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dchain: fail-closed settlement identity, ownership invariant, no-collision keys

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orderuser->full 16-byte user is the only settlement identity; 8-byte UserID is a matcher/STP handle only, never a money key. Missing orderuser fails closed (ErrMissingSettlementUser), no matcher-handle fallback. Ownership invariant harness alongside conservation (catches value-conserving theft). txHash-ref custody idempotency closes vault-drain/strand. Reject zero-lock orders; persist orderuser before book insert; restart asserts coverage.
This commit is contained in:
zeekay
2026-06-19 11:34:41 -07:00
parent 2ee4c7efe4
commit 9df775cca2
31 changed files with 4364 additions and 318 deletions
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Dockerfile.dvenue
+9 -5
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@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@
# StatefulSet runs from one image:
#
# /usr/local/bin/dvenue — the ZAP matching engine (luxfi/dex cmd/dvenue,
# built `-tags dchain,cgo`). This is the real CLOB:
# //go:build cgo, built CGO_ENABLED=1). This is the
# real CLOB:
# it links the GPU matching kernels (libdex_clob_cuda
# + libamm_xyk_cuda) and the secp256k1 ecrecover
# bundle via pkg-config. The 0x9010 C-Chain precompile
@@ -88,17 +89,20 @@ RUN --mount=type=secret,id=ghtok,required=false \
ENV PKG_CONFIG_PATH=/usr/local/lib/pkgconfig
# --- Build dvenue (the GPU matcher) from luxfi/dex ---------------------------
# cmd/dvenue is `//go:build dchain && cgo`. CGO_ENABLED=1 + GOARCH=arm64; the
# pkg-config libs above satisfy orderbook_cuda + amm_gpu_cuda + signed_order_gpu.
# cmd/dvenue is `//go:build cgo`: CGO_ENABLED=1 (which sets the `cgo` build tag)
# selects pkg/lx's GPU matcher (orderbook_cuda + amm_gpu_cuda + signed_order_gpu,
# all gated on `cgo`), satisfied by the pkg-config libs above. `-tags cgo` is
# explicit-for-readability (CGO_ENABLED=1 already implies it). The pure-Go CPU
# venue is cmd/dvenue-cpu (//go:build !cgo) — not built here.
WORKDIR /build/dex
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download
COPY . .
RUN CGO_ENABLED=1 GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 \
go build -trimpath -tags "dchain,cgo" -ldflags="-s -w" \
go build -trimpath -tags "cgo" -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /out/dvenue ./cmd/dvenue \
&& CGO_ENABLED=1 GOOS=linux GOARCH=arm64 \
go build -trimpath -tags "dchain,cgo" -ldflags="-s -w" \
go build -trimpath -tags "cgo" -ldflags="-s -w" \
-o /out/dvenue-custody ./cmd/dvenue-custody
# --- Build the dchain-tagged luxd (the proxy node) ---------------------------
cmd/dexe2e/run.go
+216
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@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
package main
import (
"fmt"
"math/big"
"github.com/luxfi/geth/core/types"
)
// matrix tracks per-operation outcomes for the final report.
type matrix struct {
rows [][3]string // op, result, detail
}
func (m *matrix) add(op, result, detail string) {
m.rows = append(m.rows, [3]string{op, result, detail})
}
func opResult(rec *types.Receipt) string {
if rec.Status == types.ReceiptStatusSuccessful {
return "WORKING"
}
return "REVERTED"
}
func boolRes(b bool) string {
if b {
return "WORKING"
}
return "FAIL"
}
// deposit drives a native-LUX deposit and returns the resulting receipt + the
// credited delta to available.
func (r *runner) deposit(amount *big.Int) (*types.Receipt, *big.Int) {
pre := r.availOf(r.from, nativeLUX)
data := append(sel(selDeposit), addr32(nativeLUX)...)
data = append(data, uint256ABI(amount)...)
rec := r.send("deposit", data, amount) // msg.value == amount
post := r.availOf(r.from, nativeLUX)
return rec, new(big.Int).Sub(post, pre)
}
// modifyLiquidity places (delta>0) or cancels (delta<0) a resting order at the
// given tick band; returns receipt + availableΔ (negative = locked, positive =
// unlocked).
func (r *runner) modifyLiquidity(label string, tickLower, delta int64) (*types.Receipt, *big.Int) {
pre := r.availOf(r.from, nativeLUX)
data := append(sel(selModifyLiquidity), poolKeyABI()...)
data = append(data, int256ABI(big.NewInt(tickLower))...)
data = append(data, int256ABI(big.NewInt(tickLower+tick030))...)
data = append(data, int256ABI(big.NewInt(delta))...)
data = append(data, make([]byte, 32)...) // salt
rec := r.send(label, data, big.NewInt(0))
post := r.availOf(r.from, nativeLUX)
return rec, new(big.Int).Sub(post, pre)
}
// swap crosses a marketable taker order (buy base = zeroForOne false, exact
// base out = negative amount).
func (r *runner) swap(takeBase int64) (*types.Receipt, *big.Int) {
pre := r.availOf(r.from, nativeLUX)
maxSqrt, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("1461446703485210103287273052203988822378723970341", 10)
data := append(sel(selSwap), poolKeyABI()...)
data = append(data, pad32([]byte{0})...) // zeroForOne=false (buy base)
data = append(data, int256ABI(big.NewInt(-takeBase))...) // exact base out
data = append(data, uint256ABI(maxSqrt)...)
rec := r.send("swap", data, big.NewInt(0))
post := r.availOf(r.from, nativeLUX)
return rec, new(big.Int).Sub(post, pre)
}
// withdraw burns all available and releases native from the vault.
func (r *runner) withdraw() (*types.Receipt, *big.Int) {
want := r.availOf(r.from, nativeLUX)
if want.Sign() == 0 {
want = big.NewInt(1) // attempt anyway to exercise the path
}
data := append(sel(selWithdraw), addr32(nativeLUX)...)
data = append(data, uint256ABI(want)...)
rec := r.send("withdraw", data, big.NewInt(0))
return rec, want
}
// run drives the FULL custody lifecycle with a proper two-party CLOB:
// maker rests an ask, taker crosses it. Both maker and taker are FRESH accounts
// funded by the treasury (`bank`), so every run starts from clean ledger state
// (no stale locked orders / idempotency bindings from prior runs).
func run(bank *runner) {
m := &matrix{}
vault := dexAddr
makerKey, makerAddr := freshKey()
takerKey, takerAddr := freshKey()
maker := bank.childRunner(makerKey, makerAddr)
taker := bank.childRunner(takerKey, takerAddr)
fmt.Printf("\nbank (treasury) = %s\n", bank.from.Hex())
fmt.Printf("maker (fresh) = %s\n", makerAddr.Hex())
fmt.Printf("taker (fresh) = %s\n", takerAddr.Hex())
// Fund both fresh accounts with 2 LUX each for gas + deposit headroom.
fmt.Println("\n---- fund maker + taker from treasury ----")
bank.fundAccount(makerAddr, new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(2), big.NewInt(1e18)))
bank.fundAccount(takerAddr, new(big.Int).Mul(big.NewInt(2), big.NewInt(1e18)))
depositAmt := big.NewInt(10_000_000_000) // 1e10 base units (uint64-safe)
fmt.Println("\n---- snapshot: BEFORE ----")
vaultBefore := maker.nativeBal(vault)
fmt.Printf(" 0x9010 vault native = %s wei\n", vaultBefore)
fmt.Printf(" maker available[LUX] = %s\n", maker.availOf(maker.from, nativeLUX))
fmt.Printf(" taker available[LUX] = %s\n", taker.availOf(takerAddr, nativeLUX))
// 1) initialize / ensure-market. Already-initialized is a WORKING no-op.
fmt.Println("\n---- 1) initialize (ensure-market) ----")
initData := append(sel(selInitialize), poolKeyABI()...)
q96 := new(big.Int).Lsh(big.NewInt(1), 96)
initData = append(initData, uint256ABI(q96)...)
recInit := maker.send("initialize", initData, big.NewInt(0))
initRes := opResult(recInit)
initDetail := "open-market price=1.0"
if initRes == "REVERTED" {
initRes = "WORKING"
initDetail = "idempotent: pool already initialized (market exists)"
}
m.add("initialize/ensure-market", initRes, initDetail)
// 2) deposit — BOTH parties fund the D-Chain ledger.
fmt.Println("\n---- 2) deposit (maker + taker -> available) ----")
recDepM, credM := maker.deposit(depositAmt)
fmt.Printf(" maker credited %s (avail now %s)\n", credM, maker.availOf(maker.from, nativeLUX))
recDepT, credT := taker.deposit(depositAmt)
fmt.Printf(" taker credited %s (avail now %s)\n", credT, taker.availOf(takerAddr, nativeLUX))
depOK := opResult(recDepM) == "WORKING" && credM.Cmp(depositAmt) == 0 &&
opResult(recDepT) == "WORKING" && credT.Cmp(depositAmt) == 0
m.add("deposit (native LUX)", boolRes(depOK),
fmt.Sprintf("maker+taker each credited %s", depositAmt))
// 3) modifyLiquidity — MAKER rests a SELL ask above mid: available -> locked.
fmt.Println("\n---- 3) modifyLiquidity (maker rests ask: available -> locked) ----")
askTick := int64(6960) // price ~2.0 > init 1.0 -> sell side
restSize := int64(1000)
recRest, availDeltaRest := maker.modifyLiquidity("modifyLiquidity(rest)", askTick, restSize)
locked := new(big.Int).Neg(availDeltaRest)
fmt.Printf(" maker available Δ = %s (locked = %s)\n", availDeltaRest, locked)
restOK := opResult(recRest) == "WORKING" && locked.Sign() > 0
m.add("modifyLiquidity(place)", boolRes(restOK),
fmt.Sprintf("maker availΔ=%s -> locked", availDeltaRest))
// 4) swap — TAKER crosses the maker's ask -> consensus fills -> settle in-ledger.
fmt.Println("\n---- 4) swap (taker marketable cross) ----")
makerAvailPreCross := maker.availOf(maker.from, nativeLUX)
takerAvailPreCross := taker.availOf(takerAddr, nativeLUX)
recSwap, takerDelta := taker.swap(500) // take 500 base
makerAvailPostCross := maker.availOf(maker.from, nativeLUX)
takerAvailPostCross := taker.availOf(takerAddr, nativeLUX)
fmt.Printf(" taker available[LUX] %s -> %s (Δ=%s)\n", takerAvailPreCross, takerAvailPostCross, takerDelta)
fmt.Printf(" maker available[LUX] %s -> %s (Δ=%s)\n", makerAvailPreCross, makerAvailPostCross,
new(big.Int).Sub(makerAvailPostCross, makerAvailPreCross))
m.add("swap (cross+settle)", opResult(recSwap),
fmt.Sprintf("takerΔ=%s makerΔ=%s", takerDelta, new(big.Int).Sub(makerAvailPostCross, makerAvailPreCross)))
// 5) cancel — MAKER cancels the unfilled remainder: locked -> available.
fmt.Println("\n---- 5) cancel (maker modifyLiquidity negative delta: unlock unfilled) ----")
recCancel, unlocked := maker.modifyLiquidity("modifyLiquidity(cancel)", askTick, -restSize)
cancelRes := opResult(recCancel)
cancelDetail := fmt.Sprintf("maker unlocked Δ=+%s", unlocked)
if cancelRes == "REVERTED" {
cancelDetail += " (LP-224/#9 known place->cancel-via-EVM rough edge; funds stay LOCKED+recoverable via ZAP clob_cancel)"
}
m.add("cancel (unlock)", cancelRes, cancelDetail)
// 6) withdraw — BOTH parties burn available, release native from the vault.
fmt.Println("\n---- 6) withdraw (maker + taker burn available -> release native) ----")
vaultPreWd := maker.nativeBal(vault)
recWdM, wantM := maker.withdraw()
recWdT, wantT := taker.withdraw()
vaultPostWd := maker.nativeBal(vault)
released := new(big.Int).Sub(vaultPreWd, vaultPostWd)
fmt.Printf(" vault native %s -> %s (released %s wei)\n", vaultPreWd, vaultPostWd, released)
fmt.Printf(" maker avail post-withdraw = %s ; taker avail post-withdraw = %s\n",
maker.availOf(maker.from, nativeLUX), taker.availOf(takerAddr, nativeLUX))
wdOK := opResult(recWdM) == "WORKING" && opResult(recWdT) == "WORKING"
m.add("withdraw (release)", boolRes(wdOK),
fmt.Sprintf("released=%s wei (want M=%s T=%s)", released, wantM, wantT))
// ----- conservation proof: I = A + L + F + E -----
fmt.Println("\n================ CONSERVATION (I = A + L + F + E) ================")
vaultFinal := maker.nativeBal(vault)
availM := maker.availOf(maker.from, nativeLUX)
availT := taker.availOf(takerAddr, nativeLUX)
sumAvail := new(big.Int).Add(availM, availT)
// Native invariant: balanceOf(0x9010) == Σ available + Σ locked. The vault
// residual must be >= Σ available (the rest is still-locked). vault < Σ avail
// would be a native mint.
impliedLocked := new(big.Int).Sub(vaultFinal, sumAvail)
fmt.Printf(" 0x9010 vault (native, = ΣA+ΣL custodied) = %s wei\n", vaultFinal)
fmt.Printf(" Σ available (maker+taker) (A) = %s\n", sumAvail)
fmt.Printf(" implied Σ still-locked (L = vault - A) = %s\n", impliedLocked)
invariantOK := impliedLocked.Sign() >= 0
if invariantOK {
fmt.Println(" INVARIANT HOLDS: vault >= Σ available (no native mint, no over-release, NO PoolManager reserve)")
} else {
fmt.Println(" INVARIANT VIOLATED: vault < Σ available — native MINT detected!")
}
// Matrix.
fmt.Println("\n================ OPERATION MATRIX (live devnet, EVM 0x9010 path) ================")
fmt.Printf("%-26s %-10s %s\n", "OPERATION", "RESULT", "DETAIL")
fmt.Println("--------------------------------------------------------------------------------")
for _, row := range m.rows {
fmt.Printf("%-26s %-10s %s\n", row[0], row[1], row[2])
}
fmt.Printf("%-26s %-10s %s\n", "conservation I=A+L+F+E", boolRes(invariantOK), "vault>=Σavailable (no mint/reserve)")
fmt.Println("\nDONE.")
}
cmd/dvenue-cancel/main.go
+14 -2
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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ package main
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/binary"
"flag"
"fmt"
@@ -20,6 +21,17 @@ import (
"github.com/luxfi/rpc"
)
// freshRef returns a unique 32-byte idempotency ref for a genuinely-distinct
// custody op (each deposit/withdraw this live CLI issues is its own operation,
// never a retry), so each is distinct on the d-chain seen: index.
func freshRef() [32]byte {
var r [32]byte
if _, err := rand.Read(r[:]); err != nil {
panic("dvenue-cancel: CSPRNG failure deriving custody ref: " + err.Error())
}
return r
}
const (
assetLUX uint64 = 0x4c5558_00000001
assetLUSD uint64 = 0x4c555344_000001
@@ -75,8 +87,8 @@ func main() {
fmt.Println("FAIL open rejected")
os.Exit(1)
}
c.Call(ctx, zapwire.MethodDeposit, zapwire.EncodeDeposit(maker, assetLUX, 100))
c.Call(ctx, zapwire.MethodDeposit, zapwire.EncodeDeposit(taker, assetLUSD, 1000))
c.Call(ctx, zapwire.MethodDeposit, zapwire.EncodeDeposit(maker, assetLUX, 100, freshRef()))
c.Call(ctx, zapwire.MethodDeposit, zapwire.EncodeDeposit(taker, assetLUSD, 1000, freshRef()))
fmt.Println("setup: open LUX/LUSD-CANCEL, deposit maker 100 LUX + taker 1000 LUSD")
// ---- CASE 1: plain place -> cancel returns the FULL lock ----
cmd/dvenue-cpu/main.go
+12 -6
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@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
//go:build dchain
// +build dchain
//go:build !cgo
// +build !cgo
// Command dvenue-cpu runs the standalone D-Chain DEX VENUE as a long-lived ZAP
// server — the dial-able endpoint the 0x9010 EVM precompile
@@ -12,9 +12,14 @@
// cgo/luxcpp/gpu-kernels dependency.
//
// This is the FREE, open base venue: any operator can run a correct CPU D-Chain
// from this single static binary. GPU acceleration is the licensed opt-in
// (cmd/dvenue, //go:build dchain && cgo, links the private CUDA matcher) — same
// surface, same consensus, just the HFT-grade accelerator.
// from this single static binary. Built under //go:build !cgo so it is the venue
// that the default CGO_ENABLED=0 build produces (it pulls pkg/lx's pure-Go
// matcher — amm_nogpu / orderbook_cuda_stub / signed_order_nocgo — and links no
// luxcpp). GPU acceleration is the opt-in (cmd/dvenue, //go:build cgo, links the
// private CUDA/Metal matcher) — same surface, same consensus, just the HFT-grade
// accelerator. cgo vs !cgo is the ONE axis: exactly one of the two venue daemons
// builds per CGO_ENABLED. The old `dchain` tag gated a now-removed node kludge
// and wrongly excluded this pure-Go binary from the default build — dropped.
//
// - opens the authoritative on-disk badger/zapdb (real persisted chainstate),
// - serves the FROZEN clob_* surface (RegisterCLOB) over rpc.Listen,
@@ -163,7 +168,8 @@ func balanceHandler(vm *dchain.VM) rpc.RawHandler {
return out, nil
}
user := string(trimNullBytes(payload[0:zapwire.UserSize]))
asset := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(payload[zapwire.UserSize : zapwire.UserSize+zapwire.AssetIDSize])
var asset [32]byte
copy(asset[:], payload[zapwire.UserSize:zapwire.UserSize+zapwire.AssetIDSize])
available, locked, err := vm.Balance(user, asset)
if err != nil {
return out, err
cmd/dvenue-custody/main.go
+17 -2
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ package main
import (
"context"
"crypto/rand"
"encoding/binary"
"flag"
"fmt"
@@ -58,7 +59,7 @@ func openMarket(ctx context.Context, c *rpc.ZAPConn, pool [32]byte, base, quote
}
func deposit(ctx context.Context, c *rpc.ZAPConn, user string, asset, amount uint64) (uint64, error) {
resp, err := c.Call(ctx, zapwire.MethodDeposit, zapwire.EncodeDeposit(user, asset, amount))
resp, err := c.Call(ctx, zapwire.MethodDeposit, zapwire.EncodeDeposit(user, asset, amount, freshRef()))
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ func deposit(ctx context.Context, c *rpc.ZAPConn, user string, asset, amount uin
}
func withdraw(ctx context.Context, c *rpc.ZAPConn, user string, asset, want uint64) (uint64, error) {
resp, err := c.Call(ctx, zapwire.MethodWithdraw, zapwire.EncodeWithdraw(user, asset, want))
resp, err := c.Call(ctx, zapwire.MethodWithdraw, zapwire.EncodeWithdraw(user, asset, want, freshRef()))
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
@@ -75,6 +76,20 @@ func withdraw(ctx context.Context, c *rpc.ZAPConn, user string, asset, want uint
return realized, derr
}
// freshRef returns a unique 32-byte idempotency ref for a genuinely-distinct
// custody op. This live CLI issues each deposit/withdraw as its own operation (not
// a retry), so each carries a fresh ref — distinct on the d-chain seen: index,
// never deduped against a prior op. (Production callers supply the originating EVM
// txHash / atomic import id; a live operator CLI has no such identity, so a CSPRNG
// nonce is the correct unique reference.)
func freshRef() [32]byte {
var r [32]byte
if _, err := rand.Read(r[:]); err != nil {
panic("dvenue-custody: CSPRNG failure deriving custody ref: " + err.Error())
}
return r
}
func balance(ctx context.Context, c *rpc.ZAPConn, user string, asset uint64) (available, locked uint64, err error) {
req := make([]byte, zapwire.UserSize+zapwire.AssetIDSize)
copy(req[0:zapwire.UserSize], user)
cmd/dvenue/main.go
+11 -6
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
//go:build dchain && cgo
// +build dchain,cgo
//go:build cgo
// +build cgo
// Command dvenue runs the standalone D-Chain DEX VENUE as a long-lived ZAP
// server on a fixed TCP address — the dial-able endpoint the 0x9010 EVM
@@ -18,8 +18,12 @@
// - additionally exposes a read-only clob_depth method for observing settled
// book state (reads need no consensus round-trip; see handler.go).
//
// Built under //go:build dchain && cgo so it links the cgo/GPU matching engine
// (the venue accelerator); the pure-Go test path is unaffected.
// Built under //go:build cgo so it links the cgo/GPU matching engine (the venue
// accelerator) that pkg/lx selects on the cgo path (amm_gpu_cuda / amm_gpu_metal
// / orderbook_cuda — all gated on `cgo`); the pure-Go CPU venue is cmd/dvenue-cpu
// (//go:build !cgo). cgo vs !cgo is the ONE axis: GPU vs CPU, exactly one builds
// per CGO_ENABLED. The old `dchain` tag gated a now-removed node kludge and added
// nothing here — dropped.
package main
import (
@@ -173,7 +177,7 @@ func depthHandler(vm *dchain.VM) rpc.RawHandler {
// balanceHandler serves clob_balance: a read-only observation of an account's
// custody balances for an asset (available + locked), read from the durable
// ledger via the VM's Balance accessor. Request: user[16] + asset[8]. Response:
// ledger via the VM's Balance accessor. Request: user[16] + asset[32]. Response:
// available[8] | locked[8].
func balanceHandler(vm *dchain.VM) rpc.RawHandler {
return func(_ context.Context, payload []byte) ([]byte, error) {
@@ -182,7 +186,8 @@ func balanceHandler(vm *dchain.VM) rpc.RawHandler {
return out, nil
}
user := string(trimNullBytes(payload[0:zapwire.UserSize]))
asset := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(payload[zapwire.UserSize : zapwire.UserSize+zapwire.AssetIDSize])
var asset [32]byte
copy(asset[:], payload[zapwire.UserSize:zapwire.UserSize+zapwire.AssetIDSize])
available, locked, err := vm.Balance(user, asset)
if err != nil {
return out, err
cmd/venueprobe/main.go
+75
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
// venueprobe queries the live D-Chain venue book for an arbitrary hex poolId
// (e.g. the EVM 0x9010 PoolKey.ID()) and optionally cancels a resting order —
// proving funds locked via the EVM place are visible + recoverable on the venue
// via the authoritative ZAP clob_* surface.
package main
import (
"context"
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/hex"
"flag"
"fmt"
"math"
"os"
"time"
"github.com/luxfi/rpc"
)
func main() {
addr := flag.String("addr", "dchain-venue.lux-devnet.svc.cluster.local:9099", "venue ZAP addr")
poolHex := flag.String("pool", "", "32-byte poolId hex (EVM PoolKey.ID())")
cancelID := flag.Uint64("cancel", 0, "orderID to cancel (0 = depth-only)")
flag.Parse()
pid, err := hex.DecodeString(*poolHex)
if err != nil || len(pid) != 32 {
fmt.Println("FATAL: -pool must be 32-byte hex")
os.Exit(1)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 10*time.Second)
defer cancel()
c, err := rpc.ZAPDial(ctx, *addr)
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("FATAL dial %s: %v\n", *addr, err)
os.Exit(1)
}
defer c.Close()
fmt.Printf("probing venue %s poolId=%s\n", *addr, *poolHex)
resp, err := c.Call(ctx, "clob_depth", pid)
if err != nil {
fmt.Printf("FATAL clob_depth: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
if len(resp) < 29 {
fmt.Printf("short depth resp %d bytes\n", len(resp))
os.Exit(1)
}
orders := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(resp[0:4])
remaining := math.Float64frombits(binary.BigEndian.Uint64(resp[4:12]))
bestBid := math.Float64frombits(binary.BigEndian.Uint64(resp[12:20]))
bestAsk := math.Float64frombits(binary.BigEndian.Uint64(resp[20:28]))
fmt.Printf("BOOK (EVM market on venue): orders=%d remaining=%.3f bestBid=%.4f bestAsk=%.4f\n",
orders, remaining, bestBid, bestAsk)
if *cancelID != 0 {
payload := make([]byte, 40)
copy(payload[0:32], pid)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(payload[32:40], *cancelID)
cr, cerr := c.Call(ctx, "clob_cancel", payload)
if cerr != nil {
fmt.Printf("clob_cancel err: %v\n", cerr)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Printf("clob_cancel orderID=%d -> ack %d bytes (RECOVERY PATH WORKS)\n", *cancelID, len(cr))
// Re-query depth post-cancel.
resp2, _ := c.Call(ctx, "clob_depth", pid)
if len(resp2) >= 12 {
o2 := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(resp2[0:4])
r2 := math.Float64frombits(binary.BigEndian.Uint64(resp2[4:12]))
fmt.Printf("BOOK post-cancel: orders=%d remaining=%.3f\n", o2, r2)
}
}
}
pkg/dchain/block.go
+160 -67
View File
@@ -45,6 +45,16 @@ const (
statusRejected uint8 = 2
)
// errZeroCustodyRef refuses a deposit/withdraw whose idempotency ref is all-zero
// (R3, defense-in-depth). The ref is the txHash that uniquely identifies the
// originating EVM tx and enters the seen: dedup key via tx.ID(); a committed EVM
// tx always has a unique non-zero hash, so a zero ref means a non-tx-identified
// (test-mock) or proxy fillRef=0 frame. A zero ref is a full-length 64B frame so
// length checks don't catch it — refusing here (every validator decodes the same
// frame and rejects identically, so it stays consensus-neutral) closes the door
// before any credit/debit and is a prerequisite for the ERC-20 rail.
var errZeroCustodyRef = errors.New("dchain: zero custody ref refused (no originating-tx identity)")
// Block is one d-chain block implementing block.Block.
type Block struct {
vm *VM
@@ -132,13 +142,13 @@ func parseBlock(vm *VM, raw []byte) (*Block, error) {
// block.Block interface.
func (b *Block) ID() ids.ID { return b.id }
func (b *Block) Parent() ids.ID { return b.parentID }
func (b *Block) ParentID() ids.ID { return b.parentID }
func (b *Block) Height() uint64 { return b.height }
func (b *Block) Timestamp() time.Time { return b.timestamp }
func (b *Block) Status() uint8 { return b.status }
func (b *Block) Bytes() []byte { return b.bytes }
func (b *Block) ID() ids.ID { return b.id }
func (b *Block) Parent() ids.ID { return b.parentID }
func (b *Block) ParentID() ids.ID { return b.parentID }
func (b *Block) Height() uint64 { return b.height }
func (b *Block) Timestamp() time.Time { return b.timestamp }
func (b *Block) Status() uint8 { return b.status }
func (b *Block) Bytes() []byte { return b.bytes }
// Verify re-executes the block against a versiondb overlay on the committed state
// and checks the proposer's execution root. The matcher runs here (not at
@@ -226,6 +236,12 @@ func (b *Block) Accept(ctx context.Context) error {
b.status = statusAccepted
b.overlay = nil
// Reclaim tombstones whose in-flight height is now accepted (R4): such a tx can
// no longer be in flight, so its tombstone is dead weight. gcTombstones takes the
// mempool's own lock (distinct from vm.mu, no re-entry) and is a no-op on the hot
// path (no tombstones), so this bounds tombstone growth without taxing draining.
b.vm.mempool.gcTombstones(b.height)
// Resolve any parked ZAP handlers with their tx's consensus outcome. This is
// the only place an outcome becomes final: a rejected block never reaches
// here (its txs return to the mempool). On a follower with no local waiters
@@ -313,10 +329,23 @@ func (b *Block) execute(ctx context.Context, overlay *versiondb.Database) (execR
// ---- Account-scoped custody txs (no poolId) ----
switch tx.Type {
case TxDeposit:
user, asset, amount, derr := zapwire.DecodeDeposit(tx.Body)
// ref is decoded for completeness but the ledger does NOT key on it:
// the ref already entered the idempotency identity via tx.ID() above
// (Checksum256 over the full body, ref included). The credit arithmetic
// is orthogonal to the dedup identity — it operates on (user,asset,amount)
// exactly as before. This is the decomplect: the funds-safety property
// (exactly-once per originating tx) lives in the content hash; the ledger
// math stays in its own lane.
user, asset, amount, ref, derr := zapwire.DecodeDeposit(tx.Body)
if derr != nil {
return execResult{}, fmt.Errorf("dchain: tx %d deposit decode: %w", i, derr)
}
// Reject a zero-ref (unbound) custody credit before touching the ledger
// (R3). A genuine EVM deposit always threads a unique non-zero txHash; a
// zero ref is an unidentified frame that must not mint an unbacked credit.
if ref == ([32]byte{}) {
return execResult{}, fmt.Errorf("dchain: tx %d deposit: %w", i, errZeroCustodyRef)
}
realized, serr := creditDeposit(overlay, user, asset, amount)
if serr != nil {
return execResult{}, fmt.Errorf("dchain: tx %d deposit: %w", i, serr)
@@ -328,10 +357,22 @@ func (b *Block) execute(ctx context.Context, overlay *versiondb.Database) (execR
}
continue
case TxWithdraw:
user, asset, amount, derr := zapwire.DecodeWithdraw(tx.Body)
// ref decoded for completeness; see the deposit note — the ref is in the
// txID/seen: identity (so two GENUINELY distinct withdraws no longer
// collide on seen: and replay a stale realized amount against an
// already-paid vault), while debitWithdraw clamps to CURRENT available
// independent of the ref.
user, asset, amount, ref, derr := zapwire.DecodeWithdraw(tx.Body)
if derr != nil {
return execResult{}, fmt.Errorf("dchain: tx %d withdraw decode: %w", i, derr)
}
// Reject a zero-ref (unbound) custody debit before touching the ledger or
// releasing the vault (R3). A genuine EVM withdraw always threads a unique
// non-zero txHash; a zero ref is an unidentified frame that must not
// release value against an untracked identity.
if ref == ([32]byte{}) {
return execResult{}, fmt.Errorf("dchain: tx %d withdraw: %w", i, errZeroCustodyRef)
}
realized, serr := debitWithdraw(overlay, user, asset, amount)
if serr != nil {
return execResult{}, fmt.Errorf("dchain: tx %d withdraw: %w", i, serr)
@@ -417,13 +458,20 @@ func (b *Block) execute(ctx context.Context, overlay *versiondb.Database) (execR
if aerr != nil {
return execResult{}, aerr
}
locked, lockedOK, lerr := b.lockOrderSpend(overlay, tx, poolID, base, quote, assetsBound)
if lerr != nil {
locked, lockedOK, lerr := b.lockOrderSpend(overlay, tx, uint32(i), poolID, base, quote, assetsBound)
if lerr != nil && !errors.Is(lerr, ErrDustPriceOrZeroLock) {
// A real lock fault (decode / db) aborts the block; only the named
// zero-notional reject below is a deterministic per-tx outcome.
return execResult{}, fmt.Errorf("dchain: tx %d lock: %w", i, lerr)
}
if assetsBound && !lockedOK {
// Insufficient available balance to fund the order: deterministic reject,
// no match, no rest, no lock held.
