refactor(papers): broad-market reposition — drop -DEF- IDs, clean titles, soften defense framing

- Doc IDs: HAI-DEF-2026-0XX / HZO-DEF-2026-0XX -> HAI-2026-0XX / HZO-2026-0XX.
- hanzo-vs-claude title cut to the clean headline 'Sovereign vs. Closed: Hanzo AI versus
  Centralized Cloud AI' (dropped the 'for Defense and Regulated Workloads' blur).
- 6 strategy papers repositioned defense-first -> broad-market (regulated industries,
  critical infrastructure, enterprise, government — defense as one application).
- Compendium retitled 'Hanzo — Technical Paper Compendium'.
- Site: vs-claude subtitle cleaned; blanket 'Defense' tag -> 'Sovereign AI' (16 cards).

defense/hanzo-agentic-ai.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{Agentic AI for Autonomous Cyber Operations\\and Multi-Domain Intelligence Fusion}
-\docid{HAI-DEF-2026-008}
+\docid{HAI-2026-008}
 \docversion{Version 1.0 --- February 21, 2026}
 \docdate{February 2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}

defense/hanzo-agentic-prowess.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{Agentic Engineering at Regulated Scale:\\Building a Post-Quantum, FHE-Native\\Securities Platform}
-\docid{HAI-DEF-2026-013}
+\docid{HAI-2026-013}
 \docversion{Version 1.0}
 \docdate{2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}
@@ -24,8 +24,9 @@ production in record time with a small team, and passed FINRA/SEC approval and S
 compliance. This is not template web
 software; it is among the most compliance-heavy and cryptographically advanced
 software domains that exists. We describe the throughput of the agentic
-engineering method that produced it, and we expand on the defense relevance of
-its FHE layer---computing on data one is not permitted to see.
+engineering method that produced it, and we expand on the broad applicability of
+its FHE layer---computing on data one is not permitted to see---across regulated
+industries and government, defense included.
 \end{abstract}
 
 \paragraph{Executive Summary.}
@@ -44,8 +45,8 @@ lines of code cut to 1.06M active---shipped fast with a small team, and cleared
 FINRA/SEC approval and SOC\,2. Regulated financial infrastructure is one of the hardest,
 most audited software domains there is; clearing it on a cryptographically
 advanced foundation is the proof that agent-driven engineering is production-grade,
-not a demo---and that it is exactly the capability needed to modernize defense
-software stacks.
+not a demo---and that it is exactly the capability needed to modernize the
+software stacks of regulated enterprises and government alike, defense among them.
 
 \tableofcontents
 \newpage
@@ -116,7 +117,9 @@ FINRA/SEC approval and SOC\,2.
 The economic consequence is direct and measured. When one engineer, multiplied by the
 agentic stack, produces what a team produces, the \textbf{cost per line of shipped,
 audited, production code} collapses---here, \textbf{\$0.0006 per line} by the audit's own
-methodology, orders of magnitude below conventional team rates. For a defense or government program the implication is the whole argument:
+methodology, orders of magnitude below conventional team rates. For any
+regulated enterprise or government program (defense included) the implication is
+the whole argument:
 the same regulated, post-quantum, FHE-native system, delivered by a fraction of the
 headcount at a fraction of the cost---and owned, not rented. This is what ``agentic
 engineering'' means in practice---not a chatbot writing snippets, but one expert
@@ -144,46 +147,57 @@ each element of which is independently hard:
 \end{itemize}
 
 A team that can compose post-quantum cryptography, a GPU blockchain, and FHE into
-a system that clears securities regulators is a team that can modernize a defense
-software stack to the same foundation.
+a system that clears securities regulators is a team that can modernize a
+high-assurance software stack---in healthcare, finance, critical infrastructure,
+or government, defense included---to the same foundation.
 
 % ============================================================================
-\section{FHE for the Military: Computing on Data You Cannot See}
+\section{FHE for High-Stakes Computation: Computing on Data You Cannot See}
 % ============================================================================
 
-Fully homomorphic encryption is the capability with the sharpest defense upside,
-so it is worth drawing out. FHE allows arbitrary computation directly on encrypted
+Fully homomorphic encryption is the capability with the broadest reach across
+high-stakes domains, so it is worth drawing out. FHE allows arbitrary computation
+directly on encrypted
 data: the operator performs the computation and returns an encrypted result
 without ever decrypting the inputs, and only the data owner (or a threshold of
 keyholders) can decrypt the output. The system doing the work never sees the
 plaintext. In the securities platform this protects order and ownership data; the
-same primitive answers several defense problems that have no clean classical
+same primitive answers a range of problems---in regulated industry, multi-party
+commerce, and government (defense included)---that have no clean classical
 solution:
 
 \begin{itemize}
-  \item \textbf{Cross-domain transfer on ciphertext.} A cross-domain guard can
-  evaluate a release policy against encrypted content and decide whether data may
-  move between security levels \emph{without ever seeing the data}---removing the
-  guard itself as a point of compromise (developed in the cross-domain paper).
-  \item \textbf{Coalition analytics without disclosure.} Allies can compute a
-  joint result---shared targets, overlapping indicators, combined logistics---over
-  their combined data while each party's raw data stays encrypted and private.
-  Nobody has to surrender sources or methods to get the joint answer.
-  \item \textbf{Private intelligence fusion.} Multi-source correlation can run
-  while the sources remain encrypted, so a breach of the fusion system does not
-  expose the underlying collection.
-  \item \textbf{Encrypted ML inference.} A model can classify encrypted imagery or
-  signals: the data owner never exposes the input, and the model operator never
-  sees it---useful when the data is sensitive, the model is sensitive, or both.
+  \item \textbf{Private healthcare and population analytics.} Hospitals and
+  researchers can compute statistics, risk scores, or model inferences over
+  patient records while the records themselves stay encrypted---enabling
+  collaboration on protected health information without exposing it.
+  \item \textbf{Multi-party financial computation.} Banks, exchanges, and
+  counterparties can compute a joint result---netting, exposure, fraud
+  signals---over their combined data while each party's books stay encrypted and
+  private, so no participant has to surrender its raw positions to get the answer.
+  \item \textbf{Confidential supply-chain analytics.} Suppliers and buyers can
+  reconcile inventory, demand, or provenance across organizations without any
+  party revealing its underlying commercial data.
   \item \textbf{Computation on untrusted infrastructure.} Sensitive workloads can
-  run on contractor or shared infrastructure without exposing the data to the host.
+  run on shared or third-party cloud infrastructure without ever exposing the data
+  to the host---widening where a regulated workload may legally run.
+  \item \textbf{Encrypted ML inference.} A model can classify encrypted images,
+  documents, or signals: the data owner never exposes the input, and the model
+  operator never sees it---useful when the data is sensitive, the model is
+  sensitive, or both.
+  \item \textbf{Cross-organization data fusion without disclosure.} Multiple
+  parties can correlate multi-source data while each source stays encrypted, so a
+  breach of the fusion system does not expose the underlying inputs. In a defense
+  setting this is the cross-domain and multi-party (coalition) case---a guard
+  evaluates a release policy against encrypted content, or allies compute a joint
+  result, without ever seeing the data (developed in the cross-domain paper).
 \end{itemize}
 
