docs: the focus law, and the two-rule collision that hid under it

The bullet claimed --ring was var(--neutral-500) at 4.43:1; it has been
var(--white-40) at 3.77:1 for the whole 0.4.x line. It also described base.css
as shipping ONE :focus-visible rule, which only became true at @hanzo/design
0.4.9 — before that a second, field-specific rule tied it at (0,1,0) and lost
to source order, so focused inputs here drew two indicators.

Records the part the next reader cannot derive: why a local focus override is
still the wrong fix, and why the treatment that rule was applying could not have
worked on this surface at all (its indicator rode on border-color, and
.hanzo-id-input states border unlayered).

Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <dev@hanzo.ai>

.github/hero.svg

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="1280" height="640" viewBox="0 0 1280 640" role="img" aria-label="id">
+<rect width="1280" height="640" fill="#0A0A0A"/>
+<svg x="96" y="215" width="210" height="210" viewBox="0 0 67 67"><path d="M22.21 67V44.6369H0V67H22.21Z" fill="#fff"/><path d="M66.7038 22.3184H22.2534L0.0878906 44.6367H44.4634L66.7038 22.3184Z" fill="#fff"/><path d="M22.21 0H0V22.3184H22.21V0Z" fill="#fff"/><path d="M66.7198 0H44.5098V22.3184H66.7198V0Z" fill="#fff"/><path d="M66.7198 67V44.6369H44.5098V67H66.7198Z" fill="#fff"/></svg>
+<text x="378" y="276" font-family="Inter,system-ui,-apple-system,sans-serif" font-size="78" font-weight="800" letter-spacing="-2" fill="#ffffff">id</text>
+<text x="378" y="322" font-family="Inter,system-ui,sans-serif" font-size="30" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".66">Hosted login pages for Hanzo IAM - configurable per organization</text>
+<rect x="378" y="338" width="806" height="3" rx="1.5" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".9"/>
+<text x="378" y="390" font-family="Inter,system-ui,sans-serif" font-size="24" font-weight="600" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".5">github.com/hanzoai</text>
+<text x="1184" y="390" text-anchor="end" font-family="Inter,system-ui,sans-serif" font-size="24" font-weight="600" fill="#ffffff" opacity=".5">hanzo.ai</text>
+</svg>

.github/workflows/docker.yml

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-name: Docker
-on:
-  workflow_dispatch:
-  push:
-    branches: [main, dev, test]
-    tags: ['v*']
-permissions:
-  contents: read
-  packages: write
-jobs:
-  docker:
-    uses: hanzoai/.github/.github/workflows/docker-build.yml@main
-    with:
-      image: ghcr.io/hanzoai/id
-      pre-build-command: |
-        corepack enable
-        pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
-        pnpm build
-    secrets: inherit

.github/workflows/workflow-sanity.yml

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-name: Workflow Sanity
-on:
-  pull_request:
-    paths: ['.github/workflows/**']
-jobs:
-  sanity:
-    uses: hanzoai/.github/.github/workflows/workflow-sanity.yml@main

.hanzo/workflows/cicd.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+name: CI/CD
+
+# The caller, and deliberately nothing else: triggers plus the import. All real
+# config is the repo-root hanzo.yml, which platform.hanzo.ai reads too.
+#
+# `.hanzo/workflows`, NOT `.github/workflows`, and the difference is whether
+# anything runs at all:
+#
+#   * github.com has ZERO self-hosted runners for this org
+#     (/orgs/hanzoai/actions/runners -> total_count 0), so a job asking for
+#     `hanzo-build-linux-amd64` there is never claimed. An unclaimable job does
+#     not fail — it waits out the 24h timeout while the next push queues behind
+#     it. Silence, not an error.
+#   * The `git-runner` StatefulSet registers against the FORGE only
+#     (GIT_INSTANCE_URL=http://hanzo-git.hanzo.svc), and that is the pool which
+#     actually advertises that label.
+#   * Gitea collects workflows from the FIRST of WORKFLOW_DIRS present in the
+#     commit (modules/actions/workflows.go, listWorkflowsInDirs breaks on the
+#     first hit). `.hanzo/workflows` already existed here, so on this forge the
+#     whole of `.github/workflows` was already dark — including the Docker lane
+#     that used to live there.
+#
+# The `uses:` path points at .hanzo/workflows for the same reason: reusables
+# resolve through services/actions.ResolveUses, which enforces the WORKFLOW_DIRS
+# allowlist on the referenced path too. hanzoai/ci publishes build.yml at both
+# paths from the same tag, byte-identical apart from the path each names for
+# itself, so this is the same pipeline at the same @v1.
+#
+# NO `paths-ignore`. deploy.yml carried one so that a docs commit would not trip
+# its "this version already exists" refusal — a guard this lane does not need,
+# because it derives the next patch instead of going red. Dropping the filter
+# means the GATES run on every commit to main, including the commits that only
+# touch a workflow. A change to CI that breaks CI should be caught by CI.
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [main]
+    # A `v*` tag is a RELEASE and publishes an image named after it, verbatim.
+    tags: ['v*']
+  pull_request:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+
+concurrency:
+  group: cicd-${{ github.ref }}
+  cancel-in-progress: true
+
+jobs:
+  cicd:
+    uses: hanzoai/ci/.hanzo/workflows/build.yml@v1
+    secrets: inherit

.hanzo/workflows/sync-from-github.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+name: Sync from GitHub
+# git.hanzo.ai is CANONICAL and builds natively; development also lands on
+# github.com/hanzoai/id. Together with the push-mirror going the other way
+# (native -> GitHub, sync_on_commit) this is the full bidirectional loop.
+#
+# The two compose rather than fight: a native commit reaches GitHub via the
+# push-mirror, so this job then sees LOCAL == REMOTE and exits "in sync". A
+# GitHub commit fast-forwards native here, and the resulting push-mirror is a
+# no-op because GitHub already has it. No echo, no loop.
+#
+# ONE deterministic direction per job: an in-cluster PULL. The runner reaches
+# both ends (GitHub outbound, this forge via the instance URL actions/checkout
+# already uses), so the sync has no ingress dependency.
+#
+# Fast-forward ONLY. A divergence fails LOUDLY here rather than force-pushing
+# either side and destroying whichever history lost the race.
+on:
+  schedule:
+    - cron: '*/10 * * * *'
+  workflow_dispatch: {}
+concurrency:
+  group: sync-from-github
+  cancel-in-progress: false
+jobs:
+  ff-main:
+    runs-on: [hanzo-build-linux-amd64]
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout main (full history for the ancestry check)
+        uses: actions/checkout@v4
+        with:
+          fetch-depth: 0
+          persist-credentials: true
+      - name: Fast-forward main from github.com/hanzoai/id
+        env:
+          GH_PAT: ${{ secrets.GH_PAT }}
+        run: |
+          set -euo pipefail
+          git fetch --quiet "https://x-access-token:${GH_PAT}@github.com/hanzoai/id.git" main
+          LOCAL="$(git rev-parse HEAD)"
+          REMOTE="$(git rev-parse FETCH_HEAD)"
+          if [ "$LOCAL" = "$REMOTE" ]; then
+            echo "in sync at $LOCAL"
+            exit 0
+          fi
+          if git merge-base --is-ancestor "$LOCAL" "$REMOTE"; then
+            echo "fast-forwarding $LOCAL -> $REMOTE"
+            git push origin "$REMOTE:refs/heads/main"
+            # A push made with the workflow token does NOT trigger other workflows
+            # (loop prevention), so synced commits would never build. Dispatch it
+            # explicitly — a real fast-forward means real commits arrived.
+            #
+            # This names the workflow BY FILENAME, so it is a hard reference to a
+            # file in this repo and moves when that file does. It pointed at
+            # deploy.yml, which no longer exists; the `|| echo` below makes that a
+            # non-fatal 404, so the symptom would not have been a red sync — it
+            # would have been commits arriving on the forge and NOTHING building,
+            # silently, which is the exact failure this repo already survived once.
+            curl -fsS --max-time 20 -X POST \
+              -H "Authorization: token ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}" \
+              -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
+              "${{ github.server_url }}/v1/repos/${{ github.repository }}/actions/workflows/cicd.yml/dispatches" \
+              -d '{"ref":"main"}' || echo "build dispatch failed (non-fatal)"
+          else
+            echo "DIVERGED: native $LOCAL is not an ancestor of GitHub $REMOTE." >&2
+            echo "Resolve by hand; this job will not force-push either side." >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi

Dockerfile

@@ -5,16 +5,81 @@ WORKDIR /build
 ENV PNPM_HOME=/pnpm PATH=$PNPM_HOME:$PATH
 RUN corepack enable && corepack prepare pnpm@10.15.0 --activate
 
-COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json ./
+# THE LOCKFILE SHIPS, and the install is frozen to it.
+#
+# This used to omit pnpm-lock.yaml and run `--frozen-lockfile=false`, so the
+# image resolved the whole tree FRESH on every build while `pnpm test` on the
+# runner resolved it from the lockfile. Two different dependency graphs from one
+# commit: the tested one, and the shipped one. It went green for as long as free
+# resolution happened to agree, and stopped the moment it did not — adding one
+# dependency (@hanzo/event) moved vite from the lockfile's
+# 7.3.5_@types+node@25.9.3_… to 7.3.6_@types+node@22.20.1 and the build died on
+# `Cannot find module '/build/apps/web/node_modules/vite/bin/vite.js'`. Nothing
+# was wrong with the source: the same commit builds cleanly when installed from
+# the lockfile.
+#
+# A resolver free to drift ships a bundle no one has run. Frozen, the image gets
+# the exact tree the tests passed against, and a lockfile that has gone stale
+# fails HERE — loudly, naming the mismatch — instead of silently building
+# something else.
+#
+# EVERY workspace member's package.json must be present before a frozen install:
+# pnpm validates the lockfile against all of them and refuses if one is missing.
+# apps/account is not built into this image, but it IS in the workspace, so its
+# manifest is required for the check to pass.
+COPY pnpm-workspace.yaml pnpm-lock.yaml package.json tsconfig.base.json ./
 COPY apps/web/package.json apps/web/
+COPY apps/account/package.json apps/account/
 COPY pkgs/shared/package.json pkgs/shared/
 COPY pkgs/auth/package.json pkgs/auth/
+COPY pkgs/connect/package.json pkgs/connect/
 COPY pkgs/idv/package.json pkgs/idv/
-RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile=false
+COPY pkgs/onboarding/package.json pkgs/onboarding/
+RUN pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
 
 COPY apps apps
 COPY pkgs pkgs
-RUN pnpm --filter @hanzo/id-web build
+
+# Publishable event-ingest key (pk-live-…), inlined by Vite into the bundle.
+#
+# EVENT_INGEST_KEY is the name in KMS (org `hanzo`, path `deploy`, env `prod`)
+# and on the --build-arg; the VITE_ prefix is what makes Vite inline it, and it
+# is a property of THIS build, so it is applied here and the secret store keeps
+# the ONE plain name.
+#
+# Publishable and write-only by design — it authorizes a write into one org and
+# can read nothing — so shipping it in a bundle is the documented use. It is
+# still a credential: it comes from KMS via CI. Never commit a value here.
+#
+# Deliberately NO default. An absent key is not a degraded mode: cloud takes the
+# unkeyed beacon down the anonymous lane, files every row under the `$public`
+# tenant this org cannot read, and answers 200 — so a keyless build looks
+# healthy from the page and reports nothing to the warehouse. hanzo.id ran that
+# way with no telemetry at all, which is the failure this build gate exists to
+# make loud.
+ARG EVENT_INGEST_KEY
+ENV VITE_EVENT_INGEST_KEY=$EVENT_INGEST_KEY
+# Fail closed, and gate HERE because this is the one path every builder passes
+# through — a guard in a workflow protects that lane only.
+RUN case "$EVENT_INGEST_KEY" in \
+      pk-*) : ;; \
+      '')   echo "EVENT_INGEST_KEY is empty - pass --build-arg EVENT_INGEST_KEY=<pk-...> (KMS deploy/EVENT_INGEST_KEY, env prod)" >&2; exit 1 ;; \
+      *)    echo "EVENT_INGEST_KEY is not a publishable key (expected a pk- prefix)" >&2; exit 1 ;; \
+    esac
+
+# Do NOT re-declare ARG VITE_EVENT_INGEST_KEY below this line. A later ARG of the
+# same name shadows the ENV set above with an empty default, so the key resolves,
+# passes the gate, and is then blanked before Vite inlines it — every step green,
+# the bundle unattributed. That is exactly how hanzo.chat 1.0.58 shipped.
+#
+# `&&`, not `;`: with `;` the RUN exits with the status of the LAST command and a
+# failed build would be masked. Assert on the bytes that actually ship — a key
+# present in the environment and absent from the bundle is indistinguishable from
+# success everywhere except the warehouse, where the traffic simply stops being
+# attributable.
+RUN pnpm --filter @hanzo/id-web build && \
+    { grep -rqF "$VITE_EVENT_INGEST_KEY" apps/web/dist || \
+      { echo "ERROR: the ingest key is not in apps/web/dist - hanzo.id would ship unattributed" >&2; exit 1; }; }
 
 # SPA server stage — hanzoai/spa is the correct base for a Vite SPA:
 # history-API fallthrough for client-side routes AND a SPA-safe CSP.
@@ -22,6 +87,6 @@ RUN pnpm --filter @hanzo/id-web build
 # (built for static assets, not an app that loads its own bundle), which
 # blocks the SPA's own scripts and leaves a blank page. hanzoai/spa serves
 # index.html for all routes with a sane CSP. Defaults: PORT=3000, ROOT=/public.
-FROM ghcr.io/hanzoai/spa:1.2.0
+FROM ghcr.io/hanzoai/spa:1.4.8
 COPY --from=build /build/apps/web/dist /public
 EXPOSE 3000

README.md

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
+<p align="center"><img src=".github/hero.svg" alt="id" width="880"></p>
+
 # @hanzo/id
 
 White-label login + identity verification portal. One Vite SPA, four hosts

apps/account/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# @hanzo/id-account
+
+The account portal: branded account-management pages at `account.hanzo.id`,
+`account.lux.id`, … served by a Cloudflare Worker, authenticated with IAM access
+tokens over the OAuth code exchange.
+
+It lives HERE, in `hanzoai/id`, because it is identity UI — the same brands, the
+same IAM, the same login redirect as `apps/web`. It used to live in
+`hanzoai/account`, which is a Go module: one repo held two unrelated codebases
+under one name (`main` was this Worker, the Go module survived only on a `go`
+branch and its tags). That collision is what made
+`github.com/hanzoai/account` unresolvable as a Go module from a clean checkout.
+
+`hanzoai/account` is now the Go module and nothing else — see its README for the
+billing-account rule it owns.

apps/account/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+{
+  "name": "@hanzo/id-account",
+  "version": "1.0.0",
+  "private": true,
+  "scripts": {
+    "dev": "wrangler dev",
+    "deploy": "wrangler deploy"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "wrangler": "^4.65.0"
+  },
+  "description": "Branded account-management pages for account.<brand>.id \u2014 a Cloudflare Worker."
+}

apps/account/src/worker.js

@@ -0,0 +1,803 @@
+/**
+ * Account Portal — Cloudflare Worker
+ *
+ * Serves branded account management pages for:
+ *   - account.hanzo.id  (Hanzo brand)
+ *   - account.lux.id    (Lux brand)
+ *
+ * Authentication: Uses IAM access tokens via OAuth code exchange.
+ * Users are redirected to their brand's login page if unauthenticated.
+ */
+
+const IAM_ORIGIN = 'https://iam.hanzo.ai';
+
+// Brand configuration keyed by hostname
+const BRANDS = {
+  'account.hanzo.id': {
+    name: 'Hanzo',
+    domain: 'hanzo.id',
+    loginUrl: 'https://hanzo.id/login',
+    bg: '#0a0a0a',
+    surface: '#111111',
+    border: '#222222',
+    accent: '#fd4444',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-app-client-id',
+    logo: `<svg viewBox="0 0 100 100" width="40" height="40" fill="none" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
+      <path d="M50 5L90 27.5V72.5L50 95L10 72.5V27.5L50 5Z" stroke="#fd4444" stroke-width="4"/>
+      <path d="M30 35V65M70 35V65M30 50H70" stroke="#fd4444" stroke-width="4" stroke-linecap="round"/>
+    </svg>`,
+  },
+  'account.lux.id': {
+    name: 'Lux',
+    domain: 'lux.id',
+    loginUrl: 'https://lux.id/login',
+    bg: '#050508',
+    surface: '#0c0c10',
+    border: '#222222',
+    accent: '#ffffff',
+    clientId: 'lux-app-client-id',
+    logo: `<svg viewBox="0 0 100 100" width="40" height="40" fill="none" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
+      <polygon points="50,10 90,75 10,75" stroke="white" stroke-width="3" fill="none"/>
+      <polygon points="50,30 72,68 28,68" stroke="white" stroke-width="2" fill="none"/>
+    </svg>`,
+  },
+};
+
+function getBrand(hostname) {
+  return BRANDS[hostname] || BRANDS['account.hanzo.id'];
+}
+
+function htmlResponse(html) {
+  return new Response(html, {
+    headers: {
+      'content-type': 'text/html;charset=UTF-8',
+      'cache-control': 'no-store',
+      'X-Content-Type-Options': 'nosniff',
+      'X-Frame-Options': 'DENY',
+    },
+  });
+}
+
+// Parse access token from cookie
+function getToken(request) {
+  const cookie = request.headers.get('Cookie') || '';
+  const match = cookie.match(/account_token=([^;]+)/);
+  return match ? decodeURIComponent(match[1]) : null;
+}
+
+// Fetch user info from IAM using token
+async function getUserInfo(token) {
+  const res = await fetch(`${IAM_ORIGIN}/v1/iam/userinfo`, {
+    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
+  });
+  if (!res.ok) return null;
+  const data = await res.json();
+  return data;
+}
+
+// Fetch full user object for editing
+async function getUser(token, owner, name) {
+  const res = await fetch(`${IAM_ORIGIN}/v1/iam/get-user?id=${encodeURIComponent(owner)}/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`, {
+    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
+  });
+  if (!res.ok) return null;
+  const data = await res.json();
+  return data.data || null;
+}
+
+// Build the OAuth login URL for the brand. Points at the brand's branded
+// /login page (front-door worker) with the OAuth params; that page renders
+// the two-pane login and emits the canonical /v1/iam/* calls itself — no
+// bare /oauth/authorize, no host leak to iam.hanzo.ai.
+function buildLoginUrl(brand, callbackUrl) {
+  const params = new URLSearchParams({
+    client_id: brand.clientId,
+    redirect_uri: callbackUrl,
+    response_type: 'code',
+    scope: 'openid profile email',
+    state: 'account',
+  });
+  return `${brand.loginUrl}?${params.toString()}`;
+}
+
+// Exchange authorization code for access token
+async function exchangeCode(code, callbackUrl, brand) {
+  const res = await fetch(`${IAM_ORIGIN}/v1/iam/oauth/token`, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded' },
+    body: new URLSearchParams({
+      grant_type: 'authorization_code',
+      code,
+      redirect_uri: callbackUrl,
+      client_id: brand.clientId,
+    }).toString(),
+  });
+  if (!res.ok) return null;
+  const data = await res.json();
+  return data.access_token || null;
+}
+
+function renderAccountPage(brand, user, fullUser) {
+  const providers = [];
+  // Extract linked providers from user object
+  const providerFields = ['github', 'google', 'facebook', 'twitter', 'linkedin', 'discord', 'wechat', 'dingtalk'];
+  if (fullUser) {
+    for (const p of providerFields) {
+      if (fullUser[p] && fullUser[p] !== '') {
+        providers.push({ name: p, id: fullUser[p] });
+      }
+    }
+    // Check for MetaMask/Web3 wallet
+    if (fullUser.metamask && fullUser.metamask !== '') {
+      providers.push({ name: 'web3', id: fullUser.metamask });
+    } else if (fullUser.web3onboard && fullUser.web3onboard !== '') {
+      providers.push({ name: 'web3', id: fullUser.web3onboard });
+    }
+  }
+
+  return `<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+  <meta charset="UTF-8">
+  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
+  <title>Account - ${brand.name}</title>
+  <style>
+    * { margin: 0; padding: 0; box-sizing: border-box; }
+    body {
+      font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, 'Segoe UI', Roboto, sans-serif;
+      background: ${brand.bg};
+      color: #fff;
+      min-height: 100vh;
+    }
+    .topbar {
+      border-bottom: 1px solid ${brand.border};
+      padding: 0.75rem 1.5rem;
+      display: flex;
+      align-items: center;
+      justify-content: space-between;
+      background: ${brand.surface};
+    }
+    .topbar-brand {
+      display: flex;
+      align-items: center;
+      gap: 0.75rem;
+      font-weight: 600;
+      font-size: 1.1rem;
+    }
+    .topbar-actions { display: flex; gap: 0.75rem; align-items: center; }
+    .topbar-actions a {
+      color: #999;
+      text-decoration: none;
+      font-size: 0.85rem;
+      padding: 0.4rem 0.8rem;
+      border-radius: 6px;
+      border: 1px solid ${brand.border};
+    }
+    .topbar-actions a:hover { color: #fff; border-color: #555; }
+    .topbar-actions .logout { color: #ff6b6b; border-color: #ff6b6b33; }
+    .topbar-actions .logout:hover { background: #ff6b6b11; }
+    .container {
+      max-width: 800px;
+      margin: 2rem auto;
+      padding: 0 1.5rem;
+    }
+    .section {
+      background: ${brand.surface};
+      border: 1px solid ${brand.border};
+      border-radius: 12px;
+      padding: 1.5rem;
+      margin-bottom: 1.5rem;
+    }
+    .section h2 {
+      font-size: 1.1rem;
+      margin-bottom: 1rem;
+      padding-bottom: 0.75rem;
+      border-bottom: 1px solid ${brand.border};
+    }
+    .field {
+      display: flex;
+      justify-content: space-between;
+      align-items: center;
+      padding: 0.6rem 0;
+    }
+    .field + .field { border-top: 1px solid ${brand.border}22; }
+    .field-label { color: #888; font-size: 0.85rem; min-width: 120px; }
+    .field-value { font-size: 0.92rem; }
+    .field-action {
+      color: ${brand.accent};
+      text-decoration: none;
+      font-size: 0.82rem;
+      cursor: pointer;
+      background: none;
+      border: 1px solid ${brand.accent}44;
+      padding: 0.3rem 0.6rem;
+      border-radius: 6px;
+    }
+    .field-action:hover { background: ${brand.accent}11; }
+    .provider-list { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 0.5rem; }
+    .provider-item {
+      display: flex;
+      align-items: center;
+      justify-content: space-between;
+      padding: 0.6rem 0.8rem;
+      border: 1px solid ${brand.border};
+      border-radius: 8px;
+      background: ${brand.bg};
+    }
+    .provider-item .name {
+      text-transform: capitalize;
+      font-weight: 500;
+    }
+    .provider-item .id {
+      color: #888;
+      font-size: 0.8rem;
+      margin-left: 0.5rem;
+    }
+    .provider-item .unlink {
+      color: #ff6b6b;
+      font-size: 0.78rem;
+      cursor: pointer;
+      background: none;
+      border: 1px solid #ff6b6b33;
+      padding: 0.2rem 0.5rem;
+      border-radius: 4px;
+    }
+    .add-provider {
+      display: flex;
+      gap: 0.5rem;
+      margin-top: 0.75rem;
+      flex-wrap: wrap;
+    }
+    .add-btn {
+      display: flex;
+      align-items: center;
+      gap: 0.4rem;
+      padding: 0.4rem 0.8rem;
+      border: 1px dashed ${brand.border};
+      border-radius: 8px;
+      color: #999;
+      font-size: 0.82rem;
+      cursor: pointer;
+      background: none;
+      text-decoration: none;
+    }
+    .add-btn:hover { border-color: #555; color: #fff; }
+    .badge {
+      display: inline-block;
+      padding: 0.15rem 0.45rem;
+      border-radius: 4px;
+      font-size: 0.72rem;
+      font-weight: 500;
+      background: #1a472a;
+      color: #6ee7b7;
+      margin-left: 0.4rem;
+    }
+    .badge.unverified { background: #472a1a; color: #e7b76e; }
+    .danger-zone {
+      border-color: #ff6b6b33;
+    }
+    .danger-zone h2 { color: #ff6b6b; }
+    .msg {
+      display: none;
+      padding: 0.75rem;
+      border-radius: 8px;
+      margin-bottom: 1rem;
+      font-size: 0.85rem;
+    }
+    .msg.success { background: #1a472a; color: #6ee7b7; display: block; }
+    .msg.error { background: #472a1a; color: #e7b76e; display: block; }
+    .avatar-row {
+      display: flex;
+      align-items: center;
+      gap: 1rem;
+      padding: 0.6rem 0;
+    }
+    .avatar {
+      width: 64px;
+      height: 64px;
+      border-radius: 50%;
+      background: ${brand.border};
+      display: flex;
+      align-items: center;
+      justify-content: center;
+      font-size: 1.5rem;
+      font-weight: 700;
+      color: #fff;
+      overflow: hidden;
+    }
+    .avatar img { width: 100%; height: 100%; object-fit: cover; }
+    .modal-overlay {
+      display: none;
+      position: fixed;
+      inset: 0;
+      background: rgba(0,0,0,0.7);
+      z-index: 100;
+      align-items: center;
+      justify-content: center;
+    }
+    .modal-overlay.active { display: flex; }
+    .modal {
+      background: ${brand.surface};
+      border: 1px solid ${brand.border};
+      border-radius: 12px;
+      padding: 1.5rem;
+      width: 100%;
+      max-width: 420px;
+    }
+    .modal h3 { margin-bottom: 1rem; }
+    .modal input {
+      width: 100%;
+      border-radius: 8px;
+      border: 1px solid ${brand.border};
+      background: ${brand.bg};
+      color: #fff;
+      padding: 0.6rem 0.8rem;
+      font-size: 0.9rem;
+      margin-bottom: 0.75rem;
+    }
+    .modal-actions {
+      display: flex;
+      gap: 0.5rem;
+      justify-content: flex-end;
+      margin-top: 0.75rem;
+    }
+    .modal-actions button {
+      padding: 0.5rem 1rem;
+      border-radius: 6px;
+      border: 1px solid ${brand.border};
+      background: none;
+      color: #fff;
+      cursor: pointer;
+      font-size: 0.85rem;
+    }
+    .modal-actions .primary {
+      background: ${brand.accent};
+      color: ${brand.accent === '#ffffff' ? '#111' : '#fff'};
+      border-color: ${brand.accent};
+    }
+    @media (max-width: 640px) {
+      .container { padding: 0 1rem; margin: 1rem auto; }
+      .section { padding: 1rem; }
+      .field { flex-direction: column; align-items: flex-start; gap: 0.3rem; }
+    }
+  </style>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <nav class="topbar">
+    <div class="topbar-brand">
+      ${brand.logo}
+      <span>${brand.name} Account</span>
+    </div>
+    <div class="topbar-actions">
+      <a href="https://${brand.domain}">Back to ${brand.name}</a>
+      <a href="https://${brand.domain}/logout" class="logout">Sign Out</a>
+    </div>
+  </nav>
+
+  <div class="container">
+    <div id="msg" class="msg"></div>
+
+    <div class="section">
+      <h2>Profile</h2>
+      <div class="avatar-row">
+        <div class="avatar">
+          ${user.picture ? `<img src="${user.picture}" alt="Avatar">` : (user.name || 'U').charAt(0).toUpperCase()}
+        </div>
+        <div>
+          <div style="font-weight:600;font-size:1.1rem;">${user.preferred_username || user.name || 'User'}</div>
+          <div style="color:#888;font-size:0.85rem;">${user.email || ''}</div>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+      <div class="field">
+        <span class="field-label">Display Name</span>
+        <span class="field-value">${user.name || '—'}</span>
+        <button class="field-action" onclick="editField('name','${(user.name || '').replace(/'/g, "\\'")}')">Edit</button>
+      </div>
+      <div class="field">
+        <span class="field-label">Email</span>
+        <span class="field-value">
+          ${user.email || '—'}
+          ${user.email_verified ? '<span class="badge">Verified</span>' : '<span class="badge unverified">Unverified</span>'}
+        </span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="field">
+        <span class="field-label">Phone</span>
+        <span class="field-value">${user.phone || '—'}</span>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="section">
+      <h2>Login Methods</h2>
+      <div class="provider-list">
+        <div class="provider-item">
+          <div>
+            <span class="name">Email & Password</span>
+            <span class="id">${user.email || 'Not set'}</span>
+          </div>
+          <button class="field-action" onclick="openPasswordModal()">Change Password</button>
+        </div>
+        ${providers.map(p => `
+        <div class="provider-item">
+          <div>
+            <span class="name">${p.name === 'web3' ? 'Web3 Wallet' : p.name}</span>
+            <span class="id">${p.name === 'web3' ? p.id.slice(0, 6) + '...' + p.id.slice(-4) : p.id}</span>
+          </div>
+          <button class="unlink" onclick="unlinkProvider('${p.name}')">Unlink</button>
+        </div>`).join('')}
+      </div>
+      <div class="add-provider">
+        <a class="add-btn" href="https://${brand.domain}/v1/iam/oauth/authorize?client_id=${brand.clientId}&redirect_uri=${encodeURIComponent(`https://${brand.domain}/callback`)}&response_type=code&scope=openid+profile+email&provider=provider-google">
+          + Google
+        </a>
+        <a class="add-btn" href="https://${brand.domain}/v1/iam/oauth/authorize?client_id=${brand.clientId}&redirect_uri=${encodeURIComponent(`https://${brand.domain}/callback`)}&response_type=code&scope=openid+profile+email&provider=provider-github">
+          + GitHub
+        </a>
+        <button class="add-btn" onclick="linkWallet()">+ Web3 Wallet</button>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="section">
+      <h2>Security</h2>
+      <div class="field">
+        <span class="field-label">Two-Factor Auth</span>
+        <span class="field-value">${fullUser && fullUser.totpSecret ? '<span class="badge">Enabled</span>' : 'Not enabled'}</span>
+        <button class="field-action" onclick="window.location.href='https://iam.hanzo.ai/account#mfa'">${fullUser && fullUser.totpSecret ? 'Manage' : 'Enable'}</button>
+      </div>
+      <div class="field">
+        <span class="field-label">Last Sign-in</span>
+        <span class="field-value">${fullUser && fullUser.lastSigninTime ? new Date(fullUser.lastSigninTime).toLocaleString() : '—'}</span>
+      </div>
+      <div class="field">
+        <span class="field-label">Last Sign-in IP</span>
+        <span class="field-value">${fullUser && fullUser.lastSigninIp ? fullUser.lastSigninIp : '—'}</span>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+
+    <div class="section danger-zone">
+      <h2>Danger Zone</h2>
+      <div class="field">
+        <span class="field-label">Delete Account</span>
+        <span class="field-value" style="color:#888;font-size:0.82rem;">Permanently delete your account and all data</span>
+        <button class="field-action" style="color:#ff6b6b;border-color:#ff6b6b44;" onclick="confirmDelete()">Delete Account</button>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+
+  <!-- Password Change Modal -->
+  <div class="modal-overlay" id="password-modal">
+    <div class="modal">
+      <h3>Change Password</h3>
+      <input type="password" id="old-password" placeholder="Current password" autocomplete="current-password">
+      <input type="password" id="new-password" placeholder="New password (min 8 characters)" autocomplete="new-password">
+      <input type="password" id="confirm-password" placeholder="Confirm new password" autocomplete="new-password">
+      <div id="pw-error" style="color:#ff8f8f;font-size:0.82rem;display:none;margin-bottom:0.5rem;"></div>
+      <div class="modal-actions">
+        <button onclick="closePasswordModal()">Cancel</button>
+        <button class="primary" onclick="changePassword()">Update Password</button>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+
+  <!-- Edit Field Modal -->
+  <div class="modal-overlay" id="edit-modal">
+    <div class="modal">
+      <h3 id="edit-title">Edit Field</h3>
+      <input type="text" id="edit-value">
+      <div class="modal-actions">
+        <button onclick="closeEditModal()">Cancel</button>
+        <button class="primary" onclick="saveField()">Save</button>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  </div>
+
+  <script>
+    const TOKEN = document.cookie.match(/account_token=([^;]+)/)?.[1] ? decodeURIComponent(document.cookie.match(/account_token=([^;]+)/)[1]) : null;
+    const IAM = '${IAM_ORIGIN}';
+    const BRAND_DOMAIN = '${brand.domain}';
+    let editingField = null;
+
+    function showMsg(text, type) {
+      const el = document.getElementById('msg');
+      el.textContent = text;
+      el.className = 'msg ' + type;
+      setTimeout(() => { el.className = 'msg'; }, 5000);
+    }
+
+    function openPasswordModal() {
+      document.getElementById('password-modal').classList.add('active');
+    }
+    function closePasswordModal() {
+      document.getElementById('password-modal').classList.remove('active');
+      document.getElementById('old-password').value = '';
+      document.getElementById('new-password').value = '';
+      document.getElementById('confirm-password').value = '';
+      document.getElementById('pw-error').style.display = 'none';
+    }
+
+    async function changePassword() {
+      const oldPw = document.getElementById('old-password').value;
+      const newPw = document.getElementById('new-password').value;
+      const confirm = document.getElementById('confirm-password').value;
+      const errEl = document.getElementById('pw-error');
+
+      if (!oldPw || !newPw) { errEl.textContent = 'All fields required'; errEl.style.display = 'block'; return; }
+      if (newPw.length < 8) { errEl.textContent = 'Password must be at least 8 characters'; errEl.style.display = 'block'; return; }
+      if (newPw !== confirm) { errEl.textContent = 'Passwords do not match'; errEl.style.display = 'block'; return; }
+
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch('/v1/iam/set-password', {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: {
+            'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
+            Authorization: 'Bearer ' + TOKEN,
+          },
+          body: new URLSearchParams({
+            userOwner: '${fullUser ? fullUser.owner : 'hanzo'}',
+            userName: '${fullUser ? fullUser.name : ''}',
+            oldPassword: oldPw,
+            newPassword: newPw,
+          }).toString(),
+        });
+        const data = await res.json();
+        if (data.status === 'ok') {
+          closePasswordModal();
+          showMsg('Password updated successfully', 'success');
+        } else {
+          errEl.textContent = data.msg || 'Failed to update password';
+          errEl.style.display = 'block';
+        }
+      } catch (e) {
+        errEl.textContent = 'Network error';
+        errEl.style.display = 'block';
+      }
+    }
+
+    function editField(field, currentValue) {
+      editingField = field;
+      document.getElementById('edit-title').textContent = 'Edit ' + field.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + field.slice(1);
+      document.getElementById('edit-value').value = currentValue;
+      document.getElementById('edit-modal').classList.add('active');
+    }
+    function closeEditModal() {
+      document.getElementById('edit-modal').classList.remove('active');
+      editingField = null;
+    }
+    async function saveField() {
+      if (!editingField) return;
+      const value = document.getElementById('edit-value').value;
+      try {
+        const userObj = { owner: '${fullUser ? fullUser.owner : 'hanzo'}', name: '${fullUser ? fullUser.name : ''}' };
+        if (editingField === 'name') userObj.displayName = value;
+        const res = await fetch('/v1/iam/update-user?id=${fullUser ? fullUser.owner + '/' + fullUser.name : ''}', {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: {
+            'Content-Type': 'application/json',
+            Authorization: 'Bearer ' + TOKEN,
+          },
+          body: JSON.stringify(userObj),
+        });
+        const data = await res.json();
+        if (data.status === 'ok') {
+          closeEditModal();
+          showMsg('Updated successfully. Refreshing...', 'success');
+          setTimeout(() => location.reload(), 1000);
+        } else {
+          showMsg(data.msg || 'Update failed', 'error');
+        }
+      } catch (e) {
+        showMsg('Network error', 'error');
+      }
+    }
+
+    async function unlinkProvider(provider) {
+      if (!confirm('Unlink ' + provider + ' from your account?')) return;
+      try {
+        var field = provider === 'web3' ? 'metamask' : provider;
+        var userObj = { owner: '${fullUser ? fullUser.owner : 'hanzo'}', name: '${fullUser ? fullUser.name : ''}' };
+        userObj[field] = '';
+        var res = await fetch('/v1/iam/update-user?id=${fullUser ? fullUser.owner + '/' + fullUser.name : ''}', {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+          body: JSON.stringify(userObj),
+        });
+        var data = await res.json();
+        if (data.status === 'ok') {
+          showMsg(provider + ' unlinked successfully', 'success');
+          setTimeout(function() { location.reload(); }, 1000);
+        } else {
+          showMsg(data.msg || 'Failed to unlink ' + provider, 'error');
+        }
+      } catch (e) {
+        showMsg('Network error: ' + e.message, 'error');
+      }
+    }
+
+    async function linkWallet() {
+      if (typeof window.ethereum === 'undefined') {
+        showMsg('Please install MetaMask or another Web3 wallet', 'error');
+        return;
+      }
+      try {
+        var accounts = await window.ethereum.request({ method: 'eth_requestAccounts' });
+        var address = accounts[0];
+        if (!address) { showMsg('No wallet account found', 'error'); return; }
+
+        // Sign a message to prove wallet ownership
+        var message = 'Link wallet ' + address + ' to ' + BRAND_DOMAIN + ' account for ${fullUser ? fullUser.name : 'user'}';
+        await window.ethereum.request({ method: 'personal_sign', params: [message, address] });
+
+        // Update user with wallet address
+        var userObj = { owner: '${fullUser ? fullUser.owner : 'hanzo'}', name: '${fullUser ? fullUser.name : ''}', metamask: address };
+        var res = await fetch('/v1/iam/update-user?id=${fullUser ? fullUser.owner + '/' + fullUser.name : ''}', {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+          body: JSON.stringify(userObj),
+        });
+        var data = await res.json();
+        if (data.status === 'ok') {
+          showMsg('Wallet linked: ' + address.slice(0, 6) + '...' + address.slice(-4), 'success');
+          setTimeout(function() { location.reload(); }, 1500);
+        } else {
+          showMsg(data.msg || 'Failed to link wallet', 'error');
+        }
+      } catch (err) {
+        if (err.code === 4001) return; // User rejected
+        showMsg(err.message || 'Failed to connect wallet', 'error');
+      }
+    }
+
+    function confirmDelete() {
+      if (!confirm('Are you sure? This action is permanent and cannot be undone.')) return;
+      if (!confirm('This will permanently delete your account and all associated data. Type OK to confirm.')) return;
+      showMsg('Account deletion requires verification. Redirecting to IAM...', 'error');
+      window.location.href = 'https://iam.hanzo.ai/account';
+    }
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>`;
+}
+
+function renderLoginRedirectPage(brand, loginUrl) {
+  return `<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html lang="en">
+<head>
+  <meta charset="UTF-8">
+  <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1.0">
+  <title>Sign In Required - ${brand.name}</title>
+  <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="2;url=${loginUrl}">
+  <style>
+    body {
+      font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, 'Segoe UI', Roboto, sans-serif;
+      background: ${brand.bg};
+      color: #fff;
+      display: flex;
+      align-items: center;
+      justify-content: center;
+      min-height: 100vh;
+      margin: 0;
+    }
+    .card {
+      text-align: center;
+      padding: 2rem;
+      border: 1px solid ${brand.border};
+      border-radius: 12px;
+      background: ${brand.surface};
+      max-width: 400px;
+    }
+    a { color: ${brand.accent}; }
+  </style>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <div class="card">
+    ${brand.logo}
+    <h2 style="margin-top:1rem;">Sign in to continue</h2>
+    <p style="color:#888;margin-top:0.5rem;">Redirecting to ${brand.name} login...</p>
+    <p style="margin-top:1rem;"><a href="${loginUrl}">Click here if not redirected</a></p>
+  </div>
+</body>
+</html>`;
+}
+
+export default {
+  async fetch(request, env) {
+    const url = new URL(request.url);
+    const hostname = url.hostname;
+    const pathname = url.pathname;
+    const brand = getBrand(hostname);
+    const callbackUrl = `https://${hostname}/callback`;
+
+    // Handle OAuth callback — exchange code for token
+    if (pathname === '/callback') {
+      const code = url.searchParams.get('code');
+      if (!code) {
+        return new Response(null, {
+          status: 302,
+          headers: { Location: buildLoginUrl(brand, callbackUrl) },
+        });
+      }
+
+      const token = await exchangeCode(code, callbackUrl, brand);
+      if (!token) {
+        return new Response(null, {
+          status: 302,
+          headers: { Location: buildLoginUrl(brand, callbackUrl) },
+        });
+      }
+
+      // Set token cookie and redirect to account page
+      return new Response(null, {
+        status: 302,
+        headers: {
+          Location: '/',
+          'Set-Cookie': `account_token=${encodeURIComponent(token)}; Path=/; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax; Max-Age=86400`,
+        },
+      });
+    }
+
+    // Handle logout
+    if (pathname === '/logout') {
+      return new Response(null, {
+        status: 302,
+        headers: {
+          Location: `https://${brand.domain}`,
+          'Set-Cookie': 'account_token=; Path=/; Expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT',
+        },
+      });
+    }
+
+    // Proxy IAM API calls (for client-side JS). Same-origin /v1/iam/* from
+    // the account page is forwarded to IAM; the access token is attached
+    // server-side from the HttpOnly cookie so it never rides in page JS.
+    if (pathname.startsWith('/v1/iam/')) {
+      const token = getToken(request);
+      const iamUrl = new URL(pathname + url.search, IAM_ORIGIN);
+      const headers = new Headers(request.headers);
+      headers.set('Host', new URL(IAM_ORIGIN).hostname);
+      if (token) headers.set('Authorization', `Bearer ${token}`);
+
+      const iamRes = await fetch(iamUrl.toString(), {
+        method: request.method,
+        headers,
+        body: request.method !== 'GET' ? request.body : undefined,
+      });
+
+      return new Response(iamRes.body, {
+        status: iamRes.status,
+        headers: {
+          'content-type': iamRes.headers.get('content-type') || 'application/json',
+          'cache-control': 'no-store',
+        },
+      });
+    }
+
+    // Check authentication for all other routes
+    const token = getToken(request);
+    if (!token) {
+      const loginUrl = buildLoginUrl(brand, callbackUrl);
+      return new Response(null, {
+        status: 302,
+        headers: { Location: loginUrl },
+      });
+    }
+
+    // Get user info
+    const user = await getUserInfo(token);
+    if (!user || !user.name) {
+      // Token expired or invalid — re-authenticate
+      const loginUrl = buildLoginUrl(brand, callbackUrl);
+      return new Response(null, {
+        status: 302,
+        headers: {
+          Location: loginUrl,
+          'Set-Cookie': 'account_token=; Path=/; Expires=Thu, 01 Jan 1970 00:00:00 GMT',
+        },
+      });
+    }
+
+    // Get full user object for detailed info
+    const fullUser = await getUser(token, user.owner || 'hanzo', user.preferred_username || user.name);
+
+    // Serve account page
+    return htmlResponse(renderAccountPage(brand, user, fullUser));
+  },
+};

apps/account/wrangler.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+name = "account-portal"
+main = "src/worker.js"
+compatibility_date = "2024-01-01"
+workers_dev = false
+
+# Custom domains are managed via CF Workers Custom Domains API:
+#   account.hanzo.id -> zone hanzo.id
+#   account.lux.id   -> zone lux.id
+# DNS records and SSL certs are automatically provisioned.
+
+[vars]
+IAM_ORIGIN = "https://iam.hanzo.ai"

apps/web/index.html

@@ -4,7 +4,9 @@
     <meta charset="UTF-8" />
     <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1, viewport-fit=cover" />
     <meta name="robots" content="noindex" />
-    <link id="favicon" rel="icon" type="image/png" href="data:," />
+    <link id="favicon" rel="icon" type="image/svg+xml" href="/favicon.svg" />
+    <link rel="icon" href="/favicon.ico" sizes="any" />
+    <link rel="apple-touch-icon" href="/apple-touch-icon.png" />
     <title>Sign in</title>
   </head>
   <body>

apps/web/package.json

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 {
   "name": "@hanzo/id-web",
   "private": true,
-  "version": "0.1.1",
-  "description": "Hanzo ID — white-label login / signup / IDV portal. Vite + React 19 + @hanzo/gui. Same image serves hanzo.id / lux.id / zoo.id / pars.id.",
+  "version": "0.1.34",
+  "description": "Hanzo ID \u2014 white-label login / signup / IDV portal. Vite + React 19, styled from @hanzo/design tokens. Same image serves hanzo.id / lux.id / zoo.id / pars.id.",
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {
     "dev": "vite",
@@ -11,18 +11,25 @@
     "tc": "tsc --noEmit"
   },
   "dependencies": {
+    "@crossmarkio/sdk": "^0.4.0",
     "@hanzo/brand": "^1.3.0",
-    "@hanzo/gui": "^7.2.4",
-    "@hanzo/iam": "^0.9.4",
+    "@hanzo/design": "^0.4.9",
+    "@hanzo/event": "^0.3.11",
+    "@hanzo/iam": "^0.21.1",
     "@hanzo/id-auth": "workspace:*",
+    "@hanzo/id-connect": "workspace:*",
     "@hanzo/id-idv": "workspace:*",
+    "@hanzo/id-onboarding": "workspace:*",
     "@hanzo/id-shared": "workspace:*",
     "@luxfi/brand": "^1.0.0",
     "@parsdao/brand": "^1.0.0",
     "@tanstack/react-router": "^1.168.0",
+    "@tonconnect/sdk": "^4.0.0",
     "@zooai/brand": "^1.3.0",
     "react": "^19.2.0",
-    "react-dom": "^19.2.0"
+    "react-dom": "^19.2.0",
+    "sats-connect": "^4.2.1",
+    "viem": "^2.53.1"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/react": "^19.0.0",

apps/web/public/favicon.svg

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" viewBox="0 0 67 67" role="img" aria-label="Hanzo">
+<style>path{fill:#000}@media (prefers-color-scheme:dark){path{fill:#fff}}</style>
+<path d="M22.21 67V44.6369H0V67H22.21Z"/>
+<path d="M66.7038 22.3184H22.2534L0.0878906 44.6367H44.4634L66.7038 22.3184Z"/>
+<path d="M22.21 0H0V22.3184H22.21V0Z"/>
+<path d="M66.7198 0H44.5098V22.3184H66.7198V0Z"/>
+<path d="M66.7198 67V44.6369H44.5098V67H66.7198Z"/>
+</svg>

apps/web/src/App.tsx

@@ -1,45 +1,80 @@
 import { useEffect, useMemo, useState } from 'react'
-import { loadBrand, parseCatalog, resolveTenant, type BrandContract, type TenantConfig } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
+import { loadBrand, catalogOf, parseCatalog, resolveOrg, idBrandLabel, type BrandContract, type OrgConfig } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
 import { createAuthClient } from '@hanzo/id-auth'
 import { Portal } from './pages/Portal'
 import { Login } from './pages/Login'
 import { Signup } from './pages/Signup'
 import { Forgot } from './pages/Forgot'
 import { Callback } from './pages/Callback'
+import { Onboarding } from './pages/Onboarding'
+import { DeviceApproval } from './pages/DeviceApproval'
 
 /**
- * Top-level wiring. Resolves tenant + brand once on mount, then routes via
+ * Top-level wiring. Resolves org + brand once on mount, then routes via
  * `window.location.pathname`. No router lib needed — this app is 5 pages,
  * `<a href>` is enough. Adding paths is a switch case.
  */
 export function App() {
-  const [tenant, setTenant] = useState<TenantConfig | null>(null)
+  const [org, setOrg] = useState<OrgConfig | null>(null)
   const [brand, setBrand] = useState<BrandContract | null>(null)
   const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
 
   useEffect(() => {
-    const runtimeCatalog = (window as unknown as { __ID_CATALOG__?: string }).__ID_CATALOG__
-    const t = resolveTenant(window.location.hostname, { catalog: parseCatalog(runtimeCatalog) })
-    setTenant(t)
-    loadBrand(t.brandPackage, t.brandUrl)
-      .then((b) => {
+    let cancelled = false
+    async function boot() {
+      // The runtime serves the per-host org catalog at /config.json — NOT a
+      // `window.__ID_CATALOG__` global, which the runtime never injects
+      // (relying on it silently dropped every catalog-only host, e.g. osage.id,
+      // to the bundled Hanzo default). Fall back to the global, then empty, so a
+      // host always resolves to something.
+      //
+      // `catalogOf` owns which key that payload uses — the name is the server's,
+      // not ours (see its doc). Reading the wrong one is a silent total-catalog
+      // outage, so it is pinned by a test next to the resolver it feeds.
+      let catalogRaw: string | undefined
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch('/config.json', { cache: 'no-store' })
+        if (res.ok) catalogRaw = catalogOf(await res.json())
+      } catch {
+        // network/parse error → fall back below
+      }
+      if (!catalogRaw) {
+        catalogRaw = (window as unknown as { __ID_CATALOG__?: string }).__ID_CATALOG__
+      }
+      const t = resolveOrg(window.location.hostname, { catalog: parseCatalog(catalogRaw) })
+      if (cancelled) return
+      setOrg(t)
+      try {
+        const b = await loadBrand(t.brandPackage)
+        if (cancelled) return
         setBrand(b)
-        document.title = `Sign in — ${b.name}`
+        document.title = idBrandLabel(b, t.orgId)
         const fav = document.getElementById('favicon') as HTMLLinkElement | null
         if (fav && b.faviconUrl) fav.href = b.faviconUrl
-      })
-      .catch((e) => setError(String(e)))
+      } catch (e) {
+        if (!cancelled) setError(String(e))
+      }
+    }
+    void boot()
+    return () => {
+      cancelled = true
+    }
   }, [])
 
-  const client = useMemo(() => (tenant ? createAuthClient({ tenant }) : null), [tenant])
+  const client = useMemo(() => (org ? createAuthClient({ org }) : null), [org])
 
   if (error) return <div className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</div>
-  if (!tenant || !brand || !client) return <div>Loading…</div>
+  if (!org || !brand || !client) return <div>Loading…</div>
 
   const path = window.location.pathname
+  // Device-authorization approval (RFC 8628). Must precede the `/login` catch
+  // since it lives under `/login/oauth/device`.
+  if (path === '/login/oauth/device' || path.startsWith('/login/oauth/device/'))
+    return <DeviceApproval client={client} brand={brand} />
   if (path === '/login' || path.startsWith('/login/')) return <Login client={client} brand={brand} />
   if (path === '/signup' || path.startsWith('/signup/')) return <Signup client={client} brand={brand} />
   if (path === '/forget' || path === '/forgot' || path.startsWith('/forg')) return <Forgot client={client} brand={brand} />
-  if (path === '/callback' || path.startsWith('/callback/')) return <Callback client={client} brand={brand} />
-  return <Portal brand={brand} />
+  if (path === '/callback' || path.startsWith('/callback/')) return <Callback org={org} brand={brand} />
+  if (path === '/onboarding' || path.startsWith('/onboarding/')) return <Onboarding org={org} brand={brand} />
+  return <Portal client={client} brand={brand} org={org} />
 }

apps/web/src/analytics.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+/**
+ * The telemetry gate, tested where it is actually true or false: on the bytes
+ * the client puts on the wire.
+ *
+ * The defect this guards is not hypothetical and is not visible in review. The
+ * obvious way to keep an OAuth code out of telemetry — "send the pathname, never
+ * the href" — DOES NOT WORK against @hanzo/event, because `build()` stamps
+ * `url: window.location.href` onto every event it assembles regardless of the
+ * `path` the caller passed. A pageview from `/callback?code=…&state=…` therefore
+ * ships the authorization code while `path` reads a clean `/callback`, and the
+ * client's scrubber does not catch it: that scrubber redacts secret SHAPES
+ * (JWT, sk-/pk-/hk-, bearer, cloud keys, PAN) and an opaque authorization code
+ * is not one.
+ *
+ * So the gate is "do not emit from a route whose URL carries a credential", and
+ * the test below asserts BOTH halves: that gated routes emit nothing, and that
+ * the same setup ungated really does leak. The second half is what keeps this
+ * from decaying into a decorative assertion — if @hanzo/event ever stops putting
+ * the href on the wire, that case fails and this whole file can be revisited.
+ */
+import { test } from 'vitest'
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import fs from 'node:fs'
+import path from 'node:path'
+import { createAnalytics } from '@hanzo/event'
+import { telemetryAllowed, consented } from './analytics'
+
+// ── the route gate ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+test('auth-artifact routes are refused, funnel routes are not', () => {
+  // Carry a credential in the query string -> must never emit.
+  for (const p of [
+    '/callback',
+    '/callback/',
+    '/callback/anything',
+    '/login/oauth/device',
+    '/login/oauth/device/',
+    '/login/oauth/device/WDJB-MJHT',
+  ]) {
+    assert.equal(telemetryAllowed(p), false, `${p} must not emit`)
+  }
+
+  // The funnel this exists to measure: arrival -> sign-in -> session.
+  for (const p of [
+    '/',
+    '/login',
+    '/login/',
+    '/signup',
+    '/forgot',
+    '/forget',
+    '/onboarding',
+    '/callbacks', // near-miss: a real route that merely starts the same way
+    '/login/oauth', // the device path is the specific one, not all of oauth
+  ]) {
+    assert.equal(telemetryAllowed(p), true, `${p} must emit`)
+  }
+})
+
+/**
+ * The gate is written against literal paths, and App.tsx dispatches against its
+ * own. If someone adds a route that lands on the callback or device page, this
+ * fails rather than silently starting to ship codes — the same reason the token
+ * suite computes from what the bundle serves instead of trusting a list.
+ */
+test('every auth-artifact route App.tsx dispatches is covered by the gate', () => {
+  const app = fs.readFileSync(path.join(import.meta.dirname, 'App.tsx'), 'utf8')
+
+  // Route literals compared in App.tsx: path === '…' / path.startsWith('…').
+  const routes = [...app.matchAll(/path\s*(?:===\s*|\.startsWith\(\s*)'([^']+)'/g)].map((m) => m[1]!)
+  assert.ok(routes.length >= 10, `expected App.tsx route literals, found ${routes.length}`)
+
+  for (const r of routes) {
+    const isAuthArtifact = r.startsWith('/callback') || r.startsWith('/login/oauth/device')
+    if (isAuthArtifact) {
+      assert.equal(telemetryAllowed(r), false, `App.tsx routes ${r} to an auth-artifact page; gate it`)
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Both pages are actually reachable — the gate is not guarding dead routes.
+  assert.ok(routes.some((r) => r.startsWith('/callback')), 'App.tsx must route /callback')
+  assert.ok(
+    routes.some((r) => r.startsWith('/login/oauth/device')),
+    'App.tsx must route /login/oauth/device',
+  )
+})
+
+// ── consent ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+test('an explicit browser opt-out turns everything off', () => {
+  assert.equal(consented({ globalPrivacyControl: true }), false)
+  assert.equal(consented({ doNotTrack: '1' }), false)
+  assert.equal(consented({ doNotTrack: 'yes' }), false)
+
+  assert.equal(consented(), true)
+  assert.equal(consented({}), true)
+  assert.equal(consented({ globalPrivacyControl: false, doNotTrack: '0' }), true)
+  assert.equal(consented({ doNotTrack: null }), true)
+})
+
+// ── the wire ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+const CODE = 'AUTHCODE_abc123XYZ'
+const STATE = 'STATE_deadbeef'
+const USER_CODE = 'WDJB-MJHT'
+
+/** Installs the browser globals @hanzo/event reads, at a given location. */
+function atLocation(href: string, pathname: string, search: string) {
+  const store: Record<string, string> = {}
+  const localStorage = {
+    getItem: (k: string) => store[k] ?? null,
+    setItem: (k: string, v: string) => void (store[k] = String(v)),
+    removeItem: (k: string) => void delete store[k],
+  }
+  const g = globalThis as Record<string, unknown>
+  g.window = {
+    location: { href, pathname, search, hostname: 'hanzo.id', origin: 'https://hanzo.id' },
+    addEventListener() {},
+    removeEventListener() {},
+    localStorage,
+    screen: { width: 1440, height: 900 },
+  }
+  g.document = {
+    referrer: '',
+    title: 'Sign in',
+    visibilityState: 'visible',
+    addEventListener() {},
+    removeEventListener() {},
+  }
+  g.localStorage = localStorage
+  g.screen = { width: 1440, height: 900 }
+  g.location = (g.window as { location: unknown }).location
+}
+
+function clearLocation() {
+  const g = globalThis as Record<string, unknown>
+  delete g.window
+  delete g.document
+  delete g.localStorage
+  delete g.screen
+  delete g.location
+}
+
+/** Runs the client exactly as mounted and returns everything it tried to send. */
+function wireFrom(href: string, pathname: string, search: string, enabled: boolean): string {
+  atLocation(href, pathname, search)
+  try {
+    const sent: string[] = []
+    const client = createAnalytics({
+      product: 'id',
+      host: 'https://api.hanzo.ai',
+      ingestKey: 'pk-live-TESTKEY',
+      enabled,
+      transport: { send: (_url: string, body: string) => void sent.push(body) },
+    })
+    client.init()
+    client.pageview(pathname) // pathname only — the mitigation that is NOT enough
+    client.captureError(new Error('boom'))
+    client.flush()
+    return sent.join('')
+  } finally {
+    clearLocation()
+  }
+}
+
+test('a gated auth-artifact route puts nothing on the wire', () => {
+  const cb = wireFrom(
+    `https://hanzo.id/callback?code=${CODE}&state=${STATE}`,
+    '/callback',
+    `?code=${CODE}&state=${STATE}`,
+    telemetryAllowed('/callback'),
+  )
+  assert.equal(cb, '', 'the callback route must emit nothing at all')
+  assert.ok(!cb.includes(CODE), 'authorization code must never reach the wire')
+  assert.ok(!cb.includes(STATE), 'state must never reach the wire')
+
+  const dev = wireFrom(
+    `https://hanzo.id/login/oauth/device?user_code=${USER_CODE}`,
+    '/login/oauth/device',
+    `?user_code=${USER_CODE}`,
+    telemetryAllowed('/login/oauth/device'),
+  )
+  assert.equal(dev, '', 'the device route must emit nothing at all')
+  assert.ok(!dev.includes(USER_CODE), 'device user_code must never reach the wire')
+})
+
+/**
+ * The reason the gate exists. Passing a clean pathname is NOT what protects the
+ * code — if this ever stops leaking, @hanzo/event changed and the gate's
+ * justification should be re-read.
+ */
+test('without the gate, a clean pathname still leaks the code (why the gate exists)', () => {
+  const leaked = wireFrom(
+    `https://hanzo.id/callback?code=${CODE}&state=${STATE}`,
+    '/callback',
+    `?code=${CODE}&state=${STATE}`,
+    true, // ungated
+  )
+  assert.ok(leaked.includes(CODE), 'expected the ungated client to leak the code via `url`')
+  assert.ok(leaked.includes(STATE), 'expected the ungated client to leak the state via `url`')
+  assert.ok(leaked.includes('"path":"/callback"'), 'and to report a clean path while doing it')
+})
+
+test('funnel routes do report, and carry no credential', () => {
+  for (const p of ['/', '/login', '/signup', '/onboarding']) {
+    const wire = wireFrom(`https://hanzo.id${p}`, p, '', telemetryAllowed(p))
+    assert.ok(wire.includes('"$pageview"'), `${p} must report a pageview`)
+    assert.ok(wire.includes('"product":"id"'), `${p} must attribute to the id product`)
+    for (const secret of [CODE, STATE, USER_CODE]) {
+      assert.ok(!wire.includes(secret), `${p} must not carry ${secret}`)
+    }
+  }
+})
+
+test('an opted-out visitor emits nothing even on a funnel route', () => {
+  const wire = wireFrom(
+    'https://hanzo.id/login',
+    '/login',
+    '',
+    consented({ globalPrivacyControl: true }) && telemetryAllowed('/login'),
+  )
+  assert.equal(wire, '', 'GPC must suppress the whole client')
+})

apps/web/src/analytics.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+// Telemetry for the sign-in portal — pageviews and errors, anonymous, via the
+// ONE @hanzo/event client (POST /v1/event, the front door cloud fans out into
+// the web / product / error lenses). No page tag, no second SDK.
+//
+// This surface reported NOTHING before this file existed, which is why the
+// arrival->session funnel had no denominator: hanzo.id is where every property's
+// visitor lands, and none of it was attributable.
+//
+// It is also an AUTH surface, so what is NOT here is deliberate:
+//
+//   - no identify(). Attribution here is anonymous; @hanzo/event stamps a
+//     per-browser `anonymousId` that survives sign-up, so the visitor's
+//     pre-signup pageviews still join to whoever they become once a
+//     post-auth surface (chat/console) identifies them. Reading the IAM
+//     subject would mean wiring this into the auth context for a join that
+//     already happens downstream.
+//   - no interaction autocapture (@hanzo/observe). Heat maps answer "where do
+//     they click"; the question this funnel exists to answer is "did they get a
+//     session", which pageviews answer completely. Autocapture on the login and
+//     signup forms is capture surface bought for no funnel signal.
+//   - no session replay, no input capture, no email/name.
+
+import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
+import type { ReactNode } from 'react'
+import { AnalyticsProvider as EventProvider, usePageview } from '@hanzo/event/react'
+
+const HOST = 'https://api.hanzo.ai'
+
+/**
+ * Publishable ingest key (pk-…), inlined by Vite from the build env. Write-only:
+ * it attributes a write to ONE org and mints no reading principal, which is what
+ * makes it safe in a bundle — and it is the ONLY thing that attributes a
+ * LOGGED-OUT visitor, which on a sign-in portal is nearly all of them.
+ *
+ * Absent is not a degraded mode: cloud takes an unkeyed beacon down the anonymous
+ * lane and files it under `$public`, a tenant this org cannot read, and answers
+ * 200 either way. The loss is silent on both ends, so the Dockerfile fails the
+ * build rather than letting an empty value ship. Never hardcode a value here.
+ */
+const INGEST_KEY = import.meta.env.VITE_EVENT_INGEST_KEY?.trim() || undefined
+
+/**
+ * Routes whose URL carries an authentication artifact.
+ *
+ * `/callback` holds the OAuth authorization `code` and `state`; the device
+ * verification URI holds a `user_code`. Both sit in the QUERY STRING, and
+ * @hanzo/event stamps `url: window.location.href` onto every event it builds —
+ * independently of the `path` a caller passes. So passing a clean pathname does
+ * NOT keep the code out of the payload; only not emitting does. Measured against
+ * the real client, a pageview from `/callback?code=…&state=…` put both values on
+ * the wire in cleartext while `path` read a tidy `/callback`.
+ *
+ * The client's scrubber does not save this either — it redacts secret SHAPES
+ * (JWTs, sk-/pk-/hk-, bearer, cloud keys, PANs) and an opaque authorization code
+ * matches none of them.
+ *
+ * Neither route is a funnel step: both are transient machine hops that redirect
+ * onward within a tick. The funnel is `/` -> `/login` -> `/onboarding`, and every
+ * one of those still reports. Dropping these two costs no signal and removes the
+ * entire class of credential leak. See analytics.test.ts.
+ */
+const AUTH_ARTIFACT = /^\/(callback|login\/oauth\/device)(\/|$)/
+
+/** telemetryAllowed reports whether a path may emit at all. Pure. */
+export function telemetryAllowed(pathname: string): boolean {
+  return !AUTH_ARTIFACT.test(pathname)
+}
+
+/**
+ * consented honours an explicit browser opt-out — Global Privacy Control, then
+ * legacy Do-Not-Track. This is the whole consent surface, and it suppresses
+ * pageviews AND errors together: a visitor who opted out is not "mostly" off.
+ * Pure with respect to its argument so the policy is testable without a DOM.
+ */
+export function consented(nav?: {
+  globalPrivacyControl?: boolean
+  doNotTrack?: string | null
+}): boolean {
+  if (!nav) return true
+  if (nav.globalPrivacyControl === true) return false
+  const dnt = nav.doNotTrack
+  return dnt !== '1' && dnt !== 'yes'
+}
+
+/** Reads the live opt-out signals off `navigator`, or none outside a browser. */
+function browserConsent(): boolean {
+  if (typeof navigator === 'undefined') return true
+  return consented(navigator as Navigator & { globalPrivacyControl?: boolean })
+}
+
+/**
+ * Fires a pageview on SPA route changes.
+ *
+ * Inert today, and deliberately kept: this app navigates with
+ * `window.location.assign/replace`, so every route change is a fresh document
+ * and the provider's own initial pageview counts each page exactly once
+ * (`usePageview` skips its first mount for precisely that reason — it would
+ * otherwise double-count). `@tanstack/react-router` is a declared dependency
+ * that nothing imports; the day someone mounts it, navigation stops reloading
+ * the document and this is what keeps pageviews from silently going to zero.
+ *
+ * It is fed the PATHNAME, never `location.href`, and only when the path is
+ * allowed to emit — `usePageview` no-ops on a null path.
+ */
+function RouteViews() {
+  const [pathname, setPathname] = useState(() =>
+    typeof window === 'undefined' ? '/' : window.location.pathname,
+  )
+  useEffect(() => {
+    const sync = () => setPathname(window.location.pathname)
+    window.addEventListener('popstate', sync)
+    return () => window.removeEventListener('popstate', sync)
+  }, [])
+  usePageview(telemetryAllowed(pathname) ? pathname : null)
+  return null
+}
+
+/**
+ * Mounts the client. `enabled` is the single gate every plane reads — it stops
+ * init, enqueue, flush and the error handlers alike, so an off state emits
+ * nothing at all rather than emitting less.
+ *
+ * The gate is evaluated once per document, which is exact here BECAUSE
+ * navigation is full-page: the path a document is loaded at is the path it dies
+ * at, so there is no window in which a `/callback` load is measured under an
+ * earlier route's decision.
+ */
+export function Analytics({ children }: { children: ReactNode }) {
+  const pathname = typeof window === 'undefined' ? '/' : window.location.pathname
+  const enabled = browserConsent() && telemetryAllowed(pathname)
+
+  return (
+    <EventProvider config={{ product: 'id', host: HOST, ingestKey: INGEST_KEY, enabled }}>
+      <RouteViews />
+      {children}
+    </EventProvider>
+  )
+}

apps/web/src/app.css

@@ -1,169 +1,573 @@
+/* Hanzo ID — the styling layer for hanzo.id / lux.id / zoo.id / pars.id.
+ *
+ * TOKENS COME FROM @hanzo/design. Not one colour, radius or type size is
+ * invented here; every value below resolves to a design token, so a token change
+ * lands on all four brand portals AND on pay.hanzo.ai — the other half of the
+ * same sign-in-then-pay flow — at once.
+ *
+ * ARCHITECTURE RULE, learned the hard way. A component's surface must never
+ * depend on WHERE it is mounted. This file used to paint controls with the
+ * descendant selectors `form input {…}` and `.hanzo-id-btn, form button {…}`,
+ * so any control that escaped a <form> ancestor fell out of the stylesheet and
+ * rendered as raw UA chrome: the device-approval screen (2 inputs, 0 forms)
+ * showed a 31px beveled browser input next to correctly-styled 44px siblings.
+ * That is the same class of defect as a distributed component shipping utility
+ * class names with no CSS behind them. Every rule below is keyed to a CLASS the
+ * component itself carries — `.hanzo-id-input`, `.hanzo-id-btn`,
+ * `.hanzo-id-field`, `.hanzo-id-form` — and there are no element-descendant
+ * selectors for surface anywhere in this file.
+ */
+
+/* ONE import, the whole token layer. This file used to cherry-pick four of the
+ * nine token groups, which meant z, elevation, spacing, fonts and the element
+ * defaults simply did not exist here — and an absent group is invisible: an
+ * unresolved var() paints nothing and reports no error. @hanzo/iam's account
+ * menu alone reaches for --z-popover, --shadow-floating and --space-1..3, none
+ * of which the four-group subset carried.
+ *
+ * The reason for cherry-picking is gone: as of @hanzo/design 0.3.0 Geist is
+ * SELF-HOSTED inside the package (two variable woff2, SIL OFL-1.1), so
+ * tokens/fonts.css no longer makes a request to fonts.googleapis.com and the
+ * sign-in path can take the typeface along with the colours. */
+@import '@hanzo/design/styles.css';
+
 :root {
-  --brand: #ffffff;
-  --bg: #0a0a0a;
-  --fg: #fafafa;
-  --muted: #a3a3a3;
-  --border: #262626;
-  font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, 'Segoe UI', Roboto, sans-serif;
   color-scheme: dark;
 }
 
