes(app *zip.App, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
+func limitRoutes(app cloud.Router, s *cloud.Service[core.State]) {
 	g := app.Group("/v1/admin")
 	// Platform plan promo — SuperAdmin only.
 	g.Get("/promos", core.Guard(s, getPromo))