 FHE's historical objection is speed; the practical answer in this stack is
 GPU acceleration of the underlying number-theoretic transforms, plus threshold
 decryption so no single party holds the key. ``Compute on data you are not allowed
-to see'' is a capability defense has wanted for decades; here it is a production
-component, not a research slide.
+to see'' is a capability high-stakes domains have wanted for decades---defense
+among them; here it is a production component, not a research slide.
 
 % ============================================================================
 \section{Why Open Source Was the Accelerant}
@@ -203,7 +217,8 @@ rebuild identity, key management, or a gateway for each new system; you compose
 owned, hardened components and point the agents at the application on top. That is
 how a regulated platform of this scope reaches production fast---and lean.
 
-For defense, open source inverts the usual security argument. A closed system asks
+For any high-assurance buyer, open source inverts the usual security argument. A
+closed system asks
 you to trust a vendor you cannot inspect; an open one lets you read every line,
 verify it---here, with machine-checked proofs---confirm there are no hidden
 backdoors, and run it on hardware you control. Auditable beats opaque whenever the
@@ -211,24 +226,27 @@ stakes are high. Open source is therefore not a cost-cutting compromise: it is
 simultaneously the source of \textbf{velocity} (compose, do not rebuild), of
 \textbf{security} (inspectable and formally verifiable), and of \textbf{sovereignty}
 (own it, modify it, run it anywhere, including air-gapped). The three properties a
-defense program most wants are the same three that made the build fast.
+regulated or government program most wants---defense included---are the same three
+that made the build fast.
 
 Stated plainly as a hook: \emph{Hanzo builds massive, secure systems quickly
 because it builds on an open-source stack it owns---so the speed, the security, and
 the sovereignty all come from the same source.}
 
 % ============================================================================
-\section{Why It Matters for Defense Modernization}
+\section{Why It Matters for Regulated and Government Modernization}
 % ============================================================================
 
 The throughput and the difficulty compound. The same agentic engineering method
 that shipped a regulated, post-quantum, FHE-native securities exchange fast and
-small is the method Hanzo brings to defense and government modernization: take an
-existing, already-accredited stack and modernize it in place---to a sovereign,
+small is the method Hanzo brings to any regulated-enterprise or government
+modernization---healthcare, finance, critical infrastructure, and defense alike:
+take an existing, audited (and, for government systems, already-accredited) stack
+and modernize it in place---to a sovereign,
 post-quantum, self-hostable footprint with FHE-grade privacy---faster and cheaper
 than a traditional rebuild, and owned by the operator. The securities venue is the
 existence proof that the method holds up under the most demanding regulatory and
-cryptographic constraints civilian software offers; defense modernization is the
-same engine pointed at the mission.
+cryptographic constraints production software offers; every other high-assurance
+modernization---defense among them---is the same engine pointed at a new mission.
 
 \end{document}

defense/hanzo-assured-networking.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{Post-Quantum Resilient Mesh Networking\\for Maritime and Tactical Edge Operations}
-\docid{HZO-DEF-2026-001}
+\docid{HZO-2026-001}
 \docversion{Version 1.0 --- January 15, 2026}
 \docdate{January 2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}

defense/hanzo-cloud-economics.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{Cloud Economics of a Sovereign OSS Stack:\\A Regulated Capital-Markets\\Migration Case Study}
-\docid{HAI-DEF-2026-012}
+\docid{HAI-2026-012}
 \docversion{Version 1.0}
 \docdate{2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}
@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ lines ($\approx$70\% less code; $\sim$3.5\,M lines of dead code deleted) running
 3 compiled Go binaries plus a small set of OSS platform services, carried through
 FINRA/SEC approval and SOC\,2. We decompose where the savings come from, report the
 figures with their provenance, and argue the same mechanism applies directly to
-government-contractor and defense modernization.
+any regulated enterprise or government modernization---defense among them---
+carrying a metered-API-plus-hyperscaler-sprawl cost structure.
 \end{abstract}
 
 \paragraph{Executive Summary.}
@@ -49,9 +50,11 @@ stack collapsed 200+ legacy microservices into 3 compiled Go binaries plus a sma
 set of OSS platform services, cutting the active codebase from $\sim$3.07\,M to
 $\sim$1.06\,M lines (deleting roughly 3.5\,M lines of dead code and eliminating
 1.3\,GB of vendored dependencies)---and still cleared the bar of a heavily
-regulated, audited domain (FINRA/SEC approval, SOC\,2). For a government
-contractor the lesson is concrete: the same approach modernizes an existing,
-already-accredited stack to a sovereign, self-hosted footprint that is far cheaper
+regulated, audited domain (FINRA/SEC approval, SOC\,2). For any organization
+carrying a similar cost structure---a healthcare provider, a financial firm, a
+critical-infrastructure operator, or a government contractor---the lesson is
+concrete: the same approach modernizes an existing stack to a sovereign,
+self-hosted footprint that is far cheaper
 to run, smaller to maintain, and faster to build.
 
 \tableofcontents
@@ -235,19 +238,22 @@ in financial services, among the most compliance-heavy software environments tha
 exists.
 
 % ============================================================================
-\section{Implications for Government Contractors}
+\section{Implications for Regulated and Government Modernization}
 % ============================================================================
 
-The same motion transfers directly to defense and government modernization. A
-contractor with an existing, already-accredited software stack does not need to
-re-accredit from zero; the agentic stack can modernize that stack in place---to a
+The same motion transfers directly to any regulated-enterprise or government
+modernization---a healthcare system, a bank, a utility, or a government
+contractor (defense included). An organization with an existing, audited (and,
+for government systems, already-accredited) software stack does not need to
+rebuild from zero; the agentic stack can modernize that stack in place---to a
 post-quantum, sovereign, self-hostable footprint---while the consolidation cuts
 recurring infrastructure cost by an order of magnitude, shrinks the codebase that
-must be maintained and accredited, and removes single-vendor dependency. The wedge
+must be maintained (and, where applicable, accredited), and removes single-vendor
+dependency. The wedge
 is low-friction (modernize what you already have, with proofs), the savings are
 immediate and structural, and the result is software the operator owns and can run
-where the data lives. A regulated financial platform is the existence proof;
-defense modernization is the same pattern.
+where the data lives. A regulated financial platform is the existence proof; the
+same pattern applies anywhere the cost structure and the compliance burden repeat.
 