 * { box-sizing: border-box; }
 html, body, #root { height: 100%; margin: 0; }
+/* 100dvh, with 100vh left underneath it as the fallback for anything that does
+   not know the unit. On a phone `vh` resolves against the LARGEST viewport —
+   the one with the URL bar retracted — so a bar that is actually on screen
+   makes a "full height" page taller than the space it has, and a login page
+   with one card on it acquires a scrollbar and sits low in the window. `dvh`
+   is the height that is really there. */
 body {
-  background: var(--bg);
-  color: var(--fg);
+  background: var(--background);
+  color: var(--foreground);
   min-height: 100vh;
+  min-height: 100dvh;
   display: flex;
   flex-direction: column;
+  font-size: var(--text-base);
 }
 
+/* NO focus rule here any more — tokens/base.css ships
+   `:focus-visible{outline:2px solid var(--ring);outline-offset:2px}` to every
+   consumer, and as of 0.3.0 --ring is var(--neutral-500), which measures 4.43:1
+   on --background (WCAG 2.4.13 wants 3:1). The local override that painted the
+   ring --primary existed only because --ring was #333333 at 1.66:1; that was a
+   finding against @hanzo/design, it has been fixed there, so the workaround
+   goes. One focus indicator, defined once, in the design system. */
+
+/* ── Page shell ────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
 .hanzo-id-page {
   flex: 1;
+  /* #root is not a flex container, so `flex: 1` alone never stretches this to
+     the viewport — pin a min height so `main`'s justify-content:center has room
+     to vertically center the auth card (box-sizing:border-box folds in padding).
+     dvh for the reason given on `body`; the vh line is the fallback. */
+  min-height: 100vh;
+  min-height: 100dvh;
   display: flex;
   flex-direction: column;
   max-width: 480px;
   margin: 0 auto;
-  padding: 24px;
+  /* index.html declares `viewport-fit=cover`, which puts the page UNDER the
+     notch, the rounded corners and the home indicator. Declaring cover without
+     consuming the insets is strictly worse than not declaring it, and nothing
+     in this stylesheet consumed them: `max()` keeps the 24px gutter everywhere
+     it is already enough and only grows it where the hardware intrudes, so
+     nothing moves on a device with no insets (env() is 0px there). */
+  padding: max(24px, env(safe-area-inset-top)) max(24px, env(safe-area-inset-right))
+           max(24px, env(safe-area-inset-bottom)) max(24px, env(safe-area-inset-left));
 }
 
-.hanzo-id-brand-header {
-  padding: 16px 0 32px;
+.hanzo-id-brand-header { padding: 16px 0 32px; }
+
+/* The home link wraps a 32px mark but measured 32x18 — an inline <a> takes its
+   box from the LINE BOX of its own font, not from a replaced child, so the tap
+   target was SMALLER than the logo inside it. inline-flex gives the anchor the
+   mark's real box; the padding/negative-margin pair then grows the hit area to
+   the 44px floor while leaving the mark exactly where it was — the padding
+   offsets the margin, so the logo's painted position and the header's height
+   are both unchanged, and only the invisible target bleeds into the gutter. */
+.hanzo-id-brand-header a {
+  display: inline-flex;
+  align-items: center;
+  box-sizing: content-box;
+  min-width: 32px;
+  min-height: 32px;
+  padding: 6px;
+  margin: -6px;
+}
+
+/* The lockup is 32px tall for EVERY brand, and it has to be said here.
+   BrandHeader writes `height={32}`, but that is a presentational attribute and
+   @hanzo/design's `:where(img,video){height:auto}` overrides it — so the logo
+   was sized by whatever the brand package happened to ship, not by this page.
+   The two assets differ in exactly the way that hides it: @hanzo/brand's SVG
+   carries a viewBox and no width/height, so it has no intrinsic size and landed
+   near the intended 32; @luxfi/brand's declares 1024x1024, so it took the full
+   column and rendered a 342px mark over lux.id's sign-in form. Same markup,
+   same CSS, opposite results, and only the brand nobody was looking at broke.
+   Pinning the height and letting width follow makes the header's own
+   declaration true again whatever a brand ships. */
+.hanzo-id-brand-header img { height: 32px; width: auto; }
+
+/* Text fallback when a brand ships no logo asset (see BrandHeader). */
+.hanzo-id-wordmark {
+  font-size: var(--text-xl);
+  font-weight: var(--weight-bold);
+  letter-spacing: var(--tracking-tight);
+  color: var(--text-primary);
 }
 
 .hanzo-id-page main {
   flex: 1;
   display: flex;
   flex-direction: column;
+  justify-content: center;
   gap: 24px;
 }
 
-.hanzo-id-page h1 { margin: 0; font-size: 28px; }
-.hanzo-id-page .lede { color: var(--muted); margin: 0; }
-
-form { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 16px; }
-form label { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 6px; font-size: 14px; color: var(--muted); }
-form input {
-  background: #111;
-  color: var(--fg);
-  border: 1px solid var(--border);
-  border-radius: 8px;
-  padding: 12px 14px;
-  font-size: 16px;
+/* The type scale is the design scale, five rungs: xs / sm / base / xl / 2xl.
+   `h1` at --text-2xl is the SAME 24px as pay.hanzo.ai's `text-2xl` headings, so
+   a heading does not change size when the flow crosses between the two. */
+.hanzo-id-page h1 {
+  margin: 0;
+  font-size: var(--text-2xl);
+  line-height: var(--leading-2xl);
+  letter-spacing: var(--tracking-tight);
 }
-form input:focus { outline: 2px solid var(--brand); outline-offset: -1px; }
+.hanzo-id-page h2 { margin: 0; font-size: var(--text-xl); line-height: var(--leading-xl); }
+.hanzo-id-page .lede { color: var(--muted-foreground); margin: 0; font-size: var(--text-base); }
 
-.hanzo-id-btn, form button {
-  background: var(--fg);
-  color: var(--bg);
-  border: 0;
-  border-radius: 8px;
-  padding: 12px 16px;
-  font-size: 16px;
-  font-weight: 600;
-  cursor: pointer;
-  text-decoration: none;
-  text-align: center;
-  display: inline-block;
-}
-.hanzo-id-btn[aria-disabled='true'], form button:disabled { opacity: 0.5; cursor: not-allowed; }
-.hanzo-id-btn.primary { background: var(--brand); }
+/* ── Field ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
 
-.hanzo-id-cta-row { display: flex; gap: 12px; }
-.hanzo-id-footer-links { color: var(--muted); font-size: 14px; }
-.hanzo-id-footer-links a { color: var(--fg); }
+.hanzo-id-form { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 16px; }
 
-.hanzo-id-error {
-  background: #2d0a0a;
-  color: #ff7878;
-  border: 1px solid #5a1414;
-  padding: 12px;
-  border-radius: 8px;
-  font-size: 14px;
-}
-.hanzo-id-info {
-  background: #0a1f2d;
-  color: #78b8ff;
-  border: 1px solid #14385a;
-  padding: 12px;
-  border-radius: 8px;
-}
-
-/* --- Social providers + passwordless (email/SMS) login + signup --- */
-.hanzo-id-login,
-.hanzo-id-signup,
-.hanzo-id-code-login {
+.hanzo-id-field {
   display: flex;
   flex-direction: column;
-  gap: 16px;
+  gap: 6px;
+  font-size: var(--text-sm);
+  color: var(--muted-foreground);
 }
-.hanzo-id-providers {
-  display: flex;
-  flex-direction: column;
-  gap: 10px;
+
+.hanzo-id-input {
+  /* `font: inherit` first: a bare <input>/<button> otherwise renders in the UA
+     face (Arial), which put two typefaces inside one 432px card — including on
+     the primary CTA. */
+  font: inherit;
+  font-size: var(--text-base);
+  background: var(--white-05);
+  color: var(--foreground);
+  /* A control's resting edge is --border-control. 0.4.2 cut it back to the alpha
+     ladder (.15) because a boundary that clears 3:1 on a near-black page IS a
+     mid-grey box, and a form of them reads as a wireframe. The contrast budget
+     went to --ring instead — the focus indicator is what a keyboard user
+     navigates by, it is the only boundary still held at 3:1, and unlike a
+     resting edge it is worth the loudness because it is transient. */
+  border: 1px solid var(--border-control);
+  /* 8px. 0.4.2 moved every control in the system to --radius-md, and tokens/
+     base.css draws a bare field at it; --radius-sm (6px) keeps its job on
+     genuinely small parts — badges, chips, menu rows — where 8px looks bubbly. */
+  border-radius: var(--radius-md);
+  padding: 0 14px;
+  min-height: 44px; /* the touch-target floor */
+  width: 100%;
 }
-.hanzo-id-provider-btn {
-  display: flex;
+.hanzo-id-input::placeholder { color: var(--text-disabled); }
+.hanzo-id-input:disabled { opacity: 0.5; cursor: not-allowed; }
+
+/* iOS Safari ZOOMS the viewport when a focused control's text is under 16px,
+   and it does not zoom back out — the user is left on a magnified, sideways-
+   scrolling sign-in page mid-credential. This rule used to be a COMMENT on
+   font-size above claiming `--text-base` prevented that; --text-base is
+   0.875rem = 14px, so the protection was never in effect on either credential
+   field. The type scale has no 16px rung and should not grow one — 16 is not a
+   design value here, it is the threshold in Safari's own zoom heuristic — so it
+   is written as the literal it is, and scoped to touch-primary pointers so the
+   desktop type ramp is untouched. */
+@media (pointer: coarse) {
+  .hanzo-id-input { font-size: 16px; }
+}
+
+/* Checkbox: the UA control, sized up from its 13px intrinsic box and tinted with
+   the brand. Its touch target is the whole <label> row, which is why it is the
+   one control here that is not 44px itself. */
+.hanzo-id-check {
+  font: inherit;
+  accent-color: var(--primary);
+  width: 18px;
+  height: 18px;
+  min-height: 0;
+  margin-top: 2px;
+  flex: none;
+}
+
+/* ── Button — ONE primitive, two modifiers ─────────────────────────── */
+/* `.hanzo-id-btn` is filled (the primary action). `.ghost` is the secondary
+   surface — social sign-in, org rows, Skip/Back. `.row` spreads content for a
+   list row. There is no `.primary`: the base IS primary, so there is one and
+   only one way to write the default button. */
+
+.hanzo-id-btn {
+  font: inherit;
+  font-size: var(--text-base);
+  font-weight: var(--weight-semibold);
+  display: inline-flex;
   align-items: center;
   justify-content: center;
   gap: 10px;
-  background: #111;
-  color: var(--fg);
-  border: 1px solid var(--border);
-  border-radius: 8px;
-  padding: 12px 16px;
-  font-size: 15px;
-  font-weight: 600;
+  background: var(--primary);
+  color: var(--primary-foreground);
+  border: 1px solid transparent;
+  /* Same 8px as the field it sits under. Two stacked controls in one 432px card
+     cannot round differently, and the system draws buttons at 8-10px too. */
+  border-radius: var(--radius-md);
+  padding: 10px 16px;
+  min-height: 44px;
   cursor: pointer;
   text-decoration: none;
   text-align: center;
+  transition: background var(--duration-fast) var(--ease-out),
+              border-color var(--duration-fast) var(--ease-out);
 }
-.hanzo-id-provider-btn:hover {
-  border-color: var(--muted);
-  background: #161616;
+.hanzo-id-btn:disabled,
+.hanzo-id-btn[aria-disabled='true'] { opacity: 0.5; cursor: not-allowed; }
+.hanzo-id-btn svg { flex: none; }
+
+/* The filled button had no hover at all. It has declared `transition:
+   background` since it was written and the system has shipped --primary-hover
+   the whole time, so the most-clicked control on the portal — Sign in, Continue,
+   Create account — was animating a property nothing ever changed. The ghost
+   variant below got its hover and this one was simply missed.
+
+   `:not(.ghost)` rather than relying on order: this selector and the ghost
+   hover both compute to (0,4,0), so with a bare `.hanzo-id-btn:hover` the two
+   would tie and source order would decide which surface a ghost button lifts
+   to. Saying which buttons are meant makes them unable to collide. */
+.hanzo-id-btn:not(.ghost):hover:not(:disabled):not([aria-disabled='true']) {
+  background: var(--primary-hover);
 }
-.hanzo-id-provider-web3 {
-  border-color: #3a3357;
+
+.hanzo-id-btn.ghost {
+  background: var(--white-05);
+  color: var(--foreground);
+  border-color: var(--border-strong);
+  font-weight: var(--weight-medium);
 }
-.hanzo-id-or {
+/* Hover is a SURFACE lift, not a brighter edge. This used to also set
+   `border-color: var(--foreground)` — #ededed, 17.9:1 on --background — which
+   painted a near-solid-white 1px wireframe around the two most-hovered controls
+   on the page (Continue with GitHub / Continue with Google). Two problems with
+   moving the edge on hover, and the second is the one that matters:
+
+   1. It read as a wireframe, not as a refined surface. The house hairline is a
+      low-alpha step (--white-10/-15), ~4x quieter than #ededed.
+   2. Brightening an edge is THEME-HOSTILE. Every rung brighter than
+      --neutral-500 is worse on white: --neutral-400 measures 8.3:1 on black but
+      only 2.52:1 on white, which would fail the same WCAG 1.4.11 floor the
+      resting border is documented to hold in BOTH themes. There is no token
+      that gets brighter on dark and darker on light, so the edge must not
+      encode state at all.
+
+   So the border stays the constant control boundary (--border-strong, 4.43:1,
+   both themes) and the background carries the state — the lift the `transition`
+   on .hanzo-id-btn was already animating. */
+.hanzo-id-btn.ghost:hover:not(:disabled) { background: var(--white-10); }
+
+.hanzo-id-btn.row { justify-content: space-between; text-align: left; width: 100%; }
+
+.hanzo-id-cta-row { display: flex; gap: 12px; }
+.hanzo-id-cta-row .hanzo-id-btn { flex: 1; }
+
+.hanzo-id-linkbtn {
+  font: inherit;
+  background: none;
+  border: 0;
+  color: var(--text-primary);
+  font-size: var(--text-sm);
+  cursor: pointer;
+  text-align: left;
+  padding: 4px 0;
+  text-decoration: underline;
+  text-underline-offset: 4px;
+}
+
+.hanzo-id-footer-links { color: var(--muted-foreground); font-size: var(--text-sm); }
+/* "Forgot password?" / "Create account" / "Sign in" / "Back to sign in" are the
+   only route changes on these pages that are not buttons, and they measured 17px
+   tall — the line box of their own text. Vertical padding on an INLINE box is
+   hit-tested but does not enter line-box height, so this buys the 44px target
+   with zero layout movement and no change to the sentences they sit inside.
+   (17 + 14 + 14 = 45.) The 14px bleed stays inside `main`'s 24px gap, so no two
+   targets overlap. Horizontal size already clears 44px on every one of them. */
+.hanzo-id-footer-links a {
+  color: var(--text-primary);
+  padding: 14px 0;
+  margin: -14px 0;
+}
+
+/* A2P SMS consent disclosure (shown on phone/SMS surfaces). */
+.hanzo-id-sms-consent { color: var(--muted-foreground); font-size: var(--text-xs); line-height: var(--leading-relaxed); }
+.hanzo-id-sms-consent p { margin: 0 0 6px; }
+.hanzo-id-sms-consent-links { margin: 0; }
+.hanzo-id-sms-consent a { color: var(--text-primary); }
+
+/* ── Inline message ────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+/* Red is one of the two hues @hanzo/design permits, and these are the system's
+   own state tokens — the same #fca5a5 pay.hanzo.ai renders errors in. The
+   informational variant used to be a blue (#78b8ff) that exists nowhere in the
+   system; on a monochrome surface "information" is a neutral card. */
+
+.hanzo-id-error,
+.hanzo-id-info {
+  padding: 12px;
+  border-radius: var(--radius-md);
+  font-size: var(--text-sm);
+  line-height: var(--leading-sm);
+  margin: 0;
+}
+.hanzo-id-error {
+  background: var(--state-error-bg);
+  color: var(--state-error-text);
+  border: 1px solid var(--state-error);
+}
+.hanzo-id-info {
+  background: var(--card);
+  color: var(--text-secondary);
+  border: 1px solid var(--white-10);
+}
+
+/* ── Loading ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+/* `.hanzo-id-spinner` used to be a class with NO rule behind it: the loading
+   state measured 0px tall and was invisible on every portal. */
+
+.hanzo-id-spinner {
+  width: 28px;
+  height: 28px;
+  margin: 0 auto;
+  border: 2px solid var(--white-15);
+  border-top-color: var(--primary);
+  border-radius: var(--radius-full);
+  animation: hanzo-id-spin 700ms linear infinite;
+}
+@keyframes hanzo-id-spin { to { transform: rotate(360deg); } }
+
+/* ── Device-authorization approval ─────────────────────────────────── */
+
+.hanzo-id-device main { gap: 18px; }
+.hanzo-id-device-prompt {
+  color: var(--muted-foreground);
+  font-size: var(--text-sm);
+  line-height: var(--leading-relaxed);
+  margin: 0;
+}
+.hanzo-id-device-prompt strong { color: var(--text-primary); }
+.hanzo-id-device-code {
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  font-size: var(--text-xl);
+  letter-spacing: var(--tracking-widest);
+  text-transform: uppercase;
+}
+.hanzo-id-device-confirm {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: row;
+  align-items: flex-start;
+  gap: 10px;
+  color: var(--muted-foreground);
+  font-size: var(--text-sm);
+  line-height: var(--leading-relaxed);
+}
+
+/* ── Forced TOTP enrollment ────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+.hanzo-id-mfa-enroll { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 16px; }
+.hanzo-id-mfa-enroll h2 { margin: 0; font-size: var(--text-xl); }
+.hanzo-id-mfa-qr {
+  align-self: center;
+  background: var(--pure-white);
+  padding: 12px;
+  border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
+  width: 220px;
+  height: 220px;
+  box-sizing: content-box;
+}
+.hanzo-id-mfa-qr svg { width: 100%; height: 100%; display: block; }
+.hanzo-id-mfa-manual { font-size: var(--text-sm); color: var(--muted-foreground); }
+.hanzo-id-mfa-manual summary { cursor: pointer; }
+.hanzo-id-mfa-secret,
+.hanzo-id-mfa-recovery code {
+  display: inline-block;
+  margin-top: 8px;
+  padding: 6px 10px;
+  background: var(--white-05);
+  border: 1px solid var(--white-10);
+  border-radius: var(--radius-sm);
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+  letter-spacing: var(--tracking-widest);
+  word-break: break-all;
+}
+.hanzo-id-mfa-recovery { font-size: var(--text-sm); color: var(--muted-foreground); line-height: var(--leading-relaxed); }
+.hanzo-id-mfa-recovery code { letter-spacing: var(--tracking-normal); }
+
+/* ── Social / Web3 sign-in ─────────────────────────────────────────── */
+/* These are `.hanzo-id-btn.ghost` — there is no separate social-button surface. */
+
+.hanzo-id-social { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 10px; }
+
+/* Wallet chain chooser — revealed under the single "Connect Wallet" button when
+   the injected chain is ambiguous. Indented so the EVM/Solana options read as
+   children of the wallet entry. */
+.hanzo-id-wallet-chains {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  gap: 10px;
+  margin-left: 4px;
+  padding-left: 12px;
+  border-left: 1px solid var(--white-10);
+}
+
+/* Labeled divider between social row and email form. */
+.hanzo-id-divider {
   display: flex;
   align-items: center;
-  gap: 12px;
-  color: var(--muted);
-  font-size: 12px;
-  text-transform: uppercase;
-  letter-spacing: 0.08em;
+  text-align: center;
+  color: var(--muted-foreground);
+  font-size: var(--text-sm);
 }
-.hanzo-id-or::before,
-.hanzo-id-or::after {
+.hanzo-id-divider::before,
+.hanzo-id-divider::after {
   content: '';
   flex: 1;
   height: 1px;
-  background: var(--border);
+  background: var(--white-10);
 }
-.hanzo-id-linkbtn {
-  background: none;
-  border: 0;
-  color: var(--muted);
-  font-size: 14px;
-  font-weight: 500;
-  width: auto;
-  padding: 4px;
-  cursor: pointer;
-  text-align: center;
+.hanzo-id-divider span { padding: 0 12px; }
+
+/* ── Signed-in portal: the apps launcher ───────────────────────────── */
+/* These rules used to be an inline `style={{…}}` object on Portal.tsx carrying
+   rgba(255,255,255,0.14), borderRadius 12, fontSize 13, fontWeight 600 and two
+   bare opacities — six invented values for facts the token layer already
+   states. They are classes now for the same reason as everything else in this
+   file: a surface must not depend on where it is mounted. */
+
+.hanzo-id-portal main { width: 100%; max-width: 760px; }
+
+.hanzo-id-apps {
+  display: grid;
+  grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fill, minmax(210px, 1fr));
+  gap: var(--space-3);
+  margin-top: var(--space-6);
 }
-.hanzo-id-linkbtn:hover {
-  color: var(--fg);
-  text-decoration: underline;
+
+.hanzo-id-applink {
+  display: block;
+  padding: var(--space-4);
+  /* A tile whose affordance is carried by its label, not its edge — so this is
+     the decorative hairline rung, not the 3:1 control boundary. --white-15 is
+     the ladder rung the old rgba(255,255,255,0.14) was approximating. */
+  border: 1px solid var(--white-15);
+  border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
+  text-decoration: none;
+  color: inherit;
+  transition: border-color var(--duration-fast) var(--ease-out);
 }
-.hanzo-id-toggle-mode {
-  margin-top: 4px;
+.hanzo-id-applink:hover { border-color: var(--border-strong); text-decoration: none; }
+.hanzo-id-applink-name { display: flex; justify-content: space-between; font-weight: var(--weight-semibold); }
+.hanzo-id-applink-name span[aria-hidden] { color: var(--text-tertiary); }
+.hanzo-id-applink-desc { color: var(--muted-foreground); font-size: var(--text-sm); margin-top: var(--space-1); }
+
+/* The account control is a control, not a bar: cap it so the trigger (and the
+   menu, which matches the trigger's width) reads at the size it does on every
+   other Hanzo surface instead of spanning the whole 760px column. */
+.hanzo-id-portal-account { margin-top: var(--space-6); max-width: 260px; }
+
+/* ── Onboarding flow ───────────────────────────────────────────────── */
+
+.hanzo-id-onboarding { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 24px; }
+.hanzo-id-onboarding-head { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 6px; }
+.hanzo-id-onboarding-head h1,
+.hanzo-id-onboarding-done h1 { margin: 0; font-size: var(--text-2xl); letter-spacing: var(--tracking-tight); }
+.hanzo-id-onboarding-body { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 16px; }
+.hanzo-id-onboarding-done { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 16px; }
+
+.hanzo-id-stepdots { display: flex; gap: 8px; }
+.hanzo-id-stepdots span {
+  flex: 1;
+  height: 4px;
+  border-radius: var(--radius-full);
+  background: var(--white-10);
 }
-.hanzo-id-notice {
-  background: #0a1f2d;
-  color: #78b8ff;
-  border: 1px solid #14385a;
+.hanzo-id-stepdots span.on { background: var(--primary); }
+
+.hanzo-id-slug-preview {
+  color: var(--muted-foreground);
+  font-size: var(--text-sm);
+  margin: -8px 0 0;
+  font-family: var(--font-mono);
+}
+
+.hanzo-id-onboarding-actions { display: flex; gap: 10px; flex-wrap: wrap; }
+.hanzo-id-onboarding-actions .hanzo-id-btn { flex: 1; min-width: 120px; }
+
+.hanzo-id-summary { display: grid; grid-template-columns: auto 1fr; gap: 8px 16px; margin: 0; }
+.hanzo-id-summary dt { color: var(--muted-foreground); font-size: var(--text-sm); }
+.hanzo-id-summary dd { margin: 0; font-size: var(--text-sm); font-family: var(--font-mono); }
+
+/* Consent step */
+.hanzo-id-consent { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 16px; }
+.hanzo-id-consent p { margin: 0; color: var(--muted-foreground); font-size: var(--text-sm); line-height: var(--leading-normal); }
+.hanzo-id-consent-check {
+  display: flex;
+  align-items: flex-start;
+  gap: 10px;
   padding: 12px;
-  border-radius: 8px;
-  font-size: 14px;
+  border: 1px solid var(--border-control);
+  border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
+  cursor: pointer;
+  font-size: var(--text-sm);
 }
+.hanzo-id-consent-check input { margin-top: 2px; accent-color: var(--primary); }
+
+/* Plan step — one card per catalog plan + the pay-as-you-go card */
+.hanzo-id-plans { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 10px; }
+.hanzo-id-plan {
+  display: flex;
+  flex-direction: column;
+  align-items: flex-start;
+  gap: 4px;
+  min-height: 44px;
+  padding: 14px 16px;
+  border: 1px solid var(--border-control);
+  border-radius: var(--radius-lg);
+  background: var(--white-05);
+  color: var(--foreground);
+  font: inherit;
+  text-align: left;
+  cursor: pointer;
+  transition: background 0.15s ease;
+}
+.hanzo-id-plan:hover { background: var(--white-10); }
+.hanzo-id-plan:disabled { opacity: 0.6; cursor: default; }
+.hanzo-id-plan.popular { border-color: var(--border-selected); }
+.hanzo-id-plan-badge {
+  align-self: flex-end;
+  margin: -4px 0 -18px;
+  padding: 2px 8px;
+  border-radius: var(--radius-full);
+  background: var(--primary);
+  color: var(--primary-foreground);
+  font-size: var(--text-xs);
+  font-weight: 600;
+}
+.hanzo-id-plans-empty { margin: 0; color: var(--muted-foreground); font-size: var(--text-sm); }
+.hanzo-id-plan-name { font-weight: 600; }
+.hanzo-id-plan-price { font-size: var(--text-sm); }
+.hanzo-id-plan-price em { font-style: normal; color: var(--muted-foreground); }
+.hanzo-id-plan-desc { color: var(--muted-foreground); font-size: var(--text-sm); }

apps/web/src/components/BrandHeader.tsx

@@ -1,10 +1,24 @@
+import { useState } from 'react'
 import type { BrandContract } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
 
+/**
+ * Brand lockup for the auth pages. Renders the brand logo when it loads, and
+ * falls back to the brand NAME as a text wordmark when the logo is absent or
+ * fails to load — so a 404 logo (e.g. a brand package that doesn't ship its
+ * assets) never shows a broken-image icon. The name always exists on the
+ * brand contract, so the header is always presentable.
+ */
 export function BrandHeader({ brand }: { brand: BrandContract }) {
+  const [imgOk, setImgOk] = useState(true)
+  const showImg = Boolean(brand.logoUrl) && imgOk
   return (
     <header className="hanzo-id-brand-header">
       <a href="/" aria-label={brand.name}>
-        <img src={brand.logoUrl} alt={brand.name} height={32} />
+        {showImg ? (
+          <img src={brand.logoUrl} alt={brand.name} height={32} onError={() => setImgOk(false)} />
+        ) : (
+          <span className="hanzo-id-wordmark">{brand.name}</span>
+        )}
       </a>
     </header>
   )

apps/web/src/main.tsx

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import { StrictMode } from 'react'
 import { createRoot } from 'react-dom/client'
 import { App } from './App'
+import { Analytics } from './analytics'
 import { registerProvider } from '@hanzo/id-idv'
 import { createStubProvider } from '@hanzo/id-idv/providers/stub'
 import './app.css'
@@ -12,6 +13,14 @@ const root = document.getElementById('root')
 if (!root) throw new Error('#root missing')
 createRoot(root).render(
   <StrictMode>
-    <App />
+    {/*
+      Telemetry wraps App rather than living inside it: the pageview must be
+      recorded for the arrival itself, including the loads where `/config.json`
+      or the brand package fails and App renders nothing but an error. Those are
+      exactly the visits worth counting.
+    */}
+    <Analytics>
+      <App />
+    </Analytics>
   </StrictMode>,
 )

apps/web/src/marketing.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/**
+ * Per-org marketing content + app launcher links.
+ *
+ * The brand-neutral `BrandContract` (from `loadBrand`) carries only the
+ * visual essentials (name, logo, accent). The split-view login's marketing
+ * panel and the post-login apps launcher need richer, org-specific copy —
+ * ported verbatim from the frozen `legacy-nextjs` design (`staticBranding`
+ * content + `orgApps`). Keyed by `org.orgId` so it stays decoupled from
+ * hostname switches; unknown orgs fall back to `hanzo`.
+ */
+
+export interface Quote {
+  readonly text: string
+  readonly author: string
+  readonly role?: string
+}
+
+export interface Marketing {
+  /** Pill above the hero ("✦ <tagline>"). */
+  readonly tagline?: string
+  /** Hero heading. */
+  readonly title: string
+  /** Hero subheading. */
+  readonly subtitle: string
+  /** Rotating testimonials. */
+  readonly quotes: readonly Quote[]
+}
+
+export interface AppLink {
+  readonly name: string
+  readonly href: string
+  readonly description: string
+}
+
+const MARKETING: Record<string, Marketing> = {
+  hanzo: {
+    tagline: 'AI-powered development',
+    title: 'Start building in seconds',
+    subtitle: 'Describe your idea and watch AI bring it to life instantly.',
+    quotes: [
+      { text: 'Hanzo is amazing. It is revolutionizing how we build and deploy applications.', author: 'Developer', role: 'Software Engineer' },
+    ],
+  },
+  lux: {
+    tagline: 'Lux-powered infrastructure',
+    title: 'Start deploying in seconds',
+    subtitle: 'High-performance blockchain infrastructure for the Lux ecosystem.',
+    quotes: [
+      { text: 'Lux is fast. We deploy chains in minutes, not weeks.', author: 'Validator', role: 'Node Operator' },
+    ],
+  },
+  zoo: {
+    tagline: 'Open AI research network',
+    title: 'Build the future of DeAI',
+    subtitle: 'Open AI research and decentralized science for everyone.',
+    quotes: [
+      { text: 'Zoo is where bleeding-edge DeAI experiments actually ship.', author: 'Researcher', role: 'ML Engineer' },
+    ],
+  },
+  pars: {
+    tagline: 'Sovereign digital identity',
+    title: 'Welcome to Pars',
+    subtitle: 'The decentralized network for the next generation.',
+    quotes: [
+      { text: 'Pars gives our community a sovereign, verifiable identity layer.', author: 'Member', role: 'Community Lead' },
+    ],
+  },
+}
+
+// The launcher lists PRODUCTS a person opens, not every host we run.
+//
+// Hanzo is three: App (build), Chat (talk), Cloud (the platform + its API).
+// "Console" is NOT a fourth — it is Cloud's former name, and console.hanzo.ai
+// now redirects to cloud.hanzo.ai, so listing both showed one product twice
+// under two names and sent half the traffic through a redirect. It is gone;
+// nothing here links to console.hanzo.ai.
+//
+// Analytics, Platform and Storage came out with it: s3.hanzo.ai answers a bare
+// XML AccessDenied to a browser (it is an S3 API endpoint, not a page), and the
+// other two are surfaces inside Cloud rather than products of their own. A
+// launcher that lands you on an error page teaches people the tiles are broken.
+const APPS: Record<string, readonly AppLink[]> = {
+  hanzo: [
+    { name: 'App', href: 'https://hanzo.app', description: 'Build with AI' },
+    { name: 'Chat', href: 'https://hanzo.chat', description: 'AI chat interface' },
+    { name: 'Cloud', href: 'https://cloud.hanzo.ai', description: 'Models, compute & API' },
+  ],
+  lux: [
+    { name: 'Bridge', href: 'https://bridge.lux.network', description: 'Cross-chain bridge' },
+    { name: 'Exchange', href: 'https://lux.exchange', description: 'DEX trading' },
+    { name: 'Cloud', href: 'https://lux.cloud', description: 'Lux Cloud' },
+    { name: 'Explorer', href: 'https://explore.lux.network', description: 'Block explorer' },
+  ],
+  zoo: [
+    { name: 'Network', href: 'https://zoo.ngo', description: 'Zoo Labs Foundation' },
+    { name: 'ZIPs', href: 'https://zips.zoo.ngo', description: 'Improvement proposals' },
+    { name: 'Chat', href: 'https://chat.zoo.ngo', description: 'DeAI chat interface' },
+  ],
+  pars: [
+    { name: 'Network', href: 'https://pars.network', description: 'Pars Network' },
+    { name: 'Vote', href: 'https://pars.vote', description: 'Governance & proposals' },
+  ],
+}
+
+const BILLING: Record<string, string> = {
+  hanzo: 'https://billing.hanzo.ai',
+  lux: 'https://billing.lux.network',
+  zoo: 'https://billing.zoo.network',
+  pars: 'https://billing.pars.network',
+}
+
+export function marketingFor(orgId: string): Marketing {
+  return MARKETING[orgId] ?? MARKETING.hanzo
+}
+
+export function appsFor(orgId: string): readonly AppLink[] {
+  return APPS[orgId] ?? APPS.hanzo
+}
+
+export function billingFor(orgId: string): string {
+  return BILLING[orgId] ?? BILLING.hanzo
+}

apps/web/src/pages/Callback.tsx

@@ -1,33 +1,54 @@
 import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
-import type { BrandContract } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
-import type { AuthClient } from '@hanzo/id-auth'
+import type { BrandContract, OrgConfig } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
+import { createIam } from '@hanzo/id-auth'
 import { BrandHeader } from '../components/BrandHeader'
 
-export function Callback({ client, brand }: { client: AuthClient; brand: BrandContract }) {
+/**
+ * OAuth/OIDC callback — the portal's OWN PKCE return, and only that.
+ *
+ * One kind of return lands here: an IAM authorization code for a flow this
+ * portal started (password, wallet, or a federated provider begun through
+ * `signinRedirect`). The `@hanzo/iam` SDK's `handleCallback` completes it,
+ * reading back the exact PKCE verifier and state it stored.
+ *
+ * There is no second, social-specific case. A federated sign-in returns from the
+ * IdP to IAM's OWN callback (`/v1/iam/oauth/callback`), which does the code
+ * exchange server-side and sends the browser back here with an ordinary IAM code
+ * — indistinguishable from any other. The page used to carry a branch that
+ * decoded a base64 provider `state` and posted the raw IdP code back to IAM; no
+ * endpoint ever accepted that, and nothing can produce that state any more.
+ *
+ * Routing after the exchange:
+ *   - A non-OIDC "come back here" target left in `post_login_redirect` (device
+ *     approval) → forward tokens there.
+ *   - A bare portal sign-in → `/onboarding`.
+ *
+ * An app that sent the user here for a code never reaches this page at all: that
+ * flow re-enters IAM's authorize endpoint and IAM redirects straight to the app.
+ */
+export function Callback({ org, brand }: { org: OrgConfig; brand: BrandContract }) {
   const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
   useEffect(() => {
-    const sp = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search)
-    const code = sp.get('code')
-    if (!code) {
-      setError('Missing authorization code.')
-      return
-    }
-    const codeVerifier = sessionStorage.getItem('pkce_verifier') ?? undefined
-    client
-      .exchange(code, codeVerifier)
+    const iam = createIam(org)
+    iam
+      .handleCallback(window.location.href)
       .then((tok) => {
-        // Forward the tokens to whichever app initiated this flow.
-        const target = sessionStorage.getItem('post_login_redirect') ?? '/'
-        const url = new URL(target, window.location.origin)
-        url.searchParams.set('access_token', tok.accessToken)
-        if (tok.refreshToken) url.searchParams.set('refresh_token', tok.refreshToken)
-        if (tok.idToken) url.searchParams.set('id_token', tok.idToken)
-        sessionStorage.removeItem('pkce_verifier')
+        const target = sessionStorage.getItem('post_login_redirect')
         sessionStorage.removeItem('post_login_redirect')
-        window.location.replace(url.toString())
+        if (target) {
+          // Forward tokens to the page that sent the user to sign in.
+          const url = new URL(target, window.location.origin)
+          url.searchParams.set('access_token', tok.accessToken)
+          if (tok.refreshToken) url.searchParams.set('refresh_token', tok.refreshToken)
+          if (tok.idToken) url.searchParams.set('id_token', tok.idToken)
+          window.location.replace(url.toString())
+          return
+        }
+        // Bare portal sign-in → onboarding.
+        window.location.replace('/onboarding')
       })
       .catch((e) => setError(String(e)))
-  }, [client])
+  }, [org])
 
   return (
     <div className="hanzo-id-page hanzo-id-callback">

apps/web/src/pages/DeviceApproval.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+import { useEffect, useState, type ReactNode } from 'react'
+import type { BrandContract } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
+import { LoginForm, SocialButtons, type AuthClient, type DeviceInfoResult } from '@hanzo/id-auth'
+import { BrandHeader } from '../components/BrandHeader'
+
+/**
+ * RFC 8628 device-authorization approval (`/login/oauth/device`).
+ *
+ * The terminal leg of `hanzo login`: the CLI shows a short `user_code` and sends
+ * the human here (the IAM `verification_uri`; `verification_uri_complete`
+ * appends the code as a PATH segment, `/login/oauth/device/<code>` — IAM builds
+ * it that way because that is the route this page is registered on, and
+ * `readUserCode` accepts the `?user_code=` query form too). The human signs in
+ * to the SAME issuer, confirms the code matches what their device shows, and
+ * approves — which binds their identity onto the pending row (`Token.User`,
+ * owner/name) so the CLI's token poll stops answering `authorization_pending`
+ * and mints. There is no `UserSignIn` flag; an empty `User` IS "not yet
+ * approved".
+ *
+ * Auth is reused, never reimplemented: not-signed-in renders the normal
+ * `<LoginForm>` + `<SocialButtons>`; once the issuer session cookie is set the
+ * page reads it back from `/v1/iam/get-account` and shows the confirm step.
+ * Approval rides that session cookie (`client.approveDevice`), so no token ever
+ * touches the URL or logs.
+ *
+ * The screen exists to answer ONE question — which application am I authorizing?
+ * — so the application it names is read from the code (`client.deviceInfo`) and
+ * from nowhere else. Until IAM has named one there is no name on screen and no
+ * button to press.
+ */
+
+type Phase =
+  | { s: 'checking' }
+  | { s: 'signin' }
+  | { s: 'confirm'; email?: string }
+  | { s: 'consent'; email?: string }
+  | { s: 'approving' }
+  | { s: 'approved' }
+
+/** Read the user_code from `?user_code=` first, then a trailing path segment
+ *  (`/login/oauth/device/<code>`) so both the complete and bare verification
+ *  URIs work; absent → the user types it. */
+function readUserCode(): string {
+  const fromQuery = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search).get('user_code')
+  if (fromQuery) return fromQuery
+  const m = window.location.pathname.match(/\/login\/oauth\/device\/([^/?#]+)/)
+  return m ? decodeURIComponent(m[1]!) : ''
+}
+
+/** A device-flow return must never leave tokens/codes sitting in the address
+ *  bar (history, referrer, shoulder-surf). Strip everything but `user_code`. */
+function scrubUrl() {
+  const url = new URL(window.location.href)
+  let changed = false
+  for (const k of ['access_token', 'refresh_token', 'id_token', 'code', 'state']) {
+    if (url.searchParams.has(k)) {
+      url.searchParams.delete(k)
+      changed = true
+    }
+  }
+  if (changed) window.history.replaceState({}, '', url.toString())
+}
+
+export function DeviceApproval({ client, brand }: { client: AuthClient; brand: BrandContract }) {
+  const [phase, setPhase] = useState<Phase>({ s: 'checking' })
+  const [userCode, setUserCode] = useState(() => readUserCode())
+  // The code is prefilled from `?user_code=` and stays EDITABLE, which is the
+  // anti-phishing property that matters: approving is an explicit click on a
+  // code the human can read and correct against what their own device shows.
+  // There was also a "I started this sign-in" checkbox in front of that click.
+  // No device page anyone actually uses has one — Google, GitHub and AWS all
+  // show the code and an Approve button — and a tickbox is not evidence: a
+  // victim being walked through a crafted link ticks it as readily as they
+  // click Approve. It bought nothing and cost every honest user a step.
+  const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
+  // WHICH application is asking — the whole point of this screen, and the one
+  // thing the page cannot know on its own. It used to render `org.appName`: this
+  // PORTAL's own branding, a static per-org string, so a sign-in started by
+  // hanzo-cli was approved under a screen reading "hanzo-console". The client is
+  // a property of the CODE (it lives on the pending row and is what the backend
+  // actually approves), so it is read from the code — `client.deviceInfo`,
+  // IAM `POST /v1/iam/oauth/device/info`.
+  //
+  // That read is session-gated and answers with one opaque refusal for unknown /
+  // expired / already-approved, so it is no oracle for hunting live codes: it
+  // tells a caller strictly less than the approval that same caller could already
+  // attempt.
+  //
+  // null = not resolved yet. NOTHING is rendered in its place — no fallback name,
+  // no portal name, no guess. Naming the wrong party is the defect being fixed
+  // here, and a screen that names none is strictly better than one that lies.
+  const [app, setApp] = useState<DeviceInfoResult | null>(null)
+  const named = app?.ok ? app : null
+
+  // Resolve the issuer session: signed in → confirm, else → sign-in form. Reads
+  // same-origin from `/v1/iam/get-account` (cookie session; the brand `*.id`
+  // host IS `iamUrl`, so the cookie rides along) — identical to the Portal.
+  useEffect(() => {
+    scrubUrl()
+    let alive = true
+    fetch(new URL('/v1/iam/get-account', client.org.iamUrl).toString(), {
+      credentials: 'include',
+      headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },
+    })
+      .then((r) => r.json())
+      .then((b: Record<string, unknown>) => {
+        if (!alive) return
+        const d = b.data as Record<string, unknown> | undefined
+        if (b.status === 'ok' && d && typeof d === 'object') {
+          setPhase({ s: 'confirm', email: str(d.email) ?? str(d.name) })
+        } else {
+          setPhase({ s: 'signin' })
+        }
+      })
+      .catch(() => {
+        if (alive) setPhase({ s: 'signin' })
+      })
+    return () => {
+      alive = false
+    }
+  }, [client.org.iamUrl])
+
+  // Ask WHICH application the code belongs to. Needs both halves of what the
+  // endpoint is gated on: the issuer session (every phase past the check has one
+  // except `signin`, and the boolean keeps consent/approving from re-asking) and
+  // a code to ask about.
+  //
+  // The debounce is what makes a hand-typed code work: each keystroke is a
+  // different code, and a partial one is not a real code — without it the human
+  // watches IAM's refusal flash at them while they are still typing.
+  const signedIn = phase.s !== 'checking' && phase.s !== 'signin'
+  const blank = userCode.trim().length === 0
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (!signedIn || blank) return
+    let alive = true
+    const t = setTimeout(() => {
+      client.deviceInfo(userCode).then((r) => {
+        if (!alive) return
+        // The session lapsed between the get-account check and this read. The
+        // signin phase preserves the code in `returnTo`, so the human lands back
+        // here with it intact.
+        if (!r.ok && r.loginRequired) setPhase({ s: 'signin' })
+        else setApp(r)
+      })
+    }, 250)
+    return () => {
+      alive = false
+      clearTimeout(t)
+    }
+  }, [client, userCode, signedIn, blank])
+
+  async function approve() {
+    setError(null)
+    setPhase({ s: 'approving' })
+    const res = await client.approveDevice(userCode)
+    if (res.ok) {
+      setPhase({ s: 'approved' })
+    } else if (res.required) {
+      setPhase({ s: 'consent' })
+    } else {
+      setError(res.error ?? 'Approval failed. Restart sign-in on your device.')
+      setPhase({ s: 'confirm' })
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (phase.s === 'checking') {
+    return (
+      <Shell brand={brand}>
+        <div className="hanzo-id-spinner" style={{ borderTopColor: brand.accentColor ?? '#fff' }} />
+      </Shell>
+    )
+  }
+
+  if (phase.s === 'signin') {
+    // Sign in first (reuse the normal flow). The password leg stays on-page via
+    // `onAuthenticated` and re-checks the session; the social leg round-trips and
+    // returns to THIS page (postLoginRedirect), where the session check resumes.
+    const returnTo = userCode
+      ? `${window.location.pathname}?user_code=${encodeURIComponent(userCode)}`
+      : window.location.pathname
+    return (
+      <Shell brand={brand}>
+        <h1>Sign in to approve your device</h1>
+        <SocialButtons client={client} intent="signin" postLoginRedirect={returnTo} />
+        <LoginForm client={client} onAuthenticated={() => setPhase({ s: 'confirm' })} />
+        <p className="hanzo-id-footer-links">
+          <a href="/forget">Forgot password?</a>
+        </p>
+      </Shell>
+    )
+  }
+
+  if (phase.s === 'approved') {
+    return (
+      <Shell brand={brand}>
+        <h1>You're signed in on your device</h1>
+        <p className="lede">Approval complete — you can close this window and return to your device.</p>
+      </Shell>
+    )
+  }
+
+  const busy = phase.s === 'approving'
+  const consent = phase.s === 'consent'
+  const email = phase.s === 'confirm' || phase.s === 'consent' ? phase.email : undefined
+  // ONE place shows a failure, whichever leg produced it: the approval itself, or
+  // the lookup that has to name an application before an approval is offered.
+  const failure = error ?? (app && !app.ok ? app.error : null)
+
+  return (
+    <Shell brand={brand}>
+      <h1>Approve this device</h1>
+      {email ? <p className="lede">Signed in as {email}</p> : null}
+
+      {/* The application is named ONLY once IAM has confirmed it — the clientId
+          alongside the display name, so a technical human can check it reads
+          `hanzo-cli` exactly and not something that merely looks like it. Until
+          then the sentence says a device, because that is all the page knows. */}
+      <p className="hanzo-id-device-prompt">
+        {named ? (
+          <>
+            <strong>{named.displayName}</strong> (<code>{named.clientId}</code>) is asking to
+            sign in as you.
+          </>
+        ) : (
+          'A device is asking to sign in as you.'
+        )}{' '}
+        Approve ONLY if the code below matches the one shown on that device, and only if you
+        started this sign-in yourself.
+      </p>
+
+      <label className="hanzo-id-field">
+        <span>Device code</span>
+        <input
+          type="text"
+          inputMode="text"
+          autoCapitalize="characters"
+          autoCorrect="off"
+          spellCheck={false}
+          autoComplete="one-time-code"
+          aria-label="Device code"
+          className="hanzo-id-input hanzo-id-device-code"
+          value={userCode}
+          // A name — and a failure — belongs to a CODE. Edit the code and both are
+          // dropped in the same commit, so no name is ever left on screen for a
+          // frame beside a code it was not confirmed for.
+          onChange={(e) => {
+            setUserCode(e.target.value)
+            setApp(null)
+            setError(null)
+          }}
+          placeholder="e.g. K7M4P2QH"
+          disabled={busy}
+        />
+      </label>
+
+      {consent && named ? (
+        <p className="hanzo-id-info">
+          <strong>{named.displayName}</strong> needs your consent to continue. By approving
+          you grant the device showing this code access to your profile.
+        </p>
+      ) : null}
+
+      {failure ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{failure}</p> : null}
+
+      <div className="hanzo-id-cta-row">
+        <button
+          type="button"
+          // Nothing is approved until IAM has named what is being approved. An
+          // unresolved or refused lookup leaves no button to press, rather than a
+          // button that authorizes an unnamed party.
+          className="hanzo-id-btn"
+          disabled={busy || !named}
+          onClick={approve}
+        >
+          {busy ? 'Approving…' : consent ? 'Approve & grant access' : 'Approve'}
+        </button>
+      </div>
+    </Shell>
+  )
+}
+
+function Shell({ brand, children }: { brand: BrandContract; children: ReactNode }) {
+  return (
+    <div className="hanzo-id-page hanzo-id-device">
+      <BrandHeader brand={brand} />
+      <main>{children}</main>
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+function str(v: unknown): string | undefined {
+  return typeof v === 'string' && v.length > 0 ? v : undefined
+}

apps/web/src/pages/Login.tsx

@@ -1,5 +1,14 @@
-import type { BrandContract } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
-import { LoginForm, type AuthClient } from '@hanzo/id-auth'
+import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
+import { idBrandLabel, type BrandContract } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
+import {
+  LoginForm,
+  MfaEnrollForm,
+  OTPForm,
+  SocialButtons,
+  mfaChannelOf,
+  type AuthClient,
+  type LoginResponse,
+} from '@hanzo/id-auth'
 import { BrandHeader } from '../components/BrandHeader'
 
 export function Login({ client, brand }: { client: AuthClient; brand: BrandContract }) {
@@ -7,19 +16,195 @@ export function Login({ client, brand }: { client: AuthClient; brand: BrandContr
   const redirectUri = sp.get('redirect_uri') ?? undefined
   const state = sp.get('state') ?? undefined
   const clientIdOverride = sp.get('client_id') ?? undefined
+  const codeChallenge = sp.get('code_challenge') ?? undefined
+  const codeChallengeMethod = (sp.get('code_challenge_method') as 'S256' | 'plain' | null) ?? undefined
+  const nonce = sp.get('nonce') ?? undefined
+  // A provider the user already chose upstream (the console sends
+  // `?provider_hint=provider-github` when they click "Continue with GitHub"
+  // over there). With no live session we launch that provider straight away
+  // instead of showing this form — so the click lands directly in the social
+  // flow, never bouncing the user to a second login page. We honor ONLY
+  // `provider_hint`, never a bare `provider=` (the SSO SDK uses that for its
+  // `<org>-iam` IDP hint — a different meaning).
+  const providerHint = sp.get('provider_hint') ?? undefined
+
+  // TRUE single sign-on. When an app sent the user here for an authorization
+  // code (client_id + redirect_uri present) AND the browser already holds an
+  // issuer session from an earlier sign-in (the `iam_session_id` cookie), mint
+  // the code from that session and redirect straight back — no form, no
+  // credential re-entry. With no live session we fall back to auto-launching the
+  // hinted provider if one was named, else the interactive form. A bare portal
+  // visit (no client_id/redirect_uri) has nowhere to redirect, so it shows the
+  // form immediately as before.
+  const canSilent = !!clientIdOverride && !!redirectUri
+  const fallback = providerHint ? 'federate' : 'form'
+  const [phase, setPhase] = useState<'silent' | 'federate' | 'form'>(canSilent ? 'silent' : fallback)
+
+  // null = show the credential form; otherwise IAM returned an MFA signal and
+  // we render the matching step instead of navigating on.
+  const [mfa, setMfa] = useState<LoginResponse | null>(null)
+  const [challengeError, setChallengeError] = useState<string | null>(null)
+
+  const clientId = clientIdOverride ?? client.org.clientId
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (!canSilent) return
+    let cancelled = false
+    client
+      .silentLogin({
+        clientId: clientIdOverride!,
+        application: clientIdOverride!,
+        redirectUri: redirectUri!,
+        state,
+        codeChallenge,
+        codeChallengeMethod,
+        nonce,
+      })
+      .then((r) => {
+        if (cancelled) return
+        if (r.redirectUrl) {
+          window.location.assign(r.redirectUrl)
+        } else {
+          setPhase(fallback)
+        }
+      })
+      .catch(() => {
+        if (!cancelled) setPhase(fallback)
+      })
+    return () => {
+      cancelled = true
+    }
+    // Run once on mount; the OAuth params are fixed for the life of the page.
+    // eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
+  }, [])
+
+  // The credential check succeeded (or MFA was satisfied). For a downstream
+  // OIDC request, re-enter authorize with the now-established IAM session so it
+  // mints the code; for a bare portal sign-in, land on onboarding.
+  function completeAfterAuth() {
+    if (redirectUri) {
+      window.location.href = client.authorize({
+        clientId,
+        redirectUri,
+        state: state ?? '',
+        codeChallenge,
+        codeChallengeMethod,
+      })
+    } else {
+      window.location.href = '/onboarding'
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (phase === 'silent') {
+    return (
+      <div className="hanzo-id-page hanzo-id-login">
+        <BrandHeader brand={brand} />
+        <main aria-busy="true">
+          <p>Signing you in…</p>
+        </main>
+      </div>
+    )
+  }
+
+  // Auto-launch the hinted provider. `SocialButtons` is headless here — it
+  // resolves the app config and runs the hop; we show a busy state meanwhile,
+  // and drop to the form only if the hint matched no configured provider.
+  if (phase === 'federate') {
+    return (
+      <div className="hanzo-id-page hanzo-id-login">
+        <BrandHeader brand={brand} />
+        <main aria-busy="true">
+          <p>Signing you in…</p>
+          <SocialButtons
+            client={client}
+            clientIdOverride={clientIdOverride}
+            intent="signin"
+            postLoginRedirect={redirectUri}
+            autoStart={providerHint}
+            onAutoStartResolved={(started) => {
+              if (!started) setPhase('form')
+            }}
+          />
+        </main>
+      </div>
+    )
+  }
+
+  if (mfa?.mfaStage === 'enroll') {
+    return (
+      <div className="hanzo-id-page hanzo-id-login">
+        <BrandHeader brand={brand} />
+        <main>
+          <MfaEnrollForm client={client} onComplete={completeAfterAuth} />
+        </main>
+      </div>
+    )
+  }
+
+  if (mfa?.mfaStage === 'challenge') {
+    const iamType = mfa.mfaTypes?.[0] ?? 'app'
+    async function onChallenge(code: string) {
+      setChallengeError(null)
+      const res = await client.mfaChallenge({
+        mfaType: iamType,
+        passcode: code,
+        clientId,
+        application: client.org.appName,
+        organization: client.org.orgId,
+        redirectUri,
+        state,
+        codeChallenge,
+        codeChallengeMethod,
+      })
+      if (res.error) {
+        setChallengeError(res.error)
+      } else if (res.redirectUrl) {
+        window.location.href = res.redirectUrl
+      } else {
+        completeAfterAuth()
+      }
+    }
+    return (
+      <div className="hanzo-id-page hanzo-id-login">
+        <BrandHeader brand={brand} />
+        <main>
+          <h1>Two-factor authentication</h1>
+          <p className="lede">Enter the code from your authenticator app to finish signing in.</p>
+          {challengeError ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{challengeError}</p> : null}
+          <OTPForm channel={mfaChannelOf(iamType)} onSubmit={onChallenge} />
+        </main>
+      </div>
+    )
+  }
+
   return (
     <div className="hanzo-id-page hanzo-id-login">
       <BrandHeader brand={brand} />
       <main>
-        <h1>Sign in to {brand.name}</h1>
+        <h1>Sign in to {idBrandLabel(brand, client.org.orgId)}</h1>
+        <SocialButtons
+          client={client}
+          clientIdOverride={clientIdOverride}
+          intent="signin"
+          postLoginRedirect={redirectUri}
+        />
         <LoginForm
           client={client}
           redirectUri={redirectUri}
           state={state}
           clientIdOverride={clientIdOverride ?? undefined}
+          codeChallenge={codeChallenge}
+          codeChallengeMethod={codeChallengeMethod}
+          nonce={nonce}
+          onMfaRequired={setMfa}
         />
         <p className="hanzo-id-footer-links">
-          <a href="/forget">Forgot password?</a> · <a href="/signup">Create account</a>
+          {/* Carry the OIDC request across. These are full page loads, so a bare
+              href drops the client_id, redirect_uri, state and PKCE challenge the
+              app sent — and registration then has nothing to return the new user
+              to. `Signup` reads exactly these params. */}
+          <a href={`/forget${window.location.search}`}>Forgot password?</a> ·{' '}
+          <a href={`/signup${window.location.search}`}>Create account</a>
         </p>
       </main>
     </div>

apps/web/src/pages/Onboarding.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+import { useEffect, useMemo, useState } from 'react'
+import type { BrandContract, OrgConfig } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
+import { createIam } from '@hanzo/id-auth'
+import { OnboardingFlow, createOnboardingService, type OnboardingState } from '@hanzo/id-onboarding'
+import { getConnector } from '@hanzo/id-connect/connectors'
+import { BrandHeader } from '../components/BrandHeader'
+
+/** Fleet default pay origin; a white-label brand overrides via catalog `payUrl`. */
+const DEFAULT_PAY_URL = 'https://pay.hanzo.ai'
+
+/**
+ * Post-login onboarding page.
+ *
+ * Reached after a bare portal sign-in (no downstream `redirect_uri`). Mounts
+ * the `@hanzo/id-onboarding` flow (org → project → wallet → consent → plan)
+ * wired to:
+ *
+ *   - the IAM session token: read from the same `@hanzo/iam` PKCE client the
+ *     Callback stored it on, so the onboarding writes ride the logged-in
+ *     user's bearer token. One client, one way.
+ *   - a `window.ethereum` wallet connector: the host owns the wallet lib so
+ *     the onboarding pkg stays wallet-agnostic. Absent injected provider →
+ *     the wallet step is skip-only.
+ *
+ * NEVER REPEATS: completion is recorded on the USER (Properties, via
+ * saveOnboarding) — so before mounting the flow this page reads it back and,
+ * if the user already finished onboarding on ANY browser, goes straight to
+ * the portal. The read failing open (network blip → run the flow again) is
+ * deliberate: repeating is annoying, silently skipping a required step is
+ * worse.
+ *
+ * On completion it routes by the plan choice — the platform is prepay-only,
+ * so a plan goes to the pay cart and pay-as-you-go goes to the top-up flow.
+ * A downstream app that wanted a token would have carried `redirect_uri` and
+ * never reached here.
+ */
+export function Onboarding({ org, brand }: { org: OrgConfig; brand: BrandContract }) {
+  const iam = useMemo(() => createIam(org), [org])
+  const payUrl = org.payUrl || DEFAULT_PAY_URL
+
+  const service = useMemo(
+    () =>
+      createOnboardingService({
+        iamUrl: org.iamUrl,
+        orgId: org.orgId,
+        getAccessToken: () => iam.getValidAccessToken(),
+      }),
+    [org, iam],
+  )
+
+  // null = still checking; false = run the flow; true = already done, leaving.
+  const [alreadyDone, setAlreadyDone] = useState<boolean | null>(null)
+  useEffect(() => {
+    let alive = true
+    ;(async () => {
+      // TOKEN BOOTSTRAP. A password/form sign-in mints a SESSION COOKIE and
+      // lands here directly — the PKCE SDK holds no token, so every onboarding
+      // WRITE (update-user needs a bearer; the cookie alone is refused, and
+      // rightly — a cookie-authed write is a CSRF surface) answered 401 and
+      // the funnel dead-ended at consent. With a live session, authorize is
+      // the silent-SSO branch: signinRedirect bounces through IAM with no UI,
+      // /callback stores the token and returns to /onboarding. One bounce per
+      // session, guarded, so a broken mint degrades to the read-only 401
+      // instead of a redirect loop.
+      const token = await iam.getValidAccessToken().catch(() => null)
+      if (!alive) return
+      if (!token) {
+        const guard = 'onboarding.token_bounce'
+        if (!sessionStorage.getItem(guard)) {
+          sessionStorage.setItem(guard, '1')
+          void iam.signinRedirect()
+          return
+        }
+      } else {
+        sessionStorage.removeItem('onboarding.token_bounce')
+      }
+      try {
+        const { completedAt } = await service.readOnboarding()
+        if (!alive) return
+        if (completedAt) {
+          setAlreadyDone(true)
+          window.location.replace('/?signed_in=1')
+          return
+        }
+      } catch {
+        // Read failing open (network blip → run the flow) is deliberate.
+      }
+      if (alive) setAlreadyDone(false)
+    })()
+    return () => {
+      alive = false
+    }
+  }, [service, iam])
+
+  function onComplete(state: OnboardingState) {
+    // Prepay-only funnel: the last step recorded a choice, now act on it.
+    //  - a plan slug  → the pay cart, seats + payment there (price is the
+    //    catalog's — commerce recomputes server-side, the slug is enough)
+    //  - pay as you go → the top-up flow ($5 minimum, all methods)
+    // The plan choice is already persisted on the user, so bouncing off the
+    // payment page never re-enters onboarding.
+    const choice = state.planChoice
+    if (choice === 'payg') {
+      window.location.replace(`${payUrl}/onboard`)
+    } else if (choice) {
+      window.location.replace(`${payUrl}/cart?plan=${encodeURIComponent(choice)}`)
+    } else {
+      // No recorded choice (should not happen — the plan step requires one):
+      // land on the authenticated portal rather than a dead end.
+      window.location.replace('/?signed_in=1')
+    }
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <div className="hanzo-id-page hanzo-id-onboarding-page">
+      <BrandHeader brand={brand} />
+      <main>
+        {alreadyDone === false ? (
+          <OnboardingFlow
+            service={service}
+            brandName={brand.name}
+            connectWallet={connectInjectedWallet}
+            onComplete={onComplete}
+            payUrl={payUrl}
+          />
+        ) : (
+          <div className="hanzo-id-spinner" aria-label="Loading" />
+        )}
+      </main>
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+/**
+ * EVM wallet connector backed by @hanzo/id-connect (EIP-6963 multi-injection,
+ * viem under the hood). Returns the checksummed 0x address, or null when the
+ * user cancels or no injected EVM wallet is present. The onboarding wallet step
+ * only needs the address (it stores it via a full-row read-merge-write in the
+ * service), so we connect and return account.address — no signature round-trip.
+ */
+async function connectInjectedWallet(): Promise<string | null> {
+  try {
+    const account = await getConnector('evm').connect()
+    return account.address ?? null
+  } catch {
+    return null // user rejected, or no injected EVM wallet available
+  }
+}

apps/web/src/pages/Portal.tsx

@@ -1,16 +1,118 @@
-import type { BrandContract } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
+import { useEffect, useState } from 'react'
+import type { IamIdentity } from '@hanzo/iam/react'
+import { UserMenu, resolveIdentity } from '@hanzo/iam/react'
+import type { BrandContract, OrgConfig } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
+import type { AuthClient } from '@hanzo/id-auth'
+import { Login } from './Login'
 import { BrandHeader } from '../components/BrandHeader'
+import { appsFor, billingFor } from '../marketing'
+
+type Auth =
+  | { s: 'loading' }
+  | { s: 'anon' }
+  | { s: 'authed'; identity: IamIdentity | null }
+
+/**
+ * Root portal (`/`). The portal IS the login surface, not a marketing hero:
+ *
+ *  - signed out → the actual `<Login>` form (GitHub/Google/email+password),
+ *                 identical to `/login`. A bare sign-in here lands on
+ *                 onboarding, then back on `/` authenticated.
+ *  - signed in  → the apps launcher (the org's apps) + billing / sign-out.
+ *
+ * Auth is read same-origin from `/v1/iam/get-account` (cookie session;
+ * `org.iamUrl` is the brand's own `*.id` host, so this is first-party and
+ * the session cookie rides along). The `?signed_in=1` marker set by the
+ * bare-login / onboarding-complete redirect is the authoritative "just
+ * authenticated" signal when the cookie read hasn't propagated yet.
+ */
+export function Portal({
+  client,
+  brand,
+  org,
+}: {
+  client: AuthClient
+  brand: BrandContract
+  org: OrgConfig
+}) {
+  const [auth, setAuth] = useState<Auth>({ s: 'loading' })
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    let alive = true
+    const justSignedIn = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search).get('signed_in') === '1'
+    fetch(new URL('/v1/iam/get-account', org.iamUrl).toString(), {
+      credentials: 'include',
+      headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },
+    })
+      .then((r) => r.json())
+      .then((b: Record<string, unknown>) => {
+        if (!alive) return
+        const d = b.data as Record<string, unknown> | undefined
+        if (b.status === 'ok' && d && typeof d === 'object') {
+          // `resolveIdentity` is the SAME name/avatar/initials resolution every
+          // Hanzo surface shows, so the portal cannot disagree with the console
+          // about who you are — and it never falls back to a raw uuid.
+          setAuth({ s: 'authed', identity: resolveIdentity(d, {}) })
+        } else {
+          setAuth(justSignedIn ? { s: 'authed', identity: null } : { s: 'anon' })
+        }
+      })
+      .catch(() => {
+        if (alive) setAuth(justSignedIn ? { s: 'authed', identity: null } : { s: 'anon' })
+      })
+    return () => {
+      alive = false
+    }
+  }, [org.iamUrl])
+
+  if (auth.s === 'loading') {
+    return (
+      <div className="hanzo-id-page" style={{ minHeight: '40vh' }}>
+        <div className="hanzo-id-spinner" style={{ borderTopColor: brand.accentColor ?? 'var(--primary)' }} />
+      </div>
+    )
+  }
+
+  // Signed out: the root IS the login form (no marketing hero).
+  if (auth.s === 'anon') return <Login client={client} brand={brand} />
+
+  // Signed in: the apps launcher.
+  const apps = appsFor(org.orgId)
+  const billingUrl = billingFor(org.orgId)
+  const logoutUrl = client.logout(undefined, `${org.publicOrigin}/login`)
 
