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ARM CCA Realm attestation: a CBOR/COSE CCA token collection (platform token signed by the operator-pinned CPAK/IAK + realm token signed by the RAK, with the H(RAK) platform-realm binding enforced). Vendor arm.cca, fail-closed zero value, real COSE_Sign1 verification. armcca branched before the registry landed and carried its own parallel copy (extraVerifiers map + a duplicate registerVerifier + a second VerifierFor lookup). Converged to the one registry: deleted that block so armcca.go's init() registers through the canonical registerVerifier in verifier.go, and repointed its self-registration test to RegisteredVerifier. There is one registry, one lookup, one dispatch path — no second way. go.mod: unioned the require blocks (cbor/v2, go-sev-guest, go-tdx-guest, veraison/ccatoken, go-cose); go mod tidy clean; ccatoken is v1.4.0 and its transitive jwx/v2, secp256k1/v4 carry their major in the import path — no dep bumped to a new major. doc.go + verifier.go: ARM CCA is now a real 6th Kind, not pending. verifier_test.go: TestRegistry_RoutesEveryKind covers all six. go build/vet/test + go test -race ./attest/... green; gofmt clean.
luxfi/cc — Confidential Compute attestation
github.com/luxfi/cc is the single, vendor-neutral attestation verifier
for the Lux confidential-compute control plane. It is an orthogonal leaf:
the MPC custody system (luxfi/mpc), the TEE custody extension (luxfi/tee),
and the confidential-AI / proof-of-AI system (luxfi/ai) all depend on it,
and it depends on none of them. There is exactly one attestation verifier;
hardware platforms are orthogonal Kinds behind one Verify interface.
Packages
| Import | Purpose |
|---|---|
github.com/luxfi/cc/attest |
The Verifier interface, VerifiedReport, Option, and Dispatch(kind, evidence, opts...). One entry point per hardware Kind. |
github.com/luxfi/cc/attest/nvidia |
NVIDIA GPU primitives: GPU evidence parser, signed-RIM verifier + measurement matcher, and the NRAS remote-attestation JWS client. Backend for KindNVTrust. |
Kinds (orthogonal hardware platforms)
KindSEVSNP— AMD SEV-SNP CPU. PRODUCTION. Live VCEK fetch from the AMD KDS, full ARK→ASK→VCEK chain + report-signature verification (google/go-sev-guest).KindTDX— Intel TDX CPU. Stub (ErrNotImplemented, fail-loud). Tracked forgo-tdx-guest+ Intel PCS.KindNVTrust— NVIDIA GPU confidential compute. PRODUCTION local-RIM mode (cloud-free): verifies the NVIDIA-signed Reference Integrity Manifest against an operator-pinned key, then matches every reported GPU measurement to the signed golden value. No NVIDIA cloud dependency. The remote NVIDIA Remote Attestation Service (NRAS) JWS path is the lower-levelnvidia.NRASClientprimitive for deployments that accept a cloud anchor.
Invariants
- No insecure mode. A verify with no trust anchor is refused, never
best-effort.
KindNVTrustrefuses an empty RIM or empty trust-root set. - One
VerifiedReporttype shared across all consumers — required so thekms.CompositeAttestationrelease-gate interface has a single, unambiguous signature acrossluxfi/mpc,luxfi/tee, andluxfi/ai. (nil, err)means refuse. No partial reports on error.- Tests never hit the network. AMD KDS responses are replayed from
attest/testdata; NVIDIA RIM fixtures are signed in-test.
Build
export SDKROOT="$(xcrun --show-sdk-path)" # macOS
GOWORK=off go build ./...
GOWORK=off go test ./...