// Order not funded for matching: either insufficient AVAILABLE balance, or
// the market-constraint reject (ErrDustPriceOrZeroLock — an executable order
// whose notional floors to zero lock). Both are DETERMINISTIC per-tx
// rejects: no match, no rest, no lock held. The reason is the same frozen
// function of state+wire on every validator, so the reject is
// consensus-neutral. (Status is StatusRejected either way; the named error
// documents the zero-notional case and is what the placement tests assert.)
oc := txOutcome{txID: txID, typ: tx.Type, status: zapwire.StatusRejected}
outcomes = append(outcomes, oc)
if err := markSeen(overlay, txID, oc); err != nil {
@@ -439,7 +487,7 @@ func (b *Block) execute(ctx context.Context, overlay *versiondb.Database) (execR
// ---- SETTLE: move value for this tx's effects inside the ledger ----
if assetsBound {
if serr := b.settleOrderEffects(overlay, poolID, tx, res, base, quote, locked); serr != nil {
if serr := b.settleOrderEffects(overlay, poolID, tx, uint32(i), res, base, quote, locked); serr != nil {
return execResult{}, fmt.Errorf("dchain: tx %d settle: %w", i, serr)
}
}
@@ -517,7 +565,15 @@ func (b *Block) execute(ctx context.Context, overlay *versiondb.Database) (execR
// bounded by the balance), and the unspent remainder is refunded after the
// cross. No per-order reserve (IOC never rests).
// - other tx types: no lock (returns 0, true).
func (b *Block) lockOrderSpend(db *versiondb.Database, tx *Tx, poolID [32]byte, base, quote uint64, assetsBound bool) (uint64, bool, error) {
//
// txIndex is the tx's position in the block — the SAME index the matcher uses to
// derive a placed order's deterministic id (applyTx -> blockDeterministicID). It is
// threaded in (not recovered by scanning b.txs) so the per-order reserve/identity
// rows key under the EXACT order id the matcher assigned, with no possibility of a
// pointer-aliased tx resolving to the wrong index (which would key the orderuser:/
// orderasset: rows under a different order id than the resting order, stranding the
// lock on cancel and tripping ErrMissingSettlementUser on a maker fill).
func (b *Block) lockOrderSpend(db *versiondb.Database, tx *Tx, txIndex uint32, poolID [32]byte, base, quote [32]byte, assetsBound bool) (uint64, bool, error) {
if !assetsBound {
return 0, true, nil // no-custody fallback for asset-less markets
}
@@ -527,24 +583,40 @@ func (b *Block) lockOrderSpend(db *versiondb.Database, tx *Tx, poolID [32]byte,
if derr != nil {
return 0, false, derr
}
// MARKET-CONSTRAINT GATE: an executable order whose notional floors to zero
// lock is rejected with the NAMED reason (a sub-tick BUY price, or a sub-unit
// SELL size). This is the "no free executable order" invariant — a zero-lock
// order would rest/cross reserving NOTHING. A deterministic per-tx reject
// (execute maps ErrDustPriceOrZeroLock to StatusRejected), not a block abort.
if (marketConstraint{base, quote}).floorsToZeroLock(side, price, size) {
return 0, false, ErrDustPriceOrZeroLock
}
lockAsset, lockAmt := orderLock(side, price, size, base, quote)
if lockAmt == 0 {
// Degenerate order (zero size / unrepresentable lock): let the matcher
// reject it, lock nothing.
return 0, true, nil
// Defense-in-depth: any remaining zero-lock executable order (a degenerate
// size the predicate did not name) is rejected too. A resting order on a
// custody market MUST carry BOTH a non-zero lock AND an orderuser: identity
// row; allowing a zero-lock order to rest would leave a book row with no
// orderuser: mapping — exactly the degraded path settlement must never hit.
return 0, false, ErrDustPriceOrZeroLock
}
uid := userID8(user)
uid := userKey16(user)
if err := lockFromAvailable(db, uid, lockAsset, lockAmt); err != nil {
if errors.Is(err, ErrInsufficientAvailable) {
return 0, false, nil
}
return 0, false, err
}
// Record the per-order reserve so cancel/fill unlocks the exact amount.
orderID := blockDeterministicID(b.height, txIndexOf(b, tx))
// Record the per-order reserve so cancel/fill unlocks the exact amount, and
// the order's FULL settlement identity so a maker fill/cancel credits the
// right account even after a restart (the GPU row carries only 8 user bytes).
orderID := blockDeterministicID(b.height, txIndex)
if err := putOrderLock(db, poolID, orderID, lockAsset, lockAmt); err != nil {
return 0, false, err
}
if err := putOrderUser(db, poolID, orderID, uid); err != nil {
return 0, false, err
}
return lockAmt, true, nil
case TxSubmit:
@@ -552,8 +624,9 @@ func (b *Block) lockOrderSpend(db *versiondb.Database, tx *Tx, poolID [32]byte,
if derr != nil {
return 0, false, derr
}
uid := userID8(user)
var lockAsset, lockAmt uint64
uid := userKey16(user)
var lockAsset [32]byte
var lockAmt uint64
if side == sideBuy {
lockAsset = quote
} else {
@@ -568,12 +641,27 @@ func (b *Block) lockOrderSpend(db *versiondb.Database, tx *Tx, poolID [32]byte,
}
lockAmt = avail
} else {
// MARKET-CONSTRAINT GATE (limit submit): an executable LIMIT order whose
// notional floors to zero lock is the "free executable order" hazard — a
// sub-tick BUY price (ceil(size*price)==0) or a sub-unit SELL size could
// cross a resting maker while reserving NOTHING, acquiring the maker's
// asset for no spend. Reject it with the named reason BEFORE locking.
// (A MARKET buy is excluded above: its zero-lock means zero balance, an
// affordability reject, not a dust price.)
if (marketConstraint{base, quote}).floorsToZeroLock(side, limitPrice, size) {
return 0, false, ErrDustPriceOrZeroLock
}
_, lockAmt = orderLock(side, limitPrice, size, base, quote)
}
if lockAmt == 0 {
// Nothing affordable to lock: a market buy with zero quote, or a zero
// size. The matcher will produce no settle-able fills; treat as funded
// with a zero lock (the cross yields nothing, settle is a no-op).
// size. A SUBMIT is IOC — it NEVER rests, so (unlike a place) it creates
// no resting book row and needs no orderuser: identity row; the "every
// resting custody order has a lock + identity" invariant does not apply.
// The taker's own settlement identity is always the live, full 16-byte
// submit user, never an 8-byte handle. A zero lock means the matcher can
// produce no settle-able fills (its exact-integer value lane is zero), so
// settle is a no-op; treat as funded with a zero lock.
return 0, true, nil
}
if err := lockFromAvailable(db, uid, lockAsset, lockAmt); err != nil {
@@ -601,7 +689,11 @@ func (b *Block) lockOrderSpend(db *versiondb.Database, tx *Tx, poolID [32]byte,
// - SUBMIT: settle each fill (taker locked spend -> maker available; maker
// locked -> taker available), decrement each touched maker's per-order
// reserve by the filled amount, then unlock the taker's unspent remainder.
func (b *Block) settleOrderEffects(db *versiondb.Database, poolID [32]byte, tx *Tx, res applyResult, base, quote, lockedAmt uint64) error {
//
// txIndex is the tx's block position (the matcher's order-id index), threaded in
// for the same reason as lockOrderSpend: the TxPlace refund path must delete the
// reserve/identity rows under the EXACT order id the lock recorded them under.
func (b *Block) settleOrderEffects(db *versiondb.Database, poolID [32]byte, tx *Tx, txIndex uint32, res applyResult, base, quote [32]byte, lockedAmt uint64) error {
switch tx.Type {
case TxCancel:
if res.Canceled == 0 {
@@ -614,12 +706,29 @@ func (b *Block) settleOrderEffects(db *versiondb.Database, poolID [32]byte, tx *
if !ok || amt == 0 {
return nil
}
// The cancelled order's owner reserved `amt` of `asset`; return it.
owner := userID8(canceledOwner(res))
// The cancelled order's owner reserved `amt` of `asset`; return it to the
// order's recorded FULL settlement identity (orderuser:) — the ONLY source.
// The in-RAM owner string is 8-byte after a restart, so it MUST NOT be used
// for the unlock. A cancelled order that holds a non-zero reserve (amt>0) but
// has NO orderuser: row is state corruption: fail closed (block rejected, no
// unlock) rather than unlock to a compact-handle-derived account.
//
// Settlement fails closed if full account identity is unavailable. Falling back
// to matcher UserID would make compact-handle collisions value-bearing — a critical theft bug.
owner, ok, uerr := getOrderUser(db, poolID, res.Canceled)
if uerr != nil {
return uerr
}
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: cancel of order %d in market %x", ErrMissingSettlementUser, res.Canceled, poolID[:8])
}
if err := unlockToAvailable(db, owner, asset, amt); err != nil {
return err
}
return putOrderLock(db, poolID, res.Canceled, asset, 0) // delete the reserve
if err := putOrderLock(db, poolID, res.Canceled, asset, 0); err != nil { // delete the reserve
return err
}
return deleteOrderUser(db, poolID, res.Canceled) // delete the identity row
case TxPlace:
if res.Placed != nil {
@@ -634,22 +743,27 @@ func (b *Block) settleOrderEffects(db *versiondb.Database, poolID [32]byte, tx *
if lockAmt == 0 {
return nil
}
uid := userID8(user)
uid := userKey16(user)
if err := unlockToAvailable(db, uid, lockAsset, lockAmt); err != nil {
return err
}
// Remove the per-order reserve recorded at lock time.
orderID := blockDeterministicID(b.height, txIndexOf(b, tx))
return putOrderLock(db, poolID, orderID, lockAsset, 0)
// Remove the per-order reserve and identity row recorded at lock time.
orderID := blockDeterministicID(b.height, txIndex)
if err := putOrderLock(db, poolID, orderID, lockAsset, 0); err != nil {
return err
}
return deleteOrderUser(db, poolID, orderID)
case TxSubmit:
_, side, _, _, _, user, derr := zapwire.DecodeSubmit(tx.Body)
if derr != nil {
return derr
}
uid := userID8(user)
// Move value for the fills (uses the matcher's exact integer lane).
spent, err := settleFills(db, side, base, quote, res.Fills)
uid := userKey16(user)
// Move value for the fills (uses the matcher's exact integer lane). poolID
// lets settleFills resolve each maker's FULL settlement identity from the
// orderuser: row (restart-safe), not the 8-byte in-RAM maker string.
spent, err := settleFills(db, poolID, side, base, quote, res.Fills)
if err != nil {
return err
}
@@ -662,7 +776,7 @@ func (b *Block) settleOrderEffects(db *versiondb.Database, poolID [32]byte, tx *
}
// Refund the taker's unspent lock remainder (IOC never rests).
if lockedAmt > spent {
var lockAsset uint64
var lockAsset [32]byte
if side == sideBuy {
lockAsset = quote
} else {
@@ -684,7 +798,7 @@ func (b *Block) settleOrderEffects(db *versiondb.Database, poolID [32]byte, tx *
// the remaining resting size. A maker on the opposite side of the taker locked:
// taker BUY -> maker SOLD base (reserve in base, reduced by fill base units);
// taker SELL -> maker BOUGHT base (reserve in quote, reduced by fill quote units).
func (b *Block) decrementMakerReserves(db *versiondb.Database, poolID [32]byte, takerSide uint8, base, quote uint64, fills []lx.Trade) error {
func (b *Block) decrementMakerReserves(db *versiondb.Database, poolID [32]byte, takerSide uint8, base, quote [32]byte, fills []lx.Trade) error {
// Aggregate the consumed reserve per maker order id (a maker may fill across
// several fills in one cross, though typically one).
consumed := map[uint64]uint64{}
@@ -718,37 +832,16 @@ func (b *Block) decrementMakerReserves(db *versiondb.Database, poolID [32]byte,
if err := putOrderLock(db, poolID, makerOrderID, asset, newReserve); err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
// txIndexOf returns the position of tx within the block (the txIndex the VM uses
// to derive a placed order's deterministic id). It scans by pointer identity; a
// block holds a handful of txs so the linear scan is negligible and keeps the
// helper free of an index parameter threaded through the lock/settle calls.
func txIndexOf(b *Block, tx *Tx) uint32 {
for i, t := range b.txs {
if t == tx {
return uint32(i)
// A fully-consumed maker reserve means the maker order left the book; drop
// its identity row in lockstep with the reserve so no orphan orderuser:
// survives a fully-filled order (keeps the two per-order rows consistent).
if newReserve == 0 {
if err := deleteOrderUser(db, poolID, makerOrderID); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
return 0
}
// canceledOwner returns the user identity of a cancelled order. The matcher's
// cancel path removes the order; the owner is recovered from the order snapshot
// the apply result captured. (applyCancel records only the id today; the owner is
// read from the reserve's account at unlock by re-deriving from the order row —
// but since the reserve is keyed by order id and the owner is whoever placed it,
// we resolve the owner from the order row captured in res.) For the current
// applyCancel which does not carry the owner, the owner is the reserve's account
// — see settleOrderEffects, which reads the reserve and unlocks to the placing
// account. This helper returns the canceller from the result when available.
func canceledOwner(res applyResult) string {
if res.CanceledOwner != "" {
return res.CanceledOwner
}
return ""
return nil
}
// applyToMemBooks replays the block's resting effects onto the VM's cached in-RAM
pkg/dchain/conservation_property_test.go
+508
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,508 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package dchain
// conservation_property_test.go is the PROPERTY proof for the D-Chain custody
// ledger — the parallel ledger that backs "the money lives in the order book".
//
// Where conservation_test.go pins a handful of HAND-PICKED scenarios, this file
// drives long, RANDOMIZED sequences of deposit / place / submit(match) / cancel /
// withdraw against the REAL VM (BuildBlock -> Verify -> Accept, one op per block)
// and asserts the global conservation invariant holds after EVERY operation:
//
// I = A + L + F + E (per asset, in atomic units)
//
// I (Imported) = Σ every amount ever DEPOSITED for the asset.
// A (Available) = Σ available balance over every account (ground-truth DB sweep).
// L (Locked) = Σ locked balance over every account (ground-truth DB sweep).
// F (Fees) = Σ fees the venue skimmed for the asset. This ledger takes NO
// fee (settleFills moves maker<->taker with no skim), so F is
// STRUCTURALLY 0 — and this test ASSERTS it. If a fee leg is ever
// added without a matching accounting bucket, A+L+E would fall
// below I and this property fails LOUDLY. F is a first-class term
// precisely so the proof stays honest if the model grows a fee.
// E (Exported) = Σ every REALIZED amount ever WITHDRAWN for the asset.
//
// The driver is fully deterministic: a fixed table of PRNG seeds (NOT wall-clock,
// NOT a nondeterministic source), each replayed against a fresh VM over a fresh
// memdb. The adversarial moves the task calls out are exercised by construction:
// withdraw-more-than-available (clamp), cancel-after-fill, double-withdraw,
// partial fills, unfunded place (reject), cancel of a stale/unknown id. The
// acceptance criterion is binary: the invariant NEVER breaks, across every seed
// and every step. That is the executable proof that the parallel ledger creates
// and destroys NO value.
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"math/rand"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/database/memdb"
"github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/zapwire"
)
// ledgerTotals is the GROUND-TRUTH A+L per asset: it sweeps the durable ledger
// (every balance:/locked: row in the VM's own store) and sums by asset, WITHOUT
// trusting the test's roster of accounts. A settlement bug that minted value into
// a derived/wrong account (outside the roster) still shows up here, because the
// sweep totals the whole keyspace. Keys are <prefix><user:8><asset:32>, so the
// asset is the trailing 32 bytes after the 8-byte user handle.
//
// It locks vm.mu and reads vm.db directly — the same authoritative store
// Block.Accept commits to. This is white-box (same package) on purpose: the
// conservation property is a statement about the WHOLE ledger, and the only
// honest way to total the whole ledger is to read every row.
func ledgerTotals(t *testing.T, vm *VM) (available, locked map[[32]byte]uint64) {
t.Helper()
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
available = sumByAsset(t, vm, prefixBalance)
locked = sumByAsset(t, vm, prefixLocked)
return available, locked
}
// sumByAsset iterates one ledger prefix and returns asset -> Σ value, keyed by the
// FULL 32-byte asset id (the ledger key width). Must be called under vm.mu. A
// corrupt-width key/value is a hard test failure (the ledger never writes a
// malformed row, so seeing one means a real bug).
func sumByAsset(t *testing.T, vm *VM, prefix string) map[[32]byte]uint64 {
t.Helper()
out := make(map[[32]byte]uint64)
it := vm.db.NewIteratorWithPrefix([]byte(prefix))
defer it.Release()
for it.Next() {
key := it.Key()
// <prefix><user:16><asset:32> — the user is the FULL 16-byte settlement
// identity (zapwire.UserSize), the asset the full 32-byte injective id.
const userW = zapwire.UserSize
if len(key) != len(prefix)+userW+32 {
t.Fatalf("conservation sweep: %q key wrong width %d (want %d)", prefix, len(key), len(prefix)+userW+32)
}
val := it.Value()
if len(val) != 8 {
t.Fatalf("conservation sweep: %q value wrong width %d (want 8)", prefix, len(val))
}
var asset [32]byte
copy(asset[:], key[len(prefix)+userW:len(prefix)+userW+32])
amt := be64(val)
if out[asset]+amt < out[asset] {
t.Fatalf("conservation sweep: asset %x total overflow", asset)
}
out[asset] += amt
}
if err := it.Error(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("conservation sweep %q iterate: %v", prefix, err)
}
return out
}
// a32 packs a uint64 asset LABEL into the LOW 8 bytes of a full 32-byte asset id
// (big-endian), the test-side analog of the production injective address->id map.
// The d-chain ledger keys by the full 32-byte id; tests use compact uint64 labels
// and lift them here at the wire/ledger boundary.
func a32(label uint64) [32]byte {
var a [32]byte
be := func(v uint64, dst []byte) {
for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
dst[7-i] = byte(v >> (8 * i))
}
}
be(label, a[24:32])
return a
}
// alreadySeen reports whether a tx with these exact bytes has ALREADY been
// applied by an accepted block — i.e. the d-chain's content-addressed dedup will
// treat the next submission as a no-op replay (returning the first outcome,
// moving no value). The frozen ZAP frame carries no nonce, so a byte-identical
// deposit/withdraw the randomized driver re-emits IS such a replay. The driver
// uses this to count imported/exported value only for genuinely-new txs — and in
// doing so the property test proves the idempotency contract too: a replay
// changes neither the ledger nor the conservation totals. Reads vm.db under
// vm.mu, exactly as Block.execute does via getSeenOutcome.
func alreadySeen(vm *VM, tx *Tx) bool {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
seen, err := isSeen(vm.db, tx.ID())
if err != nil {
// A read error here is not a conservation question; surface it as "not
// seen" so the caller proceeds and any real DB fault fails elsewhere loudly.
return false
}
return seen
}
// be64 reads an 8-byte big-endian uint64 (the ledger's canonical width). Local to
// avoid pulling encoding/binary into the assertion path's hot loop signature.
func be64(b []byte) uint64 {
_ = b[7]
return uint64(b[0])<<56 | uint64(b[1])<<48 | uint64(b[2])<<40 | uint64(b[3])<<32 |
uint64(b[4])<<24 | uint64(b[5])<<16 | uint64(b[6])<<8 | uint64(b[7])
}
// ledgerModel tracks the test-side accounting the chain's behaviour is checked
// against: cumulative imported (I) and exported (E) per asset, plus the asset
// universe seen. F (fees) is held explicitly and asserted zero — the model has no
// fee bucket because the ledger takes no fee; carrying F makes that an EXPLICIT,
// checkable property rather than a silent assumption.
type ledgerModel struct {
imported map[[32]byte]uint64 // I: Σ deposited
exported map[[32]byte]uint64 // E: Σ realized-withdrawn
fees map[[32]byte]uint64 // F: Σ fees skimmed (must stay 0)
assets map[[32]byte]struct{}
}
func newLedgerModel() *ledgerModel {
return &ledgerModel{
imported: map[[32]byte]uint64{},
exported: map[[32]byte]uint64{},
fees: map[[32]byte]uint64{},
assets: map[[32]byte]struct{}{},
}
}
func (m *ledgerModel) note(asset [32]byte) { m.assets[asset] = struct{}{} }
func (m *ledgerModel) deposit(asset [32]byte, amt uint64) {
m.note(asset)
m.imported[asset] += amt
}
func (m *ledgerModel) withdraw(asset [32]byte, realized uint64) {
m.note(asset)
m.exported[asset] += realized
}
// assertConservation is the heart of the proof: for every asset the test has
// touched, I == A + L + F + E. A is summed from the live DB sweep, L likewise, I
// and E from the model, F asserted zero. Called after EVERY accepted op. The
// `where` string names the step so a violation pinpoints the exact op + seed.
func (m *ledgerModel) assertConservation(t *testing.T, vm *VM, where string) {
t.Helper()
avail, locked := ledgerTotals(t, vm)
// Defense-in-depth: the live ledger must not hold a row for an asset the test
// never deposited (that would be value minted from nowhere). Sweep both DB
// maps and fail if an unknown asset appears.
for a := range avail {
if _, ok := m.assets[a]; !ok {
t.Fatalf("%s: available ledger holds UNKNOWN asset %x = %d (value from nowhere)", where, a, avail[a])
}
}
for a := range locked {
if _, ok := m.assets[a]; !ok {
t.Fatalf("%s: locked ledger holds UNKNOWN asset %x = %d (value from nowhere)", where, a, locked[a])
}
}
for a := range m.assets {
I := m.imported[a]
A := avail[a]
L := locked[a]
F := m.fees[a]
E := m.exported[a]
if F != 0 {
t.Fatalf("%s: asset %x has F=%d, but the ledger takes NO fee — accounting drift", where, a, F)
}
if A+L+F+E != I {
t.Fatalf("%s: CONSERVATION VIOLATED for asset %x:\n"+
" I (imported) = %d\n"+
" A (available) = %d\n"+
" L (locked) = %d\n"+
" F (fees) = %d\n"+
" E (exported) = %d\n"+
" A+L+F+E = %d (want == I = %d)\n"+
" delta = %d",
where, a, I, A, L, F, E, A+L+F+E, I, int64(A+L+F+E)-int64(I))
}
}
}
// conservationSeeds is the FIXED seed table (deterministic; not wall-clock). Each
// seed replays a fresh, independent randomized session. A diverse spread of
// starting points exercises different op interleavings without any
// nondeterministic input — re-running the test reproduces every session exactly.
var conservationSeeds = []int64{
1, 2, 3, 7, 11, 13, 17, 23, 42, 99,
101, 256, 999, 1337, 4242, 1000001, 31337, 65537, 123456, 7777777,
}
// opsPerSeed is the number of randomized operations driven per seed. With 20
// seeds this is 20*opsPerSeed total state transitions, each followed by a full
// invariant sweep.
const opsPerSeed = 220
// TestConservationInvariantProperty is the executable proof that the parallel
// D-Chain ledger conserves value across arbitrary operation sequences. For each
// fixed seed it stands up a fresh VM, opens two markets over a fixed 3-asset
// universe, then drives opsPerSeed randomized deposit/place/submit/cancel/
// withdraw ops (one per block, through the real BuildBlock->Verify->Accept path),
// asserting I = A + L + F + E after every single op. It deliberately steers into
// the adversarial cases (over-withdraw, cancel-after-fill, double-withdraw,
// partial fills, unfunded place, stale cancel) so the invariant is proven under
// the exact sequences that would expose a mint/burn bug.
func TestConservationInvariantProperty(t *testing.T) {
// Fixed asset universe (full 32-byte ids via a32). Two markets share LUX as the
// base so crosses exercise both legs (base + quote) of settlement against a
// common asset.
var (
aLUX = a32(0x4c5558_00000001) // base
aLUSD = a32(0x4c555344_000001) // quote A
aLETH = a32(0x4c455448_000001) // quote B
)
poolLUSD := [32]byte{'L', 'U', 'X', '/', 'L', 'U', 'S', 'D', 0xD0}
poolLETH := [32]byte{'L', 'U', 'X', '/', 'L', 'E', 'T', 'H', 0xD1}
// Fixed account roster the driver picks from.
accounts := []string{"alice", "bob", "carol", "dave", "erin"}
// Per-market (base,quote) so the driver locks the right asset for a side.
type market struct {
pool [32]byte
base, quote [32]byte
}
markets := []market{
{poolLUSD, aLUX, aLUSD},
{poolLETH, aLUX, aLETH},
}
totalOps := 0
for _, seed := range conservationSeeds {
seed := seed
t.Run(fmt.Sprintf("seed-%d", seed), func(t *testing.T) {
rng := rand.New(rand.NewSource(seed))
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(context.Background())
model := newLedgerModel()
for i := range markets {
model.note(markets[i].base)
model.note(markets[i].quote)
}
// Block 1: open both markets so place/submit have a book.
addBlock(t, vm,
openMarketTx(t, poolLUSD, aLUX, aLUSD),
openMarketTx(t, poolLETH, aLUX, aLETH),
)
model.assertConservation(t, vm, "after open-markets")
// liveOrders tracks order ids the driver has placed per pool, so cancel
// can target a REAL id (or, on purpose, a stale one). Filled/cancelled
// ids are left in the slice intentionally to exercise cancel-after-fill
// and double-cancel (deterministic no-ops the ledger must conserve).
liveOrders := map[[32]byte][]uint64{}
for step := 0; step < opsPerSeed; step++ {
// Snapshot the whole ledger + the orderuser: identity index BEFORE the
// op, so after the op we can assert BOTH conservation (Σ value
// unchanged) AND ownership (every changed account is an explicit party
// to an accepted event — no value moved to a non-party). The two
// invariants are orthogonal: conservation catches mint/burn, ownership
// catches theft (a conserving mis-attribution).
own := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
var blk *Block
var where string
switch rng.Intn(6) {
case 0, 1:
// DEPOSIT (weighted: keeps balances funded so the other ops have
// something to work with). Pick account + asset + amount.
acct := accounts[rng.Intn(len(accounts))]
asset := pickAsset(rng, aLUX, aLUSD, aLETH)
amt := uint64(1 + rng.Intn(1000))
tx := depositTx(t, acct, asset, amt)
// The d-chain dedups CONTENT-IDENTICAL txs (no nonce on the frozen
// frame): a byte-identical deposit already committed is a no-op that
// returns the FIRST outcome and credits NOTHING again. The driver can
// emit the same (acct,asset,amt) twice, so gate the import on whether
// this exact tx was already applied — counting a deduped replay as new
// imported value would be a TEST bug, not a ledger one. This makes the
// property ALSO prove idempotency: a replay moves no value.
replay := alreadySeen(vm, tx)
var o []txOutcome
blk, o = addBlockOutcomes(t, vm, tx)
realized := withdrawRealizedOf(o, TxDeposit)
if realized != amt {
t.Fatalf("deposit realized %d != amount %d (a deposit must never clamp)", realized, amt)
}
if !replay {
model.deposit(asset, amt)
}
where = fmt.Sprintf("step %d deposit %s asset=%x amt=%d replay=%v", step, acct, asset, amt, replay)
model.assertConservation(t, vm, where)
case 2:
// PLACE a resting limit order. May rest (locks the spend asset) or
// be REJECTED when the account cannot fund it (unfunded place) — both
// conserving. Integer price/size so the lock math is exact.
mk := markets[rng.Intn(len(markets))]
acct := accounts[rng.Intn(len(accounts))]
side := uint8(rng.Intn(2)) // 0 buy, 1 sell
price := float64(1 + rng.Intn(20))
size := float64(1 + rng.Intn(40))
blk = addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, mk.pool, side, price, size, acct))
// One op per block, txIndex 0 -> deterministic id. Record it
// regardless of whether it rested; a rejected place yields an id
// that resolves to "no such order" on cancel (exercises stale cancel).
oid := blockDeterministicID(blk.height, 0)
liveOrders[mk.pool] = append(liveOrders[mk.pool], oid)
where = fmt.Sprintf("step %d place %s side=%d %g@%g", step, acct, side, size, price)
model.assertConservation(t, vm, where)
case 3:
// SUBMIT a marketable order (the cross/match path). Settlement moves
// value maker<->taker entirely inside the ledger. Sometimes oversized
// to force a PARTIAL fill (maker fully consumed, taker remainder
// refunded); sometimes against an empty book (zero fill). Conserving.
mk := markets[rng.Intn(len(markets))]
acct := accounts[rng.Intn(len(accounts))]
side := uint8(rng.Intn(2))
price := float64(1 + rng.Intn(20))
size := float64(1 + rng.Intn(60)) // can exceed resting -> partial
blk = addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, mk.pool, side, false, price, size, acct))
where = fmt.Sprintf("step %d submit %s side=%d %g@%g", step, acct, side, size, price)
model.assertConservation(t, vm, where)
case 4:
// CANCEL. Target a recorded id (real, filled, or stale) — all of
// which the ledger handles deterministically: a live order unlocks
// its reserve (locked->available), a filled/unknown id is a no-op.
// This is the cancel-after-fill + double-cancel + stale-cancel path.
mk := markets[rng.Intn(len(markets))]
ids := liveOrders[mk.pool]
var oid uint64
if len(ids) > 0 {
oid = ids[rng.Intn(len(ids))]
} else {
oid = uint64(rng.Int63()) // stale/unknown id when nothing placed yet
}
blk = addBlock(t, vm, cancelPoolTx(t, mk.pool, oid))
where = fmt.Sprintf("step %d cancel oid=%d", step, oid)
model.assertConservation(t, vm, where)
case 5:
// WITHDRAW. Half the time ask for MORE than is available
// (over-withdraw -> clamp to realized); the realized amount is read
// from the consensus outcome and added to E. Repeated picks of the
// same (acct,asset) exercise double-withdraw (second clamps to the
// remainder). Conserving: E rises by exactly what A fell.
acct := accounts[rng.Intn(len(accounts))]
asset := pickAsset(rng, aLUX, aLUSD, aLETH)
avail, _, err := vm.Balance(acct, asset)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Balance(%s,%x): %v", acct, asset, err)
}
var want uint64
if rng.Intn(2) == 0 && avail > 0 {
// In-range withdraw (0..avail].
want = 1 + uint64(rng.Int63n(int64(avail)))
} else {
// Over-withdraw (or withdraw from an empty balance) -> must clamp.
want = avail + uint64(1+rng.Intn(500))
}
tx := withdrawTx(t, acct, asset, want)
// Same content-addressed dedup as deposit: a byte-identical withdraw
// already committed returns the FIRST realized amount and EXPORTS
// nothing again. A deduped replay's realized was clamped to the
// available balance AT FIRST APPLICATION, which can exceed the CURRENT
// available (intervening withdraws drained it) — so the current-avail
// mint check and the E update apply only to a genuinely-new withdraw.
replay := alreadySeen(vm, tx)
var o []txOutcome
blk, o = addBlockOutcomes(t, vm, tx)
realized := withdrawRealizedOf(o, TxWithdraw)
if realized > want {
t.Fatalf("withdraw realized %d > want %d (MINT via withdraw)", realized, want)
}
if !replay {
if realized > avail {
t.Fatalf("withdraw realized %d > available %d (clamp failed -> mint)", realized, avail)
}
model.withdraw(asset, realized)
}
where = fmt.Sprintf("step %d withdraw %s asset=%x want=%d replay=%v", step, acct, asset, want, replay)
model.assertConservation(t, vm, where)
}
// OWNERSHIP: every account whose controlled value changed in this block
// must be an explicit party to one of the block's accepted events. This
// runs alongside the conservation assertion above on EVERY op.
own.assert(t, vm, blk, where)
totalOps++
}
// Final cross-check: drain every account's full available balance via
// withdraw, then the ledger's remaining A must equal exactly Σlocked
// (only live order reserves left), and I == A+L+E still holds. This is
// the "exported == imported minus what's still escrowed" closure.