-export function Portal({ brand }: { brand: BrandContract }) {
   return (
     <div className="hanzo-id-page hanzo-id-portal">
       <BrandHeader brand={brand} />
       <main>
-        <h1>Welcome to {brand.name}</h1>
-        <p className="lede">{brand.description}</p>
-        <div className="hanzo-id-cta-row">
-          <a className="hanzo-id-btn primary" href="/login">Sign in</a>
-          <a className="hanzo-id-btn" href="/signup">Create account</a>
+        <h1>Your {brand.name} apps</h1>
+        <div className="hanzo-id-apps">
+          {apps.map((a) => (
+            <a key={a.name} className="hanzo-id-applink" href={a.href}>
+              <div className="hanzo-id-applink-name">
+                <span>{a.name}</span>
+                <span aria-hidden>↗</span>
+              </div>
+              <div className="hanzo-id-applink-desc">{a.description}</div>
+            </a>
+          ))}
+        </div>
+        {/* The ONE account control. This was a hand-rolled "Billing / Sign out"
+            link row; every Hanzo surface mounts @hanzo/iam's UserMenu instead,
+            so identity, billing and sign-out read and behave identically here,
+            on hanzo.chat and in the console. The portal's session is its own
+            cookie read rather than an IamProvider, which is exactly what the
+            `identity` / `isAuthenticated` / `onSignOut` overrides are for.
+            No `brand` prop: omitting `markSvg` would put the HANZO mark on
+            lux.id and zoo.id, and this one image serves all four portals. */}
+        <div className="hanzo-id-portal-account">
+          <UserMenu
+            identity={auth.identity}
+            isAuthenticated
+            usageUrl={billingUrl}
+            usageLabel="Billing"
+            onSignOut={() => { window.location.href = logoutUrl }}
+          />
         </div>
       </main>
     </div>

apps/web/src/pages/Signup.tsx

@@ -1,18 +1,42 @@
 import type { BrandContract } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
-import { SignupForm, type AuthClient } from '@hanzo/id-auth'
+import { SignupForm, SocialButtons, type AuthClient } from '@hanzo/id-auth'
 import { BrandHeader } from '../components/BrandHeader'
 
 export function Signup({ client, brand }: { client: AuthClient; brand: BrandContract }) {
   const sp = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search)
   const inviteCode = sp.get('invite') ?? undefined
+  const clientIdOverride = sp.get('client_id') ?? undefined
+  const redirectUri = sp.get('redirect_uri') ?? undefined
+  // The same downstream OIDC request `Login` reads. Registration ends in a
+  // sign-in, so it needs the whole request — not just the client and its
+  // callback — or the minted code carries no PKCE binding and no state.
+  const state = sp.get('state') ?? undefined
+  const codeChallenge = sp.get('code_challenge') ?? undefined
+  const codeChallengeMethod = (sp.get('code_challenge_method') as 'S256' | 'plain' | null) ?? undefined
+  const nonce = sp.get('nonce') ?? undefined
   return (
     <div className="hanzo-id-page hanzo-id-signup">
       <BrandHeader brand={brand} />
       <main>
         <h1>Create your {brand.name} account</h1>
-        <SignupForm client={client} inviteCode={inviteCode} />
+        <SocialButtons
+          client={client}
+          clientIdOverride={clientIdOverride}
+          intent="signup"
+          postLoginRedirect={redirectUri}
+        />
+        <SignupForm
+          client={client}
+          inviteCode={inviteCode}
+          clientIdOverride={clientIdOverride}
+          redirectUri={redirectUri}
+          state={state}
+          codeChallenge={codeChallenge}
+          codeChallengeMethod={codeChallengeMethod}
+          nonce={nonce}
+        />
         <p className="hanzo-id-footer-links">
-          Already have an account? <a href="/login">Sign in</a>
+          Already have an account? <a href={`/login${window.location.search}`}>Sign in</a>
         </p>
       </main>
     </div>

apps/web/src/tokens.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/**
+ * Every token this surface references must RESOLVE.
+ *
+ * An undefined CSS custom property paints nothing and reports no error, so this
+ * whole class of defect survives review: `var(--surface-1)` and
+ * `var(--shadow-lg)` shipped in @hanzo/iam's account menu against a token layer
+ * that defines neither, and the menu rendered transparent. "It is declared" was
+ * never evidence — nor was "it type-checks", because the reference is built at
+ * runtime from a string and is invisible to both the compiler and grep.
+ *
+ * So the gate is resolution, and it is computed from what the bundle ACTUALLY
+ * serves: it walks app.css's @import graph into the installed @hanzo/design,
+ * collects the tokens those files declare, then asserts that every var(--x)
+ * anywhere under src/ — plus every token @hanzo/iam paints its menu with — is
+ * in that set.
+ *
+ * This fails if someone cherry-picks token groups again (the four-of-nine
+ * subset this file used to import left --z-*, --shadow-* and --space-* out),
+ * if @hanzo/design renames or drops a token, or if a component starts asking
+ * for a token in @hanzo/brand's vocabulary instead of @hanzo/design's.
+ */
+import { test } from 'vitest'
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import fs from 'node:fs'
+import path from 'node:path'
+
+const SRC = path.join(import.meta.dirname, '.')
+
+/**
+ * Both packages restrict `exports`, so resolve them by walking up for the
+ * node_modules directory rather than by asking Node for a subpath it refuses.
+ */
+function pkgRoot(name: string): string {
+  for (let d = SRC; d !== path.dirname(d); d = path.dirname(d)) {
+    const p = path.join(d, 'node_modules', name)
+    if (fs.existsSync(path.join(p, 'package.json'))) return fs.realpathSync(p)
+  }
+  throw new Error(`${name} is not installed`)
+}
+const DESIGN = pkgRoot('@hanzo/design')
+
+const read = (p: string) => fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8')
+const declaredIn = (css: string) => [...css.matchAll(/(--[a-zA-Z0-9-]+)\s*:/g)].map((m) => m[1])
+const referencedIn = (css: string) => [...css.matchAll(/var\(\s*(--[a-zA-Z0-9-]+)/g)].map((m) => m[1])
+
+/** Follow @import from an entry stylesheet into the @hanzo/design package. */
+function tokenFiles(entry: string, seen = new Set<string>()): string[] {
+  for (const m of read(entry).matchAll(/@import\s+(?:url\()?['"]([^'"]+)['"]/g)) {
+    const spec = m[1]
+    const abs = spec.startsWith('@hanzo/design/')
+      ? path.join(DESIGN, spec.slice('@hanzo/design/'.length))
+      : path.resolve(path.dirname(entry), spec)
+    if (seen.has(abs) || !fs.existsSync(abs)) continue
+    seen.add(abs)
+    tokenFiles(abs, seen)
+  }
+  return [...seen]
+}
+
+/** Every .css/.ts/.tsx under src/, so inline `var(--x)` in a component counts. */
+function sources(dir: string, out: string[] = []): string[] {
+  for (const e of fs.readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
+    const p = path.join(dir, e.name)
+    if (e.isDirectory()) sources(p, out)
+    // Skip this file: its own doc comment quotes `var(--x)`.
+    else if (/\.(css|tsx?)$/.test(e.name) && p !== import.meta.filename) out.push(p)
+  }
+  return out
+}
+
+const served = tokenFiles(path.join(SRC, 'app.css'))
+const available = new Set(served.flatMap((f) => declaredIn(read(f))))
+const files = sources(SRC)
+const local = new Set(files.flatMap((f) => declaredIn(read(f))))
+
+/**
+ * Coverage is judged by TOKENS, not by files. This used to assert that each
+ * `tokens/<group>.css` was itself reached through @import, which stopped being
+ * true at @hanzo/design 0.4.x: gen-tokens.mjs now FLATTENS all ten groups into
+ * styles.css so a bundler never has to resolve those subpaths. Nothing was
+ * dropped — the files still ship, they are just inlined — so asking "is every
+ * token this group declares actually served?" catches the cherry-picking this
+ * gate exists for, and survives however the package chooses to assemble itself.
+ */
+test('app.css serves the whole @hanzo/design token layer, not a subset', () => {
+  const groups = fs.readdirSync(path.join(DESIGN, 'tokens')).filter((f) => f.endsWith('.css'))
+  const missing = groups.filter((g) => {
+    const declared = [...new Set(declaredIn(read(path.join(DESIGN, 'tokens', g))))]
+    return declared.length > 0 && !declared.every((t) => available.has(t))
+  })
+  assert.deepEqual(missing, [], `token groups authored by @hanzo/design but never served here: ${missing.join(', ')}`)
+  /* base.css is the odd group and token coverage cannot see it: it ships the
+     ELEMENT DEFAULTS (the control, the focused control, the scrollbar) as 23
+     :where() rules, and the single token it declares — --border — is declared by
+     colors.css too. It is also the only group that opens `@layer base`, so that
+     is the exact marker for "the defaults are actually being served". */
+  assert.ok(
+    served.some((f) => /@layer\s+base/.test(read(f))),
+    'the element defaults from tokens/base.css are not served'
+  )
+})
+
+test('every token this surface references is defined', () => {
+  const unresolved = new Map<string, string[]>()
+  for (const f of files) {
+    for (const name of referencedIn(read(f))) {
+      if (available.has(name) || local.has(name)) continue
+      const at = unresolved.get(name) ?? []
+      at.push(path.relative(SRC, f))
+      unresolved.set(name, at)
+    }
+  }
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    [...unresolved].map(([n, at]) => `${n} (${[...new Set(at)].join(', ')})`),
+    [],
+  )
+})
+
+test('every token @hanzo/iam paints the account menu with is defined', () => {
+  // The menu is a distributed component: it emits its own stylesheet at
+  // runtime, so its token references never appear in this repo's source and no
+  // amount of grepping here would find them. Read them out of the shipped
+  // bundle instead — literal `var(--x)` plus the names its tok() helper builds.
+  const iam = read(path.join(pkgRoot('@hanzo/iam'), 'dist/react.js'))
+  const names = new Set([
+    ...referencedIn(iam),
+    ...[...iam.matchAll(/\btok\(\s*["']([a-zA-Z0-9-]+)["']/g)].map((m) => `--${m[1]}`),
+  ])
+  const unresolved = [...names].filter((n) => !available.has(n)).sort()
+  assert.deepEqual(unresolved, [])
+})

apps/web/src/vite-env.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/// <reference types="vite/client" />
+
+interface ImportMetaEnv {
+  /**
+   * Publishable event-ingest key (pk-…), inlined at build time from the
+   * EVENT_INGEST_KEY build-arg (KMS `deploy/EVENT_INGEST_KEY`, env `prod`).
+   * Declared so a typo reads as a type error rather than as `any` — Vite's
+   * ImportMetaEnv carries a string index signature, so an undeclared
+   * `import.meta.env.VITE_EVENT_INGEST_KEZ` would type-check and ship empty.
+   */
+  readonly VITE_EVENT_INGEST_KEY: string
+}
+
+interface ImportMeta {
+  readonly env: ImportMetaEnv
+}

apps/web/tsconfig.json

@@ -2,9 +2,10 @@
   "extends": "../../tsconfig.base.json",
   "compilerOptions": {
     "outDir": "dist",
-    "baseUrl": ".",
     "paths": {
-      "@/*": ["src/*"]
+      "@/*": [
+        "./src/*"
+      ]
     },
     "types": ["vite/client"]
   },

apps/web/vite.config.ts

@@ -2,34 +2,48 @@ import { defineConfig } from 'vite'
 import react from '@vitejs/plugin-react'
 import { resolve } from 'path'
 import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'fs'
+import { createRequire } from 'module'
+
+// ESM Vite config has no global `require`; build one bound to this file so
+// `require.resolve('@scope/brand/brand.json')` works at config-eval time.
+const req = createRequire(import.meta.url)
 
 /**
  * Per-brand brand.json copy plugin.
  *
  * Each per-org brand package (`@hanzo/brand`, `@luxfi/brand`, `@zooai/brand`,
- * `@parsdao/brand`) ships a `brand.json` at the package root. We serve them
- * verbatim at `/brand/<pkg>/brand.json` so the runtime tenant resolver can
- * fetch the right one based on hostname.
+ * `@parsdao/brand`) ships a `brand.json` at the package root. We serve each at
+ * a FLAT, encoding-safe path `/brand/<scope>.json` (scope = the npm scope:
+ * `@hanzo/brand` -> `hanzo`). A nested `/brand/@hanzo/brand/brand.json` URL
+ * carries a literal `@` and an encoded `%2F` that the production static server
+ * (hanzoai/static) cannot map to the on-disk file — it falls through to the
+ * SPA catch-all and returns index.html, so the runtime brand fetch would parse
+ * HTML as JSON. The flat slug avoids that entirely. `loadBrand` fetches the
+ * same `/brand/<scope>.json`.
  *
  * Assets (logos, favicons) are imported by URL inside the per-brand `brand.json`
  * (CDN URLs in production), so no further asset copying is needed.
  */
 const BRAND_PACKAGES = ['@hanzo/brand', '@luxfi/brand', '@zooai/brand', '@parsdao/brand']
 
+/** npm scope -> flat brand slug: `@hanzo/brand` -> `hanzo`. */
+const brandSlug = (pkg: string): string => pkg.replace(/^@/, '').split('/')[0]!
+
 function brandJsonPlugin() {
   return {
     name: 'hanzo-id-brand-json',
     configureServer(server: any) {
-      server.middlewares.use((req: any, res: any, next: any) => {
-        const m = /^\/brand\/(.+)\/brand\.json$/.exec(req.url ?? '')
+      server.middlewares.use((req2: any, res: any, next: any) => {
+        const m = /^\/brand\/([^/]+)\.json$/.exec(req2.url ?? '')
         if (!m) return next()
-        const pkg = decodeURIComponent(m[1]!)
-        if (!BRAND_PACKAGES.includes(pkg)) {
+        const slug = m[1]!
+        const pkg = BRAND_PACKAGES.find((p) => brandSlug(p) === slug)
+        if (!pkg) {
           res.statusCode = 404
           return res.end()
         }
         try {
-          const path = require.resolve(`${pkg}/brand.json`)
+          const path = req.resolve(`${pkg}/brand.json`)
           res.setHeader('Content-Type', 'application/json')
           res.setHeader('Cache-Control', 'no-store')
           return res.end(readFileSync(path, 'utf8'))
@@ -42,11 +56,11 @@ function brandJsonPlugin() {
     generateBundle(this: any) {
       for (const pkg of BRAND_PACKAGES) {
         try {
-          const path = require.resolve(`${pkg}/brand.json`)
+          const path = req.resolve(`${pkg}/brand.json`)
           if (!existsSync(path)) continue
           this.emitFile({
             type: 'asset',
-            fileName: `brand/${pkg}/brand.json`,
+            fileName: `brand/${brandSlug(pkg)}.json`,
             source: readFileSync(path, 'utf8'),
           })
         } catch {

hanzo.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+# Hanzo ID — the ONE file that says how this repo builds, gates and ships.
+#
+# The only workflow is `.hanzo/workflows/cicd.yml`, ~10 lines that import
+# hanzoai/ci; everything real is here, and platform.hanzo.ai reads this same
+# file. It replaces TWO image lanes that had drifted apart:
+#
+#   .hanzo/workflows/deploy.yml   the one that worked — buildx, two registry
+#                                 logins, a version read out of package.json and
+#                                 a post-push manifest check. Every line of it is
+#                                 something the reusable already does.
+#   .github/workflows/docker.yml  a second lane on a plane with no runners for
+#                                 our labels. Already reduced to an echo, but it
+#                                 kept the shape of a build lane alive in a
+#                                 directory this forge cannot even read.
+#
+# Neither gated anything. This repo has 13 test files and 160 assertions and CI
+# ran none of them, which is how `pkgs/shared/src/org.test.ts` sat RED on main
+# while the code it tested was correct.
+
+# Gates run DIRECTLY on the runner, not inside the image build. hanzoai/ci
+# provisions Node 22 and enables corepack; corepack then reads `packageManager`
+# from package.json, so the pnpm this uses is the SAME pnpm the Dockerfile
+# activates — stated once, in package.json, rather than pinned again here.
+#
+# Three gates, because there are three different ways this repo breaks and one
+# combined gate would report all of them as the same failure.
+test:
+  - name: install
+    # --frozen-lockfile, deliberately stricter than the Dockerfile's
+    # `--frozen-lockfile=false`. The image build must not be blocked by a
+    # lockfile that drifted; CI is exactly where that drift should be caught.
+    run: |
+      set -e
+      corepack enable
+      pnpm install --frozen-lockfile
+  - name: typecheck
+    # Vite does NOT typecheck — `vite build` transpiles and strips types, so a
+    # type error ships a green image. This is the only thing in the pipeline
+    # that reads the types across all 7 workspace packages.
+    run: |
+      set -e
+      pnpm -r tc
+  - name: unit
+    # vitest over pkgs/**/src and apps/**/src (vitest.config.ts). 160 tests,
+    # including the org resolver that decides which brand a host authenticates
+    # as and which redirect_uri every social hop sends — the surface that
+    # produced days of "login is broken" and cannot be verified by looking at it.
+    run: |
+      set -e
+      pnpm test
+
+images:
+  - name: id
+    context: .
+    dockerfile: Dockerfile
+    repo: ghcr.io/hanzoai/id
+    platforms: [linux/amd64]
+    # Fetched from KMS (`deploy/EVENT_INGEST_KEY`, env `prod`) and passed as
+    # --build-arg EVENT_INGEST_KEY. The reusable fails closed on an empty value,
+    # and the Dockerfile gates the shape and then asserts the key actually landed
+    # in the bundle — because a build that is green with an unattributed bundle
+    # is the failure mode here, not a build that goes red.
+    #
+    # This is the ONE spelling the fleet carries: KMS holds the plain name, each
+    # Dockerfile re-exports it with the prefix its bundler inlines.
+    build_secrets: [EVENT_INGEST_KEY]
+    # The version comes from package.json — hanzoai/ci's bin/imgver reads it as
+    # the declared floor, exactly as deploy.yml's `node -p require('./package.
+    # json').version` did, so a release is still a version bump and nothing about
+    # how this image is named changes.
+    #
+    # One difference worth stating: imgver takes max(declared, published)+1 patch
+    # when the declared version is ALREADY at the registry, where deploy.yml
+    # failed the build instead ("bump the version to cut a release"). Both refuse
+    # to put a second digest under a tag someone may already be pinning; this one
+    # publishes the next patch rather than going red on a docs commit.
+    #
+    # oci.hanzo.ai is still written to — the reusable crane-copies the exact tag
+    # set after the ghcr push. The PATH changes: deploy.yml pushed
+    # `oci.hanzo.ai/id`, the reusable writes the org-qualified
+    # `oci.hanzo.ai/hanzoai/id`, which is the fleet convention. Nothing live
+    # pulls either one; charts/app/values/hanzo/id.yaml pins
+    # `ghcr.io/hanzoai/id` by tag AND digest.
+
+# No `deploy:` ON PURPOSE, and this is deploy.yml's own rule, not a new one.
+#
+# id is governed by Hanzo CD. The tag it runs is declared in
+# hanzoai/universe (charts/app/values/hanzo/id.yaml, tag + digest together), and
+# the in-cluster reconcile restores that within ~60-90s. A CI-side `kubectl
+# patch` therefore CANNOT stick — and the reason to refuse it is not that it
+# fails, it is that it LOOKS like it works: the patch applies, the pod rolls, and
+# CD quietly puts the old tag back a minute later.
+#
+# It would also be actively wrong here. The reusable's deploy step guards a
+# semver pin against a transient branch build by reading the current tag out of
+# `infra/k8s/operator/crs/<svc>.yaml` — a path this service does not use — so the
+# guard would not fire and a `sha-<short>-amd64` tag would be written over a
+# reviewed semver+digest pin on the live sign-in surface for every property in
+# the fleet.
+#
+# Build and deploy are separate concerns: this emits an immutable image, git
+# declares desired state, CD applies it. To ship a build, set image.tag AND
+# image.digest in universe and push.

package.json

@@ -1,15 +1,19 @@
 {
   "name": "@hanzo/id",
   "private": true,
-  "version": "0.1.1",
+  "version": "0.2.28",
   "description": "Hanzo ID — white-label login + identity verification portal (Vite + @hanzo/gui)",
+  "packageManager": "pnpm@10.15.0",
   "scripts": {
     "build": "pnpm -r build",
     "dev": "pnpm --filter @hanzo/id-web dev",
     "tc": "pnpm -r tc",
+    "test": "vitest run",
+    "test:watch": "vitest",
     "clean": "bash scripts/clean.sh"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "typescript": "^5.9.3"
+    "typescript": "^5.9.3",
+    "vitest": "^3.2.4"
   }
 }

pkgs/auth/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@hanzo/id-auth",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.7",
   "description": "Composable login / signup / OTP / OAuth-PKCE flows on top of @hanzo/iam. UI primitives in @hanzo/gui.",
   "license": "BSD-3-Clause",
   "type": "module",
@@ -12,13 +12,17 @@
     "./forms": "./src/ui/index.ts",
     "./package.json": "./package.json"
   },
-  "files": ["src"],
+  "files": [
+    "src"
+  ],
   "scripts": {
     "tc": "tsc --noEmit"
   },
   "dependencies": {
+    "@hanzo/id-connect": "workspace:*",
     "@hanzo/id-shared": "workspace:*",
-    "@hanzo/iam": "^0.9.4"
+    "@hanzo/iam": "^0.21.1",
+    "@paulmillr/qr": "^0.3.0"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
     "react": ">=19",

pkgs/auth/src/client.mfa.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/**
+ * MFA wiring tests — pure, no network (fetch is mocked via `fetchImpl`).
+ * Run with: pnpm --filter @hanzo/id-auth test
+ *
+ * Locks the wire contract verified live against iam.hanzo.ai:
+ *  - login answers a forced-MFA org with `data:"RequiredMfa"` (enroll) or
+ *    `data:"NextMfa"` + the challenge list — named `mfa` first, legacy
+ *    `data2`; both decode until the legacy slot is deleted. STRINGS, never a
+ *    boolean.
+ *  - the `/v1/iam/mfa/setup/*` calls carry EVERY param on the query string with
+ *    an EMPTY body (the one shape IAM's authz self-match + controller accept).
+ *  - the challenge re-POSTs `/v1/iam/login` with `{mfaType,passcode}` and NO
+ *    username, riding the MFA session cookie.
+ */
+import { test } from 'vitest'
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import type { OrgConfig } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
+import { createAuthClient, mfaChannelOf, MFA_TOTP } from './client.ts'
+
+const TENANT: OrgConfig = {
+  orgId: 'hanzo',
+  iamUrl: 'https://hanzo.id',
+  iamIssuer: 'https://hanzo.id',
+  clientId: 'hanzo-id',
+  appName: 'hanzo-id',
+  publicOrigin: 'https://hanzo.id',
+  brandPackage: '@hanzo/brand',
+}
+
+type Call = { url: string; init: RequestInit }
+
+function mockFetch(body: unknown, calls: Call[]): typeof fetch {
+  return (async (input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
+    calls.push({ url: String(input), init: init ?? {} })
+    return new Response(JSON.stringify(body), { status: 200, headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' } })
+  }) as unknown as typeof fetch
+}
+
+test('login → RequiredMfa maps to an enroll signal (not a redirect)', async () => {
+  const calls: Call[] = []
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: TENANT, fetchImpl: mockFetch({ status: 'ok', data: 'RequiredMfa' }, calls) })
+  const res = await client.login({
+    identifier: 'davelorenzini@gmail.com',
+    password: 'x',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-id',
+    application: 'hanzo-id',
+    organization: 'hanzo',
+  })
+  assert.equal(res.mfaRequired, true)
+  assert.equal(res.mfaStage, 'enroll')
+  assert.equal(res.redirectUrl, undefined, 'must NOT short-circuit to /onboarding')
+})
+
+const CHALLENGE = [{ mfaType: 'app', enabled: true }, { mfaType: 'sms', enabled: true }]
+
+// Both spellings decode until IAM's envelope rename lands everywhere and the
+// legacy slot is deleted: named `mfa` (new), untyped `data2` (legacy), and
+// named-first precedence when a transitional server sends both.
+test.each([
+  ['named mfa', { status: 'ok', data: 'NextMfa', mfa: CHALLENGE }],
+  ['legacy data2', { status: 'ok', data: 'NextMfa', data2: CHALLENGE }],
+  ['mfa wins over data2', { status: 'ok', data: 'NextMfa', mfa: CHALLENGE, data2: [{ mfaType: 'email', enabled: true }] }],
+])('login → NextMfa maps to a challenge signal and carries the allowed types (%s)', async (_spelling, body) => {
+  const calls: Call[] = []
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: TENANT, fetchImpl: mockFetch(body, calls) })
+  const res = await client.login({
+    identifier: 'davelorenzini@gmail.com',
+    password: 'x',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-id',
+    application: 'hanzo-id',
+    organization: 'hanzo',
+  })
+  assert.equal(res.mfaStage, 'challenge')
+  assert.deepEqual(res.mfaTypes, ['app', 'sms'])
+})
+
+test('mfaInitiate puts owner/name/mfaType on the query string with an empty body', async () => {
+  const calls: Call[] = []
+  const data = { secret: 'BOUYRUSHJCEDDB33', url: 'otpauth://totp/Hanzo:x?secret=BOUYRUSHJCEDDB33', recoveryCodes: ['rc-1'] }
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: TENANT, fetchImpl: mockFetch({ status: 'ok', data }, calls) })
+  const setup = await client.mfaInitiate({ owner: 'hanzo', name: 'davelorenzini@gmail.com' })
+
+  assert.equal(setup.secret, 'BOUYRUSHJCEDDB33')
+  assert.equal(setup.mfaType, MFA_TOTP)
+  assert.deepEqual(setup.recoveryCodes, ['rc-1'])
+
+  const u = new URL(calls[0].url)
+  assert.equal(u.pathname, '/v1/iam/mfa/setup/initiate')
+  assert.equal(u.searchParams.get('owner'), 'hanzo')
+  assert.equal(u.searchParams.get('name'), 'davelorenzini@gmail.com')
+  assert.equal(u.searchParams.get('mfaType'), 'app')
+  assert.equal(calls[0].init.method, 'POST')
+  assert.equal(calls[0].init.body, undefined, 'body must be empty for authz self-match')
+  assert.equal(calls[0].init.credentials, 'include')
+})
+
+test('mfaVerify carries owner/name (for authz) + secret + passcode on the query', async () => {
+  const calls: Call[] = []
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: TENANT, fetchImpl: mockFetch({ status: 'ok', data: 'OK' }, calls) })
+  const r = await client.mfaVerify({ owner: 'hanzo', name: 'dave@x', secret: 'SEC', passcode: '123456' })
+  assert.equal(r.ok, true)
+  const u = new URL(calls[0].url)
+  assert.equal(u.pathname, '/v1/iam/mfa/setup/verify')
+  assert.equal(u.searchParams.get('owner'), 'hanzo')
+  assert.equal(u.searchParams.get('secret'), 'SEC')
+  assert.equal(u.searchParams.get('passcode'), '123456')
+  assert.equal(u.searchParams.get('mfaType'), 'app')
+})
+
+test('mfaVerify surfaces an IAM error instead of throwing', async () => {
+  const calls: Call[] = []
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: TENANT, fetchImpl: mockFetch({ status: 'error', msg: 'wrong passcode' }, calls) })
+  const r = await client.mfaVerify({ owner: 'hanzo', name: 'dave@x', secret: 'SEC', passcode: '000000' })
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+  assert.equal(r.error, 'wrong passcode')
+})
+
+test('mfaEnable echoes the recovery code back on the query', async () => {
+  const calls: Call[] = []
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: TENANT, fetchImpl: mockFetch({ status: 'ok', data: 'OK' }, calls) })
+  const r = await client.mfaEnable({ owner: 'hanzo', name: 'dave@x', secret: 'SEC', recoveryCode: 'rc-1' })
+  assert.equal(r.ok, true)
+  const u = new URL(calls[0].url)
+  assert.equal(u.pathname, '/v1/iam/mfa/setup/enable')
+  assert.equal(u.searchParams.get('recoveryCodes'), 'rc-1')
+  assert.equal(u.searchParams.get('secret'), 'SEC')
+})
+
+test('mfaChallenge re-POSTs /v1/iam/login with mfaType/passcode and NO username', async () => {
+  const calls: Call[] = []
+  // code flow: data is the freshly minted auth code
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: TENANT, fetchImpl: mockFetch({ status: 'ok', data: 'AUTHCODE' }, calls) })
+  const res = await client.mfaChallenge({
+    mfaType: 'app',
+    passcode: '654321',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-id',
+    application: 'hanzo-id',
+    organization: 'hanzo',
+    redirectUri: 'https://app.example/cb',
+    state: 'st',
+  })
+  const sent = JSON.parse(String(calls[0].init.body)) as Record<string, unknown>
+  assert.equal(new URL(calls[0].url).pathname, '/v1/iam/login')
+  assert.equal(sent.mfaType, 'app')
+  assert.equal(sent.passcode, '654321')
+  assert.equal(sent.username, undefined, 'challenge must not send a username')
+  assert.equal(calls[0].init.credentials, 'include')
+  assert.equal(res.redirectUrl, 'https://app.example/cb?code=AUTHCODE&state=st')
+})
+
+test('mfaChannelOf maps IAM types to UI channels', () => {
+  assert.equal(mfaChannelOf('app'), 'totp')
+  assert.equal(mfaChannelOf('sms'), 'sms')
+  assert.equal(mfaChannelOf('email'), 'email')
+  assert.equal(mfaChannelOf('anything-else'), 'totp')
+})

pkgs/auth/src/client.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,685 @@
+import { test } from 'vitest'
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import { createAuthClient } from './client.ts'
+import type { OrgConfig } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
+
+// A capturing fetch double: records the URL + parsed JSON body of the last call
+// and returns a canned IAM "ok" response. No network.
+function capturingFetch() {
+  const calls: { url: string; body: Record<string, unknown> }[] = []
+  const fetchImpl: typeof fetch = async (input, init) => {
+    const url = typeof input === 'string' ? input : input.toString()
+    let body: Record<string, unknown> = {}
+    if (init?.body && typeof init.body === 'string') body = JSON.parse(init.body)
+    calls.push({ url, body })
+    return new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: 'ok', data: 'AUTHCODE' }), {
+      status: 200,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    })
+  }
+  return { calls, fetchImpl }
+}
+
+// A routing fetch double for the silent-SSO org gate: silentLogin resolves the
+// app's org (`/v1/iam/get-app-login`) and the ambient session's owner
+// (`/v1/iam/get-account`) BEFORE minting a code (`/v1/iam/login`). This lets a
+// test set the app org + session owner independently and assert whether the mint
+// leg ran. `sessionOwner: null` models "no live session" (get-account errors).
+function routingFetch(opts: { appOrg: string; sessionOwner: string | null; code?: string }) {
+  const calls: { url: string; body: Record<string, unknown> }[] = []
+  const json = (payload: unknown) =>
+    new Response(JSON.stringify(payload), { status: 200, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } })
+  const fetchImpl: typeof fetch = async (input, init) => {
+    const url = typeof input === 'string' ? input : input.toString()
+    let body: Record<string, unknown> = {}
+    if (init?.body && typeof init.body === 'string') body = JSON.parse(init.body)
+    calls.push({ url, body })
+    if (url.includes('/get-app-login')) {
+      return json({ status: 'ok', data: { name: 'app', organization: opts.appOrg, providers: [] } })
+    }
+    if (url.includes('/get-account')) {
+      return opts.sessionOwner
+        ? json({ status: 'ok', data: { owner: opts.sessionOwner, name: 'z' } })
+        : json({ status: 'error', msg: 'please sign in first' })
+    }
+    return json({ status: 'ok', data: opts.code ?? 'AUTHCODE' })
+  }
+  return { calls, fetchImpl }
+}
+
+function org(overrides: Partial<OrgConfig> = {}): OrgConfig {
+  return {
+    orgId: 'hanzo',
+    iamUrl: 'https://hanzo.id',
+    iamIssuer: 'https://hanzo.id',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-console',
+    appName: 'hanzo-console',
+    publicOrigin: 'https://hanzo.id',
+    oauthCallbackOrigin: 'https://hanzo.id',
+    brandPackage: '@hanzo/brand',
+    ...overrides,
+  }
+}
+
+// `client.login` is a PURE PASSTHROUGH for `organization`: it sends what the
+// caller gave it and omits the key when there is nothing to send. That is the
+// contract these two tests pin, and it is unchanged.
+//
+// What DID change is whose job it is to supply one. This used to be deliberate
+// omission — IAM resolved the user cross-org so a colliding identity
+// (z@hanzo.ai exists in both `admin` and `hanzo`) landed on admin/* with a full
+// multi-org session. iam2 removed that on purpose, treating the collision as a
+// defect ("the F-2 bug where z@hanzo.ai collided across admin and hanzo": it
+// coupled lockout counters across rows and gave a brute-force oracle on the
+// superadmin), and now REFUSES an org-less login. So LoginForm resolves the
+// app's own org via get-app-login and always passes one. Do not re-add an
+// omit-the-org path here expecting the server to figure it out — it will not,
+// and it fails with an HTTP 200 that reads like a wrong password.
+test('login omits organization when the caller supplies none', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+
+  await client.login({
+    identifier: 'z@hanzo.ai',
+    password: 'pw',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-console',
+    application: 'hanzo-console',
+    // organization intentionally not provided — LoginForm now always resolves one
+  })
+
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 1)
+  assert.equal(
+    'organization' in calls[0]!.body,
+    false,
+    'organization must be absent when the caller supplies none — the client never invents one',
+  )
+  // The identity + app still ride the request.
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.body.username, 'z@hanzo.ai')
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.body.application, 'hanzo-console')
+})
+
+// An empty-string org is treated the same as unset (defensive: a catalog might
+// emit "").
+test('login omits organization when it is an empty string', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  await client.login({
+    identifier: 'z@hanzo.ai',
+    password: 'pw',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-console',
+    application: 'hanzo-console',
+    organization: '',
+  })
+  assert.equal('organization' in calls[0]!.body, false)
+})
+
+// A brand that DELIBERATELY scopes its portal to one org can still force it.
+test('login INCLUDES organization when one is explicitly provided', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  await client.login({
+    identifier: 'someone',
+    password: 'pw',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-console',
+    application: 'hanzo-console',
+    organization: 'hanzo',
+  })
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.body.organization, 'hanzo')
+})
+
+// Per-app SSO: the downstream app's client_id + redirect_uri still flow through;
+// `type` flips to `code` and the org is STILL omitted (resolution stays correct
+// for the SSO path too).
+test('app SSO (redirectUri present) uses type=code and still omits organization', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  await client.login({
+    identifier: 'z@hanzo.ai',
+    password: 'pw',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-console',
+    application: 'hanzo-console',
+    redirectUri: 'https://console.hanzo.ai/auth/iam/callback',
+    state: 'xyz',
+  })
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.body.type, 'code')
+  assert.match(calls[0]!.url, /type=code/)
+  assert.equal('organization' in calls[0]!.body, false)
+})
+
+// Signup MUST still carry a concrete org — you cannot create a user in "no org".
+test('signup STILL sends organization (unchanged — create needs a concrete org)', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  await client.signup({
+    email: 'new@hanzo.ai',
+    password: 'pw',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-console',
+    application: 'hanzo-console',
+    organization: 'hanzo',
+  })
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.body.organization, 'hanzo')
+})
+
+// REGRESSION (every new customer was stranded on the portal): IAM's signup is
+// CREATE-ONLY — it sets no session and mints no code. Signup must therefore end
+// in a real sign-in, or the app that sent the user waits forever for a code.
+test('signup COMPLETES the OIDC request — create, then sign in, then redirect back with the code', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const res = await client.signup({
+    email: 'new@hanzo.ai',
+    password: 'pw',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-app',
+    application: 'hanzo-app',
+    organization: 'hanzo',
+    redirectUri: 'https://hanzo.app/auth/callback',
+    state: 'xyz',
+    codeChallenge: 'CHALLENGE',
+    codeChallengeMethod: 'S256',
+  })
+
+  // Two legs, in order: create the row, then authenticate it.
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 2)
+  assert.match(calls[0]!.url, /\/v1\/iam\/signup/)
+  assert.match(calls[1]!.url, /\/v1\/iam\/login/)
+
+  // The sign-in leg carries the downstream request, so the code is PKCE-bound.
+  assert.match(calls[1]!.url, /code_challenge=CHALLENGE/)
+  assert.match(calls[1]!.url, /code_challenge_method=S256/)
+  assert.match(calls[1]!.url, /type=code/)
+  assert.equal(calls[1]!.body.username, 'new@hanzo.ai')
+
+  // And the caller is handed a destination BACK AT THE APP — never the portal's
+  // own /onboarding, which is where the create-only response used to land.
+  assert.equal(res.redirectUrl, 'https://hanzo.app/auth/callback?code=AUTHCODE&state=xyz')
+})
+
+// `autoSignin` was posted for its name and dropped on the floor: the Go
+// signupForm has no such field, so it never signed anyone in. Do not post a flag
+// the server does not read — it is what made this look like it worked.
+test('signup does NOT post autoSignin (IAM has no such field)', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  await client.signup({
+    email: 'new@hanzo.ai',
+    password: 'pw',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-app',
+    application: 'hanzo-app',
+    organization: 'hanzo',
+  })
+  assert.equal('autoSignin' in calls[0]!.body, false)
+})
+
+// IAM refuses with HTTP 200 + status:"error", so the status code proves nothing.
+// A refused create must surface the reason and must NOT go on to try a login.
+test('a refused signup surfaces the reason and never attempts a sign-in', async () => {
+  const seen: string[] = []
+  const fetchImpl: typeof fetch = async (input) => {
+    seen.push(typeof input === 'string' ? input : input.toString())
+    return new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: 'error', msg: 'email already exists', data: null }), {
+      status: 200,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    })
+  }
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const res = await client.signup({
+    email: 'taken@hanzo.ai',
+    password: 'pw',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-app',
+    application: 'hanzo-app',
+    organization: 'hanzo',
+    redirectUri: 'https://hanzo.app/auth/callback',
+  })
+  assert.equal(res.error, 'email already exists')
+  assert.equal(res.redirectUrl, undefined)
+  assert.equal(seen.length, 1)
+  assert.match(seen[0]!, /\/v1\/iam\/signup/)
+})
+
+// REGRESSION (the `hanzo-iam does not exist` social-login bug): an IAM
+// app-provider LINK can carry an outer `name` that is NOT the provider record's
+// name (some seeds label it `<org>-iam`). The provider's real identity is the
+// nested `provider.name` the backend resolves on the social hop. getAppLogin
+// MUST surface the inner record name (`provider-github`), never the outer label,
+// or SocialButtons posts `provider=<org>-iam` and the backend 400s.
+function appLoginFetch(payload: unknown): typeof fetch {
+  return async () =>
+    new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: 'ok', data: payload }), {
+      status: 200,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    })
+}
+
+test('getAppLogin uses the nested provider record name, not the outer link label', async () => {
+  const fetchImpl = appLoginFetch({
+    name: 'hanzo-console',
+    organization: 'hanzo',
+    providers: [
+      {
+        // Outer link label — a real-world seed set this to the per-app default.
+        name: 'hanzo-iam',
+        canSignIn: true,
+        canSignUp: true,
+        // Nested provider RECORD — the true identity + creds.
+        provider: { name: 'provider-github', type: 'GitHub', clientId: 'Iv23li_real', scopes: '' },
+      },
+    ],
+  })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const app = await client.getAppLogin('hanzo-console')
+  assert.ok(app, 'app login resolved')
+  assert.equal(app!.providers.length, 1)
+  const gh = app!.providers[0]!
+  assert.equal(gh.name, 'provider-github', 'provider name comes from the nested record')
+  assert.equal(gh.key, 'github', 'key strips the provider- prefix')
+  assert.equal(gh.type, 'GitHub')
+  assert.equal(gh.configured, true, 'a real (non-placeholder) clientId is configured')
+})
+
+// Federation is entered by NAMING the provider on IAM's own authorize endpoint.
+// The `provider` field has always been on OAuthAuthorizeRequest; `authorize`
+// never emitted it, which is why social sign-in had no server side at all.
+test('authorize emits the provider record name, so IAM federates instead of showing its login', () => {
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org({ iamUrl: 'https://hanzo.id' }) })
+  const url = new URL(
+    client.authorize({
+      clientId: 'hanzo-console',
+      redirectUri: 'https://hanzo.id/callback',
+      state: 'rp1',
+      codeChallenge: 'C1',
+      codeChallengeMethod: 'S256',
+      provider: 'provider-github',
+    }),
+  )
+  assert.equal(url.pathname, '/v1/iam/oauth/authorize')
+  // The RECORD name, never the bare key: federationProvider matches
+  // ProviderItem.Name exactly (live, `provider=github` is refused).
+  assert.equal(url.searchParams.get('provider'), 'provider-github')
+  // The app's own request is what IAM binds the minted code to.
+  assert.equal(url.searchParams.get('client_id'), 'hanzo-console')
+  assert.equal(url.searchParams.get('redirect_uri'), 'https://hanzo.id/callback')
+  assert.equal(url.searchParams.get('code_challenge'), 'C1')
+  assert.equal(url.searchParams.get('code_challenge_method'), 'S256')
+})
+
+test('authorize without a provider stays the ordinary hosted-login request', () => {
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org({ iamUrl: 'https://hanzo.id' }) })
+  const url = new URL(
+    client.authorize({ clientId: 'hanzo-console', redirectUri: 'https://hanzo.id/callback', state: 'rp1' }),
+  )
+  assert.equal(url.searchParams.get('provider'), null)
+})
+
+// When there is NO nested record (degenerate seed), fall back to the outer label
+// so the provider is still surfaced rather than dropped.
+test('getAppLogin falls back to the outer name when no nested provider record', async () => {
+  const fetchImpl = appLoginFetch({
+    name: 'hanzo-console',
+    organization: 'hanzo',
+    providers: [{ name: 'provider-google', canSignIn: true, canSignUp: true, provider: null }],
+  })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const app = await client.getAppLogin('hanzo-console')
+  assert.ok(app)
+  assert.equal(app!.providers[0]!.name, 'provider-google')
+})
+
+// TRUE SSO — the silent leg. silentLogin carries NO credentials: IAM mints the
+// code from the existing issuer session (cookie sent via credentials:include).
+// It builds the redirect back to the app from the minted code + state. The mint
+// runs ONLY when the ambient session's org matches the app's org (same-org SSO,
+// the common case: a hanzo session signing into a hanzo app).
+test('silentLogin (same-org session) mints the code and redirects, carrying NO credentials', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = routingFetch({ appOrg: 'hanzo', sessionOwner: 'hanzo' })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+
+  const r = await client.silentLogin({
+    clientId: 'hanzo-console',
+    application: 'hanzo-console',
+    redirectUri: 'https://console.hanzo.ai/auth/iam/callback',
+    state: 'st1',
+    codeChallenge: 'chal',
+  })
+
+  // The mint leg (POST /v1/iam/login, type=code) ran after the org gate passed.
+  const mint = calls.find((c) => c.body.type === 'code')
+  assert.ok(mint, 'mint leg ran for a same-org session')
+  // No credentials of any kind — this is session-only.
+  assert.equal('username' in mint!.body, false, 'no username in silent login')
+  assert.equal('password' in mint!.body, false, 'no password in silent login')
+  assert.equal('provider' in mint!.body, false, 'no provider hop in silent login')
+  assert.equal(mint!.body.application, 'hanzo-console')
+  // OAuth params ride the query so IAM mints a code for the right client + PKCE.
+  assert.match(mint!.url, /clientId=hanzo-console/)
+  assert.match(mint!.url, /code_challenge=chal/)
+  // The mint returns data:'AUTHCODE' -> a fully-formed app redirect.
+  assert.equal(
+    r.redirectUrl,
+    'https://console.hanzo.ai/auth/iam/callback?code=AUTHCODE&state=st1',
+  )
+})
+
+// THE ADMIN-GUARD FIX: silent SSO must NOT reuse a session that belongs to a
+// DIFFERENT org than the app being signed into. An operator with an ambient
+// hanzo/* session hitting the admin-guard (org=admin) must fall through to the
+// interactive form (which authenticates in the admin org and resolves the
+// admin/* identity) — NOT silently mint a code from the hanzo session (which
+// would confer owner=hanzo and shadow the fix). No mint leg runs; no redirect.
+test('silentLogin (cross-org session) does NOT mint — falls back to the form', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = routingFetch({ appOrg: 'admin', sessionOwner: 'hanzo' })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+
+  const r = await client.silentLogin({
+    clientId: 'hanzo-admin-guard',
+    application: 'hanzo-admin-guard',
+    redirectUri: 'https://admin.hanzo.ai/__guard/callback',
+    state: 'st1',
+    codeChallenge: 'chal',
+  })
+
+  assert.equal(r.redirectUrl, undefined, 'no silent redirect for a cross-org session')
+  assert.equal(calls.some((c) => c.body.type === 'code'), false, 'the mint leg must NOT run')
+})
+
+// Same-org SSO still holds when BOTH are the admin org: an operator already
+// signed in as admin/* silently re-enters the admin console.
+test('silentLogin (same admin-org session) mints for the admin-guard', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = routingFetch({ appOrg: 'admin', sessionOwner: 'admin' })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const r = await client.silentLogin({
+    clientId: 'hanzo-admin-guard',
+    application: 'hanzo-admin-guard',
+    redirectUri: 'https://admin.hanzo.ai/__guard/callback',
+    state: 'st1',
+  })
+  assert.ok(calls.find((c) => c.body.type === 'code'), 'mint leg ran for a same-org admin session')
+  assert.equal(r.redirectUrl, 'https://admin.hanzo.ai/__guard/callback?code=AUTHCODE&state=st1')
+})
+
+// No live session: silentLogin returns an empty response (no mint) so Login.tsx
+// falls back to the interactive form (never a dead end).
+test('silentLogin returns empty (no mint) when there is no session (form fallback)', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = routingFetch({ appOrg: 'hanzo', sessionOwner: null })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const r = await client.silentLogin({
+    clientId: 'hanzo-console',
+    application: 'hanzo-console',
+    redirectUri: 'https://console.hanzo.ai/auth/iam/callback',
+  })
+  assert.equal(r.redirectUrl, undefined)
+  assert.equal(calls.some((c) => c.body.type === 'code'), false, 'no mint without a session')
+})
+
+// ── Device-authorization approval (RFC 8628) ─────────────────────────────────
+// approveDevice rides the issuer SESSION (like silentLogin): NO credentials in
+// the body, `type:device` + the userCode IAM keys its DeviceAuthMap on, plus the
+// org application/organization for the app lookup. On {status:ok} the device
+// code is approved (UserSignIn=true) and the CLI's token poll succeeds.
+test('approveDevice posts type=device + normalized userCode + org app/org, NO credentials', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+
+  const r = await client.approveDevice('K7M4P2QH')
+
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 1)
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.body.type, 'device')
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.body.userCode, 'K7M4P2QH')
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.body.application, 'hanzo-console')
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.body.organization, 'hanzo')
+  // Session-only: never any credentials in a device approval.
+  assert.equal('username' in calls[0]!.body, false)
+  assert.equal('password' in calls[0]!.body, false)
+  assert.equal('provider' in calls[0]!.body, false)
+  assert.match(calls[0]!.url, /type=device/)
+  assert.equal(r.ok, true)
+})
+
+// IAM mints codes from an UPPERCASE unambiguous alphabet ([A-HJ-NP-Z2-9]); a
+// human may transcribe them lower-cased or with stray spaces/dashes. Normalize
+// TO uppercase so the lookup matches — case-insensitive entry, exact-match send.
+test('approveDevice uppercases and strips spaces/dashes before sending', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  await client.approveDevice('  k7m4-p2qh ')
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.body.userCode, 'K7M4P2QH')
+})
+
+// An empty/blank code never hits the network — fail fast with a clear message.
+test('approveDevice rejects an empty code without calling fetch', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const r = await client.approveDevice('   ')
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 0)
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+  assert.ok(r.error)
+})
+
+// The IAM error message (e.g. "UserCode Expired") is surfaced verbatim.
+test('approveDevice surfaces the IAM error message', async () => {
+  const fetchImpl: typeof fetch = async () =>
+    new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: 'error', msg: 'UserCode Expired' }), {
+      status: 200,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const r = await client.approveDevice('K7M4P2QH')
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+  assert.equal(r.error, 'UserCode Expired')
+})
+
+// Consent branch: {status:ok, data:{required:true}} → {ok:false, required:true}
+// so the page can render consent instead of treating it as success or a dead end.
+test('approveDevice maps the consent-required branch to { required: true }', async () => {
+  const fetchImpl: typeof fetch = async () =>
+    new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: 'ok', data: { required: true } }), {
+      status: 200,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const r = await client.approveDevice('K7M4P2QH')
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+  assert.equal(r.required, true)
+  assert.equal(r.error, undefined)
+})
+
+// ── Which application is this code for? (deviceInfo) ─────────────────────────
+// A one-call double for `POST /v1/iam/oauth/device/info`: records what the
+// request actually was (URL, method, credentials, body) and answers with
+// `payload`.
+function deviceInfoFetch(payload: unknown) {
+  const calls: {
+    url: string
+    method?: string
+    credentials?: RequestCredentials
+    body?: string
+  }[] = []
+  const fetchImpl: typeof fetch = async (input, init) => {
+    calls.push({
+      url: typeof input === 'string' ? input : input.toString(),
+      method: init?.method,
+      credentials: init?.credentials,
+      body: typeof init?.body === 'string' ? init.body : undefined,
+    })
+    return new Response(JSON.stringify(payload), {
+      status: 200,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    })
+  }
+  return { calls, fetchImpl }
+}
+
+// THE REGRESSION THIS FILE EXISTS FOR. The approval page used to render
+// `org.appName` — the PORTAL's own branding, the static `hanzo-console` this
+// test's org() is configured with — so a device sign-in started by `hanzo-cli`
+// was approved under a screen naming a different application. The name must come
+// off the RESPONSE, which is the code's own application, and never off the org
+// config; asserting both is what keeps the two from being confused again.
+test('deviceInfo names the RESPONSE client, never the portal org appName', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = deviceInfoFetch({
+    status: 'ok',
+    data: { clientId: 'hanzo-cli', displayName: 'Hanzo CLI' },
+  })
+  const cfg = org()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: cfg, fetchImpl })
+
+  const r = await client.deviceInfo('K7M4P2QH')
+
+  assert.equal(r.ok, true)
+  assert.equal(r.ok && r.clientId, 'hanzo-cli')
+  assert.equal(r.ok && r.displayName, 'Hanzo CLI')
+  // The portal is hanzo-console. Nothing about it may reach the result.
+  assert.equal(cfg.appName, 'hanzo-console')
+  assert.notEqual(r.ok && r.clientId, cfg.appName)
+  assert.notEqual(r.ok && r.displayName, cfg.appName)
+
+  // A session-cookie POST at the /v1/ device-info path. The user_code is the one
+  // secret in this flow, so it rides the BODY: a request line is copied into
+  // ingress and proxy access logs where a body is not, and this page ships
+  // scrubUrl() precisely to keep the code out of URLs.
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 1)
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.url, 'https://hanzo.id/v1/iam/oauth/device/info')
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.method, 'POST')
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.credentials, 'include')
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.body, JSON.stringify({ userCode: 'K7M4P2QH' }))
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.url.includes('K7M4P2QH'), false)
+})
+
+// Same normalization as the approval: a code transcribed lower-cased or with
+// dashes must resolve to the same row IAM minted, or the page would refuse to
+// name an application that is perfectly live.
+test('deviceInfo uppercases and strips spaces/dashes into the body', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = deviceInfoFetch({
+    status: 'ok',
+    data: { clientId: 'hanzo-cli', displayName: 'Hanzo CLI' },
+  })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  await client.deviceInfo('  k7m4-p2qh ')
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.url, 'https://hanzo.id/v1/iam/oauth/device/info')
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.body, JSON.stringify({ userCode: 'K7M4P2QH' }))
+})
+
+// An empty code names nothing and never hits the network.
+test('deviceInfo rejects an empty code without calling fetch', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = deviceInfoFetch({ status: 'ok', data: {} })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const r = await client.deviceInfo('   ')
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 0)
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+  assert.equal(r.ok === false && r.loginRequired, undefined)
+})
+
+// IAM `CodeLoginRequired`: the session lapsed. Flagged separately from a refusal
+// because the page's answer is to sign the human in and come back, not to give up.
+test('deviceInfo flags login_required distinctly from a refusal', async () => {
+  const { fetchImpl } = deviceInfoFetch({
+    status: 'error',
+    msg: 'please sign in first',
+    code: 'login_required',
+  })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const r = await client.deviceInfo('K7M4P2QH')
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+  assert.equal(r.ok === false && r.loginRequired, true)
+  assert.equal(r.ok === false && r.error, 'please sign in first')
+})
+
+// The ONE opaque refusal IAM answers for unknown / expired / already-approved —
+// surfaced verbatim, carrying no loginRequired, so the page shows it and offers
+// no approval. Distinguishing those three would be an oracle for hunting the
+// 40-bit user_code; the client must not invent a distinction either.
+test('deviceInfo surfaces the opaque refusal verbatim and does not name an app', async () => {
+  const { fetchImpl } = deviceInfoFetch({
+    status: 'error',
+    msg: 'the user code is invalid or expired',
+  })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const r = await client.deviceInfo('K7M4P2QH')
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+  assert.equal(r.ok === false && r.error, 'the user code is invalid or expired')
+  assert.equal(r.ok === false && r.loginRequired, undefined)
+})
+
+// The org-boundary refusal is a plain refusal too: surfaced, not special-cased.
+test('deviceInfo surfaces the wrong-org refusal', async () => {
+  const { fetchImpl } = deviceInfoFetch({
+    status: 'error',
+    msg: 'your organization may not approve this device sign-in',
+  })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const r = await client.deviceInfo('K7M4P2QH')
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+  assert.equal(r.ok === false && r.error, 'your organization may not approve this device sign-in')
+})
+
+// An HTML error page from a proxy is not an application name. It must fail,
+// never resolve to a blank or guessed one.
+test('deviceInfo fails on a non-JSON response', async () => {
+  const fetchImpl: typeof fetch = async () =>
+    new Response('<html>502 Bad Gateway</html>', {
+      status: 502,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/html' },
+    })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const r = await client.deviceInfo('K7M4P2QH')
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+  assert.match(String(r.ok === false && r.error), /non-JSON/)
+})
+
+// A network failure resolves — never rejects — so the page renders the failure
+// instead of tearing down on an unhandled rejection.
+test('deviceInfo resolves an error when fetch throws', async () => {
+  const fetchImpl: typeof fetch = async () => {
+    throw new Error('offline')
+  }
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const r = await client.deviceInfo('K7M4P2QH')
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+  assert.match(String(r.ok === false && r.error), /offline/)
+})
+
+// A 200 that names no client is not a name. Falling back to ANY local string here
+// is what produced the original defect, so an absent clientId is a failure.
+test('deviceInfo refuses an ok response with no clientId', async () => {
+  const { fetchImpl } = deviceInfoFetch({ status: 'ok', data: { displayName: 'Hanzo CLI' } })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const r = await client.deviceInfo('K7M4P2QH')
+  assert.equal(r.ok, false)
+})
+
+// IAM already falls back to the app's name when DisplayName is empty; if one ever
+// arrives blank anyway, the label is the server-confirmed clientId — never the portal's.
+test('deviceInfo falls back to the confirmed clientId when displayName is empty', async () => {
+  const { fetchImpl } = deviceInfoFetch({ status: 'ok', data: { clientId: 'hanzo-cli', displayName: '' } })
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const r = await client.deviceInfo('K7M4P2QH')
+  assert.equal(r.ok, true)
+  assert.equal(r.ok && r.displayName, 'hanzo-cli')
+})
+
+// getAppLogin's redirectUri is validated by IAM against the app's REGISTERED
+// list. A cross-app SSO read (the console's `hanzo-cloud` viewed from hanzo.id)
+// MUST send the downstream app's OWN redirect_uri — the portal's `/callback` is
+// not in that app's list, so hardcoding it makes IAM drop the response and no
+// social buttons resolve. Absent, it defaults to the portal's own callback.
+test('getAppLogin sends the passed redirect_uri, and defaults to the portal callback when omitted', async () => {
+  const urls: string[] = []
+  const fetchImpl: typeof fetch = async (input) => {
+    urls.push(typeof input === 'string' ? input : input.toString())
+    return new Response(
+      JSON.stringify({ status: 'ok', data: { name: 'hanzo-cloud', organization: 'hanzo', providers: [] } }),
+      { status: 200, headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } },
+    )
+  }
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+
+  // Cross-app read: the console's registered redirect_uri rides through verbatim.
+  await client.getAppLogin('hanzo-cloud', 'https://console.hanzo.ai/auth/callback')
+  const u1 = new URL(urls[0]!)
+  assert.equal(u1.searchParams.get('clientId'), 'hanzo-cloud')
+  assert.equal(u1.searchParams.get('redirectUri'), 'https://console.hanzo.ai/auth/callback')
+
+  // Bare/own read: no redirect_uri → default to the portal's own /callback.
+  await client.getAppLogin('hanzo-id')
+  const u2 = new URL(urls[1]!)
+  assert.equal(u2.searchParams.get('redirectUri'), 'https://hanzo.id/callback')
+})

pkgs/auth/src/client.ts

@@ -1,21 +1,36 @@
-import type { TenantConfig } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
+import type { OrgConfig } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
 import type {
-  AppLoginInfo,
-  CodeLoginRequest,
+  AppLogin,
+  AppProvider,
+  DeviceApprovalResult,
+  DeviceInfoResult,
   ForgotRequest,
   LoginRequest,
   LoginResponse,
+  MfaChallengeRequest,
+  MfaChannel,
+  MfaIdentity,
+  MfaSetup,
   OAuthAuthorizeRequest,
   SignupRequest,
+  SilentLoginRequest,
   TokenResponse,
 } from './types'
 
+/** IAM's TOTP MFA type constant (`object.TotpType`). */
+export const MFA_TOTP = 'app'
+
+/** Map an IAM MFA type to the {@link MfaChannel} the OTP UI renders a label for. */
+export function mfaChannelOf(iamType: string): MfaChannel {
+  return iamType === 'sms' ? 'sms' : iamType === 'email' ? 'email' : 'totp'
+}
+
 /**
  * Composable IAM client.
  *
- * Stateless wrapper around the canonical IAM REST surface (Casdoor-compat
- * paths under `/v1/iam/*` and the OIDC paths under `/v1/iam/oauth/*`). One
- * client instance per tenant. The portal creates one in `createRoot()`;
+ * Stateless wrapper around the canonical IAM REST surface (paths under
+ * `/v1/iam/*` and the OIDC paths under `/v1/iam/oauth/*`). One
+ * client instance per org. The portal creates one in `createRoot()`;
  * downstream pages call `.login()`, `.signup()`, `.forgot()`, `.authorize()`
  * directly.
  *
@@ -32,59 +47,302 @@ import type {
  * past the redirect.
  */
 export interface AuthClient {
-  readonly tenant: TenantConfig
+  readonly org: OrgConfig
   login(req: LoginRequest): Promise<LoginResponse>
+  /**
+   * Silent single-sign-on: mint an authorization code from the EXISTING issuer
+   * session (the `iam_session_id` cookie set when the user signed in once for
+   * another app) — no credentials, no provider hop. Returns `{ redirectUrl }`
+   * (the app's `redirect_uri` + `?code=&state=`) when a live session exists, or
+   * `{ error }` when it does not so the caller renders the interactive form.
+   * This is the seamless 2nd/3rd-app login leg.
+   */
+  silentLogin(req: SilentLoginRequest): Promise<LoginResponse>
+  /**
+   * Approve an RFC 8628 device-authorization request from the device-approval
+   * page (`/login/oauth/device`). The user MUST already be signed in to the
+   * issuer — this rides the SAME `iam_session_id` cookie as silent SSO
+   * (`credentials:'include'`, no credentials in the body). It POSTs
+   * `/v1/iam/login` with `type:'device'` + the `userCode` the device shows,
+   * plus the org's `application`/`organization`; IAM resolves the user from
+   * the session, flips the device code's `UserSignIn=true`, and the CLI's token
+   * poll then succeeds. Returns `{required:true}` when the app needs consent
+   * first (rare for first-party apps), or `{error}` with the IAM message.
+   */
+  approveDevice(userCode: string): Promise<DeviceApprovalResult>
+  /**
+   * Name the application a pending device code belongs to, so the approval page
+   * can say WHICH app it is authorizing — `GET
+   * /v1/iam/oauth/device/<user_code>`, riding the same `iam_session_id` cookie
+   * as {@link approveDevice}.
+   *
+   * Read this and render it; never `org.appName`, which is this portal's own
+   * branding and names a different application than the one that minted the
+   * code. IAM answers from the code's own application row.
+   *
+   * Session-gated and deliberately terse: an expired session comes back as
+   * `loginRequired`, and unknown / expired / already-approved all come back as
+   * ONE indistinguishable refusal, because a user_code is 40 bits and an
+   * endpoint that told them apart would be an oracle for hunting live codes.
+   */
+  deviceInfo(userCode: string): Promise<DeviceInfoResult>
   signup(req: SignupRequest): Promise<LoginResponse>
   forgot(req: ForgotRequest): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }>
   authorize(req: OAuthAuthorizeRequest): string
   exchange(code: string, codeVerifier?: string): Promise<TokenResponse>
   logout(idTokenHint?: string, postLogoutRedirectUri?: string): string
-  /** Fetch the application's enabled providers + sign-in methods (drives which buttons render). */
-  appLogin(): Promise<AppLoginInfo>
-  /** Send an email/SMS verification code for passwordless login. dest = email or E.164 phone. */
-  sendLoginCode(dest: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }>
-  /** Complete a passwordless login with the code sent to dest. */
-  loginWithCode(req: CodeLoginRequest): Promise<LoginResponse>
+  /**
+   * Read the live enabled-auth-methods view for an application from
+   * `/v1/iam/get-app-login` — the canonical source of truth for which
+   * sign-in buttons (password / GitHub / Google / Web3) to render.
+   * Resolves to null when the endpoint is unreachable so callers can fall
+   * back to the org's declared default method set.
+   *
+   * `redirectUri` is validated by IAM against the app's registered list. For a
+   * cross-app SSO read (e.g. console → hanzo.id, `clientId=hanzo-cloud`) pass the
+   * DOWNSTREAM app's own OIDC `redirect_uri` — the portal's `/callback` is NOT in
+   * that app's list, so hardcoding it makes IAM answer `status:error`
+   * ("Redirect URI … doesn't exist in the allowed list") and drops the whole
+   * response. Omit it for a bare/own-app read (defaults to the portal callback).
+   */
+  getAppLogin(clientId?: string, redirectUri?: string): Promise<AppLogin | null>
+  /**
+   * Resolve the signed-in user's `{owner, name}` from the IAM session
+   * (`/v1/iam/get-account`). After a `RequiredMfa` login the IAM session cookie
+   * already authenticates the user (IAM calls `SetSessionUsername` before
+   * answering `RequiredMfa`), so this is how the portal learns the identity to
+   * key the forced-enrollment calls on. Resolves null when unauthenticated.
+   */
+  getAccount(): Promise<MfaIdentity | null>
+  /**
+   * Begin TOTP enrollment: `POST /v1/iam/mfa/setup/initiate`. Returns the secret
+   * + `otpauth://` URI + recovery codes. Does NOT persist anything — only
+   * {@link mfaEnable} does.
+   */
+  mfaInitiate(id: MfaIdentity): Promise<MfaSetup>
+  /** Verify a TOTP code against a pending secret: `POST /v1/iam/mfa/setup/verify`. */
+  mfaVerify(req: MfaIdentity & { secret: string; passcode: string }): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }>
+  /** Persist a verified TOTP enrollment: `POST /v1/iam/mfa/setup/enable`. */
+  mfaEnable(req: MfaIdentity & { secret: string; recoveryCode: string }): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }>
+  /**
+   * Answer a `NextMfa` challenge: `POST /v1/iam/login` with `{mfaType, passcode}`
+   * and NO username, riding the MFA session cookie IAM set with `NextMfa`.
+   * Returns the same shape as {@link login} (a redirect with an auth code for the
+   * code flow, or a bare-session signal for portal sign-in).
+   */
+  mfaChallenge(req: MfaChallengeRequest): Promise<LoginResponse>
 }
 
 export interface AuthClientOptions {
-  readonly tenant: TenantConfig
+  readonly org: OrgConfig
   /** Override fetch impl (testing). Defaults to global fetch. */
   readonly fetchImpl?: typeof fetch
 }
 
 export function createAuthClient(opts: AuthClientOptions): AuthClient {
-  const tenant = opts.tenant
+  const org = opts.org
   const f = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch
 
   async function login(req: LoginRequest): Promise<LoginResponse> {
     const type = req.redirectUri ? 'code' : 'login'
-    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/login', tenant.iamUrl)
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/login', org.iamUrl)
     url.searchParams.set('clientId', req.clientId)
     url.searchParams.set('responseType', 'code')
     if (req.redirectUri) url.searchParams.set('redirectUri', req.redirectUri)
     url.searchParams.set('scope', 'openid profile email')
     if (req.state) url.searchParams.set('state', req.state)
+    // Echo the downstream OIDC nonce so the minted code -> id_token carries it.
+    // Strict openid-client consumers (LibreChat OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS) reject an
+    // id_token whose nonce != the one they sent ("unexpected JWT claim value").
+    if (req.nonce) url.searchParams.set('nonce', req.nonce)
+    if (req.codeChallenge) {
+      url.searchParams.set('code_challenge', req.codeChallenge)
+      url.searchParams.set('code_challenge_method', req.codeChallengeMethod ?? 'S256')
+    }
     url.searchParams.set('type', type)
+    // `organization` is an OPTIONAL lookup hint (see LoginRequest). Omit it when
+    // empty so IAM runs its cross-org resolution: a global-admin identity then
+    // resolves to the `admin` org (full multi-org session) instead of being
+    // pinned to — and truncated by — a colliding brand-org row. The session's
+    // org is always the resolved user's real owner, never this hint.
+    const body: Record<string, unknown> = {
+      type,
+      username: req.identifier,
+      password: req.password,
+      application: req.application,
+      signinMethod: 'Password',
+      autoSignin: true,
+    }
+    if (req.organization) body.organization = req.organization
     const res = await f(url.toString(), {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
       credentials: 'include',
-      body: JSON.stringify({
-        type,
-        username: req.identifier,
-        password: req.password,
-        application: req.application,
-        organization: req.organization,
-        signinMethod: 'Password',
-        autoSignin: true,
-      }),
+      body: JSON.stringify(body),
     })
     return parseLoginResponse(res, req)
   }
 