 \paragraph{A note on figures.} Cost figures are drawn from the client's actual GCP
 billing-console data after promotional credits expired (a more defensible basis than

defense/hanzo-compendium.tex

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 \usepackage{hyperref}
 \usepackage{bookmark}
 \hypersetup{
-  pdftitle={Hanzo Defense and Reindustrialization --- Paper Compendium},
+  pdftitle={Hanzo --- Technical Paper Compendium},
   pdfauthor={Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Industries},
   colorlinks=true, linkcolor=black, urlcolor=black,
   bookmarksopen=true, bookmarksnumbered=false}
@@ -18,11 +18,11 @@
 
 % ---- Clickable contents page (internal links — work with no website) -------
 \thispagestyle{empty}
-{\Large\bfseries Hanzo --- Defense \& Reindustrialization}\\[2pt]
-{\large Paper Compendium}\\[1.5em]
-{\footnotesize\color{gray}Sovereign AI, robotics, post-quantum, and on-chain coordination for the American
-industrial base. Click any title to jump to the paper; the PDF bookmark sidebar also navigates the suite.
-The full suite is published at papers.hanzo.ai.}\\[1.5em]
+{\Large\bfseries Hanzo --- Technical Paper Compendium}\\[2pt]
+{\large Sovereign AI, Post-Quantum, FHE \& Agentic Engineering}\\[1.5em]
+{\footnotesize\color{gray}Owned, self-hostable AI and cryptography for regulated industries, critical
+infrastructure, and government. Click any title to jump to the paper; the PDF bookmark sidebar also navigates
+the suite. The full suite is published at papers.hanzo.ai.}\\[1.5em]
 
 \textbf{Start here}\\[0.4em]
 \begin{tabular}{@{}p{0.96\linewidth}@{}}

defense/hanzo-compliance.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{Hanzo AI for Compliance:\\An OSS Cloud Built to Pass the Audit}
-\docid{HAI-DEF-2026-016}
+\docid{HAI-2026-016}
 \docversion{Version 1.0}
 \docdate{2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@
 
 \begin{abstract}
 Compliance is, in operational terms, an evidence-production problem. An auditor
-for SOC~2, an examiner for FINRA/SEC, or an assessor for a defense Authority to
+for SOC~2 or ISO~27001, an examiner for FINRA/SEC, a HIPAA assessor, or---for a
+government system---an assessor for an Authority to
 Operate (ATO) does not primarily ask whether a system \emph{could} be secure; they
 ask the operator to \emph{produce the artifacts} that demonstrate a control is
 designed and operating---access reviews, key-rotation records, immutable logs,
@@ -57,11 +58,12 @@ financial-recordkeeping rules that demand write-once records and supports
 non-repudiation. Builds are reproducible and policy is code, so change-control
 evidence is generated automatically. And the cryptography is not merely tested but
 \emph{proved}---machine-checked theorems re-verified on every commit. The net effect
-is that SOC~2, FINRA/SEC, and the RMF/ATO process become tractable: less code to
-assess, a smaller accreditation boundary, and an evidence pipeline that is collected
-continuously rather than re-earned from scratch each year. For a defense or
-government program, modernizing onto this stack means inheriting the audit pipeline,
-not building it.
+is that SOC~2, ISO~27001, FINRA/SEC, HIPAA, and---for government systems---the
+RMF/ATO process all become tractable: less code to
+assess, a smaller audit boundary, and an evidence pipeline that is collected
+continuously rather than re-earned from scratch each year. For any regulated
+enterprise or government program---defense included---modernizing onto this stack
+means inheriting the audit pipeline, not building it.
 
 \tableofcontents
 \newpage
@@ -300,7 +302,8 @@ underlies all five criteria, the evidence collected once is reused across the re
 rather than re-gathered per criterion.
 
 \paragraph{The same evidence translates.} The reason one stack serves SOC~2,
-FINRA/SEC, and a defense ATO simultaneously is that the underlying control objectives
+ISO~27001, FINRA/SEC, and HIPAA---and, for government systems, an ATO---
+simultaneously is that the underlying control objectives
 overlap heavily---access control, confidentiality, audit integrity, change control,
 cryptographic correctness---and differ mainly in the framework's vocabulary and the
 assessor's authority. An append-only signed ledger is ``AU-9 protection of audit
@@ -336,9 +339,9 @@ lines of dead code deleted}, around a 65--70\% reduction. The consolidated rebui
 also remediated the security-finding backlog of the legacy estate (on the order of
 90+ findings) at the architectural level. This is the second, quieter half of why the
 audit was tractable: \emph{every line of code and every service is attack surface that
-an auditor and an accreditor must reason about}. Cutting the codebase by two-thirds and
+an auditor or accreditor must reason about}. Cutting the codebase by two-thirds and
 the runtime from a sprawl of services to three binaries shrinks the examination
-surface, the SOC~2 system description, and---for the defense analogue---the
+surface, the SOC~2 system description, and---for a government system---the
 authorization boundary. Less code plus centralized IAM/KMS/audit is a smaller,
 cheaper, faster audit. The consolidation and the evidence-by-construction property are
 the same lever viewed from two sides: one reduces \emph{what} must be proven, the other
@@ -382,21 +385,24 @@ evidence is current (continuous), which is precisely the posture continuous
 authorization is meant to reward.
 
 % ============================================================================
-\section{Why It Matters for Defense and Government}
+\section{Why It Matters Across Regulated Industries and Government}
 % ============================================================================
 
-A contractor or agency modernizing onto this stack inherits the evidence pipeline
-rather than building one. The same properties that make a commercial SOC~2 and a
-FINRA/SEC examination tractable are the properties an RMF assessment and an ATO
+Any organization modernizing onto this stack---a healthcare provider, a financial
+firm, a critical-infrastructure operator, or a government contractor or agency
+(defense included)---inherits the evidence pipeline
+rather than building one. The same properties that make a commercial SOC~2,
+ISO~27001, FINRA/SEC, or HIPAA audit tractable are the properties a government
+RMF assessment and an ATO
 package require: centralized least-privilege identity (AC/IA), no plaintext secrets
 and managed keys (SC), a tamper-evident non-repudiable audit trail (AU), reproducible
 builds and configuration-as-code (CM), and machine-checked cryptographic correctness
 (SC/SA). Because the stack is sovereign, open-source, and self-hostable, it can be
-deployed in the environments accreditation demands---on-premises, air-gapped, at the
+deployed in the environments these regimes demand---on-premises, air-gapped, at the
 edge---without renting from a closed vendor, and an assessor can inspect the entire
 path the evidence takes rather than trusting a black box. The cryptography is
 post-quantum, so the records and identities survive the retention horizon that
-defense and financial archives both require.
+financial, healthcare, and government archives all require.
 