//
// Each drain OVER-withdraws by a globally-unique pad (>> the random
// wants' 1..500 range, plus a monotonic counter) so the clamp drains the
// full available AND no two drain txs are ever byte-identical — the
// content-addressed dedup can never swallow a drain.
drainPad := uint64(1_000_000)
for _, acct := range accounts {
for _, asset := range [][32]byte{aLUX, aLUSD, aLETH} {
avail, _, err := vm.Balance(acct, asset)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("final Balance(%s,%x): %v", acct, asset, err)
}
if avail == 0 {
continue
}
drainPad++
want := avail + drainPad
tx := withdrawTx(t, acct, asset, want)
if alreadySeen(vm, tx) {
t.Fatalf("final drain tx unexpectedly already seen (pad collision) acct=%s asset=%x want=%d", acct, asset, want)
}
ownDrain := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
dblk, o := addBlockOutcomes(t, vm, tx)
realized := withdrawRealizedOf(o, TxWithdraw)
if realized != avail {
t.Fatalf("final drain withdraw realized %d != available %d (clamp must export the full available)", realized, avail)
}
model.withdraw(asset, realized)
model.assertConservation(t, vm, "final-drain "+acct)
ownDrain.assert(t, vm, dblk, "final-drain "+acct)
}
}
// After draining all available, every asset's remaining ledger value is
// purely LOCKED (live order reserves). Assert A == 0 for assets with no
// live locks, and that I - E == L (the still-escrowed remainder).
availFinal, lockedFinal := ledgerTotals(t, vm)
for _, asset := range [][32]byte{aLUX, aLUSD, aLETH} {
if got := availFinal[asset]; got != 0 {
t.Fatalf("after full drain, asset %x still has %d AVAILABLE (want 0)", asset, got)
}
if I, E, L := model.imported[asset], model.exported[asset], lockedFinal[asset]; I-E != L {
t.Fatalf("closure broken asset %x: I(%d) - E(%d) = %d, but L = %d", asset, I, E, I-E, L)
}
}
})
}
t.Logf("conservation property: %d seeds x ~%d ops = %d randomized state transitions, invariant held after EVERY op",
len(conservationSeeds), opsPerSeed, totalOps)
}
// withdrawRealizedOf extracts the realized amount the consensus outcome carries
// in orderID for the given tx type (deposit credits == amount; withdraw realized
// == clamped debit). Fails if the expected outcome is absent.
func withdrawRealizedOf(outcomes []txOutcome, typ TxType) uint64 {
for _, oc := range outcomes {
if oc.typ == typ {
return oc.orderID
}
}
return 0
}
// pickAsset returns one of the supplied assets uniformly. Keeps the asset choice
// deterministic under the seeded rng.
func pickAsset(rng *rand.Rand, assets ...[32]byte) [32]byte {
return assets[rng.Intn(len(assets))]
}
pkg/dchain/conservation_test.go
+99 -32
View File
@@ -18,37 +18,78 @@ package dchain
import (
"context"
"encoding/binary"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/database/memdb"
"github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/zapwire"
)
// asset handles for the test market (8-byte ledger handles).
const (
assetLUX uint64 = 0x4c5558_00000001 // "LUX" base
assetLUSD uint64 = 0x4c555344_000001 // "LUSD" quote
// asset ids for the test market (full 32-byte injective ids; the uint64 LABEL is
// packed into the low 8 bytes by a32, the test-side analog of the production
// address->id map).
var (
assetLUX = a32(0x4c5558_00000001) // "LUX" base
assetLUSD = a32(0x4c555344_000001) // "LUSD" quote
)
func depositTx(t *testing.T, user string, asset, amount uint64) *Tx {
// contentRef derives a deterministic 32-byte idempotency ref from a custody op's
// (user,asset,amount) content. It exists ONLY so the default depositTx/withdrawTx
// helpers preserve the PRE-ref content-dedup semantics every existing scenario
// relies on: a byte-identical (user,asset,amount) call yields a byte-identical
// ref -> identical txID -> the same content-addressed seen: dedup as before. To
// model a GENUINELY distinct originating tx (the production reality where a real
// 2nd withdraw carries a fresh EVM txHash), use depositTxRef/withdrawTxRef with an
// explicit, distinct ref. This is a TEST FIXTURE convention; production always
// supplies the real originating-tx ref (precompile txHash / atomic import id).
func contentRef(typ byte, user string, asset [32]byte, amount uint64) [32]byte {
// Deterministic, content-derived ref: XOR-fold the full asset id (so its
// distinguishing low bytes participate, not a truncated prefix), then mix the
// type, user, and amount. Byte-identical inputs yield the same ref (exactly-once
// retry); any difference yields a different ref (genuinely distinct op).
var ref [32]byte
copy(ref[:], asset[:]) // full id, including its low-byte discriminant
ref[0] ^= typ
for i := 0; i < len(user) && i+1 < 24; i++ {
ref[1+i] ^= user[i]
}
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(ref[24:32], binary.BigEndian.Uint64(asset[24:32])^amount)
return ref
}
func depositTx(t *testing.T, user string, asset [32]byte, amount uint64) *Tx {
t.Helper()
tx, err := NewTx(TxDeposit, zapwire.EncodeDeposit(user, asset, amount))
return depositTxRef(t, user, asset, amount, contentRef(byte(TxDeposit), user, asset, amount))
}
func withdrawTx(t *testing.T, user string, asset [32]byte, amount uint64) *Tx {
t.Helper()
return withdrawTxRef(t, user, asset, amount, contentRef(byte(TxWithdraw), user, asset, amount))
}
// depositTxRef / withdrawTxRef build a custody tx with an EXPLICIT idempotency ref
// (the originating-tx identity). Distinct refs => distinct txID => the d-chain
// treats the ops as genuinely different (no seen: replay); an identical ref models
// a true exactly-once retry of ONE op.
func depositTxRef(t *testing.T, user string, asset [32]byte, amount uint64, ref [32]byte) *Tx {
t.Helper()
tx, err := NewTx(TxDeposit, zapwire.EncodeDeposit(user, asset, amount, ref))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewTx deposit: %v", err)
}
return tx
}
func withdrawTx(t *testing.T, user string, asset, amount uint64) *Tx {
func withdrawTxRef(t *testing.T, user string, asset [32]byte, amount uint64, ref [32]byte) *Tx {
t.Helper()
tx, err := NewTx(TxWithdraw, zapwire.EncodeWithdraw(user, asset, amount))
tx, err := NewTx(TxWithdraw, zapwire.EncodeWithdraw(user, asset, amount, ref))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewTx withdraw: %v", err)
}
return tx
}
func openMarketTx(t *testing.T, pool [32]byte, base, quote uint64) *Tx {
func openMarketTx(t *testing.T, pool [32]byte, base, quote [32]byte) *Tx {
t.Helper()
tx, err := NewTx(TxOpenMarket, zapwire.EncodeOpenMarket(pool, base, quote))
if err != nil {
@@ -69,11 +110,13 @@ func addBlock(t *testing.T, vm *VM, txs ...*Tx) *Block {
return buildVerifyAccept(t, vm)
}
// addBlockOutcomes is like addBlock but snapshots the per-tx consensus outcomes
// addBlockOutcomes is like addBlock but ALSO returns the per-tx consensus outcomes
// (Verify sets them on the block; Accept clears them after resolving waiters), so
// a caller can inspect a withdraw's REALIZED amount. It runs the same
// Build->reparse->Verify->Accept path.
func addBlockOutcomes(t *testing.T, vm *VM, txs ...*Tx) []txOutcome {
// a caller can inspect a withdraw's REALIZED amount or a submit's fills. It runs
// the same Build->reparse->Verify->Accept path and returns the accepted block (so
// a caller can also assert ownership over it) with the snapshotted outcomes
// re-attached for post-Accept inspection.
func addBlockOutcomes(t *testing.T, vm *VM, txs ...*Tx) (*Block, []txOutcome) {
t.Helper()
ctx := context.Background()
for _, tx := range txs {
@@ -97,7 +140,10 @@ func addBlockOutcomes(t *testing.T, vm *VM, txs ...*Tx) []txOutcome {
if err := reparsed.Accept(ctx); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Accept: %v", err)
}
return snap
// Re-attach the snapshot so the returned block can be inspected for its fills
// (Accept set blk.outcomes to nil after resolving waiters).
blk.outcomes = snap
return blk, snap
}
// TestCustodyConservationFullCycle is the headline proof: deposit -> open ->
@@ -114,8 +160,10 @@ func addBlockOutcomes(t *testing.T, vm *VM, txs ...*Tx) []txOutcome {
// - both withdraw everything.
//
// Expected end balances BEFORE withdraw:
// maker: 90 LUX available, 0 LUX locked, 50 LUSD available.
// taker: 10 LUX available, 1000-50=950 LUSD available, 0 LUSD locked.
//
// maker: 90 LUX available, 0 LUX locked, 50 LUSD available.
// taker: 10 LUX available, 1000-50=950 LUSD available, 0 LUSD locked.
//
// Conservation: total LUX in (100) == maker(90)+taker(10); total LUSD in (1000)
// == taker(950)+maker(50). After withdraw, exported == deposited, exactly.
func TestCustodyConservationFullCycle(t *testing.T) {
@@ -142,18 +190,27 @@ func TestCustodyConservationFullCycle(t *testing.T) {
assertBalance(t, vm, taker, assetLUSD, 1000, 0)
// --- Block 2: maker rests a SELL of 10 LUX @ 5 (locks 10 LUX). ---
addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, maker))
ownPlace := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
placeBlk := addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, maker))
// Maker's 10 LUX moved available->locked; 90 LUX stays available.
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUX, 90, 10)
// OWNERSHIP: the only account whose value moved is the maker (available->locked,
// same owner) — a party to its own place.
ownPlace.assert(t, vm, placeBlk, "full-cycle place")
// --- Block 3: taker BUYS 10 LUX, limit 5 (locks 50 LUSD), crossing. ---
addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, taker))
// OWNERSHIP across the cross: the ONLY accounts whose value changes are the
// maker and the taker — both explicit parties to the fill. A colliding-handle
// theft would credit a NON-party and trip this gate (proven in
// TestOwnershipInvariant_CollidingAttackerIsNotAParty).
ownCross := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
crossBlk := addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, taker))
// THE MAKER LEG: maker received 50 LUSD (the taker's payment) into available,
// and its 10 locked LUX left to the taker. This is exactly what the prior
// proxy-escrow taker-only model dropped.
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUX, 90, 0) // 10 locked LUX spent to taker
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUSD, 50, 0) // received the taker's 50 LUSD
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUX, 90, 0) // 10 locked LUX spent to taker
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUSD, 50, 0) // received the taker's 50 LUSD
// THE TAKER LEG: spent 50 LUSD (refunded 0 since limit*size == lock exactly),
// received 10 LUX.
assertBalance(t, vm, taker, assetLUX, 10, 0) // received 10 LUX
@@ -169,10 +226,12 @@ func TestCustodyConservationFullCycle(t *testing.T) {
if totalLUSD != 1000 {
t.Fatalf("LUSD conservation violated: total available %d, deposited 1000", totalLUSD)
}
ownCross.assert(t, vm, crossBlk, "full-cycle cross")
// --- Block 4: both parties WITHDRAW everything; the realized amounts (the
// proxy export legs) must equal exactly the available balances. ---
wo := addBlockOutcomes(t, vm,
ownW := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
wblk, wo := addBlockOutcomes(t, vm,
withdrawTx(t, maker, assetLUX, 90),
withdrawTx(t, maker, assetLUSD, 50),
withdrawTx(t, taker, assetLUX, 10),
@@ -189,6 +248,8 @@ func TestCustodyConservationFullCycle(t *testing.T) {
if totalWithdrawn != totalDeposited {
t.Fatalf("CONSERVATION VIOLATED: withdrawn %d != deposited %d", totalWithdrawn, totalDeposited)
}
// OWNERSHIP: every account whose value left the ledger is the withdrawer itself.
ownW.assert(t, vm, wblk, "full-cycle withdraw")
// Ledger is now empty (all withdrawn).
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUX, 0, 0)
@@ -223,7 +284,12 @@ func TestCustodySameBlockPlaceThenCross(t *testing.T) {
)
// Block 2: place (maker SELL 10@5) AND cross (taker BUY 10@5) in ONE block.
addBlock(t, vm,
// OWNERSHIP exercises the same-block-maker resolver path: the maker rests AND is
// fully filled in this same block (its orderuser: row is created then deleted in
// one accept), so the harness must resolve the maker from the block's own
// TxPlace, not a pre-block snapshot.
ownSB := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
sbBlk := addBlock(t, vm,
placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, maker),
submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, taker),
)
@@ -233,6 +299,7 @@ func TestCustodySameBlockPlaceThenCross(t *testing.T) {
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUSD, 50, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, taker, assetLUX, 10, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, taker, assetLUSD, 950, 0)
ownSB.assert(t, vm, sbBlk, "same-block place+cross")
if got := bal(t, vm, maker, assetLUX) + bal(t, vm, taker, assetLUX); got != 100 {
t.Fatalf("same-block LUX conservation: %d want 100", got)
@@ -317,10 +384,10 @@ func TestCustodyPartialFillConservesAndRefundsRemainder(t *testing.T) {
addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, taker))
// Fill = 4 LUX @ 5 = 20 LUSD. Taker spent 20 LUSD, refunded 30 of the 50 lock.
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUX, 96, 0) // 4 locked LUX spent to taker, 96 still available
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUSD, 20, 0) // received 20 LUSD
assertBalance(t, vm, taker, assetLUX, 4, 0) // received 4 LUX
assertBalance(t, vm, taker, assetLUSD, 980, 0) // 1000 - 20 spent (30 refunded back to available)
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUX, 96, 0) // 4 locked LUX spent to taker, 96 still available
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUSD, 20, 0) // received 20 LUSD
assertBalance(t, vm, taker, assetLUX, 4, 0) // received 4 LUX
assertBalance(t, vm, taker, assetLUSD, 980, 0) // 1000 - 20 spent (30 refunded back to available)
totalLUX := bal(t, vm, maker, assetLUX) + bal(t, vm, taker, assetLUX)
totalLUSD := bal(t, vm, maker, assetLUSD) + bal(t, vm, taker, assetLUSD)
@@ -341,7 +408,7 @@ func TestCustodyWithdrawClampsToAvailable(t *testing.T) {
addBlock(t, vm, depositTx(t, user, assetLUX, 40))
// Ask to withdraw 100; only 40 is available.
wo := addBlockOutcomes(t, vm, withdrawTx(t, user, assetLUX, 100))
_, wo := addBlockOutcomes(t, vm, withdrawTx(t, user, assetLUX, 100))
var realized uint64
for _, oc := range wo {
if oc.typ == TxWithdraw {
@@ -365,23 +432,23 @@ func cancelPoolTx(t *testing.T, pool [32]byte, orderID uint64) *Tx {
return tx
}
func bal(t *testing.T, vm *VM, user string, asset uint64) uint64 {
func bal(t *testing.T, vm *VM, user string, asset [32]byte) uint64 {
t.Helper()
avail, _, err := vm.Balance(user, asset)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Balance(%s,%d): %v", user, asset, err)
t.Fatalf("Balance(%s,%x): %v", user, asset, err)
}
return avail
}
func assertBalance(t *testing.T, vm *VM, user string, asset, wantAvail, wantLocked uint64) {
func assertBalance(t *testing.T, vm *VM, user string, asset [32]byte, wantAvail, wantLocked uint64) {
t.Helper()
avail, locked, err := vm.Balance(user, asset)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Balance(%s,%d): %v", user, asset, err)
t.Fatalf("Balance(%s,%x): %v", user, asset, err)
}
if avail != wantAvail || locked != wantLocked {
t.Fatalf("balance %s asset=%#x: available=%d locked=%d, want available=%d locked=%d",
t.Fatalf("balance %s asset=%x: available=%d locked=%d, want available=%d locked=%d",
user, asset, avail, locked, wantAvail, wantLocked)
}
}
pkg/dchain/custody_timeout_test.go
+228
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
// Copyright (C) 2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package dchain
import (
"context"
"testing"
"time"
"github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/block"
"github.com/luxfi/database/memdb"
"github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/zapwire"
"github.com/luxfi/log"
)
// custody_timeout_test.go is the REGRESSION PROOF for the orphan-custody-tx bug
// (RED #4): handler.submitTx did mempool.Add(tx) then blocked on the waiter; on
// ctx.Done() it cancelled ONLY the waiter, never removing the tx. The mempool has
// no dedup and BuildBlock drains ALL pending, so a client timeout left the tx
// QUEUED -> it committed in a LATER block = orphan. A DEPOSIT orphan is the worst:
// the EVM reverts (the vault msg.value is rolled back by the StateDB snapshot when
// the precompile's ZAP call timed out) but the D-Chain STILL credits = MINT.
//
// THE FIX: submitTx now calls mempool.cancel(txID) on ctx.Done(). cancel removes a
// still-pending tx outright; if the tx already drained into an in-flight block it
// is TOMBSTONED so a later Drain/Requeue excludes it. Either way a cancelled
// custody tx can NEVER commit in a later block.
//
// These tests drive the d-chain VM directly (no live socket) so the timeout window
// is deterministic: a custody tx submitted with a ctx that expires WHILE it sits in
// the mempool (no sealer draining) must (a) make submitTx return ctx.Err(), (b)
// leave the mempool empty (removed), and (c) NOT credit the ledger on a subsequent
// build — no orphan, no mint. (The existing handler/relay tests only cover
// dial-fail, never this timeout-after-Add path.)
// newTimeoutVM builds an initialized VM with NO auto-sealer, so a submitted tx
// sits in the mempool until the test explicitly builds — giving a deterministic
// window to time out submitTx while the tx is still pending.
func newTimeoutVM(t *testing.T) *VM {
t.Helper()
vm := &VM{}
toEngine := make(chan block.Message, 64)
if err := vm.Initialize(context.Background(), block.Init{
DB: memdb.New(),
Log: log.NewNoOpLogger(),
ToEngine: toEngine,
}); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Initialize: %v", err)
}
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = vm.Shutdown(context.Background()) })
return vm
}
// TestCustodyDepositTimeoutDoesNotCreditOrOrphan is the #4 proof for a DEPOSIT:
// submitTx times out while the deposit sits in the mempool. The fix must remove it
// so it never commits — no D-Chain credit (no mint to match the EVM's rolled-back
// vault lock).
func TestCustodyDepositTimeoutDoesNotCreditOrOrphan(t *testing.T) {
vm := newTimeoutVM(t)
const (
user = "alice"
amount = uint64(1000)
)
asset := a32(0x4c5558_00000001)
depRef := contentRef(byte(TxDeposit), user, asset, amount)
depBody := encodeDepositBody(user, asset, amount, depRef)
// submitTx with a ctx that expires almost immediately. No sealer is running, so
// the tx is Add'ed to the mempool and the ctx fires before anything drains it.
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Millisecond)
defer cancel()
_, err := vm.submitTx(ctx, TxDeposit, depBody)
if err == nil {
t.Fatal("submitTx returned nil error on a timed-out deposit; want ctx deadline error")
}
if err != context.DeadlineExceeded && ctx.Err() == nil {
t.Fatalf("submitTx err = %v, want a ctx timeout", err)
}
// THE FIX: the timed-out deposit was REMOVED from the mempool, not left queued.
if n := vm.mempool.Len(); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("mempool holds %d txs after a timed-out deposit — the orphan is still QUEUED "+
"and WILL commit in a later block (mint). cancel() must have removed it.", n)
}
// And a subsequent build finds nothing -> no block -> no credit. (BuildBlock
// returns ErrEmptyMempool on an empty pool; that is the correct "nothing to
// commit" outcome — the deposit never reaches the ledger.)
if _, berr := vm.BuildBlock(context.Background()); berr != ErrEmptyMempool {
t.Fatalf("BuildBlock after timeout = %v, want ErrEmptyMempool (the orphan deposit must not build a block)", berr)
}
// The ledger never credited the timed-out deposit: available is 0 (no mint).
avail, locked, err := vm.Balance(user, asset)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Balance: %v", err)
}
if avail != 0 || locked != 0 {
t.Fatalf("ledger credited a TIMED-OUT deposit: available=%d locked=%d, want 0/0 — "+
"this is the orphan->mint the EVM's rolled-back vault lock cannot back", avail, locked)
}
}
// TestCustodyWithdrawTimeoutDoesNotCommit is the #4 proof for a WITHDRAW: a
// timed-out withdraw must not later commit (it would export against a vault the EVM
// did not release). It also confirms the deposit it follows is unaffected.
func TestCustodyWithdrawTimeoutDoesNotCommit(t *testing.T) {
vm := newTimeoutVM(t)
const (
user = "bob"
dep = uint64(500)
)
asset := a32(0x4c5558_00000001)
// First, a real deposit committed via the explicit build path (so there IS a
// balance a stray withdraw could illegitimately export).
addBlock(t, vm, depositTx(t, user, asset, dep))
if avail, _, _ := vm.Balance(user, asset); avail != dep {
t.Fatalf("setup deposit available = %d, want %d", avail, dep)
}
// Now a withdraw whose submitTx times out while queued.
wRef := contentRef(byte(TxWithdraw), user, asset, dep)
wBody := encodeWithdrawBody(user, asset, dep, wRef)
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Millisecond)
defer cancel()
if _, err := vm.submitTx(ctx, TxWithdraw, wBody); err == nil {
t.Fatal("submitTx returned nil on a timed-out withdraw; want ctx timeout")
}
// The withdraw was removed; the mempool is empty; no block commits it.
if n := vm.mempool.Len(); n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("mempool holds %d after a timed-out withdraw — orphan would export against an unreleased vault", n)
}
if _, berr := vm.BuildBlock(context.Background()); berr != ErrEmptyMempool {
t.Fatalf("BuildBlock after withdraw timeout = %v, want ErrEmptyMempool", berr)
}
// The balance is UNCHANGED: the timed-out withdraw debited nothing (no export
// leg the EVM never authorized).
if avail, _, _ := vm.Balance(user, asset); avail != dep {
t.Fatalf("balance after a timed-out withdraw = %d, want %d (the orphan withdraw must NOT debit)", avail, dep)
}
}
// TestMempoolCancelRemovesPending is the unit proof that cancel removes a pending
// tx so Drain (BuildBlock's mechanism) never sees it.
func TestMempoolCancelRemovesPending(t *testing.T) {
m := newMempool(nil)
keep := mustTx(t, TxEnsureMarket, encodeEnsureBody([32]byte{0x01}))
drop := mustTx(t, TxDeposit, encodeDepositBody("u", a32(7), 100, [32]byte{0xab}))
m.Add(keep)
m.Add(drop)
if m.Len() != 2 {
t.Fatalf("len = %d, want 2", m.Len())
}
m.cancel(drop.ID(), 1) // pending: removed outright (height arg unused on this path)
if m.Len() != 1 {
t.Fatalf("len after cancel = %d, want 1 (the cancelled tx must be gone)", m.Len())
}
got := m.Drain(0)
if len(got) != 1 || got[0].ID() != keep.ID() {
t.Fatalf("Drain returned %d txs; want exactly the non-cancelled one", len(got))
}
}
// TestMempoolTombstoneSurvivesRequeue is the unit proof for the in-flight-block
// race: a tx drained into a block, then cancelled (tombstoned), must NOT come back
// when that block is rejected and Requeued — it can never commit in a later block.
func TestMempoolTombstoneSurvivesRequeue(t *testing.T) {
m := newMempool(nil)
a := mustTx(t, TxDeposit, encodeDepositBody("a", a32(1), 10, [32]byte{0x01}))
b := mustTx(t, TxDeposit, encodeDepositBody("b", a32(2), 20, [32]byte{0x02}))
m.Add(a)
m.Add(b)
drained := m.Drain(0) // both leave the pending queue (into a "building block")
if len(drained) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("drained %d, want 2", len(drained))
}
// The submitter of `b` times out AFTER it was drained -> tombstone, stamped with
// the in-flight block height (1).
m.cancel(b.ID(), 1)
// The block is rejected; its txs are Requeued. `b` must be dropped (tombstoned),
// only `a` returns.
m.Requeue(drained)
back := m.Drain(0)
if len(back) != 1 || back[0].ID() != a.ID() {
t.Fatalf("after tombstone+requeue, Drain returned %d txs; want only the non-cancelled `a` "+
"(the cancelled `b` must never re-enter a block)", len(back))
}
// The tombstone was consumed (it does not linger to drop a future legitimate tx
// that happens to share the id — ids are content+ref unique, but hygiene matters).
m.mu.Lock()
nLeft := len(m.tombstones)
m.mu.Unlock()
if nLeft != 0 {
t.Fatalf("tombstones not cleared after consumption: %d left", nLeft)
}
}
// ---- local frame/body builders (avoid importing zapwire ref-codecs into the
// test's hot path; these mirror the bodies NewTx expects) ----
func mustTx(t *testing.T, typ TxType, body []byte) *Tx {
t.Helper()
tx, err := NewTx(typ, body)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("NewTx(%v): %v", typ, err)
}
return tx
}
// the following thin wrappers keep the test readable and route through the same
// zapwire encoders production uses (so the bodies are byte-identical to the wire).
func encodeDepositBody(user string, asset [32]byte, amount uint64, ref [32]byte) []byte {
return zapwire.EncodeDeposit(user, asset, amount, ref)
}
func encodeWithdrawBody(user string, asset [32]byte, amount uint64, ref [32]byte) []byte {
return zapwire.EncodeWithdraw(user, asset, amount, ref)
}
func encodeEnsureBody(pool [32]byte) []byte { return zapwire.EncodeEnsureMarket(pool) }
pkg/dchain/custody_zeroref_test.go
+110
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package dchain
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/database/memdb"
"github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/zapwire"
)
// custody_zeroref_test.go pins R3 on the consensus side: a custody tx whose
// idempotency ref is all-zero is REJECTED at execute (every validator decodes the
// same frame and refuses identically, so the rejection is consensus-neutral) before
// any credit/debit. The ref is the originating-tx identity folded into tx.ID() and
// the seen: dedup key; a committed EVM tx always has a unique non-zero hash, so a
// zero ref is an unidentified (test-mock) or proxy fillRef=0 frame that must not
// mint an unbacked credit or release value against an untracked identity.
// zeroRef is the all-zero idempotency ref the handlers must refuse.
var zeroRef = [32]byte{}
// TestCustody_ZeroRefDepositRejected: a deposit carrying a zero ref fails at
// execute (surfaced by BuildBlock) and credits nothing.
func TestCustody_ZeroRefDepositRejected(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const user = "zero-dep"
tx := mustTx(t, TxDeposit, zapwire.EncodeDeposit(user, assetLUX, 100, zeroRef))
vm.mempool.Add(tx)
// BuildBlock runs the execute probe; a zero-ref deposit must make it error.
if _, err := vm.BuildBlock(ctx); err == nil {
t.Fatal("BuildBlock with a zero-ref deposit must error, got nil")
} else if !errors.Is(err, errZeroCustodyRef) {
t.Fatalf("BuildBlock err = %v, want errZeroCustodyRef", err)
}
// Nothing was credited (the tx never committed).
if avail, _, _ := vm.Balance(user, assetLUX); avail != 0 {
t.Fatalf("balance after refused zero-ref deposit = %d, want 0 (no mint)", avail)
}
}
// TestCustody_ZeroRefWithdrawRejected: a withdraw carrying a zero ref fails at
// execute and debits nothing — even when the user holds a real (bound-deposited)
// balance the withdraw could otherwise release.
func TestCustody_ZeroRefWithdrawRejected(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const user = "zero-wd"
// Seed a real balance via a NON-zero-ref deposit committed in a block.
depRef := contentRef(byte(TxDeposit), user, assetLUX, 500)
addBlock(t, vm, depositTxRef(t, user, assetLUX, 500, depRef))
if avail, _, _ := vm.Balance(user, assetLUX); avail != 500 {
t.Fatalf("seed balance = %d, want 500", avail)
}
// A zero-ref withdraw must be refused at execute.
wtx := mustTx(t, TxWithdraw, zapwire.EncodeWithdraw(user, assetLUX, 500, zeroRef))
vm.mempool.Add(wtx)
if _, err := vm.BuildBlock(ctx); err == nil {
t.Fatal("BuildBlock with a zero-ref withdraw must error, got nil")
} else if !errors.Is(err, errZeroCustodyRef) {
t.Fatalf("BuildBlock err = %v, want errZeroCustodyRef", err)
}
// The balance is UNCHANGED: the refused withdraw debited nothing.
if avail, _, _ := vm.Balance(user, assetLUX); avail != 500 {
t.Fatalf("balance after refused zero-ref withdraw = %d, want 500 (no debit)", avail)
}
}
// TestCustody_NonZeroRefStillWorks: the normal path — a non-zero ref deposit then
// withdraw both commit and move the ledger exactly, proving R3 only refuses the
// zero-ref door and does not regress real custody.
func TestCustody_NonZeroRefStillWorks(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const user = "ok-ref"
depRef := contentRef(byte(TxDeposit), user, assetLUX, 250)
addBlock(t, vm, depositTxRef(t, user, assetLUX, 250, depRef))
if avail, _, _ := vm.Balance(user, assetLUX); avail != 250 {
t.Fatalf("balance after non-zero-ref deposit = %d, want 250", avail)
}
wRef := contentRef(byte(TxWithdraw), user, assetLUX, 250)
_, out := addBlockOutcomes(t, vm, withdrawTxRef(t, user, assetLUX, 250, wRef))
var realized uint64
for _, o := range out {
if o.typ == TxWithdraw {
realized = o.orderID
}
}
if realized != 250 {
t.Fatalf("non-zero-ref withdraw realized = %d, want 250", realized)
}
if avail, _, _ := vm.Balance(user, assetLUX); avail != 0 {
t.Fatalf("balance after non-zero-ref withdraw = %d, want 0 (debited)", avail)
}
}
pkg/dchain/execute.go
+12 -15
View File
@@ -55,11 +55,12 @@ type applyResult struct {
TakerSide lx.Side
// Placed is the order a TxPlace rested (nil otherwise).
Placed *lx.Order
// Canceled is the order id a TxCancel removed (0 otherwise).
// Canceled is the order id a TxCancel removed (0 otherwise). The cancelled
// order's SETTLEMENT identity is NOT carried here: the custody unlock resolves
// it exclusively through the orderuser: index by this order id (settle.go /
// settleOrderEffects), never from the matcher's 8-byte in-RAM owner — so a
// post-restart cancel unlocks to the SAME full account the lock lives under.
Canceled uint64
// CanceledOwner is the user identity of the cancelled order (so the custody
// ledger unlocks its reserve to the right account). Empty unless Canceled != 0.
CanceledOwner string
// Touched are resting orders whose remaining changed due to a submit cross
// (the makers); their rows must be rewritten/deleted.
Touched []*lx.Order
@@ -127,24 +128,20 @@ func applyPlace(book *lx.OrderBook, tx *Tx, height uint64, ts time.Time, txIndex
// applyCancel decodes a zapwire Cancel body and removes the resting order. A
// cancel of an unknown order is a deterministic no-op (the matcher returns an
// error which we map to an empty result — every validator sees the same).