+  // Resolve the org of the user in the ambient IAM session (the `iam_session_id`
+  // cookie), or null when there is no live session. Reads `/v1/iam/get-account`;
+  // the org is the `owner` field (IAM returns the User at the top level or
+  // under `data`). Used to keep silent SSO from reusing a session that belongs
+  // to a DIFFERENT org than the app being signed into.
+  async function sessionOwner(): Promise<string | null> {
+    try {
+      const res = await f(new URL('/v1/iam/get-account', org.iamUrl).toString(), {
+        credentials: 'include',
+        headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },
+      })
+      if (!res.ok) return null
+      const body = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
+      if (body.status === 'error') return null
+      const nested = (typeof body.data === 'object' && body.data ? body.data : {}) as Record<string, unknown>
+      const owner = typeof body.owner === 'string' ? body.owner : nested.owner
+      return typeof owner === 'string' && owner ? owner : null
+    } catch {
+      return null
+    }
+  }
+
+  async function silentLogin(req: SilentLoginRequest): Promise<LoginResponse> {
+    // Silent SSO may reuse the ambient IAM session ONLY when that session's user
+    // belongs to the SAME org as the app being signed into. A cross-org app —
+    // e.g. the admin-guard (client_id=hanzo-admin-guard, org=admin) reached from
+    // a browser that already holds a hanzo/* session — must NOT mint a code from
+    // the wrong-org session: that confers owner=hanzo and silently shadows the
+    // org-scoped credential form (which resolves the admin/* identity). Resolve
+    // the app's org and the session owner; on no session or an org mismatch,
+    // return an empty response so Login.tsx falls back to the interactive form,
+    // which authenticates in the app's own org. Same-org SSO (the common case)
+    // still mints silently, so seamless sign-in is preserved.
+    const [app, owner] = await Promise.all([getAppLogin(req.clientId), sessionOwner()])
+    if (!owner) return {}
+    const appOrg = app?.organization
+    if (appOrg && owner !== appOrg) return {}
+
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/login', org.iamUrl)
+    url.searchParams.set('clientId', req.clientId)
+    url.searchParams.set('responseType', 'code')
+    url.searchParams.set('redirectUri', req.redirectUri)
+    url.searchParams.set('scope', req.scope ?? 'openid profile email')
+    if (req.state) url.searchParams.set('state', req.state)
+    if (req.nonce) url.searchParams.set('nonce', req.nonce)
+    if (req.codeChallenge) {
+      url.searchParams.set('code_challenge', req.codeChallenge)
+      url.searchParams.set('code_challenge_method', req.codeChallengeMethod ?? 'S256')
+    }
+    url.searchParams.set('type', 'code')
+    // NO username/password and NO provider: IAM's Login handler falls through to
+    // its "already signed in to IAM" branch (`GetSessionUsername() != ""`) and
+    // mints an authorization code for `application` from the existing
+    // `iam_session_id` cookie. `credentials: 'include'` sends that cookie. When
+    // there is no live session IAM responds `status:error` -> parseLoginResponse
+    // returns `{ error }`, and Login.tsx renders the interactive form instead.
+    const res = await f(url.toString(), {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      credentials: 'include',
+      body: JSON.stringify({ type: 'code', application: req.application, autoSignin: true }),
+    })
+    return parseLoginResponse(res, { redirectUri: req.redirectUri, state: req.state })
+  }
+
+  async function approveDevice(userCode: string): Promise<DeviceApprovalResult> {
+    const code = normalizeUserCode(userCode)
+    if (!code) return { ok: false, error: 'Enter the code shown on your device.' }
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/login', org.iamUrl)
+    // IAM's device branch keys the cache off the `userCode` in the BODY; the
+    // `type` echo on the query mirrors the other login legs. NO credentials —
+    // the user is already signed in, so this rides the session cookie
+    // (`credentials:'include'`) and IAM resolves the user from the session.
+    url.searchParams.set('type', 'device')
+    const body: Record<string, unknown> = {
+      type: 'device',
+      userCode: code,
+      application: org.appName,
+    }
+    // `organization` scopes the application lookup (FindApplicationByName); it
+    // does NOT resolve the user (that comes from the session), so pinning the
+    // org org here is safe — unlike password login, which omits it.
+    if (org.orgId) body.organization = org.orgId
+    let res: Response
+    try {
+      res = await f(url.toString(), {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+        credentials: 'include',
+        body: JSON.stringify(body),
+      })
+    } catch (e) {
+      return { ok: false, error: String(e) }
+    }
+    let parsed: Record<string, unknown> = {}
+    try {
+      parsed = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
+    } catch {
+      return { ok: false, error: `HTTP ${res.status} non-JSON response` }
+    }
+    if (!res.ok || parsed.status === 'error') {
+      return { ok: false, error: typeof parsed.msg === 'string' && parsed.msg ? parsed.msg : `HTTP ${res.status}` }
+    }
+    // Consent branch: {status:ok, data:{required:true}}. First-party apps skip
+    // this; surface it so the caller can render consent rather than dead-ending.
+    const data = parsed.data
+    if (data !== null && typeof data === 'object' && (data as Record<string, unknown>).required === true) {
+      return { ok: false, required: true }
+    }
+    return { ok: true }
+  }
+
+  async function deviceInfo(userCode: string): Promise<DeviceInfoResult> {
+    const code = normalizeUserCode(userCode)
+    if (!code) return { ok: false, error: 'Enter the code shown on your device.' }
+    // POST, and the code rides the BODY — like `approveDevice` beside it, and for
+    // the reason IAM's own introspection endpoint is POST: the user_code is the one
+    // secret in this flow, and a request line is copied into ingress and proxy
+    // access logs where a body is not. This page ships `scrubUrl()` to keep the
+    // code out of the address bar; putting it into every request line would undo
+    // that server-side. Same session cookie as the approval: whatever you may look
+    // at is exactly what you may approve.
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/oauth/device/info', org.iamUrl)
+    let res: Response
+    try {
+      res = await f(url.toString(), {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Accept: 'application/json' },
+        credentials: 'include',
+        body: JSON.stringify({ userCode: code }),
+      })
+    } catch (e) {
+      return { ok: false, error: String(e) }
+    }
+    let parsed: Record<string, unknown> = {}
+    try {
+      parsed = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
+    } catch {
+      return { ok: false, error: `HTTP ${res.status} non-JSON response` }
+    }
+    if (!res.ok || parsed.status === 'error') {
+      const error = typeof parsed.msg === 'string' && parsed.msg ? parsed.msg : `HTTP ${res.status}`
+      // IAM `CodeLoginRequired` (internal/oidc/oidc.go): the session lapsed between
+      // the page's get-account check and this read. Not a dead end — sign in again.
+      if (parsed.code === 'login_required') return { ok: false, error, loginRequired: true }
+      return { ok: false, error }
+    }
+    // A name is only worth rendering if the server sent it. An answer with no
+    // clientId names nothing, so it fails rather than letting the page fall back
+    // to a guess — showing the WRONG application is the defect this endpoint exists
+    // to fix. `displayName` falls back to the clientId, which IAM did confirm.
+    const data = parsed.data as Record<string, unknown> | undefined
+    const clientId = typeof data?.clientId === 'string' ? data.clientId : ''
+    const displayName = typeof data?.displayName === 'string' ? data.displayName : ''
+    if (!clientId) return { ok: false, error: 'IAM did not name the application for this code.' }
+    return { ok: true, clientId, displayName: displayName || clientId }
+  }
+
   async function signup(req: SignupRequest): Promise<LoginResponse> {
-    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/signup', tenant.iamUrl)
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/signup', org.iamUrl)
     url.searchParams.set('clientId', req.clientId)
     const username = req.email.split('@')[0]
     const res = await f(url.toString(), {
@@ -99,22 +357,48 @@ export function createAuthClient(opts: AuthClientOptions): AuthClient {
         email: req.email,
         password: req.password,
         confirm: req.password,
-        autoSignin: true,
         ...(req.inviteCode ? { invitationCode: req.inviteCode } : {}),
       }),
     })
-    return parseLoginResponse(res)
+
+    // Registration is CREATE-ONLY at IAM. `/v1/iam/signup` persists the user and
+    // answers with the created row — it sets no session cookie and mints no
+    // authorization code, and its form (`internal/oidc/signup.go`) has no
+    // `autoSignin`, `redirectUri` or `code_challenge` field to make it do so.
+    // The `autoSignin: true` this used to post was silently dropped by the Go
+    // decoder, so "signed up" and "signed in" were never the same event.
+    //
+    // Left there, the response fell through `parseLoginResponse`'s no-redirect
+    // arm to `{ redirectUrl: '/onboarding' }` — every new customer was sent to
+    // the portal's own onboarding, unauthenticated, while the app that sent them
+    // waited on a code that was never minted. So finish the job here: a signup
+    // that leaves you logged out is not a signup.
+    const created = await parseCreated(res)
+    if (created.error) return created
+
+    return login({
+      identifier: req.email,
+      password: req.password,
+      clientId: req.clientId,
+      application: req.application,
+      organization: req.organization,
+      redirectUri: req.redirectUri,
+      state: req.state,
+      codeChallenge: req.codeChallenge,
+      codeChallengeMethod: req.codeChallengeMethod,
+      nonce: req.nonce,
+    })
   }
 
   async function forgot(req: ForgotRequest): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
-    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/send-verification-code', tenant.iamUrl)
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/send-verification-code', org.iamUrl)
     url.searchParams.set('clientId', req.clientId)
     url.searchParams.set('organization', req.organization)
     const res = await f(url.toString(), {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
       body: JSON.stringify({
-        applicationId: `admin/${tenant.appName}`,
+        applicationId: `admin/${org.appName}`,
         organization: req.organization,
         dest: req.identifier,
         type: req.identifier.includes('@') ? 'email' : 'phone',
@@ -129,28 +413,31 @@ export function createAuthClient(opts: AuthClientOptions): AuthClient {
   }
 
   function authorize(req: OAuthAuthorizeRequest): string {
-    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/oauth/authorize', tenant.iamUrl)
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/oauth/authorize', org.iamUrl)
     url.searchParams.set('client_id', req.clientId)
     url.searchParams.set('redirect_uri', req.redirectUri)
     url.searchParams.set('response_type', req.responseType ?? 'code')
     url.searchParams.set('scope', req.scope ?? 'openid profile email')
     url.searchParams.set('state', req.state)
-    if (req.provider) url.searchParams.set('provider', req.provider)
     if (req.nonce) url.searchParams.set('nonce', req.nonce)
     if (req.codeChallenge) {
       url.searchParams.set('code_challenge', req.codeChallenge)
       url.searchParams.set('code_challenge_method', req.codeChallengeMethod ?? 'S256')
     }
+    // Naming a provider federates the request to that external IdP instead of
+    // the hosted credential login. The type has always declared this field;
+    // never emitting it is why social sign-in had no server side at all.
+    if (req.provider) url.searchParams.set('provider', req.provider)
     return url.toString()
   }
 
   async function exchange(code: string, codeVerifier?: string): Promise<TokenResponse> {
-    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/oauth/token', tenant.iamUrl)
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/oauth/token', org.iamUrl)
     const body = new URLSearchParams({
       grant_type: 'authorization_code',
       code,
-      client_id: tenant.clientId,
-      redirect_uri: `${tenant.publicOrigin}/callback`,
+      client_id: org.clientId,
+      redirect_uri: `${org.publicOrigin}/callback`,
     })
     if (codeVerifier) body.set('code_verifier', codeVerifier)
     const res = await f(url.toString(), {
@@ -171,122 +458,275 @@ export function createAuthClient(opts: AuthClientOptions): AuthClient {
   }
 
   function logout(idTokenHint?: string, postLogoutRedirectUri?: string): string {
-    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/oauth/logout', tenant.iamUrl)
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/oauth/logout', org.iamUrl)
     if (idTokenHint) url.searchParams.set('id_token_hint', idTokenHint)
     url.searchParams.set(
       'post_logout_redirect_uri',
-      postLogoutRedirectUri ?? `${tenant.publicOrigin}/login`,
+      postLogoutRedirectUri ?? `${org.publicOrigin}/login`,
     )
     return url.toString()
   }
 
-  // appLogin fetches the application's enabled providers + sign-in methods so
-  // the UI renders exactly what the IAM app offers (social buttons, code login).
-  async function appLogin(): Promise<AppLoginInfo> {
-    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/get-app-login', tenant.iamUrl)
-    url.searchParams.set('clientId', tenant.clientId)
+  async function getAppLogin(clientId?: string, redirectUri?: string): Promise<AppLogin | null> {
+    const id = clientId ?? org.clientId
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/get-app-login', org.iamUrl)
+    url.searchParams.set('clientId', id)
     url.searchParams.set('responseType', 'code')
-    url.searchParams.set('redirectUri', `${tenant.publicOrigin}/callback`)
+    // Validate against the downstream app's OWN redirect_uri when the caller has
+    // one (the SSO authorize flow carries it); the portal's own /callback is not
+    // registered for another app, so IAM would reject the read and we'd surface
+    // no social buttons. Fall back to the portal callback for a bare/own read.
+    url.searchParams.set('redirectUri', redirectUri || `${org.publicOrigin}/callback`)
     url.searchParams.set('scope', 'openid profile email')
-    url.searchParams.set('state', 'login')
-    const res = await f(url.toString(), { credentials: 'include' })
+    url.searchParams.set('state', 'app-login')
+    let body: Record<string, unknown>
+    try {
+      const res = await f(url.toString(), { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
+      if (!res.ok) return null
+      body = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
+    } catch {
+      return null
+    }
+    if (body.status !== 'ok' || typeof body.data !== 'object' || body.data === null) return null
+    return parseAppLogin(body.data as Record<string, unknown>, org.appName, org.orgId)
+  }
+
+  async function getAccount(): Promise<MfaIdentity | null> {
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/get-account', org.iamUrl)
+    let body: Record<string, unknown>
+    try {
+      const res = await f(url.toString(), { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' }, credentials: 'include' })
+      if (!res.ok) return null
+      body = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
+    } catch {
+      return null
+    }
+    const d = (typeof body.data === 'object' && body.data ? body.data : {}) as Record<string, unknown>
+    if (typeof d.owner !== 'string' || typeof d.name !== 'string' || !d.owner || !d.name) return null
+    return { owner: d.owner, name: d.name }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Build a `/v1/iam/mfa/setup/*` POST URL with EVERY param on the query string
+   * and send an EMPTY body. This is the one wire shape IAM's authz filter and
+   * the MFA controller both accept: the controller reads `owner`/`name`/… from
+   * the merged form (query + body), while the authz filter only extracts the
+   * `{owner,name}` object from the query when the body is empty (a non-empty
+   * body is JSON-unmarshalled, and a urlencoded body fails that parse → empty
+   * object → the self-access match `sub==obj` fails → "Unauthorized operation").
+   * `owner`/`name` ride the query on EVERY call — including `verify`, which
+   * otherwise carries no identity — purely so that self-access check passes.
+   */
+  async function mfaSetupPost(path: string, params: Record<string, string>): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
+    const url = new URL(`/v1/iam/mfa/setup/${path}`, org.iamUrl)
+    for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(params)) url.searchParams.set(k, v)
+    const res = await f(url.toString(), { method: 'POST', credentials: 'include' })
     const body = (await res.json().catch(() => ({}))) as Record<string, unknown>
-    const d = (body.data ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>
-    const providers = Array.isArray(d.providers)
-      ? (d.providers as Array<Record<string, unknown>>).map((p) => {
-          const prov = (p.provider ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>
-          return {
-            name: String(p.name ?? prov.name ?? ''),
-            displayName: typeof prov.displayName === 'string' ? prov.displayName : undefined,
-            type: typeof prov.type === 'string' ? prov.type : undefined,
-            category: typeof prov.category === 'string' ? prov.category : undefined,
-            canSignIn: p.canSignIn !== false,
-            canSignUp: p.canSignUp !== false,
-          }
-        })
-      : []
-    const signinMethods = Array.isArray(d.signinMethods)
-      ? (d.signinMethods as Array<Record<string, unknown>>).map((m) => ({
-          name: String(m.name ?? ''),
-          rule: typeof m.rule === 'string' ? m.rule : undefined,
-        }))
-      : []
+    if (typeof body.status === 'string' && body.status === 'error') {
+      throw new Error(typeof body.msg === 'string' && body.msg ? body.msg : `HTTP ${res.status}`)
+    }
+    if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`HTTP ${res.status}`)
+    return body
+  }
+
+  async function mfaInitiate(id: MfaIdentity): Promise<MfaSetup> {
+    const body = await mfaSetupPost('initiate', { owner: id.owner, name: id.name, mfaType: MFA_TOTP })
+    const d = (typeof body.data === 'object' && body.data ? body.data : {}) as Record<string, unknown>
+    const secret = typeof d.secret === 'string' ? d.secret : ''
+    const url = typeof d.url === 'string' ? d.url : ''
+    if (!secret || !url) throw new Error('IAM returned no TOTP secret')
     return {
-      name: String(d.name ?? tenant.appName),
-      displayName: typeof d.displayName === 'string' ? d.displayName : undefined,
-      providers,
-      signinMethods,
-      enablePassword: d.enablePassword !== false,
-      enableCodeSignin: d.enableCodeSignin === true,
-      enableSignUp: d.enableSignUp !== false,
+      mfaType: MFA_TOTP,
+      secret,
+      url,
+      recoveryCodes: Array.isArray(d.recoveryCodes) ? d.recoveryCodes.filter((c): c is string => typeof c === 'string') : [],
     }
   }
 
-  async function sendLoginCode(dest: string): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
-    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/send-verification-code', tenant.iamUrl)
-    url.searchParams.set('clientId', tenant.clientId)
-    url.searchParams.set('organization', tenant.orgId)
-    const isEmail = dest.includes('@')
-    const res = await f(url.toString(), {
-      method: 'POST',
-      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
-      body: JSON.stringify({
-        applicationId: `admin/${tenant.appName}`,
-        organization: tenant.orgId,
-        dest,
-        type: isEmail ? 'email' : 'phone',
-        method: 'login',
-        checkUser: dest,
-      }),
-    })
-    if (!res.ok) return { ok: false, error: `HTTP ${res.status}` }
-    const body = (await res.json().catch(() => ({}))) as Record<string, unknown>
-    if (body.status === 'error') return { ok: false, error: typeof body.msg === 'string' ? body.msg : 'failed' }
-    return { ok: true }
+  async function mfaVerify(req: MfaIdentity & { secret: string; passcode: string }): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
+    try {
+      await mfaSetupPost('verify', { owner: req.owner, name: req.name, mfaType: MFA_TOTP, secret: req.secret, passcode: req.passcode })
+      return { ok: true }
+    } catch (e) {
+      return { ok: false, error: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e) }
+    }
   }
 
-  async function loginWithCode(req: CodeLoginRequest): Promise<LoginResponse> {
+  async function mfaEnable(req: MfaIdentity & { secret: string; recoveryCode: string }): Promise<{ ok: boolean; error?: string }> {
+    try {
+      await mfaSetupPost('enable', {
+        owner: req.owner,
+        name: req.name,
+        mfaType: MFA_TOTP,
+        secret: req.secret,
+        recoveryCodes: req.recoveryCode,
+      })
+      return { ok: true }
+    } catch (e) {
+      return { ok: false, error: e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e) }
+    }
+  }
+
+  async function mfaChallenge(req: MfaChallengeRequest): Promise<LoginResponse> {
     const type = req.redirectUri ? 'code' : 'login'
-    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/login', tenant.iamUrl)
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/login', org.iamUrl)
     url.searchParams.set('clientId', req.clientId)
     url.searchParams.set('responseType', 'code')
     if (req.redirectUri) url.searchParams.set('redirectUri', req.redirectUri)
     url.searchParams.set('scope', 'openid profile email')
     if (req.state) url.searchParams.set('state', req.state)
+    if (req.codeChallenge) {
+      url.searchParams.set('code_challenge', req.codeChallenge)
+      url.searchParams.set('code_challenge_method', req.codeChallengeMethod ?? 'S256')
+    }
     url.searchParams.set('type', type)
-    const isEmail = req.dest.includes('@')
     const res = await f(url.toString(), {
       method: 'POST',
       headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
       credentials: 'include',
       body: JSON.stringify({
         type,
-        username: req.dest,
-        code: req.code,
+        // No username: IAM resolves the user from the MFA session cookie it set
+        // when it answered NextMfa.
+        mfaType: req.mfaType,
+        passcode: req.passcode,
         application: req.application,
         organization: req.organization,
-        signinMethod: 'Verification code',
-        ...(isEmail ? { email: req.dest } : { phone: req.dest }),
-        autoSignin: true,
+        enableMfaRemember: req.rememberDevice ?? false,
       }),
     })
     return parseLoginResponse(res, req)
   }
 
   return {
-    tenant,
+    org,
     login,
+    silentLogin,
+    approveDevice,
+    deviceInfo,
     signup,
     forgot,
     authorize,
     exchange,
     logout,
-    appLogin,
-    sendLoginCode,
-    loginWithCode,
+    getAppLogin,
+    getAccount,
+    mfaInitiate,
+    mfaVerify,
+    mfaEnable,
+    mfaChallenge,
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Canonicalize a user-entered device code to the form IAM generated. IAM mints
+ * user_codes from an UPPERCASE unambiguous alphabet ([A-HJ-NP-Z2-9], no
+ * I/L/O/0/1) and keys its DeviceAuthMap on the exact string. A human may
+ * transcribe it lower-cased or with stray spaces/dashes, so normalize TO
+ * uppercase and strip separators — case-insensitive entry, an exact-match send.
+ */
+function normalizeUserCode(raw: string): string {
+  return raw.trim().toUpperCase().replace(/[\s-]+/g, '')
+}
+
+/**
+ * The provider's DISPLAY key — `provider-github` → `github` — used to pick an
+ * icon and a label (`PROVIDER_META`) and to match a `provider_hint`.
+ *
+ * It is NOT what the authorize endpoint wants. `federationProvider` matches the
+ * record name exactly, so `?provider=` must carry the full `provider-github`;
+ * live, `?provider=github` is refused "unknown or unavailable provider". This
+ * comment used to assert the opposite — a bare key — which was never true of the
+ * federation broker.
+ */
+function providerKey(name: string): string {
+  return name.replace(/^provider-/, '')
+}
+
+/**
+ * A provider is renderable only when IAM holds a real OAuth clientId for it.
+ * The seed ships obvious placeholders (`GITHUB_CLIENT_ID_PLACEHOLDER`,
+ * `placeholder`); an empty or placeholder id means the provider isn't
+ * provisioned, so its button is hidden rather than dead-ending the user. Real
+ * OAuth client ids never contain "placeholder".
+ */
+function isConfiguredClientId(clientId: string): boolean {
+  return clientId.length > 0 && !/placeholder/i.test(clientId)
+}
+
+/** Shape the `/v1/iam/get-app-login` `data` payload into the {@link AppLogin} view. */
+function parseAppLogin(
+  data: Record<string, unknown>,
+  fallbackApp: string,
+  fallbackOrg: string,
+): AppLogin {
+  const rawProviders = Array.isArray(data.providers) ? data.providers : []
+  const providers: AppProvider[] = rawProviders
+    .map((p): AppProvider | null => {
+      if (typeof p !== 'object' || p === null) return null
+      const rec = p as Record<string, unknown>
+      // The provider's IDENTITY is the nested provider record's name
+      // (`rec.provider.name`, e.g. `provider-github`) — that is what the IAM
+      // backend's social-login lookup (`GetProvider(admin/<name>)`) resolves.
+      // The OUTER link object's `name` is the app's provider-LINK label, which
+      // some IAM seeds set to a per-app default (e.g. `<org>-iam`); reading
+      // it as the provider name made the hop POST `provider=<org>-iam`, which
+      // the backend rejects ("The provider: <org>-iam does not exist"). Prefer
+      // the inner record name; fall back to the outer label only when there is
+      // no nested provider record. One source of truth: the provider record.
+      const inner =
+        typeof rec.provider === 'object' && rec.provider !== null
+          ? (rec.provider as Record<string, unknown>)
+          : {}
+      const innerName = typeof inner.name === 'string' ? inner.name : ''
+      const outerName = typeof rec.name === 'string' ? rec.name : ''
+      const name = innerName || outerName
+      if (!name) return null
+      const clientId = typeof inner.clientId === 'string' ? inner.clientId : ''
+      return {
+        name,
+        key: providerKey(name),
+        canSignIn: rec.canSignIn !== false,
+        canSignUp: rec.canSignUp !== false,
+        configured: isConfiguredClientId(clientId),
+        type: typeof inner.type === 'string' ? inner.type : '',
+        clientId,
+        scopes: typeof inner.scopes === 'string' ? inner.scopes : '',
+      }
+    })
+    .filter((p): p is AppProvider => p !== null)
+  return {
+    application: typeof data.name === 'string' ? data.name : fallbackApp,
+    organization: typeof data.organization === 'string' ? data.organization : fallbackOrg,
+    enablePassword: data.enablePassword !== false,
+    enableSignUp: data.enableSignUp !== false,
+    enableCodeSignin: data.enableCodeSignin === true,
+    providers,
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read a create-only IAM response: `{status, msg, data}` where `data` is the
+ * created row. Success carries nothing the caller can navigate to, so this
+ * reports only whether it worked — never a redirect. Kept separate from
+ * `parseLoginResponse` precisely because that one INVENTS a destination when no
+ * `redirectUri` was requested, which is wrong for a row that is not a session.
+ */
+async function parseCreated(res: Response): Promise<{ error?: string }> {
+  let body: Record<string, unknown> = {}
+  try {
+    body = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
+  } catch {
+    return { error: `HTTP ${res.status} non-JSON response` }
+  }
+  // IAM answers a REFUSAL with HTTP 200 + status:"error" (see the org-less login
+  // note in this repo's LLM.md), so the status code alone proves nothing.
+  if (!res.ok || body.status === 'error') {
+    return { error: typeof body.msg === 'string' ? body.msg : `HTTP ${res.status}` }
+  }
+  return {}
+}
+
 async function parseLoginResponse(
   res: Response,
   req?: { redirectUri?: string; state?: string },
@@ -302,6 +742,25 @@ async function parseLoginResponse(
   }
   const data = body.data
 
+  // Multi-factor signal — IAM answers a successful credential check with a
+  // STRING in `data` (NOT a `mfa_required` boolean): `"RequiredMfa"` when org
+  // policy forces MFA the user has not enrolled, `"NextMfa"` when the user has
+  // MFA and must answer a challenge. Branch BEFORE any session/redirect return:
+  // the password session is not yet usable, so the portal must render the
+  // enrollment/challenge step rather than navigate on.
+  if (data === 'RequiredMfa') {
+    return { mfaRequired: true, mfaStage: 'enroll' }
+  }
+  if (data === 'NextMfa') {
+    // Challenge allow-list: IAM's named `mfa` field first, falling back to
+    // the legacy untyped `data2` slot until IAM stops emitting it.
+    const allow = Array.isArray(body.mfa) ? body.mfa : Array.isArray(body.data2) ? body.data2 : []
+    const mfaTypes = allow
+      .map((p) => (typeof p === 'object' && p !== null ? (p as Record<string, unknown>).mfaType : undefined))
+      .filter((t): t is string => typeof t === 'string' && t.length > 0)
+    return { mfaRequired: true, mfaStage: 'challenge', mfaTypes }
+  }
+
   // Authorization-code flow: a client redirectUri is present and `data` is the
   // freshly minted code — hand the SPA a fully-formed redirect back to the app.
   if (req?.redirectUri && typeof data === 'string' && data.length > 0) {
@@ -311,9 +770,12 @@ async function parseLoginResponse(
     }
   }
 
-  // Bare portal sign-in: the IAM session cookie is now set; land on the portal.
+  // Bare portal sign-in: the IAM session cookie is now set; land on the
+  // post-login onboarding flow. Onboarding's IAM writes ride the same
+  // session cookie (`credentials: include`), so no bearer token is needed
+  // for the password path.
   if (!req?.redirectUri) {
-    return { redirectUrl: '/' }
+    return { redirectUrl: '/onboarding' }
   }
 
   // Fallback: a nested token payload (future direct-token IAM responses).
@@ -323,7 +785,5 @@ async function parseLoginResponse(
     refreshToken: typeof d.refresh_token === 'string' ? d.refresh_token : undefined,
     idToken: typeof d.id_token === 'string' ? d.id_token : undefined,
     expiresAt: typeof d.expires_at === 'number' ? d.expires_at : undefined,
-    mfaRequired: d.mfa_required === true,
-    mfaChannel: typeof d.mfa_channel === 'string' ? (d.mfa_channel as LoginResponse['mfaChannel']) : undefined,
   }
 }

pkgs/auth/src/iam.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+import type { OrgConfig } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
+import { IAM } from '@hanzo/iam/browser'
+
+/**
+ * One IAM browser-SDK instance per org, wired to the portal's own
+ * `/callback` route. This is the single place that constructs the PKCE
+ * client — social/web3 sign-in (here) and the callback handler
+ * (`Callback.tsx`) share it so the PKCE verifier/state the SDK stores on
+ * `signinRedirect` is the same one it reads on `handleCallback`. One way.
+ *
+ * The portal is its own OIDC client (`clientId` = the brand `-id` app), so
+ * every flow it initiates lands back at `${publicOrigin}/callback`.
+ */
+export function createIam(org: OrgConfig, clientId?: string): IAM {
+  return new IAM({
+    serverUrl: org.iamUrl,
+    clientId: clientId ?? org.clientId,
+    redirectUri: `${org.publicOrigin}/callback`,
+    scope: 'openid profile email',
+  })
+}

pkgs/auth/src/index.ts

@@ -1,14 +1,34 @@
-export { createAuthClient, type AuthClient, type AuthClientOptions } from './client'
+export {
+  createAuthClient,
+  mfaChannelOf,
+  MFA_TOTP,
+  type AuthClient,
+  type AuthClientOptions,
+} from './client'
+export { createIam } from './iam'
+export { authorizeRequest, matchProviderHint } from './social'
+export {
+  loginWithWalletChain,
+  detectWalletChains,
+  ENABLED_WALLET_CHAINS,
+  WALLET_CHAIN_LABELS,
+  type WalletLoginContext,
+  type WalletWindow,
+} from './web3'
 export type {
   LoginRequest,
   LoginResponse,
+  MfaChannel,
+  MfaChallengeRequest,
+  MfaIdentity,
+  MfaSetup,
   SignupRequest,
   ForgotRequest,
   OAuthAuthorizeRequest,
   TokenResponse,
-  ProviderInfo,
-  SigninMethod,
-  AppLoginInfo,
-  CodeLoginRequest,
+  AppLogin,
+  AppProvider,
+  DeviceApprovalResult,
+  DeviceInfoResult,
 } from './types'
 export * from './ui'

pkgs/auth/src/social.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/**
+ * Federated sign-in — pure unit tests, no network. Run with:
+ *   pnpm --filter @hanzo/id-auth test
+ *
+ * The browser's whole job in a federated sign-in is to name the provider on
+ * IAM's authorize endpoint and, when an app sent the user here, to hand that
+ * app's own request back unchanged so IAM mints the code against it. Those two
+ * are what these tests pin; the IdP leg belongs to IAM and is not modelled here.
+ */
+import { test } from 'vitest'
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import { authorizeRequest, matchProviderHint } from './social.ts'
+
+const PORTAL = 'hanzo-console'
+
+test('an app-initiated request is recovered whole, so IAM binds the code to that app', () => {
+  // What IAM forwards to the hosted login (authorizeForwardQuery) when an app
+  // sends a user here for a code.
+  const req = authorizeRequest(
+    '?client_id=hanzo-app&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fhanzo.app%2Fcallback&response_type=code' +
+      '&scope=openid+profile&state=rp123&nonce=n1&code_challenge=C1&code_challenge_method=S256',
+    PORTAL,
+  )!
+  assert.equal(req.clientId, 'hanzo-app')
+  assert.equal(req.redirectUri, 'https://hanzo.app/callback')
+  assert.equal(req.state, 'rp123')
+  assert.equal(req.scope, 'openid profile')
+  assert.equal(req.nonce, 'n1')
+  // Load-bearing: the code IAM mints is bound to the APP's challenge, so the
+  // app's own callback completes the exchange with the verifier it kept.
+  assert.equal(req.codeChallenge, 'C1')
+  assert.equal(req.codeChallengeMethod, 'S256')
+})
+
+test('a bare portal sign-in has no app to return to', () => {
+  // No redirect_uri → nothing to return a code to, so the portal starts its own
+  // PKCE flow instead (the SDK owns the verifier; Callback reads it back).
+  assert.equal(authorizeRequest('', PORTAL), null)
+  assert.equal(authorizeRequest('?provider_hint=provider-github', PORTAL), null)
+})
+
+test('the portal client id is the fallback, never an override', () => {
+  const own = authorizeRequest('?redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fhanzo.id%2Fcallback', PORTAL)!
+  assert.equal(own.clientId, PORTAL, 'no client_id on the query → the portal is the client')
+
+  const app = authorizeRequest('?client_id=hanzo-app&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fhanzo.app%2Fcallback', PORTAL)!
+  assert.equal(app.clientId, 'hanzo-app', "the app's own client_id wins — the code is minted for IT")
+})
+
+test('a leading ? is optional and absent params stay absent', () => {
+  const withMark = authorizeRequest('?redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fhanzo.id%2Fcallback', PORTAL)!
+  const without = authorizeRequest('redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fhanzo.id%2Fcallback', PORTAL)!
+  assert.deepEqual(withMark, without)
+  // Undefined, not '' — client.authorize omits a param it was not given, and an
+  // empty code_challenge is not the same request as no code_challenge.
+  assert.equal(withMark.codeChallenge, undefined)
+  assert.equal(withMark.nonce, undefined)
+  assert.equal(withMark.scope, undefined)
+  assert.equal(withMark.state, '', 'state is always sent, empty when the app sent none')
+})
+
+test('only the two PKCE methods RFC 7636 defines are carried through', () => {
+  const base = 'redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fhanzo.id%2Fcallback&code_challenge=C1&code_challenge_method='
+  assert.equal(authorizeRequest(base + 'S256', PORTAL)!.codeChallengeMethod, 'S256')
+  assert.equal(authorizeRequest(base + 'plain', PORTAL)!.codeChallengeMethod, 'plain')
+  // Anything else is dropped rather than forwarded, so client.authorize applies
+  // its S256 default instead of asking IAM to honor a method it does not define.
+  assert.equal(authorizeRequest(base + 'md5', PORTAL)!.codeChallengeMethod, undefined)
+})
+
+test('matchProviderHint resolves the console hint, the bare key, and case, else undefined', () => {
+  const providers = [
+    { name: 'provider-github', key: 'github' },
+    { name: 'provider-google', key: 'google' },
+  ]
+  // The console sends the IAM record name verbatim (`provider-github`).
+  assert.equal(matchProviderHint(providers, 'provider-github')?.key, 'github')
+  assert.equal(matchProviderHint(providers, 'provider-google')?.key, 'google')
+  // The bare key and any case also resolve, so the two sides need no shared constant.
+  assert.equal(matchProviderHint(providers, 'github')?.key, 'github')
+  assert.equal(matchProviderHint(providers, 'GitHub')?.key, 'github')
+  // A hint for a provider this app doesn't offer, or an empty hint, matches nothing.
+  assert.equal(matchProviderHint(providers, 'provider-apple'), undefined)
+  assert.equal(matchProviderHint(providers, ''), undefined)
+})

pkgs/auth/src/social.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+import type { OAuthAuthorizeRequest } from './types'
+
+/**
+ * Federated sign-in — the portal's half of IAM identity federation.
+ *
+ * IAM is the relying party; this SPA is not. `/v1/iam/oauth/authorize?provider=…`
+ * IS the entry point: having already validated the client_id, the EXACT
+ * redirect_uri and the PKCE policy, IAM stashes the app-leg request server-side,
+ * sets a single-use browser-binding cookie and sends the browser to the IdP
+ * (`internal/oidc/federation.go::beginFederation`). The IdP returns to IAM's own
+ * fixed callback — `/v1/iam/oauth/callback`, never a route in this SPA — where
+ * IAM, which holds the client SECRET a browser cannot, exchanges the code, links
+ * or provisions the user, and mints an IAM authorization code bound to the
+ * original PKCE challenge, redirect_uri and nonce. The ordinary code→token
+ * exchange then completes unchanged.
+ *
+ * This file used to build the IdP URL here in the browser, replicating a contract
+ * from an IAM fork whose front end no longer exists. Nothing could ever finish it:
+ * the SPA has no client secret and IAM has no endpoint that exchanges a raw
+ * provider code, so GitHub returned to `/callback` with a code nobody could spend
+ * and the flow died there. The browser's only job is to NAME the provider.
+ *
+ * The name is the IAM provider RECORD name (`provider-github`), never the bare
+ * key: `federationProvider` matches `ProviderItem.Name` exactly, and
+ * `EnrichProviders` resolves that same name to the record, so the two are one
+ * string by construction. Verified live — `provider=github` is refused with
+ * "unknown or unavailable provider"; `provider=provider-github` redirects to
+ * GitHub.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * The authorize request this portal is standing in for, read from its own URL.
+ *
+ * When an app sends a user here for a code, IAM forwards that app's validated
+ * request on the query (`authorizeForwardQuery`). Re-entering authorize with it —
+ * plus `provider` — is what makes IAM mint the code against THAT app: its
+ * client_id, its redirect_uri, its PKCE challenge. The browser is returned
+ * straight to the app, so this portal's own `/callback` never runs and no token
+ * is ever handed across on a URL.
+ *
+ * Null when there is no app to return to (a bare portal sign-in), which is the
+ * signal to start the portal's own PKCE flow instead. Keyed on `redirect_uri`
+ * because that is the one parameter that makes a request returnable — the same
+ * condition the password path branches on (`Login.completeAfterAuth`).
+ *
+ * The result is an {@link OAuthAuthorizeRequest} because that is exactly what
+ * `client.authorize` consumes: one type, read and written in one shape.
+ */
+export function authorizeRequest(search: string, clientId: string): OAuthAuthorizeRequest | null {
+  const q = new URLSearchParams(search.startsWith('?') ? search.slice(1) : search)
+  const redirectUri = q.get('redirect_uri')
+  if (!redirectUri) return null
+  const method = q.get('code_challenge_method')
+  return {
+    clientId: q.get('client_id') || clientId,
+    redirectUri,
+    state: q.get('state') ?? '',
+    scope: q.get('scope') ?? undefined,
+    nonce: q.get('nonce') ?? undefined,
+    codeChallenge: q.get('code_challenge') ?? undefined,
+    codeChallengeMethod: method === 'plain' || method === 'S256' ? method : undefined,
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve a `provider_hint` from the authorize query to one of the app's
+ * configured providers. A client that already knows which provider the user
+ * chose (the console passes `?provider_hint=provider-github` when a user clicks
+ * "Continue with GitHub" over there) sends the hint so this portal launches that
+ * provider straight away — no second button press, no bounce through a login
+ * page. Accepts the IAM record name (`provider-github`), the normalized key
+ * (`github`), or the record name with the `provider-` prefix stripped, so the
+ * two sides agree without a shared constant. Returns undefined when nothing
+ * matches (the caller falls back to the interactive form).
+ */
+export function matchProviderHint<P extends { name: string; key: string }>(
+  providers: Iterable<P>,
+  hint: string,
+): P | undefined {
+  const h = hint.trim().toLowerCase()
+  if (h === '') return undefined
+  const bare = h.replace(/^provider-/, '')
+  for (const p of providers) {
+    const name = p.name.toLowerCase()
+    const key = p.key.toLowerCase()
+    if (name === h || key === h || key === bare) return p
+  }
+  return undefined
+}

pkgs/auth/src/types.ts

@@ -3,29 +3,193 @@ export interface LoginRequest {
   readonly password: string
   readonly clientId: string
   readonly application: string
-  readonly organization: string
+  /**
+   * Org-resolution anchor for the credential lookup. OPTIONAL by design.
+   *
+   * IAM resolves the user by (org, identifier); if the in-org lookup misses it
+   * falls back to a CROSS-ORG lookup by email/username and the session always
+   * encodes the user's REAL owner-org (`GetOrganizationByUser`), never this
+   * value. So this field is a lookup HINT, not the session's org.
+   *
+   * Leaving it empty/undefined makes login ORG-AGNOSTIC: every in-org lookup
+   * misses, the cross-org fallback runs, and an identity that lives in the
+   * global `admin` org (a global admin) resolves to `admin` (→ full multi-org
+   * session) while a brand-only identity resolves to its own brand org. This is
+   * why the portal does NOT pin the brand org here — pinning `hanzo` would
+   * resolve a colliding `hanzo/<name>` row and truncate a global admin to one
+   * org. Set it only to FORCE a specific org (e.g. a brand that deliberately
+   * scopes its portal to a single org). Signup, by contrast, MUST carry a
+   * concrete org (you cannot create a user in "no org").
+   */
+  readonly organization?: string
   readonly redirectUri?: string
   readonly state?: string
+  readonly codeChallenge?: string
+  readonly codeChallengeMethod?: 'S256' | 'plain'
+  /**
+   * OIDC nonce from the downstream authorize request. MUST be threaded through
+   * the password-login path so the minted code (and resulting id_token) echo it.
+   * Confidential OIDC clients that validate strictly (e.g. LibreChat /
+   * openid-client with OPENID_REUSE_TOKENS) reject an id_token whose nonce
+   * doesn't match the one they sent -> "unexpected JWT claim value" -> callback
+   * 500. Forward, never default — only echo what the authorize URL carried.
+   */
+  readonly nonce?: string
 }
 
+/**
+ * Inputs to {@link AuthClient.silentLogin} — the silent-SSO leg.
+ *
+ * Carries NO credentials. When the browser already holds an `iam_session_id`
+ * cookie on the issuer host (the user signed in once for another app), IAM's
+ * Login handler takes its "already signed in" branch and mints an authorization
+ * code for `application` without a password or a provider hop. This is what
+ * makes the 2nd/3rd app log in seamlessly. With no live session IAM returns an
+ * error and the caller falls back to the interactive login form.
+ */
+export interface SilentLoginRequest {
+  /** OAuth client id of the requesting app (== application name in Hanzo IAM). */
+  readonly clientId: string
+  /** IAM application name the code is minted for. */
+  readonly application: string
+  /** The requesting app's OAuth redirect_uri — the code is appended to it. */
+  readonly redirectUri: string
+  readonly state?: string
+  readonly scope?: string
+  readonly codeChallenge?: string
+  readonly codeChallengeMethod?: 'S256' | 'plain'
+  /** OIDC nonce, echoed into the minted code -> id_token (strict consumers). */
+  readonly nonce?: string
+}
+
+/** A multi-factor channel the portal can render a code entry for. */
+export type MfaChannel = 'totp' | 'sms' | 'email'
+
 export interface LoginResponse {
   readonly accessToken?: string
   readonly refreshToken?: string
   readonly idToken?: string
   readonly expiresAt?: number
   readonly redirectUrl?: string
+  /**
+   * Set when IAM answered the login with a multi-factor signal instead of a
+   * session/code. `mfaStage` discriminates the two IAM states:
+   *   - `'enroll'`  — IAM returned `data:"RequiredMfa"`: org policy forces MFA
+   *     and the user has none yet → render forced TOTP enrollment.
+   *   - `'challenge'` — IAM returned `data:"NextMfa"`: the user has MFA enabled
+   *     → render a code challenge for one of `mfaTypes`.
+   * The password session is NOT established until the enrollment/challenge
+   * completes, so the portal must not navigate past this signal.
+   */
   readonly mfaRequired?: boolean
-  readonly mfaChannel?: 'totp' | 'sms' | 'email'
+  readonly mfaStage?: 'enroll' | 'challenge'
+  /**
+   * The IAM MFA types available for a `'challenge'` (from the login response's
+   * named `mfa` field, legacy `data2`), in IAM's own vocabulary: `app` (TOTP),
+   * `sms`, `email`. Empty for enrollment.
+   */
+  readonly mfaTypes?: readonly string[]
   readonly error?: string
 }
 
+/**
+ * Result of approving an RFC 8628 device-authorization request
+ * ({@link AuthClient.approveDevice}).
+ *
+ * `ok` — the device code was marked signed-in (the CLI's token poll now
+ * succeeds). `required` — the application needs the user to grant consent
+ * before approval can complete (`{status:ok, data:{required:true}}`); rare for
+ * first-party apps. `error` — the IAM-surfaced failure message (e.g.
+ * "UserCode Expired", "DeviceCode Invalid").
+ */
+export interface DeviceApprovalResult {
+  readonly ok: boolean
+  readonly required?: boolean
+  readonly error?: string
+}
+
+/**
+ * WHICH application a pending device code belongs to
+ * ({@link AuthClient.deviceInfo}) — the one thing the approval page exists to
+ * tell a human, and the one thing it cannot know on its own.
+ *
+ * Both fields come off the device code's own application row, so a page that
+ * renders them names the party it is actually authorizing. They are the ONLY
+ * honest source: `org.appName` is this portal's static branding and names the
+ * wrong app for every code minted by anything else.
+ *
+ * Discriminated on `ok` so a caller cannot read `displayName` without having
+ * proved the server confirmed one. `loginRequired` singles out the expired
+ * session (IAM `code:"login_required"`) — the page's cue to sign the human in
+ * and come back, not an error to show. Every other failure is IAM's single
+ * opaque refusal, surfaced verbatim.
+ */
+export type DeviceInfoResult =
+  | { readonly ok: true; readonly clientId: string; readonly displayName: string }
+  | { readonly ok: false; readonly error: string; readonly loginRequired?: boolean }
+
+/**
+ * The TOTP enrollment material minted by `/v1/iam/mfa/setup/initiate`. The
+ * secret + `url` (an `otpauth://` URI) are rendered locally as a QR code — the
+ * secret never leaves the browser to a third party. `recoveryCodes[0]` must be
+ * echoed back to `/v1/iam/mfa/setup/enable`.
+ */
+export interface MfaSetup {
+  /** IAM MFA type — `app` for TOTP. */
+  readonly mfaType: string
+  /** Base32 TOTP secret. */
+  readonly secret: string
+  /** `otpauth://totp/...` provisioning URI for the authenticator app. */
+  readonly url: string
+  /** One-time recovery codes issued alongside the secret. */
+  readonly recoveryCodes: readonly string[]
+}
+
+/** The signed-in user's identity, resolved from the IAM session for MFA setup. */
+export interface MfaIdentity {
+  readonly owner: string
+  readonly name: string
+}
+
+/** A TOTP challenge submission for a user who already enrolled (`NextMfa`). */
+export interface MfaChallengeRequest {
+  /** IAM MFA type, e.g. `app` (TOTP), `sms`, `email`. */
+  readonly mfaType: string
+  readonly passcode: string
+  readonly clientId: string
+  readonly application: string
+  readonly organization: string
+  readonly redirectUri?: string
+  readonly state?: string
+  readonly codeChallenge?: string
+  readonly codeChallengeMethod?: 'S256' | 'plain'
+  /** Honor the org's "remember this device" window after a successful code. */
+  readonly rememberDevice?: boolean
+}
+
 export interface SignupRequest {
   readonly email: string
   readonly password: string
   readonly clientId: string
   readonly application: string
+  /**
+   * The org to create the user in. REQUIRED — unlike login's optional
+   * lookup hint, you cannot create a user in "no org", and IAM gates this
+   * against the application's own org.
+   */
   readonly organization: string
   readonly inviteCode?: string
+  /**
+   * The downstream OIDC request, when an app sent the user here to register.
+   * Registration completes by signing the new user in, so these are forwarded
+   * to that sign-in: without them the minted code carries no PKCE binding and
+   * there is nowhere to return the user to.
+   */
+  readonly redirectUri?: string
+  readonly state?: string
+  readonly codeChallenge?: string
+  readonly codeChallengeMethod?: 'S256' | 'plain'
+  readonly nonce?: string
 }
 
 export interface ForgotRequest {
@@ -51,9 +215,9 @@ export interface OAuthAuthorizeRequest {
 export interface ProviderInfo {
   readonly name: string
   readonly displayName?: string
-  /** Casdoor provider type, e.g. GitHub, Google, Apple, Web3Onboard. */
+  /** IAM provider type, e.g. GitHub, Google, Apple, Web3Onboard. */
   readonly type?: string
-  /** Casdoor category, e.g. OAuth, Web3, SAML. */
+  /** IAM category, e.g. OAuth, Web3, SAML. */
   readonly category?: string
   readonly canSignIn?: boolean
   readonly canSignUp?: boolean
@@ -96,3 +260,52 @@ export interface TokenResponse {
   readonly expiresIn?: number
   readonly scope?: string
 }
+
+/** A social/web3 provider enabled on an IAM application. */
+export interface AppProvider {
+  /** IAM provider record name, e.g. `provider-github`. */
+  readonly name: string
+  /** Normalized provider key passed to the authorize endpoint, e.g. `github`, `google`, `web3`. */
+  readonly key: string
+  /** Whether the provider may be used to sign in. */
+  readonly canSignIn: boolean
+  /** Whether the provider may be used to sign up. */
+  readonly canSignUp: boolean
+  /**
+   * Whether IAM holds a real OAuth credential for this provider (a non-empty,
+   * non-placeholder clientId). The login UI renders ONLY configured providers,
+   * so an unprovisioned button never dead-ends the user — it appears
+   * automatically once real credentials are seeded into IAM. The seed ships
+   * obvious placeholders (`GITHUB_CLIENT_ID_PLACEHOLDER`, `placeholder`), which
+   * read as not-configured.
+   */
+  readonly configured: boolean
+  /** IAM provider `type`, e.g. `GitHub` / `Google` / `Web3Onboard` (selects the OAuth endpoint). */
+  readonly type: string
+  /** The provider's OAuth client id (used to build the provider redirect; empty when unconfigured). */
+  readonly clientId: string
+  /** Override OAuth scopes, if the provider record sets them. */
+  readonly scopes: string
+}
+
+/**
+ * The enabled-auth-methods view of an IAM application, read live from
+ * `/v1/iam/get-app-login`. This is the canonical source of truth for which
+ * buttons to render — it reflects the per-app config in `init_data.json`
+ * (password + GitHub + Google + Web3). The portal renders exactly what IAM
+ * reports enabled, so there is no client/server method drift.
+ */
+export interface AppLogin {
+  /** IAM application name (e.g. `hanzo-id`). */
+  readonly application: string
+  /** Owning organization slug. */
+  readonly organization: string
+  /** Email/username + password sign-in is enabled. */
+  readonly enablePassword: boolean
+  /** Self-service signup is enabled. */
+  readonly enableSignUp: boolean
+  /** Email/SMS verification-code sign-in is enabled. */
+  readonly enableCodeSignin: boolean
+  /** Social + Web3 providers enabled on the app, in display order. */
+  readonly providers: readonly AppProvider[]
+}

pkgs/auth/src/ui/Divider.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/** Labeled horizontal rule, e.g. "or", separating social from email sign-in. */
+export function Divider({ label = 'or' }: { label?: string }) {
+  return (
+    <div className="hanzo-id-divider" role="separator" aria-label={label}>
+      <span>{label}</span>
+    </div>
+  )
+}

pkgs/auth/src/ui/ForgotForm.tsx

@@ -20,8 +20,8 @@ export function ForgotForm(props: ForgotFormProps) {
     try {
       const res = await client.forgot({
         identifier,
-        clientId: client.tenant.clientId,
-        organization: client.tenant.orgId,
+        clientId: client.org.clientId,
+        organization: client.org.orgId,
       })
       if (!res.ok) setError(res.error ?? 'send failed')
       else {
@@ -40,13 +40,13 @@ export function ForgotForm(props: ForgotFormProps) {
   }
 
   return (
-    <form onSubmit={onSubmit} className="hanzo-id-forgot-form" aria-busy={busy}>
-      <label>
+    <form onSubmit={onSubmit} className="hanzo-id-form" aria-busy={busy}>
+      <label className="hanzo-id-field">
         <span>Email</span>
-        <input type="email" autoComplete="email" value={identifier} onChange={(e) => setIdentifier(e.target.value)} required />
+        <input className="hanzo-id-input" type="email" autoComplete="email" value={identifier} onChange={(e) => setIdentifier(e.target.value)} required />
       </label>
       {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
-      <button type="submit" disabled={busy}>{busy ? 'Sending…' : 'Send reset link'}</button>
+      <button type="submit" className="hanzo-id-btn" disabled={busy}>{busy ? 'Sending…' : 'Send reset link'}</button>
     </form>
   )
 }

pkgs/auth/src/ui/LoginForm.tsx

@@ -1,91 +1,95 @@
-import { useEffect, useState, type FormEvent } from 'react'
+import { useState, type FormEvent } from 'react'
 import type { AuthClient } from '../client'
-import type { AppLoginInfo, LoginResponse } from '../types'
-import { ProviderButtons } from './ProviderButtons'
-import { OTPForm } from './OTPForm'
+import type { LoginResponse } from '../types'
 
 export interface LoginFormProps {
   readonly client: AuthClient
   readonly redirectUri?: string
   readonly state?: string
   readonly clientIdOverride?: string
+  readonly codeChallenge?: string
+  readonly codeChallengeMethod?: 'S256' | 'plain'
+  readonly nonce?: string
   readonly onSuccess?: (res: LoginResponse) => void
   readonly onMfaRequired?: (res: LoginResponse) => void
+  /**
+   * Called after a successful sign-in INSTEAD of the form's default post-login
+   * navigation. When provided, the form does not redirect (neither to a
+   * downstream app nor to `/onboarding`) — the caller owns what happens next.
+   * Used by the device-approval page to stay on-page and show the confirm step.
+   */
+  readonly onAuthenticated?: (res: LoginResponse) => void
 }
 
 export function LoginForm(props: LoginFormProps) {
   const { client } = props
-  const [app, setApp] = useState<AppLoginInfo | null>(null)
-  const [mode, setMode] = useState<'password' | 'code'>('password')
   const [identifier, setIdentifier] = useState('')
   const [password, setPassword] = useState('')
-  const [codeSent, setCodeSent] = useState(false)
   const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false)
   const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
-  const [notice, setNotice] = useState<string | null>(null)
 
-  // Load the application's providers + sign-in methods so we render exactly
-  // what IAM offers (social buttons, email/SMS code). Best-effort: on failure
-  // we still show password login.
-  useEffect(() => {
-    let alive = true
-    client
-      .appLogin()
-      .then((a) => {
-        if (alive) setApp(a)
-      })
-      .catch(() => {})
-    return () => {
-      alive = false
-    }
-  }, [client])
-
-  const codeEnabled =
-    !!app &&
-    (app.enableCodeSignin ||
-      app.signinMethods.some((m) => m.name === 'Verification code' && m.rule !== 'None'))
-
-  function handleResult(res: LoginResponse) {
-    if (res.error) setError(res.error)
-    else if (res.mfaRequired) props.onMfaRequired?.(res)
-    else if (res.redirectUrl) window.location.href = res.redirectUrl
-    else props.onSuccess?.(res)
-  }
-
-  async function onPasswordSubmit(e: FormEvent) {
+  async function onSubmit(e: FormEvent) {
     e.preventDefault()
     setBusy(true)
     setError(null)
     try {
+      // Authenticate against the ORG OF THE APP being logged into, not the
+      // portal's own brand. When a downstream app initiates the login it passes
+      // its own `client_id` (props.clientIdOverride); that app may live in a
+      // different org than this brand portal — e.g. the admin-guard
+      // (client_id=hanzo-admin-guard) is in the `admin` org, so its operators
+      // must resolve to the admin/* identity (owner=admin), NOT this brand's
+      // hanzo/* row. get-app-login is the canonical clientId -> {application,
+      // organization} map; resolve through it and post BOTH so IAM scopes the
+      // credential check to the app's org.
+      //
+      // BOTH entry points resolve the same way — the downstream-app login
+      // (clientIdOverride) and the brand portal's own bare sign-in. They used to
+      // differ: the bare portal deliberately posted NO `organization` so IAM's
+      // cross-org fallback landed a colliding identity (z@hanzo.ai exists in both
+      // `admin` and `hanzo`) on admin/* and returned the full multi-org session.
+      //
+      // That is gone, on purpose, at the server. iam2 scopes every credential
+      // lookup to one org and treats the collision it relied on as a defect —
+      // "the F-2 bug where z@hanzo.ai collided across admin and hanzo" — because
+      // cross-org resolution coupled lockout counters across rows and gave a
+      // brute-force oracle on the superadmin. So it now REFUSES an org-less login
+      // with "organization, username and password are required". It answers HTTP
+      // **200**, which the form then renders as if the user's own password were
+      // wrong, and which every status-code monitor reads as green — the apex form
+      // was dead on hanzo.id, lux.id, iam.hanzo.ai and pars.id simultaneously.
+      //
+      // Posting the app's own org is the established answer (it is what the
+      // override path already does, and what reaches admin/* for admin-org apps).
+      // A global admin is no longer resolved by omission; they reach the admin
+      // identity by signing into an admin-org app, which is the explicit path.
+      const app = await client.getAppLogin(props.clientIdOverride ?? client.org.clientId)
+      const application = app?.application ?? client.org.appName
+      const organization = app?.organization ?? client.org.loginOrg
       const res = await client.login({
         identifier,
         password,
-        clientId: props.clientIdOverride ?? client.tenant.clientId,
-        application: client.tenant.appName,
-        organization: client.tenant.orgId,
+        clientId: props.clientIdOverride ?? client.org.clientId,
+        application,
+        organization,
         redirectUri: props.redirectUri,
         state: props.state,
+        codeChallenge: props.codeChallenge,
+        codeChallengeMethod: props.codeChallengeMethod,
+        nonce: props.nonce,
       })
-      handleResult(res)
-    } catch (err) {
-      setError(String(err))
-    } finally {
-      setBusy(false)
-    }
-  }
-
-  async function onSendCode(e: FormEvent) {
-    e.preventDefault()
-    setBusy(true)
-    setError(null)
-    setNotice(null)
-    try {
-      const r = await client.sendLoginCode(identifier)
-      if (r.ok) {
-        setCodeSent(true)
-        setNotice(`Code sent to ${identifier}`)
+      if (res.error) {
+        setError(res.error)
+      } else if (res.mfaRequired) {
+        props.onMfaRequired?.(res)
+      } else if (props.onAuthenticated) {
+        // Caller owns the next step (e.g. device approval) — suppress the
+        // default navigation so we stay on-page.
+        props.onAuthenticated(res)
+      } else if (res.redirectUrl) {
+        window.location.href = res.redirectUrl
       } else {
-        setError(r.error ?? 'Could not send code')
+        props.onSuccess?.(res)
       }
     } catch (err) {
       setError(String(err))
@@ -94,117 +98,32 @@ export function LoginForm(props: LoginFormProps) {
     }
   }
 
-  async function onVerifyCode(code: string) {
-    setBusy(true)
-    setError(null)
-    try {
-      const res = await client.loginWithCode({
-        dest: identifier,
-        code,
-        clientId: props.clientIdOverride ?? client.tenant.clientId,
-        application: client.tenant.appName,
-        organization: client.tenant.orgId,
-        redirectUri: props.redirectUri,
-        state: props.state,
-      })
-      handleResult(res)
-    } catch (err) {
-      setError(String(err))
-    } finally {
-      setBusy(false)
-    }
-  }
-
   return (
-    <div className="hanzo-id-login">
-      {app && app.providers.length > 0 ? (
-        <ProviderButtons
-          client={client}
-          providers={app.providers}
-          mode="login"
-          redirectUri={props.redirectUri}
-          state={props.state}
-          clientIdOverride={props.clientIdOverride}
+    <form onSubmit={onSubmit} className="hanzo-id-form" aria-busy={busy}>
+      <label className="hanzo-id-field">
+        <span>Email or username</span>
+        <input
+          className="hanzo-id-input"
+          type="text"
+          autoComplete="username"
+          value={identifier}
+          onChange={(e) => setIdentifier(e.target.value)}
+          required
         />
-      ) : null}
-
-      {mode === 'password' ? (
-        <form onSubmit={onPasswordSubmit} className="hanzo-id-login-form" aria-busy={busy}>
-          <label>
-            <span>Email or username</span>
-            <input
-              type="text"
-              autoComplete="username"
-              value={identifier}
-              onChange={(e) => setIdentifier(e.target.value)}
-              required
-            />
-          </label>
-          <label>
-            <span>Password</span>
-            <input
-              type="password"
-              autoComplete="current-password"
-              value={password}
-              onChange={(e) => setPassword(e.target.value)}
-              required
-            />
-          </label>
-          {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
-          <button type="submit" disabled={busy}>{busy ? 'Signing in…' : 'Sign in'}</button>
-        </form>
-      ) : (
-        <div className="hanzo-id-code-login">
-          {!codeSent ? (
-            <form onSubmit={onSendCode} className="hanzo-id-login-form" aria-busy={busy}>
-              <label>
-                <span>Email or phone</span>
-                <input
-                  type="text"
-                  autoComplete="username"
-                  placeholder="you@example.com or +1 555 555 5555"
-                  value={identifier}
-                  onChange={(e) => setIdentifier(e.target.value)}
-                  required
-                />
-              </label>
-              {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
-              <button type="submit" disabled={busy}>{busy ? 'Sending…' : 'Send code'}</button>
-            </form>
-          ) : (
-            <>
-              {notice ? <p className="hanzo-id-notice">{notice}</p> : null}
-              <OTPForm channel={identifier.includes('@') ? 'email' : 'sms'} onSubmit={onVerifyCode} />
-              {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
-              <button
-                type="button"
-                className="hanzo-id-linkbtn"
-                onClick={() => {
-                  setCodeSent(false)
-                  setNotice(null)
-                }}
-              >
-                Use a different address
-              </button>
-            </>
-          )}
-        </div>
-      )}
-
-      {codeEnabled ? (
-        <button
-          type="button"
-          className="hanzo-id-linkbtn hanzo-id-toggle-mode"
-          onClick={() => {
-            setMode(mode === 'password' ? 'code' : 'password')
-            setError(null)
-            setNotice(null)
-            setCodeSent(false)
-          }}
-        >
-          {mode === 'password' ? 'Sign in with email or SMS code' : 'Sign in with password'}
-        </button>
-      ) : null}
-    </div>
+      </label>
+      <label className="hanzo-id-field">
+        <span>Password</span>
+        <input
+          className="hanzo-id-input"
+          type="password"
+          autoComplete="current-password"
+          value={password}
+          onChange={(e) => setPassword(e.target.value)}
+          required
+        />
+      </label>
+      {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
+      <button type="submit" className="hanzo-id-btn" disabled={busy}>{busy ? 'Signing in…' : 'Sign in'}</button>
+    </form>
   )
 }

pkgs/auth/src/ui/MfaEnrollForm.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+import { useEffect, useMemo, useState } from 'react'
+import encodeQR from '@paulmillr/qr'
+import type { AuthClient } from '../client'
+import type { MfaIdentity, MfaSetup } from '../types'
+import { OTPForm } from './OTPForm'
+
+export interface MfaEnrollFormProps {
+  readonly client: AuthClient
+  /**
+   * Called once the user has verified a TOTP code AND the enrollment is
+   * persisted. The caller continues the session (onboarding or the OIDC
+   * code redirect).
+   */
+  readonly onComplete: () => void
+}
+
+/**
+ * Forced TOTP enrollment, shown when IAM answers a login with `RequiredMfa`
+ * (org policy requires MFA and the user has none). There is intentionally NO
+ * skip / dismiss control — the only way past this screen is to enroll an
+ * authenticator. The QR is rendered locally from the `otpauth://` URI, so the
+ * TOTP secret never leaves the browser.
+ *
+ * Flow: `getAccount` (resolve identity from the session IAM set with
+ * `RequiredMfa`) → `mfaInitiate` (secret + QR) → user scans → `mfaVerify`
+ * (prove the code) → `mfaEnable` (persist) → `onComplete`.
+ */
+export function MfaEnrollForm({ client, onComplete }: MfaEnrollFormProps) {
+  const [identity, setIdentity] = useState<MfaIdentity | null>(null)
+  const [setup, setSetup] = useState<MfaSetup | null>(null)
+  const [fatal, setFatal] = useState<string | null>(null)
+  const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
+  const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false)
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    let cancelled = false
+    async function begin() {
+      try {
+        const id = await client.getAccount()
+        if (!id) throw new Error('Your session could not be resolved. Please sign in again.')
+        const s = await client.mfaInitiate(id)
+        if (cancelled) return
+        setIdentity(id)
+        setSetup(s)
+      } catch (e) {
+        if (!cancelled) setFatal(e instanceof Error ? e.message : String(e))
+      }
+    }
+    void begin()
+    return () => {
+      cancelled = true
+    }
+  }, [client])
+
+  const qrSvg = useMemo(() => (setup ? encodeQR(setup.url, 'svg') : ''), [setup])
+
+  async function onCode(code: string) {
+    if (!identity || !setup || busy) return
+    setBusy(true)
+    setError(null)
+    try {
+      const verified = await client.mfaVerify({ owner: identity.owner, name: identity.name, secret: setup.secret, passcode: code })
+      if (!verified.ok) {
+        setError(verified.error ?? 'That code did not match. Try the current code from your app.')
+        return
+      }
+      const enabled = await client.mfaEnable({
+        owner: identity.owner,
+        name: identity.name,
+        secret: setup.secret,
+        recoveryCode: setup.recoveryCodes[0] ?? '',
+      })
+      if (!enabled.ok) {
+        setError(enabled.error ?? 'Could not enable two-factor authentication.')
+        return
+      }
+      onComplete()
+    } finally {
+      setBusy(false)
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (fatal) {
+    return (
+      <div className="hanzo-id-mfa-enroll">
+        <h2>Two-factor setup</h2>
+        <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{fatal}</p>
+      </div>
+    )
+  }
+
+  if (!setup) {
+    return (
+      <div className="hanzo-id-mfa-enroll">
+        <h2>Two-factor setup</h2>
+        <p className="lede">Preparing your authenticator…</p>
+      </div>
+    )
+  }
+
+  const recoveryCode = setup.recoveryCodes[0]
+  return (
+    <div className="hanzo-id-mfa-enroll">
+      <h2>Set up two-factor authentication</h2>
+      <p className="lede">
+        Your organization requires two-factor authentication. Scan this QR code with an
+        authenticator app (Google Authenticator, 1Password, Authy), then enter the 6-digit code it
+        shows.
+      </p>
+      <div
+        className="hanzo-id-mfa-qr"
+        role="img"
+        aria-label="TOTP enrollment QR code"
+        // Local SVG from @paulmillr/qr — the otpauth secret never leaves the browser.
+        dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: qrSvg }}
+      />
+      <details className="hanzo-id-mfa-manual">
+        <summary>Can't scan? Enter this key manually</summary>
+        <code className="hanzo-id-mfa-secret">{setup.secret}</code>
+      </details>
+      {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
+      <OTPForm channel="totp" onSubmit={onCode} />
+      {recoveryCode ? (
+        <p className="hanzo-id-mfa-recovery">
+          Save this recovery code somewhere safe — it lets you sign in if you lose your device:
+          <br />
+          <code>{recoveryCode}</code>
+        </p>
+      ) : null}
+    </div>
+  )
+}

pkgs/auth/src/ui/OTPForm.tsx

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import { useState, type FormEvent } from 'react'
+import { SmsConsentNotice } from './SmsConsent'
 
 export interface OTPFormProps {
   readonly onSubmit: (code: string) => void | Promise<void>
@@ -25,10 +26,11 @@ export function OTPForm(props: OTPFormProps) {
   const label = channel === 'sms' ? 'SMS code' : channel === 'email' ? 'Email code' : 'Authenticator code'
 
   return (
-    <form onSubmit={onSubmit} className="hanzo-id-otp-form" aria-busy={busy}>
-      <label>
+    <form onSubmit={onSubmit} className="hanzo-id-form" aria-busy={busy}>
+      <label className="hanzo-id-field">
         <span>{label}</span>
         <input
+          className="hanzo-id-input"
           type="text"
           inputMode="numeric"
           pattern={`\\d{${length}}`}
@@ -39,7 +41,8 @@ export function OTPForm(props: OTPFormProps) {
           required
         />
       </label>
-      <button type="submit" disabled={busy || code.length !== length}>{busy ? 'Verifying…' : 'Verify'}</button>
+      {channel === 'sms' ? <SmsConsentNotice /> : null}
+      <button type="submit" className="hanzo-id-btn" disabled={busy || code.length !== length}>{busy ? 'Verifying…' : 'Verify'}</button>
     </form>
   )
 }

pkgs/auth/src/ui/ProviderButtons.tsx

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-import type { AuthClient } from '../client'
-import type { ProviderInfo } from '../types'
-
-interface Meta {
-  readonly label: string
-  /** stable brand token used for the CSS class + data attribute (for icon styling) */
-  readonly brand: string
-}
-
-// Keyed by a normalized provider token (type or name, lowercased, alnum-only,
-// "provider" prefix stripped). Falls back to a generic label for anything new.
-const META: Record<string, Meta> = {
-  google: { label: 'Continue with Google', brand: 'google' },
-  github: { label: 'Continue with GitHub', brand: 'github' },
-  apple: { label: 'Continue with Apple', brand: 'apple' },
-  facebook: { label: 'Continue with Facebook', brand: 'facebook' },
-  web3: { label: 'Connect wallet', brand: 'web3' },
-  web3onboard: { label: 'Connect wallet', brand: 'web3' },
-  metamask: { label: 'Connect wallet', brand: 'web3' },
-}
-
-function metaFor(p: ProviderInfo): Meta {
-  const key = (p.type || p.name || '')
-    .toLowerCase()
-    .replace(/[^a-z0-9]/g, '')
-    .replace(/^provider/, '')
-  return META[key] ?? { label: `Continue with ${p.displayName || p.name}`, brand: 'generic' }
-}
-
-export interface ProviderButtonsProps {
-  readonly client: AuthClient
-  readonly providers: ProviderInfo[]
-  readonly mode: 'login' | 'signup'
-  readonly redirectUri?: string
-  readonly state?: string
-  readonly clientIdOverride?: string
-}
-
-/**
- * Renders one button per social/wallet provider attached to the application.
- * Each links to the IAM authorize endpoint with `provider=<name>`, which
- * initiates that provider's OAuth and returns to `${publicOrigin}/callback`.
- * The set is driven by the live app config (AuthClient.appLogin) — no
- * hardcoded provider list — so enabling a provider in IAM surfaces it here.
- */
-export function ProviderButtons(props: ProviderButtonsProps) {
-  const { client, providers, mode } = props
-  const usable = providers.filter((p) =>
-    mode === 'signup' ? p.canSignUp !== false : p.canSignIn !== false,
-  )
-  if (usable.length === 0) return null
-
-  const redirectUri = props.redirectUri ?? `${client.tenant.publicOrigin}/callback`
-  return (
-    <div className="hanzo-id-providers">
-      {usable.map((p) => {
-        const m = metaFor(p)
-        const href = client.authorize({
-          clientId: props.clientIdOverride ?? client.tenant.clientId,
-          redirectUri,
-          state: props.state ?? mode,
-          provider: p.name,
-        })
-        return (
-          <a
-            key={p.name}
-            className={`hanzo-id-provider-btn hanzo-id-provider-${m.brand}`}
-            href={href}
-            data-provider={m.brand}
-          >
-            {m.label}
-          </a>
-        )
-      })}
-      <div className="hanzo-id-or">
-        <span>or</span>
-      </div>
-    </div>
-  )
-}

pkgs/auth/src/ui/SignupForm.tsx

@@ -1,51 +1,73 @@
-import { useEffect, useState, type FormEvent } from 'react'
+import { useState, type FormEvent } from 'react'
 import type { AuthClient } from '../client'
-import type { AppLoginInfo } from '../types'
-import { ProviderButtons } from './ProviderButtons'
 
 export interface SignupFormProps {
   readonly client: AuthClient
   readonly inviteCode?: string
-  readonly onSuccess?: () => void
+  /**
+   * The downstream OIDC request the user arrived with, when an app sent them
+   * here to register. Forwarded to the sign-in that follows account creation so
+   * the flow ends where it started — back at the app, holding a code.
+   */
+  readonly redirectUri?: string
+  readonly state?: string
+  readonly clientIdOverride?: string
+  readonly codeChallenge?: string
+  readonly codeChallengeMethod?: 'S256' | 'plain'
+  readonly nonce?: string
 }
 
 export function SignupForm(props: SignupFormProps) {
   const { client } = props
-  const [app, setApp] = useState<AppLoginInfo | null>(null)
   const [email, setEmail] = useState('')
   const [password, setPassword] = useState('')
   const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false)
   const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
 