 This compliance posture is one facet of a broader sovereign stack built by Hanzo
 AI---an American-owned applied-AI lab and venture studio (Techstars~'17, founded
@@ -453,12 +459,16 @@ evidence, an immutable signed on-chain log emits tamper-evident and non-repudiab
 audit evidence, reproducible builds and policy-as-code emit change-control evidence,
 and 50 machine-checked proofs plus NIST KAT validation emit cryptographic assurance
 that is proved rather than asserted. The same evidence maps across SOC~2's five Trust
-Services Criteria, FINRA/SEC recordkeeping, and the NIST~800-53 families that
-underpin RMF and the ATO process---so one stack serves the commercial, financial, and
-defense frameworks at once. A production case shows it carrying a regulated securities
+Services Criteria, ISO~27001, FINRA/SEC recordkeeping, HIPAA, and the NIST~800-53
+families that
+underpin RMF and the ATO process---so one stack serves the commercial, financial,
+healthcare, and government frameworks (defense included) at once. A production case
+shows it carrying a regulated securities
 platform through FINRA/SEC and SOC~2 with a small team, while a $200{+}$-microservice
-to 3-binary consolidation shrank the surface that had to be audited and accredited.
-For a defense or government program, the consequence is direct: modernize on this
+to 3-binary consolidation shrank the surface that had to be audited (and, for a
+government system, accredited).
+For any regulated enterprise or government program---defense included---the
+consequence is direct: modernize on this
 stack and inherit the audit pipeline---sovereign, auditable, post-quantum, and
 continuous---rather than rebuild it from scratch each cycle.
 

defense/hanzo-countermeasures.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{Quantum-Resistant Counter-Exploitation:\\Confidential Compute and Coercion-Resistant\\Communications}
-\docid{HZO-DEF-2026-005}
+\docid{HZO-2026-005}
 \docversion{Version 1.0 --- February 7, 2026}
 \docdate{February 2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}

defense/hanzo-cross-domain.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{Multi-Level Security and Cross-Domain Solutions\\via Homomorphic Policy Evaluation\\and Zero-Trust Fabric}
-\docid{HAI-DEF-2026-007}
+\docid{HAI-2026-007}
 \docversion{Version 1.0 --- February 18, 2026}
 \docdate{February 2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}

defense/hanzo-edge-ai-ml.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{Edge-Deployable AI/ML Framework for\\Disconnected Tactical Environments}
-\docid{HZO-DEF-2026-003}
+\docid{HZO-2026-003}
 \docversion{Version 1.0 --- January 29, 2026}
 \docdate{January 2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}

defense/hanzo-fhe-native.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{Confidential Computing by Default:\\An FHE-Native Chain and\\Agent Runtime}
-\docid{HAI-DEF-2026-014}
+\docid{HAI-2026-014}
 \docversion{Version 1.0}
 \docdate{2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ that state stays encrypted on-chain, policies are evaluated over ciphertext, and
 agents act on data they are never able to read. We give the cryptographic basis
 (BFV/BGV/CKKS/TFHE with threshold decryption), the GPU acceleration that makes it
 practical, the post-quantum anchoring that protects it for the long term, the
-defense applications it unlocks, and an explicit, honest assessment of which
+applications it unlocks across regulated industry, multi-party commerce, and
+government (defense included), and an explicit, honest assessment of which
 components are production today versus an active research frontier.
 \end{abstract}
 
@@ -35,11 +36,14 @@ the work \emph{while the data stays encrypted}: it takes in ciphertext, produces
 ciphertext answer, and never sees the plaintext. Hanzo pushes this idea through the
 whole stack. The blockchain stores encrypted state and can enforce rules on
 encrypted data; agents can act on encrypted data and return encrypted answers; and
-only a quorum of keyholders can ever decrypt---no single party holds the key. For
-defense this is directly useful: allies can compute a joint answer without sharing
-raw data, a cross-domain guard can decide whether something is releasable without
-seeing its content, and sensitive workloads can run on infrastructure you do not
-fully control without exposing the data to the host. FHE's historical objection is
+only a quorum of keyholders can ever decrypt---no single party holds the key. This
+is directly useful wherever the stakes are high: hospitals can compute over
+patient records without exposing them, financial counterparties can compute a
+joint result without sharing their books, and sensitive workloads can run on
+infrastructure you do not fully control without exposing the data to the host. The
+same shape serves government and defense---allies can compute a joint answer
+without sharing raw data, and a cross-domain guard can decide whether something is
+releasable without seeing its content. FHE's historical objection is
 speed; the practical answer here is GPU acceleration plus running only the
 sensitive part of a computation under encryption. The result is a stack where
 confidentiality is the default state of data in use, not just data at rest or in
@@ -134,7 +138,8 @@ rules are evaluated homomorphically, so validators advance the ledger
   encrypted yes/no that gates the state update. The rule is enforced without the
   rule-evaluator learning the balance.
   \item \textbf{Threshold-gated disclosure.} When a value must be revealed---a
-  settlement, an audit, a court order, a coalition release decision---a threshold of
+  settlement, an audit, a court order, a cross-organization release decision---a
+  threshold of
   keyholders cooperates to decrypt exactly that value, and the decryption itself is
   recorded. Disclosure becomes an explicit, quorum-authorized, logged event rather
   than a default.
@@ -184,8 +189,9 @@ builds on, because most high-consequence decisions are policy decisions over
 sensitive inputs:
 
 \begin{itemize}
-  \item \textbf{Releasability} --- ``may this datum cross to that security domain /
-  that coalition partner?'' decided on the encrypted datum (see cross-domain paper).
+  \item \textbf{Releasability} --- ``may this datum cross to that domain /
+  that external partner?'' decided on the encrypted datum (a cross-domain or
+  coalition guard is the defense instance; see cross-domain paper).
   \item \textbf{Eligibility / authorization} --- ``does this party satisfy the
   conditions?'' decided without revealing the party's attributes.
   \item \textbf{Thresholds and limits} --- ``is the aggregate over/under the line?''
@@ -201,34 +207,46 @@ candidate for threshold decryption. Confidentiality becomes programmable: you wr
 the rule once and it runs blind.
 