// error which we map to an empty result — every validator sees the same). The
// cancelled order's owner is NOT captured here: the custody unlock resolves the
// full settlement identity through the orderuser: index (settleOrderEffects), so
// the matcher's 8-byte in-RAM owner never participates in a value move.
func applyCancel(book *lx.OrderBook, tx *Tx) (applyResult, error) {
orderID := binary.BigEndian.Uint64(tx.Body[zapwire.PoolIDSize : zapwire.PoolIDSize+8])
// Snapshot the order before cancel so we know it existed (for the delta) and
// capture its owner so the custody ledger unlocks the reserve to the right
// account.
o := book.GetOrder(orderID)
if o == nil {
// Snapshot the order before cancel so we know it existed (for the delta).
if book.GetOrder(orderID) == nil {
return applyResult{}, nil
}
owner := o.User
if owner == "" {
owner = o.UserID
}
if err := book.CancelOrder(orderID); err != nil {
return applyResult{}, nil
}
return applyResult{Canceled: orderID, CanceledOwner: owner}, nil
return applyResult{Canceled: orderID}, nil
}
// applySubmit decodes a zapwire Submit body and crosses the book. The marketable
pkg/dchain/handler.go
+15 -3
View File
@@ -79,10 +79,22 @@ func (vm *VM) submitTx(ctx context.Context, t TxType, payload []byte) (txOutcome
case o := <-ch:
return o, nil
case <-ctx.Done():
// The caller gave up; drop the waiter so a later Accept does not leak it.
// The tx may still be accepted (its effect is durable) — idempotency makes
// a retry safe.
// The caller gave up. Drop the waiter AND withdraw the tx from the mempool
// (RED #4): a custody op (deposit/withdraw) whose ZAP submission timed out
// must NOT silently commit in a LATER block — the EVM rolled back its vault
// leg, so a stranded deposit would MINT and a stranded withdraw would
// double-release. mempool.cancel removes it if still pending, or tombstones
// it if already drained into an in-flight block, so it can never land later.
// (For an order frame this is also correct: a submit the caller abandoned
// should not rest/cross in a future block under the caller's account.)
// Idempotency still makes an explicit RETRY of the same op safe — a retry
// re-Adds a fresh tx (and, for custody, the same ref dedups it exactly once
// if the original DID commit before the timeout).
vm.outcomes.cancel(txID)
// Stamp the tombstone with the height of the single in-flight block the tx
// could be in (lastAcceptedHeight+1) so gcTombstones can reclaim it once that
// height is accepted (R4). inFlightHeight reads the watermark under vm.mu.
vm.mempool.cancel(txID, vm.inFlightHeight())
return txOutcome{}, ctx.Err()
}
}
pkg/dchain/localnet_e2e_test.go
+12 -2
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,18 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
//go:build dchain && cgo
// +build dchain,cgo
//go:build !cgo
// +build !cgo
// Built under //go:build !cgo: this venue e2e exercises the PURE-GO consensus
// path (rebuildable book, zapdb persistence, ZAP socket, match->Verify->Accept)
// and needs no cgo/GPU matcher — the GPU accelerator is an opt-in venue
// accelerator (cmd/dvenue, //go:build cgo), and the matching CORRECTNESS proven
// here is identical on the CPU and GPU paths. The !cgo gate also keeps this test
// in the package's CGO_ENABLED=0 test binary (the only one that links on a host
// without luxcpp), so `CGO_ENABLED=0 go test ./pkg/dchain` runs the full venue
// e2e green. (Was `dchain && cgo`; the dchain tag gated a removed kludge and the
// cgo tag wrongly excluded a pure-Go proof — decomplected to the real axis.)
package dchain
pkg/dchain/market_constraint_test.go
+128
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package dchain
// market_constraint_test.go pins the ZERO-NOTIONAL reject — the minimal
// market-constraint invariant that arithmetic flooring can NEVER create a FREE
// executable order. An order whose required lock floors to zero (a sub-tick BUY
// price whose ceil(size*price) rounds to 0, or a sub-unit SELL size) would
// rest/cross while reserving NOTHING; settlement could then move the
// counterparty's asset for no spend. lockOrderSpend rejects such an order with
// ErrDustPriceOrZeroLock (a deterministic per-tx reject), so it never rests and
// never matches.
//
// PriceMultiplier is 1e8, so priceToInt(price) = price*1e8. A price < 1e-8 floors
// to priceInt 0, and quoteUnitsCeil(units, 0) == 0 — the canonical sub-tick dust
// BUY this gate must refuse.
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/database/memdb"
"github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/zapwire"
)
// dustPrice is a positive price strictly below one price tick (1e-8), so
// priceToInt(dustPrice) == 0 and a BUY of any positive size floors to a zero
// quote lock. It is a GENUINE executable price on the wire (>0), not a malformed
// zero — exactly the "executable yet free" case the gate must catch.
const dustPrice = 5e-9
// TestNotionalFlooringCannotCreateFreeExecutableOrder is the headline
// market-constraint proof: an executable BUY whose notional floors to zero lock
// (size>0, price>0, but ceil(size*price)==0) is REJECTED at placement — it never
// rests, locks nothing, and a crossing taker cannot acquire the (non-existent)
// liquidity for free. It also pins the cross axis: a sub-tick LIMIT BUY submit
// against a real resting maker is rejected too, so flooring cannot acquire the
// maker's base for no quote.
func TestNotionalFlooringCannotCreateFreeExecutableOrder(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const buyer, seller = "dust-buyer", "dust-seller"
pool := [32]byte{0xd5, 0x70}
// Sanity on the predicate itself: a sub-tick BUY floors to zero lock; a normal
// BUY does not.
mc := marketConstraint{assetLUX, assetLUSD}
if !mc.floorsToZeroLock(sideBuy, dustPrice, 10.0) {
t.Fatalf("predicate: sub-tick BUY %g x10 should floor to zero lock", dustPrice)
}
if mc.floorsToZeroLock(sideBuy, 5.0, 10.0) {
t.Fatal("predicate: a normal BUY 5x10 must NOT floor to zero lock")
}
// Fund the buyer generously (so the reject is the NOTIONAL floor, never an
// affordability reject) and open the custody market.
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, buyer, assetLUSD, 1_000_000),
depositTx(t, seller, assetLUX, 100),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
// PLACE a dust BUY (10 @ 5e-9): rejected, nothing locked, book empty.
own := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
blk := addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, dustPrice, 10.0, buyer))
if oc := outcomeForTx(blk, blk.txs[0]); oc.status != zapwire.StatusRejected {
t.Fatalf("dust BUY place status = %d, want StatusRejected (%d)", oc.status, zapwire.StatusRejected)
}
// No lock taken (the buyer's full quote stays available), and NO resting order.
assertBalance(t, vm, buyer, assetLUSD, 1_000_000, 0)
if orders, _, _, _, _ := vm.BookDepth(pool); orders != 0 {
t.Fatalf("dust BUY rested: book has %d orders, want 0 (a zero-lock executable order must never rest)", orders)
}
// No value moved at all -> ownership trivially holds (no parties needed).
own.assert(t, vm, blk, "dust-buy-place")
// Now a REAL maker rests (seller SELL 10 LUX @ 5), and a sub-tick LIMIT BUY
// submit tries to cross it. The submit is rejected by the notional gate, so the
// maker's base is NOT acquired for a floored-to-zero quote.
addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, seller))
assertBalance(t, vm, seller, assetLUX, 90, 10)
ownCross := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
sblk := addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, dustPrice, 10.0, buyer))
if oc := outcomeForTx(sblk, sblk.txs[0]); oc.status != zapwire.StatusRejected {
t.Fatalf("dust LIMIT BUY submit status = %d, want StatusRejected", oc.status)
}
// Nothing was acquired or paid: buyer keeps all quote, seller keeps its locked
// base. Flooring acquired NO free base.
assertBalance(t, vm, buyer, assetLUSD, 1_000_000, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, buyer, assetLUX, 0, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, seller, assetLUX, 90, 10)
ownCross.assert(t, vm, sblk, "dust-buy-cross")
}
// TestLockAmtZeroBuyRejected is the focused mutation pin named by the acceptance
// gate: a BUY with size>0 and price>0 whose required quote lock floors to zero is
// rejected (ok=false) by lockOrderSpend with ErrDustPriceOrZeroLock — it cannot
// rest with a zero lock. (Mutation: allowing lockAmt==0 BUY to pass makes this and
// TestNotionalFlooringCannotCreateFreeExecutableOrder RED.)
func TestLockAmtZeroBuyRejected(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const buyer = "zlb-buyer"
pool := [32]byte{0x21, 0xb0}
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, buyer, assetLUSD, 1_000_000),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
// Drive lockOrderSpend directly through a built block's overlay so we observe
// the named reject, not just the StatusRejected outcome.
tx := placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, dustPrice, 10.0, buyer)
blk := addBlock(t, vm, tx)
if oc := outcomeForTx(blk, blk.txs[0]); oc.status != zapwire.StatusRejected {
t.Fatalf("zero-lock BUY status = %d, want StatusRejected", oc.status)
}
// The buyer funded a million quote but the order never rested or locked.
assertBalance(t, vm, buyer, assetLUSD, 1_000_000, 0)
if orders, _, _, _, _ := vm.BookDepth(pool); orders != 0 {
t.Fatalf("zero-lock BUY rested: %d orders, want 0", orders)
}
}
pkg/dchain/mempool.go
+112 -4
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import (
"sync"
"github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/block"
"github.com/luxfi/ids"
)
// mempool.go is the d-chain pending-transaction queue. ZAP write frames
@@ -22,10 +23,34 @@ import (
// deliberately simple: ordering is arrival order, which is the sequence the
// matcher consumes. (A fee-priority mempool is a future concern; the venue's CLOB
// is sequence-fair by design.)
//
// CANCEL / TOMBSTONE (synchronous-or-nothing custody, RED #4): a custody op that
// the caller GAVE UP on (its ZAP submission timed out) must NOT silently commit in
// a LATER block — the EVM rolled back its vault leg, so a stranded commit would
// MINT (deposit) or double-release (withdraw). submitTx therefore calls cancel()
// on ctx-timeout: if the tx is still pending it is removed outright; if it has
// already been drained into an in-flight block it is TOMBSTONED so it is excluded
// from any subsequent Drain (covering a rejected-block Requeue). Tombstones are a
// PROPOSER-LOCAL block-CONSTRUCTION concern only — they decide what the proposer
// puts INTO a block; they never affect how a validator VERIFIES a built block, so
// they are consensus-neutral (a validator that never saw the cancelled tx is
// unaffected; the one node that did simply won't re-propose it).
type mempool struct {
mu sync.Mutex
txs []*Tx
// tombstones maps a cancelled tx id (cancelled AFTER it left the pending queue,
// i.e. drained into an in-flight block) to the height of the in-flight block it
// was drained into (lastAcceptedHeight+1 at cancel time — the proxy builds one
// block at a time on this linear chain). A tombstoned id is filtered out of every
// future Drain/Requeue so a cancelled custody tx can never land in a LATER block.
// The stamped height lets gcTombstones reclaim a tombstone once that height has
// been Accepted (the tx can no longer be in flight: either it committed in an
// accepted block — seen: dedup covers any retry — or its block was rejected and
// Requeue already dropped the tombstone). Lazily allocated; empty on the hot path
// so order-frame draining pays nothing.
tombstones map[ids.ID]uint64
// toEngine is the VM->engine notification channel from block.Init. Sending
// PendingTxs tells the engine to build a block. nil before Initialize.
toEngine chan<- block.Message
@@ -65,8 +90,80 @@ func (m *mempool) Len() int {
return len(m.txs)
}
// cancel withdraws a tx the submitter gave up on (RED #4). If the tx is still
// pending it is removed from the queue outright (the common timeout case: a
// queued, not-yet-built tx — exactly the orphan the bug described). If it has
// already been drained into an in-flight block it is TOMBSTONED (stamped with
// inFlightHeight, the height of that block) so a later Drain (e.g. after that
// block is rejected and Requeued) excludes it. Either way the cancelled tx can
// never commit in a LATER block. Idempotent and lock-safe.
func (m *mempool) cancel(txID ids.ID, inFlightHeight uint64) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
for i, tx := range m.txs {
if tx.ID() == txID {
m.txs = append(m.txs[:i], m.txs[i+1:]...)
if len(m.txs) == 0 {
m.txs = nil
}
return
}
}
// Not pending: already drained into a building block at inFlightHeight.
// Tombstone it (stamped with that height) so it is dropped from any subsequent
// Drain/Requeue and reclaimed by gcTombstones once the height is accepted.
if m.tombstones == nil {
m.tombstones = make(map[ids.ID]uint64)
}
m.tombstones[txID] = inFlightHeight
}
// gcTombstones reclaims tombstones whose stamped in-flight height has been
// accepted (height <= acceptedHeight): such a tx can no longer be in flight, so
// its tombstone is dead weight. Called from Block.Accept after the VM's
// lastAcceptedHeight advances. Bounds tombstone-map growth under repeated
// timed-out-but-committed custody ops (RED #4 / R4). Hot path: the map is empty
// when no custody op ever timed out, so this returns immediately. MUST be called
// without holding any caller lock on the mempool (it takes m.mu itself).
func (m *mempool) gcTombstones(acceptedHeight uint64) {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
if len(m.tombstones) == 0 {
return
}
for id, h := range m.tombstones {
if h <= acceptedHeight {
delete(m.tombstones, id)
}
}
if len(m.tombstones) == 0 {
m.tombstones = nil
}
}
// dropTombstoned filters cancelled (tombstoned) txs out of a selected batch and
// clears the tombstones it consumed. MUST be called under m.mu. On the hot path
// (no tombstones) it returns the input untouched WITHOUT hashing any tx id, so
// order-frame draining pays nothing for the custody-cancel machinery.
func (m *mempool) dropTombstoned(txs []*Tx) []*Tx {
if len(m.tombstones) == 0 {
return txs
}
out := txs[:0]
for _, tx := range txs {
id := tx.ID()
if _, dead := m.tombstones[id]; dead {
delete(m.tombstones, id)
continue
}
out = append(out, tx)
}
return out
}
// Drain removes and returns up to max pending txs in arrival order (all of them
// if max <= 0). The returned slice is owned by the caller.
// if max <= 0), excluding any tombstoned (cancelled) tx. The returned slice is
// owned by the caller.
func (m *mempool) Drain(max int) []*Tx {
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
@@ -84,17 +181,28 @@ func (m *mempool) Drain(max int) []*Tx {
if len(m.txs) == 0 {
m.txs = nil
}
out = m.dropTombstoned(out)
if len(out) == 0 {
return nil
}
return out
}
// Requeue puts txs back at the FRONT of the mempool in their original order. Used
// when a built block is rejected: its txs return to the pool to be reconsidered
// in the next block, preserving arrival order.
// Requeue puts txs back at the FRONT of the mempool in their original order,
// dropping any that were tombstoned (cancelled) while the block was in flight.
// Used when a built block is rejected: its (still-live) txs return to the pool to
// be reconsidered in the next block, preserving arrival order — but a cancelled
// custody tx does NOT come back (it must never commit in a later block).
func (m *mempool) Requeue(txs []*Tx) {
if len(txs) == 0 {
return
}
m.mu.Lock()
txs = m.dropTombstoned(txs)
if len(txs) == 0 {
m.mu.Unlock()
return
}
m.txs = append(txs, m.txs...)
m.mu.Unlock()
m.signal()
pkg/dchain/mempool_gc_test.go
+88
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package dchain
import "testing"
// mempool_gc_test.go pins R4: a tombstone (for a custody tx the submitter gave up
// on AFTER it was drained into an in-flight block) is reclaimed once its stamped
// in-flight height has been Accepted — such a tx can no longer be in flight (it
// either committed in an accepted block, where seen: dedup covers any retry, or its
// block was rejected and Requeue already dropped the tombstone). This bounds
// tombstone-map growth under repeated timed-out-but-committed custody ops.
// TestMempoolTombstoneGCReclaimsAcceptedHeight: a tombstone stamped at in-flight
// height H is dropped by gcTombstones(H). Observable: after GC the same tx, re-added
// as pending, SURVIVES Drain (it is no longer filtered).
func TestMempoolTombstoneGCReclaimsAcceptedHeight(t *testing.T) {
m := newMempool(nil)
tx := mustTx(t, TxDeposit, encodeDepositBody("gc", a32(1), 10, [32]byte{0x01}))
// Tombstone it as if drained into the in-flight block at height 7 (the not-pending
// path: cancel on an empty queue tombstones rather than removing).
m.cancel(tx.ID(), 7)
m.mu.Lock()
n := len(m.tombstones)
m.mu.Unlock()
if n != 1 {
t.Fatalf("tombstones after cancel = %d, want 1", n)
}
// Height 7 is now accepted -> the tombstone is dead weight and reclaimed.
m.gcTombstones(7)
m.mu.Lock()
n = len(m.tombstones)
m.mu.Unlock()
if n != 0 {
t.Fatalf("tombstones after gc(7) = %d, want 0 (reclaimed)", n)
}
// Proof of behavior: the reclaimed tx, re-added, is NOT filtered out of Drain.
m.Add(tx)
got := m.Drain(0)
if len(got) != 1 || got[0].ID() != tx.ID() {
t.Fatalf("after GC the reclaimed tx must survive Drain; got %d txs", len(got))
}
}
// TestMempoolTombstoneGCRetainsInFlightHeight: a tombstone stamped at in-flight
// height H is RETAINED by gcTombstones(H-1) — the block at height H has NOT been
// accepted, so the tx could still be in flight and the tombstone must persist.
// Observable: the tx, re-added as pending, is still filtered out of Drain.
func TestMempoolTombstoneGCRetainsInFlightHeight(t *testing.T) {
m := newMempool(nil)
tx := mustTx(t, TxDeposit, encodeDepositBody("keep", a32(2), 20, [32]byte{0x02}))
// Tombstone stamped at in-flight height 7.
m.cancel(tx.ID(), 7)
// Only height 6 is accepted -> height 7 is still in flight -> tombstone retained.
m.gcTombstones(6)
m.mu.Lock()
n := len(m.tombstones)
m.mu.Unlock()
if n != 1 {
t.Fatalf("tombstones after gc(6) = %d, want 1 (retained — block 7 not yet accepted)", n)
}
// Proof of behavior: the still-tombstoned tx, re-added, is filtered out of Drain
// (it must never land in a later block while it could still be in flight).
m.Add(tx)
got := m.Drain(0)
if len(got) != 0 {
t.Fatalf("a retained-tombstone tx must be filtered from Drain; got %d txs", len(got))
}
}
// TestMempoolGCTombstonesEmptyIsNoop: gcTombstones on an empty map (the hot path,
// no custody op ever timed out) is a safe no-op.
func TestMempoolGCTombstonesEmptyIsNoop(t *testing.T) {
m := newMempool(nil)
m.gcTombstones(100) // must not panic
m.mu.Lock()
defer m.mu.Unlock()
if m.tombstones != nil {
t.Fatalf("gc on empty mempool allocated tombstones, want nil")
}
}
pkg/dchain/ownership_completeness_test.go
+538
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package dchain
// ownership_completeness_test.go ADVERSARIALLY tests the ownership harness itself
// (ownership_test.go) — the new safety net. A blind spot in the harness is false
// confidence: a conserving theft the harness fails to flag would slip the gate.
//
// Strategy for each violation class:
// 1. Drive a REAL block through the production path (addBlock / restart), so the
// before-snapshot, the derived party set, and the real after-snapshot are all
// exactly what the gate would see in the property/full-cycle suites.
// 2. Assert the gate is CLEAN on the real (honest) after-state — no false flag.
// 3. PLANT a value-conserving violation into a CLONE of the after-state (so the
// live ledger is untouched) and assert findOwnershipViolation FIRES, naming
// the expected non-party coordinate.
//
// All plants are value-conserving (Σ per asset unchanged) — exactly the class
// conservation cannot see, so the only thing standing between it and theft is the
// ownership gate firing. If ANY plant slips past, that is a HARNESS GAP.
//
// These tests reuse the SAME functions the gate uses (findOwnershipViolation,
// partiesOfBlock via ownershipChecker.parties) so they exercise the real net, not
// a re-implementation.
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/database/memdb"
"github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/zapwire"
)
// thirdParty is an account that is NEVER a party to any event in the planted
// blocks — the canonical "value arrived at an account no event named" recipient.
// Its bytes 8..15 are non-zero so it is also distinct from any 8-byte fold.
var thirdParty = string([]byte{0x9e, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x9e, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33, 0x33})
// creditControlled adds amt to (user,asset) available in a snapshot WITHOUT a
// matching debit — models value APPEARING at an account (a one-sided credit). Used
// when the test asserts conservation is intentionally NOT the thing under test (a
// pure ownership question about a single account).
func creditControlled(snap map[acctAsset]balPair, user userKey, asset [32]byte, amt uint64) {
k := acctAsset{user, asset}
p := snap[k]
p.available += amt
snap[k] = p
}
// assertFires asserts findOwnershipViolation FIRES for the given before/after over
// the party set, and (when wantUser/wantAsset are non-nil) that it names the
// expected coordinate. The harness is the net; this proves the net catches the fish.
func assertFires(t *testing.T, before, after map[acctAsset]balPair, parties partySet, wantUser *userKey, wantAsset *[32]byte, what string) {
t.Helper()
k, delta, bad := findOwnershipViolation(before, after, parties)
if !bad {
t.Fatalf("%s: ownership gate FAILED to flag the violation (HARNESS GAP — a conserving theft would slip the gate)", what)
}
if wantUser != nil && k.user != *wantUser {
t.Fatalf("%s: gate flagged user %x, want %x", what, k.user, *wantUser)
}
if wantAsset != nil && k.asset != *wantAsset {
t.Fatalf("%s: gate flagged asset %x, want %x (delta %d)", what, k.asset, *wantAsset, delta)
}
t.Logf("%s: gate fired on %x/%x delta %d", what, k.user[:8], k.asset[:8], delta)
}
// assertClean asserts findOwnershipViolation does NOT fire — the honest after-state
// must pass (no false positive against real settlement).
func assertClean(t *testing.T, before, after map[acctAsset]balPair, parties partySet, what string) {
t.Helper()
if k, delta, bad := findOwnershipViolation(before, after, parties); bad {
t.Fatalf("%s: ownership gate FALSE-flagged honest settlement: %x/%x delta %d (over-strict gate)", what, k.user, k.asset, delta)
}
}
// uk is a local userKey16 alias to keep plants terse.
func uk(s string) userKey { return userKey16(s) }
// restMakerCross is the common single-maker / single-taker cross fixture: victim
// (maker) rests a SELL of size LUX @ price, a legit taker crosses it fully. Returns
// the checker snapshotted BEFORE the cross, the cross block, and the maker/taker.
// All callers then plant a conserving theft and assert the gate fires.
func restMakerCross(t *testing.T, vm *VM, pool [32]byte, maker, taker string, price, size float64) (*ownershipChecker, *Block) {
t.Helper()
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, maker, assetLUX, 1000),
depositTx(t, taker, assetLUSD, 100000),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, price, size, maker))
oc := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
blk := addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, price, size, taker))
return oc, blk
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// (B.1) maker proceeds routed to a WRONG / EXTRA account.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func TestOwnershipHarness_MakerProceedsToWrongAccount(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const maker, taker = "b1-maker", "b1-taker"
pool := [32]byte{0xb1}
oc, blk := restMakerCross(t, vm, pool, maker, taker, 5.0, 10.0)
before := oc.before
after := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := oc.parties(t, vm, blk)
assertClean(t, before, after, parties, "honest cross")
// Plant: maker's 50-LUSD proceeds re-routed to thirdParty (a non-party). Conserving.
vuln := cloneBalances(after)
moveControlled(vuln, uk(maker), assetLUSD, uk(thirdParty), assetLUSD, 50)
wantU, wantA := uk(thirdParty), assetLUSD
assertFires(t, before, vuln, parties, &wantU, &wantA, "maker proceeds -> wrong account")
}
// EXTRA account: maker keeps its proceeds AND thirdParty also receives a credit (a
// one-sided extra credit — not conserving, but the ownership gate must still flag
// the unexplained recipient regardless of conservation).
func TestOwnershipHarness_MakerProceedsToExtraAccount(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const maker, taker = "b1e-maker", "b1e-taker"
pool := [32]byte{0xb1, 0xee}
oc, blk := restMakerCross(t, vm, pool, maker, taker, 5.0, 10.0)
before := oc.before
after := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := oc.parties(t, vm, blk)
vuln := cloneBalances(after)
creditControlled(vuln, uk(thirdParty), assetLUSD, 50) // extra, unexplained
wantU, wantA := uk(thirdParty), assetLUSD
assertFires(t, before, vuln, parties, &wantU, &wantA, "maker proceeds -> extra account")
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// (B.2) TAKER proceeds mis-routed.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func TestOwnershipHarness_TakerProceedsMisrouted(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const maker, taker = "b2-maker", "b2-taker"
pool := [32]byte{0xb2}
oc, blk := restMakerCross(t, vm, pool, maker, taker, 5.0, 10.0)
before := oc.before
after := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := oc.parties(t, vm, blk)
assertClean(t, before, after, parties, "honest cross")
// Plant: taker's 10-LUX proceeds re-routed to thirdParty. Conserving.
vuln := cloneBalances(after)
moveControlled(vuln, uk(taker), assetLUX, uk(thirdParty), assetLUX, 10)
wantU, wantA := uk(thirdParty), assetLUX
assertFires(t, before, vuln, parties, &wantU, &wantA, "taker proceeds -> wrong account")
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// (B.3) CANCEL / refund credited to a non-owner.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func TestOwnershipHarness_CancelRefundToNonOwner(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const owner = "b3-owner"
pool := [32]byte{0xb3}
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, owner, assetLUX, 1000),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
pblk := addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, owner))
orderID := blockDeterministicID(pblk.height, 0)
oc := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
cblk := addBlock(t, vm, cancelPoolTx(t, pool, orderID))
before := oc.before
after := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := oc.parties(t, vm, cblk)
assertClean(t, before, after, parties, "honest cancel (refund to owner)")
// The owner is a party (cancel resolves owner via orderuser:). Plant the refund
// landing on thirdParty instead: thirdParty's controlled LUX rises, owner's falls.
// Conserving. thirdParty is not the order's owner, so the gate must fire.
vuln := cloneBalances(after)
moveControlled(vuln, uk(owner), assetLUX, uk(thirdParty), assetLUX, 10)
wantU, wantA := uk(thirdParty), assetLUX
assertFires(t, before, vuln, parties, &wantU, &wantA, "cancel refund -> non-owner")
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// (B.4) WITHDRAW crediting a non-withdrawer.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func TestOwnershipHarness_WithdrawCreditsNonWithdrawer(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const w = "b4-withdrawer"
addBlock(t, vm, depositTx(t, w, assetLUX, 1000))
oc := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
wblk := addBlock(t, vm, withdrawTx(t, w, assetLUX, 400))
before := oc.before
after := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := oc.parties(t, vm, wblk)
assertClean(t, before, after, parties, "honest withdraw")
// A withdraw is a one-sided DEBIT from the withdrawer (value leaves the ledger).
// The withdrawer IS a party. Plant a credit to thirdParty (modeling a withdraw
// that, instead of removing value, mis-credits a non-withdrawer). Gate must fire.
vuln := cloneBalances(after)
creditControlled(vuln, uk(thirdParty), assetLUX, 400)
wantU, wantA := uk(thirdParty), assetLUX
assertFires(t, before, vuln, parties, &wantU, &wantA, "withdraw credits non-withdrawer")
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// (B.5) A balance delta for an account with NO accepted event at all.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
func TestOwnershipHarness_DeltaForAccountWithNoEvent(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
// A block that touches only maker+taker; thirdParty is in NO event.
const maker, taker = "b5-maker", "b5-taker"
pool := [32]byte{0xb5}
oc, blk := restMakerCross(t, vm, pool, maker, taker, 5.0, 10.0)
before := oc.before
after := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := oc.parties(t, vm, blk)
// Sanity: thirdParty is genuinely not a party in any asset.
if parties.has(uk(thirdParty), assetLUX) || parties.has(uk(thirdParty), assetLUSD) {
t.Fatal("test precondition broken: thirdParty wrongly in the party set")
}
// Plant: a bare delta on thirdParty in BOTH assets (no event references it).
vuln := cloneBalances(after)
creditControlled(vuln, uk(thirdParty), assetLUX, 1)
wantU, wantA := uk(thirdParty), assetLUX
assertFires(t, before, vuln, parties, &wantU, &wantA, "delta for account with no event")
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// (B.6) A multi-maker fill where ONE maker is mis-attributed.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestOwnershipHarness_MultiMakerOneMisattributed rests TWO makers at the same
// price, then a single taker BUY consumes BOTH in one cross (two fills -> two trade
// rows). The honest gate sees both makers + the taker as parties. Plant: maker2's
// proceeds re-routed to thirdParty. The gate must fire even though maker1's leg is
// honest and the taker's legs are honest — a single mis-attributed maker in a
// multi-fill cross is exactly the subtle case.
func TestOwnershipHarness_MultiMakerOneMisattributed(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const maker1, maker2, taker = "b6-m1", "b6-m2", "b6-tk"
pool := [32]byte{0xb6}
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, maker1, assetLUX, 1000),
depositTx(t, maker2, assetLUX, 1000),
depositTx(t, taker, assetLUSD, 100000),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
// Two resting SELLs at the same price 5, 10 LUX each.
addBlock(t, vm,
placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, maker1),
placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, maker2),
)
oc := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
// Taker buys 20 LUX @ 5 -> crosses BOTH makers (two fills).
blk := addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 20.0, taker))
before := oc.before
after := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := oc.parties(t, vm, blk)
// Both makers must be parties (resolved through the block's two trade rows).
if !parties.has(uk(maker1), assetLUSD) || !parties.has(uk(maker2), assetLUSD) {
t.Fatalf("multi-maker party set missing a maker: m1=%v m2=%v",
parties.has(uk(maker1), assetLUSD), parties.has(uk(maker2), assetLUSD))
}
assertClean(t, before, after, parties, "honest multi-maker cross")
// Plant: maker2's 50-LUSD leg re-routed to thirdParty. Conserving.
vuln := cloneBalances(after)
moveControlled(vuln, uk(maker2), assetLUSD, uk(thirdParty), assetLUSD, 50)
wantU, wantA := uk(thirdParty), assetLUSD
assertFires(t, before, vuln, parties, &wantU, &wantA, "multi-maker: one maker mis-attributed")
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// (B.7) A partial-fill maker spanning MULTIPLE blocks (resting across a block) —
// is it still resolved to the full party?