-  useEffect(() => {
-    let alive = true
-    client
-      .appLogin()
-      .then((a) => {
-        if (alive) setApp(a)
-      })
-      .catch(() => {})
-    return () => {
-      alive = false
-    }
-  }, [client])
-
   async function onSubmit(e: FormEvent) {
     e.preventDefault()
     setBusy(true)
     setError(null)
     try {
-      const res = await client.signup({
+      // Register against the app the user CAME FROM, not this portal. IAM's
+      // signup resolves the application by clientId and then gates the org
+      // against that app's own org, so a downstream `client_id` must reach
+      // it or the account is created under the portal's app instead.
+      const clientId = props.clientIdOverride ?? client.org.clientId
+      const app = await client.getAppLogin(clientId, props.redirectUri)
+      const application = app?.application ?? client.org.appName
+      const organization = app?.organization ?? client.org.orgId
+
+      const session = await client.signup({
         email,
         password,
-        clientId: client.tenant.clientId,
-        application: client.tenant.appName,
-        organization: client.tenant.orgId,
+        clientId,
+        application,
+        organization,
         inviteCode: props.inviteCode,
+        redirectUri: props.redirectUri,
+        state: props.state,
+        codeChallenge: props.codeChallenge,
+        codeChallengeMethod: props.codeChallengeMethod,
+        nonce: props.nonce,
       })
-      if (res.error) setError(res.error)
-      else if (res.redirectUrl) window.location.href = res.redirectUrl
-      else props.onSuccess?.()
+      if (session.error) {
+        setError(session.error)
+        return
+      }
+      if (session.redirectUrl) {
+        window.location.href = session.redirectUrl
+        return
+      }
+      // The account exists but the session did not complete here — an org that
+      // forces MFA answers the login with an enrollment step. Hand the user to
+      // the sign-in page, carrying the same OIDC request, rather than leaving
+      // them on a form that has nothing left to do.
+      if (session.mfaRequired) {
+        window.location.href = `/login${window.location.search}`
+        return
+      }
+      setError('Your account was created, but sign-in did not complete. Please sign in.')
     } catch (err) {
       setError(String(err))
     } finally {
@@ -54,29 +76,25 @@ export function SignupForm(props: SignupFormProps) {
   }
 
   return (
-    <div className="hanzo-id-signup">
-      {app && app.providers.length > 0 ? (
-        <ProviderButtons client={client} providers={app.providers} mode="signup" />
-      ) : null}
-      <form onSubmit={onSubmit} className="hanzo-id-signup-form" aria-busy={busy}>
-        <label>
-          <span>Email</span>
-          <input type="email" autoComplete="email" value={email} onChange={(e) => setEmail(e.target.value)} required />
-        </label>
-        <label>
-          <span>Password</span>
-          <input
-            type="password"
-            autoComplete="new-password"
-            value={password}
-            onChange={(e) => setPassword(e.target.value)}
-            minLength={12}
-            required
-          />
-        </label>
-        {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
-        <button type="submit" disabled={busy}>{busy ? 'Creating account…' : 'Create account'}</button>
-      </form>
-    </div>
+    <form onSubmit={onSubmit} className="hanzo-id-form" aria-busy={busy}>
+      <label className="hanzo-id-field">
+        <span>Email</span>
+        <input className="hanzo-id-input" type="email" autoComplete="email" value={email} onChange={(e) => setEmail(e.target.value)} required />
+      </label>
+      <label className="hanzo-id-field">
+        <span>Password</span>
+        <input
+          className="hanzo-id-input"
+          type="password"
+          autoComplete="new-password"
+          value={password}
+          onChange={(e) => setPassword(e.target.value)}
+          minLength={12}
+          required
+        />
+      </label>
+      {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
+      <button type="submit" className="hanzo-id-btn" disabled={busy}>{busy ? 'Creating account…' : 'Create account'}</button>
+    </form>
   )
 }

pkgs/auth/src/ui/SmsConsent.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+// Canonical A2P 10DLC consent copy. This EXACT disclosure is reused at every
+// point where Hanzo collects or uses a phone number for messaging. It MUST stay
+// verbatim-identical to the public opt-in page (hanzo.ai/sms-opt-in,
+// `SMS_CONSENT_TEXT`) and to the IAM phone-login UI — Twilio / carrier campaign
+// review compares the wording across surfaces. One string, reused everywhere.
+export const SMS_CONSENT_TEXT =
+  'I agree to receive text messages (SMS) from Hanzo AI at the number provided, ' +
+  'including one-time passcodes and two-factor authentication, account and security ' +
+  'alerts, and transactional notifications. Message frequency varies. Message and data ' +
+  'rates may apply. Reply STOP to opt out at any time, or HELP for help. Consent is not ' +
+  'a condition of any purchase.'
+
+const TERMS_URL = 'https://hanzo.ai/terms'
+const PRIVACY_URL = 'https://hanzo.ai/privacy'
+
+/**
+ * SMS consent disclosure shown beneath any phone/SMS surface (disclosure-only,
+ * no checkbox — the portal's SMS step is reached only after the user already
+ * provided/opted-in their number in IAM, and after a code was sent).
+ *
+ * For a phone-number COLLECTION surface that requires affirmative opt-in (A2P),
+ * gate the submit on a checkbox and reuse {@link SMS_CONSENT_TEXT} — see the IAM
+ * SignupPage `SmsConsentCheckbox`. The portal does not yet render its own phone
+ * field (collection happens in the IAM-hosted UI), so only the notice is used
+ * here today.
+ */
+export function SmsConsentNotice() {
+  return (
+    <div className="hanzo-id-sms-consent" role="note">
+      <p>{SMS_CONSENT_TEXT}</p>
+      <p className="hanzo-id-sms-consent-links">
+        By continuing, you agree to our{' '}
+        <a href={TERMS_URL} target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Terms of Service</a> and{' '}
+        <a href={PRIVACY_URL} target="_blank" rel="noreferrer">Privacy Policy</a>.
+      </p>
+    </div>
+  )
+}

pkgs/auth/src/ui/SocialButtons.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,331 @@
+import { Fragment, useEffect, useRef, useState } from 'react'
+import type { ComponentType, SVGProps } from 'react'
+import type { Chain } from '@hanzo/id-connect'
+import type { AuthClient } from '../client'
+import type { AppProvider } from '../types'
+import { authorizeRequest, matchProviderHint } from '../social'
+import { createIam } from '../iam'
+import {
+  loginWithWalletChain,
+  detectWalletChains,
+  ENABLED_WALLET_CHAINS,
+  WALLET_CHAIN_LABELS,
+} from '../web3'
+import { GitHubIcon, GitLabIcon, GoogleIcon, WalletIcon } from './icons'
+import { Divider } from './Divider'
+
+/**
+ * Social + multi-chain wallet sign-in buttons.
+ *
+ * The enabled set is read live from `/v1/iam/get-app-login` (via
+ * `client.getAppLogin()`) — the canonical source of truth that mirrors the
+ * per-app provider config in `init_data.json`. We render ONLY providers IAM
+ * holds real credentials for (`AppProvider.configured`); a provider seeded with
+ * placeholder creds is hidden so its button never dead-ends, and reappears once
+ * real creds land. When the config is unreadable we render none.
+ *
+ * Two sign-in shapes, decomplected:
+ *   - OAuth (github/google/gitlab) → FEDERATION: name the provider on IAM's own
+ *     authorize endpoint (`?provider=provider-github`) and let IAM run the entire
+ *     IdP leg server-side, where the client secret lives. See `social.ts`. This
+ *     browser never builds an IdP URL and never sees a provider code.
+ *   - Web3/wallet → native Sign-In-With-X (`loginWithWalletChain`): connect a
+ *     wallet with `@hanzo/id-connect` (no WalletConnect, no projectId), sign the
+ *     IAM-minted challenge, POST `/v1/iam/web3/verify`, then follow the SAME
+ *     redirect the password flow returns. The wallet provider renders ONE
+ *     chain-agnostic "Connect Wallet" button: it auto-detects the injected
+ *     chain (`detectWalletChains`) and connects straight when exactly one is
+ *     present, else reveals a chooser so either EVM or Solana stays reachable.
+ */
+export interface SocialButtonsProps {
+  readonly client: AuthClient
+  /** Override the OAuth client_id (e.g. a downstream app's id). */
+  readonly clientIdOverride?: string
+  /** "signin" (default) or "signup" — only changes button copy. */
+  readonly intent?: 'signin' | 'signup'
+  /**
+   * Downstream app's `redirect_uri`, if this portal is mid-flow for another
+   * app. OAuth sign-in returns to the portal's own `/callback` (stashed here
+   * and forwarded by `Callback`); wallet sign-in threads it straight into the
+   * verify POST so IAM mints the auth-code redirect back to the app. Absent →
+   * a bare portal sign-in that lands on onboarding.
+   */
+  readonly postLoginRedirect?: string
+  /**
+   * A `provider_hint` from the authorize query — the console passes
+   * `?provider_hint=provider-github` when a user clicks "Continue with GitHub"
+   * over there. When set, once the app config resolves this component launches
+   * the matching provider's hop straight away (the SAME hop the button runs) and
+   * renders NOTHING: it is headless, a pure side-effect, so the caller shows its
+   * own "signing you in" state. If the hint matches no configured provider,
+   * `onAutoStartResolved(false)` fires so the caller can fall back to the form.
+   */
+  readonly autoStart?: string
+  /**
+   * Called once, in `autoStart` mode, after the app config resolves: `true` when
+   * the hinted provider launched, `false` when the hint matched nothing (so the
+   * caller can drop to the interactive form instead of a blank redirect state).
+   */
+  readonly onAutoStartResolved?: (started: boolean) => void
+}
+
+interface ProviderMeta {
+  readonly key: string
+  readonly label: string
+  readonly Icon: ComponentType<SVGProps<SVGSVGElement>>
+}
+
+/** Display metadata for the providers the portal knows how to render. */
+const PROVIDER_META: Record<string, ProviderMeta> = {
+  github: { key: 'github', label: 'GitHub', Icon: GitHubIcon },
+  gitlab: { key: 'gitlab', label: 'GitLab', Icon: GitLabIcon },
+  google: { key: 'google', label: 'Google', Icon: GoogleIcon },
+  web3: { key: 'web3', label: 'Wallet', Icon: WalletIcon },
+}
+
+/** Canonical render order. */
+const ORDER = ['github', 'gitlab', 'google', 'web3']
+
+interface Resolved {
+  /** Configured + renderable providers, keyed by their normalized key. */
+  readonly providers: Record<string, AppProvider>
+}
+
+export function SocialButtons({
+  client,
+  clientIdOverride,
+  intent = 'signin',
+  postLoginRedirect,
+  autoStart,
+  onAutoStartResolved,
+}: SocialButtonsProps) {
+  const [resolved, setResolved] = useState<Resolved | null>(null)
+  const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
+  const [busyChain, setBusyChain] = useState<Chain | null>(null)
+  // The chain-agnostic wallet entry reveals a chooser only when it can't decide
+  // for the user (zero or multiple injected wallets); a single injected wallet
+  // connects straight without ever showing it.
+  const [walletMenu, setWalletMenu] = useState(false)
+  const autoStarted = useRef(false)
+
+  // Start federation: hand the provider's NAME to IAM's authorize endpoint and
+  // let IAM run the whole IdP leg. Shared by the button click and the `autoStart`
+  // auto-launch so both take the identical path.
+  //
+  // Two arms, and they are the same two the password path already branches on
+  // (`Login.completeAfterAuth`) — the question is only who owns the PKCE verifier:
+  //
+  //   an app sent the user here → re-enter authorize with THAT app's request, so
+  //   IAM mints the code against its client_id, redirect_uri and challenge and
+  //   returns the browser straight to it. The app holds the verifier; this portal
+  //   is never in the return path and never touches a token.
+  //
+  //   a bare portal sign-in → the portal is its own client, so the IAM SDK mints
+  //   and stores the verifier that `Callback` reads back. `post_login_redirect`
+  //   carries a non-OIDC "come back here" target (device approval), which is why
+  //   it belongs to this arm alone: it is only ever read by the portal's own
+  //   callback, and only this arm runs it.
+  function hop(provider: AppProvider) {
+    const app = authorizeRequest(window.location.search, clientIdOverride ?? client.org.clientId)
+    if (app) {
+      sessionStorage.removeItem('post_login_redirect')
+      window.location.assign(client.authorize({ ...app, provider: provider.name }))
+      return
+    }
+    if (postLoginRedirect) sessionStorage.setItem('post_login_redirect', postLoginRedirect)
+    else sessionStorage.removeItem('post_login_redirect')
+    createIam(client.org, clientIdOverride)
+      .signinRedirect({ additionalParams: { provider: provider.name } })
+      .catch((e) => setError(String(e)))
+  }
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    let cancelled = false
+    // Read the app config against the DOWNSTREAM app's own redirect_uri (carried
+    // on the authorize query in the SSO flow), not the portal's /callback — IAM
+    // validates it against the app's registered list, and a cross-app clientId
+    // (e.g. console's `hanzo-cloud` viewed from hanzo.id) does NOT register the
+    // portal callback, so hardcoding it drops the whole response and no social
+    // resolves. Absent (bare portal / device flow) → getAppLogin defaults it.
+    const oidcRedirectUri =
+      typeof window !== 'undefined'
+        ? new URLSearchParams(window.location.search).get('redirect_uri') ?? undefined
+        : undefined
+    client
+      .getAppLogin(clientIdOverride, oidcRedirectUri)
+      .then((app) => {
+        if (cancelled) return
+        if (!app) {
+          // Can't read the app config → render no social rather than risk a
+          // dead-end button. Password / email-code still render.
+          setResolved({ providers: {} })
+          onAutoStartResolved?.(false)
+          return
+        }
+        const want = intent === 'signup' ? (p: AppProvider) => p.canSignUp : (p: AppProvider) => p.canSignIn
+        // Render ONLY providers IAM actually holds credentials for. A provider
+        // with placeholder/empty creds would dead-end the OAuth redirect, so we
+        // hide it; it reappears automatically once real creds are seeded. Web3
+        // needs no IAM-side OAuth credential (the wallet IS the credential), so
+        // it renders whenever the app enables it.
+        const providers: Record<string, AppProvider> = {}
+        for (const p of app.providers) {
+          const enabled = p.key === 'web3' ? want(p) : want(p) && p.configured
+          if (enabled && p.key in PROVIDER_META) providers[p.key] = p
+        }
+        setResolved({ providers })
+        // A client that already knows the provider (console `?provider_hint=…`)
+        // launches it straight away — the SAME hop the button runs, so a click
+        // over there lands directly in the provider flow, no second press and no
+        // bounce through this login page.
+        if (autoStart && !autoStarted.current) {
+          autoStarted.current = true
+          const target = matchProviderHint(Object.values(providers), autoStart)
+          if (target) {
+            onAutoStartResolved?.(true)
+            hop(target)
+          } else {
+            // Hint names a provider this app doesn't offer → let the caller show
+            // the form rather than dead-end on a blank "signing you in".
+            onAutoStartResolved?.(false)
+          }
+        }
+      })
+      .catch(() => {
+        if (cancelled) return
+        setResolved({ providers: {} })
+        onAutoStartResolved?.(false)
+      })
+    return () => {
+      cancelled = true
+    }
+    // Run once on mount: getAppLogin is a one-shot and autoStart is fixed for
+    // the life of the page; the ref guards the hop against a double-fire.
+    // eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
+  }, [client, clientIdOverride, intent])
+
+  // In autoStart mode the component is headless — it exists only to run the hop
+  // above; the caller renders its own "signing you in" state. Render nothing.
+  if (autoStart) return null
+  if (resolved === null) return null // resolving — render nothing rather than flicker
+  const ordered = ORDER.filter((k) => k in resolved.providers)
+  if (ordered.length === 0) return null
+
+  const verb = intent === 'signup' ? 'Sign up' : 'Continue'
+
+  function startOAuth(provider: AppProvider) {
+    setError(null)
+    hop(provider)
+  }
+
+  async function startWallet(chain: Chain) {
+    setError(null)
+    setBusyChain(chain)
+    try {
+      const sp = new URLSearchParams(typeof window !== 'undefined' ? window.location.search : '')
+      const res = await loginWithWalletChain(client, chain, {
+        clientId: clientIdOverride,
+        redirectUri: postLoginRedirect,
+        state: sp.get('state') ?? undefined,
+        nonce: sp.get('nonce') ?? undefined,
+        codeChallenge: sp.get('code_challenge') ?? undefined,
+        codeChallengeMethod: (sp.get('code_challenge_method') as 'S256' | 'plain' | null) ?? undefined,
+      })
+      if (res.error) {
+        setError(res.error)
+      } else if (res.redirectUrl) {
+        // Same post-login redirect the password flow performs.
+        window.location.href = res.redirectUrl
+      }
+    } catch (e) {
+      setError(String(e))
+    } finally {
+      setBusyChain(null)
+    }
+  }
+
+  // The chain-agnostic entry: auto-detect the injected wallet and connect
+  // straight when exactly one chain is available; otherwise reveal the chooser
+  // so the user picks EVM or Solana. Both underlying flows stay reachable.
+  function onConnectWallet() {
+    setError(null)
+    const detected = detectWalletChains()
+    if (detected.length === 1) startWallet(detected[0]!)
+    else setWalletMenu(true)
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <>
+      <div className="hanzo-id-social">
+        {ordered.map((k) => {
+          const provider = resolved.providers[k]!
+          // Web3 expands into one connect button per ENABLED chain; OAuth
+          // providers render a single hop button.
+          if (k === 'web3') {
+            // ONE chain-agnostic entry. It connects straight when a single
+            // wallet is detected, else expands into the chooser below — so the
+            // page always shows exactly one "Connect Wallet" button, with both
+            // EVM and Solana reachable from it.
+            return (
+              <Fragment key="web3">
+                <button
+                  type="button"
+                  className="hanzo-id-btn ghost"
+                  data-provider="web3"
+                  data-wallet-connect="true"
+                  aria-expanded={walletMenu}
+                  disabled={busyChain !== null}
+                  onClick={onConnectWallet}
+                >
+                  <WalletIcon />
+                  <span>{busyChain !== null && !walletMenu ? 'Connecting…' : 'Connect Wallet'}</span>
+                </button>
+                {walletMenu ? (
+                  <div
+                    className="hanzo-id-wallet-chains"
+                    role="group"
+                    aria-label="Choose a wallet network"
+                  >
+                    {ENABLED_WALLET_CHAINS.map((chain) => (
+                      <button
+                        key={`web3-${chain}`}
+                        type="button"
+                        className="hanzo-id-btn ghost"
+                        data-provider="web3"
+                        data-chain={chain}
+                        disabled={busyChain !== null}
+                        onClick={() => startWallet(chain)}
+                      >
+                        <WalletIcon />
+                        <span>{busyChain === chain ? 'Connecting…' : WALLET_CHAIN_LABELS[chain]}</span>
+                      </button>
+                    ))}
+                  </div>
+                ) : null}
+              </Fragment>
+            )
+          }
+          const meta = PROVIDER_META[k]!
+          const { Icon } = meta
+          return (
+            <button
+              key={k}
+              type="button"
+              className="hanzo-id-btn ghost"
+              data-provider={k}
+              onClick={() => startOAuth(provider)}
+            >
+              <Icon />
+              <span>{verb} with {meta.label}</span>
+            </button>
+          )
+        })}
+        {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
+      </div>
+      {/* The "or" separator belongs WITH the social block — render it only when
+          there are buttons, so it never dangles above the password form when
+          no providers are configured. */}
+      <Divider />
+    </>
+  )
+}

pkgs/auth/src/ui/icons.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/**
+ * Minimal inline provider marks. Brand-neutral, currentColor-driven, no
+ * external icon dependency. One 18px glyph per supported sign-in provider.
+ */
+import type { SVGProps } from 'react'
+
+const base = (props: SVGProps<SVGSVGElement>) => ({
+  width: 18,
+  height: 18,
+  viewBox: '0 0 24 24',
+  'aria-hidden': true,
+  focusable: false as const,
+  ...props,
+})
+
+export function GitHubIcon(props: SVGProps<SVGSVGElement>) {
+  return (
+    <svg {...base(props)} fill="currentColor">
+      <path d="M12 .5C5.73.5.5 5.73.5 12a11.5 11.5 0 0 0 7.86 10.92c.58.1.79-.25.79-.56v-2c-3.2.7-3.88-1.37-3.88-1.37-.53-1.34-1.3-1.7-1.3-1.7-1.05-.72.08-.7.08-.7 1.17.08 1.78 1.2 1.78 1.2 1.04 1.78 2.73 1.27 3.4.97.1-.75.4-1.27.73-1.56-2.56-.29-5.26-1.28-5.26-5.7 0-1.26.45-2.29 1.2-3.1-.12-.3-.52-1.48.11-3.08 0 0 .97-.31 3.18 1.18a11 11 0 0 1 5.8 0c2.2-1.5 3.17-1.18 3.17-1.18.63 1.6.23 2.78.11 3.08.75.81 1.2 1.84 1.2 3.1 0 4.43-2.7 5.4-5.28 5.69.42.36.79 1.07.79 2.16v3.2c0 .31.21.67.8.56A11.5 11.5 0 0 0 23.5 12C23.5 5.73 18.27.5 12 .5Z" />
+    </svg>
+  )
+}
+
+export function GoogleIcon(props: SVGProps<SVGSVGElement>) {
+  return (
+    <svg {...base(props)}>
+      <path fill="#4285F4" d="M23.52 12.27c0-.82-.07-1.6-.21-2.36H12v4.46h6.46a5.52 5.52 0 0 1-2.4 3.62v3h3.88c2.27-2.09 3.58-5.17 3.58-8.72Z" />
+      <path fill="#34A853" d="M12 24c3.24 0 5.96-1.08 7.94-2.91l-3.88-3c-1.08.72-2.45 1.15-4.06 1.15-3.12 0-5.77-2.11-6.71-4.95H1.28v3.1A12 12 0 0 0 12 24Z" />
+      <path fill="#FBBC05" d="M5.29 14.29A7.2 7.2 0 0 1 4.91 12c0-.8.14-1.57.38-2.29v-3.1H1.28A12 12 0 0 0 0 12c0 1.94.46 3.77 1.28 5.39l4.01-3.1Z" />
+      <path fill="#EA4335" d="M12 4.76c1.76 0 3.34.61 4.58 1.8l3.43-3.43A11.99 11.99 0 0 0 12 0 12 12 0 0 0 1.28 6.61l4.01 3.1C6.23 6.87 8.88 4.76 12 4.76Z" />
+    </svg>
+  )
+}
+
+export function GitLabIcon(props: SVGProps<SVGSVGElement>) {
+  return (
+    <svg {...base(props)} fill="currentColor">
+      <path d="M23.955 13.587l-1.342-4.135-2.664-8.189a.455.455 0 0 0-.867 0L16.418 9.45H7.582L4.919 1.263a.455.455 0 0 0-.867 0L1.388 9.452-.001 13.587a.924.924 0 0 0 .331 1.023L12 23.054l11.625-8.443a.92.92 0 0 0 .33-1.024" />
+    </svg>
+  )
+}
+
+export function WalletIcon(props: SVGProps<SVGSVGElement>) {
+  return (
+    <svg {...base(props)} fill="none" stroke="currentColor" strokeWidth={2} strokeLinecap="round" strokeLinejoin="round">
+      <path d="M3 7a2 2 0 0 1 2-2h12a2 2 0 0 1 2 2v1H5a2 2 0 0 0-2 2V7Z" />
+      <path d="M3 9a2 2 0 0 1 2-2h14a2 2 0 0 1 2 2v8a2 2 0 0 1-2 2H5a2 2 0 0 1-2-2V9Z" />
+      <circle cx="16.5" cy="13" r="1.25" fill="currentColor" stroke="none" />
+    </svg>
+  )
+}

pkgs/auth/src/ui/index.ts

@@ -2,4 +2,7 @@ export { LoginForm } from './LoginForm'
 export { SignupForm } from './SignupForm'
 export { ForgotForm } from './ForgotForm'
 export { OTPForm } from './OTPForm'
-export { ProviderButtons } from './ProviderButtons'
+export { MfaEnrollForm, type MfaEnrollFormProps } from './MfaEnrollForm'
+export { SmsConsentNotice, SMS_CONSENT_TEXT } from './SmsConsent'
+export { SocialButtons, type SocialButtonsProps } from './SocialButtons'
+export { Divider } from './Divider'

pkgs/auth/src/web3.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+/**
+ * Multi-chain wallet login orchestration tests — pure, no network, no wallet
+ * libs. Run with: pnpm --filter @hanzo/id-auth test
+ *
+ * Locks the connect→nonce→sign→verify→redirect contract against
+ * `hanzoai/iam` controllers/web3_auth.go using a capturing fetch double and a
+ * fake signer (the injectable `WalletSigner` seam — the real one lazy-loads the
+ * wallet libs, which this test never touches).
+ */
+import { test } from 'vitest'
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import { createAuthClient } from './client.ts'
+import {
+  loginWithWalletChain,
+  detectWalletChains,
+  ENABLED_WALLET_CHAINS,
+  WALLET_CHAIN_LABELS,
+  type WalletSigner,
+} from './web3.ts'
+import type { Chain, LoginChallenge, SignedProof } from '@hanzo/id-connect'
+import type { OrgConfig } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
+
+function org(overrides: Partial<OrgConfig> = {}): OrgConfig {
+  return {
+    orgId: 'hanzo',
+    iamUrl: 'https://hanzo.id',
+    iamIssuer: 'https://hanzo.id',
+    clientId: 'hanzo-id',
+    appName: 'hanzo-id',
+    publicOrigin: 'https://hanzo.id',
+    oauthCallbackOrigin: 'https://hanzo.id',
+    brandPackage: '@hanzo/brand',
+    ...overrides,
+  }
+}
+
+const CHALLENGE: LoginChallenge = {
+  domain: 'hanzo.id',
+  uri: 'https://hanzo.id',
+  nonce: 'NONCE1234567890A',
+  issuedAt: '2026-01-01T00:00:00.000Z',
+  expirationTime: '2026-01-01T00:10:00.000Z',
+  version: '1',
+}
+
+/**
+ * Capturing fetch: returns the minted CHALLENGE for the nonce GET, and a canned
+ * IAM "ok" body for the verify POST (an auth code in `data`, like /v1/iam/login).
+ * Records every call so the test can assert the exact wire shape.
+ */
+function capturingFetch(verifyData: unknown = 'AUTHCODE') {
+  const calls: { url: string; method: string; body: Record<string, unknown> }[] = []
+  const fetchImpl: typeof fetch = async (input, init) => {
+    const url = typeof input === 'string' ? input : input.toString()
+    const method = init?.method ?? 'GET'
+    let body: Record<string, unknown> = {}
+    if (init?.body && typeof init.body === 'string') body = JSON.parse(init.body)
+    calls.push({ url, method, body })
+    if (url.includes('/v1/iam/web3/nonce')) {
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: 'ok', data: CHALLENGE }), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      })
+    }
+    // verify
+    return new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: 'ok', data: verifyData }), {
+      status: 200,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    })
+  }
+  return { calls, fetchImpl }
+}
+
+/** Fake signer: records the (chain, challenge) it was handed, returns a proof. */
+function fakeSigner() {
+  const seen: { chain: Chain; challenge: LoginChallenge }[] = []
+  const proof: SignedProof = {
+    chain: 'evm',
+    scheme: 'secp256k1-eip191',
+    address: '0xabc0000000000000000000000000000000000def',
+    message: 'rendered CAIP-122 message',
+    signature: '0xdeadbeef',
+  }
+  const sign: WalletSigner = async (chain, challenge) => {
+    seen.push({ chain, challenge })
+    return { ...proof, chain }
+  }
+  return { seen, sign, proof }
+}
+
+test('fetches the nonce for the chosen chain, signs the returned challenge, POSTs the proof', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch()
+  const { seen, sign } = fakeSigner()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+
+  const res = await loginWithWalletChain(client, 'evm', {}, fetchImpl, sign)
+
+  // 1) nonce GET first, scoped to the chain, on the brand's own iamUrl.
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.method, 'GET')
+  assert.match(calls[0]!.url, /^https:\/\/hanzo\.id\/v1\/iam\/web3\/nonce\?chain=evm$/)
+
+  // 2) the server challenge was handed to the signer (nonce/domain/uri/times
+  //    intact — the server-minted, single-use values the proof must bind).
+  assert.equal(seen.length, 1)
+  assert.equal(seen[0]!.chain, 'evm')
+  assert.equal(seen[0]!.challenge.nonce, CHALLENGE.nonce)
+  assert.equal(seen[0]!.challenge.domain, CHALLENGE.domain)
+  assert.equal(seen[0]!.challenge.uri, CHALLENGE.uri)
+  assert.equal(seen[0]!.challenge.issuedAt, CHALLENGE.issuedAt)
+  assert.equal(seen[0]!.challenge.expirationTime, CHALLENGE.expirationTime)
+
+  // 3) the proof + routing was POSTed to verify.
+  const verify = calls[1]!
+  assert.equal(verify.method, 'POST')
+  assert.match(verify.url, /\/v1\/iam\/web3\/verify$/)
+  assert.equal(verify.body.chain, 'evm')
+  assert.equal(verify.body.scheme, 'secp256k1-eip191')
+  assert.equal(verify.body.address, '0xabc0000000000000000000000000000000000def')
+  assert.equal(verify.body.message, 'rendered CAIP-122 message')
+  assert.equal(verify.body.signature, '0xdeadbeef')
+  // routing fields the controller needs.
+  assert.equal(verify.body.application, 'hanzo-id')
+  assert.equal(verify.body.method, 'login')
+  assert.equal(verify.body.clientId, 'hanzo-id')
+  // bare sign-in (no downstream redirectUri) → type=login.
+  assert.equal(verify.body.type, 'login')
+
+  // 4) bare sign-in lands on onboarding — same destination as the password flow.
+  assert.equal(res.redirectUrl, '/onboarding')
+  assert.equal(res.error, undefined)
+})
+
+test('SSO flow (downstream redirectUri) sends type=code and returns the app redirect with the minted code', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch('CODE_XYZ')
+  const { sign } = fakeSigner()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+
+  const res = await loginWithWalletChain(
+    client,
+    'evm',
+    { redirectUri: 'https://console.hanzo.ai/auth/iam/callback', state: 'rp123', clientId: 'hanzo-console' },
+    fetchImpl,
+    sign,
+  )
+
+  const verify = calls[1]!
+  assert.equal(verify.body.type, 'code')
+  assert.equal(verify.body.redirectUri, 'https://console.hanzo.ai/auth/iam/callback')
+  assert.equal(verify.body.state, 'rp123')
+  assert.equal(verify.body.clientId, 'hanzo-console')
+  assert.equal(
+    res.redirectUrl,
+    'https://console.hanzo.ai/auth/iam/callback?code=CODE_XYZ&state=rp123',
+  )
+})
+
+test('disabled chains are not offered and fail closed without any network or signer call', async () => {
+  // The stub-verifier chains must NOT be in the enabled set...
+  for (const stub of ['ton', 'xrp', 'bitcoin'] as const) {
+    assert.equal(ENABLED_WALLET_CHAINS.includes(stub), false, `${stub} must be disabled`)
+  }
+  // ...and only the production-verifier chains are.
+  assert.deepEqual([...ENABLED_WALLET_CHAINS], ['evm', 'solana'])
+  // every enabled chain has a render label.
+  for (const c of ENABLED_WALLET_CHAINS) assert.ok(WALLET_CHAIN_LABELS[c])
+
+  // Calling a disabled chain returns an error and touches neither fetch nor signer.
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch()
+  let signed = false
+  const sign: WalletSigner = async () => {
+    signed = true
+    throw new Error('signer must not run for a disabled chain')
+  }
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const res = await loginWithWalletChain(client, 'ton', {}, fetchImpl, sign)
+  assert.match(res.error ?? '', /not enabled/)
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 0)
+  assert.equal(signed, false)
+})
+
+test('a wallet rejection surfaces as { error } (not a throw), and verify is never called', async () => {
+  const { calls, fetchImpl } = capturingFetch()
+  const sign: WalletSigner = async () => {
+    throw new Error('User rejected the request')
+  }
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const res = await loginWithWalletChain(client, 'evm', {}, fetchImpl, sign)
+  assert.equal(res.error, 'User rejected the request')
+  // nonce was fetched (1 call) but verify was NOT (no 2nd call).
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 1)
+  assert.match(calls[0]!.url, /\/v1\/iam\/web3\/nonce/)
+})
+
+test('detectWalletChains: a single injected wallet resolves to exactly its chain', () => {
+  // EVM only → [evm]; the UI connects straight, no chooser.
+  assert.deepEqual(detectWalletChains({ ethereum: {} }), ['evm'])
+  // Solana only, via any of the recognized injected providers → [solana].
+  assert.deepEqual(detectWalletChains({ solana: {} }), ['solana'])
+  assert.deepEqual(detectWalletChains({ solflare: {} }), ['solana'])
+  assert.deepEqual(detectWalletChains({ backpack: {} }), ['solana'])
+})
+
+test('detectWalletChains: both injected → both, in enabled order (chooser)', () => {
+  assert.deepEqual(detectWalletChains({ ethereum: {}, solana: {} }), ['evm', 'solana'])
+})
+
+test('detectWalletChains: nothing injected → [] (chooser, both still reachable)', () => {
+  // No window (server / node) and an empty window both resolve to none — the UI
+  // then reveals the chooser so EVM and Solana stay selectable regardless.
+  assert.deepEqual(detectWalletChains({}), [])
+  assert.deepEqual(detectWalletChains(undefined), [])
+  assert.deepEqual(detectWalletChains(), []) // node has no global window
+  // Every detectable chain is one the wallet flow actually enables.
+  for (const c of detectWalletChains({ ethereum: {}, solana: {} })) {
+    assert.ok(ENABLED_WALLET_CHAINS.includes(c))
+  }
+})
+
+test('an IAM verify error is returned as { error }', async () => {
+  const calls: string[] = []
+  const fetchImpl: typeof fetch = async (input) => {
+    const url = typeof input === 'string' ? input : input.toString()
+    calls.push(url)
+    if (url.includes('/web3/nonce')) {
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: 'ok', data: CHALLENGE }), { status: 200 })
+    }
+    return new Response(JSON.stringify({ status: 'error', msg: 'web3: bad signature' }), { status: 200 })
+  }
+  const { sign } = fakeSigner()
+  const client = createAuthClient({ org: org(), fetchImpl })
+  const res = await loginWithWalletChain(client, 'evm', {}, fetchImpl, sign)
+  assert.equal(res.error, 'web3: bad signature')
+  assert.equal(res.redirectUrl, undefined)
+})

pkgs/auth/src/web3.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+/**
+ * Multi-chain wallet Sign-In-With-X — the ONE client-side orchestration.
+ *
+ * Decomplected: connect+sign is the BROWSER's job (native `@hanzo/id-connect`
+ * connectors — viem / @solana injected wallets, no WalletConnect, no projectId),
+ * verify is the SERVER's job (IAM `POST /v1/iam/web3/verify`, which runs the same
+ * `walletconnect.VerifyProof` the connectors target). This module ties the two
+ * into a single call so the UI only picks a chain and follows the redirect.
+ *
+ *   client: nonce ─► connect ─► signLogin(challenge) ─► SignedProof
+ *           ─► POST verify ─► IAM signs in ─► same redirect the password flow uses
+ *
+ * Wire contract (verified against `hanzoai/iam` controllers/web3_auth.go):
+ *   GET  {iamUrl}/v1/iam/web3/nonce?chain=<c>&address=<a>
+ *        → {status:'ok', data:{domain,uri,statement,nonce,issuedAt,
+ *                              expirationTime,version}}   (a LoginChallenge)
+ *   POST {iamUrl}/v1/iam/web3/verify   body = SignedProof + routing fields
+ *        → same success shape as /v1/iam/login (auth code | session cookie).
+ */
+import type { OrgConfig } from '@hanzo/id-shared'
+import type { Chain, LoginChallenge, SignedProof } from '@hanzo/id-connect'
+import type { AuthClient } from './client'
+import type { LoginResponse } from './types'
+
+/**
+ * Connect a wallet on `chain` and sign `challenge`, returning the proof. The
+ * single seam between this orchestrator and the browser wallet libs: the default
+ * lazy-loads `@hanzo/id-connect/login` (so importing this module never pulls
+ * viem/sats-connect, and the wallet bundle is code-split until first use); tests
+ * inject a fake. One signature, one way.
+ */
+export type WalletSigner = (chain: Chain, challenge: LoginChallenge) => Promise<SignedProof>
+
+const defaultSigner: WalletSigner = async (chain, challenge) => {
+  const { loginWithWallet } = await import('@hanzo/id-connect/login')
+  const { proof } = await loginWithWallet({ chain, challenge })
+  return proof
+}
+
+/**
+ * Chains whose wallet login is ENABLED. The server-side verifiers for EVM and
+ * Solana are production-grade; TON / XRP / Bitcoin verifiers are still stubs and
+ * would fail closed, so they are NOT offered. Adding a chain later is one line
+ * here (once its Go verifier is real). Single source of truth — the UI renders
+ * exactly this set.
+ */
+export const ENABLED_WALLET_CHAINS: readonly Chain[] = ['evm', 'solana']
+
+/** Display label per chain, shown on each connect button. */
+export const WALLET_CHAIN_LABELS: Record<Chain, string> = {
+  evm: 'Ethereum / EVM',
+  solana: 'Solana',
+  bitcoin: 'Bitcoin',
+  ton: 'TON',
+  xrp: 'XRP',
+}
+
+/** The `window` fields the injected-wallet sniff reads — kept local so the
+ * wallet libs stay out of this module (detection is a pure property read). */
+export interface WalletWindow {
+  readonly ethereum?: unknown
+  readonly solana?: unknown
+  readonly solflare?: unknown
+  readonly backpack?: unknown
+}
+
+/** Is an injected wallet for `chain` present on `w`? Mirrors the connectors'
+ * own discovery: EVM = `window.ethereum` (EIP-1193 / EIP-6963 legacy handle),
+ * Solana = Phantom/Solflare/Backpack injected providers. */
+function chainInjected(chain: Chain, w: WalletWindow): boolean {
+  switch (chain) {
+    case 'evm':
+      return Boolean(w.ethereum)
+    case 'solana':
+      return Boolean(w.solana || w.solflare || w.backpack)
+    default:
+      // A chain with no sniff is never auto-detected; the chooser still offers
+      // it. Only the ENABLED set is ever consulted, so this stays unreachable.
+      return false
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * The ENABLED wallet chains that currently have an injected provider. A pure
+ * `window` sniff — no connect, no I/O — that powers the chain-agnostic "Connect
+ * Wallet" entry: exactly one match → connect straight; zero or many → let the
+ * user pick. Derived from {@link ENABLED_WALLET_CHAINS} so there is ONE source
+ * of truth for what wallet login offers.
+ */
+export function detectWalletChains(
+  w: WalletWindow | undefined = typeof window === 'undefined' ? undefined : (window as WalletWindow),
+): Chain[] {
+  if (!w) return []
+  return ENABLED_WALLET_CHAINS.filter((c) => chainInjected(c, w))
+}
+
+/** Routing context for the verify POST — exactly what the password flow carries. */
+export interface WalletLoginContext {
+  /** Override the OAuth client_id (downstream app); defaults to org.clientId. */
+  readonly clientId?: string
+  /** Downstream app `redirect_uri`; presence flips the flow to the auth-code (SSO) path. */
+  readonly redirectUri?: string
+  readonly state?: string
+  /** OIDC nonce from the downstream authorize request, echoed into the minted code. */
+  readonly nonce?: string
+  readonly codeChallenge?: string
+  readonly codeChallengeMethod?: 'S256' | 'plain'
+}
+
+/**
+ * Connect a wallet on `chain`, sign the IAM-minted challenge, and verify it —
+ * resolving to the SAME {@link LoginResponse} the password login returns (so the
+ * caller reuses one redirect path). Throws only on a programming/transport error
+ * the UI can't act on; expected failures (user rejects, bad signature) come back
+ * as `{ error }`.
+ *
+ * `client.org.iamUrl` is the fetch base (HIP-0111 host-relative — the brand's
+ * own `*.id` host), matching every other AuthClient call.
+ */
+export async function loginWithWalletChain(
+  client: AuthClient,
+  chain: Chain,
+  ctx: WalletLoginContext = {},
+  fetchImpl: typeof fetch = fetch,
+  sign: WalletSigner = defaultSigner,
+): Promise<LoginResponse> {
+  const org = client.org
+  if (!ENABLED_WALLET_CHAINS.includes(chain)) {
+    return { error: `wallet login not enabled for ${chain}` }
+  }
+
+  // 1. Mint the challenge, then connect+sign atomically (the connector
+  //    disconnects on failure). The nonce is fetched without an address — the
+  //    controller treats (chain,address) as advisory and binds the real address
+  //    from the SIGNED message, so there is no second round-trip to scope it.
+  let proof: SignedProof
+  try {
+    const challenge = await fetchNonce(org, chain, fetchImpl)
+    proof = await sign(chain, challenge)
+  } catch (err) {
+    return { error: errMessage(err) }
+  }
+
+  // 2. Verify the proof + routing at IAM. Type defaults to "login" (session
+  //    cookie) server-side; a downstream redirectUri makes it the code flow.
+  const url = new URL('/v1/iam/web3/verify', org.iamUrl)
+  const res = await fetchImpl(url.toString(), {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    credentials: 'include',
+    body: JSON.stringify({
+      // routing
+      organization: org.loginOrg ?? '',
+      application: org.appName,
+      method: 'login',
+      clientId: ctx.clientId ?? org.clientId,
+      redirectUri: ctx.redirectUri ?? '',
+      state: ctx.state ?? '',
+      scope: 'openid profile email',
+      type: ctx.redirectUri ? 'code' : 'login',
+      nonce: ctx.nonce ?? '',
+      codeChallenge: ctx.codeChallenge ?? '',
+      codeChallengeMethod: ctx.codeChallengeMethod ?? '',
+      // proof
+      chain: proof.chain,
+      scheme: proof.scheme,
+      address: proof.address,
+      publicKey: proof.publicKey ?? '',
+      message: proof.message,
+      signature: proof.signature,
+      extra: proof.extra ?? {},
+    }),
+  })
+
+  return parseVerifyResponse(res, ctx)
+}
+
+/** GET the CAIP-122 challenge for (chain) from IAM; throws on a non-ok payload. */
+async function fetchNonce(
+  org: OrgConfig,
+  chain: Chain,
+  fetchImpl: typeof fetch,
+): Promise<LoginChallenge> {
+  const url = new URL('/v1/iam/web3/nonce', org.iamUrl)
+  url.searchParams.set('chain', chain)
+  const res = await fetchImpl(url.toString(), { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
+  let body: Record<string, unknown> = {}
+  try {
+    body = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error(`web3 nonce: HTTP ${res.status} non-JSON response`)
+  }
+  if (!res.ok || body.status !== 'ok' || typeof body.data !== 'object' || body.data === null) {
+    throw new Error(typeof body.msg === 'string' ? body.msg : `web3 nonce: HTTP ${res.status}`)
+  }
+  const d = body.data as Record<string, unknown>
+  return {
+    domain: String(d.domain ?? ''),
+    uri: String(d.uri ?? ''),
+    statement: typeof d.statement === 'string' ? d.statement : undefined,
+    nonce: String(d.nonce ?? ''),
+    issuedAt: String(d.issuedAt ?? ''),
+    expirationTime: typeof d.expirationTime === 'string' ? d.expirationTime : undefined,
+    version: typeof d.version === 'string' ? d.version : '1',
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Shape the `/v1/iam/web3/verify` response into a {@link LoginResponse}, mirroring
+ * the password flow's `parseLoginResponse`: auth-code flow → a redirect back to
+ * the downstream app; bare sign-in → land on onboarding.
+ */
+async function parseVerifyResponse(
+  res: Response,
+  ctx: WalletLoginContext,
+): Promise<LoginResponse> {
+  let body: Record<string, unknown> = {}
+  try {
+    body = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
+  } catch {
+    return { error: `HTTP ${res.status} non-JSON response` }
+  }
+  if (!res.ok || body.status === 'error') {
+    return { error: typeof body.msg === 'string' ? body.msg : `HTTP ${res.status}` }
+  }
+  const data = body.data
+
+  // Auth-code (SSO) flow: a downstream redirectUri is present and `data` is the
+  // minted code — hand back a fully-formed redirect to the app.
+  if (ctx.redirectUri && typeof data === 'string' && data.length > 0) {
+    const sep = ctx.redirectUri.includes('?') ? '&' : '?'
+    return {
+      redirectUrl: `${ctx.redirectUri}${sep}code=${encodeURIComponent(data)}&state=${encodeURIComponent(ctx.state ?? '')}`,
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Bare portal sign-in: the IAM session cookie is set; land on onboarding —
+  // identical to the password path so there is one post-login destination.
+  return { redirectUrl: '/onboarding' }
+}
+
+function errMessage(err: unknown): string {
+  if (err instanceof Error) return err.message
+  return String(err)
+}

pkgs/auth/tsconfig.json

@@ -4,5 +4,6 @@
     "outDir": "dist",
     "noEmit": true
   },
-  "include": ["src"]
+  "include": ["src"],
+  "exclude": ["src/**/*.test.ts"]
 }

pkgs/connect/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+# @luxwallet/connect
+
+Multi-chain wallet connect + **Sign-In-With-X** for **EVM, Solana, Bitcoin, TON, XRP**.
+
+One vocabulary, one canonical login message ([CAIP-122](https://github.com/ChainAgnostic/CAIPs/blob/main/CAIPs/caip-122.md)),
+one verifier. **MIT licensed — zero GPL.** This is the clean wallet stack; the
+Uniswap-derived GPL bones stay quarantined in `luxfi/exchange`.
+
+## Why
+
+`@luxfi/wallet` (Uniswap "Universe" fork) is GPL-3.0 and EVM-only. This package
+is a from-scratch, permissively-licensed connector that any Hanzo/Lux/Zoo/Pars
+surface — `hanzo.id` login, the browser extension, web and mobile apps — can use
+to authenticate a wallet on **any** supported chain.
+
+## Architecture
+
+```
+connect(chain) ─► Account ─► signLogin(challenge) ─► SignedProof ─► verifyProof()
+                  (browser, per-chain connector)      (server, one pure fn)
+```
+
+- **`caip122.ts`** — render/parse the canonical login message. `build ∘ parse` round-trips.
+- **`verify.ts`** — `verifyProof(proof, expected)`: parse → enforce domain/nonce/time → dispatch to the per-chain crypto verifier. Pure, fails closed, never throws.
+- **`<chain>/`** — per-chain connector (browser) + verifier (pure crypto).
+- **`go/walletconnect`** — Go port of `verifyProof`, imported by Hanzo IAM so the server verifies identically.
+
+## Chain support
+
+| Chain | Connect lib (license) | Login proof | Connector | Verifier |
+|-------|-----------------------|-------------|-----------|----------|
+| EVM | `viem` (MIT) — EIP-6963 / `window.ethereum` | EIP-191 `personal_sign` | ✅ `evm/connect.ts` | ✅ secp256k1 recover |
+| Solana | injected provider (Phantom/Solflare/Backpack) | ed25519 `signMessage` | ✅ `solana/connect.ts` | ✅ ed25519 |
+| Bitcoin | `sats-connect` (MIT) — Xverse/Leather/Unisat | BIP-322 | ✅ `bitcoin/connect.ts` | ✅ legacy + BIP-322 |
+| TON | `@tonconnect/sdk` (Apache-2.0) | `ton_proof` | ✅ `ton/connect.ts` | ✅ ed25519 envelope |
+| XRP | `@crossmarkio/sdk` (MIT) — Crossmark | `signInAndWait` | ✅ `xrp/connect.ts` | ✅ secp256k1 + ed25519 |
+
+All connect libs are MIT/Apache/ISC — **no GPL anywhere** in the dependency tree.
+GemWallet is intentionally not wired: its only client, `@gemwallet/api`, ships
+under a custom dual license requiring GemWallet's permission for public/commercial
+use — incompatible with the MIT/Apache/ISC-only rule. Crossmark covers both XRPL
+key types, so the XRP path is complete without it.
+
+### Architecture: server verify never pulls a wallet lib
+
+The wallet libraries are **optional peer dependencies**. The server-side
+`verifyProof` path imports only `@noble/*` + `bs58`:
+
+```ts
+import { verifyProof } from '@luxwallet/connect/verify';     // zero wallet libs
+import { buildSiwxMessage } from '@luxwallet/connect/caip122'; // zero deps
+```
+
+Connectors live behind separate entrypoints, so a server bundle stays clean:
+
+```ts
+import { loginWithWallet, getConnector } from '@luxwallet/connect/connectors';
+import { EvmConnector } from '@luxwallet/connect/evm/connect';
+```
+
+## Use
+
+```ts
+// Server: mint a challenge
+import { newChallenge, verifyProof } from '@luxwallet/connect';
+const challenge = newChallenge({ domain: 'hanzo.id', uri: 'https://hanzo.id/login' });
+// → store challenge.nonce, send challenge to the client
+
+// Server: verify what comes back
+const res = verifyProof(proof, { domain: 'hanzo.id', nonce: challenge.nonce });
+if (res.ok) { /* res.address is authenticated on res.chain */ }
+```
+
+```ts
+// Client (browser): connect a wallet and sign the challenge in one call.
+import { loginWithWallet } from '@luxwallet/connect/connectors';
+
+const { account, proof } = await loginWithWallet({ chain: 'evm', challenge });
+// → POST `proof` to the server, which calls verifyProof(proof, { domain, nonce }).
+
+// Or drive a connector directly:
+import { getConnector } from '@luxwallet/connect/connectors';
+const c = getConnector('solana');
+const acct = await c.connect();             // provider.connect()
+const p = await c.signLogin(acct, challenge); // ed25519 signMessage → SignedProof
+```
+
+## Develop
+
+```bash
+pnpm install
+pnpm test        # vitest — crypto verifiers run against generated keypairs
+pnpm typecheck
+pnpm build
+```
+
+## License
+
+MIT © Lux Industries Inc.

pkgs/connect/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+  "name": "@hanzo/id-connect",
+  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "description": "Multi-chain wallet connect + Sign-In-With-X (EVM, Solana, Bitcoin, TON, XRP). Vendored from luxwallet/connect (MIT).",
+  "type": "module",
+  "main": "./src/index.ts",
+  "types": "./src/index.ts",
+  "exports": {
+    ".": "./src/index.ts",
+    "./verify": "./src/verify.ts",
+    "./caip122": "./src/caip122.ts",
+    "./connectors": "./src/connectors.ts",
+    "./login": "./src/login.ts",
+    "./evm/connect": "./src/evm/connect.ts",
+    "./solana/connect": "./src/solana/connect.ts",
+    "./bitcoin/connect": "./src/bitcoin/connect.ts",
+    "./ton/connect": "./src/ton/connect.ts",
+    "./xrp/connect": "./src/xrp/connect.ts",
+    "./package.json": "./package.json"
+  },
+  "scripts": {
+    "tc": "tsc --noEmit"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@noble/curves": "^1.6.0",
+    "@noble/hashes": "^1.5.0",
+    "bs58": "^6.0.0"
+  },
+  "peerDependencies": {
+    "@crossmarkio/sdk": "^0.4.0",
+    "@tonconnect/sdk": "^4.0.0",
+    "sats-connect": "^4.2.1",
+    "viem": "^2.53.1"
+  }
+}

pkgs/connect/src/__tests__/bitcoin.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+/**
+ * Bitcoin verifier tests.
+ *
+ * Coverage:
+ *   • Legacy "Bitcoin Signed Message" (recoverable ECDSA) over a real CAIP-122
+ *     login message — for P2PKH, P2WPKH and P2TR (BIP-86) addresses.
+ *   • BIP-322 "simple" for P2WPKH (ECDSA / BIP-143) and P2TR key-path
+ *     (Schnorr / BIP-341).
+ *   • Tamper / wrong-address / wrong-type negatives (fail closed).
+ *   • Anchors: the BIP-322 message hash + to_spend txid + P2WPKH derivation
+ *     are pinned to the official Bitcoin Core BIP-322 test vectors, so the
+ *     sighash construction is verified against a known-answer source rather
+ *     than only self-consistently.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { secp256k1, schnorr } from '@noble/curves/secp256k1';
+import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2';
+import { ripemd160 } from '@noble/hashes/legacy';
+import { verifyBitcoin } from '../bitcoin/verify.js';
+import { encodeSegwitAddress } from '../bitcoin/bech32.js';
+import { base58checkEncode } from '../bitcoin/base58check.js';
+import { buildSiwxMessage } from '../caip122.js';
+import { newChallenge } from '../nonce.js';
+import { utf8ToBytes, concatBytes, bytesToHex } from '../bytes.js';
+import type { SignedProof } from '../types.js';
+
+// ── local crypto helpers (independent of the verifier internals) ─────────────
+
+const enc = (s: string) => utf8ToBytes(s);
+const sha256d = (b: Uint8Array) => sha256(sha256(b));
+const hash160 = (b: Uint8Array) => ripemd160(sha256(b));
+
+function taggedHash(tag: string, ...m: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array {
+  const t = sha256(enc(tag));
+  return sha256(concatBytes(t, t, ...m));
+}
+
+function compactSize(n: number): Uint8Array {
+  if (n < 0xfd) return new Uint8Array([n]);
+  if (n <= 0xffff) return new Uint8Array([0xfd, n & 0xff, (n >>> 8) & 0xff]);
+  return new Uint8Array([0xfe, n & 0xff, (n >>> 8) & 0xff, (n >>> 16) & 0xff, (n >>> 24) & 0xff]);
+}
+const u32le = (n: number) =>
+  new Uint8Array([n & 0xff, (n >>> 8) & 0xff, (n >>> 16) & 0xff, (n >>> 24) & 0xff]);
+const u64le = (n: bigint) => {
+  const o = new Uint8Array(8);
+  let v = n;
+  for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+    o[i] = Number(v & 0xffn);
+    v >>= 8n;
+  }
+  return o;
+};
+const varBytes = (b: Uint8Array) => concatBytes(compactSize(b.length), b);
+
+function bytesToBig(b: Uint8Array): bigint {
+  let v = 0n;
+  for (const x of b) v = (v << 8n) | BigInt(x);
+  return v;
+}
+function bigToXonly(x: bigint): Uint8Array {
+  const o = new Uint8Array(32);
+  let v = x;
+  for (let i = 31; i >= 0; i--) {
+    o[i] = Number(v & 0xffn);
+    v >>= 8n;
+  }
+  return o;
+}
+
+function toBase64(b: Uint8Array): string {
+  return Buffer.from(b).toString('base64');
+}
+
+// Address derivations (must match the verifier's, independently written).
+function p2pkh(pubkey: Uint8Array): string {
+  return base58checkEncode(0x00, hash160(pubkey));
+}
+function p2wpkh(pubCompressed: Uint8Array): string {
+  return encodeSegwitAddress('bc', 0, hash160(pubCompressed))!;
+}
+function taprootTweak(internalXonly: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  const n = secp256k1.CURVE.n;
+  const P = schnorr.utils.lift_x(bytesToBig(internalXonly));
+  const t = bytesToBig(taggedHash('TapTweak', internalXonly)) % n;
+  const Q = P.add(secp256k1.Point.BASE.multiply(t));
+  return bigToXonly(Q.toAffine().x);
+}
+function p2tr(internalXonly: Uint8Array): { address: string; program: Uint8Array } {
+  const program = taprootTweak(internalXonly);
+  return { address: encodeSegwitAddress('bc', 1, program)!, program };
+}
+
+// ── legacy "Bitcoin Signed Message" signer ───────────────────────────────────
+
+function legacyDigest(message: string): Uint8Array {
+  const msg = enc(message);
+  const magic = enc('\x18Bitcoin Signed Message:\n');
+  return sha256d(concatBytes(magic, compactSize(msg.length), msg));
+}
+
+/** Produce a 65-byte [header || r || s] legacy signature. */
+function signLegacy(priv: Uint8Array, message: string, compressed: boolean): Uint8Array {
+  const digest = legacyDigest(message);
+  const sig = secp256k1.sign(digest, priv);
+  const recid = sig.recovery!;
+  const header = 27 + recid + (compressed ? 4 : 0);
+  return concatBytes(new Uint8Array([header]), sig.toBytes('compact'));
+}
+
+// ── BIP-322 simple signers (sign exactly the verifier's sighash) ─────────────
+
+function toSpendTxid(message: string, scriptPubKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  const msgHash = taggedHash('BIP0322-signed-message', enc(message));
+  const scriptSig = concatBytes(new Uint8Array([0x00, 0x20]), msgHash);
+  const ser = concatBytes(
+    u32le(0),
+    compactSize(1),
+    new Uint8Array(32),
+    u32le(0xffffffff),
+    varBytes(scriptSig),
+    u32le(0),
+    compactSize(1),
+    u64le(0n),
+    varBytes(scriptPubKey),
+    u32le(0),
+  );
+  return sha256d(ser);
+}
+
+function bip143SighashP2WPKH(txid: Uint8Array, h160: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  const outpoint = concatBytes(txid, u32le(0));
+  const nSequence = u32le(0);
+  const hashPrevouts = sha256d(outpoint);
+  const hashSequence = sha256d(nSequence);
+  const scriptCode = concatBytes(
+    new Uint8Array([0x19, 0x76, 0xa9, 0x14]),
+    h160,
+    new Uint8Array([0x88, 0xac]),
+  );
+  const output = concatBytes(u64le(0n), varBytes(new Uint8Array([0x6a])));
+  const hashOutputs = sha256d(output);
+  const preimage = concatBytes(
+    u32le(0),
+    hashPrevouts,
+    hashSequence,
+    outpoint,
+    scriptCode,
+    u64le(0n),
+    nSequence,
+    hashOutputs,
+    u32le(0),
+    u32le(1),
+  );
+  return sha256d(preimage);
+}
+
+function bip341SighashP2TR(txid: Uint8Array, scriptPubKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  const outpoint = concatBytes(txid, u32le(0));
+  const nSequence = u32le(0);
+  const shaPrevouts = sha256(outpoint);
+  const shaAmounts = sha256(u64le(0n));
+  const shaScriptPubkeys = sha256(varBytes(scriptPubKey));
+  const shaSequences = sha256(nSequence);
+  const output = concatBytes(u64le(0n), varBytes(new Uint8Array([0x6a])));
+  const shaOutputs = sha256(output);
+  const sigMsg = concatBytes(
+    new Uint8Array([0x00]), // hash_type SIGHASH_DEFAULT
+    u32le(0),
+    u32le(0),
+    shaPrevouts,
+    shaAmounts,
+    shaScriptPubkeys,
+    shaSequences,
+    shaOutputs,
+    new Uint8Array([0x00]), // spend_type
+    u32le(0), // input index
+  );
+  return taggedHash('TapSighash', concatBytes(new Uint8Array([0x00]), sigMsg));
+}
+
+function serializeWitness(items: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array {
+  let out = compactSize(items.length);
+  for (const it of items) out = concatBytes(out, varBytes(it));
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** BIP-322 simple P2WPKH signature (serialized witness [sig||SIGHASH_ALL, pubkey]). */
+function signBip322P2WPKH(priv: Uint8Array, message: string): Uint8Array {
+  const pub = secp256k1.getPublicKey(priv, true);
+  const h160 = hash160(pub);
+  const spk = concatBytes(new Uint8Array([0x00, 0x14]), h160);
+  const txid = toSpendTxid(message, spk);
+  const sighash = bip143SighashP2WPKH(txid, h160);
+  const sig = secp256k1.sign(sighash, priv, { lowS: true });
+  const der = concatBytes(sig.toBytes('der'), new Uint8Array([0x01])); // SIGHASH_ALL
+  return serializeWitness([der, pub]);
+}
+
+/** BIP-322 simple P2TR key-path signature (serialized witness [schnorr_sig]). */
+function signBip322P2TR(priv: Uint8Array, message: string): { sig: Uint8Array; address: string } {
+  const internalXonly = secp256k1.getPublicKey(priv, true).slice(1);
+  const { address, program } = p2tr(internalXonly);
+  const spk = concatBytes(new Uint8Array([0x51, 0x20]), program);
+  const txid = toSpendTxid(message, spk);
+  const sighash = bip341SighashP2TR(txid, spk);
+  // Taproot key-path must sign with the *tweaked* private key.
+  const n = secp256k1.CURVE.n;
+  let d = bytesToBig(priv) % n;
+  // BIP-340: if the internal pubkey has odd Y, negate d.
+  const Pfull = secp256k1.Point.BASE.multiply(d);
+  if (Pfull.toAffine().y % 2n === 1n) d = n - d;
+  const t = bytesToBig(taggedHash('TapTweak', internalXonly)) % n;
+  const tweaked = (d + t) % n;
+  const tweakedBytes = bigToXonly(tweaked);
+  const sig = schnorr.sign(sighash, tweakedBytes);
+  return { sig: serializeWitness([sig]), address };
+}
+
+// ── fixtures ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+function makeMessage(address: string): string {
+  const challenge = newChallenge({
+    domain: 'hanzo.id',
+    uri: 'https://hanzo.id/login',
+    statement: 'Sign in to Hanzo',
+    nonce: 'abc123XYZ789',
+    now: Date.UTC(2026, 0, 1),
+  });
+  return buildSiwxMessage({ challenge, address, chain: 'bitcoin' });
+}
+
+// A fixed key so failures are reproducible.
+const PRIV = new Uint8Array(32).fill(0);
+PRIV[31] = 0x2a; // d = 42
+
+describe('verifyBitcoin — anchors against Bitcoin Core BIP-322 vectors', () => {
+  it('message_hash + to_spend txid match the official vectors', () => {
+    const addr = 'bc1q9vza2e8x573nczrlzms0wvx3gsqjx7vavgkx0l';
+    // Reconstruct that address's witness program from the known WIF private key.
+    // WIF L3VFe…: 0x80 || priv(32) || 0x01 || checksum(4)  → priv extracted below.
+    const wifPriv = hexToBytesLocal(
+      'bb051cd0dda0246f33c5a9e133ebd8e7bc02a92af6c41adc131ccd7826c5b004',
+    );
+    const pub = secp256k1.getPublicKey(wifPriv, true);
+    expect(p2wpkh(pub)).toBe(addr); // P2WPKH derivation anchor
+
+    expect(bytesToHex(taggedHash('BIP0322-signed-message', enc('')))).toBe(
+      'c90c269c4f8fcbe6880f72a721ddfbf1914268a794cbb21cfafee13770ae19f1',
+    );
+    expect(bytesToHex(taggedHash('BIP0322-signed-message', enc('Hello World')))).toBe(
+      'f0eb03b1a75ac6d9847f55c624a99169b5dccba2a31f5b23bea77ba270de0a7a',
+    );
+    const spk = concatBytes(new Uint8Array([0x00, 0x14]), hash160(pub));
+    const display = (b: Uint8Array) => bytesToHex(Uint8Array.from([...b].reverse()));
+    expect(display(toSpendTxid('', spk))).toBe(
+      'c5680aa69bb8d860bf82d4e9cd3504b55dde018de765a91bb566283c545a99a7',
+    );
+    expect(display(toSpendTxid('Hello World', spk))).toBe(
+      'b79d196740ad5217771c1098fc4a4b51e0535c32236c71f1ea4d61a2d603352b',
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+function hexToBytesLocal(hex: string): Uint8Array {
+  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);
+  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
+  return out;
+}
+
+describe('verifyBitcoin — legacy Bitcoin Signed Message', () => {
+  const pubC = secp256k1.getPublicKey(PRIV, true);
+  const pubU = secp256k1.getPublicKey(PRIV, false);
+
+  it('P2PKH (compressed) verifies, tamper + wrong address fail', () => {
+    const address = p2pkh(pubC);
+    const message = makeMessage(address);
+    const sig = signLegacy(PRIV, message, true);
+    const proof: SignedProof = {
+      chain: 'bitcoin',
+      scheme: 'bip322',
+      address,
+      message,
+      signature: toBase64(sig),
+    };
+    expect(verifyBitcoin(proof)).toBe(true);
+
+    // Tamper the signature (flip a byte in r).
+    const bad = sig.slice();
+    bad[5] = bad[5]! ^ 0xff;
+    expect(verifyBitcoin({ ...proof, signature: toBase64(bad) })).toBe(false);
+
+    // Tamper the message.
+    expect(verifyBitcoin({ ...proof, message: message + ' ' })).toBe(false);
+
+    // Wrong address (different key's P2PKH).
+    const other = secp256k1.getPublicKey(hexToBytesLocal('11'.repeat(32)), true);
+    expect(verifyBitcoin({ ...proof, address: p2pkh(other) })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('P2PKH (uncompressed) verifies and is key-encoding-bound', () => {
+    const address = p2pkh(pubU);
+    const message = makeMessage(address);
+    const sig = signLegacy(PRIV, message, false);
+    expect(
+      verifyBitcoin({ chain: 'bitcoin', scheme: 'bip322', address, message, signature: toBase64(sig) }),
+    ).toBe(true);
+
+    // The compressed-key address must NOT verify against an uncompressed-header sig.
+    const cAddr = p2pkh(pubC);
+    const cMsg = makeMessage(cAddr);
+    const uncompSig = signLegacy(PRIV, cMsg, false);
+    expect(
+      verifyBitcoin({ chain: 'bitcoin', scheme: 'bip322', address: cAddr, message: cMsg, signature: toBase64(uncompSig) }),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('P2WPKH verifies via legacy recoverable sig, rejects uncompressed header', () => {
+    const address = p2wpkh(pubC);
+    const message = makeMessage(address);
+    const sig = signLegacy(PRIV, message, true);
+    expect(
+      verifyBitcoin({ chain: 'bitcoin', scheme: 'bip322', address, message, signature: toBase64(sig) }),
+    ).toBe(true);
+
+    // Uncompressed header can't back a segwit address → reject.
+    const uncompSig = signLegacy(PRIV, message, false);
+    expect(
+      verifyBitcoin({ chain: 'bitcoin', scheme: 'bip322', address, message, signature: toBase64(uncompSig) }),
+    ).toBe(false);
+
+    // A P2WPKH address from a DIFFERENT key must not verify against this sig.
+    const otherP2wpkh = p2wpkh(secp256k1.getPublicKey(hexToBytesLocal('05'.repeat(32)), true));
+    expect(
+      verifyBitcoin({
+        chain: 'bitcoin',
+        scheme: 'bip322',
+        address: otherP2wpkh,
+        message,
+        signature: toBase64(sig),
+      }),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('P2TR (BIP-86) verifies via legacy recoverable sig', () => {
+    const internalXonly = pubC.slice(1);
+    const { address } = p2tr(internalXonly);
+    const message = makeMessage(address);
+    const sig = signLegacy(PRIV, message, true);
+    expect(
+      verifyBitcoin({ chain: 'bitcoin', scheme: 'bip322', address, message, signature: toBase64(sig) }),
+    ).toBe(true);
+
+    // Tamper → false.
+    const bad = sig.slice();
+    bad[40] = bad[40]! ^ 0x01;
+    expect(
+      verifyBitcoin({ chain: 'bitcoin', scheme: 'bip322', address, message, signature: toBase64(bad) }),
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('verifyBitcoin — BIP-322 simple', () => {
+  it('P2WPKH (BIP-143 / ECDSA) verifies, tamper + wrong address fail', () => {
+    const pub = secp256k1.getPublicKey(PRIV, true);
+    const address = p2wpkh(pub);
+    const message = makeMessage(address);
+    const sig = signBip322P2WPKH(PRIV, message);
+    const proof: SignedProof = {
+      chain: 'bitcoin',
+      scheme: 'bip322',
+      address,
+      message,
+      signature: toBase64(sig),
+      extra: { addressType: 'p2wpkh' },
+    };
+    expect(verifyBitcoin(proof)).toBe(true);
+
+    // Tamper the message → sighash changes → false.
+    expect(verifyBitcoin({ ...proof, message: message + 'x' })).toBe(false);
+
+    // Wrong address → witness pubkey no longer hashes to it → false.
+    const other = p2wpkh(secp256k1.getPublicKey(hexToBytesLocal('07'.repeat(32)), true));
+    expect(verifyBitcoin({ ...proof, address: other })).toBe(false);
+
+    // Truncated witness → false.
+    expect(verifyBitcoin({ ...proof, signature: toBase64(sig.slice(0, sig.length - 3)) })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('P2TR key-path (BIP-341 / Schnorr) verifies, tamper fails', () => {
+    const message0 = 'placeholder';
+    const { address } = signBip322P2TR(PRIV, message0); // get the address first
+    const message = makeMessage(address);
+    const { sig } = signBip322P2TR(PRIV, message);
+    const proof: SignedProof = {
+      chain: 'bitcoin',
+      scheme: 'bip322',
+      address,
+      message,
+      signature: toBase64(sig),
+      extra: { addressType: 'p2tr' },
+    };
+    expect(verifyBitcoin(proof)).toBe(true);
+
+    // Tamper the message → false.
+    expect(verifyBitcoin({ ...proof, message: message + 'z' })).toBe(false);
+
+    // Flip a byte in the schnorr sig → false.
+    const bad = sig.slice();
+    bad[bad.length - 1] = bad[bad.length - 1]! ^ 0x01;
+    expect(verifyBitcoin({ ...proof, signature: toBase64(bad) })).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('verifyBitcoin — malformed input fails closed', () => {
+  const address = p2wpkh(secp256k1.getPublicKey(PRIV, true));
+  const message = makeMessage(address);
+  const base: SignedProof = { chain: 'bitcoin', scheme: 'bip322', address, message, signature: '' };
+
+  it('empty signature → false', () => {
+    expect(verifyBitcoin(base)).toBe(false);
+  });
+  it('garbage base64 → false', () => {
+    expect(verifyBitcoin({ ...base, signature: '!!!notbase64!!!' })).toBe(false);
+  });
+  it('unknown address prefix → false', () => {
+    expect(verifyBitcoin({ ...base, address: '3unsupportedP2SHaddress', signature: 'AQID' })).toBe(false);
+  });
+  it('legacy sig with out-of-range header → false', () => {
+    const sig = new Uint8Array(65);
+    sig[0] = 99; // invalid header
+    expect(verifyBitcoin({ ...base, signature: toBase64(sig) })).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

