zeekay 7debd71c7d keyera: BootstrapPedersen — public-BFT-safe bootstrap via dkg2 + Path (a)
Closes the last trusted-dealer caveat in the Bootstrap ceremony. The
trusted-dealer path is retained under a renamed alias for genesis
ceremonies where a non-distributed trust root is acceptable by policy
(publicly observable HSM-bound foundation MPC with commit-and-reveal
entropy from genesis validators).

Construction.

BootstrapPedersen drives the keyera-genesis ceremony through dkg2/
(Pedersen-DKG over R_q with public matrices A, B derived from BLAKE3-XOF
on the nothing-up-my-sleeve tags `corona.dkg2.{A,B}.v1`):

  1. Each party samples Gaussian f_i, g_i in R_q^Nvec[x]_{deg<t}, runs
     dkg2.Round1 → broadcasts Pedersen commits C_{i,k} = A·NTT(c_{i,k})
     + B·NTT(r_{i,k}) and sends (share_{i→j}, blind_{i→j}) privately
     over an authenticated p2p channel.

  2. Each recipient j runs dkg2.Round2Identify, verifying every incoming
     pair against the commits in constant time. On mismatch the recipient
     emits a signed ComplaintBadDelivery naming the misbehaving sender.

  3. Each recipient holds its standard-form share s_j of the master
     secret s; NO PARTY ever reconstructs s.

  4. Path (a) noise flooding (LP-073 §07 Mapping). Each party broadcasts
     β_j = A·NTT(λ_j · s_j) + e_j' where e_j' ~ D(σ'') and
     σ'' = κ·σ_E·√n is the LP-073 §5 flood bound.

  5. All parties aggregate b = Σ_j β_j = A·s + e'' in NTT-Mont; the
     Corona-Sign-shaped public key bTilde = Round_Xi(b) drops cleanly
     into threshold.GroupKey. The existing 2-round threshold-sign path
     accepts the noise-flooded GroupKey unchanged.

Security claims.

- Hiding under decisional MLWE on the wide concatenation [A | B]
  (Pedersen-DKG; papers/lp-073-pulsar §07).
- Per-party Gaussian flooding bound σ'' = κ·σ_E·√n covers the LWE
  leakage budget (Path (a) flood-bound, LP-073 §5).
- Identifiable abort with constant-time verification (dkg2.Round2-
  Identify; subtle.ConstantTimeCompare across all M slots).
- No master-secret reconstruction at any point in the ceremony
  (structural; see TestBootstrapPedersen_NoMasterSecretInMemory).

Tests (keyera/bootstrap_pedersen_test.go; all green).

- TestBootstrapPedersen_RoundTrip — 5-party Pedersen-DKG with t=3;
  transcript determinism; bTilde stability across entropy replays.
- TestBootstrapPedersen_DishonestDealer — tampered share-to-0 triggers
  ErrBootstrapPedersenAbort naming sender 2; AbortEvidence carries a
  re-checkable ComplaintBadDelivery.
- TestBootstrapPedersen_FollowedBySign — bootstrap → threshold-sign →
  threshold.Verify PASS (the noise-flooded GroupKey is structurally
  identical to a trusted-dealer Corona setup).
- TestBootstrapPedersen_NoMasterSecretInMemory — structural assertion
  that dkg2.DKGSession exposes no master-secret field and no two
  parties' SkShares/Lambdas collide.
- TestBootstrapPedersen_ParameterValidation — bounds checking.
- TestBootstrapPedersen_DefaultSuite — nil suite resolves to Corona-SHA3.
- TestBootstrapTrustedDealer_LegacyAlias — legacy alias byte-equivalent
  to historical Bootstrap.

Documentation.

- AUDIT-2026-05.md — read-only SOTA refresh covering threshold lattice
  DKG / signing literature 2024-2026. Verdict: Boschini-Takahashi-
  Tibouchi 2024/1113 remains canonical; 2025 follow-ups (del Pino,
  Doerner-Kondi, Hofheinz, Beimel-Eitan, Bos-Lyubashevsky, Crites-
  Komlo-Maller) are complementary or non-blocking; no SOTA refresh
  blocks this revision. Path (a) bound stays comfortable for committee
  sizes up to n=256.
- DEPLOYMENT-RUNBOOK.md §Bootstrap-Trust — decision matrix documenting
  Option A (BootstrapPedersen, recommended) vs Option B
  (BootstrapTrustedDealer, ceremony-only).
- CHANGELOG.md — v0.7.3 entry listing the new public surface, tests,
  and documentation deltas.
- keyera/keyera.go — inline trust-model documentation pointing at
  BootstrapPedersen as the public-BFT-safe alternative.

API summary.