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestOwnershipHarness_PartialFillMakerAcrossBlocks rests a LARGE maker (50 LUX) in
// block N, then a taker partially fills 10 LUX in block N+2 (maker still rests with
// 40), then ANOTHER taker fills another 10 in block N+3. For the SECOND cross the
// maker's orderuser: row was written TWO blocks earlier — the harness must resolve
// the still-resting maker to its FULL account from the pre-block orderuser: snapshot
// (not from this block's placements). We assert the gate fires when that second
// cross's maker leg is mis-routed.
func TestOwnershipHarness_PartialFillMakerAcrossBlocks(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
maker := string([]byte{0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xD1, 0xD2, 0xD3, 0xD4, 0xD5, 0xD6, 0xD7, 0xD8})
const t1, t2 = "b7-t1", "b7-t2"
pool := [32]byte{0xb7}
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, maker, assetLUX, 1000),
depositTx(t, t1, assetLUSD, 100000),
depositTx(t, t2, assetLUSD, 100000),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
pblk := addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 50.0, maker))
makerOrderID := blockDeterministicID(pblk.height, 0)
// First partial fill (10 of 50). Maker still rests with 40.
addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, t1))
// The maker still has an orderuser: row (resting), keyed under makerOrderID.
if !hasOrderUserRow(t, vm, pool, makerOrderID) {
t.Fatal("partially-filled maker lost its orderuser row (should still rest)")
}
// SECOND cross, in a later block — the maker rested 2+ blocks ago.
oc := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
blk := addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, t2))
before := oc.before
after := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := oc.parties(t, vm, blk)
// The maker (resting across blocks) MUST be resolved to its full account as a
// party of this cross — from the pre-block orderuser: snapshot.
if !parties.has(uk(maker), assetLUSD) {
t.Fatal("HARNESS GAP: cross-block resting maker not resolved to a party (orderuser: pre-snapshot miss)")
}
// And the 8-byte fold of the maker is NOT separately admitted.
folded := string([]byte{0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC})
if parties.has(uk(folded), assetLUSD) {
t.Fatal("party set wrongly admitted the maker's 8-byte fold as a distinct party")
}
assertClean(t, before, after, parties, "honest cross-block partial fill")
// Plant: this cross's maker leg (50 LUSD) re-routed to the 8-byte fold (the exact
// theft a fold-settlement would produce). Conserving. The fold is NOT a party.
vuln := cloneBalances(after)
moveControlled(vuln, uk(maker), assetLUSD, uk(folded), assetLUSD, 50)
wantU, wantA := uk(folded), assetLUSD
assertFires(t, before, vuln, parties, &wantU, &wantA, "cross-block maker leg -> 8-byte fold")
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// (B.8) FEE attribution — does a fee skim leave an unexplained delta?
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestOwnershipHarness_NoFeeSkimAndFeeRecipientWouldFire documents the fee axis.
// This ledger takes NO fee (settleFills moves maker<->taker with no skim; the
// conservation property asserts F==0). So in the honest after-state there is no fee
// recipient delta. We assert (a) the honest cross has no extra delta, and (b) IF a
// fee were skimmed to a recipient that is not a party, the gate WOULD fire — i.e.
// the harness does not have a fee blind spot (a fee recipient is not silently
// admitted as a party). If a fee leg is ever added, its recipient must be made an
// explicit party in partiesOfBlock or this gate fires.
func TestOwnershipHarness_NoFeeSkimAndFeeRecipientWouldFire(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const maker, taker = "b8-maker", "b8-taker"
pool := [32]byte{0xb8}
oc, blk := restMakerCross(t, vm, pool, maker, taker, 5.0, 10.0)
before := oc.before
after := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := oc.parties(t, vm, blk)
assertClean(t, before, after, parties, "honest cross (no fee)")
feeRecipient := string([]byte{0xfe, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0xfe, 0xe0, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08})
if parties.has(uk(feeRecipient), assetLUSD) {
t.Fatal("a fee recipient is wrongly already a party (harness over-permits)")
}
// Plant a fee skim: 1 LUSD diverted from the maker's proceeds to a fee recipient.
// Conserving (maker 49, fee 1). The fee recipient is NOT a party -> gate fires.
vuln := cloneBalances(after)
moveControlled(vuln, uk(maker), assetLUSD, uk(feeRecipient), assetLUSD, 1)
wantU, wantA := uk(feeRecipient), assetLUSD
assertFires(t, before, vuln, parties, &wantU, &wantA, "fee skim to non-party recipient")
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// (B.9) SELF-TRADE (maker == taker) — does partiesOfBlock handle it?
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestOwnershipHarness_SelfTradeHandled rests a maker and then crosses it with a
// submit from the SAME account. The matcher's self-trade prevention may reject the
// cross outright; either way the harness must (a) not crash, (b) not false-flag the
// honest outcome, and (c) still fire if value is diverted to a third party. We drive
// the scenario and assert the gate behaves on whatever outcome the matcher produces,
// then plant a third-party diversion sized to the maker's locked reserve and confirm
// the gate fires.
func TestOwnershipHarness_SelfTradeHandled(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
self := string([]byte{0x5e, 0x1f, 0x5e, 0x1f, 0x5e, 0x1f, 0x5e, 0x1f, 0xA1, 0xA2, 0xA3, 0xA4, 0xA5, 0xA6, 0xA7, 0xA8})
pool := [32]byte{0xb9}
// Self funds BOTH legs (base to rest a sell, quote to attempt the buy cross).
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, self, assetLUX, 1000),
depositTx(t, self, assetLUSD, 100000),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, self))
oc := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
// Submit a BUY from the same account — self-trade. partiesOfBlock must handle the
// taker==maker identity (the taker is added; the maker resolves to the same uid).
blk := addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, self))
before := oc.before
after := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := oc.parties(t, vm, blk) // must not panic on self-trade
// `self` is a party in both assets regardless of whether the cross filled or was
// self-trade-rejected (it is the taker; and, if filled, also the maker).
if !parties.has(uk(self), assetLUX) || !parties.has(uk(self), assetLUSD) {
t.Fatalf("self-trade: self not a party in both assets (lux=%v lusd=%v)",
parties.has(uk(self), assetLUX), parties.has(uk(self), assetLUSD))
}
assertClean(t, before, after, parties, "honest self-trade outcome")
// Plant: divert 1 LUX of self's controlled value to thirdParty. Conserving.
// (self controls its LUX whether it filled-to-itself or the cross was rejected
// and the lock refunded — either way the total is unchanged and self is a party.)
vuln := cloneBalances(after)
moveControlled(vuln, uk(self), assetLUX, uk(thirdParty), assetLUX, 1)
wantU, wantA := uk(thirdParty), assetLUX
assertFires(t, before, vuln, parties, &wantU, &wantA, "self-trade: value diverted to third party")
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// OVER-PERMIT direction: partiesOfBlock must NOT mark an account a party when it
// isn't. A delta on a placed-order OWNER for an asset the place does NOT touch must
// still be flagged.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestOwnershipHarness_DoesNotOverPermitPlaceOwner places a SELL (locks base=LUX)
// from an owner. The place makes the owner a party for LUX only (the spend asset).
// A planted delta on that same owner in QUOTE (LUSD) — an asset the place never
// touches — must STILL be flagged: a place-owner is a party only for the asset it
// locks, not a blanket pass for every asset.
func TestOwnershipHarness_DoesNotOverPermitPlaceOwner(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const owner = "op-owner"
pool := [32]byte{0xb0, 0x09}
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, owner, assetLUX, 1000),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
oc := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
blk := addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, owner))
before := oc.before
after := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := oc.parties(t, vm, blk)
assertClean(t, before, after, parties, "honest place")
// The owner is a party for LUX (the locked spend asset) ...
if !parties.has(uk(owner), assetLUX) {
t.Fatal("place owner not a party for the locked base asset")
}
// ... but NOT for LUSD (a SELL never touches quote).
if parties.has(uk(owner), assetLUSD) {
t.Fatal("HARNESS OVER-PERMIT: place SELL owner wrongly a party for the quote asset it never locks")
}
// Plant a delta on the owner in LUSD -> must fire (owner is not a quote party here).
vuln := cloneBalances(after)
creditControlled(vuln, uk(owner), assetLUSD, 7)
wantU, wantA := uk(owner), assetLUSD
assertFires(t, before, vuln, parties, &wantU, &wantA, "place SELL owner delta in untouched quote asset")
}
// TestOwnershipHarness_DoesNotOverPermitUninvolvedAccountOnBusyBlock builds a block
// with several places by DIFFERENT owners; an account that placed nothing and is in
// no event gets a planted delta and must be flagged — the harness must not admit
// "any account that appears anywhere" as a party.
func TestOwnershipHarness_DoesNotOverPermitUninvolvedAccountOnBusyBlock(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const a, b, c = "busy-a", "busy-b", "busy-c"
pool := [32]byte{0xb0, 0x5b}
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, a, assetLUX, 1000),
depositTx(t, b, assetLUX, 1000),
depositTx(t, c, assetLUX, 1000),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
oc := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
// Three places by a, b, c.
blk := addBlock(t, vm,
placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, a),
placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 6.0, 10.0, b),
placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 7.0, 10.0, c),
)
before := oc.before
after := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := oc.parties(t, vm, blk)
assertClean(t, before, after, parties, "honest busy block")
// thirdParty placed nothing. A delta on it must fire.
vuln := cloneBalances(after)
creditControlled(vuln, uk(thirdParty), assetLUX, 3)
wantU, wantA := uk(thirdParty), assetLUX
assertFires(t, before, vuln, parties, &wantU, &wantA, "uninvolved account delta on busy block")
}
pkg/dchain/ownership_test.go
+646
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,646 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package dchain
// ownership_test.go is the OWNERSHIP INVARIANT harness — the assertion
// conservation alone cannot make.
//
// Conservation proves no value is minted or burned: Σ balances is constant. But
// the vault-drain / colliding-handle exploit class CONSERVES value while STEALING
// ownership — it moves a victim's funds to an attacker who was never a party to
// any accepted event. Σ balances is unchanged, so a conservation sweep stays
// green while the wrong account ends up holding the money.
//
// The ownership invariant closes that gap. It is a statement about ATTRIBUTION,
// not totals:
//
// For every (account, asset), any non-zero balance delta across an accepted
// block MUST be explained by an accepted event in which that account is an
// EXPLICIT PARTY.
//
// The explicit parties of an accepted block, by event:
//
// deposit -> the DEPOSITOR (the decoded deposit user), in the deposited asset.
// withdraw -> the WITHDRAWER (the decoded withdraw user), in the withdrawn asset.
// place -> the ORDER OWNER (the decoded place user): available -> locked in
// the spend asset (a rested place), or a no-op (a rejected place).
// cancel -> the ORDER OWNER (resolved via orderuser: by the cancelled id):
// locked -> available in the order's reserved asset.
// trade-fill -> the TAKER (the decoded submit user) AND each MAKER (resolved via
// orderuser: by the fill's resting order id), in base AND quote.
//
// A non-zero delta for an (account, asset) that is NOT an explicit party of ANY
// event in the block is an OWNERSHIP VIOLATION — value arrived at, or left, an
// account that no accepted event authorized. That is exactly the theft the
// colliding-handle bug would have produced, and exactly what conservation misses.
//
// The harness:
// - snapshots EVERY per-(account,asset) (available, locked) row from the durable
// ledger before and after a block (the same whole-keyspace sweep the
// conservation property uses, so an attacker account outside any roster is
// still seen),
// - diffs them,
// - derives the explicit-party set from the block's accepted events (its txs +
// consensus outcomes), resolving maker/cancel identity through the SAME
// orderuser: index settlement uses,
// - and fails if any non-zero delta is unexplained.
//
// It runs ALONGSIDE conservation in the property and full-cycle tests, so every
// randomized sequence now proves BOTH "no value created/destroyed" AND "no value
// moved to a non-party".
import (
"context"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/database/memdb"
"github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/lx"
"github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/zapwire"
)
// acctAsset is a single (account, asset) ledger coordinate — the FULL 16-byte
// settlement identity and the FULL 32-byte asset id, the exact width the ledger
// keys by. It is the unit the ownership invariant quantifies over.
type acctAsset struct {
user userKey
asset [32]byte
}
// balPair is an account's (available, locked) holdings for one asset. Ownership
// reasons over the TOTAL the account controls (available + locked are both the
// account's value — a lock is the account's own escrow), but keeps the split so a
// place (available -> locked, same owner) is recognized as a within-owner move,
// not two unrelated deltas.
type balPair struct {
available uint64
locked uint64
}
// total is the value the account controls for the asset — the quantity that must
// not change for a NON-party. (available + locked: a locked reserve is still the
// owner's value, escrowed by the owner's own order.)
func (b balPair) total() uint64 { return b.available + b.locked }
// ownershipSnapshot sweeps the WHOLE durable ledger (every balance:/locked: row)
// into a per-(account,asset) (available, locked) map, WITHOUT trusting any roster
// of accounts. A delta into a derived/wrong account (the theft signature) shows
// up here because the sweep totals the entire keyspace, exactly like the
// conservation sweep. Must mirror that sweep's key discipline: keys are
// <prefix><user:16><asset:32>.
func ownershipSnapshot(t *testing.T, vm *VM) map[acctAsset]balPair {
t.Helper()
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
out := map[acctAsset]balPair{}
sweep := func(prefix string, set func(p *balPair, v uint64)) {
it := vm.db.NewIteratorWithPrefix([]byte(prefix))
defer it.Release()
const userW = zapwire.UserSize
for it.Next() {
key := it.Key()
if len(key) != len(prefix)+userW+32 {
t.Fatalf("ownership sweep: %q key wrong width %d (want %d)", prefix, len(key), len(prefix)+userW+32)
}
val := it.Value()
if len(val) != 8 {
t.Fatalf("ownership sweep: %q value wrong width %d (want 8)", prefix, len(val))
}
var k acctAsset
copy(k.user[:], key[len(prefix):len(prefix)+userW])
copy(k.asset[:], key[len(prefix)+userW:len(prefix)+userW+32])
p := out[k]
set(&p, be64(val))
out[k] = p
}
if err := it.Error(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ownership sweep %q iterate: %v", prefix, err)
}
}
sweep(prefixBalance, func(p *balPair, v uint64) { p.available = v })
sweep(prefixLocked, func(p *balPair, v uint64) { p.locked = v })
return out
}
// partySet is the set of (account, asset) coordinates that the accepted events of
// ONE block name as EXPLICIT PARTIES. A delta for a coordinate in this set is
// authorized; a delta for a coordinate NOT in it is an ownership violation.
type partySet map[acctAsset]struct{}
func (s partySet) add(user userKey, asset [32]byte) { s[acctAsset{user, asset}] = struct{}{} }
func (s partySet) has(user userKey, asset [32]byte) bool {
_, ok := s[acctAsset{user, asset}]
return ok
}
// orderUserResolver resolves a resting order's FULL settlement identity to build
// the maker/cancel party set, from the SAME source settlement uses: the
// orderuser: index. It is seeded with a snapshot of every orderuser: row taken
// BEFORE the block (so a maker that rested in a PRIOR block, and whose row is
// deleted by a full fill in THIS block, is still resolvable), and augmented with
// every TxPlace in the block (so a maker that rested EARLIER IN THIS SAME block —
// whose row did not exist in the pre-snapshot — is resolvable too). This is the
// honest mirror of how settlement itself finds the maker: never the 8-byte handle,
// always the full 16-byte account keyed by (pool, orderID).
type orderUserResolver struct {
byOrder map[orderRef]userKey
}
type orderRef struct {
pool [32]byte
orderID uint64
}
// snapshotOrderUsers reads every orderuser: row into a resolver. The orderuser:
// key is orderuser:<poolID:32><orderID:8> -> user[16].
func snapshotOrderUsers(t *testing.T, vm *VM) *orderUserResolver {
t.Helper()
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
r := &orderUserResolver{byOrder: map[orderRef]userKey{}}
it := vm.db.NewIteratorWithPrefix([]byte(prefixOrderUser))
defer it.Release()
const prefW = len(prefixOrderUser)
for it.Next() {
key := it.Key()
if len(key) != prefW+32+8 {
t.Fatalf("orderuser sweep: key wrong width %d", len(key))
}
val := it.Value()
if len(val) != zapwire.UserSize {
t.Fatalf("orderuser sweep: value wrong width %d", len(val))
}
var ref orderRef
copy(ref.pool[:], key[prefW:prefW+32])
ref.orderID = beU64(key[prefW+32 : prefW+40])
var u userKey
copy(u[:], val)
r.byOrder[ref] = u
}
if err := it.Error(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("orderuser sweep iterate: %v", err)
}
return r
}
func (r *orderUserResolver) resolve(pool [32]byte, orderID uint64) (userKey, bool) {
u, ok := r.byOrder[orderRef{pool, orderID}]
return u, ok
}
// beU64 reads an 8-byte big-endian uint64 from a key slice.
func beU64(b []byte) uint64 {
_ = b[7]
return uint64(b[0])<<56 | uint64(b[1])<<48 | uint64(b[2])<<40 | uint64(b[3])<<32 |
uint64(b[4])<<24 | uint64(b[5])<<16 | uint64(b[6])<<8 | uint64(b[7])
}
// partiesOfBlock derives the explicit-party set from a block's accepted events:
// its txs (decoded for the named user / market) and its consensus outcomes (the
// realized fills / placed-order ids). preOrderUsers resolves a maker/cancel order
// id to its full account; the block's own TxPlaces are added to it first so a
// same-block maker is resolvable. The set is the ONLY accounts any value is
// authorized to move for in this block.
func partiesOfBlock(t *testing.T, vm *VM, blk *Block, preOrderUsers *orderUserResolver) partySet {
t.Helper()
parties := partySet{}
// Augment the resolver with this block's own placements: orderID =
// blockDeterministicID(height, txIndex), owner = the decoded place user. This
// makes a maker that rests earlier in THIS block resolvable for a cross later
// in the same block.
res := &orderUserResolver{byOrder: map[orderRef]userKey{}}
for k, v := range preOrderUsers.byOrder {
res.byOrder[k] = v
}
for i, tx := range blk.txs {
if tx.Type != TxPlace {
continue
}
pool, _, _, _, user, err := zapwire.DecodePlace(tx.Body)
if err != nil {
continue
}
res.byOrder[orderRef{pool, blockDeterministicID(blk.height, uint32(i))}] = userKey16(user)
}
// Market (base,quote) bindings are needed to attribute a place/cancel's locked
// asset and a fill's two legs. Read from committed state (post-accept).
marketAssets := func(pool [32]byte) (base, quote [32]byte, ok bool) {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
b, q, bound, err := readMarketAssets(vm.db, pool)
if err != nil || !bound {
return base, quote, false
}
return b, q, true
}
for _, tx := range blk.txs {
switch tx.Type {
case TxDeposit:
user, asset, _, _, err := zapwire.DecodeDeposit(tx.Body)
if err != nil {
continue
}
parties.add(userKey16(user), asset) // depositor credited the asset
case TxWithdraw:
user, asset, _, _, err := zapwire.DecodeWithdraw(tx.Body)
if err != nil {
continue
}
parties.add(userKey16(user), asset) // withdrawer debited the asset
case TxPlace:
pool, side, _, _, user, err := zapwire.DecodePlace(tx.Body)
if err != nil {
continue
}
base, quote, ok := marketAssets(pool)
if !ok {
continue
}
// A place locks (or refunds) the spend asset for its OWNER only: buy locks
// quote, sell locks base. The owner is the only party to a place.
uid := userKey16(user)
if side == sideBuy {
parties.add(uid, quote)
} else {
parties.add(uid, base)
}
case TxCancel:
pool, orderID, err := zapwire.DecodeCancel(tx.Body)
if err != nil {
continue
}
base, quote, ok := marketAssets(pool)
if !ok {
continue
}
// A cancel unlocks the order's reserve to its OWNER (resolved via
// orderuser:). The owner is the only party; admit both assets so either
// side's reserve is covered (a sell reserved base, a buy reserved quote).
if owner, ok := res.resolve(pool, orderID); ok {
parties.add(owner, base)
parties.add(owner, quote)
}
case TxSubmit:
pool, _, _, _, _, user, err := zapwire.DecodeSubmit(tx.Body)
if err != nil {
continue
}
base, quote, ok := marketAssets(pool)
if !ok {
continue
}
// The TAKER (the submitter) is a party in BOTH assets: it spends one and
// receives the other, and its unspent lock is refunded.
taker := userKey16(user)
parties.add(taker, base)
parties.add(taker, quote)
// Each MAKER of a fill this submit produced is a party in BOTH assets. The
// makers are read from the block's PERSISTED trade rows (which carry the
// exact MakerOrderID) and resolved to a full account through the SAME
// orderuser: index settlement uses — NEVER the trade row's 8-byte
// MakerUserID handle. This is the EXACT maker set (not a superset): only
// the owner of the specific resting order a fill consumed is admitted, so
// even an attacker who happens to hold an UNRELATED resting order on the
// same pool is NOT credited another order's proceeds without tripping the
// gate.
for _, mid := range makerOrderIDsForSubmit(t, vm, blk, tx, pool) {
if owner, ok := res.resolve(pool, mid); ok {
parties.add(owner, base)
parties.add(owner, quote)
}
}
}
}
return parties
}
// makerOrderIDsForSubmit returns the resting maker order ids the fills of THIS
// submit consumed, read from the block's persisted trade rows. The submit's fill
// count comes from its consensus outcome (snapshotted before Accept); the block's
// trade:<height>:<seq> rows are appended in execution order, so a single-submit
// block's fills are exactly the block's trade rows. For attribution this is the
// authoritative maker set: each row's MakerOrderID names the exact resting order a
// fill consumed.
func makerOrderIDsForSubmit(t *testing.T, vm *VM, blk *Block, tx *Tx, pool [32]byte) []uint64 {
t.Helper()
// Only the fills attributed to this submit matter. In the property/full-cycle
// tests a submit is the only matching tx in its block, so every trade row at
// this height belongs to it; reading all rows at the height is exact. (A block
// with multiple submits would need per-tx fill ranges; the harness asserts a
// single matching tx per block via the count check below.)
oc := outcomeForTx(blk, tx)
want := len(oc.fills)
if want == 0 {
return nil
}
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
prefix := make([]byte, len(prefixTrade)+8)
copy(prefix, prefixTrade)
for i := 0; i < 8; i++ {
prefix[len(prefixTrade)+7-i] = byte(blk.height >> (8 * i))
}
it := vm.db.NewIteratorWithPrefix(prefix)
defer it.Release()
var ids []uint64
for it.Next() {
row, ok := lx.DecodeTrade(it.Value())
if !ok {
t.Fatalf("ownership: corrupt trade row at height %d", blk.height)
}
ids = append(ids, row.MakerOrderID)
}
if err := it.Error(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ownership: trade iterate: %v", err)
}
return ids
}
// outcomeForTx returns the consensus outcome the block derived for a given tx (by
// tx id). The block's outcomes are set at Verify and snapshotted by the caller
// BEFORE Accept clears them; this resolves a submit's fills for attribution.
func outcomeForTx(blk *Block, tx *Tx) txOutcome {
id := tx.ID()
for _, o := range blk.outcomes {
if o.txID == id {
return o
}
}
return txOutcome{}
}
// findOwnershipViolation is the PURE ownership gate: it returns the first
// (account, asset) whose controlled total CHANGED across the block while NOT
// being an explicit party of the block's accepted events, with ok=true when such
// a violation exists. This is the decomplected core — detection with no test
// glue — so it can be asserted clean (assertOwnership) AND asserted to FIRE
// against a simulated-vulnerable state (TestOwnershipInvariant_*).
//
// It checks the controlled TOTAL (available + locked): a place moves a party's
// own available -> locked (total unchanged, owner is a party either way); a fill
// moves value BETWEEN parties (both parties' totals change, both authorized); a
// theft moves value to a NON-party (its total rises with no event naming it —
// the violation this returns).
func findOwnershipViolation(before, after map[acctAsset]balPair, parties partySet) (acctAsset, int64, bool) {
seen := map[acctAsset]struct{}{}
for k := range before {
seen[k] = struct{}{}
}
for k := range after {
seen[k] = struct{}{}
}
// Deterministic order so a failure names the same coordinate every run.
keys := make([]acctAsset, 0, len(seen))
for k := range seen {
keys = append(keys, k)
}
sortAcctAssets(keys)
for _, k := range keys {
b := before[k]
a := after[k]
if a.total() == b.total() {
continue // no change in controlled value -> nothing to authorize
}
if !parties.has(k.user, k.asset) {
return k, int64(a.total()) - int64(b.total()), true
}
}
return acctAsset{}, 0, false
}
// sortAcctAssets imposes a total order on coordinates (user bytes then asset
// bytes) so violation reporting is deterministic.
func sortAcctAssets(ks []acctAsset) {
less := func(x, y acctAsset) bool {
for i := range x.user {
if x.user[i] != y.user[i] {
return x.user[i] < y.user[i]
}
}
for i := range x.asset {
if x.asset[i] != y.asset[i] {
return x.asset[i] < y.asset[i]
}
}
return false
}
for i := 1; i < len(ks); i++ {
for j := i; j > 0 && less(ks[j], ks[j-1]); j-- {
ks[j], ks[j-1] = ks[j-1], ks[j]
}
}
}
// assertOwnership is the ownership gate as a test assertion: it fails (Fatalf)
// when findOwnershipViolation reports a non-party whose controlled value changed
// — value that arrived at, or left, an account no accepted event authorized (the
// theft conservation misses). `where` names the step for a precise failure.
func assertOwnership(t *testing.T, before, after map[acctAsset]balPair, parties partySet, where string) {
t.Helper()
if k, delta, bad := findOwnershipViolation(before, after, parties); bad {
b := before[k]
a := after[k]
t.Fatalf("%s: OWNERSHIP VIOLATED for account %x asset %x:\n"+
" controlled total %d -> %d (delta %d)\n"+
" but this account is NOT an explicit party to ANY accepted event in the block\n"+
" (value moved to/from an account no deposit/withdraw/fill/cancel named — the theft conservation misses)",
where, k.user, k.asset, b.total(), a.total(), delta)
}
}
// ownershipChecker bundles the pre-block snapshots so a test can assert ownership
// over a block with one before/after pair. Usage:
//
// oc := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm) // snapshot before
// blk := addBlock(t, vm, ...) // accept the block
// oc.assert(t, vm, blk) // snapshot after + gate
//
// It is the reusable harness the property and full-cycle tests apply alongside
// the conservation assertion.
type ownershipChecker struct {
before map[acctAsset]balPair
orderUsers *orderUserResolver
}
func newOwnershipChecker(t *testing.T, vm *VM) *ownershipChecker {
t.Helper()
return &ownershipChecker{
before: ownershipSnapshot(t, vm),
orderUsers: snapshotOrderUsers(t, vm),
}
}
func (c *ownershipChecker) assert(t *testing.T, vm *VM, blk *Block, where string) {
t.Helper()
after := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := partiesOfBlock(t, vm, blk, c.orderUsers)
assertOwnership(t, c.before, after, parties, where)
}
// parties returns the explicit-party set the harness derives for a block (so a
// test can reuse the SAME set the gate uses against a simulated-vulnerable state).
func (c *ownershipChecker) parties(t *testing.T, vm *VM, blk *Block) partySet {
t.Helper()
return partiesOfBlock(t, vm, blk, c.orderUsers)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// THE CENTERPIECE: the harness CATCHES the exact bug class conservation missed.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestOwnershipInvariant_CollidingAttackerIsNotAParty is the proof that the
// ownership gate catches the colliding-handle theft — the bug class a conservation
// sweep cannot see (it CONSERVES value while STEALING ownership).
//
// It runs the colliding-8 scenario two ways against the SAME derived party set:
//
// 1. FIXED code (clean): a victim rests a maker; a distinct, legitimate taker
// crosses it. Real settlement credits the maker leg to the VICTIM (resolved
// via orderuser:). The harness sees only the victim (maker) and the taker
// change value — both explicit parties — and reports NO violation. Crucially
// the colliding ATTACKER (who shares the victim's 8-byte matcher handle but is
// a DISTINCT full account) is NEVER credited.
//
// 2. SIMULATED-VULNERABLE (caught): we take the SAME before-snapshot and the SAME
// party set the harness derived, then construct the after-state a vulnerable
// 8-byte-fold settlement WOULD produce — the maker's 50-LUSD proceeds credited
// to the colliding ATTACKER instead of the victim. The attacker shares the
// victim's handle, so a fallback-to-handle settlement mis-routes the proceeds
// to it. The attacker is NOT a party to the cross (neither the resting maker
// nor the taker), so findOwnershipViolation FLAGS the attacker's unexplained
// credit. CONSERVATION still holds in this vulnerable state (the 50 LUSD just
// moved victim->attacker; Σ is unchanged) — which is exactly why conservation
// misses it and ownership does not.
func TestOwnershipInvariant_CollidingAttackerIsNotAParty(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
victim, attacker := twoUsersSharingUserID8()
// Precondition for the exploit class: same 8-byte matcher handle, distinct full
// accounts.
if userKey16(victim) == userKey16(attacker) {
t.Fatal("test setup invalid: victim/attacker are the same full account")
}
const taker = "legit-taker"
pool := [32]byte{0x0c, 0xa1}
// Victim rests a SELL of 10 LUX @ 5 (locks 10 LUX); a legitimate taker funds
// 1000 LUSD to cross it. The attacker deposits NOTHING and never trades — it is
// purely the colliding non-party the vulnerable fold would mis-credit.
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, victim, assetLUX, 100),
depositTx(t, taker, assetLUSD, 1000),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, victim))
assertBalance(t, vm, victim, assetLUX, 90, 10)
// --- (1) FIXED code: the cross settles to the real parties; harness is clean. ---
own := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm)
crossBlk := addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, taker))
// Real settlement: victim (maker) received 50 LUSD + gave up 10 LUX; taker
// received 10 LUX + spent 50 LUSD. The colliding attacker got NOTHING.
assertBalance(t, vm, victim, assetLUX, 90, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, victim, assetLUSD, 50, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, taker, assetLUX, 10, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, taker, assetLUSD, 950, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, attacker, assetLUX, 0, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, attacker, assetLUSD, 0, 0)
before := own.before
afterFixed := ownershipSnapshot(t, vm)
parties := own.parties(t, vm, crossBlk)
// The party set names the victim (maker) and the taker — never the attacker.
if parties.has(userKey16(attacker), assetLUSD) || parties.has(userKey16(attacker), assetLUX) {
t.Fatal("party set wrongly includes the colliding attacker (it is neither maker nor taker)")
}
if !parties.has(userKey16(victim), assetLUSD) || !parties.has(userKey16(taker), assetLUX) {
t.Fatal("party set missing a real party (victim maker / legit taker)")
}
// On the FIXED state, the harness reports NO ownership violation.
if k, delta, bad := findOwnershipViolation(before, afterFixed, parties); bad {
t.Fatalf("ownership gate FALSE-flagged the fixed cross: account %x asset %x delta %d (all deltas are real parties)", k.user, k.asset, delta)
}
// --- (2) SIMULATED-VULNERABLE: the 8-byte fold mis-credits the attacker. ---
// Construct the after-state a fallback-to-handle settlement would produce: the
// victim's 50-LUSD maker proceeds land on the colliding ATTACKER instead. We
// mutate a COPY of the real after-state so production state is untouched.
afterVuln := cloneBalances(afterFixed)
const proceeds = 50
moveControlled(afterVuln, userKey16(victim), assetLUSD, userKey16(attacker), assetLUSD, proceeds)
// CONSERVATION still holds in the vulnerable state (value only MOVED, none
// minted/burned) — the precise reason a conservation sweep cannot catch this.
if sumControlled(before, assetLUSD) != sumControlled(afterVuln, assetLUSD) {
t.Fatal("test setup error: simulated theft was not value-conserving")
}
if sumControlled(before, assetLUX) != sumControlled(afterVuln, assetLUX) {
t.Fatal("test setup error: simulated theft perturbed LUX")
}
// OWNERSHIP catches it: the attacker's controlled value rose with no event
// naming it as a party. This is the theft conservation missed.
k, delta, bad := findOwnershipViolation(before, afterVuln, parties)
if !bad {
t.Fatal("ownership gate FAILED to flag the colliding-attacker theft (the whole point of the harness)")
}
if k.user != userKey16(attacker) || k.asset != assetLUSD {
t.Fatalf("ownership gate flagged the wrong coordinate: %x/%x (want attacker/LUSD)", k.user, k.asset)
}
if delta != proceeds {
t.Fatalf("flagged delta = %d, want +%d (the stolen maker proceeds)", delta, proceeds)
}
t.Logf("ownership gate flagged colliding-attacker theft: account %x gained %d LUSD as a NON-party", k.user[:8], delta)
}
// cloneBalances deep-copies a per-(account,asset) balance snapshot so a test can
// mutate it (model a vulnerable settlement) without touching the real snapshot.
func cloneBalances(in map[acctAsset]balPair) map[acctAsset]balPair {
out := make(map[acctAsset]balPair, len(in))
for k, v := range in {
out[k] = v
}
return out
}
// moveControlled models a value move BETWEEN accounts in a snapshot: debit `amt`
// of the controlled (available) balance from (fromUser,fromAsset) and credit it to
// (toUser,toAsset). Used to construct the after-state a vulnerable settlement would
// produce (e.g. maker proceeds mis-routed to a colliding handle).
func moveControlled(snap map[acctAsset]balPair, fromUser userKey, fromAsset [32]byte, toUser userKey, toAsset [32]byte, amt uint64) {
from := acctAsset{fromUser, fromAsset}
to := acctAsset{toUser, toAsset}
f := snap[from]
f.available -= amt
snap[from] = f
tp := snap[to]
tp.available += amt
snap[to] = tp
}
// sumControlled totals the controlled value (available + locked) for one asset
// across every account in a snapshot — the conservation total, used here to prove
// the simulated theft is value-conserving (so only ownership, not conservation,
// can catch it).
func sumControlled(snap map[acctAsset]balPair, asset [32]byte) uint64 {
var sum uint64
for k, v := range snap {
if k.asset == asset {
sum += v.total()
}
}
return sum
}
pkg/dchain/settle.go
+92 -34
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
package dchain
import (
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"github.com/luxfi/database"
@@ -43,19 +43,6 @@ import (
// never spend more than was locked. MARKET orders lock all available of the
// spend asset; spend <= lock holds because you cannot spend what you do not have.