pkgs/connect/src/__tests__/caip122.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { buildSiwxMessage, parseSiwxMessage } from '../caip122.js';
+import { newChallenge } from '../nonce.js';
+
+describe('CAIP-122 message', () => {
+  const now = 1_700_000_000_000; // fixed epoch for determinism
+
+  it('build → parse round-trips all fields', () => {
+    const challenge = newChallenge({
+      domain: 'hanzo.id',
+      uri: 'https://hanzo.id/login',
+      statement: 'Sign in to Hanzo.',
+      nonce: 'abc12345',
+      now,
+      ttlSeconds: 600,
+      requestId: 'req-1',
+      resources: ['https://hanzo.ai/api', 'https://hanzo.chat'],
+    });
+    const msg = buildSiwxMessage({
+      challenge,
+      address: '0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111',
+      chain: 'evm',
+      chainId: 'eip155:1',
+    });
+    const p = parseSiwxMessage(msg);
+    expect(p.domain).toBe('hanzo.id');
+    expect(p.address).toBe('0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111');
+    expect(p.statement).toBe('Sign in to Hanzo.');
+    expect(p.uri).toBe('https://hanzo.id/login');
+    expect(p.version).toBe('1');
+    expect(p.chainId).toBe('eip155:1');
+    expect(p.nonce).toBe('abc12345');
+    expect(p.issuedAt).toBe(new Date(now).toISOString());
+    expect(p.expirationTime).toBe(new Date(now + 600_000).toISOString());
+    expect(p.requestId).toBe('req-1');
+    expect(p.resources).toEqual(['https://hanzo.ai/api', 'https://hanzo.chat']);
+  });
+
+  it('renders the chain label on the header line', () => {
+    const c = newChallenge({ domain: 'hanzo.id', uri: 'https://hanzo.id', nonce: 'nonce123', now });
+    expect(buildSiwxMessage({ challenge: c, address: 'So1aNa', chain: 'solana' })).toContain(
+      'wants you to sign in with your Solana account:',
+    );
+    expect(buildSiwxMessage({ challenge: c, address: 'bc1q', chain: 'bitcoin' })).toContain(
+      'with your Bitcoin account:',
+    );
+    expect(buildSiwxMessage({ challenge: c, address: 'EQxx', chain: 'ton' })).toContain(
+      'with your TON account:',
+    );
+    expect(buildSiwxMessage({ challenge: c, address: 'rXYZ', chain: 'xrp' })).toContain(
+      'with your XRP Ledger account:',
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('omits optional fields when absent', () => {
+    const c = newChallenge({ domain: 'd', uri: 'https://d', nonce: 'nonce123', now });
+    const msg = buildSiwxMessage({ challenge: { ...c, expirationTime: undefined }, address: 'a', chain: 'evm' });
+    expect(msg).not.toContain('Chain ID:');
+    expect(msg).not.toContain('Request ID:');
+    expect(msg).not.toContain('Resources:');
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a multi-line statement', () => {
+    const c = newChallenge({ domain: 'd', uri: 'https://d', nonce: 'nonce123', now, statement: 'a\nb' });
+    expect(() => buildSiwxMessage({ challenge: c, address: 'a', chain: 'evm' })).toThrow();
+  });
+
+  it('throws on malformed message', () => {
+    expect(() => parseSiwxMessage('not a siwx message')).toThrow();
+  });
+});

pkgs/connect/src/__tests__/connectors.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+/**
+ * Connector tests.
+ *
+ * Two things are exercised without a real wallet or browser:
+ *   1. getConnector(chain) returns a connector whose `.chain` matches.
+ *   2. EVM + Solana round-trip: a MOCKED injected provider (backed by a real
+ *      keypair) signs the CAIP-122 message via the connector's signLogin, and
+ *      the resulting SignedProof passes the server-side verifyProof.
+ *
+ * The other connectors (Bitcoin/TON/XRP) drive third-party SDKs whose wallet
+ * handshakes cannot be faithfully mocked headlessly; they are covered by their
+ * verifiers' round-trip tests and need a real wallet to exercise end-to-end.
+ */
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+import { secp256k1 } from '@noble/curves/secp256k1';
+import { ed25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+import bs58 from 'bs58';
+import { getConnector, allConnectors } from '../connectors.js';
+import { EvmConnector } from '../evm/connect.js';
+import { SolanaConnector } from '../solana/connect.js';
+import { verifyProof } from '../verify.js';
+import { newChallenge } from '../nonce.js';
+import { CHAINS, type Chain } from '../types.js';
+import {
+  eip191Digest,
+  addressFromPublicKey,
+  recoverEvmAddress,
+} from '../evm/verify.js';
+import { bytesToHex, utf8ToBytes, hexToBytes } from '../bytes.js';
+
+// ── factory ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('getConnector', () => {
+  it('returns a connector whose chain matches, for every chain', () => {
+    for (const chain of CHAINS) {
+      const c = getConnector(chain);
+      expect(c.chain).toBe(chain);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('binds the right class per chain', () => {
+    expect(getConnector('evm')).toBeInstanceOf(EvmConnector);
+    expect(getConnector('solana')).toBeInstanceOf(SolanaConnector);
+  });
+
+  it('allConnectors() yields one connector per chain, in canonical order', () => {
+    const all = allConnectors();
+    expect(all.map((c) => c.chain)).toEqual(CHAINS as Chain[]);
+  });
+});
+
+// ── shared window shim ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// A bare window without addEventListener/dispatchEvent so the EVM connector's
+// EIP-6963 discovery short-circuits to the legacy window.ethereum path (fast,
+// deterministic — no 300ms announce wait).
+
+const realWindow = (globalThis as Record<string, unknown>).window;
+
+function setWindow(props: Record<string, unknown>): void {
+  (globalThis as Record<string, unknown>).window = props;
+}
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  if (realWindow === undefined) {
+    delete (globalThis as Record<string, unknown>).window;
+  } else {
+    (globalThis as Record<string, unknown>).window = realWindow;
+  }
+});
+
+// ── EVM mock provider (EIP-1193, real secp256k1 key) ─────────────────────────
+
+function makeEvmProvider() {
+  const priv = secp256k1.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+  const pub = secp256k1.getPublicKey(priv, false);
+  const address = addressFromPublicKey(pub); // lowercased 0x…
+
+  const provider = {
+    async request({ method, params }: { method: string; params?: unknown[] }): Promise<unknown> {
+      switch (method) {
+        case 'eth_requestAccounts':
+        case 'eth_accounts':
+          return [address];
+        case 'eth_chainId':
+          return '0x1';
+        case 'personal_sign': {
+          // viem sends [data, account]; data is the 0x-hex of the UTF-8 message.
+          const dataHex = params?.[0] as string;
+          const msgBytes = hexToBytes(dataHex);
+          const message = new TextDecoder().decode(msgBytes);
+          const sig = secp256k1.sign(eip191Digest(message), priv);
+          const full = new Uint8Array(65);
+          full.set(sig.toCompactRawBytes(), 0);
+          full[64] = (sig.recovery ?? 0) + 27;
+          return '0x' + bytesToHex(full);
+        }
+        default:
+          throw new Error(`unexpected method ${method}`);
+      }
+    },
+  };
+  return { provider, address };
+}
+
+describe('EvmConnector round-trip (mocked injected wallet)', () => {
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    const { provider } = makeEvmProvider();
+    setWindow({ ethereum: provider });
+  });
+
+  it('connects, signs the CAIP-122 message, and verifyProof accepts it', async () => {
+    const c = new EvmConnector();
+    const account = await c.connect();
+    expect(account.chain).toBe('evm');
+    expect(account.address).toMatch(/^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/);
+
+    const now = 1_700_000_000_000;
+    const challenge = newChallenge({
+      domain: 'hanzo.id',
+      uri: 'https://hanzo.id/login',
+      nonce: 'evmNonce123',
+      now,
+    });
+    const proof = await c.signLogin(account, challenge);
+
+    expect(proof.scheme).toBe('secp256k1-eip191');
+    expect(proof.chain).toBe('evm');
+    // The signature recovers the connected address (the verifier's core check).
+    expect(recoverEvmAddress(proof.message, proof.signature)?.toLowerCase()).toBe(
+      account.address.toLowerCase(),
+    );
+
+    const res = verifyProof(proof, { domain: 'hanzo.id', nonce: 'evmNonce123', now });
+    expect(res.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.address?.toLowerCase()).toBe(account.address.toLowerCase());
+    expect(res.chain).toBe('evm');
+  });
+
+  it('available() discovers the injected wallet via the legacy path', async () => {
+    const c = new EvmConnector();
+    const wallets = await c.available();
+    expect(wallets.length).toBe(1);
+    expect(wallets[0]?.chain).toBe('evm');
+    expect(wallets[0]?.installed).toBe(true);
+  });
+});
+
+// ── Solana mock provider (real ed25519 key) ──────────────────────────────────
+
+function makeSolanaProvider() {
+  const priv = ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+  const pub = ed25519.getPublicKey(priv);
+  const address = bs58.encode(pub);
+
+  const publicKey = {
+    toBytes: () => pub,
+    toString: () => address,
+  };
+  const provider = {
+    isPhantom: true,
+    publicKey,
+    async connect() {
+      return { publicKey };
+    },
+    async signMessage(message: Uint8Array, _encoding?: string) {
+      return { signature: ed25519.sign(message, priv) };
+    },
+    async disconnect() {},
+  };
+  return { provider, address };
+}
+
+describe('SolanaConnector round-trip (mocked injected wallet)', () => {
+  let expectedAddress: string;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    const { provider, address } = makeSolanaProvider();
+    expectedAddress = address;
+    setWindow({ solana: provider });
+  });
+
+  it('connects, signs the CAIP-122 message, and verifyProof accepts it', async () => {
+    const c = new SolanaConnector();
+    const account = await c.connect();
+    expect(account.chain).toBe('solana');
+    expect(account.address).toBe(expectedAddress);
+
+    const now = 1_700_000_000_000;
+    const challenge = newChallenge({
+      domain: 'hanzo.id',
+      uri: 'https://hanzo.id/login',
+      nonce: 'solNonce4567',
+      now,
+    });
+    const proof = await c.signLogin(account, challenge);
+
+    expect(proof.scheme).toBe('ed25519');
+    expect(proof.chain).toBe('solana');
+    expect(proof.address).toBe(expectedAddress);
+
+    const res = verifyProof(proof, { domain: 'hanzo.id', nonce: 'solNonce4567', now });
+    expect(res.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.address).toBe(expectedAddress);
+    expect(res.chain).toBe('solana');
+  });
+
+  it('handles the bare-Uint8Array signMessage return shape', async () => {
+    // Some wallets return the raw signature bytes instead of {signature}.
+    const priv = ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+    const pub = ed25519.getPublicKey(priv);
+    const address = bs58.encode(pub);
+    const publicKey = { toBytes: () => pub, toString: () => address };
+    setWindow({
+      solana: {
+        isPhantom: true,
+        publicKey,
+        connect: async () => ({ publicKey }),
+        signMessage: async (m: Uint8Array) => ed25519.sign(m, priv),
+      },
+    });
+
+    const c = new SolanaConnector();
+    const account = await c.connect();
+    const now = 1_700_000_000_000;
+    const challenge = newChallenge({
+      domain: 'hanzo.id',
+      uri: 'https://hanzo.id/login',
+      nonce: 'solBareSig99',
+      now,
+    });
+    const proof = await c.signLogin(account, challenge);
+    expect(verifyProof(proof, { domain: 'hanzo.id', nonce: 'solBareSig99', now }).ok).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a proof whose nonce was tampered after signing', async () => {
+    const c = new SolanaConnector();
+    const account = await c.connect();
+    const now = 1_700_000_000_000;
+    const challenge = newChallenge({
+      domain: 'hanzo.id',
+      uri: 'https://hanzo.id/login',
+      nonce: 'solGood0001',
+      now,
+    });
+    const proof = await c.signLogin(account, challenge);
+    // Server expects a different nonce → rejected before crypto.
+    expect(verifyProof(proof, { domain: 'hanzo.id', nonce: 'solOther0002', now }).reason).toBe(
+      'nonce-mismatch',
+    );
+  });
+});
+
+// ── browser-only guard ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+describe('connectors are browser-only', () => {
+  it('EVM connect throws without a window', async () => {
+    delete (globalThis as Record<string, unknown>).window;
+    await expect(new EvmConnector().connect()).rejects.toThrow(/browser-only/);
+  });
+
+  it('Solana connect throws without a window', async () => {
+    delete (globalThis as Record<string, unknown>).window;
+    await expect(new SolanaConnector().connect()).rejects.toThrow(/browser-only/);
+  });
+});

pkgs/connect/src/__tests__/ton.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { ed25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha256';
+import { verifyTon } from '../ton/verify.js';
+import { buildSiwxMessage } from '../caip122.js';
+import { newChallenge } from '../nonce.js';
+import { bytesToHex, bytesToBase64, utf8ToBytes, concatBytes } from '../bytes.js';
+import type { SignedProof } from '../types.js';
+
+// --- Reproduce the TON Connect ton_proof signing algorithm (the wallet side). ---
+// This MUST mirror src/ton/verify.ts byte-for-byte; if they ever drift, the
+// round-trip "accepts a valid proof" test fails — which is the whole point.
+
+interface ProofEnvelope {
+  timestamp: number;
+  domain: string;
+  payload: string;
+  workchain: number;
+  addressHashHex: string;
+}
+
+function tonProofDigest(env: ProofEnvelope): Uint8Array {
+  const addressHash = hexFix(env.addressHashHex);
+
+  const wc = new Uint8Array(4);
+  new DataView(wc.buffer).setInt32(0, env.workchain, false); // big-endian, signed
+
+  const domainBytes = utf8ToBytes(env.domain);
+  const dlen = new Uint8Array(4);
+  new DataView(dlen.buffer).setUint32(0, domainBytes.length, true); // little-endian
+
+  const ts = new Uint8Array(8);
+  new DataView(ts.buffer).setBigUint64(0, BigInt(env.timestamp), true); // little-endian
+
+  const message = concatBytes(
+    utf8ToBytes('ton-proof-item-v2/'),
+    wc,
+    addressHash,
+    dlen,
+    domainBytes,
+    ts,
+    utf8ToBytes(env.payload),
+  );
+
+  const fullMsg = concatBytes(Uint8Array.of(0xff, 0xff), utf8ToBytes('ton-connect'), sha256(message));
+  return sha256(fullMsg);
+}
+
+/** Local hex→bytes (no 0x) so the test does not depend on verifier internals. */
+function hexFix(hex: string): Uint8Array {
+  const h = hex.startsWith('0x') ? hex.slice(2) : hex;
+  const out = new Uint8Array(h.length / 2);
+  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) out[i] = parseInt(h.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
+  return out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Mint a fresh, self-consistent TON proof: random ed25519 key, a CAIP-122
+ * message whose Nonce equals the ton_proof payload, and a real signature over
+ * the reconstructed digest.
+ */
+function mintProof(overrides?: {
+  workchain?: number;
+  domain?: string;
+  now?: number;
+}): { proof: SignedProof; env: ProofEnvelope; priv: Uint8Array; pub: Uint8Array } {
+  const priv = ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+  const pub = ed25519.getPublicKey(priv);
+
+  // A TON address-hash (account state-init hash). For the verifier it is just
+  // 32 opaque bytes; use a deterministic-but-arbitrary value here.
+  const addressHash = sha256(pub); // 32 bytes
+  const addressHashHex = bytesToHex(addressHash);
+
+  const workchain = overrides?.workchain ?? 0;
+  const domain = overrides?.domain ?? 'hanzo.id';
+  const now = overrides?.now ?? 1_700_000_000_000;
+  const timestamp = Math.floor(now / 1000);
+
+  // Server mints the nonce; the connector reuses it as the ton_proof payload.
+  const challenge = newChallenge({ domain, uri: `https://${domain}/login`, now });
+  const payload = challenge.nonce;
+
+  // The on-chain "address" we use for binding: friendly form would be base64url,
+  // but for verifier purposes the address must simply equal the SIWx address
+  // line. Use "<workchain>:<addressHashHex>" (raw TON address form).
+  const address = `${workchain}:${addressHashHex}`;
+
+  const message = buildSiwxMessage({ challenge, address, chain: 'ton' });
+
+  const env: ProofEnvelope = { timestamp, domain, payload, workchain, addressHashHex };
+  const digest = tonProofDigest(env);
+  const signature = bytesToBase64(ed25519.sign(digest, priv));
+
+  const proof: SignedProof = {
+    chain: 'ton',
+    scheme: 'ton-proof',
+    address,
+    publicKey: bytesToHex(pub),
+    message,
+    signature,
+    extra: { ...env },
+  };
+  return { proof, env, priv, pub };
+}
+
+describe('TON ton_proof verify', () => {
+  it('accepts a valid proof (full round-trip)', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintProof();
+    expect(verifyTon(proof)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a valid proof on the masterchain (workchain = -1)', () => {
+    // Exercises signed int32BE encoding: -1 must serialize as 0xFFFFFFFF on
+    // both the signing and verifying sides.
+    const { proof } = mintProof({ workchain: -1 });
+    expect(verifyTon(proof)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a tampered timestamp', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintProof();
+    const bad: SignedProof = {
+      ...proof,
+      extra: { ...(proof.extra as object), timestamp: (proof.extra as any).timestamp + 1 },
+    };
+    expect(verifyTon(bad)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a tampered domain', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintProof();
+    const bad: SignedProof = {
+      ...proof,
+      extra: { ...(proof.extra as object), domain: 'evil.com' },
+    };
+    expect(verifyTon(bad)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a tampered payload (signature no longer matches)', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintProof();
+    // Mutate BOTH the SIWx nonce and the envelope payload so the binding check
+    // passes and we isolate the cryptographic rejection.
+    const tamperedPayload = (proof.extra as any).payload + 'X';
+    const bad: SignedProof = {
+      ...proof,
+      message: proof.message.replace(/Nonce: .*/, `Nonce: ${tamperedPayload}`),
+      address: proof.address,
+      extra: { ...(proof.extra as object), payload: tamperedPayload },
+    };
+    expect(verifyTon(bad)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a wrong public key', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintProof();
+    const otherPub = ed25519.getPublicKey(ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey());
+    const bad: SignedProof = { ...proof, publicKey: bytesToHex(otherPub) };
+    expect(verifyTon(bad)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a nonce/payload mismatch (binding failure, before crypto)', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintProof();
+    // Envelope payload no longer equals the SIWx Nonce → binding rejects it
+    // even though the (still-valid-for-old-payload) signature is untouched.
+    const bad: SignedProof = {
+      ...proof,
+      extra: { ...(proof.extra as object), payload: 'a-different-nonce' },
+    };
+    expect(verifyTon(bad)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects an address that does not match the SIWx message', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintProof();
+    const bad: SignedProof = { ...proof, address: '0:deadbeef' };
+    expect(verifyTon(bad)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a malformed signature (wrong length)', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintProof();
+    const bad: SignedProof = { ...proof, signature: bytesToBase64(new Uint8Array(63)) };
+    expect(verifyTon(bad)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a malformed public key (wrong length)', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintProof();
+    const bad: SignedProof = { ...proof, publicKey: bytesToHex(new Uint8Array(31)) };
+    expect(verifyTon(bad)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a malformed address hash (wrong length)', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintProof();
+    const bad: SignedProof = {
+      ...proof,
+      extra: { ...(proof.extra as object), addressHashHex: 'dead' },
+    };
+    expect(verifyTon(bad)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed on a missing envelope', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintProof();
+    const bad: SignedProof = { ...proof, extra: undefined };
+    expect(verifyTon(bad)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed on a missing public key', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintProof();
+    const bad = { ...proof, publicKey: undefined } as SignedProof;
+    expect(verifyTon(bad)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('does not throw on garbage input', () => {
+    const garbage = {
+      chain: 'ton',
+      scheme: 'ton-proof',
+      address: 'x',
+      publicKey: 'nothex',
+      message: 'not a siwx message',
+      signature: '!!!!',
+      extra: { timestamp: 'soon', domain: 1, payload: null, workchain: 0.5, addressHashHex: 7 },
+    } as unknown as SignedProof;
+    expect(() => verifyTon(garbage)).not.toThrow();
+    expect(verifyTon(garbage)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

pkgs/connect/src/__tests__/verify.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { secp256k1 } from '@noble/curves/secp256k1';
+import { ed25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+import bs58 from 'bs58';
+import { verifyEvm, eip191Digest, addressFromPublicKey } from '../evm/verify.js';
+import { verifySolana } from '../solana/verify.js';
+import { verifyProof } from '../verify.js';
+import { buildSiwxMessage } from '../caip122.js';
+import { newChallenge } from '../nonce.js';
+import { bytesToHex, bytesToBase64, utf8ToBytes } from '../bytes.js';
+import type { SignedProof } from '../types.js';
+
+// --- test signers (produce real signatures the verifier must accept) ---
+
+function evmSign(message: string) {
+  const priv = secp256k1.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+  const pub = secp256k1.getPublicKey(priv, false);
+  const address = addressFromPublicKey(pub);
+  const sig = secp256k1.sign(eip191Digest(message), priv);
+  const full = new Uint8Array(65);
+  full.set(sig.toCompactRawBytes(), 0);
+  full[64] = (sig.recovery ?? 0) + 27;
+  return { address, signature: '0x' + bytesToHex(full) };
+}
+
+function solanaSign(message: string) {
+  const priv = ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+  const pub = ed25519.getPublicKey(priv);
+  const address = bs58.encode(pub);
+  const signature = bytesToBase64(ed25519.sign(utf8ToBytes(message), priv));
+  return { address, signature };
+}
+
+describe('EVM EIP-191 verify', () => {
+  it('accepts a valid signature', () => {
+    const message = 'hello hanzo';
+    const { address, signature } = evmSign(message);
+    expect(verifyEvm(message, signature, address)).toBe(true);
+  });
+  it('is case-insensitive on the address', () => {
+    const message = 'hello';
+    const { address, signature } = evmSign(message);
+    expect(verifyEvm(message, signature, address.toUpperCase().replace('0X', '0x'))).toBe(true);
+  });
+  it('rejects a tampered message', () => {
+    const { address, signature } = evmSign('original');
+    expect(verifyEvm('tampered', signature, address)).toBe(false);
+  });
+  it('rejects a wrong address', () => {
+    const { signature } = evmSign('m');
+    expect(verifyEvm('m', signature, '0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('Solana ed25519 verify', () => {
+  it('accepts a valid signature', () => {
+    const message = 'hello solana';
+    const { address, signature } = solanaSign(message);
+    expect(verifySolana(message, signature, address)).toBe(true);
+  });
+  it('rejects a tampered message', () => {
+    const { address, signature } = solanaSign('original');
+    expect(verifySolana('tampered', signature, address)).toBe(false);
+  });
+  it('rejects a wrong address', () => {
+    const { signature } = solanaSign('m');
+    const other = bs58.encode(ed25519.getPublicKey(ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey()));
+    expect(verifySolana('m', signature, other)).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('verifyProof end-to-end', () => {
+  const now = 1_700_000_000_000;
+  const base = { domain: 'hanzo.id', uri: 'https://hanzo.id/login', nonce: 'abc12345', now };
+
+  it('accepts a fresh EVM proof', () => {
+    const challenge = newChallenge(base);
+    // EVM: derive the address from the key, embed it in the message, then sign.
+    const priv = secp256k1.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+    const address = addressFromPublicKey(secp256k1.getPublicKey(priv, false));
+    const message = buildSiwxMessage({ challenge, address, chain: 'evm' });
+    const sig = secp256k1.sign(eip191Digest(message), priv);
+    const full = new Uint8Array(65);
+    full.set(sig.toCompactRawBytes(), 0);
+    full[64] = (sig.recovery ?? 0) + 27;
+    const proof: SignedProof = {
+      chain: 'evm', scheme: 'secp256k1-eip191', address, message,
+      signature: '0x' + bytesToHex(full),
+    };
+    const res = verifyProof(proof, { domain: 'hanzo.id', nonce: 'abc12345', now });
+    expect(res.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(res.address).toBe(address);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a fresh Solana proof', () => {
+    const challenge = newChallenge(base);
+    // address is the pubkey; sign the message that embeds that address
+    const priv = ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+    const address = bs58.encode(ed25519.getPublicKey(priv));
+    const message = buildSiwxMessage({ challenge, address, chain: 'solana' });
+    const signature = bytesToBase64(ed25519.sign(utf8ToBytes(message), priv));
+    const proof: SignedProof = { chain: 'solana', scheme: 'ed25519', address, message, signature };
+    expect(verifyProof(proof, { domain: 'hanzo.id', nonce: 'abc12345', now }).ok).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects wrong nonce / domain', () => {
+    const challenge = newChallenge(base);
+    const address = bs58.encode(ed25519.getPublicKey(ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey()));
+    const message = buildSiwxMessage({ challenge, address, chain: 'solana' });
+    const proof: SignedProof = { chain: 'solana', scheme: 'ed25519', address, message, signature: 'AAAA' };
+    expect(verifyProof(proof, { domain: 'hanzo.id', nonce: 'WRONG', now }).reason).toBe('nonce-mismatch');
+    expect(verifyProof(proof, { domain: 'evil.com', nonce: 'abc12345', now }).reason).toBe('domain-mismatch');
+  });
+
+  it('rejects an expired proof', () => {
+    const challenge = newChallenge({ ...base, ttlSeconds: 60 });
+    const priv = ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+    const address = bs58.encode(ed25519.getPublicKey(priv));
+    const message = buildSiwxMessage({ challenge, address, chain: 'solana' });
+    const signature = bytesToBase64(ed25519.sign(utf8ToBytes(message), priv));
+    const proof: SignedProof = { chain: 'solana', scheme: 'ed25519', address, message, signature };
+    // now is 1h after issuance, well past 60s ttl + skew
+    const res = verifyProof(proof, { domain: 'hanzo.id', nonce: 'abc12345', now: now + 3_600_000 });
+    expect(res.reason).toBe('expired');
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed on an unknown scheme', () => {
+    const challenge = newChallenge(base);
+    const message = buildSiwxMessage({ challenge, address: 'rXYZ', chain: 'xrp' });
+    const proof = { chain: 'xrp', scheme: 'totally-unknown', address: 'rXYZ', message, signature: '00' } as unknown as SignedProof;
+    expect(verifyProof(proof, { domain: 'hanzo.id', nonce: 'abc12345', now }).reason).toBe('unsupported-scheme');
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed (bad-signature) on a wired-but-unverifiable proof', () => {
+    const challenge = newChallenge(base);
+    const message = buildSiwxMessage({ challenge, address: 'rXYZ', chain: 'xrp' });
+    const proof: SignedProof = { chain: 'xrp', scheme: 'secp256k1-xrpl', address: 'rXYZ', message, signature: '00' };
+    expect(verifyProof(proof, { domain: 'hanzo.id', nonce: 'abc12345', now }).ok).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

pkgs/connect/src/__tests__/xrp.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { secp256k1 } from '@noble/curves/secp256k1';
+import { ed25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha256';
+import { sha512 } from '@noble/hashes/sha512';
+import { ripemd160 } from '@noble/hashes/ripemd160';
+import { verifyXrp } from '../xrp/verify.js';
+import { buildSiwxMessage } from '../caip122.js';
+import { newChallenge } from '../nonce.js';
+import { bytesToHex, concatBytes, utf8ToBytes } from '../bytes.js';
+import type { SignedProof } from '../types.js';
+
+// --- Reproduce the XRPL signing + r-address derivation (the wallet side). ---
+// This is an INDEPENDENT implementation of the same spec the verifier uses; if
+// the two ever drift, the round-trip "accepts a valid proof" test fails. That
+// is the whole point of mirroring rather than importing verifier internals.
+
+const XRPL_ALPHABET = 'rpshnaf39wBUDNEGHJKLM4PQRST7VWXYZ2bcdeCg65jkm8oFqi1tuvAxyz';
+
+/** Independent XRPL base58check (account/version-prefixed payload in). */
+function base58CheckXrpl(payload: Uint8Array): string {
+  const checksum = sha256(sha256(payload)).slice(0, 4);
+  const full = concatBytes(payload, checksum);
+  let acc = 0n;
+  for (const b of full) acc = (acc << 8n) | BigInt(b);
+  let out = '';
+  while (acc > 0n) {
+    out = XRPL_ALPHABET[Number(acc % 58n)] + out;
+    acc /= 58n;
+  }
+  for (let i = 0; i < full.length && full[i] === 0; i++) out = XRPL_ALPHABET[0] + out;
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** r-address from a full 33-byte XRPL public key. */
+function rAddressFromPubkey(pubkey33: Uint8Array): string {
+  const accountId = ripemd160(sha256(pubkey33));
+  return base58CheckXrpl(concatBytes(Uint8Array.of(0x00), accountId));
+}
+
+function sha512Half(d: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  return sha512(d).slice(0, 32);
+}
+
+interface Minted {
+  proof: SignedProof;
+  address: string;
+}
+
+/** Mint a self-consistent ed25519-xrpl proof: key → r-address → SIWx → raw sig. */
+function mintEd25519(now = 1_700_000_000_000): Minted {
+  const seed = ed25519.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+  const raw32 = ed25519.getPublicKey(seed);
+  // XRPL ed25519 public key = 0xED || 32-byte Edwards key.
+  const pubkey33 = concatBytes(Uint8Array.of(0xed), raw32);
+  const address = rAddressFromPubkey(pubkey33);
+
+  const challenge = newChallenge({ domain: 'hanzo.id', uri: 'https://hanzo.id/login', now });
+  const message = buildSiwxMessage({ challenge, address, chain: 'xrp' });
+
+  // ed25519-xrpl signs the raw UTF-8 message bytes.
+  const sig = ed25519.sign(utf8ToBytes(message), seed);
+
+  return {
+    address,
+    proof: {
+      chain: 'xrp',
+      scheme: 'ed25519-xrpl',
+      address,
+      publicKey: bytesToHex(pubkey33),
+      message,
+      signature: bytesToHex(sig),
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+/** Mint a self-consistent secp256k1-xrpl proof: key → r-address → SIWx → DER sig. */
+function mintSecp256k1(now = 1_700_000_000_000): Minted {
+  // Reject keys whose compressed form is not the usual length (defensive).
+  const priv = secp256k1.utils.randomPrivateKey();
+  const pubkey33 = secp256k1.getPublicKey(priv, true); // compressed: 0x02/0x03 || 32
+  const address = rAddressFromPubkey(pubkey33);
+
+  const challenge = newChallenge({ domain: 'hanzo.id', uri: 'https://hanzo.id/login', now });
+  const message = buildSiwxMessage({ challenge, address, chain: 'xrp' });
+
+  // secp256k1-xrpl signs the sha512half of the message, DER-encoded.
+  const digest = sha512Half(utf8ToBytes(message));
+  const sig = secp256k1.sign(digest, priv, { prehash: false, lowS: true });
+  const der = bytesToHex(sig.toBytes('der'));
+
+  return {
+    address,
+    proof: {
+      chain: 'xrp',
+      scheme: 'secp256k1-xrpl',
+      address,
+      publicKey: bytesToHex(pubkey33),
+      message,
+      signature: der,
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+describe('XRPL base58check (known-answer vector)', () => {
+  it('encodes the canonical xrpl.org AccountID example', () => {
+    // From https://xrpl.org/addresses.html (Address Encoding worked example):
+    //   AccountID  = BA8E78626EE42C41B46D46C3048DF3A1C3C87072
+    //   r-address  = rJrRMgiRgrU6hDF4pgu5DXQdWyPbY35ErN
+    const accountId = Uint8Array.from(
+      'BA8E78626EE42C41B46D46C3048DF3A1C3C87072'.match(/../g)!.map((h) => parseInt(h, 16)),
+    );
+    const addr = base58CheckXrpl(concatBytes(Uint8Array.of(0x00), accountId));
+    expect(addr).toBe('rJrRMgiRgrU6hDF4pgu5DXQdWyPbY35ErN');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('verifyXrp — ed25519-xrpl', () => {
+  it('accepts a valid proof (full round-trip)', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintEd25519();
+    expect(verifyXrp(proof)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a tampered message (signature no longer matches)', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintEd25519();
+    const bad: SignedProof = { ...proof, message: proof.message + ' ' };
+    expect(verifyXrp(bad)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a flipped signature bit', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintEd25519();
+    const sig = Uint8Array.from(proof.signature.match(/../g)!.map((h) => parseInt(h, 16)));
+    sig[0] = (sig[0]! ^ 0x01) & 0xff;
+    expect(verifyXrp({ ...proof, signature: bytesToHex(sig) })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a wrong address (binding failure, key/sig still valid)', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintEd25519();
+    const other = mintEd25519();
+    expect(verifyXrp({ ...proof, address: other.address })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a mismatched public key', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintEd25519();
+    const other = mintEd25519();
+    // Valid 0xED-prefixed key but not the signer → sig verify fails.
+    expect(verifyXrp({ ...proof, publicKey: other.proof.publicKey })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a missing 0xED prefix on the public key', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintEd25519();
+    const bytes = Uint8Array.from(proof.publicKey!.match(/../g)!.map((h) => parseInt(h, 16)));
+    bytes[0] = 0xee; // wrong family tag
+    expect(verifyXrp({ ...proof, publicKey: bytesToHex(bytes) })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed on a missing public key', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintEd25519();
+    expect(verifyXrp({ ...proof, publicKey: undefined })).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('verifyXrp — secp256k1-xrpl', () => {
+  it('accepts a valid proof (full round-trip)', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintSecp256k1();
+    expect(verifyXrp(proof)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a tampered message (signature no longer matches)', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintSecp256k1();
+    const bad: SignedProof = { ...proof, message: proof.message + ' ' };
+    expect(verifyXrp(bad)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a corrupted DER signature', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintSecp256k1();
+    const der = Uint8Array.from(proof.signature.match(/../g)!.map((h) => parseInt(h, 16)));
+    const last = der.length - 1;
+    der[last] = (der[last]! ^ 0x01) & 0xff; // mangle last byte of s
+    expect(verifyXrp({ ...proof, signature: bytesToHex(der) })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a wrong address (binding failure, key/sig still valid)', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintSecp256k1();
+    const other = mintSecp256k1();
+    expect(verifyXrp({ ...proof, address: other.address })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a mismatched public key', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintSecp256k1();
+    const other = mintSecp256k1();
+    expect(verifyXrp({ ...proof, publicKey: other.proof.publicKey })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects an ed25519-tagged key under the secp256k1 scheme', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintSecp256k1();
+    const bytes = Uint8Array.from(proof.publicKey!.match(/../g)!.map((h) => parseInt(h, 16)));
+    bytes[0] = 0xed; // not a valid compressed-point tag
+    expect(verifyXrp({ ...proof, publicKey: bytesToHex(bytes) })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('fails closed on a missing public key', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintSecp256k1();
+    expect(verifyXrp({ ...proof, publicKey: undefined })).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('verifyXrp — fail-closed hardening', () => {
+  it('rejects an unknown scheme via this verifier', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintEd25519();
+    expect(verifyXrp({ ...proof, scheme: 'ed25519' as SignedProof['scheme'] })).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('does not throw on garbage input', () => {
+    const garbage = {
+      chain: 'xrp',
+      scheme: 'ed25519-xrpl',
+      address: 'x',
+      publicKey: 'nothex',
+      message: 'not a siwx message',
+      signature: '!!!!',
+    } as unknown as SignedProof;
+    expect(() => verifyXrp(garbage)).not.toThrow();
+    expect(verifyXrp(garbage)).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a wrong-length public key', () => {
+    const { proof } = mintEd25519();
+    expect(verifyXrp({ ...proof, publicKey: bytesToHex(new Uint8Array(31)) })).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

pkgs/connect/src/bitcoin/base58check.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/**
+ * Base58Check (Bitcoin alphabet) — inline, no deps. Encode-only: we build a
+ * P2PKH address from a recovered pubkey-hash and compare it byte-for-byte
+ * against `proof.address`. Checksum = first 4 bytes of sha256d(payload).
+ */
+import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2';
+import { concatBytes } from '../bytes.js';
+
+const ALPHABET = '123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz';
+
+/** Plain base58 (big-endian) encode. */
+function base58encode(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
+  // Count leading zero bytes → leading '1's.
+  let zeros = 0;
+  while (zeros < bytes.length && bytes[zeros] === 0) zeros++;
+
+  // Convert base-256 → base-58 via repeated division on a digit buffer.
+  const digits: number[] = [0];
+  for (let i = zeros; i < bytes.length; i++) {
+    let carry = bytes[i]!;
+    for (let j = 0; j < digits.length; j++) {
+      carry += digits[j]! << 8;
+      digits[j] = carry % 58;
+      carry = (carry / 58) | 0;
+    }
+    while (carry > 0) {
+      digits.push(carry % 58);
+      carry = (carry / 58) | 0;
+    }
+  }
+
+  let out = '';
+  for (let i = 0; i < zeros; i++) out += '1';
+  for (let i = digits.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) out += ALPHABET[digits[i]!];
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** version-byte || payload, append sha256d checksum, base58-encode. */
+export function base58checkEncode(version: number, payload: Uint8Array): string {
+  const data = concatBytes(new Uint8Array([version & 0xff]), payload);
+  const checksum = sha256(sha256(data)).slice(0, 4);
+  return base58encode(concatBytes(data, checksum));
+}

pkgs/connect/src/bitcoin/bech32.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/**
+ * bech32 (BIP-173) and bech32m (BIP-350) segwit address encoding — inline, no
+ * deps. Encode-only: we derive an address from a recovered pubkey and compare
+ * it against the claimed `proof.address` string, so we never need to decode.
+ *
+ * A SegWit v0 address (P2WPKH) uses the bech32 constant; v1+ (P2TR) uses
+ * bech32m. The two differ only in the final XOR constant of the checksum —
+ * the source of the 2017-era "bech32 is malleable for v1" fix.
+ */
+
+const CHARSET = 'qpzry9x8gf2tvdw0s3jn54khce6mua7l';
+
+const BECH32_CONST = 1;
+const BECH32M_CONST = 0x2bc830a3;
+
+function polymod(values: number[]): number {
+  const GEN = [0x3b6a57b2, 0x26508e6d, 0x1ea119fa, 0x3d4233dd, 0x2a1462b3];
+  let chk = 1;
+  for (const v of values) {
+    const top = chk >>> 25;
+    chk = ((chk & 0x1ffffff) << 5) ^ v;
+    for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
+      if ((top >>> i) & 1) chk ^= GEN[i]!;
+    }
+  }
+  return chk >>> 0;
+}
+
+function hrpExpand(hrp: string): number[] {
+  const out: number[] = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < hrp.length; i++) out.push(hrp.charCodeAt(i) >>> 5);
+  out.push(0);
+  for (let i = 0; i < hrp.length; i++) out.push(hrp.charCodeAt(i) & 31);
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** Convert a byte array (8-bit) to 5-bit groups (frombits=8, tobits=5, pad=true). */
+function convert8to5(data: Uint8Array): number[] | null {
+  let acc = 0;
+  let bits = 0;
+  const out: number[] = [];
+  const maxv = 31;
+  for (const value of data) {
+    if (value < 0 || value >> 8 !== 0) return null;
+    acc = ((acc << 8) | value) & 0xffffffff;
+    bits += 8;
+    while (bits >= 5) {
+      bits -= 5;
+      out.push((acc >>> bits) & maxv);
+    }
+  }
+  if (bits > 0) out.push((acc << (5 - bits)) & maxv);
+  return out;
+}
+
+function createChecksum(hrp: string, data5: number[], constant: number): number[] {
+  const values = hrpExpand(hrp).concat(data5);
+  const mod = polymod(values.concat([0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0])) ^ constant;
+  const out: number[] = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < 6; i++) out.push((mod >>> (5 * (5 - i))) & 31);
+  return out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Encode a SegWit address. witver 0 → bech32 (P2WPKH); witver 1 → bech32m
+ * (P2TR). Returns null on any invalid input (fail closed; never throws).
+ */
+export function encodeSegwitAddress(
+  hrp: string,
+  witver: number,
+  program: Uint8Array,
+): string | null {
+  if (witver < 0 || witver > 16) return null;
+  // BIP-141 program length bounds: 2..40 bytes; v0 must be 20 or 32.
+  if (program.length < 2 || program.length > 40) return null;
+  if (witver === 0 && program.length !== 20 && program.length !== 32) return null;
+
+  const data5 = convert8to5(program);
+  if (data5 === null) return null;
+  const payload = [witver, ...data5];
+  const constant = witver === 0 ? BECH32_CONST : BECH32M_CONST;
+  const checksum = createChecksum(hrp, payload, constant);
+  const combined = payload.concat(checksum);
+
+  let out = hrp + '1';
+  for (const d of combined) {
+    if (d < 0 || d > 31) return null;
+    out += CHARSET[d];
+  }
+  return out;
+}

pkgs/connect/src/bitcoin/connect.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+/**
+ * Bitcoin wallet connector — message signing via `sats-connect` (Xverse,
+ * Leather, Unisat, and any wallet implementing the sats-connect provider RPC).
+ *
+ * Connect requests the wallet's addresses and prefers a P2WPKH ('bc1q…')
+ * payment address (the broadest-compatibility key-path login form). Signing
+ * uses `signMessage` with the BIP-322 protocol, which returns a base64
+ * signature — a serialized witness stack for segwit/taproot addresses, or a
+ * recoverable ECDSA sig for legacy. {@link verifyBitcoin} dispatches on that
+ * shape, so the proof here carries the address *type* in `extra.addressType`
+ * and scheme `bip322`.
+ */
+import Wallet, {
+  AddressPurpose,
+  MessageSigningProtocols,
+  type Address,
+} from 'sats-connect';
+import type {
+  Account,
+  LoginChallenge,
+  SignedProof,
+  WalletConnector,
+  WalletInfo,
+} from '../types.js';
+import { buildSiwxMessage } from '../caip122.js';
+
+/** sats-connect addressType → the hint string {@link verifyBitcoin} expects. */
+type BtcAddressTypeHint = 'p2pkh' | 'p2wpkh' | 'p2tr';
+
+function toAddressTypeHint(addressType: string): BtcAddressTypeHint | null {
+  if (addressType === 'p2pkh' || addressType === 'p2wpkh' || addressType === 'p2tr') {
+    return addressType;
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Choose the address to sign with. Order of preference:
+ *   1. P2WPKH payment ('bc1q…')   — widest wallet + verifier support
+ *   2. P2TR payment/ordinals      — taproot key-path
+ *   3. P2PKH                      — legacy
+ * Returns the chosen entry plus its verifier address-type hint.
+ */
+function chooseAddress(addresses: readonly Address[]): { addr: Address; hint: BtcAddressTypeHint } | null {
+  const ranked: BtcAddressTypeHint[] = ['p2wpkh', 'p2tr', 'p2pkh'];
+  for (const want of ranked) {
+    const found = addresses.find((a) => toAddressTypeHint(a.addressType) === want);
+    if (found) return { addr: found, hint: want };
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+export class BitcoinConnector implements WalletConnector {
+  readonly chain = 'bitcoin' as const;
+
+  #address: string | null = null;
+  #addressType: BtcAddressTypeHint | null = null;
+  #walletId = 'sats-connect';
+
+  /**
+   * sats-connect resolves the concrete wallet at request time (it shows its own
+   * provider picker), so discovery here advertises the aggregate provider.
+   */
+  async available(): Promise<WalletInfo[]> {
+    if (typeof window === 'undefined') return [];
+    return [
+      {
+        id: 'sats-connect',
+        name: 'Bitcoin Wallet (Xverse / Leather / Unisat)',
+        chain: this.chain,
+        installed: true,
+      },
+    ];
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Connect and pick a signing address. `walletId` is forwarded to sats-connect
+   * as the provider id when given; otherwise its built-in picker is used.
+   */
+  async connect(walletId?: string): Promise<Account> {
+    if (typeof window === 'undefined') {
+      throw new Error('bitcoin: no window — connectors are browser-only');
+    }
+    if (walletId != null) this.#walletId = walletId;
+
+    const res = await Wallet.request('getAddresses', {
+      purposes: [AddressPurpose.Payment, AddressPurpose.Ordinals],
+      message: 'Connect to sign in',
+    });
+    if (res.status !== 'success') {
+      throw new Error(`bitcoin: getAddresses failed (${res.error?.message ?? 'rejected'})`);
+    }
+
+    const chosen = chooseAddress(res.result.addresses);
+    if (!chosen) throw new Error('bitcoin: wallet returned no usable address');
+
+    this.#address = chosen.addr.address;
+    this.#addressType = chosen.hint;
+
+    return {
+      chain: this.chain,
+      address: chosen.addr.address,
+      publicKey: chosen.addr.publicKey,
+      walletId: this.#walletId,
+    };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Render the CAIP-122 message and have the wallet sign it (BIP-322).
+   * Produces a `bip322` proof carrying `extra.addressType` so the verifier
+   * derives the correct address form.
+   */
+  async signLogin(account: Account, challenge: LoginChallenge): Promise<SignedProof> {
+    if (!this.#address || !this.#addressType) {
+      throw new Error('bitcoin: not connected — call connect() first');
+    }
+    const message = buildSiwxMessage({
+      challenge,
+      address: account.address,
+      chain: this.chain,
+    });
+
+    const res = await Wallet.request('signMessage', {
+      address: account.address,
+      message,
+      protocol: MessageSigningProtocols.BIP322,
+    });
+    if (res.status !== 'success') {
+      throw new Error(`bitcoin: signMessage failed (${res.error?.message ?? 'rejected'})`);
+    }
+
+    return {
+      chain: this.chain,
+      scheme: 'bip322',
+      address: account.address,
+      message,
+      signature: res.result.signature, // base64
+      extra: { addressType: this.#addressType },
+    };
+  }
+
+  async disconnect(): Promise<void> {
+    try {
+      await Wallet.disconnect();
+    } catch {
+      // sats-connect throws if no session; ignore on teardown.
+    } finally {
+      this.#address = null;
+      this.#addressType = null;
+    }
+  }
+}

pkgs/connect/src/bitcoin/verify.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,555 @@
+/**
+ * Bitcoin login-signature verifier.
+ *
+ * Two signing conventions are supported, both verifying a CAIP-122 message
+ * against a BTC address (P2PKH '1…', P2WPKH 'bc1q…', P2TR 'bc1p…'):
+ *
+ *   1. Legacy "Bitcoin Signed Message" — recoverable ECDSA over the
+ *      double-SHA256 of the magic-prefixed message. Primary path; works for
+ *      every address type (the wallet picks the key form via the header byte).
+ *
+ *   2. BIP-322 "simple" — a virtual to_spend/to_sign transaction pair whose
+ *      witness is verified with BIP-143 (P2WPKH, ECDSA) or BIP-341 (P2TR,
+ *      Schnorr) sighash. Used when the signature is a serialized witness stack
+ *      rather than a 65-byte recoverable sig.
+ *
+ * Security posture: fail closed. Every parse/branch returns `false` on the
+ * slightest irregularity and the whole function is wrapped so it never throws.
+ * The recovered/derived address must match the *type* claimed by the proof and
+ * be byte-for-byte equal to `proof.address`.
+ */
+import { secp256k1, schnorr } from '@noble/curves/secp256k1';
+import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha2';
+import { ripemd160 } from '@noble/hashes/legacy';
+import type { SignedProof } from '../types.js';
+import { base64ToBytes, utf8ToBytes, concatBytes } from '../bytes.js';
+import { encodeSegwitAddress } from './bech32.js';
+import { base58checkEncode } from './base58check.js';
+
+// ── address type ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+type BtcAddressType = 'p2pkh' | 'p2wpkh' | 'p2tr';
+
+/** Bitcoin mainnet bech32 human-readable part. */
+const HRP = 'bc';
+
+/** Determine the address type from an explicit hint, else from the prefix. */
+function addressType(proof: SignedProof): BtcAddressType | null {
+  const hint = (proof.extra?.addressType as string | undefined)?.toLowerCase();
+  if (hint === 'p2pkh' || hint === 'p2wpkh' || hint === 'p2tr') return hint;
+
+  const a = proof.address;
+  if (a.startsWith('bc1p')) return 'p2tr';
+  if (a.startsWith('bc1q')) return 'p2wpkh';
+  if (a.startsWith('1')) return 'p2pkh';
+  return null;
+}
+
+// ── hashing helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+const sha256d = (b: Uint8Array): Uint8Array => sha256(sha256(b));
+const hash160 = (b: Uint8Array): Uint8Array => ripemd160(sha256(b));
+
+/** BIP-340 tagged hash: sha256(sha256(tag) || sha256(tag) || msg…). */
+function taggedHash(tag: string, ...messages: Uint8Array[]): Uint8Array {
+  const tagHash = sha256(utf8ToBytes(tag));
+  return sha256(concatBytes(tagHash, tagHash, ...messages));
+}
+
+// ── address derivation (pubkey → address string) ────────────────────────────
+
+function deriveP2PKH(pubkey: Uint8Array): string {
+  // base58check( 0x00 || hash160(pubkey) )
+  return base58checkEncode(0x00, hash160(pubkey));
+}
+
+function deriveP2WPKH(pubkeyCompressed: Uint8Array): string | null {
+  // bech32(hrp='bc', witver=0, program=hash160(compressed pubkey))
+  return encodeSegwitAddress(HRP, 0, hash160(pubkeyCompressed));
+}
+
+/** x-only (32-byte) coordinate of a point given as its affine x bigint. */
+function xonlyFromBigInt(x: bigint): Uint8Array {
+  const out = new Uint8Array(32);
+  let v = x;
+  for (let i = 31; i >= 0; i--) {
+    out[i] = Number(v & 0xffn);
+    v >>= 8n;
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * BIP-86 key-path taproot output for an internal pubkey.
+ *   t = taggedHash('TapTweak', xonly(P))
+ *   Q = lift_x(xonly(P)) + t*G        // internal key is the even-Y lift
+ *   program = xonly(Q)
+ * Returns the 32-byte tweaked x-only program, or null on any failure.
+ */
+function taprootTweak(internalXonly: Uint8Array): Uint8Array | null {
+  try {
+    const Point = secp256k1.Point;
+    const n = secp256k1.CURVE.n;
+    const x = bytesToBigInt(internalXonly);
+    const P = schnorr.utils.lift_x(x); // even-Y point with this x
+    const t = bytesToBigInt(taggedHash('TapTweak', internalXonly)) % n;
+    if (t === 0n) return null;
+    const Q = P.add(Point.BASE.multiply(t));
+    const qx = Q.toAffine().x;
+    return xonlyFromBigInt(qx);
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+function deriveP2TR(internalXonly: Uint8Array): string | null {
+  const program = taprootTweak(internalXonly);
+  if (program === null) return null;
+  return encodeSegwitAddress(HRP, 1, program);
+}
+
+function bytesToBigInt(b: Uint8Array): bigint {
+  let v = 0n;
+  for (const byte of b) v = (v << 8n) | BigInt(byte);
+  return v;
+}
+
+// ── Bitcoin var-int / serialization (CompactSize) ───────────────────────────
+
+function compactSize(n: number): Uint8Array {
+  if (n < 0) throw new Error('negative compactSize');
+  if (n < 0xfd) return new Uint8Array([n]);
+  if (n <= 0xffff) return new Uint8Array([0xfd, n & 0xff, (n >>> 8) & 0xff]);
+  if (n <= 0xffffffff) {
+    return new Uint8Array([0xfe, n & 0xff, (n >>> 8) & 0xff, (n >>> 16) & 0xff, (n >>> 24) & 0xff]);
+  }
+  // 64-bit lengths are never needed for login messages.
+  const out = new Uint8Array(9);
+  out[0] = 0xff;
+  let v = BigInt(n);
+  for (let i = 1; i <= 8; i++) {
+    out[i] = Number(v & 0xffn);
+    v >>= 8n;
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+function u32le(n: number): Uint8Array {
+  return new Uint8Array([n & 0xff, (n >>> 8) & 0xff, (n >>> 16) & 0xff, (n >>> 24) & 0xff]);
+}
+
+function u64le(n: bigint): Uint8Array {
+  const out = new Uint8Array(8);
+  let v = n;
+  for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+    out[i] = Number(v & 0xffn);
+    v >>= 8n;
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** length-prefixed (CompactSize) byte string. */
+function varBytes(b: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  return concatBytes(compactSize(b.length), b);
+}
+
+// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+// 1. LEGACY "Bitcoin Signed Message" (recoverable ECDSA)
+// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+const MSG_MAGIC = utf8ToBytes('\x18Bitcoin Signed Message:\n');
+
+/** digest = sha256d( magic || varint(len) || message ). */
+function legacyMessageDigest(message: string): Uint8Array {
+  const msg = utf8ToBytes(message);
+  return sha256d(concatBytes(MSG_MAGIC, compactSize(msg.length), msg));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify a 65-byte recoverable signature [header || r || s] over the legacy
+ * message digest, deriving the address of `type` and comparing to `address`.
+ */
+function verifyLegacy(
+  sig: Uint8Array,
+  message: string,
+  address: string,
+  type: BtcAddressType,
+): boolean {
+  if (sig.length !== 65) return false;
+  const header = sig[0]!;
+  // 27-30: uncompressed key; 31-34: compressed key. (BIP-137 also defines
+  // 35-42 for segwit, but the recovered key form is what matters here, so we
+  // accept the canonical 27-34 range and infer compression from it.)
+  if (header < 27 || header > 34) return false;
+  const recid = (header - 27) & 3;
+  const compressed = header >= 31;
+
+  const r = sig.slice(1, 33);
+  const s = sig.slice(33, 65);
+  const digest = legacyMessageDigest(message);
+
+  let point;
+  try {
+    point = secp256k1.Signature.fromCompact(concatBytes(r, s))
+      .addRecoveryBit(recid)
+      .recoverPublicKey(digest);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  // For segwit address types the key MUST be compressed — an uncompressed key
+  // cannot back a P2WPKH/P2TR script, so reject rather than silently coercing.
+  if ((type === 'p2wpkh' || type === 'p2tr') && !compressed) return false;
+
+  let derived: string | null;
+  switch (type) {
+    case 'p2pkh': {
+      // P2PKH commits to the exact key encoding chosen by the header byte.
+      const pub = point.toBytes(compressed);
+      derived = deriveP2PKH(pub);
+      break;
+    }
+    case 'p2wpkh': {
+      derived = deriveP2WPKH(point.toBytes(true));
+      break;
+    }
+    case 'p2tr': {
+      // Internal key = x-only of the recovered (compressed) key.
+      const xonly = point.toBytes(true).slice(1);
+      derived = deriveP2TR(xonly);
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  return derived !== null && constTimeStrEq(derived, address);
+}
+
+/** Length-checked, content-comparing string equality (addresses are public). */
+function constTimeStrEq(a: string, b: string): boolean {
+  if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
+  let diff = 0;
+  for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) diff |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i);
+  return diff === 0;
+}
+
+// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+// 2. BIP-322 "simple"
+// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+/** Parse a serialized witness stack: count, then length-prefixed elements. */
+function parseWitness(buf: Uint8Array): Uint8Array[] | null {
+  let off = 0;
+  const readCompact = (): number | null => {
+    if (off >= buf.length) return null;
+    const first = buf[off++]!;
+    if (first < 0xfd) return first;
+    if (first === 0xfd) {
+      if (off + 2 > buf.length) return null;
+      const v = buf[off]! | (buf[off + 1]! << 8);
+      off += 2;
+      return v;
+    }
+    if (first === 0xfe) {
+      if (off + 4 > buf.length) return null;
+      const v = buf[off]! | (buf[off + 1]! << 8) | (buf[off + 2]! << 16) | (buf[off + 3]! * 0x1000000);
+      off += 4;
+      return v;
+    }
+    return null; // 64-bit lengths never appear in witness logins
+  };
+
+  const count = readCompact();
+  if (count === null || count < 1 || count > 4) return null;
+  const items: Uint8Array[] = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+    const len = readCompact();
+    if (len === null || len < 0 || off + len > buf.length) return null;
+    items.push(buf.slice(off, off + len));
+    off += len;
+  }
+  if (off !== buf.length) return null; // no trailing garbage
+  return items;
+}
+
+/** scriptPubKey bytes for each supported address type given its program. */
+function scriptPubKeyP2WPKH(hash160Pub: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  // OP_0 PUSH20 <hash160>
+  return concatBytes(new Uint8Array([0x00, 0x14]), hash160Pub);
+}
+function scriptPubKeyP2TR(programXonly: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  // OP_1 PUSH32 <tweaked xonly>
+  return concatBytes(new Uint8Array([0x51, 0x20]), programXonly);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build the BIP-322 to_spend txid.
+ *   to_spend: nVersion=0, vin=[ {prevout=0..00:0xFFFFFFFF,
+ *     scriptSig=OP_0 PUSH32 <msgHash>, nSequence=0} ],
+ *     vout=[ {value=0, scriptPubKey} ], nLockTime=0
+ * txid = sha256d(serialization without witness).
+ */
+function toSpendTxid(message: string, scriptPubKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  const msgHash = taggedHash('BIP0322-signed-message', utf8ToBytes(message));
+  const scriptSig = concatBytes(new Uint8Array([0x00, 0x20]), msgHash); // OP_0 PUSH32
+
+  const ser = concatBytes(
+    u32le(0), // nVersion = 0
+    compactSize(1), // vin count
+    new Uint8Array(32), // prevout hash = 0
+    u32le(0xffffffff), // prevout index = 0xFFFFFFFF
+    varBytes(scriptSig),
+    u32le(0), // nSequence = 0
+    compactSize(1), // vout count
+    u64le(0n), // value = 0
+    varBytes(scriptPubKey),
+    u32le(0), // nLockTime = 0
+  );
+  return sha256d(ser);
+}
+
+/**
+ * BIP-143 sighash for the single input of the BIP-322 to_sign tx (P2WPKH).
+ * SIGHASH_ALL. scriptCode for P2WPKH = OP_DUP OP_HASH160 PUSH20 <h160>
+ * OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG.
+ */
+function bip143SighashP2WPKH(toSpendTxid: Uint8Array, hash160Pub: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  const outpoint = concatBytes(toSpendTxid, u32le(0)); // to_spend:0
+  const nSequence = u32le(0);
+  const hashPrevouts = sha256d(outpoint);
+  const hashSequence = sha256d(nSequence);
+
+  const scriptCode = concatBytes(
+    new Uint8Array([0x19, 0x76, 0xa9, 0x14]), // len(25) OP_DUP OP_HASH160 PUSH20
+    hash160Pub,
+    new Uint8Array([0x88, 0xac]), // OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG
+  );
+
+  // to_sign single output: value=0, scriptPubKey = OP_RETURN (0x6a).
+  const output = concatBytes(u64le(0n), varBytes(new Uint8Array([0x6a])));
+  const hashOutputs = sha256d(output);
+
+  const preimage = concatBytes(
+    u32le(0), // nVersion = 0
+    hashPrevouts,
+    hashSequence,
+    outpoint,
+    scriptCode,
+    u64le(0n), // amount of the spent output = 0
+    nSequence,
+    hashOutputs,
+    u32le(0), // nLockTime = 0
+    u32le(1), // SIGHASH_ALL
+  );
+  return sha256d(preimage);
+}
+
+/**
+ * BIP-341 (taproot key-path) sighash for the single input of the to_sign tx,
+ * SIGHASH_DEFAULT (0x00). Single P2TR input, single OP_RETURN output.
+ */
+function bip341SighashP2TR(toSpendTxid: Uint8Array, scriptPubKey: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  const outpoint = concatBytes(toSpendTxid, u32le(0));
+  const nSequence = u32le(0);
+
+  const shaPrevouts = sha256(outpoint);
+  const shaAmounts = sha256(u64le(0n)); // single spent amount = 0
+  const shaScriptPubkeys = sha256(varBytes(scriptPubKey));
+  const shaSequences = sha256(nSequence);
+  const output = concatBytes(u64le(0n), varBytes(new Uint8Array([0x6a]))); // value=0, OP_RETURN
+  const shaOutputs = sha256(output);
+
+  const epoch = new Uint8Array([0x00]);
+  const hashType = new Uint8Array([0x00]); // SIGHASH_DEFAULT
+  const spendType = new Uint8Array([0x00]); // no annex, key-path
+  const inputIndex = u32le(0);
+
+  const sigMsg = concatBytes(
+    hashType,
+    u32le(0), // nVersion = 0
+    u32le(0), // nLockTime = 0
+    shaPrevouts,
+    shaAmounts,
+    shaScriptPubkeys,
+    shaSequences,
+    shaOutputs,
+    spendType,
+    inputIndex,
+  );
+  // BIP-341: tagged hash "TapSighash" over (epoch || sigMsg).
+  return taggedHash('TapSighash', concatBytes(epoch, sigMsg));
+}
+
+/** Strip a trailing SIGHASH byte from a DER ECDSA signature, returning (der, sighash). */
+function splitDerSighash(witnessSig: Uint8Array): { der: Uint8Array; sighash: number } | null {
+  if (witnessSig.length < 1) return null;
+  const sighash = witnessSig[witnessSig.length - 1]!;
+  return { der: witnessSig.slice(0, witnessSig.length - 1), sighash };
+}
+
+/** Parse a 64- or 65-byte BIP-340 schnorr sig (optional trailing sighash). */
+function splitSchnorrSighash(witnessSig: Uint8Array): { sig: Uint8Array; sighash: number } | null {
+  if (witnessSig.length === 64) return { sig: witnessSig, sighash: 0x00 };
+  if (witnessSig.length === 65) {
+    const sighash = witnessSig[64]!;
+    return { sig: witnessSig.slice(0, 64), sighash };
+  }
+  return null;
+}
+
+function verifyBip322P2WPKH(
+  witness: Uint8Array[],
+  message: string,
+  address: string,
+): boolean {
+  // Witness stack for P2WPKH is exactly [signature, pubkey].
+  if (witness.length !== 2) return false;
+  const [sigBytes, pubkey] = witness as [Uint8Array, Uint8Array];
+  if (pubkey.length !== 33 || (pubkey[0] !== 0x02 && pubkey[0] !== 0x03)) return false;
+
+  // Address binding: the witness pubkey must hash to the claimed P2WPKH address.
+  const h160 = hash160(pubkey);
+  const derived = deriveP2WPKH(pubkey);
+  if (derived === null || !constTimeStrEq(derived, address)) return false;
+
+  const parsed = splitDerSighash(sigBytes);
+  if (parsed === null) return false;
+  // BIP-322 simple for single-key uses SIGHASH_ALL.
+  if (parsed.sighash !== 0x01) return false;
+
+  const txid = toSpendTxid(message, scriptPubKeyP2WPKH(h160));
+  const sighash = bip143SighashP2WPKH(txid, h160);
+
+  try {
+    const sig = secp256k1.Signature.fromDER(parsed.der);
+    // Reject high-S (BIP-146 / consensus-standardness, anti-malleability).
+    if (sig.hasHighS()) return false;
+    return secp256k1.verify(sig.toCompactRawBytes(), sighash, pubkey, { lowS: true });
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+function verifyBip322P2TR(
+  witness: Uint8Array[],
+  message: string,
+  address: string,
+): boolean {
+  // Key-path spend: witness is exactly [schnorr_sig].
+  if (witness.length !== 1) return false;
+  const parsed = splitSchnorrSighash(witness[0]!);
+  if (parsed === null) return false;
+  if (parsed.sighash !== 0x00) return false; // SIGHASH_DEFAULT only
+
+  // Recover the tweaked output key from the claimed address by re-deriving the
+  // scriptPubKey from… the address itself: we must decode the program. Since we
+  // only have the address string, derive the program by trusting the bech32m
+  // body is the output key. We re-encode and compare, then verify schnorr
+  // against that x-only output key.
+  const program = decodeP2TRProgram(address);
+  if (program === null) return false;
+
+  const txid = toSpendTxid(message, scriptPubKeyP2TR(program));
+  const sighash = bip341SighashP2TR(txid, scriptPubKeyP2TR(program));
+
+  try {
+    return schnorr.verify(parsed.sig, sighash, program);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Decode a bech32m P2TR ('bc1p…') address to its 32-byte witness program.
+ * Minimal decoder used only to recover the output key for schnorr verify; it
+ * re-validates the checksum by re-encoding and comparing (fail closed).
+ */
+function decodeP2TRProgram(address: string): Uint8Array | null {
+  const CHARSET = 'qpzry9x8gf2tvdw0s3jn54khce6mua7l';
+  const lower = address.toLowerCase();
+  if (lower !== address && address.toUpperCase() !== address) return null; // mixed case
+  const pos = lower.lastIndexOf('1');
+  if (pos < 1) return null;
+  const hrp = lower.slice(0, pos);
+  if (hrp !== HRP) return null;
+  const dataPart = lower.slice(pos + 1);
+  if (dataPart.length < 7) return null; // 1 (witver) + program + 6 checksum
+
+  const values: number[] = [];
+  for (const ch of dataPart) {
+    const v = CHARSET.indexOf(ch);
+    if (v === -1) return null;
+    values.push(v);
+  }
+  const witver = values[0]!;
+  if (witver !== 1) return null; // only taproot here
+
+  // Convert 5-bit data (excluding witver and 6-byte checksum) → 8-bit program.
+  const data5 = values.slice(1, values.length - 6);
+  const program = convert5to8(data5);
+  if (program === null || program.length !== 32) return null;
+
+  // Re-encode with bech32m and compare to validate the checksum.
+  const reencoded = encodeSegwitAddress(HRP, 1, program);
+  if (reencoded === null || reencoded !== lower) return null;
+  return program;
+}
+
+/** 5-bit groups → 8-bit bytes (frombits=5, tobits=8, pad=false). */
+function convert5to8(data: number[]): Uint8Array | null {
+  let acc = 0;
+  let bits = 0;
+  const out: number[] = [];
+  for (const value of data) {
+    if (value < 0 || value >> 5 !== 0) return null;
+    acc = ((acc << 5) | value) & 0xffffffff;
+    bits += 5;
+    while (bits >= 8) {
+      bits -= 8;
+      out.push((acc >>> bits) & 0xff);
+    }
+  }
+  // Reject if leftover bits form a non-zero pad (strict, per BIP-173).
+  if (bits >= 5) return null;
+  if ((acc << (8 - bits)) & 0xff) return null;
+  return Uint8Array.from(out);
+}
+
+// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+// dispatch
+// ════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+
+export function verifyBitcoin(proof: SignedProof): boolean {
+  try {
+    const type = addressType(proof);
+    if (type === null) return false;
+
+    let sig: Uint8Array;
+    try {
+      sig = base64ToBytes(proof.signature);
+    } catch {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (sig.length === 0) return false;
+
+    // Shape-based dispatch (exactly one path per shape):
+    //   • 65 bytes with a valid header → legacy recoverable ECDSA.
+    //   • otherwise → BIP-322 simple (serialized witness stack).
+    const header = sig[0]!;
+    const looksLegacy = sig.length === 65 && header >= 27 && header <= 34;
+
+    if (looksLegacy) {
+      return verifyLegacy(sig, proof.message, proof.address, type);
+    }
+
+    // BIP-322 simple — only P2WPKH and P2TR are defined for key-path here.
+    const witness = parseWitness(sig);
+    if (witness === null) return false;
+    if (type === 'p2wpkh') return verifyBip322P2WPKH(witness, proof.message, proof.address);
+    if (type === 'p2tr') return verifyBip322P2TR(witness, proof.message, proof.address);
+    // BIP-322 for P2PKH is not standardized for "simple"; legacy covers it.
+    return false;
+  } catch {
+    // Absolute backstop: never throw out of a verifier.
+    return false;
+  }
+}

