zeekay 4cff733804 threshold: validate Vector[Poly] frame before lattigo ReadFrom
FuzzPulsarSign1Round1Data found a 9-byte input that crashes the
goroutine with `fatal error: out of memory: cannot allocate
105589698985984-byte block` in `lattice/v7/utils/structs.Vector[T].
ReadFrom`. Recovery cannot catch the fatal OOM — the only safe path
is to reject malformed frames before `make([]T, size)` runs.

This is a SECOND DoS surface in lattice/v7, distinct from the
ReadUintNSlice recursion fixed by luxfi/lattice#3 (still open):
ReadFrom calls `make([]T, size)` with `size` read from the wire
before any bound check. PR #3 fixes the inner slice readers but the
outer Vector wrapper allocation remains exploitable.

Filed upstream as luxfi/lattice#4 with reproduction. The new
validateVectorPolyFrameInline walker mirrors the existing
warp/pulsar.validateVectorPolyFrame: walks the wire frame
end-to-end, asserts every length field is <= MaxLatticeUintSliceLen
(4096), and rejects truncated / over-large frames before the
lattigo decoder runs.

Result: FuzzPulsarSign1Round1Data passes 30s with the new walker
in place (28577 execs, 0 panics). Failing input
testdata/fuzz/FuzzPulsarSign1Round1Data/a80b8d313b40fa55 is now
rejected cleanly with "vector length 70368955777453 exceeds 4096".

Refs: luxfi/lattice#2 (open), luxfi/lattice#3 (open),
      luxfi/lattice#4 (filed 2026-05-04)
2026-05-04 03:15:49 -07:00

Pulsar

Lux is not merely adding post-quantum signatures to a chain; it defines a hybrid finality architecture for DAG-native consensus, with protocol-agnostic threshold lifecycle, post-quantum threshold sealing, and cross-chain propagation of Horizon finality.

See LP-105 §Claims and evidence for the canonical claims/evidence table and the ten architectural commitments — single source of truth.

Pulsar is the Lux-evolved post-quantum threshold signature stack for Quasar consensus, derived from daryakaviani/corona (academic 2-round threshold signature from LWE) with the protocol additions needed to operate on a leaderless open public chain.

Why "Pulsar"

Lux (Latin) → light. Pulsar → SI unit of luminous flux. Each validator emits a "pulsar" of signature toward consensus; aggregated, they form the chain's overall light. Brand-paired with Quasar (the consensus that consumes them).

Relationship to upstream Corona

The upstream repo at daryakaviani/corona is an academic proof-of-concept ("not ready for production use" per its README). Pulsar is the production track:

Layer Upstream Corona Pulsar
2-round threshold sign ✅ same byte-equal protocol ✅ inherited
Trusted-dealer Gen ✅ for fixed federation ✅ retained for bridge MPC
Proactive resharing for epoch validator rotation ❌ not specified 🚧 pulsar/reshare/ (this fork)
Pedersen DKG over R_q with proper hiding ❌ not specified 🚧 pulsar/dkg2/ (this fork)
Per-validator triple-sign integration with Quasar ❌ N/A 🚧 pulsar/consensus/ integration

Layout

  • sign/ — 2-round threshold signing (byte-equal with upstream)
  • primitives/ — Shamir, hashes, MACs, PRFs (byte-equal with upstream)
  • utils/ — NTT, Montgomery, ring helpers (byte-equal with upstream)
  • networking/ — TCP peer-to-peer (byte-equal with upstream)
  • dkg/ — original Lux DKG (Feldman VSS without noise; broken for public broadcast — see RED-DKG-REVIEW). Retained for reference.
  • dkg2/ — proper Pedersen DKG over R_q (Pulsar addition; this fork)
  • reshare/ — proactive secret resharing for epoch rotation (Pulsar addition; this fork)
  • cmd/ — KAT oracle generators

Status

WIP. The 2-round Sign+Verify path is byte-equal-validated against the academic Corona spec via 16 SHA-256 KATs. The Pulsar-specific additions (resharing + Pedersen DKG) are under design and implementation.

S
Description
A 2-round lattice-based threshold signature from standard assumptions for public networks
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