Ryan El Kochta 435549c32d tmpfs: implement POSIX ACLs
Implements POSIX ACLs for gVisor's tmpfs. As a summary:
- Adds `acl` and `defaultACL` fields to tmpfs's inode
- Allows `system.posix_acl_access` and `system.posix_acl_default`
  xattrs to set and retrieve POSIX ACLs
- Updates tmpfs's stat implementation to account for the ACL in
  setting/retrieving a file's mode
- Updates `GenericCheckPermission` to take an optional ACL. All
  non-tmpfs filesystems pass the `nil` ACL.
- Updates tmpfs's tar save-and-restore logic to store the base64-encoded
  POSIX ACL xattrs in the tar header
- Adds unit tests for POSIX ACL parsing/serialization
- Adds integration tests for POSIX ACLs
- Adds a container test to verify the tmpfs tar save/restore logic with
  ACLs. This required a new subcommand for `test_app` to set and fetch
  xattrs in the container

The motivation for POSIX ACLs is for journald (which uses POSIX ACLs to
give non-root users access to their own `systemctl --user` services'
logs). This commit is not actually sufficient to get this working -- we
will need to plumb ACLs to overlayfs, too, which will be done in a
follow-up commit.

The implementation is very similar to the implementation in Linux,
although it is filesystem-specific rather than at the VFS layer (much
like we store `mode`, `uid`, `gid`, etc at the FS layer currently). An
optional access and default ACL is stored in each inode. If present, it
is used for permission checks and is kept in sync with the `mode`. The
`mode` is computed from the ACL when permissions are updated. If the ACL
is simple enough to be stored equivalently as a `mode`, an ACL is not
stored.

One limitation at the moment is that upon file creation, the process's
umask is masked against the creation mode regardless of the presence of
a default ACL, whereas Linux only masks against umask when *not*
inheriting from a default ACL. Fixing this would require a fair bit of
refactoring since umask isn't passed through to filesystems at all, and
is instead masked with the creation mode at the syscall layer. This is
not a security issue since the resulting permissions are always of
equal-or-greater restrictiveness to those of Linux, but is tracked in
\#13688.
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gVisor

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What is gVisor?

gVisor provides a strong layer of isolation between running applications and the host operating system. It is an application kernel that implements a Linux-like interface. Unlike Linux, it is written in a memory-safe language (Go) and runs in userspace.

gVisor includes an Open Container Initiative (OCI) runtime called runsc that makes it easy to work with existing container tooling. The runsc runtime integrates with Docker and Kubernetes, making it simple to run sandboxed containers.

What isn't gVisor?

  • gVisor is not a syscall filter (e.g. seccomp-bpf), nor a wrapper over Linux isolation primitives (e.g. firejail, AppArmor, etc.).
  • gVisor is also not a VM in the everyday sense of the term (e.g. VirtualBox, QEMU).

gVisor takes a distinct third approach, providing many security benefits of VMs while maintaining the lower resource footprint, fast startup, and flexibility of regular userspace applications.

Why does gVisor exist?

Containers are not a sandbox. While containers have revolutionized how we develop, package, and deploy applications, using them to run untrusted or potentially malicious code without additional isolation is not a good idea. While using a single, shared kernel allows for efficiency and performance gains, it also means that container escape is possible with a single vulnerability.

gVisor is an application kernel for containers. It limits the host kernel surface accessible to the application while still giving the application access to all the features it expects. Unlike most kernels, gVisor does not assume or require a fixed set of physical resources; instead, it leverages existing host kernel functionality and runs as a normal process. In other words, gVisor implements Linux by way of Linux.

gVisor should not be confused with technologies and tools to harden containers against external threats, provide additional integrity checks, or limit the scope of access for a service. One should always be careful about what data is made available to a container.

Documentation

User documentation and technical architecture, including quick start guides, can be found at gvisor.dev.

Installing from source

gVisor builds on x86_64 and ARM64. Other architectures may become available in the future.

For the purposes of these instructions, bazel and other build dependencies are wrapped in a build container. It is possible to use bazel directly, or type make help for standard targets.

Requirements

Make sure the following dependencies are installed:

Building

Build and install the runsc binary:

mkdir -p bin
make copy TARGETS=runsc DESTINATION=bin/
sudo cp ./bin/runsc /usr/local/bin

To build specific libraries or binaries, you can specify the target:

make build TARGETS="//pkg/tcpip:tcpip"

Building directly with Bazel (without Docker)

Using Bazel directly isn't recommended due to the extra overhead, but in order to get started:

  • Look at the build dockerfile for the canonical list of needed dependencies.
  • Install and use bazelisk. Otherwise, make sure your bazel version matches the one listed in the .bazelversion file.

After setting up dependencies, using Bazel is similar to the Makefile:

bazel build //runsc:runsc

Testing

To run standard test suites, you can use:

make unit-tests
make tests

To run specific tests, you can specify the target:

# Makefile
make test TARGETS="//runsc:version_test"
# Bazel
bazel test //runsc:version_test

Mac OS

Some packages support running tests directly on macOS. At the time of this writing, gVisor requires bazel 8, which you can install via homebrew:

brew install bazel@8

# You can then run the tests, e.g.:
$(brew --prefix bazel@8)/bin/bazel test --macos_sdk_version=$(xcrun --show-sdk-version) -- //tools/nogo/... //tools/check{aligned,const,escape,linkname,locks,unsafe}/...

Using go get

This project uses bazel to build and manage dependencies. A synthetic go branch is maintained that is compatible with standard go tooling for convenience.

For example, to build and install runsc directly from this branch:

echo "module runsc" > go.mod
GO111MODULE=on go get gvisor.dev/gvisor/runsc@go
CGO_ENABLED=0 GO111MODULE=on sudo -E go build -o /usr/local/bin/runsc gvisor.dev/gvisor/runsc

Subsequently, you can build and install the shim binary for containerd:

GO111MODULE=on sudo -E go build -o /usr/local/bin/containerd-shim-runsc-v1 gvisor.dev/gvisor/shim

Note that this branch is supported in a best effort capacity, and direct development on this branch is not supported. Development should occur on the master branch, which is then reflected into the go branch.

Community & Governance

See GOVERNANCE.md for project governance information.

The gvisor-users mailing list and gvisor-dev mailing list are good starting points for questions and discussion.

Security Policy

See SECURITY.md.

Contributing

See Contributing.md.

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