Host networking did not have checkpoint/restore support. A sandbox running with `--network=host` could not be checkpointed because `hostinet.Stack` was not savable, and restore did not define what should happen to open host sockets. This change makes the hostinet stack savable and defines that restore contract. Host socket fds cannot cross a checkpoint boundary, so `Socket.fd` is tagged `state:"nosave"` and save does not touch host sockets. With checkpoint `--leave-running`, the original sandbox keeps serving traffic on its existing connections. If save fails, the sandbox is left unharmed. Without `--leave-running`, the sandbox exits after save and the host kernel closes its sockets. That sends `FIN` or `RST` so remote peers do not hang on half-open connections. In the restored sandbox, `afterLoad` sets each socket fd to `-1`. Host syscalls then fail with `EBADF`. `Readiness` reports hangup and error so `epoll` waiters wake immediately, and tasks that were blocked in I/O see `EBADF` when their syscall restarts. `State()` reports no TCP state for these sockets rather than logging a warning on every `/proc/net/tcp` read. Applications are expected to reconnect after restore. The stack's host-derived state is not saved. This includes `/proc/net/dev`, `/proc/net/snmp`, TCP buffer sizes, and allowed socket types. During restore, runsc configures a fresh hostinet stack before seccomp filters are installed. `ReplaceConfig` then copies the destination host configuration into the deserialized stack and transfers ownership of the fresh proc net handles. The restored sandbox therefore uses the destination host configuration and limits. A hostinet checkpoint contains no netstack state and a netstack checkpoint contains no hostinet state, so the checkpoint now records the network type in its metadata. Restore fails with a clear error when the network stack kind differs between checkpoint and restore, instead of panicking inside `ReplaceConfig` during kernel load. Sandbox and none networking both use netstack and remain interchangeable. Checkpoints taken before the network type was recorded skip this check. The hostinet `save_resume` syscall tests are enabled because save does not touch host sockets. The save and restore syscall tests remain excluded because they expect sockets to keep working after restore. Container tests cover restored socket behavior for TCP, UDP, `epoll`, and a blocked accept. They also cover remote peer close after checkpoint, continued service after checkpoint `--leave-running`, and the error when restoring a host networking checkpoint with sandbox networking. The focused hostinet unit tests and the hostinet `save_resume` syscall tests pass on `x86_64`. The checkpoint/restore user guide documents the restored socket behavior. Fixes #6243 COPYBARA_INTEGRATE_REVIEW=https://github.com/google/gvisor/pull/13404 from shayonj:hostinet-save-restore-v2 734480ee348d774346ec024b6483b89ea0a91adb PiperOrigin-RevId: 950854464
What is gVisor?
gVisor provides a strong layer of isolation between running applications and the host operating system. It is an application kernel that implements a Linux-like interface. Unlike Linux, it is written in a memory-safe language (Go) and runs in userspace.
gVisor includes an Open Container Initiative (OCI) runtime called runsc
that makes it easy to work with existing container tooling. The runsc runtime
integrates with Docker and Kubernetes, making it simple to run sandboxed
containers.
What isn't gVisor?
- gVisor is not a syscall filter (e.g.
seccomp-bpf), nor a wrapper over Linux isolation primitives (e.g.firejail, AppArmor, etc.). - gVisor is also not a VM in the everyday sense of the term (e.g. VirtualBox, QEMU).
gVisor takes a distinct third approach, providing many security benefits of VMs while maintaining the lower resource footprint, fast startup, and flexibility of regular userspace applications.
Why does gVisor exist?
Containers are not a sandbox. While containers have revolutionized how we develop, package, and deploy applications, using them to run untrusted or potentially malicious code without additional isolation is not a good idea. While using a single, shared kernel allows for efficiency and performance gains, it also means that container escape is possible with a single vulnerability.
gVisor is an application kernel for containers. It limits the host kernel surface accessible to the application while still giving the application access to all the features it expects. Unlike most kernels, gVisor does not assume or require a fixed set of physical resources; instead, it leverages existing host kernel functionality and runs as a normal process. In other words, gVisor implements Linux by way of Linux.
gVisor should not be confused with technologies and tools to harden containers against external threats, provide additional integrity checks, or limit the scope of access for a service. One should always be careful about what data is made available to a container.
Documentation
User documentation and technical architecture, including quick start guides, can be found at gvisor.dev.
Installing from source
gVisor builds on x86_64 and ARM64. Other architectures may become available in the future.
For the purposes of these instructions, bazel and other build
dependencies are wrapped in a build container. It is possible to use
bazel directly, or type make help for standard targets.
Requirements
Make sure the following dependencies are installed:
- Linux 4.14.77+ (older linux)
- Docker version 17.09.0 or greater
Building
Build and install the runsc binary:
mkdir -p bin
make copy TARGETS=runsc DESTINATION=bin/
sudo cp ./bin/runsc /usr/local/bin
To build specific libraries or binaries, you can specify the target:
make build TARGETS="//pkg/tcpip:tcpip"
Building directly with Bazel (without Docker)
Using Bazel directly isn't recommended due to the extra overhead, but in order to get started:
- Look at the build dockerfile for the canonical list of needed dependencies.
- Install and use bazelisk. Otherwise, make sure your bazel version matches the one listed in the .bazelversion file.
After setting up dependencies, using Bazel is similar to the Makefile:
bazel build //runsc:runsc
Testing
To run standard test suites, you can use:
make unit-tests
make tests
To run specific tests, you can specify the target:
# Makefile
make test TARGETS="//runsc:version_test"
# Bazel
bazel test //runsc:version_test
Mac OS
Some packages support running tests directly on macOS. At the time of this writing, gVisor requires bazel 8, which you can install via homebrew:
brew install bazel@8
# You can then run the tests, e.g.:
$(brew --prefix bazel@8)/bin/bazel test --macos_sdk_version=$(xcrun --show-sdk-version) -- //tools/nogo/... //tools/check{aligned,const,escape,linkname,locks,unsafe}/...
Using go get
This project uses bazel to build and manage dependencies. A synthetic
go branch is maintained that is compatible with standard go tooling for
convenience.
For example, to build and install runsc directly from this branch:
echo "module runsc" > go.mod
GO111MODULE=on go get gvisor.dev/gvisor/runsc@go
CGO_ENABLED=0 GO111MODULE=on sudo -E go build -o /usr/local/bin/runsc gvisor.dev/gvisor/runsc
Subsequently, you can build and install the shim binary for containerd:
GO111MODULE=on sudo -E go build -o /usr/local/bin/containerd-shim-runsc-v1 gvisor.dev/gvisor/shim
Note that this branch is supported in a best effort capacity, and direct
development on this branch is not supported. Development should occur on the
master branch, which is then reflected into the go branch.
Community & Governance
See GOVERNANCE.md for project governance information.
The gvisor-users mailing list and gvisor-dev mailing list are good starting points for questions and discussion.
Security Policy
See SECURITY.md.
Contributing
See Contributing.md.