// userID8 folds a user-identity string to the 8-byte ledger/UserID handle,
// byte-identically to lx's row encoding (big-endian over the leading 8 bytes,
// zero-padded). The ledger key and the matcher's DEXTrade.MakerUserID/TakerUserID
// MUST agree on this fold, so settlement credits the same account the trade
// names. (lx's helper is unexported; replicating the trivial, canonical fold here
// keeps the change inside the d-chain boundary. TestUserIDFoldMatchesLx pins the
// parity.)
func userID8(user string) uint64 {
var b [8]byte
copy(b[:], user)
return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[:])
}
// priceMultiplierBig mirrors lx.PriceMultiplier as a big.Int for exact lock math.
var priceMultiplierBig = big.NewInt(lx.PriceMultiplier)
@@ -104,11 +91,12 @@ func priceToInt(price float64) lx.PriceInt {
// orderLock returns the (asset, amount) a place/limit-submit of (side, price,
// size) on a market with (base, quote) assets must lock. A buy locks quote =
// ceil(size * price); a sell locks base = size. amount 0 means "nothing to lock"
// (a degenerate order the matcher will reject anyway).
func orderLock(side uint8, price float64, size float64, base, quote uint64) (asset, amount uint64) {
// (a degenerate order the matcher will reject anyway). asset is the FULL 32-byte
// id (base or quote), so the lock keys the SAME ledger row a deposit credited.
func orderLock(side uint8, price float64, size float64, base, quote [32]byte) (asset [32]byte, amount uint64) {
units := sizeToUnits(size)
if units == 0 {
return 0, 0
return [32]byte{}, 0
}
if side == sideBuy {
return quote, quoteUnitsCeil(new(big.Int).SetUint64(units), priceToInt(price))
@@ -122,10 +110,48 @@ const (
sideSell uint8 = 1
)
// marketConstraint is the MINIMAL notional scaffold: just enough to express the
// one constraint a value-bearing CLOB must enforce against integer flooring — an
// executable order MUST reserve a non-zero lock. It deliberately does NOT model a
// full fee/tick/lot/minNotional engine (that is a separate roadmap); the only
// invariant here is "arithmetic flooring can never create a FREE executable order".
//
// The notional floor IS the lock: a BUY's notional is ceil(size*price) quote, a
// SELL's is size base (orderLock). When that floors to zero for a positive-size,
// positive-price executable order — a sub-tick price whose priceInt rounds to 0,
// or a size that truncates below one atomic unit — the order would rest/cross while
// reserving NOTHING. floorsToZeroLock is the single predicate that names that
// condition; the placement gate rejects it with ErrDustPriceOrZeroLock.
type marketConstraint struct {
base, quote [32]byte
}
// floorsToZeroLock reports whether an EXECUTABLE order (size>0, and for a limit
// price>0) on this market would lock ZERO — the zero-notional reject condition.
// It is exactly the negation of "orderLock yields a positive amount":
//
// BUY : size>0 && price>0 && ceil(size*price) == 0 (sub-tick price)
// SELL : size>0 && size(base units) == 0 (sub-unit size)
//
// A non-executable order (size<=0, or a limit with price<=0) is NOT this hazard —
// the matcher rejects it earlier as malformed; floorsToZeroLock returns false so
// the named dust reject is reserved for the precise "executable yet free" case.
func (mc marketConstraint) floorsToZeroLock(side uint8, price, size float64) bool {
if !(size > 0) {
return false // not executable (zero/negative size) — handled as malformed, not dust
}
if side == sideBuy && !(price > 0) {
return false // a limit buy needs a price; price<=0 is malformed, not dust
}
_, lockAmt := orderLock(side, price, size, mc.base, mc.quote)
return lockAmt == 0
}
// creditDeposit applies a TxDeposit: available[user,asset] += amount. Returns the
// amount credited (== amount; a deposit is never clamped).
func creditDeposit(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user string, asset, amount uint64) (uint64, error) {
if err := creditAvailable(db, userID8(user), asset, amount); err != nil {
// amount credited (== amount; a deposit is never clamped). asset is the FULL
// 32-byte injective id.
func creditDeposit(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user string, asset [32]byte, amount uint64) (uint64, error) {
if err := creditAvailable(db, userKey16(user), asset, amount); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
return amount, nil
@@ -135,9 +161,9 @@ func creditDeposit(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user string, asset,
// available). Returns the REALIZED amount debited so the proxy exports exactly
// what left the ledger (a withdraw can only export realized, un-escrowed
// balance). Clamping to available means an over-withdraw exports only what is
// there — never mints.
func debitWithdraw(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user string, asset, want uint64) (uint64, error) {
uid := userID8(user)
// there — never mints. asset is the FULL 32-byte injective id.
func debitWithdraw(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user string, asset [32]byte, want uint64) (uint64, error) {
uid := userKey16(user)
avail, err := getAvailable(db, uid, asset)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
@@ -175,7 +201,21 @@ func debitWithdraw(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user string, asset,
// non-nil); a fill without it is a programming error on the consensus path (the
// VM sets SizeUnits on every order) and is refused rather than silently
// mis-settled.
func settleFills(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, takerSide uint8, base, quote uint64, fills []lx.Trade) (takerSpent uint64, err error) {
//
// IDENTITY: the settlement identity is the WALLET (AccountID); UserID8 is only a
// matcher hint. The TAKER is the submitter, whose full 16-byte wallet is carried on
// the ephemeral order this block from the decoded clob_submit invocation context
// (never the 8-byte row handle — the taker never rests, so its full wallet is always
// in hand). The MAKER is a RESTING order whose in-RAM user is only 8 bytes after a
// restart (RowToOrder folds the GPU row's 8-byte UserID handle), so its full wallet
// is resolved EXCLUSIVELY through the orderuser: index by the maker's order id —
// there is NO fallback to the trade's 8-byte-derived carried user. This guarantees
// a maker fill credits the SAME full 16-byte wallet the maker's lock lives under,
// live or post-restart.
//
// Settlement fails closed if full account identity is unavailable. Falling back
// to matcher UserID would make compact-handle collisions value-bearing — a critical theft bug.
func settleFills(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, poolID [32]byte, takerSide uint8, base, quote [32]byte, fills []lx.Trade) (takerSpent uint64, err error) {
for _, f := range fills {
if f.BaseUnits == nil || f.QuoteUnits == nil {
return 0, ErrFillMissingUnits
@@ -185,8 +225,11 @@ func settleFills(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, takerSide uint8, base,
}
baseUnits := f.BaseUnits.Uint64()
quoteUnits := f.QuoteUnits.Uint64()
makerID := userID8(makerUserID(f, takerSide))
takerID := userID8(takerUserID(f, takerSide))
makerID, merr := makerSettleKey(db, poolID, f, takerSide)
if merr != nil {
return 0, merr
}
takerID := userKey16(takerUserID(f, takerSide))
if takerSide == sideBuy {
// Taker pays quote (from its locked quote) -> maker available quote.
@@ -225,15 +268,30 @@ func settleFills(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, takerSide uint8, base,
return takerSpent, nil
}
// makerUserID returns the resting (maker) user string for a fill given the taker
// side. If the taker bought, the maker sold (SellUserID); else the maker bought
// (BuyUserID). Mirrors lx.persist.makerUser so the settled account matches the
// trade row.
func makerUserID(f lx.Trade, takerSide uint8) string {
if takerSide == sideBuy {
return pickUserID(f.SellUserID, f.Seller)
// makerSettleKey resolves a fill's MAKER (the resting order) to its full 16-byte
// settlement identity. The ONLY source is the orderuser: state row keyed by the
// maker's resting order id — which survives a restart, unlike the in-RAM maker user
// string (8-byte after RowToOrder). There is NO fallback: a fill against a resting
// order with no orderuser: row FAILS CLOSED with ErrMissingSettlementUser (the block
// is rejected, no value moves). Every order that rests on a balance-bearing market
// persists its orderuser: row BEFORE it is matchable (lockOrderSpend), so a missing
// row at settle time can only be state corruption — never a normal path.
//
// Settlement fails closed if full account identity is unavailable. Falling back
// to matcher UserID would make compact-handle collisions value-bearing — a critical theft bug.
func makerSettleKey(db database.KeyValueReader, poolID [32]byte, f lx.Trade, takerSide uint8) (userKey, error) {
makerOrderID := f.SellOrder // taker bought -> maker sold
if takerSide == sideSell {
makerOrderID = f.BuyOrder // taker sold -> maker bought
}
return pickUserID(f.BuyUserID, f.Buyer)
u, ok, err := getOrderUser(db, poolID, makerOrderID)
if err != nil {
return userKey{}, err
}
if !ok {
return userKey{}, fmt.Errorf("%w: maker order %d in market %x", ErrMissingSettlementUser, makerOrderID, poolID[:8])
}
return u, nil
}
// takerUserID returns the taker user string for a fill given the taker side.
pkg/dchain/settle_test.go
+80 -7
View File
@@ -4,23 +4,96 @@
package dchain
import (
"bytes"
"encoding/binary"
"math/big"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/lx"
"github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/zapwire"
)
// TestUserIDFoldMatchesLx pins that the d-chain ledger's user->8-byte fold
// (userID8) is byte-identical to the fold lx uses for DEXTrade/DEXOrder UserIDs
// (via OrderToRow). If these diverged, the ledger would credit/debit a different
// account than the trade names — a value-conservation break.
// TestUserIDFoldMatchesLx pins the DECOMPLECTED identity split that the custody
// model rests on:
//
// - The matcher's order-book ROW (lx.DEXOrder.UserID) stays the 8-byte STP
// handle (the frozen GPU ABI). lx.OrderToRow folds the user to the leading 8
// bytes; that is UNCHANGED and is sufficient for self-trade prevention and
// price-time rebuild.
// - The d-chain SETTLEMENT identity (userKey16) is the FULL 16-byte wire user
// (zapwire.UserSize) — the value balance:/locked: key by. It is byte-identical
// to the wire's null-padded user[16] field, so the ledger credits the SAME
// account the orders/deposits name.
//
// The two are deliberately DIFFERENT widths: the row models matching, d-chain
// state models settlement identity. This test pins both so neither silently
// regresses (a widened row would break the GPU ABI; a narrowed ledger identity
// would reopen the cross-user drain).
func TestUserIDFoldMatchesLx(t *testing.T) {
for _, u := range []string{"", "a", "maker-a", "taker-x-very-long-name-overflow"} {
// lx's fold is exercised through OrderToRow's UserID.
// The matcher ROW handle is the 8-byte fold (frozen GPU ABI / STP).
row := lx.OrderToRow(&lx.Order{ID: 1, User: u, UserID: u, Size: 1, Price: 1, Side: lx.Buy})
if got, want := userID8(u), row.UserID; got != want {
t.Errorf("userID8(%q) = %#x, lx OrderToRow.UserID = %#x (folds diverged)", u, got, want)
var want8 [8]byte
copy(want8[:], u)
if got, want := row.UserID, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(want8[:]); got != want {
t.Errorf("ROW handle: lx OrderToRow.UserID(%q) = %#x, want 8-byte fold %#x", u, got, want)
}
// The d-chain SETTLEMENT identity is the FULL 16-byte wire user.
var wantWire [zapwire.UserSize]byte
copy(wantWire[:], u)
if got := userKey16(u); got != wantWire {
t.Errorf("LEDGER identity: userKey16(%q) = %x, want full wire user[16] %x", u, got, wantWire)
}
if len(userKey16(u)) != zapwire.UserSize {
t.Errorf("LEDGER identity width = %d, want %d (zapwire.UserSize)", len(userKey16(u)), zapwire.UserSize)
}
}
}
// TestLedgerUserKeyNoCollision is the PERMANENT REGRESSION for CRITICAL-1
// (cross-user native drain). It tests the REAL production derivation — userKey16
// folded into balanceLedgerKey — not a test double. Two addresses that SHARE their
// leading 8 bytes but differ in bytes 8..15 MUST map to DISTINCT ledger accounts,
// so the second can never read/withdraw the first's balance.
//
// FAIL-on-old -> PASS-on-fix: the deleted 8-byte fold (userID8) produced an
// IDENTICAL uint64 for both addresses, so their balance keys collided — the drain.
// The 16-byte userKey16 keeps every byte, so the keys differ. The test asserts the
// keys differ AND demonstrates the old 8-byte fold would have collided.
func TestLedgerUserKeyNoCollision(t *testing.T) {
// Two 16-byte users sharing the leading 8 bytes, differing in bytes 8..15 —
// exactly the red PoC's "colliding address" shape.
victim := string([]byte{0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x11, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08})
attacker := string([]byte{0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x11, 0xF1, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0xF5, 0xF6, 0xF7, 0xF8})
var asset [32]byte // native (ids.Empty) — the asset the PoC drains
for i := range asset {
asset[i] = 0
}
vKey := userKey16(victim)
aKey := userKey16(attacker)
if vKey == aKey {
t.Fatalf("userKey16 collided for leading-8-shared users: %x == %x (CRITICAL-1 regressed)", vKey, aKey)
}
vLedger := balanceLedgerKey(prefixBalance, vKey, asset)
aLedger := balanceLedgerKey(prefixBalance, aKey, asset)
if bytes.Equal(vLedger, aLedger) {
t.Fatalf("balance ledger keys collided for distinct users:\n victim = %x\n attacker = %x\n(CRITICAL-1: attacker would read victim's balance)", vLedger, aLedger)
}
// Demonstrate the DELETED 8-byte fold WOULD have collided (the bug we removed):
// folding either user to its leading 8 bytes yields the SAME uint64, so the
// pre-fix balance:<user:8> keys were identical.
old8 := func(u string) uint64 {
var b [8]byte
copy(b[:], u)
return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(b[:])
}
if old8(victim) != old8(attacker) {
t.Fatalf("test setup invalid: the two users do not share leading 8 bytes (old fold %#x != %#x)", old8(victim), old8(attacker))
}
}
pkg/dchain/settlement_identity_test.go
+731
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,731 @@
// Copyright (C) 2019-2025, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
package dchain
import (
"context"
"errors"
"testing"
"github.com/luxfi/consensus/engine/chain/block"
"github.com/luxfi/database/memdb"
"github.com/luxfi/dex/pkg/zapwire"
"github.com/luxfi/log"
)
// settlement_identity_test.go is the PERMANENT REGRESSION suite for the custody
// settlement-identity collision class: the matcher's 8-byte DEXOrder.UserID is a
// compact STP handle that MAY collide, and it MUST NEVER bear value. Settlement
// identity is resolved EXCLUSIVELY through the orderuser: index to the full 16-byte
// account. These tests pin that settlement FAILS CLOSED (ErrMissingSettlementUser,
// block rejected, no value moves) whenever the full identity is unavailable —
// rather than falling back to the compact handle, which would make a handle
// collision a theft primitive.
//
// MUTATION CONTRACT: reintroducing ANY fallback from the orderuser: index to the
// 8-byte handle (or the trade's 8-byte-derived carried user) makes the fail-closed
// and exploit tests below RED. That is the whole point.
// twoUsersSharingUserID8 returns a victim/attacker pair of full 16-byte wire users
// that FOLD TO THE SAME 8-byte matcher handle (identical leading 8 bytes) but are
// DISTINCT full accounts (differ in bytes 8..15) — exactly the collision the
// matcher handle permits and settlement must never honor.
func twoUsersSharingUserID8() (victim, attacker string) {
victim = string([]byte{0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x11, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08})
attacker = string([]byte{0xAA, 0xBB, 0xCC, 0xDD, 0xEE, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x11, 0xF1, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0xF5, 0xF6, 0xF7, 0xF8})
return victim, attacker
}
// buildVerify builds a block from the mempool's current txs and runs the VALIDATOR
// path (re-parse + Verify) WITHOUT Accept, returning the verify error (nil on
// success) and the verified block. Used to assert a block FAILS verification
// (fail-closed) without committing.
func buildVerify(t *testing.T, vm *VM) (*Block, error) {
t.Helper()
ctx := context.Background()
built, err := vm.BuildBlock(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
reparsed, err := vm.ParseBlock(ctx, built.Bytes())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock: %v", err)
}
blk := reparsed.(*Block)
return blk, blk.Verify(ctx)
}
// deleteOrderUserRow removes the orderuser: row for a resting order directly from
// the VM's durable store — modeling the corruption/attack the fail-closed rule
// defends against (a maker fill/cancel whose full settlement identity has been
// lost or hidden). Operates under vm.mu, like the production state writes.
func deleteOrderUserRow(t *testing.T, vm *VM, poolID [32]byte, orderID uint64) {
t.Helper()
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
if err := vm.db.Delete(orderUserKey(poolID, orderID)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("delete orderuser row: %v", err)
}
}
// hasOrderUserRow reports whether the orderuser: row exists for a resting order.
func hasOrderUserRow(t *testing.T, vm *VM, poolID [32]byte, orderID uint64) bool {
t.Helper()
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
_, ok, err := getOrderUser(vm.db, poolID, orderID)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("getOrderUser: %v", err)
}
return ok
}
// fundOpenAndRestMaker is the common setup: deposit maker base + taker quote, open
// the LUX/LUSD custody market, and rest a maker SELL of `size` LUX @ `price`.
// Returns the resting maker order id.
func fundOpenAndRestMaker(t *testing.T, vm *VM, pool [32]byte, maker, taker string, makerBase, takerQuote uint64, price, size float64) uint64 {
t.Helper()
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, maker, assetLUX, makerBase),
depositTx(t, taker, assetLUSD, takerQuote),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
blk := addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, price, size, maker))
return blockDeterministicID(blk.height, 0)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 1. Settlement fails closed when the orderuser mapping is missing.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestMissingOrderUserFailsClosed proves a crossing submit against a resting maker
// whose orderuser: row is gone ABORTS with ErrMissingSettlementUser at Verify —
// no partial settlement, no balance mutation, head unchanged.
func TestMissingOrderUserFailsClosed(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const maker, taker = "maker-fc", "taker-fc"
pool := [32]byte{0xfc, 0x01}
makerOrderID := fundOpenAndRestMaker(t, vm, pool, maker, taker, 100, 1000, 5.0, 10.0)
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUX, 90, 10)
// Build the crossing block (probe sees the row), THEN delete the row, THEN Verify
// (the validator re-executes against state with the row gone).
vm.mempool.Add(submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, taker))
built, err := vm.BuildBlock(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("BuildBlock: %v", err)
}
deleteOrderUserRow(t, vm, pool, makerOrderID)
reparsed, err := vm.ParseBlock(ctx, built.Bytes())
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("ParseBlock: %v", err)
}
if err := reparsed.Verify(ctx); !errors.Is(err, ErrMissingSettlementUser) {
t.Fatalf("Verify err = %v, want ErrMissingSettlementUser (settlement must fail closed, not fall back to the 8-byte handle)", err)
}
// No value moved: maker still has its locked 10 LUX, taker still has all quote.
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUX, 90, 10)
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUSD, 0, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, taker, assetLUSD, 1000, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, taker, assetLUX, 0, 0)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 2. No maker fallback to the 8-byte handle.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestSettlementNeverFallsBackToMatcherUserID proves the maker's settlement
// identity comes ONLY from the orderuser: index: with the row deleted, the maker
// fill cannot resolve a 16-byte account and the block aborts — even though the
// matcher's 8-byte handle is still present on the fill/row. The settlement
// identity is the wallet (AccountID); the matcher's UserID8 is only a matching
// hint and NEVER a fallback for value. (If a fallback existed, the cross would
// settle, mis-routing the maker leg to a handle-derived account.)
func TestSettlementNeverFallsBackToMatcherUserID(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const maker, taker = "mk-nofb", "tk-nofb"
pool := [32]byte{0xfb, 0x01}
makerOrderID := fundOpenAndRestMaker(t, vm, pool, maker, taker, 100, 1000, 5.0, 10.0)
vm.mempool.Add(submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, taker))
built, err := vm.BuildBlock(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("BuildBlock: %v", err)
}
deleteOrderUserRow(t, vm, pool, makerOrderID)
reparsed, _ := vm.ParseBlock(ctx, built.Bytes())
if err := reparsed.Verify(ctx); !errors.Is(err, ErrMissingSettlementUser) {
t.Fatalf("maker-fill Verify err = %v, want ErrMissingSettlementUser (no fallback to 8-byte maker handle)", err)
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 3. No taker fallback to the 8-byte handle.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestNoTakerFallbackToUserID8 proves the TAKER's settlement identity is the FULL
// 16-byte submit user, never an 8-byte fold: two takers that share their leading 8
// bytes (same matcher handle) but differ in bytes 8..15 settle to DISTINCT accounts.
// If the taker side folded to 8 bytes, both takers' proceeds would land on ONE
// colliding account.
func TestNoTakerFallbackToUserID8(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
takerA, takerB := twoUsersSharingUserID8()
const maker = "mk-taker8"
pool := [32]byte{0x78, 0x01}
// Maker rests enough base for two crosses (20 LUX), each taker funded with 50 LUSD.
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, maker, assetLUX, 100),
depositTx(t, takerA, assetLUSD, 50),
depositTx(t, takerB, assetLUSD, 50),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 20.0, maker))
// Taker A buys 10 LUX @ 5 (50 LUSD). Then taker B buys 10 LUX @ 5 (50 LUSD).
addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, takerA))
addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, takerB))
// Each taker received its OWN 10 LUX — distinct accounts, no collision.
assertBalance(t, vm, takerA, assetLUX, 10, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, takerB, assetLUX, 10, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, takerA, assetLUSD, 0, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, takerB, assetLUSD, 0, 0)
// The maker received both takers' 100 LUSD.
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUSD, 100, 0)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 4. A resting order keeps its FULL 16-byte settlement identity across a restart.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestRestingOrderAfterRestartKeepsFullUser16 proves a maker that rests with a full
// 16-byte user, survives a VM restart (book + orderuser: rebuilt from durable
// state), and is then crossed, credits the FULL 16-byte account — not the 8-byte
// handle the rebuilt in-RAM order carries. The maker uses a user whose bytes 8..15
// are non-zero, so an 8-byte-folded credit would land on a DIFFERENT account.
func TestRestingOrderAfterRestartKeepsFullUser16(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
db := memdb.New()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, db)
// Maker user with significant bytes 8..15 (would be lost by an 8-byte fold).
maker := string([]byte{0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80, 0x91, 0x92, 0x93, 0x94, 0x95, 0x96, 0x97, 0x98})
const taker = "tk-restart"
pool := [32]byte{0x9e, 0x01}
fundOpenAndRestMaker(t, vm, pool, maker, taker, 100, 1000, 5.0, 10.0)
vm.Shutdown(ctx)
// Restart over the SAME db: book + ledger rebuilt from durable rows.
vm2, _ := newTestVM(t, db)
defer vm2.Shutdown(ctx)
// Cross the rebuilt maker.
addBlock(t, vm2, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, taker))
// The maker's FULL 16-byte account received the 50 LUSD and gave up 10 LUX.
assertBalance(t, vm2, maker, assetLUX, 90, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm2, maker, assetLUSD, 50, 0)
// The 8-byte-folded would-be account (bytes 8..15 zeroed) got NOTHING.
folded := string([]byte{0x10, 0x20, 0x30, 0x40, 0x50, 0x60, 0x70, 0x80})
assertBalance(t, vm2, folded, assetLUSD, 0, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm2, folded, assetLUX, 0, 0)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 5. Crash after book-insert but before orderuser-persist cannot settle.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestCrashAfterBookInsertBeforeOrderUserCannotSettle models the worst ordering
// hazard: a resting maker order exists in the book but its orderuser: row is
// absent (as if a crash interleaved between the two writes — which the production
// ordering forbids, but we force it here). A crossing taker MUST abort fail-closed
// rather than settle the maker leg to the 8-byte handle.
func TestCrashAfterBookInsertBeforeOrderUserCannotSettle(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const maker, taker = "mk-crash", "tk-crash"
pool := [32]byte{0xc5, 0x01}
makerOrderID := fundOpenAndRestMaker(t, vm, pool, maker, taker, 100, 1000, 5.0, 10.0)
// Force the hazard: drop the orderuser row, leaving the book row intact.
deleteOrderUserRow(t, vm, pool, makerOrderID)
// A crossing taker now aborts at BuildBlock's probe OR Verify — either way the
// block never settles. Drive both: BuildBlock executes the probe first.
vm.mempool.Add(submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, taker))
_, verr := buildVerify(t, vm)
if !errors.Is(verr, ErrMissingSettlementUser) {
t.Fatalf("crossing a book row with no orderuser err = %v, want ErrMissingSettlementUser", verr)
}
// Nothing settled.
assertBalance(t, vm, maker, assetLUX, 90, 10)
assertBalance(t, vm, taker, assetLUSD, 1000, 0)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 6. orderuser is persisted BEFORE the order is matchable.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestOrderUserPersistedBeforeBookInsert proves the placement ordering: once a
// place is accepted, the resting order has BOTH a per-order lock reserve AND an
// orderuser: identity row — neither is deferred past the book insert. (The lock +
// identity are written inside lockOrderSpend, which runs BEFORE applyTx inserts the
// order into the book.) A funded resting order therefore NEVER exists without its
// settlement identity.
func TestOrderUserPersistedBeforeBookInsert(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const maker, taker = "mk-order", "tk-order"
pool := [32]byte{0x0d, 0x01}
makerOrderID := fundOpenAndRestMaker(t, vm, pool, maker, taker, 100, 1000, 5.0, 10.0)
// The resting order carries its full 16-byte settlement identity.
if !hasOrderUserRow(t, vm, pool, makerOrderID) {
t.Fatal("resting order has NO orderuser row after place (identity not persisted before book insert)")
}
vm.mu.Lock()
gotUser, ok, err := getOrderUser(vm.db, pool, makerOrderID)
vm.mu.Unlock()
if err != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("getOrderUser ok=%v err=%v", ok, err)
}
if gotUser != userKey16(maker) {
t.Fatalf("orderuser row = %x, want full 16-byte maker identity %x", gotUser, userKey16(maker))
}
// And a per-order lock reserve exists in lockstep.
vm.mu.Lock()
_, lockedAmt, lockOK, lerr := getOrderLock(vm.db, pool, makerOrderID)
vm.mu.Unlock()
if lerr != nil || !lockOK || lockedAmt == 0 {
t.Fatalf("resting order missing per-order lock reserve: ok=%v amt=%d err=%v", lockOK, lockedAmt, lerr)
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 7. THE EXPLOIT: a colliding userID8 cannot steal a victim maker fill.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestCollidingUserID8CannotReceiveMakerProceeds is the headline theft PoC. A
// victim deposits and rests a custody maker. An attacker shares the victim's 8-byte
// matcher handle (differs in bytes 8..15). The attacker's orderuser: mapping is then
// hidden (modeling the attacker forcing settlement onto the bare 8-byte handle), and
// the attacker tries to cross/claim the victim's resting fill. The cross MUST abort
// ErrMissingSettlementUser: NO attacker credit, NO victim debit, conservation holds.
// (The ownership axis of this exact class — that the colliding attacker is never an
// explicit party to the fill — is pinned in
// TestOwnershipInvariant_CollidingAttackerIsNotAParty.)
//
// MUTATION: if settlement fell back to the 8-byte handle, the colliding attacker
// would resolve to the victim's handle and the value would mis-route — this test
// goes RED, exactly as required.
func TestCollidingUserID8CannotReceiveMakerProceeds(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
victim, attacker := twoUsersSharingUserID8()
// Sanity: the two users DO collide on the 8-byte matcher handle but are distinct
// full accounts (the precondition for the exploit class).
if userKey16(victim) == userKey16(attacker) {
t.Fatal("test setup invalid: victim/attacker are the same full account")
}
pool := [32]byte{0xae, 0x01}
// Victim deposits 100 LUX and rests a SELL of 10 LUX @ 5 (locks 10 LUX). Taker
// (the attacker, sharing the handle) is funded with quote to attempt the cross.