pkgs/connect/src/bytes.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+/** Byte helpers shared by every verifier. Cross-runtime (Node + browser). */
+import { hexToBytes as nobleHexToBytes, bytesToHex, utf8ToBytes, concatBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils';
+
+export { bytesToHex, utf8ToBytes, concatBytes };
+
+/** Hex → bytes, tolerant of a leading 0x. */
+export function hexToBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {
+  return nobleHexToBytes(hex.startsWith('0x') || hex.startsWith('0X') ? hex.slice(2) : hex);
+}
+
+/** base64 (standard, with padding) → bytes. */
+export function base64ToBytes(b64: string): Uint8Array {
+  if (typeof atob === 'function') {
+    const bin = atob(b64);
+    const out = new Uint8Array(bin.length);
+    for (let i = 0; i < bin.length; i++) out[i] = bin.charCodeAt(i);
+    return out;
+  }
+  // Node
+  return new Uint8Array(Buffer.from(b64, 'base64'));
+}
+
+export function bytesToBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {
+  if (typeof btoa === 'function') {
+    let bin = '';
+    for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) bin += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]!);
+    return btoa(bin);
+  }
+  return Buffer.from(bytes).toString('base64');
+}
+
+/** Decode a signature that may be hex (0x…) or base64 into raw bytes. */
+export function decodeSignature(sig: string): Uint8Array {
+  const s = sig.trim();
+  if (s.startsWith('0x') || s.startsWith('0X')) return hexToBytes(s);
+  // Heuristic: pure hex (even length, [0-9a-f]) → hex, else base64.
+  if (/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(s) && s.length % 2 === 0) return hexToBytes(s);
+  return base64ToBytes(s);
+}

pkgs/connect/src/caip122.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/**
+ * CAIP-122 "Sign-In-With-X" message — the one canonical login string for every
+ * chain. Generalizes EIP-4361 (SIWE) so a Solana / Bitcoin / TON / XRP wallet
+ * signs the exact same human-readable assertion an Ethereum wallet does.
+ *
+ * Spec: https://github.com/ChainAgnostic/CAIPs/blob/main/CAIPs/caip-122.md
+ * (which itself generalizes https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-4361)
+ *
+ * build ∘ parse round-trips. Both are pure — no I/O, no clock — so the Go port
+ * for IAM can mirror them byte-for-byte.
+ */
+import type { Chain, LoginChallenge } from './types.js';
+
+/** Human chain label used on the first line of the message. */
+const CHAIN_LABEL: Record<Chain, string> = {
+  evm: 'Ethereum',
+  solana: 'Solana',
+  bitcoin: 'Bitcoin',
+  ton: 'TON',
+  xrp: 'XRP Ledger',
+};
+
+export interface ParsedSiwx {
+  domain: string;
+  address: string;
+  statement?: string;
+  uri: string;
+  version?: string;
+  chainId?: string;
+  nonce: string;
+  issuedAt: string;
+  expirationTime?: string;
+  notBefore?: string;
+  requestId?: string;
+  resources?: string[];
+}
+
+export interface BuildParams {
+  challenge: LoginChallenge;
+  address: string;
+  chain: Chain;
+  /** CAIP-2 network id, e.g. 'eip155:1', 'solana:5eykt...'. Optional. */
+  chainId?: string;
+}
+
+/** Render a {@link LoginChallenge} to the canonical CAIP-122 message string. */
+export function buildSiwxMessage(params: BuildParams): string {
+  const { challenge: c, address, chain, chainId } = params;
+  const label = CHAIN_LABEL[chain];
+
+  const lines: string[] = [];
+  lines.push(`${c.domain} wants you to sign in with your ${label} account:`);
+  lines.push(address);
+  lines.push('');
+  // Statement block is optional. When present it sits on its own line between
+  // two blank lines (per EIP-4361 ABNF).
+  if (c.statement != null && c.statement.length > 0) {
+    if (c.statement.includes('\n')) {
+      throw new Error('caip122: statement must be a single line');
+    }
+    lines.push(c.statement);
+    lines.push('');
+  }
+  lines.push(`URI: ${c.uri}`);
+  lines.push(`Version: ${c.version ?? '1'}`);
+  if (chainId != null) {
+    lines.push(`Chain ID: ${chainId}`);
+  }
+  lines.push(`Nonce: ${c.nonce}`);
+  lines.push(`Issued At: ${c.issuedAt}`);
+  if (c.expirationTime != null) {
+    lines.push(`Expiration Time: ${c.expirationTime}`);
+  }
+  if (c.notBefore != null) {
+    lines.push(`Not Before: ${c.notBefore}`);
+  }
+  if (c.requestId != null) {
+    lines.push(`Request ID: ${c.requestId}`);
+  }
+  if (c.resources != null && c.resources.length > 0) {
+    lines.push('Resources:');
+    for (const r of c.resources) {
+      lines.push(`- ${r}`);
+    }
+  }
+  return lines.join('\n');
+}
+
+const HEADER_RE = /^(?<domain>[^\n]+?) wants you to sign in with your .+ account:$/;
+const FIELD_RE = /^(?<key>URI|Version|Chain ID|Nonce|Issued At|Expiration Time|Not Before|Request ID): (?<val>.*)$/;
+
+/** Parse a CAIP-122 message back into its fields. Throws on malformed input. */
+export function parseSiwxMessage(message: string): ParsedSiwx {
+  const raw = message.split('\n');
+  if (raw.length < 2) {
+    throw new Error('caip122: message too short');
+  }
+  const header = HEADER_RE.exec(raw[0] ?? '');
+  if (!header?.groups) {
+    throw new Error('caip122: malformed header line');
+  }
+  const domain = header.groups.domain;
+  const address = (raw[1] ?? '').trim();
+  if (address.length === 0) {
+    throw new Error('caip122: missing address line');
+  }
+
+  // Everything from line 2 onward: an optional statement block, then fields.
+  const out: Partial<ParsedSiwx> = { domain, address };
+  const resources: string[] = [];
+  let inResources = false;
+  let statementParts: string[] = [];
+  let sawField = false;
+
+  for (let i = 2; i < raw.length; i++) {
+    const line = raw[i] ?? '';
+    if (inResources) {
+      if (line.startsWith('- ')) {
+        resources.push(line.slice(2));
+        continue;
+      }
+      inResources = false;
+    }
+    if (line === 'Resources:') {
+      inResources = true;
+      sawField = true;
+      continue;
+    }
+    const f = FIELD_RE.exec(line);
+    if (f?.groups) {
+      sawField = true;
+      const v = f.groups.val;
+      switch (f.groups.key) {
+        case 'URI': out.uri = v; break;
+        case 'Version': out.version = v; break;
+        case 'Chain ID': out.chainId = v; break;
+        case 'Nonce': out.nonce = v; break;
+        case 'Issued At': out.issuedAt = v; break;
+        case 'Expiration Time': out.expirationTime = v; break;
+        case 'Not Before': out.notBefore = v; break;
+        case 'Request ID': out.requestId = v; break;
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+    // Pre-field, non-empty, non-field lines are the statement.
+    if (!sawField && line.length > 0) {
+      statementParts.push(line);
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (statementParts.length > 0) {
+    out.statement = statementParts.join('\n');
+  }
+  if (resources.length > 0) {
+    out.resources = resources;
+  }
+
+  if (out.uri == null || out.nonce == null || out.issuedAt == null) {
+    throw new Error('caip122: missing required field (URI / Nonce / Issued At)');
+  }
+  return out as ParsedSiwx;
+}

pkgs/connect/src/connectors.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/**
+ * Browser wallet connectors — the client side of @luxwallet/connect.
+ *
+ * One factory, one vocabulary: {@link getConnector} returns the
+ * {@link WalletConnector} for a {@link Chain}; every connector produces a
+ * {@link SignedProof} the matching server-side verifier accepts.
+ *
+ * IMPORTANT: this module (and everything it imports) pulls the wallet libraries
+ * (viem, sats-connect, @tonconnect/sdk, @crossmarkio/sdk). The server verify
+ * path (`@luxwallet/connect/verify`) imports NONE of this — keep it that way.
+ */
+import type { Chain, WalletConnector } from './types.js';
+import { EvmConnector } from './evm/connect.js';
+import { SolanaConnector } from './solana/connect.js';
+import { BitcoinConnector } from './bitcoin/connect.js';
+import { TonConnector, type TonConnectorOptions } from './ton/connect.js';
+import { XrpConnector } from './xrp/connect.js';
+
+export { EvmConnector } from './evm/connect.js';
+export { SolanaConnector } from './solana/connect.js';
+export { BitcoinConnector } from './bitcoin/connect.js';
+export { TonConnector, type TonConnectorOptions } from './ton/connect.js';
+export { XrpConnector } from './xrp/connect.js';
+
+/** Per-chain construction options. Only TON needs one (its dApp manifest URL). */
+export interface ConnectorOptions {
+  ton?: TonConnectorOptions;
+}
+
+/** Build the connector for a chain. Pure construction — no I/O, no window touch. */
+export function getConnector(chain: Chain, options: ConnectorOptions = {}): WalletConnector {
+  switch (chain) {
+    case 'evm':
+      return new EvmConnector();
+    case 'solana':
+      return new SolanaConnector();
+    case 'bitcoin':
+      return new BitcoinConnector();
+    case 'ton':
+      return new TonConnector(options.ton);
+    case 'xrp':
+      return new XrpConnector();
+    default: {
+      // Exhaustiveness: a new Chain must be handled here.
+      const _never: never = chain;
+      throw new Error(`no connector for chain '${String(_never)}'`);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/** One connector per supported chain, in canonical order. */
+export function allConnectors(options: ConnectorOptions = {}): WalletConnector[] {
+  return [
+    getConnector('evm', options),
+    getConnector('solana', options),
+    getConnector('bitcoin', options),
+    getConnector('ton', options),
+    getConnector('xrp', options),
+  ];
+}

pkgs/connect/src/evm/connect.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/**
+ * EVM wallet connector — EIP-191 `personal_sign` over the CAIP-122 message.
+ *
+ * Discovery: EIP-6963 multi-injection (`window.dispatchEvent` /
+ * `eip6963:requestProvider`) when wallets announce themselves, with a fallback
+ * to the legacy single `window.ethereum`. Connection uses viem's `custom`
+ * transport over the chosen EIP-1193 provider; signing uses `personal_sign`.
+ *
+ * The produced {@link SignedProof} is exactly what {@link verifyEvm} accepts:
+ * a 65-byte hex signature, address recoverable from it, scheme
+ * `secp256k1-eip191`. viem stays out of the verify core (see ../verify.ts) —
+ * it lives here, on the browser side only.
+ */
+import {
+  createWalletClient,
+  custom,
+  getAddress as toChecksum,
+  type WalletClient,
+  type EIP1193Provider,
+} from 'viem';
+import type {
+  Account,
+  LoginChallenge,
+  SignedProof,
+  WalletConnector,
+  WalletInfo,
+} from '../types.js';
+import { buildSiwxMessage } from '../caip122.js';
+
+/** EIP-6963 provider announcement detail. */
+interface Eip6963ProviderInfo {
+  uuid: string;
+  name: string;
+  icon: string;
+  rdns: string;
+}
+interface Eip6963ProviderDetail {
+  info: Eip6963ProviderInfo;
+  provider: EIP1193Provider;
+}
+
+interface Eip6963AnnounceEvent extends Event {
+  detail: Eip6963ProviderDetail;
+}
+
+/** A discovered injected provider, keyed by a stable id. */
+interface DiscoveredProvider {
+  id: string;
+  name: string;
+  icon?: string;
+  provider: EIP1193Provider;
+}
+
+/** window shape we touch — kept local so the browser libs stay optional. */
+interface EvmWindow {
+  ethereum?: EIP1193Provider & { providers?: EIP1193Provider[] };
+  addEventListener?: typeof addEventListener;
+  removeEventListener?: typeof removeEventListener;
+  dispatchEvent?: typeof dispatchEvent;
+}
+
+function getWindow(): EvmWindow | undefined {
+  return typeof window === 'undefined' ? undefined : (window as unknown as EvmWindow);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Collect EIP-6963 providers. Wallets respond to `eip6963:requestProvider`
+ * synchronously by dispatching `eip6963:announceProvider`; we listen for a
+ * short window and dedupe by rdns.
+ */
+function discoverEip6963(win: EvmWindow, waitMs = 300): Promise<DiscoveredProvider[]> {
+  if (typeof win.addEventListener !== 'function' || typeof win.dispatchEvent !== 'function') {
+    return Promise.resolve([]);
+  }
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    const byRdns = new Map<string, DiscoveredProvider>();
+    const onAnnounce = (ev: Event): void => {
+      const e = ev as Eip6963AnnounceEvent;
+      const d = e.detail;
+      if (d?.info?.rdns && d.provider && !byRdns.has(d.info.rdns)) {
+        byRdns.set(d.info.rdns, {
+          id: d.info.rdns,
+          name: d.info.name,
+          icon: d.info.icon,
+          provider: d.provider,
+        });
+      }
+    };
+    win.addEventListener!('eip6963:announceProvider', onAnnounce as EventListener);
+    win.dispatchEvent!(new Event('eip6963:requestProvider'));
+    setTimeout(() => {
+      win.removeEventListener?.('eip6963:announceProvider', onAnnounce as EventListener);
+      resolve([...byRdns.values()]);
+    }, waitMs);
+  });
+}
+
+/** Legacy fallback: window.ethereum (and any window.ethereum.providers fan-out). */
+function discoverLegacy(win: EvmWindow): DiscoveredProvider[] {
+  const eth = win.ethereum;
+  if (!eth) return [];
+  const list = Array.isArray(eth.providers) && eth.providers.length > 0 ? eth.providers : [eth];
+  return list.map((provider, i) => ({
+    id: i === 0 ? 'injected' : `injected-${i}`,
+    name: 'Injected Wallet',
+    provider,
+  }));
+}
+
+export class EvmConnector implements WalletConnector {
+  readonly chain = 'evm' as const;
+
+  #provider: EIP1193Provider | null = null;
+  #client: WalletClient | null = null;
+
+  /** Discover injected EVM wallets via EIP-6963, falling back to window.ethereum. */
+  async available(): Promise<WalletInfo[]> {
+    const win = getWindow();
+    if (!win) return [];
+    const discovered = await this.#discover(win);
+    return discovered.map((d) => ({
+      id: d.id,
+      name: d.name,
+      chain: this.chain,
+      icon: d.icon,
+      installed: true,
+    }));
+  }
+
+  async #discover(win: EvmWindow): Promise<DiscoveredProvider[]> {
+    const announced = await discoverEip6963(win);
+    if (announced.length > 0) return announced;
+    return discoverLegacy(win);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Connect to an injected wallet. `walletId` selects an EIP-6963 provider by
+   * its rdns (or the legacy `injected[-n]` id); omit it to use the first.
+   */
+  async connect(walletId?: string): Promise<Account> {
+    const win = getWindow();
+    if (!win) throw new Error('evm: no window — connectors are browser-only');
+
+    const discovered = await this.#discover(win);
+    if (discovered.length === 0) {
+      throw new Error('evm: no injected EVM wallet found');
+    }
+    const chosen = walletId != null ? discovered.find((d) => d.id === walletId) : discovered[0];
+    if (!chosen) {
+      throw new Error(`evm: wallet '${walletId}' not found`);
+    }
+
+    const provider = chosen.provider;
+    const accounts = (await provider.request({ method: 'eth_requestAccounts' })) as string[];
+    if (!Array.isArray(accounts) || accounts.length === 0) {
+      throw new Error('evm: wallet returned no accounts');
+    }
+    const address = toChecksum(accounts[0]!);
+
+    let caip2: string | undefined;
+    try {
+      const chainIdHex = (await provider.request({ method: 'eth_chainId' })) as string;
+      const chainId = Number.parseInt(chainIdHex, 16);
+      if (Number.isFinite(chainId)) caip2 = `eip155:${chainId}`;
+    } catch {
+      // chainId is best-effort; signing does not require it.
+    }
+
+    this.#provider = provider;
+    this.#client = createWalletClient({ account: address, transport: custom(provider) });
+
+    return { chain: this.chain, address, walletId: chosen.id, caip2 };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Render the CAIP-122 message and have the wallet `personal_sign` it.
+   * Produces a `secp256k1-eip191` proof: 65-byte hex signature over the EIP-191
+   * digest, with the signer recoverable from the signature.
+   */
+  async signLogin(account: Account, challenge: LoginChallenge): Promise<SignedProof> {
+    if (!this.#client || !this.#provider) {
+      throw new Error('evm: not connected — call connect() first');
+    }
+    const chainId = account.caip2 ?? undefined;
+    const message = buildSiwxMessage({
+      challenge,
+      address: account.address,
+      chain: this.chain,
+      chainId,
+    });
+
+    // personal_sign returns a 0x-prefixed 65-byte signature (r‖s‖v).
+    const signature = await this.#client.signMessage({
+      account: account.address as `0x${string}`,
+      message,
+    });
+
+    return {
+      chain: this.chain,
+      scheme: 'secp256k1-eip191',
+      address: account.address,
+      message,
+      signature,
+    };
+  }
+
+  async disconnect(): Promise<void> {
+    this.#provider = null;
+    this.#client = null;
+  }
+}

pkgs/connect/src/evm/verify.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/**
+ * EVM verifier — EIP-191 `personal_sign` over the CAIP-122 message.
+ *
+ * Recovers the secp256k1 public key from the signature, derives the Ethereum
+ * address (keccak256 of the uncompressed pubkey, last 20 bytes), and compares
+ * it case-insensitively to the claimed address. No viem dependency — pure
+ * @noble so this mirrors 1:1 in the Go port.
+ */
+import { secp256k1 } from '@noble/curves/secp256k1';
+import { keccak_256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha3';
+import { utf8ToBytes, concatBytes, hexToBytes, bytesToHex } from '../bytes.js';
+
+/** keccak256(\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n<len><msg>). */
+export function eip191Digest(message: string): Uint8Array {
+  const msg = utf8ToBytes(message);
+  const prefix = utf8ToBytes(`\x19Ethereum Signed Message:\n${msg.length}`);
+  return keccak_256(concatBytes(prefix, msg));
+}
+
+/** Lowercased 0x-address derived from an uncompressed (65-byte) public key. */
+export function addressFromPublicKey(pubUncompressed: Uint8Array): string {
+  // Drop the 0x04 prefix → 64 bytes, hash, take last 20.
+  const body = pubUncompressed.length === 65 ? pubUncompressed.slice(1) : pubUncompressed;
+  const hash = keccak_256(body);
+  return '0x' + bytesToHex(hash.slice(-20));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify an EIP-191 signature. Returns the recovered lowercased address, or
+ * null if the signature is malformed / unrecoverable.
+ */
+export function recoverEvmAddress(message: string, signature: string): string | null {
+  try {
+    const sig = hexToBytes(signature);
+    if (sig.length !== 65) return null;
+    const compact = sig.slice(0, 64);
+    let v = sig[64]!;
+    // Accept 27/28 (Ethereum) and raw 0/1 recovery ids.
+    if (v >= 27) v -= 27;
+    if (v !== 0 && v !== 1) return null;
+    const digest = eip191Digest(message);
+    const recovered = secp256k1.Signature.fromCompact(compact)
+      .addRecoveryBit(v)
+      .recoverPublicKey(digest);
+    return addressFromPublicKey(recovered.toRawBytes(false));
+  } catch {
+    return null;
+  }
+}
+
+/** True iff `signature` over `message` was produced by `address`. */
+export function verifyEvm(message: string, signature: string, address: string): boolean {
+  const recovered = recoverEvmAddress(message, signature);
+  if (recovered == null) return false;
+  return recovered.toLowerCase() === address.trim().toLowerCase();
+}

pkgs/connect/src/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/**
+ * @luxwallet/connect — multi-chain wallet connect + Sign-In-With-X.
+ *
+ * Public surface. One vocabulary ({@link Chain}, {@link SignedProof}), one
+ * canonical login message (CAIP-122), one verifier ({@link verifyProof}).
+ *
+ * MIT licensed, zero GPL — clean of the Uniswap-derived bones that stay
+ * quarantined in luxfi/exchange.
+ */
+export type {
+  Chain,
+  SignatureScheme,
+  Account,
+  LoginChallenge,
+  SignedProof,
+  VerifyExpectation,
+  VerifyResult,
+  WalletConnector,
+  WalletInfo,
+} from './types.js';
+export { CHAINS } from './types.js';
+
+export { buildSiwxMessage, parseSiwxMessage } from './caip122.js';
+export type { ParsedSiwx, BuildParams } from './caip122.js';
+
+export { generateNonce, newChallenge } from './nonce.js';
+
+export { verifyProof } from './verify.js';
+
+// Per-chain primitives (useful standalone; the connectors build on them).
+export { verifyEvm, recoverEvmAddress, eip191Digest } from './evm/verify.js';
+export { verifySolana } from './solana/verify.js';
+export { verifyTon } from './ton/verify.js';
+export { verifyBitcoin } from './bitcoin/verify.js';
+export { verifyXrp } from './xrp/verify.js';
+
+// Browser wallet connectors + the high-level login flow. These import the
+// wallet libraries (viem, sats-connect, @tonconnect/sdk, @crossmarkio/sdk);
+// the server verify path above pulls NONE of them.
+export {
+  getConnector,
+  allConnectors,
+  EvmConnector,
+  SolanaConnector,
+  BitcoinConnector,
+  TonConnector,
+  XrpConnector,
+} from './connectors.js';
+export type { ConnectorOptions, TonConnectorOptions } from './connectors.js';
+export { loginWithWallet } from './login.js';
+export type { LoginWithWalletParams, LoginResult } from './login.js';

pkgs/connect/src/login.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+/**
+ * loginWithWallet — the one client-side login flow.
+ *
+ * Ties a connector's connect → signLogin into a single call: pick the chain,
+ * connect the wallet, sign the server-issued {@link LoginChallenge}, and return
+ * the {@link SignedProof}. The caller (or its server) mints the challenge and
+ * later verifies the proof with {@link import('./verify.js').verifyProof}.
+ *
+ *   server: newChallenge() ─► client: loginWithWallet({chain, challenge})
+ *           ─► SignedProof ─► server: verifyProof(proof, {domain, nonce})
+ *
+ * This module imports connectors, so it carries the wallet libs. Keep it out of
+ * the server verify path.
+ */
+import type { Account, Chain, LoginChallenge, SignedProof } from './types.js';
+import { getConnector, type ConnectorOptions } from './connectors.js';
+
+export interface LoginWithWalletParams {
+  /** Which chain's wallet to authenticate. */
+  chain: Chain;
+  /** Server-minted challenge to sign (domain, nonce, uri, times). */
+  challenge: LoginChallenge;
+  /** Specific wallet id to target (else the connector's default). */
+  walletId?: string;
+  /** Per-chain connector options (e.g. TON manifest URL). */
+  options?: ConnectorOptions;
+}
+
+export interface LoginResult {
+  account: Account;
+  proof: SignedProof;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Connect a wallet on `chain` and sign `challenge`, returning the connected
+ * account and the {@link SignedProof}. Throws if no wallet is available or the
+ * user rejects; the connector is disconnected on failure to avoid a dangling
+ * session.
+ */
+export async function loginWithWallet(params: LoginWithWalletParams): Promise<LoginResult> {
+  const connector = getConnector(params.chain, params.options);
+  try {
+    const account = await connector.connect(params.walletId);
+    const proof = await connector.signLogin(account, params.challenge);
+    return { account, proof };
+  } catch (err) {
+    await connector.disconnect().catch(() => {});
+    throw err;
+  }
+}

pkgs/connect/src/nonce.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/**
+ * Single-use login nonces. The server mints one per challenge, stores it, and
+ * burns it on verify so a captured proof cannot be replayed.
+ */
+const ALPHABET = 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789';
+
+/** Cryptographically-random alphanumeric nonce (default 16 chars, ~95 bits). */
+export function generateNonce(length = 16): string {
+  if (length < 8) {
+    throw new Error('nonce: length must be >= 8 (CAIP-122 minimum)');
+  }
+  const bytes = new Uint8Array(length);
+  globalThis.crypto.getRandomValues(bytes);
+  let out = '';
+  for (let i = 0; i < length; i++) {
+    out += ALPHABET[bytes[i]! % ALPHABET.length];
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** Build a {@link import('./types.js').LoginChallenge} with sane defaults. */
+export function newChallenge(opts: {
+  domain: string;
+  uri: string;
+  statement?: string;
+  nonce?: string;
+  /** TTL in seconds for the expirationTime field. Default 600 (10 min). */
+  ttlSeconds?: number;
+  /** Epoch ms for "now"; injectable for tests. */
+  now?: number;
+  requestId?: string;
+  resources?: string[];
+}) {
+  const nowMs = opts.now ?? Date.now();
+  const issuedAt = new Date(nowMs).toISOString();
+  const ttl = opts.ttlSeconds ?? 600;
+  const expirationTime = new Date(nowMs + ttl * 1000).toISOString();
+  return {
+    domain: opts.domain,
+    uri: opts.uri,
+    statement: opts.statement,
+    nonce: opts.nonce ?? generateNonce(),
+    issuedAt,
+    expirationTime,
+    version: '1',
+    requestId: opts.requestId,
+    resources: opts.resources,
+  };
+}

pkgs/connect/src/solana/connect.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/**
+ * Solana wallet connector — ed25519 `signMessage` over the CAIP-122 message.
+ *
+ * Uses the injected provider directly (Phantom `window.solana`, Solflare
+ * `window.solflare`) — no adapter library needed; the Wallet Standard surface
+ * these expose is a thin `connect()` / `signMessage()` pair. The account
+ * address IS the base58 ed25519 public key, which is exactly what
+ * {@link verifySolana} needs (it decodes the address as the verifying key).
+ *
+ * Produced {@link SignedProof}: scheme `ed25519`, base64 signature over the
+ * raw UTF-8 message bytes, address = base58 public key.
+ */
+import bs58 from 'bs58';
+import type {
+  Account,
+  LoginChallenge,
+  SignedProof,
+  WalletConnector,
+  WalletInfo,
+} from '../types.js';
+import { buildSiwxMessage } from '../caip122.js';
+import { utf8ToBytes, bytesToBase64 } from '../bytes.js';
+
+/** Minimal shape of an injected Solana provider (Phantom / Solflare / Backpack). */
+interface SolanaProvider {
+  isPhantom?: boolean;
+  isSolflare?: boolean;
+  isBackpack?: boolean;
+  publicKey?: { toBytes(): Uint8Array; toString(): string } | null;
+  connect(opts?: { onlyIfTrusted?: boolean }): Promise<{ publicKey: { toBytes(): Uint8Array; toString(): string } }>;
+  disconnect?(): Promise<void>;
+  signMessage(message: Uint8Array, encoding?: 'utf8' | 'hex'): Promise<{ signature: Uint8Array } | Uint8Array>;
+}
+
+interface SolanaWindow {
+  solana?: SolanaProvider;
+  solflare?: SolanaProvider;
+  backpack?: SolanaProvider;
+}
+
+function getWindow(): SolanaWindow | undefined {
+  return typeof window === 'undefined' ? undefined : (window as unknown as SolanaWindow);
+}
+
+interface ProviderEntry {
+  id: string;
+  name: string;
+  provider: SolanaProvider;
+}
+
+/** Enumerate the injected providers we know how to drive. */
+function discover(win: SolanaWindow): ProviderEntry[] {
+  const out: ProviderEntry[] = [];
+  if (win.solana) {
+    out.push({ id: win.solana.isPhantom ? 'phantom' : 'solana', name: win.solana.isPhantom ? 'Phantom' : 'Solana', provider: win.solana });
+  }
+  if (win.solflare && win.solflare !== win.solana) {
+    out.push({ id: 'solflare', name: 'Solflare', provider: win.solflare });
+  }
+  if (win.backpack && win.backpack !== win.solana) {
+    out.push({ id: 'backpack', name: 'Backpack', provider: win.backpack });
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+/** Normalize the two shapes signMessage can return into raw signature bytes. */
+function extractSignature(res: { signature: Uint8Array } | Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  if (res instanceof Uint8Array) return res;
+  if (res && res.signature instanceof Uint8Array) return res.signature;
+  throw new Error('solana: wallet returned an unrecognized signMessage result');
+}
+
+export class SolanaConnector implements WalletConnector {
+  readonly chain = 'solana' as const;
+
+  #provider: SolanaProvider | null = null;
+
+  async available(): Promise<WalletInfo[]> {
+    const win = getWindow();
+    if (!win) return [];
+    return discover(win).map((e) => ({
+      id: e.id,
+      name: e.name,
+      chain: this.chain,
+      installed: true,
+    }));
+  }
+
+  /** Connect to an injected wallet (Phantom by default) and return the account. */
+  async connect(walletId?: string): Promise<Account> {
+    const win = getWindow();
+    if (!win) throw new Error('solana: no window — connectors are browser-only');
+
+    const entries = discover(win);
+    if (entries.length === 0) throw new Error('solana: no injected Solana wallet found');
+
+    const chosen = walletId != null ? entries.find((e) => e.id === walletId) : entries[0];
+    if (!chosen) throw new Error(`solana: wallet '${walletId}' not found`);
+
+    const { publicKey } = await chosen.provider.connect();
+    const address = bs58.encode(publicKey.toBytes());
+
+    this.#provider = chosen.provider;
+    // For Solana the address IS the base58 ed25519 public key — one value.
+    return { chain: this.chain, address, publicKey: address, walletId: chosen.id };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Render the CAIP-122 message and have the wallet sign its UTF-8 bytes.
+   * Produces an `ed25519` proof whose signature {@link verifySolana} checks
+   * against the base58 address (the public key).
+   */
+  async signLogin(account: Account, challenge: LoginChallenge): Promise<SignedProof> {
+    if (!this.#provider) throw new Error('solana: not connected — call connect() first');
+
+    const message = buildSiwxMessage({
+      challenge,
+      address: account.address,
+      chain: this.chain,
+    });
+    const res = await this.#provider.signMessage(utf8ToBytes(message), 'utf8');
+    const signature = bytesToBase64(extractSignature(res));
+
+    return {
+      chain: this.chain,
+      scheme: 'ed25519',
+      address: account.address,
+      message,
+      signature,
+    };
+  }
+
+  async disconnect(): Promise<void> {
+    try {
+      await this.#provider?.disconnect?.();
+    } finally {
+      this.#provider = null;
+    }
+  }
+}

pkgs/connect/src/solana/verify.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/**
+ * Solana verifier — ed25519 over the raw UTF-8 CAIP-122 message
+ * (the bytes a wallet's `signMessage` returns). The account address IS the
+ * base58-encoded ed25519 public key, so the key needed to verify is the
+ * address itself.
+ */
+import { ed25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+import bs58 from 'bs58';
+import { utf8ToBytes, decodeSignature } from '../bytes.js';
+
+/** True iff `signature` over `message` was produced by the key behind `address`. */
+export function verifySolana(message: string, signature: string, address: string): boolean {
+  try {
+    const pub = bs58.decode(address.trim());
+    if (pub.length !== 32) return false;
+    const sig = decodeSignature(signature);
+    if (sig.length !== 64) return false;
+    return ed25519.verify(sig, utf8ToBytes(message), pub);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}

pkgs/connect/src/ton/connect.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+/**
+ * TON wallet connector — TON Connect `ton_proof` (ed25519).
+ *
+ * TON differs from text-signing chains: the wallet does not sign the CAIP-122
+ * string. It signs a structured `ton_proof` envelope whose `payload` we pin to
+ * the server nonce, and returns the ed25519 signature plus the domain /
+ * timestamp it bound in. {@link verifyTon} reconstructs that envelope and
+ * checks the signature, then binds it back to the CAIP-122 message
+ * (nonce === payload, address === signer).
+ *
+ * Because TON Connect binds the proof payload at connect time, `signLogin`
+ * re-runs the connect handshake with `tonProof: challenge.nonce` and waits for
+ * the wallet's `ton_proof` reply. The produced {@link SignedProof} carries:
+ *   - scheme `ton-proof`
+ *   - publicKey: ed25519 key, hex
+ *   - signature: base64
+ *   - extra: { timestamp, domain, payload, workchain, addressHashHex }
+ */
+import TonConnect, {
+  isWalletInfoCurrentlyInjected,
+  type Wallet,
+  type WalletInfo as TonWalletInfo,
+  type TonProofItemReply,
+} from '@tonconnect/sdk';
+import type {
+  Account,
+  LoginChallenge,
+  SignedProof,
+  WalletConnector,
+  WalletInfo,
+} from '../types.js';
+import { buildSiwxMessage } from '../caip122.js';
+
+/** Default manifest URL used when the host page does not supply one. */
+const DEFAULT_MANIFEST = 'https://hanzo.id/tonconnect-manifest.json';
+
+export interface TonConnectorOptions {
+  /** TON Connect dApp manifest URL (defaults to hanzo.id's). */
+  manifestUrl?: string;
+}
+
+/** A successful ton_proof reply (the only variant we accept). */
+function readProof(reply: TonProofItemReply | undefined): {
+  timestamp: number;
+  domain: string;
+  payload: string;
+  signature: string;
+} | null {
+  if (!reply || reply.name !== 'ton_proof' || !('proof' in reply)) return null;
+  const p = reply.proof;
+  return { timestamp: p.timestamp, domain: p.domain.value, payload: p.payload, signature: p.signature };
+}
+
+/** Split a raw TON address `"<workchain>:<hex>"` into its parts. */
+function parseRawAddress(address: string): { workchain: number; addressHashHex: string } | null {
+  const i = address.indexOf(':');
+  if (i < 0) return null;
+  const workchain = Number.parseInt(address.slice(0, i), 10);
+  const addressHashHex = address.slice(i + 1);
+  if (!Number.isInteger(workchain)) return null;
+  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(addressHashHex)) return null;
+  return { workchain, addressHashHex };
+}
+
+export class TonConnector implements WalletConnector {
+  readonly chain = 'ton' as const;
+
+  readonly #manifestUrl: string;
+  #connector: TonConnect | null = null;
+
+  constructor(options: TonConnectorOptions = {}) {
+    // Pure construction: TonConnect's constructor touches localStorage, so it is
+    // created lazily on first use (in a browser) rather than here.
+    this.#manifestUrl = options.manifestUrl ?? DEFAULT_MANIFEST;
+  }
+
+  /** Lazily build the underlying TonConnect (requires a browser w/ localStorage). */
+  #sdk(): TonConnect {
+    if (typeof window === 'undefined') {
+      throw new Error('ton: no window — connectors are browser-only');
+    }
+    if (!this.#connector) {
+      this.#connector = new TonConnect({ manifestUrl: this.#manifestUrl });
+    }
+    return this.#connector;
+  }
+
+  /** List injected TON wallets (Tonkeeper, MyTonWallet, …) detected on the page. */
+  async available(): Promise<WalletInfo[]> {
+    if (typeof window === 'undefined') return [];
+    const wallets = await this.#sdk().getWallets();
+    return wallets.filter(isWalletInfoCurrentlyInjected).map((w: TonWalletInfo) => ({
+      id: (w as { jsBridgeKey: string }).jsBridgeKey,
+      name: w.name,
+      chain: this.chain,
+      icon: w.imageUrl,
+      installed: true,
+    }));
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Establish a session (no proof yet) and return the account. `walletId` is the
+   * wallet's `jsBridgeKey`; omit it to use the first injected wallet.
+   */
+  async connect(walletId?: string): Promise<Account> {
+    const wallet = await this.#handshake(walletId);
+    return this.#toAccount(wallet, walletId);
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Re-run the handshake with `tonProof: nonce`, wait for the wallet's signed
+   * envelope, and assemble the {@link SignedProof} {@link verifyTon} accepts.
+   */
+  async signLogin(account: Account, challenge: LoginChallenge): Promise<SignedProof> {
+    const parsed = parseRawAddress(account.address);
+    if (!parsed) throw new Error(`ton: address '${account.address}' is not raw '<wc>:<hex>' form`);
+
+    // Bind the ton_proof payload to the server nonce.
+    const wallet = await this.#handshake(account.walletId, challenge.nonce);
+
+    const publicKey = wallet.account.publicKey;
+    if (!publicKey) throw new Error('ton: wallet did not return a public key');
+
+    const proof = readProof(wallet.connectItems?.tonProof);
+    if (!proof) throw new Error('ton: wallet did not return a ton_proof');
+    if (proof.payload !== challenge.nonce) {
+      throw new Error('ton: wallet signed a different payload than the requested nonce');
+    }
+
+    // CAIP-122 message: address line is the raw TON address; its Nonce equals
+    // the ton_proof payload (the verifier enforces both bindings).
+    const message = buildSiwxMessage({
+      challenge,
+      address: account.address,
+      chain: this.chain,
+    });
+
+    return {
+      chain: this.chain,
+      scheme: 'ton-proof',
+      address: account.address,
+      publicKey,
+      message,
+      signature: proof.signature,
+      extra: {
+        timestamp: proof.timestamp,
+        domain: proof.domain,
+        payload: proof.payload,
+        workchain: parsed.workchain,
+        addressHashHex: parsed.addressHashHex,
+      },
+    };
+  }
+
+  async disconnect(): Promise<void> {
+    // Only act if the SDK was ever created (avoids touching localStorage in SSR).
+    if (this.#connector?.connected) await this.#connector.disconnect();
+  }
+
+  /** Resolve the chosen injected wallet's jsBridgeKey. */
+  async #resolveBridgeKey(walletId?: string): Promise<string> {
+    if (walletId != null) return walletId;
+    const wallets = (await this.#sdk().getWallets()).filter(isWalletInfoCurrentlyInjected);
+    const first = wallets[0] as { jsBridgeKey?: string } | undefined;
+    if (!first?.jsBridgeKey) throw new Error('ton: no injected TON wallet found');
+    return first.jsBridgeKey;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Drive one connect handshake and resolve with the resulting Wallet. When
+   * `proofPayload` is given, the wallet returns a ton_proof bound to it.
+   */
+  async #handshake(walletId?: string, proofPayload?: string): Promise<Wallet> {
+    const sdk = this.#sdk(); // throws outside a browser
+    const jsBridgeKey = await this.#resolveBridgeKey(walletId);
+
+    return new Promise<Wallet>((resolve, reject) => {
+      let unsubscribe: (() => void) | undefined;
+      const done = (fn: () => void): void => {
+        unsubscribe?.();
+        fn();
+      };
+      unsubscribe = sdk.onStatusChange(
+        (wallet) => {
+          if (wallet) done(() => resolve(wallet));
+        },
+        (err) => done(() => reject(err)),
+      );
+      try {
+        // Injected connect returns void; the reply arrives via onStatusChange.
+        sdk.connect(
+          { jsBridgeKey },
+          proofPayload != null ? { tonProof: proofPayload } : undefined,
+        );
+      } catch (err) {
+        done(() => reject(err instanceof Error ? err : new Error(String(err))));
+      }
+    });
+  }
+
+  #toAccount(wallet: Wallet, walletId?: string): Account {
+    return {
+      chain: this.chain,
+      address: wallet.account.address,
+      publicKey: wallet.account.publicKey,
+      walletId: walletId ?? wallet.device.appName,
+      caip2: `ton:${wallet.account.chain}`,
+    };
+  }
+}

pkgs/connect/src/ton/verify.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+/**
+ * TON verifier — TON Connect `ton_proof` (ed25519).
+ *
+ * Unlike text-signing chains, TON signs a structured `ton_proof` envelope, not
+ * the CAIP-122 string. The connector carries the envelope in `proof.extra` and
+ * the wallet public key in `proof.publicKey`; this verifier reconstructs the
+ * ton_proof signing message exactly as the TON Connect spec defines it, checks
+ * the ed25519 signature over the double-SHA-256 digest, and binds the envelope
+ * to the CAIP-122 login message (nonce == payload, address == signer).
+ *
+ * Reference (TON Connect ton_proof):
+ *   message = "ton-proof-item-v2/"
+ *           ‖ int32BE(workchain)
+ *           ‖ addressHash(32)
+ *           ‖ uint32LE(len(domain))
+ *           ‖ domain
+ *           ‖ uint64LE(timestamp)
+ *           ‖ payload
+ *   signed  = sha256( 0xffff ‖ "ton-connect" ‖ sha256(message) )
+ *   ok      = ed25519.verify(signature, signed, publicKey)
+ *
+ * Pure: no I/O, no network, no clock. Fails closed — any malformed or missing
+ * field returns false; never throws.
+ */
+import { ed25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha256';
+import type { SignedProof } from '../types.js';
+import { parseSiwxMessage } from '../caip122.js';
+import { hexToBytes, base64ToBytes, utf8ToBytes, concatBytes } from '../bytes.js';
+
+/** ton_proof static prefixes (TON Connect v2). */
+const PROOF_PREFIX = utf8ToBytes('ton-proof-item-v2/');
+const CONNECT_PREFIX = utf8ToBytes('ton-connect');
+
+/** ed25519 public keys are 32 bytes; signatures are 64 bytes; addr hash 32. */
+const ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN = 32;
+const ED25519_SIG_LEN = 64;
+const ADDR_HASH_LEN = 32;
+
+/** The `extra` envelope a TON connector attaches to a ton_proof. */
+interface TonProofExtra {
+  timestamp: number;
+  domain: string;
+  payload: string;
+  workchain: number;
+  addressHashHex: string;
+}
+
+/** Narrow `proof.extra` to the ton_proof envelope, validating field shapes. */
+function readExtra(extra: unknown): TonProofExtra | null {
+  if (extra == null || typeof extra !== 'object') return null;
+  const e = extra as Record<string, unknown>;
+  const { timestamp, domain, payload, workchain, addressHashHex } = e;
+  // timestamp: a finite, non-negative integer number of unix seconds.
+  if (typeof timestamp !== 'number' || !Number.isInteger(timestamp) || timestamp < 0) return null;
+  // workchain: a finite integer (0 = basechain, -1 = masterchain typically).
+  if (typeof workchain !== 'number' || !Number.isInteger(workchain)) return null;
+  if (typeof domain !== 'string') return null;
+  if (typeof payload !== 'string') return null;
+  if (typeof addressHashHex !== 'string') return null;
+  return { timestamp, domain, payload, workchain, addressHashHex };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reconstruct the ton_proof message body that the wallet hashed:
+ *   "ton-proof-item-v2/" ‖ int32BE(wc) ‖ addrHash ‖ uint32LE(|domain|) ‖ domain
+ *                        ‖ uint64LE(ts) ‖ payload
+ *
+ * Integer widths/endianness are spec-exact:
+ *   - workchain: 4 bytes, big-endian, SIGNED (so -1 → 0xFFFFFFFF).
+ *   - domain length: 4 bytes, little-endian, the UTF-8 BYTE length.
+ *   - timestamp: 8 bytes, little-endian (BigInt to span > 2^53 safely).
+ */
+function buildProofMessage(
+  workchain: number,
+  addressHash: Uint8Array,
+  domainBytes: Uint8Array,
+  timestamp: number,
+  payloadBytes: Uint8Array,
+): Uint8Array {
+  // workchain — int32 big-endian (signed two's-complement via setInt32).
+  const wc = new Uint8Array(4);
+  new DataView(wc.buffer).setInt32(0, workchain, /* littleEndian */ false);
+
+  // domain length — uint32 little-endian over the UTF-8 byte length.
+  const dlen = new Uint8Array(4);
+  new DataView(dlen.buffer).setUint32(0, domainBytes.length, /* littleEndian */ true);
+
+  // timestamp — uint64 little-endian.
+  const ts = new Uint8Array(8);
+  new DataView(ts.buffer).setBigUint64(0, BigInt(timestamp), /* littleEndian */ true);
+
+  return concatBytes(PROOF_PREFIX, wc, addressHash, dlen, domainBytes, ts, payloadBytes);
+}
+
+/** TON Connect's full pre-image and the double hash that ed25519 actually signs. */
+function proofDigest(message: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  // fullMsg = 0xff 0xff ‖ "ton-connect" ‖ sha256(message)
+  const fullMsg = concatBytes(Uint8Array.of(0xff, 0xff), CONNECT_PREFIX, sha256(message));
+  return sha256(fullMsg);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verify a TON Connect `ton_proof` login proof.
+ *
+ * @returns true iff the ed25519 signature is valid over the reconstructed
+ *   ton_proof digest AND the envelope is bound to the CAIP-122 message
+ *   (nonce == payload, address == signer). Any other condition → false.
+ */
+export function verifyTon(proof: SignedProof): boolean {
+  try {
+    // --- 0. Structural presence: scheme, public key, signature, envelope. ---
+    if (proof.scheme !== 'ton-proof') return false;
+    if (typeof proof.publicKey !== 'string' || proof.publicKey.length === 0) return false;
+    if (typeof proof.signature !== 'string' || proof.signature.length === 0) return false;
+    if (typeof proof.message !== 'string' || proof.message.length === 0) return false;
+    if (typeof proof.address !== 'string' || proof.address.length === 0) return false;
+
+    const extra = readExtra(proof.extra);
+    if (extra === null) return false;
+
+    // --- 1. Binding to the CAIP-122 login message (anti-replay, anti-phishing).
+    // parseSiwxMessage throws on malformed input; the try/catch fails closed.
+    const parsed = parseSiwxMessage(proof.message);
+    // The signed payload MUST be the server-minted nonce carried in the SIWx msg.
+    if (parsed.nonce !== extra.payload) return false;
+    // The signer MUST be the address embedded in the message.
+    if (parsed.address !== proof.address) return false;
+
+    // --- 2. Decode + length-check the fixed-width cryptographic material. ---
+    const publicKey = hexToBytes(proof.publicKey);
+    if (publicKey.length !== ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN) return false;
+
+    const signature = base64ToBytes(proof.signature);
+    if (signature.length !== ED25519_SIG_LEN) return false;
+
+    const addressHash = hexToBytes(extra.addressHashHex);
+    if (addressHash.length !== ADDR_HASH_LEN) return false;
+
+    // --- 3. Reconstruct the ton_proof message and the digest the wallet signed.
+    const domainBytes = utf8ToBytes(extra.domain);
+    const payloadBytes = utf8ToBytes(extra.payload);
+    const message = buildProofMessage(
+      extra.workchain,
+      addressHash,
+      domainBytes,
+      extra.timestamp,
+      payloadBytes,
+    );
+    const digest = proofDigest(message);
+
+    // --- 4. ed25519 signature check over the 32-byte digest. ---
+    return ed25519.verify(signature, digest, publicKey);
+  } catch {
+    // Bad hex/base64, malformed SIWx, etc. — fail closed.
+    return false;
+  }
+}

pkgs/connect/src/types.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/**
+ * @luxwallet/connect — core types.
+ *
+ * One vocabulary across every chain. A wallet on any chain produces a
+ * {@link SignedProof}; the server verifies it with one {@link verifyProof}
+ * call. The login message itself is chain-agnostic (CAIP-122 "Sign-In-With-X").
+ */
+
+/** Supported chain families. Values, not places — namespaced by this union. */
+export type Chain = 'evm' | 'solana' | 'bitcoin' | 'ton' | 'xrp';
+
+export const CHAINS: readonly Chain[] = ['evm', 'solana', 'bitcoin', 'ton', 'xrp'];
+
+/**
+ * Signature scheme used to produce a proof. The verifier dispatches on this,
+ * not on {@link Chain}, so a chain could in principle offer more than one.
+ */
+export type SignatureScheme =
+  | 'secp256k1-eip191' // EVM personal_sign (EIP-191)
+  | 'ed25519' // Solana, TON
+  | 'bip322' // Bitcoin message signing (BIP-322)
+  | 'ton-proof' // TON Connect ton_proof envelope (ed25519 inside)
+  | 'secp256k1-xrpl' // XRPL signMessage
+  | 'ed25519-xrpl'; // XRPL ed25519 keypair
+
+/** A connected wallet account. `publicKey` is required where the address is not recoverable from the signature (Solana, TON, XRP). */
+export interface Account {
+  chain: Chain;
+  /** Canonical address string for the chain (checksum EVM, base58 Solana, etc.). */
+  address: string;
+  /** Raw public key, hex (no 0x) or base64 — needed by ed25519/XRPL verifiers. */
+  publicKey?: string;
+  /** Identifier of the wallet that produced it (e.g. 'metamask', 'phantom'). */
+  walletId: string;
+  /** CAIP-2 chain id of the specific network, when known (e.g. 'eip155:1'). */
+  caip2?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The login challenge a server asks a wallet to sign. Mirrors EIP-4361 /
+ * CAIP-122 fields. The server mints `nonce` and stores it until verification.
+ */
+export interface LoginChallenge {
+  /** RFC 4501 dnsauthority that is requesting the signing (e.g. 'hanzo.id'). */
+  domain: string;
+  /** RFC 3986 URI referring to the resource that is the subject of the signing. */
+  uri: string;
+  /** Human-readable assertion the user signs (one line, no newlines). */
+  statement?: string;
+  /** Server-minted single-use nonce (>= 8 alphanumerics). */
+  nonce: string;
+  /** ISO-8601 issuance time. */
+  issuedAt: string;
+  /** ISO-8601 expiry; after this the proof is rejected. */
+  expirationTime?: string;
+  /** ISO-8601 not-before; before this the proof is rejected. */
+  notBefore?: string;
+  /** Opaque request correlation id. */
+  requestId?: string;
+  /** Version of the message spec; '1' for CAIP-122/EIP-4361. */
+  version?: string;
+  /** Resource URIs the sign-in grants access to. */
+  resources?: string[];
+}
+
+/** What a wallet hands back after signing — everything a server needs to verify. */
+export interface SignedProof {
+  chain: Chain;
+  scheme: SignatureScheme;
+  /** Address that signed (must match the address embedded in `message`). */
+  address: string;
+  /** Public key (hex/base64) when required by the scheme. */
+  publicKey?: string;
+  /** The exact UTF-8 string that was signed (the rendered CAIP-122 message). */
+  message: string;
+  /** Signature bytes, hex (0x-prefixed allowed) or base64 per scheme. */
+  signature: string;
+  /** Scheme-specific extra fields (e.g. TON proof envelope, BTC address type). */
+  extra?: Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+/** Server-side expectations checked against the parsed message during verify. */
+export interface VerifyExpectation {
+  /** Must equal the message `domain`. */
+  domain: string;
+  /** Must equal the message `nonce` (single-use; server also burns it). */
+  nonce: string;
+  /** Optional: require an exact address (case-insensitive for EVM). */
+  address?: string;
+  /** Override "now" for deterministic tests (epoch ms). */
+  now?: number;
+  /** Max clock skew tolerated on issuedAt/notBefore, ms. Default 5 min. */
+  clockSkewMs?: number;
+}
+
+export interface VerifyResult {
+  ok: boolean;
+  /** Present when ok=false: machine-readable reason. */
+  reason?:
+    | 'bad-signature'
+    | 'address-mismatch'
+    | 'domain-mismatch'
+    | 'nonce-mismatch'
+    | 'expired'
+    | 'not-yet-valid'
+    | 'malformed-message'
+    | 'unsupported-scheme'
+    | 'missing-public-key';
+  /** The verified address (canonicalized) when ok=true. */
+  address?: string;
+  chain?: Chain;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A per-chain connector. Browser/runtime side only — the verifier never needs
+ * it. Implementations live under src/<chain>/.
+ */
+export interface WalletConnector {
+  readonly chain: Chain;
+  /** Wallets this connector can discover/offer in the current runtime. */
+  available(): Promise<WalletInfo[]>;
+  /** Connect (optionally to a specific wallet) and return the active account. */
+  connect(walletId?: string): Promise<Account>;
+  /** Render the challenge to the canonical message and have the wallet sign it. */
+  signLogin(account: Account, challenge: LoginChallenge): Promise<SignedProof>;
+  /** Disconnect / forget the session. */
+  disconnect(): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+export interface WalletInfo {
+  id: string;
+  name: string;
+  chain: Chain;
+  /** Data URI or URL to the wallet icon. */
+  icon?: string;
+  /** True if detected/installed in the current runtime. */
+  installed: boolean;
+  /** Where to get it if not installed. */
+  downloadUrl?: string;
+}

pkgs/connect/src/verify.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/**
+ * verifyProof — the one server-side entry point. Chain-agnostic: parse the
+ * CAIP-122 message, enforce domain/nonce/time, then dispatch to the per-chain
+ * cryptographic verifier. Fails closed: any unknown scheme or malformed input
+ * returns `{ ok: false, reason }`, never throws.
+ *
+ * This pure function is mirrored by the Go port in go/walletconnect so IAM
+ * verifies identically.
+ */
+import type { SignedProof, VerifyExpectation, VerifyResult, Chain } from './types.js';
+import { parseSiwxMessage } from './caip122.js';
+import { verifyEvm } from './evm/verify.js';
+import { verifySolana } from './solana/verify.js';
+import { verifyTon } from './ton/verify.js';
+import { verifyBitcoin } from './bitcoin/verify.js';
+import { verifyXrp } from './xrp/verify.js';
+
+const DEFAULT_SKEW_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
+
+function fail(reason: NonNullable<VerifyResult['reason']>): VerifyResult {
+  return { ok: false, reason };
+}
+
+/** Case-insensitive only for EVM (checksummed hex); all others are exact. */
+function addressesEqual(chain: Chain, a: string, b: string): boolean {
+  const x = a.trim();
+  const y = b.trim();
+  return chain === 'evm' ? x.toLowerCase() === y.toLowerCase() : x === y;
+}
+
+function parseTime(s: string | undefined): number | null {
+  if (s == null) return null;
+  const t = Date.parse(s);
+  return Number.isNaN(t) ? null : t;
+}
+
+/** Cryptographic dispatch. Returns null for not-yet-supported schemes. */
+function verifyCrypto(proof: SignedProof): boolean | null {
+  switch (proof.scheme) {
+    case 'secp256k1-eip191':
+      return verifyEvm(proof.message, proof.signature, proof.address);
+    case 'ed25519':
+      // ed25519-over-message is Solana today; TON uses 'ton-proof'.
+      return verifySolana(proof.message, proof.signature, proof.address);
+    case 'ton-proof':
+      return verifyTon(proof);
+    case 'bip322':
+      return verifyBitcoin(proof);
+    case 'secp256k1-xrpl':
+    case 'ed25519-xrpl':
+      return verifyXrp(proof);
+    default:
+      return null;
+  }
+}
+
+export function verifyProof(proof: SignedProof, expected: VerifyExpectation): VerifyResult {
+  let parsed;
+  try {
+    parsed = parseSiwxMessage(proof.message);
+  } catch {
+    return fail('malformed-message');
+  }
+
+  // 1. Binding: the signer in the message must match the proof's address.
+  if (!addressesEqual(proof.chain, parsed.address, proof.address)) {
+    return fail('address-mismatch');
+  }
+  if (expected.address != null && !addressesEqual(proof.chain, proof.address, expected.address)) {
+    return fail('address-mismatch');
+  }
+
+  // 2. Domain + nonce binding (anti-phishing, anti-replay).
+  if (parsed.domain !== expected.domain) {
+    return fail('domain-mismatch');
+  }
+  if (parsed.nonce !== expected.nonce) {
+    return fail('nonce-mismatch');
+  }
+
+  // 3. Time window.
+  const now = expected.now ?? Date.now();
+  const skew = expected.clockSkewMs ?? DEFAULT_SKEW_MS;
+  const exp = parseTime(parsed.expirationTime);
+  if (exp != null && now > exp + skew) {
+    return fail('expired');
+  }
+  const nbf = parseTime(parsed.notBefore);
+  if (nbf != null && now + skew < nbf) {
+    return fail('not-yet-valid');
+  }
+  const iat = parseTime(parsed.issuedAt);
+  if (iat != null && iat - skew > now) {
+    return fail('not-yet-valid');
+  }
+
+  // 4. Cryptographic signature.
+  const crypto = verifyCrypto(proof);
+  if (crypto == null) {
+    return fail('unsupported-scheme');
+  }
+  if (!crypto) {
+    return fail('bad-signature');
+  }
+
+  return { ok: true, address: proof.address, chain: proof.chain };
+}

pkgs/connect/src/xrp/connect.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/**
+ * XRP (XRP Ledger) wallet connector — Crossmark (`@crossmarkio/sdk`, MIT).
+ *
+ * Crossmark's `signInAndWait(hex)` performs a sign-in that also signs the hex
+ * bytes we pass, returning the account's r-address, its 33-byte public key
+ * (hex, with the XRPL family tag — `0xED` for ed25519, `0x02/0x03` for
+ * secp256k1), and the signature. {@link verifyXrp} digests the CAIP-122 message
+ * the same way XRPL does and checks the signature under that key, then binds
+ * the key to the r-address.
+ *
+ * The signing input must be the CAIP-122 message bytes: we pass
+ * `hex(utf8(message))` to the wallet and set `proof.message` to the same
+ * string, so the verifier's `utf8ToBytes(proof.message)` digest matches what
+ * the wallet signed. The scheme is chosen from the public key's family tag.
+ *
+ * GemWallet is intentionally NOT wired: its only client (`@gemwallet/api`) ships
+ * under a custom dual license that requires GemWallet's permission for
+ * public/commercial use — incompatible with this package's MIT/Apache/ISC-only
+ * rule. Crossmark covers both XRPL key types, so the XRP path stays complete.
+ */
+import sdk from '@crossmarkio/sdk';
+import type {
+  Account,
+  LoginChallenge,
+  SignedProof,
+  SignatureScheme,
+  WalletConnector,
+  WalletInfo,
+} from '../types.js';
+import { buildSiwxMessage } from '../caip122.js';
+import { utf8ToBytes, bytesToHex } from '../bytes.js';
+
+/** XRPL public-key family tag → signature scheme. */
+function schemeForPublicKey(publicKeyHex: string): SignatureScheme {
+  const tag = publicKeyHex.slice(0, 2).toLowerCase();
+  return tag === 'ed' ? 'ed25519-xrpl' : 'secp256k1-xrpl';
+}
+
+export class XrpConnector implements WalletConnector {
+  readonly chain = 'xrp' as const;
+
+  #publicKey: string | null = null;
+
+  /** Crossmark is the supported XRP wallet; report it when installed. */
+  async available(): Promise<WalletInfo[]> {
+    if (typeof window === 'undefined') return [];
+    const installed = sdk.sync.isInstalled() === true;
+    return [
+      {
+        id: 'crossmark',
+        name: 'Crossmark',
+        chain: this.chain,
+        installed,
+        downloadUrl: installed ? undefined : 'https://crossmark.io',
+      },
+    ];
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Connect via Crossmark sign-in. We do a bare sign-in here to capture the
+   * address + public key; the actual login signature is produced in signLogin.
+   */
+  async connect(walletId?: string): Promise<Account> {
+    if (typeof window === 'undefined') {
+      throw new Error('xrp: no window — connectors are browser-only');
+    }
+    if (walletId != null && walletId !== 'crossmark') {
+      throw new Error(`xrp: unsupported wallet '${walletId}' (only 'crossmark')`);
+    }
+
+    const res = await sdk.async.signInAndWait();
+    const data = res?.response?.data;
+    if (!data?.address || !data?.publicKey) {
+      throw new Error('xrp: Crossmark sign-in returned no address/public key');
+    }
+
+    this.#publicKey = data.publicKey;
+
+    return {
+      chain: this.chain,
+      address: data.address,
+      publicKey: data.publicKey,
+      walletId: 'crossmark',
+    };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Render the CAIP-122 message, have Crossmark sign its UTF-8 bytes (passed as
+   * hex), and assemble a proof under the key's scheme. The signature lands in
+   * the sign-in response's `signature` field when a hex challenge is supplied.
+   */
+  async signLogin(account: Account, challenge: LoginChallenge): Promise<SignedProof> {
+    if (!this.#publicKey) throw new Error('xrp: not connected — call connect() first');
+
+    const message = buildSiwxMessage({
+      challenge,
+      address: account.address,
+      chain: this.chain,
+    });
+    const hex = bytesToHex(utf8ToBytes(message));
+
+    const res = await sdk.async.signInAndWait(hex);
+    const data = res?.response?.data;
+    if (!data?.signature) {
+      throw new Error('xrp: Crossmark did not return a signature');
+    }
+    // The public key may refine on the signing response; prefer it if present.
+    const publicKey = data.publicKey ?? this.#publicKey;
+
+    return {
+      chain: this.chain,
+      scheme: schemeForPublicKey(publicKey),
+      address: account.address,
+      publicKey,
+      message,
+      signature: data.signature,
+    };
+  }
+
+  async disconnect(): Promise<void> {
+    this.#publicKey = null;
+  }
+}