 % ============================================================================
-\section{Defense Applications}
+\section{High-Stakes Applications}
 % ============================================================================
 
 The combination of an encrypted ledger and operator-blind agents answers a set of
-defense problems that have no clean classical solution:
+problems---across regulated industry, multi-party commerce, and government
+(defense included)---that have no clean classical solution:
 
 \begin{itemize}
-  \item \textbf{Coalition analytics without disclosure.} Partners compute a joint
-  result---shared targets, overlapping indicators, combined logistics---over their
-  combined data while each party's raw data stays encrypted. Nobody surrenders
-  sources or methods to get the joint answer, and the chain records that the
-  computation occurred.
-  \item \textbf{Cross-domain transfer on ciphertext.} A guard evaluates a release
-  policy against encrypted content and decides movement between security levels
-  without ever seeing the content, removing the guard itself as a data tap.
-  \item \textbf{Private intelligence fusion.} Multi-source correlation runs while
+  \item \textbf{Private healthcare and population analytics.} Hospitals and
+  researchers compute statistics, risk scores, or model inferences over patient
+  records while the records stay encrypted, so collaboration on protected health
+  information never requires exposing it.
+  \item \textbf{Multi-party computation without disclosure.} Independent parties
+  compute a joint result---netting and exposure between financial counterparties,
+  overlapping indicators between organizations, combined logistics between
+  partners---over their combined data while each party's raw data stays encrypted.
+  Nobody surrenders sources or proprietary data to get the joint answer, and the
+  chain records that the computation occurred. (In a defense setting this is
+  coalition analytics among allies.)
+  \item \textbf{Releasability on ciphertext.} A guard evaluates a release
+  policy against encrypted content and decides whether it may move between domains
+  without ever seeing the content, removing the guard itself as a data tap---the
+  pattern behind both commercial data-sharing controls and a defense cross-domain
+  guard.
+  \item \textbf{Private data fusion.} Multi-source correlation runs while
   the sources stay encrypted, so a breach of the fusion system does not expose the
-  underlying collection.
-  \item \textbf{Encrypted ML inference.} A model classifies encrypted imagery or
-  signals: the data owner never exposes the input and the model operator never sees
-  it---useful when the data is sensitive, the model is sensitive, or both.
-  \item \textbf{Encrypted command, targeting, and logistics state.} Orders,
-  target lists, and movement tables live as encrypted on-chain state with an
+  underlying inputs---whether those are commercial datasets or intelligence
+  collection.
+  \item \textbf{Encrypted ML inference.} A model classifies encrypted images,
+  documents, or signals: the data owner never exposes the input and the model
+  operator never sees it---useful when the data is sensitive, the model is
+  sensitive, or both.
+  \item \textbf{Encrypted operational state.} Records, work lists, and movement
+  tables---an order book, a supply chain, or, in a defense setting, command,
+  targeting, and logistics state---live as encrypted on-chain state with an
   immutable, post-quantum audit trail; agents act on them under encryption; reveal
   is quorum-gated and logged.
   \item \textbf{Computation on untrusted infrastructure.} Sensitive workloads run on
-  contractor, coalition, or commercial-cloud hardware without exposing the data to
-  the host---widening where a mission can compute.
+  third-party, shared, or commercial-cloud hardware without exposing the data to
+  the host---widening where a regulated workload can legally compute.
 \end{itemize}
 
 % ============================================================================
@@ -264,11 +282,13 @@ inference are now practical, and GPU acceleration keeps widening the set.''
 
 A confidentiality system is only as strong as its key handling. The design holds
 the decryption key nowhere: threshold decryption splits it $t$-of-$n$ across
-independent parties (validators, agencies, coalition members) so that decrypting
+independent parties (validators, regulators, partner organizations, or coalition
+members) so that decrypting
 any value requires an explicit quorum and no minority---and no single compromised
 host, insider, or seized server---can reveal anything. This is the structural
 answer to ``who can see the data?'': by construction, \emph{nobody}, until enough
-authorized parties agree, and that agreement is itself recorded on the chain.
+authorized parties agree (validators, agencies, partner organizations, or
+coalition members), and that agreement is itself recorded on the chain.
 
 % ============================================================================
 \section{Composition With the Rest of the Stack}
@@ -289,7 +309,8 @@ end-to-end, which is what makes the ``native'' claim real:
 \end{itemize}
 
 Because all four are owned and open, the confidentiality guarantee is auditable
-rather than asserted: a defense customer can inspect the whole path the data takes
+rather than asserted: any high-assurance customer---a regulated enterprise, a
+government agency, or a defense program---can inspect the whole path the data takes
 and confirm there is no point where it is silently in the clear.
 
 % ============================================================================
@@ -323,8 +344,10 @@ expose the capability.
 % ============================================================================
 
 Confidentiality of data \emph{in use} is the unsolved third of the problem, and it
-is the one that matters most for coalition operations, cross-domain movement,
-intelligence fusion, and computing on infrastructure you do not own. FHE closes the
+is the one that matters most for multi-party computation, private analytics,
+cross-organization data sharing, and computing on infrastructure you do not
+own---and, in government and defense, for coalition operations, cross-domain
+movement, and intelligence fusion. FHE closes the
 plaintext gap by computing on ciphertext; threshold decryption removes the single
 point of trust; GPU acceleration and selective application make the important
 workloads practical; and post-quantum anchoring protects the encrypted record for

defense/hanzo-formal-verification.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{Machine-Checked Proofs and Automated Verification\\for Post-Quantum Distributed Systems}
-\docid{HAI-DEF-2026-010}
+\docid{HAI-2026-010}
 \docversion{Version 1.0 --- February 28, 2026}
 \docdate{February 2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}

defense/hanzo-full-spectrum-cyber.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{FIPS 203/204/205 Compliant Cryptographic\\Architecture for Naval Information Dominance}
-\docid{HZO-DEF-2026-002}
+\docid{HZO-2026-002}
 \docversion{Version 1.0 --- January 22, 2026}
 \docdate{January 2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}

defense/hanzo-quantum-sensing-qkd.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{Quantum Key Distribution and Quantum Sensing\\Integration for Post-Quantum Blockchain\\Consensus and Threshold Cryptography}
-\docid{HAI-DEF-2026-009}
+\docid{HAI-2026-009}
 \docversion{Version 1.0 --- February 27, 2026}
 \docdate{February 2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}

defense/hanzo-security.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{Hanzo AI for Security:\\Automated, Agentic Security Auditing\\at Estate Scale}
-\docid{HAI-DEF-2026-015}
+\docid{HAI-2026-015}
 \docversion{Version 1.0}
 \docdate{2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}
@@ -58,8 +58,8 @@ $\sim$3.5 million lines of dead code, a reduction in attack surface that no amou
 of patching can equal. The same properties that made this possible---owned
 models, an open and auditable stack, secrets in a KMS, post-quantum identity, and
 a cryptographically signed, immutable audit trail---are exactly the properties a
-defense Authorization to Operate (ATO) and a continuous-authorization posture
-require.
+SOC~2 audit, a FINRA/SEC examination, an ISO~27001 certification, and (for
+government systems) a continuous-authorization posture all require.
 