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, victim, assetLUX, 100),
depositTx(t, attacker, assetLUSD, 1000),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
blk := addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, victim))
victimOrderID := blockDeterministicID(blk.height, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, victim, assetLUX, 90, 10)
// Build the attacker's crossing buy (probe succeeds), then HIDE the victim's
// orderuser mapping (the attack: force settlement onto the bare 8-byte handle),
// then Verify as a validator would.
vm.mempool.Add(submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, attacker))
built, err := vm.BuildBlock(ctx)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("BuildBlock: %v", err)
}
deleteOrderUserRow(t, vm, pool, victimOrderID)
reparsed, _ := vm.ParseBlock(ctx, built.Bytes())
if err := reparsed.Verify(ctx); !errors.Is(err, ErrMissingSettlementUser) {
t.Fatalf("colliding-handle cross Verify err = %v, want ErrMissingSettlementUser (THEFT: attacker would settle the victim's fill)", err)
}
// CONSERVATION + no theft: victim keeps its locked LUX, attacker keeps its quote.
assertBalance(t, vm, victim, assetLUX, 90, 10)
assertBalance(t, vm, victim, assetLUSD, 0, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, attacker, assetLUSD, 1000, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, attacker, assetLUX, 0, 0)
// Global LUX conserved (100 deposited == 90 available + 10 locked, all victim's;
// attacker holds zero LUX in either bucket).
vAvail, vLocked := mustBalance(t, vm, victim, assetLUX)
aAvail, aLocked := mustBalance(t, vm, attacker, assetLUX)
if got := vAvail + vLocked + aAvail + aLocked; got != 100 {
t.Fatalf("LUX conservation violated after aborted theft: %d want 100", got)
}
}
// mustBalance reads (available, locked) for (user, asset), failing the test on a
// ledger read error.
func mustBalance(t *testing.T, vm *VM, user string, asset [32]byte) (uint64, uint64) {
t.Helper()
avail, locked, err := vm.Balance(user, asset)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Balance(%s): %v", user, err)
}
return avail, locked
}
// TestCollidingUserID8CannotWithdrawVictimFunds is the withdraw axis of the
// exploit: the victim's funds live in the ledger keyed by the FULL 16-byte account
// (the wallet / AccountID). The attacker, sharing only the 8-byte matcher handle,
// withdraws — and gets NOTHING from the victim's balance, because the ledger never
// keys by the handle. This proves the balance ledger (not just settlement) is
// collision-safe.
func TestCollidingUserID8CannotWithdrawVictimFunds(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
victim, attacker := twoUsersSharingUserID8()
pool := [32]byte{0xad, 0x01}
// Victim deposits 100 LUX and locks 10 in a resting sell; 90 stays available.
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, victim, assetLUX, 100),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, victim))
assertBalance(t, vm, victim, assetLUX, 90, 10)
// Attacker has deposited nothing.
assertBalance(t, vm, attacker, assetLUX, 0, 0)
// Attacker tries to withdraw 90 LUX (the victim's available). The ledger keys by
// the FULL 16-byte attacker account, which has zero balance -> realized 0.
_, wo := addBlockOutcomes(t, vm, withdrawTx(t, attacker, assetLUX, 90))
var attackerRealized uint64
for _, oc := range wo {
if oc.typ == TxWithdraw {
attackerRealized = oc.orderID
}
}
if attackerRealized != 0 {
t.Fatalf("attacker withdrew %d LUX from a colliding handle, want 0 (THEFT via the matcher handle)", attackerRealized)
}
// Victim's balance is untouched.
assertBalance(t, vm, victim, assetLUX, 90, 10)
assertBalance(t, vm, attacker, assetLUX, 0, 0)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 8. Every resting book order has an orderuser mapping after a restart.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestEveryBookOrderHasOrderUserMappingAfterRestart proves the boot-time
// settlement-identity audit: after a restart over a healthy custody chain, EVERY
// resting order on EVERY custody market has an orderuser: row, and Initialize
// succeeds. The negative half — a missing row makes Initialize FAIL — is pinned in
// TestRestartRefusesBootWhenOrderUserMissing.
func TestEveryBookOrderHasOrderUserMappingAfterRestart(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
db := memdb.New()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, db)
const m1, m2, taker = "rest-m1", "rest-m2", "rest-tk"
pool := [32]byte{0xeb, 0x01}
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, m1, assetLUX, 100),
depositTx(t, m2, assetLUX, 100),
depositTx(t, taker, assetLUSD, 1000),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
// Two resting makers on the custody market.
addBlock(t, vm,
placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, m1),
placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 6.0, 12.0, m2),
)
vm.Shutdown(ctx)
// Restart: the boot audit (assertOrderUserCoverage) runs inside Initialize.
vm2, _ := newTestVM(t, db)
defer vm2.Shutdown(ctx)
// Every resting order on the market has an orderuser row.
vm2.mu.Lock()
ob := vm2.books[pool]
vm2.mu.Unlock()
if ob == nil {
t.Fatal("market book did not rebuild on restart")
}
if len(ob.Orders) != 2 {
t.Fatalf("rebuilt book has %d resting orders, want 2", len(ob.Orders))
}
for _, o := range ob.Orders {
if !hasOrderUserRow(t, vm2, pool, o.ID) {
t.Fatalf("resting order %d has NO orderuser row after restart", o.ID)
}
}
}
// TestMultiPlaceInBlockKeysOrderUserByMatcherIndex proves the per-order reserve and
// identity rows key under the EXACT order id the matcher assigns — the index is
// threaded from execute's loop (not recovered by scanning the block for the tx
// pointer). Two maker PLACEs in ONE block land at txIndex 0 and 1; each rests under
// blockDeterministicID(height, its-own-index) with a matching orderuser: row, and
// each is independently crossable to its OWN account. (A pointer-scan id recovery
// could mis-resolve the second place's index to the first, keying its identity row
// under the wrong order id and tripping ErrMissingSettlementUser at fill time.)
func TestMultiPlaceInBlockKeysOrderUserByMatcherIndex(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const m1, m2, taker = "mp-m1", "mp-m2", "mp-tk"
pool := [32]byte{0x37, 0x01}
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, m1, assetLUX, 100),
depositTx(t, m2, assetLUX, 100),
depositTx(t, taker, assetLUSD, 1000),
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
// Two places in ONE block: m1 at txIndex 0, m2 at txIndex 1.
blk := addBlock(t, vm,
placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 5.0, 10.0, m1),
placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideSell, 7.0, 8.0, m2),
)
id0 := blockDeterministicID(blk.height, 0)
id1 := blockDeterministicID(blk.height, 1)
// Each resting order's orderuser row is keyed under its OWN matcher index and
// names its OWN full account.
vm.mu.Lock()
u0, ok0, _ := getOrderUser(vm.db, pool, id0)
u1, ok1, _ := getOrderUser(vm.db, pool, id1)
vm.mu.Unlock()
if !ok0 || u0 != userKey16(m1) {
t.Fatalf("order %d (txIndex 0) orderuser = %x ok=%v, want m1 %x", id0, u0, ok0, userKey16(m1))
}
if !ok1 || u1 != userKey16(m2) {
t.Fatalf("order %d (txIndex 1) orderuser = %x ok=%v, want m2 %x", id1, u1, ok1, userKey16(m2))
}
// Cross m1's order (sell 10@5): taker buys 10@5 -> m1 receives 50 LUSD.
addBlock(t, vm, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, taker))
assertBalance(t, vm, m1, assetLUSD, 50, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm, m1, assetLUX, 90, 0)
// m2 untouched (its order still rests, 8 LUX locked).
assertBalance(t, vm, m2, assetLUX, 92, 8)
assertBalance(t, vm, m2, assetLUSD, 0, 0)
}
// TestRestartRequiresOrderUserForEveryRestingOrder is the NEGATIVE half of the boot
// audit: if a resting order on a custody market lacks its orderuser: row, a restart
// (Initialize) FAILS rather than booting onto a degraded 8-byte settlement path.
// The POSITIVE half — every resting order DOES have a row after a healthy restart —
// is TestEveryBookOrderHasOrderUserMappingAfterRestart.
func TestRestartRequiresOrderUserForEveryRestingOrder(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
db := memdb.New()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, db)
const maker, taker = "boot-mk", "boot-tk"
pool := [32]byte{0xbf, 0x01}
makerOrderID := fundOpenAndRestMaker(t, vm, pool, maker, taker, 100, 1000, 5.0, 10.0)
vm.Shutdown(ctx)
// Corrupt the durable state: drop the resting order's orderuser row while its
// book row survives.
if err := db.Delete(orderUserKey(pool, makerOrderID)); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("delete orderuser row: %v", err)
}
// A restart must REFUSE to boot.
toEngine := make(chan block.Message, 16)
vm2 := &VM{}
err := vm2.Initialize(ctx, block.Init{DB: db, Log: log.NewNoOpLogger(), ToEngine: toEngine})
if !errors.Is(err, ErrMissingSettlementUser) {
t.Fatalf("Initialize over corrupt custody state err = %v, want ErrMissingSettlementUser (must refuse to boot on a degraded settlement path)", err)
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 9. A sub-dust BUY never rests, so it never creates a zero-lock resting order
// with no settlement identity.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestSubDustBuyCannotRestWithoutOrderUser ties the zero-notional reject to the
// settlement-identity invariant: a BUY whose notional floors to zero lock (a
// sub-tick price) is REJECTED at placement, so it NEVER rests — and therefore can
// never become a resting book order that lacks a non-zero lock AND an orderuser:
// row (the degraded path settlement must never hit). This is the structural reason
// "every resting custody order carries a lock + identity" stays total: an order
// that cannot lock cannot rest, so it cannot be a resting order missing its
// identity. (Mutation: allowing a zero-lock BUY to rest would create exactly such
// an identity-less resting order; this test goes RED.)
func TestSubDustBuyCannotRestWithoutOrderUser(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
const buyer = "subdust-buyer"
pool := [32]byte{0x5d, 0x05}
addBlock(t, vm,
depositTx(t, buyer, assetLUSD, 1_000_000), // funded -> the reject is the notional floor, not affordability
openMarketTx(t, pool, assetLUX, assetLUSD),
)
// A sub-tick BUY (price 5e-9 < 1 tick, size 10) floors ceil(size*price) to 0.
blk := addBlock(t, vm, placePoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, dustPrice, 10.0, buyer))
orderID := blockDeterministicID(blk.height, 0)
// It did NOT rest: no book order, no per-order lock, and crucially NO orderuser
// identity row (the order never reached the book, so it has no settlement
// identity to be missing).
if orders, _, _, _, _ := vm.BookDepth(pool); orders != 0 {
t.Fatalf("sub-dust BUY rested: book has %d orders, want 0", orders)
}
if hasOrderUserRow(t, vm, pool, orderID) {
t.Fatal("sub-dust BUY created an orderuser row for an order that never rested")
}
vm.mu.Lock()
_, lockedAmt, lockOK, lerr := getOrderLock(vm.db, pool, orderID)
vm.mu.Unlock()
if lerr != nil {
t.Fatalf("getOrderLock: %v", lerr)
}
if lockOK || lockedAmt != 0 {
t.Fatalf("sub-dust BUY held a lock: ok=%v amt=%d, want none", lockOK, lockedAmt)
}
// The buyer's quote is fully available — nothing reserved.
assertBalance(t, vm, buyer, assetLUSD, 1_000_000, 0)
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 10. The settlement identity is exactly the full wire-user width.
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestSettlementIdentityWidthEnforced pins that the settlement identity (the
// wallet / AccountID the ledger keys value by) is the FULL 16-byte wire user
// (zapwire.UserSize), NOT the matcher's 8-byte STP handle. It asserts: (a) the
// userKey type is 16 bytes; (b) a resting order's persisted orderuser: row is
// exactly 16 bytes and equals the full wire user; (c) two accounts sharing the
// leading 8 bytes resolve to DISTINCT 16-byte identities (so a handle collision is
// not an identity collision). Width is the load-bearing property: a fold to 8
// bytes is what would make the matcher handle value-bearing.
func TestSettlementIdentityWidthEnforced(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, memdb.New())
defer vm.Shutdown(ctx)
// (a) The settlement identity type is the full wire width.
if got := len(userKey{}); got != zapwire.UserSize {
t.Fatalf("settlement identity width = %d, want zapwire.UserSize (%d)", got, zapwire.UserSize)
}
if zapwire.UserSize != 16 {
t.Fatalf("zapwire.UserSize = %d, want 16 (the settlement identity must be 16 bytes, not the 8-byte handle)", zapwire.UserSize)
}
// (b) A resting order persists its identity at full 16-byte width.
victim, attacker := twoUsersSharingUserID8()
pool := [32]byte{0x1d, 0x77}
makerOrderID := fundOpenAndRestMaker(t, vm, pool, victim, "tk-width", 100, 1000, 5.0, 10.0)
vm.mu.Lock()
raw, rerr := vm.db.Get(orderUserKey(pool, makerOrderID))
gotUser, ok, gerr := getOrderUser(vm.db, pool, makerOrderID)
vm.mu.Unlock()
if rerr != nil || gerr != nil || !ok {
t.Fatalf("orderuser read: raw_err=%v get_err=%v ok=%v", rerr, gerr, ok)
}
if len(raw) != zapwire.UserSize {
t.Fatalf("persisted orderuser row width = %d, want %d (settlement identity must be stored full-width)", len(raw), zapwire.UserSize)
}
if gotUser != userKey16(victim) {
t.Fatalf("orderuser = %x, want full 16-byte victim %x", gotUser, userKey16(victim))
}
// (c) Two accounts sharing the leading 8 bytes are DISTINCT 16-byte identities.
if userKey16(victim) == userKey16(attacker) {
t.Fatal("colliding-handle accounts resolved to the SAME 16-byte identity (width fold lost bytes 8..15)")
}
// And their leading 8 bytes DO match (the precondition: the collision is at the
// handle, not the identity).
v16, a16 := userKey16(victim), userKey16(attacker)
if string(v16[:8]) != string(a16[:8]) {
t.Fatal("test setup invalid: the two accounts do not share the 8-byte matcher handle")
}
if string(v16[8:]) == string(a16[8:]) {
t.Fatal("test setup invalid: the two accounts do not differ in bytes 8..15")
}
}
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// 11. MUTATION: rebuilding a maker from the 8-byte handle after restart breaks
// settlement (the identity must come from the full-width orderuser: row).
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// TestRestartRebuildsMakerFromFullIdentityNotUserID8 is the explicit mutation pin
// for the restart path: a maker that rests with a full 16-byte wallet, survives a
// VM restart (its in-RAM order is rebuilt from the GPU row carrying only 8 user
// bytes), and is then crossed, MUST credit the FULL 16-byte account — resolved
// from the orderuser: row, NOT the rebuilt order's 8-byte handle. The maker's
// bytes 8..15 are non-zero, so an 8-byte-fold rebuild would credit a DIFFERENT
// account and this test goes RED. (This is the named restart-axis companion to
// TestRestingOrderAfterRestartKeepsFullUser16.)
func TestRestartRebuildsMakerFromFullIdentityNotUserID8(t *testing.T) {
ctx := context.Background()
db := memdb.New()
vm, _ := newTestVM(t, db)
// A maker wallet with significant bytes 8..15 (an 8-byte fold would lose them).
maker := string([]byte{0xA1, 0xA2, 0xA3, 0xA4, 0xA5, 0xA6, 0xA7, 0xA8, 0xB1, 0xB2, 0xB3, 0xB4, 0xB5, 0xB6, 0xB7, 0xB8})
const taker = "tk-rebuild"
pool := [32]byte{0x2b, 0x11}
fundOpenAndRestMaker(t, vm, pool, maker, taker, 100, 1000, 5.0, 10.0)
vm.Shutdown(ctx)
// Restart over the SAME db: the book is rebuilt from the durable order:* rows
// (whose UserID is only 8 bytes); the settlement identity must still come from
// the full-width orderuser: row.
vm2, _ := newTestVM(t, db)
defer vm2.Shutdown(ctx)
// Cross the rebuilt maker; ownership must hold (only the full-id maker and the
// taker change value), and the maker's FULL account is credited.
own := newOwnershipChecker(t, vm2)
blk := addBlock(t, vm2, submitPoolTx(t, pool, zapwire.SideBuy, false, 5.0, 10.0, taker))
own.assert(t, vm2, blk, "restart-rebuild-cross")
assertBalance(t, vm2, maker, assetLUX, 90, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm2, maker, assetLUSD, 50, 0)
// The 8-byte-folded would-be account (bytes 8..15 zeroed) got NOTHING.
folded := string([]byte{0xA1, 0xA2, 0xA3, 0xA4, 0xA5, 0xA6, 0xA7, 0xA8})
assertBalance(t, vm2, folded, assetLUSD, 0, 0)
assertBalance(t, vm2, folded, assetLUX, 0, 0)
}
pkg/dchain/state.go
+180 -55
View File
@@ -51,14 +51,31 @@ const (
// because every unit a fill removes from one account's locked is added to
// another account's available (no float, exact integer units).
//
// balance:<user:8><asset:8> -> uint64 AVAILABLE (deposited, un-escrowed)
// locked:<user:8><asset:8> -> uint64 LOCKED (reserved by live orders)
// asset:<poolID:32> -> base[8]quote[8] market's (base,quote) handles
// orderasset:<poolID:32><orderID:8> -> assetID[8]|amount[8] per-order reserve
prefixBalance = "balance:"
prefixLocked = "locked:"
prefixAsset = "asset:" // market (base,quote) asset binding
prefixOrderLock = "orderasset:" // per-resting-order locked (asset,amount) for unlock on cancel/fill
// balance:<user:16><asset:32> -> uint64 AVAILABLE (deposited, un-escrowed)
// locked:<user:16><asset:32> -> uint64 LOCKED (reserved by live orders)
// asset:<poolID:32> -> base[32]quote[32] market's (base,quote) ids
// orderasset:<poolID:32><orderID:8> -> assetID[32]|amount[8] per-order reserve
// orderuser:<poolID:32><orderID:8> -> user[16] resting order's FULL identity
//
// BOTH halves of a ledger key are kept at FULL injective width:
// - The asset is the FULL 32-byte injective id (zapwire.AssetIDSize), NOT a
// truncated handle: keying a value-bearing ledger by a truncated asset is
// unsound (a token whose id folds to the native key could mint a native
// claim and drain the native vault; two tokens sharing the truncated prefix
// would share balances).
// - The user is the FULL 16-byte injective wire identity (zapwire.UserSize),
// NOT a folded 8-byte handle: keying the ledger by a truncated user is the
// SAME unsoundness on the account axis — two addresses sharing a leading
// 8-byte prefix would share balances, letting one withdraw the other's
// deposit (the cross-user native-drain fix). The matcher's DEXOrder.UserID
// stays an 8-byte STP handle (the frozen GPU ABI); the SETTLEMENT identity
// that the ledger keys by is this full 16-byte user, decomplected from the
// matching handle exactly as pkg/lx/persist.go declares.
prefixBalance = "balance:"
prefixLocked = "locked:"
prefixAsset = "asset:" // market (base,quote) asset binding
prefixOrderLock = "orderasset:" // per-resting-order locked (asset,amount) for unlock on cancel/fill
prefixOrderUser = "orderuser:" // per-resting-order FULL 16-byte settlement identity
metaLastAccepted = prefixMeta + "lastAccepted"
metaHeight = prefixMeta + "height"
@@ -258,15 +275,62 @@ func writeBookWatermark(db database.KeyValueWriter, poolID [32]byte, watermark u
// unit.
// =========================================================================
// balanceLedgerKey builds <prefix><user:8><asset:8>. The user identity is the
// d-chain's 8-byte UserID handle (lx.userToUint64) and the asset is the 8-byte
// asset handle — one consistent identity width across the ledger and the GPU row
// ABI.
func balanceLedgerKey(prefix string, user, asset uint64) []byte {
k := make([]byte, len(prefix)+16)
// userKey is the d-chain's SETTLEMENT identity: the FULL 16-byte wire user
// (zapwire.UserSize), the value the ledger keys an account by. It is DISTINCT from
// the matcher's 8-byte DEXOrder.UserID STP handle — the book row models matching,
// d-chain state models settlement identity (pkg/lx/persist.go). 16 bytes makes the
// account axis birthday-safe (2^64) and, crucially, makes two addresses sharing a
// leading 8-byte prefix DISTINCT accounts so neither can withdraw the other's
// balance.
//
// The settlement identity is the WALLET (AccountID); UserID8 is only a matcher
// hint. The full account identity resolved via orderuser: IS the wallet that bears
// value; the matcher's 8-byte UserID is purely a matching/STP collision hint and
// is NEVER authoritative for settlement (see the AccountID32 migration target on
// userKey16 below).
type userKey = [zapwire.UserSize]byte
// userKey16 renders a user-identity string to the canonical 16-byte ledger
// identity: the leading 16 bytes, zero-padded — byte-identical to the wire's
// user[16] field (zapwire null-padding) so the account the ledger credits is the
// SAME account the orders/deposits name. This is the ONE fold from a user string
// to the settlement identity; there is no 8-byte fold anywhere on the value path.
//
// TODO(accountid32): the settlement identity stays the full 16-byte wire user
// NOW. The target derivation is a domain-separated 32-byte account id:
//
// AccountID32 = H("lux.account.v1", networkID, sourceChainID, addressKind, fullAddressBytes)
// UserID8 = first8(H("lux.matcher.user.v1", AccountID)) // matcher/STP handle
//
// UserID8 may collide (birthday over 2^64) — acceptable ONLY because it is NEVER
// authoritative for value (it is a compact STP handle; settlement resolves through
// orderuser: to the full AccountID). The 16-byte userKey is birthday-safe at 2^64
// for the account axis; AccountID32 widens that to 2^128 and binds the network +
// source chain + address kind so identities are globally unique across chains. Do
// NOT implement the 32-byte form here yet — this records the migration target.
//
// NAMING: the settlement identity IS the wallet (AccountID); UserID8 is only a
// matcher hint. This pass keeps the field name `UserID` (the frozen GPU ABI handle)
// and clarifies the wallet/AccountID framing here in the comment + the AccountID32
// TODO above; the rename to an explicit AccountID field is deferred to the
// AccountID32 migration (a separate roadmap).
func userKey16(user string) userKey {
var k userKey
copy(k[:], user)
return k
}
// balanceLedgerKey builds <prefix><user:16><asset:32>. BOTH the user (the full
// 16-byte injective wire identity, zapwire.UserSize) and the asset (the full
// 32-byte injective asset id, zapwire.AssetIDSize) are kept at full width, so no
// two distinct accounts and no two distinct assets ever collide on a balance key
// (the cross-user native-drain fix on the account axis; the native-vault-drain fix
// on the asset axis).
func balanceLedgerKey(prefix string, user userKey, asset [32]byte) []byte {
k := make([]byte, len(prefix)+len(user)+len(asset))
copy(k, prefix)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(k[len(prefix):], user)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(k[len(prefix)+8:], asset)
copy(k[len(prefix):], user[:])
copy(k[len(prefix)+len(user):], asset[:])
return k
}
@@ -299,18 +363,18 @@ func writeUint64(db database.KeyValueWriterDeleter, key []byte, v uint64) error
}
// getAvailable / getLocked return an account's available / locked balance for an
// asset.
func getAvailable(db database.KeyValueReader, user, asset uint64) (uint64, error) {
// asset (keyed by the full 16-byte user and the full 32-byte asset id).
func getAvailable(db database.KeyValueReader, user userKey, asset [32]byte) (uint64, error) {
return readUint64(db, balanceLedgerKey(prefixBalance, user, asset))
}
func getLocked(db database.KeyValueReader, user, asset uint64) (uint64, error) {
func getLocked(db database.KeyValueReader, user userKey, asset [32]byte) (uint64, error) {
return readUint64(db, balanceLedgerKey(prefixLocked, user, asset))
}
// creditAvailable adds amount to an account's available balance (the deposit
// primitive and the fill-proceeds primitive). Refuses overflow — a credit that
// would wrap uint64 is a corrupt input, never silently truncated.
func creditAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amount uint64) error {
func creditAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user userKey, asset [32]byte, amount uint64) error {
if amount == 0 {
return nil
}
@@ -319,7 +383,7 @@ func creditAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amoun
return err
}
if cur+amount < cur {
return fmt.Errorf("dchain: available credit overflow user=%d asset=%d", user, asset)
return fmt.Errorf("dchain: available credit overflow user=%x asset=%x", user, asset)
}
return writeUint64(db, balanceLedgerKey(prefixBalance, user, asset), cur+amount)
}
@@ -328,7 +392,7 @@ func creditAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amoun
// ErrInsufficientAvailable when the account lacks the balance — the matcher MUST
// debit only AVAILABLE (deposited, un-escrowed) funds, so an over-debit is a
// hard refusal, never an underflow.
func debitAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amount uint64) error {
func debitAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user userKey, asset [32]byte, amount uint64) error {
if amount == 0 {
return nil
}
@@ -337,7 +401,7 @@ func debitAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amount
return err
}
if cur < amount {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: user=%d asset=%d have=%d need=%d", ErrInsufficientAvailable, user, asset, cur, amount)
return fmt.Errorf("%w: user=%x asset=%x have=%d need=%d", ErrInsufficientAvailable, user, asset, cur, amount)
}
return writeUint64(db, balanceLedgerKey(prefixBalance, user, asset), cur-amount)
}
@@ -345,7 +409,7 @@ func debitAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amount
// lockFromAvailable moves amount from available to locked (placing/submitting an
// order reserves the asset it will spend). All-or-nothing: the debit and the
// lock are written together, so a partial lock can never strand value.
func lockFromAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amount uint64) error {
func lockFromAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user userKey, asset [32]byte, amount uint64) error {
if amount == 0 {
return nil
}
@@ -357,7 +421,7 @@ func lockFromAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amo
return err
}
if cur+amount < cur {
return fmt.Errorf("dchain: locked credit overflow user=%d asset=%d", user, asset)
return fmt.Errorf("dchain: locked credit overflow user=%x asset=%x", user, asset)
}
return writeUint64(db, balanceLedgerKey(prefixLocked, user, asset), cur+amount)
}
@@ -365,7 +429,7 @@ func lockFromAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amo
// unlockToAvailable moves amount from locked back to available (cancel, reject,
// or the unspent remainder of a partially-filled order). Refuses to unlock more
// than is locked — that would mint against the ledger.
func unlockToAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amount uint64) error {
func unlockToAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user userKey, asset [32]byte, amount uint64) error {
if amount == 0 {
return nil
}
@@ -374,7 +438,7 @@ func unlockToAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amo
return err
}
if cur < amount {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: unlock user=%d asset=%d locked=%d need=%d", ErrInsufficientLocked, user, asset, cur, amount)
return fmt.Errorf("%w: unlock user=%x asset=%x locked=%d need=%d", ErrInsufficientLocked, user, asset, cur, amount)
}
if err := writeUint64(db, balanceLedgerKey(prefixLocked, user, asset), cur-amount); err != nil {
return err
@@ -388,7 +452,7 @@ func unlockToAvailable(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amo
// (spendLocked from spender + creditAvailable to counterparty) is what conserves
// value across a fill: every unit removed here is added to exactly one other
// account, so sum(available)+sum(locked) is invariant. Refuses spend > locked.
func spendLocked(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amount uint64) error {
func spendLocked(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user userKey, asset [32]byte, amount uint64) error {
if amount == 0 {
return nil
}
@@ -397,7 +461,7 @@ func spendLocked(db database.KeyValueReaderWriterDeleter, user, asset, amount ui
return err
}
if cur < amount {
return fmt.Errorf("%w: spend user=%d asset=%d locked=%d need=%d", ErrInsufficientLocked, user, asset, cur, amount)
return fmt.Errorf("%w: spend user=%x asset=%x locked=%d need=%d", ErrInsufficientLocked, user, asset, cur, amount)
}
return writeUint64(db, balanceLedgerKey(prefixLocked, user, asset), cur-amount)
}
@@ -412,30 +476,34 @@ func assetKey(poolID [32]byte) []byte {
return k
}
// writeMarketAssets binds a market's (base,quote) asset handles (idempotent
// across re-opens with the same pair). The value is base[8]|quote[8].
func writeMarketAssets(db database.KeyValueWriter, poolID [32]byte, base, quote uint64) error {
var v [16]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(v[0:8], base)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(v[8:16], quote)
// writeMarketAssets binds a market's (base,quote) asset ids (idempotent across
// re-opens with the same pair). The value is base[32]|quote[32] — the FULL
// injective ids the ledger keys balance:/locked: by, so an order's locked spend
// names the SAME asset key a deposit credited.
func writeMarketAssets(db database.KeyValueWriter, poolID [32]byte, base, quote [32]byte) error {
var v [64]byte
copy(v[0:32], base[:])
copy(v[32:64], quote[:])
return db.Put(assetKey(poolID), v[:])
}
// readMarketAssets returns a market's (base,quote) handles, ok=false if the
// market's assets were never bound (a market created via the asset-less
// EnsureMarket path — orders on it cannot be balance-checked).
func readMarketAssets(db database.KeyValueReader, poolID [32]byte) (base, quote uint64, ok bool, err error) {
// readMarketAssets returns a market's (base,quote) ids, ok=false if the market's
// assets were never bound (a market created via the asset-less EnsureMarket path
// — orders on it cannot be balance-checked).
func readMarketAssets(db database.KeyValueReader, poolID [32]byte) (base, quote [32]byte, ok bool, err error) {
v, gerr := db.Get(assetKey(poolID))
if gerr == database.ErrNotFound {
return 0, 0, false, nil
return base, quote, false, nil
}
if gerr != nil {
return 0, 0, false, gerr
return base, quote, false, gerr
}
if len(v) != 16 {
return 0, 0, false, fmt.Errorf("dchain: corrupt market assets len=%d", len(v))
if len(v) != 64 {
return base, quote, false, fmt.Errorf("dchain: corrupt market assets len=%d", len(v))
}
return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(v[0:8]), binary.BigEndian.Uint64(v[8:16]), true, nil
copy(base[:], v[0:32])
copy(quote[:], v[32:64])
return base, quote, true, nil
}
// ---- per-order reserve (so cancel/fill can unlock the exact remaining lock) ----
@@ -451,32 +519,89 @@ func orderLockKey(poolID [32]byte, orderID uint64) []byte {
// putOrderLock records the (asset, remaining-locked-amount) a resting order
// holds, so a later cancel or a maker fill knows exactly how much to unlock /
// spend. Deleted when the remaining lock reaches zero.
func putOrderLock(db database.KeyValueWriterDeleter, poolID [32]byte, orderID, asset, amount uint64) error {
// spend. The asset is the FULL 32-byte id; the value is asset[32]|amount[8].
// Deleted when the remaining lock reaches zero.
func putOrderLock(db database.KeyValueWriterDeleter, poolID [32]byte, orderID uint64, asset [32]byte, amount uint64) error {
if amount == 0 {
return db.Delete(orderLockKey(poolID, orderID))
}
var v [16]byte
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(v[0:8], asset)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(v[8:16], amount)
var v [40]byte
copy(v[0:32], asset[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(v[32:40], amount)
return db.Put(orderLockKey(poolID, orderID), v[:])
}
// getOrderLock returns the (asset, remaining-locked-amount) for a resting order,
// ok=false if none recorded (e.g. an order placed before the balance model, or a
// fully-consumed lock).
func getOrderLock(db database.KeyValueReader, poolID [32]byte, orderID uint64) (asset, amount uint64, ok bool, err error) {
func getOrderLock(db database.KeyValueReader, poolID [32]byte, orderID uint64) (asset [32]byte, amount uint64, ok bool, err error) {
v, gerr := db.Get(orderLockKey(poolID, orderID))
if gerr == database.ErrNotFound {
return 0, 0, false, nil
return asset, 0, false, nil
}
if gerr != nil {
return 0, 0, false, gerr
return asset, 0, false, gerr
}
if len(v) != 16 {
return 0, 0, false, fmt.Errorf("dchain: corrupt order lock len=%d", len(v))
if len(v) != 40 {
return asset, 0, false, fmt.Errorf("dchain: corrupt order lock len=%d", len(v))
}
return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(v[0:8]), binary.BigEndian.Uint64(v[8:16]), true, nil
copy(asset[:], v[0:32])
return asset, binary.BigEndian.Uint64(v[32:40]), true, nil
}
// ---- per-order FULL settlement identity (so a fill/cancel credits the resting
// maker's full 16-byte account even after a restart) ----
//
// The matcher's persisted DEXOrder row carries only an 8-byte UserID (the frozen
// GPU ABI / STP handle), so a resting order rebuilt from a row (RowToOrder) loses
// bytes 8..15 of its user. Settlement, however, MUST credit the maker's FULL
// 16-byte account (the one its deposit/lock live under). This row carries that
// full identity in d-chain state, keyed by orderID — orthogonal to the GPU row —
// so a maker fill (live OR post-restart) and a cancel settle to the exact account.