pkgs/connect/src/xrp/verify.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+/**
+ * XRP (XRP Ledger) verifier — wallet login-message signatures.
+ *
+ * XRPL accounts use either a secp256k1 or an ed25519 keypair. The connector
+ * carries the public key in `proof.publicKey` (33 bytes in XRPL's canonical
+ * form). This verifier does two independent checks, both of which must hold:
+ *
+ *  1. Signature: the signature is valid over the CAIP-122 message under the
+ *     declared key, using XRPL's signing convention for the scheme.
+ *       - ed25519-xrpl : raw EdDSA over the UTF-8 message bytes.
+ *       - secp256k1-xrpl : ECDSA over the "sha512half" digest
+ *         (first 32 bytes of SHA-512 of the message), DER-encoded.
+ *  2. Address binding: the public key derives the claimed r-address via the
+ *     standard XRPL AccountID derivation (RIPEMD160(SHA256(pubkey)) under the
+ *     0x00 account prefix, base58check with the XRPL alphabet).
+ *
+ * Decomplected: signature verification and address binding are separate,
+ * each complete on its own. Fails closed — every error path returns false,
+ * nothing throws. Pure: no I/O, no clock. Mirrors 1:1 in the Go port.
+ *
+ * Refs:
+ *  - https://xrpl.org/cryptographic-keys.html (key prefixes, AccountID)
+ *  - https://xrpl.org/base58-encodings.html (XRPL base58 alphabet, type prefix)
+ *  - https://github.com/ChainAgnostic/CAIPs/blob/main/CAIPs/caip-122.md
+ */
+import { secp256k1 } from '@noble/curves/secp256k1';
+import { ed25519 } from '@noble/curves/ed25519';
+import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha256';
+import { sha512 } from '@noble/hashes/sha512';
+import { ripemd160 } from '@noble/hashes/ripemd160';
+import type { SignedProof } from '../types.js';
+import { hexToBytes, decodeSignature, utf8ToBytes, concatBytes } from '../bytes.js';
+
+/** XRPL's base58 alphabet (NOT the Bitcoin/IPFS alphabet — different order). */
+const XRPL_ALPHABET = 'rpshnaf39wBUDNEGHJKLM4PQRST7VWXYZ2bcdeCg65jkm8oFqi1tuvAxyz';
+
+/** Account address type prefix byte (the leading 'r' once base58-encoded). */
+const ACCOUNT_ID_PREFIX = 0x00;
+
+/** XRPL public keys are always 33 bytes: a 1-byte family tag + 32-byte key. */
+const PUBKEY_LEN = 33;
+const ED25519_PREFIX = 0xed;
+const ED25519_SIG_LEN = 64;
+
+/** XRPL "sha512half": the first half (32 bytes) of SHA-512 over the input. */
+function sha512Half(data: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
+  return sha512(data).slice(0, 32);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Base58Check encode using the XRPL alphabet. `payload` is the version-prefixed
+ * data; a 4-byte double-SHA256 checksum is appended before encoding. Pure
+ * big-integer base conversion so it matches the Go port byte-for-byte.
+ */
+function base58CheckXrpl(payload: Uint8Array): string {
+  const checksum = sha256(sha256(payload)).slice(0, 4);
+  const full = concatBytes(payload, checksum);
+
+  // Big-endian base-256 → base-58 via repeated division.
+  let acc = 0n;
+  for (const b of full) acc = (acc << 8n) | BigInt(b);
+
+  let out = '';
+  while (acc > 0n) {
+    const rem = Number(acc % 58n);
+    acc = acc / 58n;
+    out = XRPL_ALPHABET[rem] + out;
+  }
+  // Each leading zero byte encodes as the alphabet's zeroth character.
+  for (let i = 0; i < full.length && full[i] === 0; i++) {
+    out = XRPL_ALPHABET[0] + out;
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Derive the canonical r-address from a 33-byte XRPL public key:
+ *   accountID = ripemd160(sha256(pubkey))
+ *   address   = base58check( 0x00 || accountID )
+ * The FULL 33-byte key (with its 0xED / 0x02 / 0x03 family tag) is hashed —
+ * this matches rippled's AccountID derivation for both key types.
+ */
+function deriveAddress(publicKey33: Uint8Array): string {
+  const accountId = ripemd160(sha256(publicKey33));
+  const versioned = concatBytes(Uint8Array.of(ACCOUNT_ID_PREFIX), accountId);
+  return base58CheckXrpl(versioned);
+}
+
+export function verifyXrp(proof: SignedProof): boolean {
+  try {
+    if (proof.publicKey == null || proof.publicKey.length === 0) return false;
+
+    const publicKey = hexToBytes(proof.publicKey);
+    if (publicKey.length !== PUBKEY_LEN) return false;
+
+    const messageBytes = utf8ToBytes(proof.message);
+    const sigBytes = decodeSignature(proof.signature);
+
+    // 1. Cryptographic signature check, per scheme.
+    let sigOk: boolean;
+    if (proof.scheme === 'ed25519-xrpl') {
+      // Family tag must be 0xED; verify over the bare 32-byte Edwards key.
+      if (publicKey[0] !== ED25519_PREFIX) return false;
+      if (sigBytes.length !== ED25519_SIG_LEN) return false;
+      const pub32 = publicKey.slice(1);
+      sigOk = ed25519.verify(sigBytes, messageBytes, pub32);
+    } else if (proof.scheme === 'secp256k1-xrpl') {
+      // Compressed point: family tag is 0x02 or 0x03.
+      if (publicKey[0] !== 0x02 && publicKey[0] !== 0x03) return false;
+      const digest = sha512Half(messageBytes);
+      // DER signature over the prehashed digest. lowS:false — rippled does not
+      // require low-S of wallet signatures, and malleability is irrelevant for
+      // a login proof already bound to a server nonce.
+      sigOk = secp256k1.verify(sigBytes, digest, publicKey, {
+        prehash: false,
+        lowS: false,
+        format: 'der',
+      });
+    } else {
+      return false;
+    }
+    if (!sigOk) return false;
+
+    // 2. Address binding: the key must derive exactly the claimed r-address.
+    const derived = deriveAddress(publicKey);
+    return derived === proof.address.trim();
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}

pkgs/connect/tsconfig.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "extends": "../../tsconfig.base.json",
+  "compilerOptions": {
+    "outDir": "dist",
+    "noEmit": true
+  },
+  "include": ["src"],
+  "exclude": ["src/**/*.test.ts"]
+}

pkgs/idv/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@hanzo/id-idv",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "description": "Pluggable identity verification (KYC / KYB / liveness). Provider-agnostic — wires Persona, Onfido, Veriff, Sumsub, or any custom backend behind a single React surface.",
   "license": "BSD-3-Clause",
   "type": "module",

pkgs/idv/src/provider.ts

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ export type IDVStatus =
 export interface IDVSubject {
   /** Stable subject identifier (typically the IAM user id). */
   readonly subjectId: string
-  /** Tenant org slug (for multi-tenant providers). */
+  /** Org org slug (for multi-org providers). */
   readonly orgId: string
   /** Email + display name carried through for vendor pre-fill. */
   readonly email?: string

pkgs/onboarding/package.json

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+{
+  "name": "@hanzo/id-onboarding",
+  "version": "0.1.5",
+  "description": "Post-login onboarding for the Hanzo ID portal: choose/create org → optional project → optional wallet link. White-labeled by host. Domain / service / UI split.",
+  "license": "BSD-3-Clause",
+  "type": "module",
+  "main": "./src/index.ts",
+  "types": "./src/index.ts",
+  "exports": {
+    ".": "./src/index.ts",
+    "./service": "./src/service/onboarding.ts",
+    "./flow": "./src/ui/OnboardingFlow.tsx",
+    "./package.json": "./package.json"
+  },
+  "files": ["src", "!src/**/*.test.ts"],
+  "scripts": {
+    "build": "tsc --noEmit",
+    "tc": "tsc --noEmit"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@hanzo/id-shared": "workspace:*",
+    "@hanzo/iam": "^0.21.1"
+  },
+  "peerDependencies": {
+    "react": ">=19",
+    "react-dom": ">=19"
+  },
+  "devDependencies": {
+    "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
+    "@types/react": "^19.0.0",
+    "react": "^19.2.0",
+    "react-dom": "^19.2.0",
+    "typescript": "^5.9.3"
+  }
+}

pkgs/onboarding/src/domain/types.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/**
+ * Onboarding domain types — React-free, serializable.
+ *
+ * The post-login onboarding is a three-step linear flow:
+ *
+ *   1. org     — choose an existing org the user already belongs to, or
+ *                create a new one. Required (every account needs a home org).
+ *   2. project — create a first project inside the chosen org. Optional
+ *                (skippable; the org ships with a default project).
+ *   3. wallet  — link a Web3 wallet to the account. Optional (skippable).
+ *
+ * The flow is declared as data here so the UI layer can render it without
+ * the domain importing React. `OnboardingService` (the service layer) does
+ * the actual IAM writes; this module only describes the shape of the flow
+ * and its accumulated state.
+ */
+
+/** Identifier for each step in the onboarding flow. */
+export type StepId = 'org' | 'project' | 'wallet' | 'consent' | 'plan' | 'done'
+
+/** A step's place in the linear flow. */
+export interface StepDesc {
+  readonly id: StepId
+  /** Heading shown at the top of the step. */
+  readonly title: string
+  /** One-line subhead under the title. */
+  readonly byline: string
+  /** Whether the user may skip this step (Continue without acting). */
+  readonly skippable: boolean
+}
+
+/**
+ * The canonical step sequence. `done` is a terminal pseudo-step the flow
+ * lands on after `wallet`; it renders the success state and hands control
+ * back to the host via `onComplete`.
+ */
+export const STEPS: readonly StepDesc[] = [
+  {
+    id: 'org',
+    title: 'Choose your organization',
+    byline: 'Pick an organization you belong to, or create a new one.',
+    skippable: false,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'project',
+    title: 'Create your first project',
+    byline: 'Projects group your apps, keys, and usage. You can add more later.',
+    skippable: true,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'wallet',
+    title: 'Link a wallet',
+    byline: 'Connect a Web3 wallet to sign and pay onchain. Optional.',
+    skippable: true,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'consent',
+    title: 'Data sharing',
+    byline: 'Choose whether to share usage data to improve the products.',
+    // Not skippable: the agreement needs an explicit ANSWER (yes or no, both
+    // valid), recorded once on the user so it is never re-asked. Skipping is
+    // how this page kept going missing.
+    skippable: false,
+  },
+  {
+    id: 'plan',
+    title: 'Choose how you pay',
+    byline: 'Pick a plan, or pay as you go with a prepaid balance.',
+    // The LAST page, and a required choice: the platform is prepay-only, so an
+    // account is not usable until a plan or a balance exists. "Pay as you go"
+    // IS a choice — there is nothing to skip to.
+    skippable: false,
+  },
+] as const
+
+/** A minimal org reference the UI lists in the "choose org" step. */
+export interface OrgRef {
+  /** IAM org slug (the `<org>` in `<org>-<app>`). */
+  readonly name: string
+  /** Human-facing name; falls back to `name` when unset. */
+  readonly displayName: string
+}
+
+/** A minimal project reference returned after creation. */
+export interface ProjectRef {
+  readonly owner: string
+  readonly name: string
+  readonly displayName: string
+  readonly organization: string
+}
+
+/**
+ * Accumulated flow state. Each step writes its result here; the success
+ * screen and `onComplete` read it. Serializable so the host can persist a
+ * resume point if it wants (this pkg does not persist on its own).
+ */
+export interface OnboardingState {
+  /** Slug of the org the user landed in (chosen or created). */
+  readonly orgName?: string
+  /** Whether the org was freshly created in this flow (vs. pre-existing). */
+  readonly orgCreated?: boolean
+  /** Name of the project created in step 2, if any. */
+  readonly projectName?: string
+  /** Wallet address linked in step 3, if any. */
+  readonly walletAddress?: string
+  /** The data-sharing answer given in step 4 (true = opted in). */
+  readonly dataSharingConsent?: boolean
+  /**
+   * The payment choice made on the final step: a plan slug from the billing
+   * catalog, or the literal 'payg' for a prepaid pay-as-you-go balance.
+   */
+  readonly planChoice?: string
+}
+
+/**
+ * One purchasable plan as the billing catalog serves it (GET /v1/billing/plans
+ * on the pay origin). Prices are the CATALOG's — this pkg never states one.
+ */
+export interface PlanInfo {
+  readonly slug: string
+  readonly name: string
+  readonly description?: string
+  /** Monthly price in CENTS (the catalog's `price` — 900 = $9/mo). */
+  readonly priceCents: number
+  /**
+   * Monthly-equivalent price in CENTS when billed annually (the catalog's
+   * `priceAnnual` — 825 = $8.25/mo ≈ $99/yr). Absent when the plan has no
+   * annual rate.
+   */
+  readonly priceAnnualCents?: number
+  readonly popular?: boolean
+}
+
+/**
+ * User-record keys the onboarding persists under `Properties`. ONE writer
+ * (saveOnboarding) and one reader (readOnboarding); the names are part of the
+ * user record's public shape, so change them never.
+ */
+export const PROP_COMPLETED = 'onboarding.completedAt'
+export const PROP_CONSENT = 'onboarding.dataSharingConsent'
+export const PROP_PLAN = 'onboarding.plan'
+
+/** Resolve a step descriptor by id. */
+export function stepById(id: StepId): StepDesc | undefined {
+  return STEPS.find((s) => s.id === id)
+}
+
+/** The step that follows `id` in the linear flow (`done` is terminal). */
+export function nextStep(id: StepId): StepId {
+  if (id === 'done') return 'done'
+  const i = STEPS.findIndex((s) => s.id === id)
+  if (i < 0 || i + 1 >= STEPS.length) return 'done'
+  return STEPS[i + 1]!.id
+}
+
+/** The step that precedes `id`, or undefined at the first step. */
+export function prevStep(id: StepId): StepId | undefined {
+  const i = STEPS.findIndex((s) => s.id === id)
+  if (i <= 0) return undefined
+  return STEPS[i - 1]!.id
+}

pkgs/onboarding/src/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+// @hanzo/id-onboarding — post-login onboarding for the Hanzo ID portal.
+//
+// Five-step flow: choose/create org → optional project → optional wallet
+// link → data-sharing consent → plan or pay-as-you-go. White-labeled by the
+// host's brand name. Domain (serializable types + step machine) / service
+// (IAM-backed writes) / UI (self-contained flow) split. Auth lives in
+// @hanzo/id-auth — import login/signup from there.
+
+// ── Domain ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+export {
+  STEPS,
+  stepById,
+  nextStep,
+  prevStep,
+  type StepId,
+  type StepDesc,
+  type OrgRef,
+  type ProjectRef,
+  type OnboardingState,
+  type PlanInfo,
+} from './domain/types'
+
+// ── Service ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+export {
+  createOnboardingService,
+  type OnboardingService,
+  type OnboardingServiceOptions,
+  type Result,
+} from './service/onboarding'
+
+// ── UI ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+export { OnboardingFlow, type OnboardingFlowProps } from './ui/OnboardingFlow'

pkgs/onboarding/src/onboarding.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+/**
+ * Onboarding unit tests — run with the Node built-in test runner and native
+ * TypeScript stripping (no test-framework dependency):
+ *
+ *   node --test --experimental-strip-types src/onboarding.test.ts
+ *
+ * Covers the React-free surface: the domain step machine and the service's
+ * request shaping + IAM response translation (with an injected fake fetch).
+ */
+import { test } from 'vitest'
+import assert from 'node:assert/strict'
+import { STEPS, stepById, nextStep, prevStep } from './domain/types.ts'
+import { createOnboardingService } from './service/onboarding.ts'
+
+// ── Domain: step machine ────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+test('step machine walks org → project → wallet → consent → plan → done', () => {
+  assert.equal(STEPS[0]!.id, 'org')
+  assert.equal(nextStep('org'), 'project')
+  assert.equal(nextStep('project'), 'wallet')
+  assert.equal(nextStep('wallet'), 'consent')
+  assert.equal(nextStep('consent'), 'plan')
+  assert.equal(nextStep('plan'), 'done')
+  assert.equal(nextStep('done'), 'done') // terminal is a fixpoint
+})
+
+test('prevStep is the inverse within the flow, undefined at the head', () => {
+  assert.equal(prevStep('org'), undefined)
+  assert.equal(prevStep('project'), 'org')
+  assert.equal(prevStep('wallet'), 'project')
+  assert.equal(prevStep('consent'), 'wallet')
+  assert.equal(prevStep('plan'), 'consent')
+})
+
+test('project and wallet are skippable; org, consent and plan are not', () => {
+  assert.equal(stepById('org')!.skippable, false)
+  assert.equal(stepById('project')!.skippable, true)
+  assert.equal(stepById('wallet')!.skippable, true)
+  // Consent needs an ANSWER (either answer) and plan is the prepay gate —
+  // neither may be walked past. plan is LAST so the choice hands straight
+  // off to the pay surface.
+  assert.equal(stepById('consent')!.skippable, false)
+  assert.equal(stepById('plan')!.skippable, false)
+  assert.equal(STEPS[STEPS.length - 1]!.id, 'plan')
+})
+
+// ── Service: fake-fetch harness ─────────────────────────────────────
+
+interface Recorded {
+  url: string
+  method: string
+  body?: string
+  headers: Record<string, string>
+}
+
+/** Build a service whose fetch records calls and returns scripted JSON. */
+function harness(script: (rec: Recorded) => { status?: number; json: unknown }) {
+  const calls: Recorded[] = []
+  const fetchImpl = (async (input: string | URL, init?: RequestInit) => {
+    const headers: Record<string, string> = {}
+    const h = init?.headers as Record<string, string> | undefined
+    if (h) for (const k of Object.keys(h)) headers[k] = h[k]!
+    const rec: Recorded = {
+      url: String(input),
+      method: init?.method ?? 'GET',
+      body: typeof init?.body === 'string' ? init.body : undefined,
+      headers,
+    }
+    calls.push(rec)
+    const { status = 200, json } = script(rec)
+    return new Response(JSON.stringify(json), {
+      status,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+    })
+  }) as unknown as typeof fetch
+
+  const service = createOnboardingService({
+    iamUrl: 'https://hanzo.id',
+    orgId: 'hanzo',
+    getAccessToken: () => 'tok-123',
+    fetchImpl,
+  })
+  return { service, calls }
+}
+
+test('listOrgs hits get-organizations with the bearer token and maps rows', async () => {
+  const { service, calls } = harness(() => ({
+    json: { status: 'ok', data: [{ name: 'hanzo', displayName: 'Hanzo' }, { name: 'acme' }] },
+  }))
+  const orgs = await service.listOrgs()
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.url, 'https://hanzo.id/v1/iam/get-organizations')
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.headers.Authorization, 'Bearer tok-123')
+  assert.deepEqual(orgs, [
+    { name: 'hanzo', displayName: 'Hanzo' },
+    { name: 'acme', displayName: 'acme' }, // displayName falls back to name
+  ])
+})
+
+test('listOrgs decodes rows from the legacy data2 slot until IAM stops emitting it', async () => {
+  const { service } = harness(() => ({ json: { status: 'ok', data2: [{ name: 'acme' }] } }))
+  assert.deepEqual(await service.listOrgs(), [{ name: 'acme', displayName: 'acme' }])
+})
+
+test('listOrgs returns [] (not throw) on a server error', async () => {
+  const { service } = harness(() => ({ status: 500, json: { status: 'error', msg: 'boom' } }))
+  assert.deepEqual(await service.listOrgs(), [])
+})
+
+// Founding an org goes through the SELF-SERVICE front door, never the
+// add-organization admin verb — that one is bearer-only entity CRUD filed under
+// owner "admin", so a person founding their first org gets 401/403 there. This is
+// the regression guard for the hanzo.id/onboarding "HTTP 401".
+test('createOrg founds the org through /v1/iam/onboard, never the admin verb', async () => {
+  const ok = harness(() => ({ json: { org: 'acme', accessKey: 'pk-live-x' } }))
+  const res = await ok.service.createOrg({ name: 'acme', displayName: 'Acme Inc' })
+  assert.equal(ok.calls[0]!.url, 'https://hanzo.id/v1/iam/onboard')
+  assert.equal(ok.calls[0]!.method, 'POST')
+  assert.ok(!ok.calls.some((c) => c.url.includes('add-organization')))
+  // The DISPLAY name is what travels: the server owns the slug policy.
+  assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(ok.calls[0]!.body!), { name: 'Acme Inc' })
+  // …and the slug it answers with is authoritative, not the client's guess.
+  assert.deepEqual(res, { ok: true, value: { name: 'acme', displayName: 'Acme Inc' } })
+})
+
+test('createOrg carries BOTH credentials — the portal session mints no bearer', async () => {
+  const { service, calls } = harness(() => ({ json: { org: 'acme' } }))
+  await service.createOrg({ name: 'acme', displayName: 'Acme Inc' })
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.headers.Authorization, 'Bearer tok-123')
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.headers['Content-Type'], 'application/json')
+})
+
+test('createOrg surfaces the front door’s own error text, not a bare HTTP code', async () => {
+  const taken = harness(() => ({ status: 409, json: { error: 'the organization "acme" already exists' } }))
+  assert.deepEqual(await taken.service.createOrg({ name: 'acme', displayName: 'Acme' }), {
+    ok: false,
+    error: 'the organization "acme" already exists',
+  })
+
+  const anon = harness(() => ({ status: 401, json: { error: 'please sign in first' } }))
+  assert.deepEqual(await anon.service.createOrg({ name: 'x', displayName: 'X' }), {
+    ok: false,
+    error: 'please sign in first',
+  })
+})
+
+test('linkWallet rejects a malformed address before any network call', async () => {
+  const { service, calls } = harness(() => ({ json: { status: 'ok' } }))
+  const res = await service.linkWallet('not-an-address')
+  assert.deepEqual(res, { ok: false, error: 'invalid wallet address' })
+  assert.equal(calls.length, 0)
+})
+
+// IAM's update-user is a FULL-ROW write that ignores `columns=` — a minimal
+// body silently blanks every field it omits. So the contract under test is
+// read-merge-write: the row that comes back from get-account goes back OUT
+// with only the mutation applied. This is the regression guard for the wallet
+// step wiping displayName/email on every link.
+test('linkWallet reads the full row and writes it back with web3onboard merged in', async () => {
+  const addr = '0x' + 'a'.repeat(40)
+  const { service, calls } = harness((rec) => {
+    if (rec.url.includes('get-account'))
+      return {
+        json: {
+          status: 'ok',
+          data: { owner: 'hanzo', name: 'alice', displayName: 'Alice', email: 'alice@hanzo.ai' },
+        },
+      }
+    return { json: { status: 'ok' } }
+  })
+  const res = await service.linkWallet(addr)
+  assert.deepEqual(res, { ok: true, value: addr })
+  // 1) get-account, 2) update-user keyed by owner/name with the WHOLE row
+  assert.match(calls[0]!.url, /get-account$/)
+  const upd = calls[1]!
+  assert.ok(upd.url.includes('/v1/iam/update-user'))
+  assert.ok(upd.url.includes('id=hanzo%2Falice') || upd.url.includes('id=hanzo/alice'))
+  const sent = JSON.parse(upd.body!)
+  assert.equal(sent.web3onboard, addr)
+  assert.equal(sent.owner, 'hanzo')
+  assert.equal(sent.name, 'alice')
+  // The fields the mutation did not touch MUST survive the round trip.
+  assert.equal(sent.displayName, 'Alice')
+  assert.equal(sent.email, 'alice@hanzo.ai')
+})
+
+test('saveOnboarding merges properties without dropping existing ones; readOnboarding decodes them', async () => {
+  const { service, calls } = harness((rec) => {
+    if (rec.url.includes('get-account'))
+      return {
+        json: {
+          status: 'ok',
+          data: {
+            owner: 'hanzo',
+            name: 'alice',
+            properties: { 'onboarding.dataSharingConsent': 'true', unrelated: 'kept' },
+          },
+        },
+      }
+    return { json: { status: 'ok' } }
+  })
+  const res = await service.saveOnboarding({ plan: 'pro', completedAt: '2026-08-04T00:00:00Z' })
+  assert.deepEqual(res, { ok: true, value: true })
+  const sent = JSON.parse(calls[1]!.body!)
+  assert.deepEqual(sent.properties, {
+    'onboarding.dataSharingConsent': 'true',
+    unrelated: 'kept',
+    'onboarding.plan': 'pro',
+    'onboarding.completedAt': '2026-08-04T00:00:00Z',
+  })
+})
+
+test('readOnboarding reports null completedAt/consent/plan for a fresh user', async () => {
+  const { service } = harness(() => ({ json: { status: 'ok', data: { owner: 'hanzo', name: 'bob' } } }))
+  assert.deepEqual(await service.readOnboarding(), { completedAt: null, consent: null, plan: null })
+})
+
+// The live catalog prices in CENTS (go=900 means $9/mo, priceAnnual=825 means
+// $8.25/mo billed annually) and carries other product lines (dns-*) in the
+// same list. This test pins both facts with production-shaped rows.
+test('listPlans keeps cents unscaled, keeps personal+team only; [] on failure', async () => {
+  const { service, calls } = harness(() => ({
+    json: [
+      { slug: 'pro', name: 'Pro', category: 'personal', price: 4900, priceAnnual: 4150, popular: true },
+      { slug: 'go', name: 'Go', category: 'personal', price: 900, priceAnnual: 825 },
+      { slug: 'team', name: 'Team', category: 'team', price: 2500, priceAnnual: 2000 },
+      { slug: 'dns-pro', name: 'DNS Pro', category: 'dns', price: 500 }, // other product line → dropped
+      { slug: 'enterprise', name: 'Enterprise', category: 'enterprise', price: 0 }, // not self-serve → dropped
+      { slug: '', name: 'broken', category: 'personal', price: 500 }, // no slug → dropped
+    ],
+  }))
+  const plans = await service.listPlans('https://pay.hanzo.ai/')
+  assert.equal(calls[0]!.url, 'https://pay.hanzo.ai/v1/billing/plans')
+  assert.deepEqual(
+    plans.map((p) => p.slug),
+    ['pro', 'go', 'team'],
+  )
+  assert.equal(plans[0]!.priceCents, 4900)
+  assert.equal(plans[0]!.priceAnnualCents, 4150)
+  assert.equal(plans[0]!.popular, true)
+
+  const down = harness(() => ({ status: 503, json: { error: 'nope' } }))
+  assert.deepEqual(await down.service.listPlans('https://pay.hanzo.ai'), [])
+})
+
+test('linkWallet fails closed when there is no signed-in user', async () => {
+  const addr = '0x' + 'b'.repeat(40)
+  const { service } = harness((rec) => {
+    if (rec.url.includes('get-account')) return { status: 401, json: { status: 'error', msg: 'not signed in' } }
+    return { json: { status: 'ok' } }
+  })
+  assert.deepEqual(await service.linkWallet(addr), { ok: false, error: 'not signed in' })
+})

pkgs/onboarding/src/service/onboarding.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,335 @@
+/**
+ * Onboarding service — the IAM-backed implementation of the org/project/
+ * wallet flow.
+ *
+ * One way: every write goes through the canonical IAM REST surface under
+ * `/v1/iam/*` (the same IAM paths the auth client uses). There is no separate
+ * onboarding backend — the org and project records live in IAM, which is the
+ * identity registry.
+ *
+ *   listOrgs()    GET  /v1/iam/get-organizations   (user-scoped server-side)
+ *   createOrg()   POST /v1/iam/onboard             (the self-service front door)
+ *   createProject POST /v1/iam/add-project
+ *   linkWallet()  client-side wallet connect → IAM update-user (host-driven)
+ *
+ * Founding an org goes through `onboard`, NOT the `add-organization` admin verb.
+ * They are different doors: add-organization is entity CRUD behind IAM's
+ * authenticated Guard, filed under owner "admin", and a human may only write an
+ * org row named after the org they are already in — so a person founding their
+ * FIRST org is refused there by construction (403), and with no bearer at all the
+ * Guard refuses before that (401). `onboard` is the door built for this: it
+ * resolves the caller from their own session or bearer and provisions the whole
+ * org — org stamped with them as Founder, them moved in as its owner, one
+ * metered API key — under their own authority as its founder.
+ *
+ * Both credentials are offered on every call: `credentials: 'include'` for the
+ * portal session cookie (a bare portal sign-in mints NO bearer, which is why the
+ * bearer-only door 401'd), and `Authorization` when the host does hold a token.
+ * IAM resolves session first, then bearer.
+ */
+import type { Project } from '@hanzo/iam'
+import {
+  PROP_COMPLETED,
+  PROP_CONSENT,
+  PROP_PLAN,
+  type OrgRef,
+  type PlanInfo,
+  type ProjectRef,
+} from '../domain/types'
+
+/** Result of a write that can fail gracefully (no throw on expected errors). */
+export type Result<T> = { readonly ok: true; readonly value: T } | { readonly ok: false; readonly error: string }
+
+export interface OnboardingService {
+  /**
+   * List organizations the signed-in user can land in. IAM scopes
+   * `get-organizations` to the caller's memberships server-side from the
+   * bearer token. Returns [] (not an error) when the user belongs to none.
+   */
+  listOrgs(): Promise<OrgRef[]>
+  /** Create a new organization owned by the user. */
+  createOrg(input: { name: string; displayName: string }): Promise<Result<OrgRef>>
+  /** Create a project inside `organization`. */
+  createProject(input: { organization: string; name: string; displayName: string }): Promise<Result<ProjectRef>>
+  /**
+   * Attach a wallet address to the signed-in user (IAM `update-user`,
+   * `web3Onboard` address field). The actual wallet connect happens in the
+   * browser via the host-supplied `connectWallet`; this only persists the
+   * resulting address.
+   */
+  linkWallet(address: string): Promise<Result<string>>
+  /**
+   * Read the persisted onboarding record from the signed-in user's
+   * `properties`. All-null when the user has never completed onboarding —
+   * which is the ONLY case the host should mount the flow for.
+   */
+  readOnboarding(): Promise<{ completedAt: string | null; consent: boolean | null; plan: string | null }>
+  /**
+   * Persist onboarding fields onto the user record, read-merge-write. THIS is
+   * what stops the flow repeating: completion lives on the USER, not in any
+   * browser storage, so a new device, a cleared cache and a re-login all see
+   * it done.
+   */
+  saveOnboarding(patch: { completedAt?: string; consent?: boolean; plan?: string }): Promise<Result<true>>
+  /**
+   * List purchasable plans from the billing catalog on the PAY origin. The
+   * catalog is the only price authority — this pkg renders what it serves and
+   * states no price of its own. Returns [] on any failure; the plan step then
+   * offers the two choices without a price grid.
+   */
+  listPlans(payUrl: string): Promise<PlanInfo[]>
+}
+
+export interface OnboardingServiceOptions {
+  /** IAM origin, no trailing slash (the org's `iamUrl`, i.e. hanzo.id). */
+  readonly iamUrl: string
+  /** Owning org slug used as the default `owner` for new records. */
+  readonly orgId: string
+  /** Bearer-token provider; resolves null when no session is present. */
+  readonly getAccessToken: () => Promise<string | null> | string | null
+  /** Override fetch (testing). Defaults to global fetch. */
+  readonly fetchImpl?: typeof fetch
+}
+
+const trimSlash = (s: string): string => s.replace(/\/+$/, '')
+
+export function createOnboardingService(opts: OnboardingServiceOptions): OnboardingService {
+  const base = trimSlash(opts.iamUrl)
+  const f = opts.fetchImpl ?? fetch
+
+  async function authHeaders(json = true): Promise<HeadersInit> {
+    const token = await opts.getAccessToken()
+    const h: Record<string, string> = { Accept: 'application/json' }
+    if (json) h['Content-Type'] = 'application/json'
+    if (token) h.Authorization = `Bearer ${token}`
+    return h
+  }
+
+  async function listOrgs(): Promise<OrgRef[]> {
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/get-organizations', base)
+    let body: Record<string, unknown>
+    try {
+      const res = await f(url.toString(), { headers: await authHeaders(false), credentials: 'include' })
+      if (!res.ok) return []
+      body = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
+    } catch {
+      return []
+    }
+    const rows = extractRows(body)
+    return rows.map(toOrgRef).filter((o): o is OrgRef => o !== null)
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Found the caller's own organization through the self-service front door.
+   *
+   * The server owns the slug: it derives it from the display name under the ONE
+   * policy every surface shares, so the returned `org` is authoritative and the
+   * client's slug preview is only a preview. It answers `{org}` on success and
+   * `{error}` with a 4xx/5xx on failure — not the casibase `{status,msg}`
+   * envelope the entity CRUD returns — so read it directly.
+   */
+  async function createOrg(input: { name: string; displayName: string }): Promise<Result<OrgRef>> {
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/onboard', base)
+    const displayName = input.displayName || input.name
+    try {
+      const res = await f(url.toString(), {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: await authHeaders(),
+        credentials: 'include',
+        body: JSON.stringify({ name: displayName }),
+      })
+      const body = (await res.json().catch(() => ({}))) as Record<string, unknown>
+      if (!res.ok) {
+        const msg = typeof body.error === 'string' && body.error ? body.error : `HTTP ${res.status}`
+        return { ok: false, error: msg }
+      }
+      const org = typeof body.org === 'string' ? body.org : ''
+      if (!org) return { ok: false, error: 'request failed' }
+      return { ok: true, value: { name: org, displayName } }
+    } catch (e) {
+      return { ok: false, error: String(e) }
+    }
+  }
+
+  async function createProject(input: {
+    organization: string
+    name: string
+    displayName: string
+  }): Promise<Result<ProjectRef>> {
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/add-project', base)
+    const project: Partial<Project> = {
+      owner: input.organization,
+      name: input.name,
+      displayName: input.displayName,
+      organization: input.organization,
+      isDefault: false,
+    }
+    return writeRecord(url, project, () => ({
+      owner: input.organization,
+      name: input.name,
+      displayName: input.displayName,
+      organization: input.organization,
+    }))
+  }
+
+  async function linkWallet(address: string): Promise<Result<string>> {
+    const trimmed = address.trim()
+    if (!isHexAddress(trimmed)) return { ok: false, error: 'invalid wallet address' }
+    const res = await updateSelf((row) => {
+      row.web3onboard = trimmed
+    })
+    return res.ok ? { ok: true, value: trimmed } : res
+  }
+
+  async function readOnboarding(): Promise<{
+    completedAt: string | null
+    consent: boolean | null
+    plan: string | null
+  }> {
+    const row = await getAccount()
+    const props = (row?.properties ?? {}) as Record<string, unknown>
+    const str = (k: string): string | null => (typeof props[k] === 'string' && props[k] ? (props[k] as string) : null)
+    const consentRaw = str(PROP_CONSENT)
+    return {
+      completedAt: str(PROP_COMPLETED),
+      consent: consentRaw === null ? null : consentRaw === 'true',
+      plan: str(PROP_PLAN),
+    }
+  }
+
+  async function saveOnboarding(patch: {
+    completedAt?: string
+    consent?: boolean
+    plan?: string
+  }): Promise<Result<true>> {
+    const res = await updateSelf((row) => {
+      const props = { ...((row.properties as Record<string, string> | undefined) ?? {}) }
+      if (patch.completedAt !== undefined) props[PROP_COMPLETED] = patch.completedAt
+      if (patch.consent !== undefined) props[PROP_CONSENT] = String(patch.consent)
+      if (patch.plan !== undefined) props[PROP_PLAN] = patch.plan
+      row.properties = props
+    })
+    return res.ok ? { ok: true, value: true } : res
+  }
+
+  async function listPlans(payUrl: string): Promise<PlanInfo[]> {
+    try {
+      const res = await f(trimSlash(payUrl) + '/v1/billing/plans', { headers: { Accept: 'application/json' } })
+      if (!res.ok) return []
+      const body = (await res.json()) as unknown
+      const rows = Array.isArray(body) ? body : []
+      return rows
+        .filter((r): r is Record<string, unknown> => typeof r === 'object' && r !== null)
+        // Onboarding offers the account plans; other product lines in the same
+        // catalog (dns-*, enterprise) have their own surfaces.
+        .filter((r) => r.category === 'personal' || r.category === 'team')
+        .map((r) => ({
+          slug: typeof r.slug === 'string' ? r.slug : '',
+          name: typeof r.name === 'string' ? r.name : '',
+          description: typeof r.description === 'string' ? r.description : undefined,
+          // Catalog prices are CENTS (900 = $9/mo); passed through unscaled.
+          priceCents: typeof r.price === 'number' ? r.price : NaN,
+          priceAnnualCents: typeof r.priceAnnual === 'number' && r.priceAnnual > 0 ? r.priceAnnual : undefined,
+          popular: r.popular === true,
+        }))
+        .filter((p) => p.slug && p.name && Number.isFinite(p.priceCents) && p.priceCents > 0)
+    } catch {
+      return []
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Read-merge-write the signed-in user's FULL row. IAM's update-user is a
+   * FULL-ROW write (internal/users Update: "this is a full-row write") and it
+   * ignores the v1 `columns=` scoping param — so a minimal body silently
+   * blanks every field it omits. The wallet step used to do exactly that,
+   * wiping displayName/email on every link. Every self-write goes through
+   * here now: fetch the row, mutate, post the whole thing back.
+   */
+  async function updateSelf(mutate: (row: Record<string, unknown>) => void): Promise<Result<true>> {
+    const row = await getAccount()
+    if (!row) return { ok: false, error: 'not signed in' }
+    const owner = typeof row.owner === 'string' ? row.owner : ''
+    const name = typeof row.name === 'string' ? row.name : ''
+    if (!owner || !name) return { ok: false, error: 'not signed in' }
+    mutate(row)
+    row.owner = owner
+    row.name = name
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/update-user', base)
+    url.searchParams.set('id', `${owner}/${name}`)
+    try {
+      const res = await f(url.toString(), {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: await authHeaders(),
+        credentials: 'include',
+        body: JSON.stringify(row),
+      })
+      if (!res.ok) return { ok: false, error: `HTTP ${res.status}` }
+      const body = (await res.json().catch(() => ({}))) as Record<string, unknown>
+      if (body.status === 'error') return { ok: false, error: msgOf(body) }
+      return { ok: true, value: true }
+    } catch (e) {
+      return { ok: false, error: String(e) }
+    }
+  }
+
+  /** Read the signed-in user's FULL row from `/v1/iam/get-account`. */
+  async function getAccount(): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null> {
+    const url = new URL('/v1/iam/get-account', base)
+    try {
+      const res = await f(url.toString(), { headers: await authHeaders(false), credentials: 'include' })
+      if (!res.ok) return null
+      const body = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>
+      const data = (body.data ?? body) as Record<string, unknown>
+      if (typeof data !== 'object' || data === null) return null
+      return data
+    } catch {
+      return null
+    }
+  }
+
+  async function writeRecord<T>(
+    url: URL,
+    payload: unknown,
+    onOk: () => T,
+  ): Promise<Result<T>> {
+    try {
+      const res = await f(url.toString(), {
+        method: 'POST',
+        headers: await authHeaders(),
+        credentials: 'include',
+        body: JSON.stringify(payload),
+      })
+      if (!res.ok) return { ok: false, error: `HTTP ${res.status}` }
+      const body = (await res.json().catch(() => ({}))) as Record<string, unknown>
+      if (body.status === 'error') return { ok: false, error: msgOf(body) }
+      return { ok: true, value: onOk() }
+    } catch (e) {
+      return { ok: false, error: String(e) }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return { listOrgs, createOrg, createProject, linkWallet, readOnboarding, saveOnboarding, listPlans }
+}
+
+/** Rows of an IAM list response: the named `data` slot, falling back to the legacy `data2` slot until IAM stops emitting it. */
+function extractRows(body: Record<string, unknown>): Record<string, unknown>[] {
+  const candidate = Array.isArray(body.data) ? body.data : Array.isArray(body.data2) ? body.data2 : []
+  return candidate.filter((r): r is Record<string, unknown> => typeof r === 'object' && r !== null)
+}
+
+function toOrgRef(row: Record<string, unknown>): OrgRef | null {
+  const name = typeof row.name === 'string' ? row.name : ''
+  if (!name) return null
+  const displayName = typeof row.displayName === 'string' && row.displayName ? row.displayName : name
+  return { name, displayName }
+}
+
+function msgOf(body: Record<string, unknown>): string {
+  return typeof body.msg === 'string' && body.msg ? body.msg : 'request failed'
+}
+
+/** EIP-55-agnostic 0x-prefixed 20-byte address check. */
+function isHexAddress(s: string): boolean {
+  return /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/.test(s)
+}

pkgs/onboarding/src/ui/OnboardingFlow.tsx

@@ -0,0 +1,604 @@
+import { useCallback, useEffect, useReducer, useState, type FormEvent } from 'react'
+import {
+  STEPS,
+  nextStep,
+  prevStep,
+  stepById,
+  type OnboardingState,
+  type PlanInfo,
+  type StepId,
+} from '../domain/types'
+import type { OnboardingService } from '../service/onboarding'
+
+/**
+ * Post-login onboarding flow.
+ *
+ * A self-contained three-step wizard (org → project → wallet) driven by an
+ * internal step machine — no router lib, consistent with the rest of the
+ * portal which routes on `window.location` and keeps page-local state in
+ * React. The host renders this once after login and gets the accumulated
+ * {@link OnboardingState} back via `onComplete`.
+ *
+ * White-label: all copy comes from the domain `STEPS` table + the `brandName`
+ * prop. No brand-specific strings live in this component. Styling reuses the
+ * portal's `hanzo-id-*` classes (defined in the web app's app.css).
+ */
+export interface OnboardingFlowProps {
+  readonly service: OnboardingService
+  /** Brand display name for headings (e.g. the resolved org brand). */
+  readonly brandName: string
+  /**
+   * Host-supplied wallet connector. Returns the connected address (0x…) or
+   * null if the user cancels. Kept as a prop so this pkg stays free of any
+   * specific wallet library — the host wires Web3Onboard / wagmi / window
+   * .ethereum. When omitted, the wallet step shows a "not available" note
+   * and can only be skipped.
+   */
+  readonly connectWallet?: () => Promise<string | null>
+  /** Called once the flow reaches `done`, with the final accumulated state. */
+  readonly onComplete: (state: OnboardingState) => void
+  /**
+   * Pay origin serving the billing catalog (GET /v1/billing/plans). The plan
+   * step renders the catalog's own prices — no price is stated here.
+   */
+  readonly payUrl: string
+}
+
+interface FlowState {
+  readonly step: StepId
+  readonly data: OnboardingState
+}
+
+type FlowAction =
+  | { type: 'advance'; patch: Partial<OnboardingState> }
+  | { type: 'back' }
+
+function reducer(state: FlowState, action: FlowAction): FlowState {
+  switch (action.type) {
+    case 'advance':
+      return { step: nextStep(state.step), data: { ...state.data, ...action.patch } }
+    case 'back': {
+      const prev = prevStep(state.step)
+      return prev ? { ...state, step: prev } : state
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+export function OnboardingFlow({ service, brandName, connectWallet, onComplete, payUrl }: OnboardingFlowProps) {
+  const [state, dispatch] = useReducer(reducer, { step: 'org', data: {} })
+
+  // Terminal step: hand the accumulated state back to the host exactly once.
+  useEffect(() => {
+    if (state.step === 'done') onComplete(state.data)
+  }, [state.step, state.data, onComplete])
+
+  const advance = useCallback((patch: Partial<OnboardingState>) => dispatch({ type: 'advance', patch }), [])
+  const back = useCallback(() => dispatch({ type: 'back' }), [])
+
+  const desc = stepById(state.step)
+  const stepIndex = STEPS.findIndex((s) => s.id === state.step)
+  const showBack = stepIndex > 0
+
+  return (
+    <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding">
+      {state.step !== 'done' && desc ? (
+        <>
+          <StepDots active={stepIndex} total={STEPS.length} />
+          <header className="hanzo-id-onboarding-head">
+            <h1>{desc.title}</h1>
+            <p className="lede">{desc.byline}</p>
+          </header>
+        </>
+      ) : null}
+
+      {state.step === 'org' ? (
+        <OrgStep service={service} onNext={advance} />
+      ) : null}
+      {state.step === 'project' ? (
+        <ProjectStep
+          service={service}
+          orgName={state.data.orgName}
+          showBack={showBack}
+          onBack={back}
+          onNext={advance}
+        />
+      ) : null}
+      {state.step === 'wallet' ? (
+        <WalletStep
+          service={service}
+          connectWallet={connectWallet}
+          showBack={showBack}
+          onBack={back}
+          onNext={advance}
+        />
+      ) : null}
+      {state.step === 'consent' ? (
+        <ConsentStep service={service} showBack={showBack} onBack={back} onNext={advance} />
+      ) : null}
+      {state.step === 'plan' ? (
+        <PlanStep service={service} payUrl={payUrl} showBack={showBack} onBack={back} onNext={advance} />
+      ) : null}
+      {state.step === 'done' ? <DoneStep brandName={brandName} data={state.data} /> : null}
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+/** Linear progress dots. */
+function StepDots({ active, total }: { active: number; total: number }) {
+  return (
+    <div className="hanzo-id-stepdots" role="progressbar" aria-valuenow={active + 1} aria-valuemax={total}>
+      {Array.from({ length: total }, (_, i) => (
+        <span key={i} className={i <= active ? 'on' : ''} aria-hidden />
+      ))}
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+// ── Step 1: organization ────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+function OrgStep({
+  service,
+  onNext,
+}: {
+  service: OnboardingService
+  onNext: (patch: Partial<OnboardingState>) => void
+}) {
+  const [displayName, setDisplayName] = useState('')
+  const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false)
+  const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
+
+  async function create(e: FormEvent) {
+    e.preventDefault()
+    const name = slugify(displayName)
+    if (!name) {
+      setError('Enter an organization name.')
+      return
+    }
+    setBusy(true)
+    setError(null)
+    const res = await service.createOrg({ name, displayName: displayName.trim() })
+    setBusy(false)
+    if (!res.ok) {
+      setError(humanizeError(res.error))
+      return
+    }
+    onNext({ orgName: res.value.name, orgCreated: true })
+  }
+
+  // Onboarding never lists other orgs' organizations — a brand-new user only
+  // ever creates their own org or skips. Listing the org directory would leak
+  // every org's name to anyone who signs up. Joining an existing org happens
+  // by invitation, handled outside this flow.
+  return (
+    <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding-body">
+      <form onSubmit={create} className="hanzo-id-form" aria-busy={busy}>
+        <label className="hanzo-id-field">
+          <span>Organization name</span>
+          <input
+            className="hanzo-id-input"
+            type="text"
+            value={displayName}
+            onChange={(e) => setDisplayName(e.target.value)}
+            placeholder="Acme Inc"
+            autoFocus
+            required
+          />
+        </label>
+        {displayName ? <p className="hanzo-id-slug-preview">slug: {slugify(displayName) || '—'}</p> : null}
+        {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
+        <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding-actions">
+          <button type="button" className="hanzo-id-btn ghost" onClick={() => onNext({})} disabled={busy}>
+            Skip for now
+          </button>
+          <button type="submit" className="hanzo-id-btn" disabled={busy}>
+            {busy ? 'Creating…' : 'Create organization'}
+          </button>
+        </div>
+      </form>
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+// ── Step 2: project (optional) ──────────────────────────────────────
+
+function ProjectStep({
+  service,
+  orgName,
+  showBack,
+  onBack,
+  onNext,
+}: {
+  service: OnboardingService
+  orgName?: string
+  showBack: boolean
+  onBack: () => void
+  onNext: (patch: Partial<OnboardingState>) => void
+}) {
+  const [displayName, setDisplayName] = useState('')
+  const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false)
+  const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
+
+  async function create(e: FormEvent) {
+    e.preventDefault()
+    if (!orgName) return // can't create a project without a home org
+    const name = slugify(displayName)
+    if (!name) {
+      setError('Enter a project name.')
+      return
+    }
+    setBusy(true)
+    setError(null)
+    const res = await service.createProject({ organization: orgName, name, displayName: displayName.trim() })
+    setBusy(false)
+    if (!res.ok) {
+      setError(humanizeError(res.error))
+      return
+    }
+    onNext({ projectName: res.value.name })
+  }
+
+  // No org was chosen (org step skipped) — a project needs a home org, so
+  // offer only to continue.
+  if (!orgName) {
+    return (
+      <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding-body">
+        <p className="hanzo-id-info">Choose an organization first to create a project. You can do this later.</p>
+        <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding-actions">
+          {showBack ? (
+            <button type="button" className="hanzo-id-btn ghost" onClick={onBack}>
+              Back
+            </button>
+          ) : null}
+          <button type="button" className="hanzo-id-btn" onClick={() => onNext({})}>
+            Continue
+          </button>
+        </div>
+      </div>
+    )
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding-body">
+      <form onSubmit={create} className="hanzo-id-form" aria-busy={busy}>
+        <label className="hanzo-id-field">
+          <span>Project name</span>
+          <input
+            className="hanzo-id-input"
+            type="text"
+            value={displayName}
+            onChange={(e) => setDisplayName(e.target.value)}
+            placeholder="Production"
+            autoFocus
+          />
+        </label>
+        {displayName ? <p className="hanzo-id-slug-preview">slug: {slugify(displayName) || '—'}</p> : null}
+        {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
+        <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding-actions">
+          {showBack ? (
+            <button type="button" className="hanzo-id-btn ghost" onClick={onBack}>
+              Back
+            </button>
+          ) : null}
+          <button type="button" className="hanzo-id-btn ghost" onClick={() => onNext({})} disabled={busy}>
+            Skip
+          </button>
+          <button type="submit" className="hanzo-id-btn" disabled={busy}>
+            {busy ? 'Creating…' : 'Create project'}
+          </button>
+        </div>
+      </form>
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+// ── Step 3: wallet (optional) ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+function WalletStep({
+  service,
+  connectWallet,
+  showBack,
+  onBack,
+  onNext,
+}: {
+  service: OnboardingService
+  connectWallet?: () => Promise<string | null>
+  showBack: boolean
+  onBack: () => void
+  onNext: (patch: Partial<OnboardingState>) => void
+}) {
+  const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false)
+  const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
+
+  async function link() {
+    if (!connectWallet) return
+    setBusy(true)
+    setError(null)
+    try {
+      const address = await connectWallet()
+      if (!address) {
+        setBusy(false)
+        return // user cancelled the wallet prompt
+      }
+      const res = await service.linkWallet(address)
+      setBusy(false)
+      if (!res.ok) {
+        setError(res.error)
+        return
+      }
+      onNext({ walletAddress: res.value })
+    } catch (e) {
+      setBusy(false)
+      setError(String(e))
+    }
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding-body">
+      {connectWallet ? null : (
+        <p className="hanzo-id-info">Wallet linking isn’t available here. You can add one later in settings.</p>
+      )}
+      {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
+      <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding-actions">
+        {showBack ? (
+          <button type="button" className="hanzo-id-btn ghost" onClick={onBack}>
+            Back
+          </button>
+        ) : null}
+        <button type="button" className="hanzo-id-btn ghost" onClick={() => onNext({})} disabled={busy}>
+          Skip
+        </button>
+        {connectWallet ? (
+          <button type="button" className="hanzo-id-btn" onClick={link} disabled={busy}>
+            {busy ? 'Connecting…' : 'Connect wallet'}
+          </button>
+        ) : null}
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+// ── Step 4: data-sharing consent ────────────────────────────────────
+
+function ConsentStep({
+  service,
+  showBack,
+  onBack,
+  onNext,
+}: {
+  service: OnboardingService
+  showBack: boolean
+  onBack: () => void
+  onNext: (patch: Partial<OnboardingState>) => void
+}) {
+  const [agreed, setAgreed] = useState(false)
+  const [busy, setBusy] = useState(false)
+  const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
+
+  // Either answer continues; the answer itself is what must exist. It is
+  // persisted on the USER (not browser storage) before the flow advances, so
+  // this page is asked exactly once per account, ever.
+  async function answer() {
+    setBusy(true)
+    setError(null)
+    const res = await service.saveOnboarding({ consent: agreed })
+    setBusy(false)
+    if (!res.ok) {
+      setError(res.error)
+      return
+    }
+    onNext({ dataSharingConsent: agreed })
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding-body">
+      <div className="hanzo-id-consent">
+        <p>
+          Sharing usage data helps improve the models and products you use. It
+          covers product usage patterns and diagnostics — never the content of
+          your conversations, code, or files. You can change this any time in
+          account settings.
+        </p>
+        <label className="hanzo-id-consent-check">
+          <input
+            type="checkbox"
+            checked={agreed}
+            onChange={(e) => setAgreed(e.target.checked)}
+          />
+          <span>I agree to share usage data to improve products and models.</span>
+        </label>
+      </div>
+      {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
+      <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding-actions">
+        {showBack ? (
+          <button type="button" className="hanzo-id-btn ghost" onClick={onBack} disabled={busy}>
+            Back
+          </button>
+        ) : null}
+        <button type="button" className="hanzo-id-btn" onClick={answer} disabled={busy}>
+          {busy ? 'Saving…' : 'Continue'}
+        </button>
+      </div>
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+// ── Step 5 (last): plan or pay-as-you-go ────────────────────────────
+
+/** Format catalog CENTS as dollars — "$9" or "$8.25", never "$9.00". */
+function usd(cents: number): string {
+  const dollars = cents / 100
+  return Number.isInteger(dollars) ? `$${dollars}` : `$${dollars.toFixed(2)}`
+}
+
+function PlanStep({
+  service,
+  payUrl,
+  showBack,
+  onBack,
+  onNext,
+}: {
+  service: OnboardingService
+  payUrl: string
+  showBack: boolean
+  onBack: () => void
+  onNext: (patch: Partial<OnboardingState>) => void
+}) {
+  const [plans, setPlans] = useState<PlanInfo[] | null>(null)
+  const [busy, setBusy] = useState<string | null>(null)
+  const [error, setError] = useState<string | null>(null)
+
+  useEffect(() => {
+    let alive = true
+    service.listPlans(payUrl).then((p) => {
+      if (alive) setPlans(p)
+    })
+    return () => {
+      alive = false
+    }
+    // payUrl is fixed for the page's life.
+    // eslint-disable-next-line react-hooks/exhaustive-deps
+  }, [])
+
+  // The choice is persisted (with completion) BEFORE the flow advances, so a
+  // user who bounces off the payment page still never re-enters onboarding —
+  // they land on the portal, where the top-up surface remains one click away.
+  async function choose(choice: string) {
+    setBusy(choice)
+    setError(null)
+    const res = await service.saveOnboarding({
+      plan: choice,
+      completedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+    })
+    setBusy(null)
+    if (!res.ok) {
+      setError(res.error)
+      return
+    }
+    onNext({ planChoice: choice })
+  }
+
+  return (
+    <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding-body">
+      {plans === null ? (
+        <p className="lede">Loading plans…</p>
+      ) : (
+        <div className="hanzo-id-plans" role="list">
+          {plans.length === 0 ? (
+            // The catalog fetch failed or came back empty. Say so — a plan
+            // picker showing ONLY pay-as-you-go with no explanation reads as
+            // "there are no plans", which is false. Pay as you go still works,
+            // and plans remain choosable later from billing.
+            <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-plans-empty">
+              Plans are unavailable right now — you can start with pay as you
+              go and pick a plan later from Billing.
+            </p>
+          ) : null}
+          {plans.map((p) => (
+            <button
+              key={p.slug}
+              type="button"
+              role="listitem"
+              className={p.popular ? 'hanzo-id-plan popular' : 'hanzo-id-plan'}
+              onClick={() => choose(p.slug)}
+              disabled={busy !== null}
+              aria-busy={busy === p.slug}
+            >
+              {p.popular ? <span className="hanzo-id-plan-badge">Popular</span> : null}
+              <span className="hanzo-id-plan-name">{p.name}</span>
+              <span className="hanzo-id-plan-price">
+                {usd(p.priceCents)}/mo
+                {p.priceAnnualCents ? <em> · {usd(p.priceAnnualCents * 12)}/yr billed annually</em> : null}
+              </span>
+              {p.description ? <span className="hanzo-id-plan-desc">{p.description}</span> : null}
+            </button>
+          ))}
+          <button
+            type="button"
+            role="listitem"
+            className="hanzo-id-plan payg"
+            onClick={() => choose('payg')}
+            disabled={busy !== null}
+            aria-busy={busy === 'payg'}
+          >
+            <span className="hanzo-id-plan-name">Pay as you go</span>
+            <span className="hanzo-id-plan-price">Prepaid balance · $5 minimum</span>
+            <span className="hanzo-id-plan-desc">
+              No subscription. Top up a balance and pay only for what you use.
+            </span>
+          </button>
+        </div>
+      )}
+      {error ? <p role="alert" className="hanzo-id-error">{error}</p> : null}
+      {showBack ? (
+        <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding-actions">
+          <button type="button" className="hanzo-id-btn ghost" onClick={onBack} disabled={busy !== null}>
+            Back
+          </button>
+        </div>
+      ) : null}
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+// ── Terminal: success ───────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+function DoneStep({ brandName, data }: { brandName: string; data: OnboardingState }) {
+  return (
+    <div className="hanzo-id-onboarding-done">
+      <h1>You’re all set</h1>
+      <p className="lede">Welcome to {brandName}.</p>
+      <dl className="hanzo-id-summary">
+        {data.orgName ? (
+          <>
+            <dt>Organization</dt>
+            <dd>{data.orgName}</dd>
+          </>
+        ) : null}
+        {data.projectName ? (
+          <>
+            <dt>Project</dt>
+            <dd>{data.projectName}</dd>
+          </>
+        ) : null}
+        {data.walletAddress ? (
+          <>
+            <dt>Wallet</dt>
+            <dd>{shortAddr(data.walletAddress)}</dd>
+          </>
+        ) : null}
+      </dl>
+    </div>
+  )
+}
+
+/**
+ * Map raw IAM errors to a human sentence. Org/project creation is admin-gated
+ * in IAM authz (`add-organization` requires the `admin` role; `add-project`
+ * default-denies for non-admins), so a normal member hits a permission error
+ * — say so plainly instead of leaking an HTTP code, and the step stays
+ * skippable so onboarding never hard-blocks.
+ */
+function humanizeError(raw: string): string {
+  const lower = raw.toLowerCase()
+  if (lower.includes('403') || lower.includes('permission') || lower.includes('not allowed') || lower.includes('unauthorized')) {
+    return 'You don’t have permission to create this here. Pick an existing organization, or ask an admin to invite you.'
+  }
+  if (lower.includes('already') || lower.includes('exist') || lower.includes('conflict') || lower.includes('409')) {
+    return 'That name is taken. Try a different one.'
+  }
+  return raw
+}
+
+/** Lower-kebab a display name into an org/project slug. */
+function slugify(s: string): string {
+  return s
+    .trim()
+    .toLowerCase()
+    .replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g, '-')
+    .replace(/^-+|-+$/g, '')
+    .slice(0, 40)
+}
+
+function shortAddr(a: string): string {
+  return a.length > 12 ? `${a.slice(0, 6)}…${a.slice(-4)}` : a
+}

pkgs/onboarding/tsconfig.json

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+{
+  "extends": "../../tsconfig.base.json",
+  "compilerOptions": {
+    "outDir": "dist",
+    "noEmit": true
+  },
+  "include": ["src"],
+  "exclude": ["src/**/*.test.ts"]
+}

pkgs/shared/package.json

@@ -1,23 +1,28 @@
 {
   "name": "@hanzo/id-shared",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
-  "description": "Shared types + tenant resolver for the Hanzo ID portal. No UI deps.",
+  "version": "0.1.4",
+  "description": "Shared types + org resolver for the Hanzo ID portal. No UI deps.",
   "license": "BSD-3-Clause",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./src/index.ts",
   "types": "./src/index.ts",
   "exports": {
     ".": "./src/index.ts",
-    "./tenant": "./src/tenant.ts",
+    "./org": "./src/org.ts",
     "./brand": "./src/brand.ts",
     "./package.json": "./package.json"
   },
-  "files": ["src"],
+  "files": [
+    "src"
+  ],
   "scripts": {
     "tc": "tsc --noEmit",
     "build": "tsc --noEmit"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "typescript": "^5.9.3"
+  },
+  "dependencies": {
+    "@hanzo/brand": "^1.4.0"
   }
 }

pkgs/shared/src/brand.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 import type { BrandContract } from './types'
 
 /**
- * Resolve a BrandContract from a tenant's brand package.
+ * Resolve a BrandContract from a org's brand package.
  *
  * Each per-org brand pkg (`@hanzo/brand`, `@luxfi/brand`, `@zooai/brand`,
  * `@parsdao/brand`) ships a `brand.json` at the package root. This loader
@@ -13,31 +13,29 @@ import type { BrandContract } from './types'
  * Vite plugin or the Express static serves the assets from each pkg's
  * `assets/` directory at this path).
  */
-export async function loadBrand(brandPackage: string, brandUrl?: string): Promise<BrandContract> {
-  // Browser: try the tenant's brandUrl (e.g. the jsDelivr-hosted brand.json
-  // from config.json) first, then the app-local /brand/<pkg>/brand.json.
-  //
-  // Branding is cosmetic — it must NEVER block the login form. The SPA server
-  // answers unknown paths with index.html (HTTP 200, text/html) for client-
-  // side routing, so a missing brand.json comes back as HTML, not a 404. We
-  // therefore reject any non-JSON response and, if every candidate fails,
-  // return a minimal fallback brand so the app still renders. (Previously this
-  // did `res.json()` on the HTML fallback → "Unexpected token '<'" → blank page.)
+export async function loadBrand(brandPackage: string): Promise<BrandContract> {
+  // Browser: served by the app from /brand/<pkg>/brand.json. The brand is
+  // purely cosmetic, so a transient fetch failure must NEVER blank the login
+  // form. Retry the (occasionally 502-flaky) asset a few times, then fall back
+  // to a neutral brand so the form always renders.
   if (typeof window !== 'undefined') {
-    const candidates = [brandUrl, `/brand/${brandPackage}/brand.json`].filter(
-      (u): u is string => typeof u === 'string' && u.length > 0,
-    )
-    for (const url of candidates) {
+    // Flat, encoding-safe path emitted by the Vite brandJsonPlugin:
+    // `@hanzo/brand` -> `/brand/hanzo.json`. A nested `@scope/brand/brand.json`
+    // URL cannot be served by the production static server (literal `@` +
+    // encoded `%2F` miss the on-disk file -> SPA catch-all returns index.html).
+    const slug = brandPackage.replace(/^@/, '').split('/')[0] ?? 'hanzo'
+    const url = `/brand/${slug}.json`
+    for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt++) {
       try {
         const res = await fetch(url, { cache: 'no-store' })
-        if (!res.ok) continue
-        const ct = res.headers.get('content-type') ?? ''
-        if (!ct.includes('json')) continue // SPA fallback HTML — not our brand.json
-        const raw = (await res.json()) as { brand?: BrandContract }
-        if (raw?.brand) return raw.brand
+        if (res.ok) {
+          const raw = await res.json()
+          return raw.brand as BrandContract
+        }
       } catch {
-        // try the next candidate
+        // network error — fall through to retry
       }
+      if (attempt < 2) await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 150 * (attempt + 1)))
     }
     return fallbackBrand(brandPackage)
   }
@@ -49,20 +47,22 @@ export async function loadBrand(brandPackage: string, brandUrl?: string): Promis
 }
 
 /**
- * Minimal brand used only when no brand.json could be loaded — keeps the login
- * form rendering. Derives a display name from the package scope
- * (`@hanzo/brand` → "Hanzo").
+ * Last-resort brand when the asset is unreachable after retries. Keeps the
+ * login form usable (a generic heading) instead of blanking the page. The
+ * display name is derived from the pkg scope (`@hanzo/brand` -> "Hanzo"); the
+ * few orgs whose scope differs from their display name are mapped.
  */
 function fallbackBrand(brandPackage: string): BrandContract {
-  const scope = brandPackage.match(/@([^/]+)\//)?.[1] ?? 'hanzo'
-  const name = scope.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + scope.slice(1)
+  const scope = brandPackage.replace(/^@/, '').split('/')[0] ?? 'hanzo'
+  const overrides: Record<string, string> = { luxfi: 'Lux', zooai: 'Zoo', parsdao: 'Pars' }
+  const name = overrides[scope] ?? scope.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + scope.slice(1)
   return {
     name,
-    title: 'Sign in',
+    title: name,
     description: '',
     appDomain: '',
     logoUrl: '',
-    faviconUrl: 'data:,',
+    faviconUrl: '',
   }
 }
 
@@ -76,6 +76,24 @@ export interface BrandRuntime {
   readonly accentColor?: string
 }
 
+/**
+ * Neutral identity-portal label — always "<Brand> ID". `BrandContract.name`
+ * is meant to be the bare org display ("Lux"), but some brand packages ship
+ * the product name ("Lux Exchange" / "Zoo Exchange"), which leaks a sibling
+ * surface into the IAM portal heading + tab title. Prefer the org orgId
+ * ("lux" → "Lux"); otherwise strip a trailing product word from the brand
+ * name. So id.lux.network reads "Lux ID", never "Lux Exchange".
+ */
+export function idBrandLabel(brand: { name: string }, orgId?: string): string {
+  const cap = (s: string) => (s ? s.charAt(0).toUpperCase() + s.slice(1) : '')
+  const short =
+    cap((orgId ?? '').trim()) ||
+    (brand.name ?? '').replace(/\s+(Exchange|Network|Labs|Foundation|DAO|Wallet)\b.*$/i, '').trim() ||
+    brand.name ||
+    'Account'
+  return `${short} ID`
+}
+
 export function toBrandRuntime(b: BrandContract): BrandRuntime {
   return {
     name: b.name,

pkgs/shared/src/index.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-export * from './tenant'
+export * from './org'
 export * from './brand'
 export * from './types'