 \tableofcontents
 \newpage
@@ -175,8 +175,8 @@ exactly the step that surfaces the forgotten service. In the engagement this pap
 describes, this discovery pass is what turned a ``narrow remediation'' into a true
 accounting of the estate: it found a footprint of more than 200 microservices
 across 127+ repositories where the engagement had been scoped to a handful. You
-cannot audit, and you certainly cannot get an ATO for, a system whose extent you
-have not established; automated discovery establishes it.
+cannot audit, certify, or---for a government system---accredit a system whose
+extent you have not established; automated discovery establishes it.
 
 \subsection{Dependency scanning across the whole tree}
 
@@ -412,47 +412,54 @@ has dramatically less to find---and what it does find, it finds against a system
 that is already producing the evidence to prove the fix.
 
 % ============================================================================
-\section{Why It Matters for Defense}
+\section{Why It Matters for Audit, Certification, and Accreditation}
 % ============================================================================
 
-Defense and national-security systems face the estate-scale security problem in
+Regulated enterprises, critical-infrastructure operators, and government
+systems---defense among them---face the estate-scale security problem in
 its most acute form: larger sprawls, longer lifetimes, higher consequences, and a
-formal accreditation regime that demands evidence, not assertion. The capability
-described here maps directly onto those requirements.
+formal audit or accreditation regime that demands evidence, not assertion. The
+capability described here maps directly onto those requirements, from a commercial
+SOC~2 or ISO~27001 audit through to a government Authorization to Operate.
 
 \begin{itemize}
-  \item \textbf{ATO evidence.} An Authorization to Operate requires an enumerated
+  \item \textbf{Boundary and control evidence.} Every audit and accreditation
+  regime---SOC~2, a FINRA/SEC examination, and (for government systems) an
+  Authorization to Operate---requires an enumerated
   system boundary, an assessed control set, and a documented residual-risk
   posture. Automated discovery produces the boundary (including the forgotten
   services that would otherwise sit outside it), the agent swarm produces the
   assessment at a coverage no sampling approach reaches, and the signed,
-  immutable audit trail produces the evidence---turning the accreditation package
+  immutable audit trail produces the evidence---turning the evidence package
   from a periodic manual artifact into a continuously regenerated one.
   \item \textbf{Supply-chain assurance.} The dependency scanner enumerates the
   complete transitive software bill of materials, matches it against advisories,
   and drives it to zero actionable with a documented adjudication for every
   residual. This is the concrete substance behind software-supply-chain mandates
-  (SBOM, known-vulnerability remediation): not a one-time scan but a standing,
+  (SBOM, known-vulnerability remediation), which now run from commercial
+  procurement through to federal acquisition: not a one-time scan but a standing,
   re-run guarantee.
   \item \textbf{Continuous authorization.} The shift from periodic to continuous
-  re-audit is exactly the shift modern frameworks (cATO, ongoing authorization)
-  are pushing toward. Every closed finding becomes a standing regression check;
+  re-audit is exactly the shift modern frameworks are pushing toward---continuous
+  SOC~2 monitoring on the commercial side and continuous ATO (cATO, ongoing
+  authorization) on the government side. Every closed finding becomes a standing
+  regression check;
   every commit is re-assessed; drift is an event, not a year-end surprise. The
-  authorization reflects the system as it is, not as it was at the last
+  posture reflects the system as it is, not as it was at the last
   assessment.
   \item \textbf{Sovereign and auditable.} The entire stack---the review agents,
   the models behind them, the KMS, the IAM, the post-quantum cryptography, the
-  ledger---is owned and open. It runs offline, at the edge, in a classified
-  enclave, with no dependency on a foreign or black-box service and no telemetry
-  leaving the boundary. A defense customer can inspect the auditor itself, which is
-  the only honest basis for trusting an auditor's output.
+  ledger---is owned and open. It runs offline, at the edge, in an air-gapped or
+  classified enclave, with no dependency on a foreign or black-box service and no
+  telemetry leaving the boundary. The customer can inspect the auditor itself,
+  which is the only honest basis for trusting an auditor's output.
 \end{itemize}
 
-The deeper point the case study makes for a defense buyer is about
+The deeper point the case study makes for any high-assurance buyer is about
 \emph{consolidation as defense}. A 200-service estate reduced to three auditable
 binaries is not only cheaper to run; it is a fundamentally smaller thing to
-defend, accredit, and reason about. In a domain where every additional service is
-additional attack surface, additional accreditation scope, and additional
+defend, certify, and reason about. In a domain where every additional service is
+additional attack surface, additional audit or accreditation scope, and additional
 supply-chain exposure, the ability to find what you have, prove it secure, and
 then make it radically smaller is itself a security capability.
 
@@ -464,7 +471,9 @@ The stack described here is built and owned end-to-end by Hanzo AI, an
 American-owned applied-AI lab and venture studio (Techstars~'17, founded 2014)
 responsible for more than 100 venture-funded startups and several unicorns,
 founded by an expert in both AI/ML and cryptography. Two facts make this relevant
-to a security and national-security buyer. First, sovereignty of the security
+to any security-conscious buyer---a regulated enterprise, a critical-infrastructure
+operator, or a government and national-security program. First, sovereignty of the
+security
 tooling itself: an audit is only as trustworthy as the party that controls the
 auditor, and this stack---agents, models, key management, and cryptography---is
 American-owned, auditable, and free of dependence on foreign or black-box
@@ -502,8 +511,10 @@ binaries with $\sim$3.5 million lines of dead code deleted; and FINRA/SEC approv
 plus SOC~2 as the result. The same stack that audits is built so that whole
 classes of finding cannot occur in the first place---secrets in a KMS, identity in
 one IAM, post-quantum transport, signed actions, an immutable on-chain trail---and
-all of it is American-owned, open, and sovereign. For defense, that is the
-combination the accreditation regime is asking for: enumerate what you have, prove
+all of it is American-owned, open, and sovereign. For any audit, certification, or
+accreditation regime---SOC~2 and FINRA/SEC, and for government systems the
+ATO---that is the
+combination being asked for: enumerate what you have, prove
 it secure with evidence rather than assertion, keep proving it on every change,
 and make it smaller. Find everything; fix what matters; delete the rest; and let
 the auditor be a machine you are allowed to inspect.

