hanzoai/python-sdk
2
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/hanzoai/python-sdk.git synced 2026-10-23 20:23:00 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

research SDK: content-address artifacts server-side; drop X-User-Id minting (Red L1/M1)

Browse Source 
snapshot/report now SUBMIT the bytes (base64 content); the server hashes them and owns
the sha256 + ref — the SDK no longer asserts a (poisonable) hash or a client ref. _headers
sends ONLY the per-org key (Bearer); it never mints X-User-Id/X-Org-Id (a cross-tenant
forge the gateway strips) — any dev bypass is server-side.
This commit is contained in:
zeekay
2026-07-22 19:57:31 -07:00
parent eb5eb00fe9
commit f991ce81ff
1 changed files with 19 additions and 17 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
pkg/hanzo-research/hanzo_research/client.py
+19 -17
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ Auth is the per-org key (private-by-default is enforced server-side). Records mi
the cloud /v1/research surface (HIP-0512), which is versioned + append-only + idempotent
by content, so re-recording the same result is a no-op.
"""
import base64
import hashlib
import json
import os
@@ -52,13 +53,13 @@ class Research:
# ── transport ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _headers(self):
# Auth is ONLY the per-org key (the gateway mints the validated principal from it).
# The client NEVER mints X-User-Id/X-Org-Id — that is a cross-tenant forge the
# gateway strips anyway (SanitizeIdentity); any local/dev bypass belongs SERVER-side
# behind an explicit unsafe flag, never in the client.
h = {"Content-Type": "application/json", "X-Project-Id": self.project}
if self.api_key:
h["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + self.api_key
elif os.environ.get("RESEARCH_ORG"): # dev/local: raw principal for a gateway-less server
org = os.environ["RESEARCH_ORG"]
h["X-Org-Id"] = org
h["X-User-Id"] = "u-" + org
return h
def _req(self, method, path, payload=None):
@@ -167,25 +168,26 @@ class Experiment:
self._ok += 1
return self.c.ingest(attempts=[a])
def snapshot(self, data, ref=None, run_id=None):
"""File a board-snapshot artifact. `data` is the PNG bytes (or a path to the PNG);
the SDK content-addresses it by sha256. `ref` is the blob location (defaults to
the content address; the blob upload to object storage is the recorder's job)."""
def snapshot(self, data, run_id=None):
"""File a board-snapshot artifact. `data` is the PNG bytes (or a path to the PNG).
The SDK submits the bytes; the SERVER content-addresses them by sha256."""
raw = data if isinstance(data, (bytes, bytearray)) else _read_bytes(data)
return self._artifact("snapshot", raw, ref, run_id)
return self._artifact("snapshot", raw, run_id)
def report(self, data, ref=None, run_id=None):
def report(self, data, run_id=None):
"""File a generated-report artifact — HTML/Markdown TEXT (or bytes)."""
raw = data if isinstance(data, (bytes, bytearray)) else str(data).encode()
return self._artifact("report", raw, ref, run_id)
return self._artifact("report", raw, run_id)
def _artifact(self, kind, raw, ref, run_id):
sha = hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
def _artifact(self, kind, raw, run_id):
# Submit the BYTES; the server hashes them and owns the sha256 + ref. The client
# sha256 travels only so the server can reject a mismatch (a mis-hash or tamper).
return self.c.artifact({
"sha256": sha, "kind": kind, "ref": ref or f"sha256:{sha}",
"run_id": run_id or self.id, "git_sha": self.prov["git_sha"],
"git_branch": self.prov["git_branch"], "git_dirty": self.prov["git_dirty"],
"lib_versions": self.libs,
"content": base64.b64encode(raw).decode(),
"sha256": hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest(),
"kind": kind, "run_id": run_id or self.id,
"git_sha": self.prov["git_sha"], "git_branch": self.prov["git_branch"],
"git_dirty": self.prov["git_dirty"], "lib_versions": self.libs,
})
def finish(self, value=None):