New (keyera package):
  - BootstrapPedersen(suite, t, validators, groupID, eraID, entropy)
    (*KeyEra, *BootstrapTranscript, error)
  - FinishBootstrapPedersen(suite, t, validators, ..., dkgParams,
    sessions, round1) (*KeyEra, *BootstrapTranscript, error)
  - BootstrapTrustedDealer / BootstrapTrustedDealerWithSuite — legacy
    aliases for the single-dealer ceremony.
  - BootstrapTranscript — public, byte-stable ceremony record.
  - AbortEvidence + ExtractAbortEvidence(err) — identifiable-abort
    consumption surface.
  - ErrBootstrapPedersenAbort, ErrBootstrapPedersenShape — typed errors.

Wire / KAT compatibility.

- Existing trusted-dealer KATs continue to byte-match
  ~/work/luxcpp/crypto/corona/ (no behaviour change on that path).
- BootstrapPedersen adds new ceremony bytes; deterministic given a
  reproducible entropy stream. A future cross-runtime port can pin
  them via BootstrapTranscript.TranscriptHash.
2026-05-21 17:09:36 -07:00
2026-05-12 09:21:34 -07:00

Corona

Lux is not merely adding post-quantum signatures to a chain; it defines a hybrid finality architecture for DAG-native consensus, with protocol-agnostic threshold lifecycle, post-quantum threshold sealing, and cross-chain propagation of Horizon finality.

See LP-105 §Claims and evidence for the canonical claims/evidence table and the ten architectural commitments — single source of truth.

Corona is the Lux Ring-LWE post-quantum threshold signature library for Quasar consensus. The 2-round threshold construction line traces back to the Boschini–Kaviani–Lai–Malavolta–Takahashi–Tibouchi R-LWE paper (ePrint 2024/1113). Corona adds the production lifecycle that line lacked: Pedersen DKG over R_q with proper hiding, proactive resharing for epoch validator rotation, identifiable abort, and the integration surface Quasar consumes.

The Module-LWE sibling library lives at luxfi/pulsar. Pulsar's threshold signature output is byte-equal to FIPS 204 single-party ML-DSA (NIST MPTC Class N1). The two libraries are independent — there is no import line between them — and Quasar consumes them as parallel kernels selected per-chain via FinalitySchemeID.

Why "Corona"

A corona is the luminous ring of light surrounding a star — visible only when the brighter central body (the Pulsar / Quasar) is partially occluded. Brand-paired with Pulsar (Module-LWE) and Quasar (the consensus that consumes both): the same family of threshold-finality light, observed at a different layer.

Production lifecycle additions

The original Boschini et al construction (ePrint 2024/1113) is a research artefact — trusted-dealer DKG, no proactive resharing, no integration surface. Corona is the production track that fills those gaps:

Layer Original R-LWE construction Corona
2-round threshold sign ✅ same byte-equal protocol ✅ inherited
Trusted-dealer Gen ✅ for fixed federation ✅ retained for bridge MPC
Proactive resharing for epoch validator rotation ❌ not specified 🚧 corona/reshare/ (this fork)
Pedersen DKG over R_q with proper hiding ❌ not specified 🚧 corona/dkg2/ (this fork)
Per-validator triple-sign integration with Quasar ❌ N/A 🚧 corona/consensus/ integration

Composition with Pulsar as optional layered PQ defense

Corona is independently usable: a chain can pick Ring-LWE Corona as its sole PQ threshold layer, no cross-dependency on Pulsar. Lux primary- network QuasarCert combines both lattice families as a Double Lattice layered defence so a break in one family does not break finality:

QuasarCert {
    BLS         — optional classical fast-path (BLS-12-381 aggregate)
    Corona      — Ring-LWE   threshold ML-DSA (this repo)
    Pulsar      — Module-LWE threshold ML-DSA (luxfi/pulsar)
    MLDSARollup — per-validator ML-DSA-65 rolled up via STARK/FRI (P3Q)
}

Each layer is checkable independently with no shared code; selecting the layer happens at chain-construction time via the FinalitySchemeID axis on the chain's ChainSecurityProfile. The pure-PQ profile drops BLS entirely and runs on Corona + Pulsar.

Layout

  • sign/ — 2-round threshold signing (byte-equal with upstream)
  • primitives/ — Shamir, hashes, MACs, PRFs (byte-equal with upstream)
  • utils/ — NTT, Montgomery, ring helpers (byte-equal with upstream)
  • networking/ — TCP peer-to-peer (byte-equal with upstream)
  • dkg/ — original Lux DKG (Feldman VSS without noise; broken for public broadcast — see RED-DKG-REVIEW). Retained for reference.
  • dkg2/ — proper Pedersen DKG over R_q (Pulsar addition; this fork)
  • reshare/ — proactive secret resharing for epoch rotation (Pulsar addition; this fork)
  • cmd/ — KAT oracle generators

Status

WIP. The 2-round Sign+Verify path is byte-equal-validated against the original R-LWE construction (ePrint 2024/1113) via 16 SHA-256 KATs. The production-lifecycle additions (resharing + Pedersen DKG) are under design and implementation.

S
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A 2-round lattice-based threshold signature from standard assumptions for public networks
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