defense/hanzo-test-evaluation.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{Automated Verification and Validation Framework\\with Digital Twin Environments}
-\docid{HZO-DEF-2026-004}
+\docid{HZO-2026-004}
 \docversion{Version 1.0 --- February 3, 2026}
 \docdate{February 2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}

defense/hanzo-vs-claude.tex

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 \documentclass[11pt,letterpaper]{article}
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
-\doctitle{Sovereign vs.\ Closed: Hanzo AI versus\\Centralized Cloud AI for Defense and\\Regulated Workloads}
-\docid{HAI-DEF-2026-011}
+\doctitle{Sovereign vs.\ Closed:\\Hanzo AI versus Centralized Cloud AI}
+\docid{HAI-2026-011}
 \docversion{Version 1.0}
 \docdate{2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}
@@ -17,8 +17,9 @@ centrally hosted model accessed as a metered cloud service (typified by
 Anthropic's Claude), and a sovereign, self-hostable stack with owned model
 weights (Hanzo). The distinction is not primarily one of model quality---closed
 frontier models are excellent---but of \emph{deployment model and control}.
-For defense and regulated workloads, the binding constraints are data residency,
-operation in disconnected and contested environments, supply-chain provenance,
+For regulated industries, critical infrastructure, and government (including
+defense), the binding constraints are data residency,
+operation in disconnected and critical environments, supply-chain provenance,
 post-quantum security, auditability, and cost at scale. A closed cloud service
 cannot satisfy several of these by construction: it cannot run air-gapped, its
 weights cannot be inspected or owned, and sensitive data must leave the
@@ -26,8 +27,11 @@ enclave to be processed. We argue that for these workloads the relevant choice
 is between foreign open-weight models and an American open-source alternative,
 and we position Hanzo as the latter---owning both the model (the Zen family)
 and the cryptography (a production post-quantum stack). We give a dimension-by-dimension
-comparison and a decision framework for when each model of consumption fits. We
-also make the productivity case concrete: on a regulated capital-markets build
+comparison and a decision framework for when each model of consumption fits.
+These constraints are most acute in financial services, healthcare, critical
+infrastructure, and government systems---defense among them---but the framework
+applies to any organization that must control where its data and models live.
+We also make the productivity case concrete: on a regulated capital-markets build
 where every engineer had the same frontier chat model, the client's own
 engineering audit found that one engineer working through Hanzo's agentic stack
 out-produced entire contractor teams by the audit's own unit-cost metrics---the
@@ -42,11 +46,12 @@ goes to the vendor, you cannot see or own the weights, and it cannot run on a
 disconnected device. That is the right product for many commercial uses and the
 wrong one for a workload that cannot leave a controlled environment. Hanzo is the
 opposite shape: open, owned-weight models you run on your own hardware---in a
-data center, on a vehicle, or air-gapped---with post-quantum security built in,
+data center, at the edge, or air-gapped---with post-quantum security built in,
 your data never leaving, and cost driven down because you are not paying a
 per-token markup or a hyperscaler margin. America's frontier AI has narrowed to
 two closed labs; the only openly available frontier weights today are largely
-foreign. For defense and regulated buyers who need open, sovereign, controllable
+foreign. For regulated industries, critical infrastructure, and government
+buyers---defense included---who need open, sovereign, controllable
 AI, that makes Hanzo the American alternative to both the closed duopoly and
 foreign open weights.
 
@@ -58,8 +63,8 @@ foreign open weights.
 % ============================================================================
 
 Discussions of ``which AI is better'' usually compare benchmark scores. For
-commercial chat and coding that is a reasonable proxy. For defense and regulated
-deployment it is the wrong axis. A model that scores two points higher on a
+commercial chat and coding that is a reasonable proxy. For regulated and
+sovereign deployment it is the wrong axis. A model that scores two points higher on a
 reasoning benchmark is of no use inside a controlled environment if it can only
 be reached by sending the data outside that environment.
 
@@ -75,7 +80,8 @@ We state plainly what closed cloud AI does well: it is operationally simple
 (no infrastructure to run), it tracks the frontier of raw capability, and its
 provider invests heavily in alignment and safety research. None of that is in
 dispute. The argument here is narrow and structural: several requirements that
-are mandatory for defense and regulated workloads cannot be met by a model you
+are mandatory for regulated, critical-infrastructure, and government workloads
+(defense among them) cannot be met by a model you
 do not hold and cannot run yourself.
 
 % ============================================================================
@@ -201,7 +207,7 @@ Hanzo gets both halves of that sentence at once.
 Model weights & Not disclosed; not transferable & Owned (Zen family, 0.8B--1T+); inspectable \\
 Where inference runs & Vendor cloud only & Your hardware: data center, edge, air-gapped \\
 Your data & Leaves the enclave to the vendor & Never leaves; stays where it lives \\
-Disconnected / DDIL & Not possible (requires connectivity) & First-class (offline on embedded ARM) \\
+Disconnected / offline & Not possible (requires connectivity) & First-class (offline on embedded ARM) \\
 Provenance & Vendor-controlled & American-owned, full provenance \\
 Post-quantum security & Not a product property & Native (ML-KEM-768 + ML-DSA-65) \\
 Auditability & Black box & Open stack; cryptographically signed actions \\
@@ -217,21 +223,25 @@ is of deployment model, not of raw benchmark quality.}
 \subsection{Data residency and the enclave boundary}
 The single most consequential difference is the enclave boundary. To use a closed
 cloud model, the data being reasoned over must cross the boundary to the vendor.
-For CUI, engineering files, procurement records, or operational data this is often
+For protected health information, customer financial records, regulated
+controlled data (CUI included), engineering files, or operational data this is often
 simply prohibited. Hanzo runs the model inside the boundary, so the data never
 crosses it. This is not a policy preference that can be waived with a contract
 clause; it is a property of where computation physically happens.
 
-\subsection{Disconnected and contested operation}
-A cloud service is unavailable the moment the link drops or is jammed. At the
-tactical edge, on a ship, or in an air-gapped facility there is no link to call.
+\subsection{Disconnected and offline operation}
+A cloud service is unavailable the moment the link drops. On a remote industrial
+site, aboard a vessel, in an air-gapped facility, or at any field location where
+connectivity is intermittent or denied---disconnected defense operations
+included---there is no link to call.
 Hanzo's models are quantized to run fully offline on hardware ranging from a
 laptop to an embedded processor, so capability persists in exactly the
 environments where a cloud service cannot operate at all.
 
 \subsection{Provenance and the supply chain}
 For an open, controllable alternative to a closed cloud model, today's practical
-options are foreign open-weight models or Hanzo. Defense buyers care about who
+options are foreign open-weight models or Hanzo. Regulated enterprises and
+government buyers (defense among them) care about who
 produced the weights and whether they can be trusted and inspected. Hanzo's
 position is specific: an American-owned, open-source frontier stack with owned
 weights, so an organization can have open, auditable AI without depending on
@@ -275,9 +285,10 @@ when the workload is non-sensitive, connectivity is reliable, operational
 simplicity outweighs control, and there is no requirement to own or inspect the
 model. A sovereign self-hosted stack is the right---often the only---choice when
 any of the following hold: the data cannot leave a controlled environment; the
-system must work disconnected or in contested conditions; provenance and
+system must work disconnected or in degraded conditions; provenance and
 auditability are required; post-quantum protection is mandated; or per-token cost
-at scale is untenable. Defense and regulated workloads concentrate in the second
+at scale is untenable. Regulated industries, critical infrastructure, and
+government workloads---defense included---concentrate in the second
 column. That is the gap Hanzo is built to fill.
 
 % ============================================================================
@@ -286,7 +297,8 @@ column. That is the gap Hanzo is built to fill.
 
 The honest comparison is not ``Hanzo's model beats Claude.'' It is that a closed
 cloud model and a sovereign self-hostable stack are different categories, and the
-requirements of defense and regulated workloads---data residency, disconnected
+requirements of regulated, critical-infrastructure, and government workloads
+(defense among them)---data residency, disconnected
 operation, provenance, post-quantum security, auditability, and cost---select the
 second category by construction. Within that category the choice narrows to
 foreign open weights or an American open-source alternative. Hanzo is built to be

defense/hanzo-zap-protocol.tex

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 \usepackage{hanzo-defense}
 
 \doctitle{ZAP: Zero-Copy Application Protocol for\\Contested, Edge, and Bandwidth-Limited\\Military Environments}
-\docid{HAI-DEF-2026-006}
+\docid{HAI-2026-006}
 \docversion{Version 1.0 --- February 12, 2026}
 \docdate{February 2026}
 \docauthors{Zach Kelling --- Hanzo Team}

site/src/config/papers.ts

@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
   accentColor: '#00D9FF',
   logo: '/logos/hanzo-logo.svg',
   papers: [
-    // --- Defense / Reindustrialization Papers ---
+    // --- Sovereign AI, Security & Infrastructure ---
     {
       id: 'hanzo-security',
       title: 'Hanzo AI for Security',
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Security', 'Agentic AI', 'Audit'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Security', 'Agentic AI', 'Audit'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-compliance',
@@ -62,19 +62,19 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Compliance', 'SOC 2', 'ATO'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Compliance', 'SOC 2', 'ATO'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-vs-claude',
       title: 'Sovereign vs. Closed',
-      subtitle: 'Hanzo AI versus Centralized Cloud AI for Defense and Regulated Workloads',
+      subtitle: 'Hanzo AI versus Centralized Cloud AI',
       abstract: 'Owned, self-hostable AI versus a metered cloud chat — on deployment and control, not benchmark scores. Includes a measured productivity case: on a regulated build where every engineer had the same frontier model (Claude), the client\'s own audit found one engineer on Hanzo\'s agentic stack shipped more than three contractor pods combined at ~250x-900x lower cost per line — the differentiator being the owned agentic stack, not the model. Covers data residency, air-gapped operation, provenance, post-quantum security, and cost at scale.',
       pdfUrl: '/pdfs/hanzo-vs-claude.pdf',
       latexUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers/blob/main/defense/hanzo-vs-claude.tex',
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Sovereign AI', 'Post-Quantum', 'Open Weights'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Post-Quantum', 'Open Weights'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-agentic-prowess',
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Agentic AI', 'FHE', 'Post-Quantum'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Agentic AI', 'FHE', 'Post-Quantum'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-cloud-economics',
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Cloud Economics', 'Sovereign Stack', 'OSS'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Cloud Economics', 'Sovereign Stack', 'OSS'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-fhe-native',
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'FHE', 'Confidential Computing', 'Post-Quantum'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'FHE', 'Confidential Computing', 'Post-Quantum'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-zap-protocol',
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Protocol', 'Post-Quantum', 'Edge'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Protocol', 'Post-Quantum', 'Edge'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-full-spectrum-cyber',
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Post-Quantum', 'FIPS', 'Cryptography'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Post-Quantum', 'FIPS', 'Cryptography'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-formal-verification',
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Formal Verification', 'Lean 4', 'Post-Quantum'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Formal Verification', 'Lean 4', 'Post-Quantum'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-agentic-ai',
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Agentic AI', 'Cyber Operations', 'Intelligence'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Agentic AI', 'Cyber Operations', 'Intelligence'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-edge-ai-ml',
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Edge AI', 'Quantization', 'Offline'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Edge AI', 'Quantization', 'Offline'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-cross-domain',
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Cross-Domain', 'FHE', 'Zero-Trust'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Cross-Domain', 'FHE', 'Zero-Trust'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-assured-networking',
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Mesh Networking', 'Post-Quantum', 'Maritime'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Mesh Networking', 'Post-Quantum', 'Maritime'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-countermeasures',
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Counter-Exploitation', 'Post-Quantum', 'FHE'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Counter-Exploitation', 'Post-Quantum', 'FHE'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-quantum-sensing-qkd',
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'QKD', 'Quantum Sensing', 'Post-Quantum'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'QKD', 'Quantum Sensing', 'Post-Quantum'],
     },
     {
       id: 'hanzo-test-evaluation',
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ export const siteConfig: SiteConfig = {
       githubUrl: 'https://github.com/hanzoai/papers',
       date: '2026-06-15',
       authors: ['Zach Kelling'],
-      tags: ['Defense', 'Test & Evaluation', 'Digital Twin', 'Observability'],
+      tags: ['Sovereign AI', 'Test & Evaluation', 'Digital Twin', 'Observability'],
     },
 
     // --- Engine / AI Infrastructure (measured, on-device) ---