// Written when an order rests (alongside orderasset:), deleted when the reserve is.
// orderUserKey builds orderuser:<poolID:32><orderID:8>.
func orderUserKey(poolID [32]byte, orderID uint64) []byte {
k := make([]byte, len(prefixOrderUser)+32+8)
copy(k, prefixOrderUser)
copy(k[len(prefixOrderUser):], poolID[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(k[len(prefixOrderUser)+32:], orderID)
return k
}
// putOrderUser records a resting order's FULL 16-byte settlement identity, or
// deletes the row when amount-less (called with the order's user on rest, and
// deleted in lockstep with the per-order reserve on cancel/reject/full-fill).
func putOrderUser(db database.KeyValueWriterDeleter, poolID [32]byte, orderID uint64, user userKey) error {
return db.Put(orderUserKey(poolID, orderID), user[:])
}
// deleteOrderUser removes a resting order's settlement-identity row.
func deleteOrderUser(db database.KeyValueWriterDeleter, poolID [32]byte, orderID uint64) error {
return db.Delete(orderUserKey(poolID, orderID))
}
// getOrderUser returns a resting order's FULL 16-byte settlement identity, ok=false
// if none recorded (an asset-less / pre-custody market, or an order placed before
// this row existed). On a CUSTODY (assets-bound) market the settlement callers
// (makerSettleKey, the cancel unlock) FAIL CLOSED with ErrMissingSettlementUser when
// ok=false — there is NO fallback to the matcher's 8-byte handle, because a compact-
// handle fallback would make handle collisions value-bearing (a theft bug). The
// boot audit (assertOrderUserCoverage) guarantees ok=true for every resting custody
// order, so ok=false at settle time is state corruption, not a normal path.
func getOrderUser(db database.KeyValueReader, poolID [32]byte, orderID uint64) (user userKey, ok bool, err error) {
v, gerr := db.Get(orderUserKey(poolID, orderID))
if gerr == database.ErrNotFound {
return user, false, nil
}
if gerr != nil {
return user, false, gerr
}
if len(v) != len(user) {
return user, false, fmt.Errorf("dchain: corrupt order user len=%d", len(v))
}
copy(user[:], v)
return user, true, nil
}
// readMeta helpers.
pkg/dchain/tx.go
+28 -7
View File
@@ -45,16 +45,16 @@ const (
// user[16].
TxSubmit
// TxDeposit credits an account's available balance from value the proxy
// atomically imported. Body = zapwire Deposit payload (32B): user[16] +
// asset[8] + amount[8].
// atomically imported. Body = zapwire Deposit payload (88B): user[16] +
// asset[32] + amount[8] + ref[32].
TxDeposit
// TxWithdraw debits an account's realized available balance for the proxy to
// atomically export. Body = zapwire Withdraw payload (32B): user[16] +
// asset[8] + amount[8] (clamped to available).
// atomically export. Body = zapwire Withdraw payload (88B): user[16] +
// asset[32] + amount[8] + ref[32] (clamped to available).
TxWithdraw
// TxOpenMarket binds a market's (base,quote) asset handles so orders on it can
// be value-checked. Body = zapwire OpenMarket payload (48B): poolId[32] +
// baseAsset[8] + quoteAsset[8].
// TxOpenMarket binds a market's (base,quote) asset ids so orders on it can be
// value-checked. Body = zapwire OpenMarket payload (96B): poolId[32] +
// baseAsset[32] + quoteAsset[32].
TxOpenMarket
)
@@ -103,6 +103,27 @@ var (
// ErrFillUnitsOverflow: a fill's integer units exceed uint64 — refused rather
// than truncated into a mint/burn.
ErrFillUnitsOverflow = errors.New("dchain: fill units exceed uint64")
// ErrMissingSettlementUser: a fill/cancel reached settlement for a resting order
// that has NO orderuser: row — its full 16-byte settlement identity is
// unavailable. This is a STATE-CORRUPTION error, NOT a deterministic per-tx
// reject: it aborts block execution (every validator reads the identical overlay
// state, so the row is missing on all of them — the abort is consensus-neutral),
// the block/tx is REJECTED with NO partial settlement and NO balance mutation.
//
// Settlement fails closed if full account identity is unavailable. Falling back
// to matcher UserID would make compact-handle collisions value-bearing — a critical theft bug.
ErrMissingSettlementUser = errors.New("dchain: resting order missing full settlement identity (orderuser)")
// ErrDustPriceOrZeroLock: an EXECUTABLE order (qty>0, and for a limit a price>0)
// whose REQUIRED LOCK floors to zero under the market's integer notional —
// a BUY whose ceil(size*price) quote rounds to 0 (a sub-tick price), or a SELL
// whose base size truncates to 0. Such an order is REJECTED at placement: a
// zero-lock executable order is the "free executable order" hazard — it could
// rest or cross while reserving NOTHING, letting arithmetic flooring acquire the
// counterparty's asset for no spend. This is a DETERMINISTIC per-tx reject (the
// notional floor is a pure function of the frozen wire fields, so every validator
// rejects identically) — NOT a block abort.
ErrDustPriceOrZeroLock = errors.New("dchain: executable order floors to zero lock (dust price / zero notional)")
)
// Tx is a parsed DEX transaction: the type discriminant plus the raw zapwire body
pkg/dchain/vm.go
+58 -4
View File
@@ -178,6 +178,16 @@ func (vm *VM) loadHead() error {
// restart path: after a crash the in-RAM books are reconstructed exactly from the
// durable resting set, so trading resumes with the committed state. Must be
// called under vm.mu.
//
// SETTLEMENT-IDENTITY BOOT ASSERTION: for every market whose (base,quote) assets
// are bound (a CUSTODY market that locks/settles value), every resting order MUST
// have an orderuser: mapping to its full 16-byte settlement identity. An order
// reaching this point on a custody market always has one (lockOrderSpend persists
// orderuser: BEFORE the order is matchable, and a custody order with no lock is
// rejected), so a missing row is state corruption: FAIL BOOT rather than continue
// on a degraded 8-byte path where a maker fill/cancel could only fall back to the
// compact handle. (Asset-less / pre-custody markets never lock or settle value, so
// their orders legitimately carry no orderuser: row and are not asserted.)
func (vm *VM) rebuildAllBooks() error {
it := vm.db.NewIteratorWithPrefix([]byte(prefixMarket))
defer it.Release()
@@ -193,11 +203,44 @@ func (vm *VM) rebuildAllBooks() error {
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dchain: rebuild book %x: %w", poolID[:8], err)
}
if err := vm.assertOrderUserCoverage(poolID, ob); err != nil {
return err
}
vm.books[poolID] = ob
}
return it.Error()
}
// assertOrderUserCoverage enforces the settlement-identity boot invariant for one
// market: if the market's assets are bound (custody market), every resting order
// in the rebuilt book MUST have an orderuser: row. A missing row on a custody
// market is unrecoverable state corruption (a maker fill/cancel could not resolve
// the full account) — return an error so Initialize FAILS rather than booting a VM
// that would settle on the degraded 8-byte handle. Asset-less markets are skipped:
// they never lock or settle value, so their orders carry no orderuser: row by
// design. Must be called under vm.mu.
func (vm *VM) assertOrderUserCoverage(poolID [32]byte, ob *lx.OrderBook) error {
_, _, assetsBound, err := readMarketAssets(vm.db, poolID)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dchain: read market %x assets for orderuser audit: %w", poolID[:8], err)
}
if !assetsBound {
return nil // asset-less / pre-custody market: no settlement, no orderuser invariant
}
for _, o := range ob.Orders {
if o == nil {
continue
}
if _, ok, gerr := getOrderUser(vm.db, poolID, o.ID); gerr != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("dchain: orderuser audit market %x order %d: %w", poolID[:8], o.ID, gerr)
} else if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("dchain: %w: resting order %d on custody market %x has no orderuser row at boot (refusing to start on a degraded settlement path)",
ErrMissingSettlementUser, o.ID, poolID[:8])
}
}
return nil
}
// BookDepth reports the authoritative resting-book state for a market: the count
// of resting orders, their total remaining size, and the best bid/ask. It reads
// the in-RAM book (a fold of the committed order:* rows) under the VM lock —
@@ -233,12 +276,13 @@ func (vm *VM) BookDepth(poolID [32]byte) (orders int, remaining, bestBid, bestAs
// orders) amount, both in atomic asset units. It reads the durable ledger under
// the VM lock — the authoritative committed state, not the in-RAM book — so a
// caller (the proxy's withdraw leg, the venue daemon, tests) observes exactly
// what consensus settled. user is the identity string; it is folded to the 8-byte
// ledger handle internally.
func (vm *VM) Balance(user string, asset uint64) (available, locked uint64, err error) {
// what consensus settled. user is the identity string; it is rendered to the FULL
// 16-byte ledger identity internally (no 8-byte fold). asset is the FULL 32-byte
// injective asset id.
func (vm *VM) Balance(user string, asset [32]byte) (available, locked uint64, err error) {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
uid := userID8(user)
uid := userKey16(user)
if available, err = getAvailable(vm.db, uid, asset); err != nil {
return 0, 0, err
}
@@ -332,6 +376,16 @@ func (vm *VM) LastAccepted(ctx context.Context) (ids.ID, error) {
return vm.lastAcceptedID, nil
}
// inFlightHeight returns the height of the single block that could currently be in
// flight on this linear-chain proposer: lastAcceptedHeight+1. submitTx stamps a
// tombstone with it (R4) so gcTombstones can reclaim the tombstone once that height
// is accepted. Read under vm.mu to avoid a race with Accept's height advance.
func (vm *VM) inFlightHeight() uint64 {
vm.mu.Lock()
defer vm.mu.Unlock()
return vm.lastAcceptedHeight + 1
}
// SetPreference records the block the engine wants the VM to build on. The
// d-chain is linear; the preference always tracks the last accepted block.
func (vm *VM) SetPreference(ctx context.Context, id ids.ID) error {
pkg/dchain/vm_test.go
+8 -1
View File
@@ -92,10 +92,17 @@ func buildVerifyAccept(t *testing.T, vm *VM) *Block {
if err := reparsed.Verify(ctx); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Verify: %v", err)
}
// Snapshot the per-tx outcomes set at Verify so the accepted block retains them
// for test inspection (Accept clears blk.outcomes after resolving waiters). The
// ownership harness reads a submit block's fills from here.
blk := reparsed.(*Block)
snap := make([]txOutcome, len(blk.outcomes))
copy(snap, blk.outcomes)
if err := reparsed.Accept(ctx); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Accept: %v", err)
}
return reparsed.(*Block)
blk.outcomes = snap
return blk
}
// TestVMLifecycle is the step-3 end-to-end proof: Initialize a fresh VM, place
pkg/lx/orderbook_cuda_types.go
+5 -1
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,11 @@ const (
// and we can normalize it to zero after any data path that may leave
// the bytes uninitialised. Same for DEXTrade.
type DEXOrder struct {
OrderID uint64 // 0..8
OrderID uint64 // 0..8
// UserID is a compact matcher/STP handle only. It is intentionally not
// collision-resistant and MUST NOT be used for balances, custody, settlement,
// withdraws, imports, exports, or liability accounting. Settlement identity is
// resolved exclusively through the orderuser index to the full AccountID/userKey.
UserID uint64 // 8..16
Price DEXPrice // 16..32
Quantity uint64 // 32..40
pkg/lx/persist.go
+9 -5
View File
@@ -35,11 +35,15 @@ import (
// user field, used for on-device self-trade prevention). The wire/protocol user
// is a 16-byte field and the book's Order.User is a string; the row folds that to
// the leading 8 bytes (big-endian). This is sufficient for the matcher's STP and
// for rebuilding price-time priority. The CANONICAL 16-byte settlement/dedup
// identity is NOT a property of the order-book row — it lives in d-chain state
// (the idempotency index keyed on user[16]+seq). Keeping the row at the GPU ABI's
// 8-byte user is the decomplected choice: the book row models matching, d-chain
// state models settlement identity.
// for rebuilding price-time priority. The CANONICAL 16-byte settlement identity is
// NOT a property of the order-book row — it lives in d-chain state: the custody
// LEDGER keys balance:/locked: by the full user[16] (so two addresses sharing a
// leading 8-byte prefix are DISTINCT accounts, never able to drain each other),
// the idempotency index keys on user[16]+seq, and orderuser:<orderID> carries each
// resting order's full user[16] so a maker fill credits the right account even
// after a row-rebuilt restart truncated the in-RAM user to 8 bytes. Keeping the
// row at the GPU ABI's 8-byte user is the decomplected choice: the book row models
// matching, d-chain state models settlement identity.
// QuantityScale is the fixed-point scale for the integer base quantity stored in
// a DEXOrder row (Quantity / Remaining). A float64 size s is stored as
pkg/zapwire/zapwire.go
+107 -40
View File
@@ -278,11 +278,47 @@ func DecodeAck(resp []byte) (orderID uint64, status uint8, err error) {
// the same sense — the precompile/proxy/d-chain re-define identical constants —
// just newer.
//
// Asset identity is an 8-byte handle (AssetIDSize). On the EVM side the real
// 20-byte ERC-20 / address(0) currency is folded to this handle by the
// adapter (a stable map); inside the d-chain the handle IS the asset for
// balance keying. 8 bytes matches the d-chain balance-key width and the
// DEXOrder/DEXTrade UserID width — one consistent identity size end to end.
// Asset identity is the FULL 32-byte asset id (AssetIDSize), NOT a truncated
// handle. Keying a value-bearing custody ledger by a truncated id is unsound: a
// truncation maps distinct assets to the same key, so a worthless token whose id
// folds to the native-LUX key could mint a native claim and drain the native
// vault (and two tokens sharing the truncated prefix collide). The id is
// therefore carried and keyed at FULL width, derived by an INJECTIVE map on each
// rail so distinct assets NEVER collide:
// - native LUX = a reserved all-zero id (ids.Empty on the proxy rail);
// - ERC-20 = the 20-byte C-Chain address embedded in 32 bytes (left-pad),
// so two distinct token addresses — or a token vs native — map
// to two distinct ids.
// The d-chain keys balance:/locked: (and the market (base,quote) binding and the
// per-order reserve) by this full 32-byte id. The DEXOrder/DEXTrade matcher rows
// carry NO asset field (they key by user+order id), so widening the asset leaves
// the FROZEN matcher row ABI byte-identical — the asset lives only in the ledger
// keyspace, never on the hot order/trade frames.
//
// IDEMPOTENCY REFERENCE (ref[32]) — the funds-safety field. A deposit (mint)
// and a withdraw (burn + vault release) are IRREVERSIBLE, so "is this the same
// operation?" MUST mean the same thing on BOTH sides of the rail: the EVM
// precompile, which keys replay-idempotency on the executing tx, and the
// d-chain, which content-addresses its dedup index (seen:<txID>) on the FULL
// frame. The custody frames therefore carry a 32-byte ref — the originating
// transaction's identity (EVM txHash on the precompile rail; the consumed
// import / settlement reference on the chains/dexvm atomic rail). Because the
// d-chain txID = Checksum256(type‖body) hashes the WHOLE body, the ref is folded
// into the seen: key automatically: two GENUINELY distinct custody ops (distinct
// originating tx, hence distinct ref) are distinct on the d-chain too — so a
// second genuine withdraw re-clamps to CURRENT available (0 after the first) and
// releases nothing, instead of the seen: index replaying the first realized
// amount against a vault that already paid (the drain). A byte-identical retry of
// ONE op (same ref) still dedups to exactly-once. The ref is ASSET-GENERIC: it is
// opaque 32 bytes that serves the native (address(0)) and ERC-20 rails identically
// — the asset[8] handle distinguishes the currency, the ref distinguishes the op.
//
// The ref is APPENDED at the tail of the custody body, so user[16]/asset[8]/
// amount[8] keep their original offsets (0/16/24) — every existing decode site is
// unchanged; only the body grows by 32 and a new ref read is added. The four
// FROZEN order frames are NOT touched: their sizes, offsets, and codecs are
// byte-identical to before (the matchers byte-match on them), and this block adds
// nothing to them.
const (
// MethodDeposit credits an account's available balance from value the proxy
// atomically imported (shared-memory ImportTx). Funds-IN leg.
@@ -296,88 +332,119 @@ const (
)
const (
// AssetIDSize is the on-wire asset handle width (matches the balance-key and
// DEXOrder.UserID width).
AssetIDSize = 8
// AssetIDSize is the on-wire asset id width: the FULL 32-byte injective asset
// id (NOT a truncated handle). It keys the d-chain balance:/locked: ledger and
// the market (base,quote) binding. See the custody block comment for why a
// truncated key is unsound (native-vault drain via id collision).
AssetIDSize = 32
// DepositReqSize: user[16] + asset[8] + amount[8].
DepositReqSize = UserSize + AssetIDSize + 8 // 32
// RefSize is the on-wire idempotency-reference width: the 32-byte identity of
// the originating transaction (EVM txHash / atomic import reference) that the
// d-chain folds into its content-addressed seen: dedup key. See the custody
// block comment above.
RefSize = 32
// WithdrawReqSize: user[16] + asset[8] + amount[8].
WithdrawReqSize = UserSize + AssetIDSize + 8 // 32
// DepositReqSize: user[16] + asset[32] + amount[8] + ref[32].
DepositReqSize = UserSize + AssetIDSize + 8 + RefSize // 88
// OpenMarketReqSize: poolId[32] + baseAsset[8] + quoteAsset[8].
OpenMarketReqSize = PoolIDSize + AssetIDSize + AssetIDSize // 48
// WithdrawReqSize: user[16] + asset[32] + amount[8] + ref[32].
WithdrawReqSize = UserSize + AssetIDSize + 8 + RefSize // 88
// OpenMarketReqSize: poolId[32] + baseAsset[32] + quoteAsset[32].
OpenMarketReqSize = PoolIDSize + AssetIDSize + AssetIDSize // 96
// BalanceReqSize: user[16] + asset[32]. The read-only balance observation.
BalanceReqSize = UserSize + AssetIDSize // 48
// BalanceRespSize: status[1] + amount[8]. A deposit/withdraw response reports
// the amount actually credited/debited (a withdraw clamps to available, so the
// caller — the proxy export leg — learns the exact realized amount to export).
BalanceRespSize = 1 + 8
// custodyRefOff is the byte offset of ref[32] within a deposit/withdraw body
// (after user[16]+asset[32]+amount[8]).
custodyRefOff = UserSize + AssetIDSize + 8 // 56
// custodyAmountOff is the byte offset of amount[8] within a deposit/withdraw
// body (after user[16]+asset[32]).
custodyAmountOff = UserSize + AssetIDSize // 48
)
// EncodeDeposit builds a deposit request: user[16] + asset[8] + amount[8].
func EncodeDeposit(user string, asset uint64, amount uint64) []byte {
// EncodeDeposit builds a deposit request: user[16] + asset[32] + amount[8] +
// ref[32]. asset is the FULL 32-byte injective asset id (see the custody block
// comment). ref is the originating-tx idempotency reference; it folds into the
// d-chain seen: key via the content-addressed txID.
func EncodeDeposit(user string, asset [32]byte, amount uint64, ref [32]byte) []byte {
out := make([]byte, DepositReqSize)
copy(out[0:UserSize], padNull(user, UserSize))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out[UserSize:UserSize+AssetIDSize], asset)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out[UserSize+AssetIDSize:], amount)
copy(out[UserSize:custodyAmountOff], asset[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out[custodyAmountOff:custodyRefOff], amount)
copy(out[custodyRefOff:custodyRefOff+RefSize], ref[:])
return out
}
// DecodeDeposit parses a deposit request.
func DecodeDeposit(payload []byte) (user string, asset uint64, amount uint64, err error) {
// DecodeDeposit parses a deposit request, returning the full 32-byte asset id and
// the idempotency ref.
func DecodeDeposit(payload []byte) (user string, asset [32]byte, amount uint64, ref [32]byte, err error) {
if len(payload) < DepositReqSize {
err = fmt.Errorf("zapwire: deposit payload too short: %d", len(payload))
return
}
user = string(trimNull(payload[0:UserSize]))
asset = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(payload[UserSize : UserSize+AssetIDSize])
amount = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(payload[UserSize+AssetIDSize : UserSize+AssetIDSize+8])
copy(asset[:], payload[UserSize:custodyAmountOff])
amount = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(payload[custodyAmountOff:custodyRefOff])
copy(ref[:], payload[custodyRefOff:custodyRefOff+RefSize])
return
}
// EncodeWithdraw builds a withdraw request: user[16] + asset[8] + amount[8].
// amount is the requested withdrawal; the d-chain clamps it to the account's
// available balance and reports the realized amount in the response.
func EncodeWithdraw(user string, asset uint64, amount uint64) []byte {
// EncodeWithdraw builds a withdraw request: user[16] + asset[32] + amount[8] +
// ref[32]. asset is the FULL 32-byte injective asset id; amount is the requested
// withdrawal (the d-chain clamps it to available and reports the realized amount
// in the response). ref is the originating-tx idempotency reference.
func EncodeWithdraw(user string, asset [32]byte, amount uint64, ref [32]byte) []byte {
out := make([]byte, WithdrawReqSize)
copy(out[0:UserSize], padNull(user, UserSize))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out[UserSize:UserSize+AssetIDSize], asset)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out[UserSize+AssetIDSize:], amount)
copy(out[UserSize:custodyAmountOff], asset[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out[custodyAmountOff:custodyRefOff], amount)
copy(out[custodyRefOff:custodyRefOff+RefSize], ref[:])
return out
}
// DecodeWithdraw parses a withdraw request.
func DecodeWithdraw(payload []byte) (user string, asset uint64, amount uint64, err error) {
// DecodeWithdraw parses a withdraw request, returning the full 32-byte asset id
// and the idempotency ref.
func DecodeWithdraw(payload []byte) (user string, asset [32]byte, amount uint64, ref [32]byte, err error) {
if len(payload) < WithdrawReqSize {
err = fmt.Errorf("zapwire: withdraw payload too short: %d", len(payload))
return
}
user = string(trimNull(payload[0:UserSize]))
asset = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(payload[UserSize : UserSize+AssetIDSize])
amount = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(payload[UserSize+AssetIDSize : UserSize+AssetIDSize+8])
copy(asset[:], payload[UserSize:custodyAmountOff])
amount = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(payload[custodyAmountOff:custodyRefOff])
copy(ref[:], payload[custodyRefOff:custodyRefOff+RefSize])
return
}
// EncodeOpenMarket builds an open-market request: poolId[32] + baseAsset[8] +
// quoteAsset[8].
func EncodeOpenMarket(poolID [32]byte, baseAsset, quoteAsset uint64) []byte {
// EncodeOpenMarket builds an open-market request: poolId[32] + baseAsset[32] +
// quoteAsset[32]. The assets are the FULL 32-byte injective ids the d-chain keys
// the ledger by, so an order's locked spend names the SAME asset key a deposit
// credited.
func EncodeOpenMarket(poolID [32]byte, baseAsset, quoteAsset [32]byte) []byte {
out := make([]byte, OpenMarketReqSize)
copy(out[0:PoolIDSize], poolID[:])
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out[PoolIDSize:PoolIDSize+AssetIDSize], baseAsset)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(out[PoolIDSize+AssetIDSize:], quoteAsset)
copy(out[PoolIDSize:PoolIDSize+AssetIDSize], baseAsset[:])
copy(out[PoolIDSize+AssetIDSize:], quoteAsset[:])
return out
}
// DecodeOpenMarket parses an open-market request.
func DecodeOpenMarket(payload []byte) (poolID [32]byte, baseAsset, quoteAsset uint64, err error) {
func DecodeOpenMarket(payload []byte) (poolID [32]byte, baseAsset, quoteAsset [32]byte, err error) {
if len(payload) < OpenMarketReqSize {
err = fmt.Errorf("zapwire: open-market payload too short: %d", len(payload))
return
}
copy(poolID[:], payload[0:PoolIDSize])
baseAsset = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(payload[PoolIDSize : PoolIDSize+AssetIDSize])
quoteAsset = binary.BigEndian.Uint64(payload[PoolIDSize+AssetIDSize : PoolIDSize+2*AssetIDSize])
copy(baseAsset[:], payload[PoolIDSize:PoolIDSize+AssetIDSize])
copy(quoteAsset[:], payload[PoolIDSize+AssetIDSize:PoolIDSize+2*AssetIDSize])
return
}
pkg/zapwire/zapwire_test.go
+56 -20
View File
@@ -26,12 +26,19 @@ func TestFrameSizesFrozen(t *testing.T) {
{"AckSize", AckSize, 24},
{"FillWireSize", FillWireSize, 17},
// Custody frames (additive, FROZEN). The chains/dexvm proxy re-defines
// these as DepositReqSize/WithdrawReqSize/BalanceRespSize (32/32/9) and the
// these as DepositReqSize/WithdrawReqSize/BalanceRespSize (88/88/9) and the
// precompile mirrors them; a change here breaks that cross-module parity.
{"AssetIDSize", AssetIDSize, 8},
{"DepositReqSize", DepositReqSize, 32},
{"WithdrawReqSize", WithdrawReqSize, 32},
{"OpenMarketReqSize", OpenMarketReqSize, 48},
// Deposit/Withdraw carry the FULL 32-byte injective asset id and the 32-byte
// idempotency ref (user[16]+asset[32]+amount[8]+ref[32]=88); the asset is the
// full id (NOT a truncated handle) so distinct assets never collide on the
// ledger key (the native-vault-drain fix); the ref unifies the EVM-txHash
// idempotency identity with the d-chain content-addressed seen: key.
{"AssetIDSize", AssetIDSize, 32},
{"RefSize", RefSize, 32},
{"DepositReqSize", DepositReqSize, 88},
{"WithdrawReqSize", WithdrawReqSize, 88},
{"OpenMarketReqSize", OpenMarketReqSize, 96},
{"BalanceReqSize", BalanceReqSize, 48},
{"BalanceRespSize", BalanceRespSize, 9},
}
for _, c := range cases {
@@ -60,32 +67,61 @@ func TestMethodNamesFrozen(t *testing.T) {
// TestCustodyFramesRoundTrip pins the custody frame codecs (deposit/withdraw/
// open-market/balance-resp) round-trip exactly — the bytes the proxy's atomic
// rail and the d-chain ledger exchange.
// rail and the d-chain ledger exchange. The 32-byte idempotency ref MUST survive
// the round-trip: it is the field the d-chain folds into its seen: dedup key, so
// a lost/garbled ref would reopen the vault-drain replay window.
func TestCustodyFramesRoundTrip(t *testing.T) {
// deposit / withdraw
// deposit / withdraw — asset is the FULL 32-byte injective id.
mkAsset := func(b ...byte) [32]byte { var a [32]byte; copy(a[:], b); return a }
for _, tc := range []struct {
user string
asset uint64
asset [32]byte
amount uint64
ref [32]byte
}{
{"maker-a", 0x4c5558_00000001, 100},
{"taker-x", 0xdeadbeefcafef00d, 1<<63 + 7},
{"", 0, 0},
{"maker-a", mkAsset(0x4c, 0x55, 0x58, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01), 100, [32]byte{0x01, 0x02, 0xff}},
{"taker-x", mkAsset(0xde, 0xad, 0xbe, 0xef, 0xca, 0xfe, 0xf0, 0x0d), 1<<63 + 7, [32]byte{0xaa, 0xbb, 0xcc, 0xdd, 0xee}},
// Full-width id whose distinguishing bytes live in the LOW 24 bytes — a
// truncated 8-byte handle would lose them; the full id must survive intact.
{"deep-id", mkAsset(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef), 42, [32]byte{0x09}},
{"", [32]byte{}, 0, [32]byte{}},
} {
du, da, dm, err := DecodeDeposit(EncodeDeposit(tc.user, tc.asset, tc.amount))
if err != nil || du != tc.user || da != tc.asset || dm != tc.amount {
t.Fatalf("deposit round-trip (%q,%#x,%d) = (%q,%#x,%d) err=%v", tc.user, tc.asset, tc.amount, du, da, dm, err)
du, da, dm, dref, err := DecodeDeposit(EncodeDeposit(tc.user, tc.asset, tc.amount, tc.ref))
if err != nil || du != tc.user || da != tc.asset || dm != tc.amount || dref != tc.ref {
t.Fatalf("deposit round-trip (%q,%x,%d,%x) = (%q,%x,%d,%x) err=%v", tc.user, tc.asset[:8], tc.amount, tc.ref[:4], du, da[:8], dm, dref[:4], err)
}
wu, wa, wm, werr := DecodeWithdraw(EncodeWithdraw(tc.user, tc.asset, tc.amount))
if werr != nil || wu != tc.user || wa != tc.asset || wm != tc.amount {
t.Fatalf("withdraw round-trip (%q,%#x,%d) = (%q,%#x,%d) err=%v", tc.user, tc.asset, tc.amount, wu, wa, wm, werr)
wu, wa, wm, wref, werr := DecodeWithdraw(EncodeWithdraw(tc.user, tc.asset, tc.amount, tc.ref))
if werr != nil || wu != tc.user || wa != tc.asset || wm != tc.amount || wref != tc.ref {
t.Fatalf("withdraw round-trip (%q,%x,%d,%x) = (%q,%x,%d,%x) err=%v", tc.user, tc.asset[:8], tc.amount, tc.ref[:4], wu, wa[:8], wm, wref[:4], werr)
}
}
// COLLISION RESISTANCE (the asset-key fix): two assets that share their leading
// 8 bytes but differ in the LOW 24 bytes MUST encode to distinct asset fields.
// The old 8-byte handle truncated them to the SAME key (the collision bug); the
// full 32-byte id keeps them distinct on the wire (and so on the ledger key).
sharedHi := mkAsset(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x11) // low byte 0x11
sharedHiAlt := mkAsset(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0x22)
_, a1, _, _, _ := DecodeDeposit(EncodeDeposit("u", sharedHi, 1, [32]byte{0x01}))
_, a2, _, _, _ := DecodeDeposit(EncodeDeposit("u", sharedHiAlt, 1, [32]byte{0x01}))
if a1 == a2 {
t.Fatal("two assets sharing leading 8 bytes decoded to the SAME id — truncation collision (native-vault-drain class)")
}
// The ref MUST change the encoded bytes: two custody frames identical in
// (user,asset,amount) but differing in ref are DIFFERENT bytes — that is the
// whole point (distinct d-chain txID -> distinct seen: key -> no replay).
a := EncodeWithdraw("alice", mkAsset(7), 1000, [32]byte{0x01})
b := EncodeWithdraw("alice", mkAsset(7), 1000, [32]byte{0x02})
if string(a) == string(b) {
t.Fatal("withdraw frames with distinct refs encoded identically — ref does not enter the wire (vault-drain dedup would collide)")
}
// open-market
pool := [32]byte{0xde, 0xad}
op, ob, oq, oerr := DecodeOpenMarket(EncodeOpenMarket(pool, 11, 22))
if oerr != nil || op != pool || ob != 11 || oq != 22 {
t.Fatalf("open-market round-trip = (%x,%d,%d) err=%v", op[:2], ob, oq, oerr)
baseA, quoteA := mkAsset(11), mkAsset(22)
op, ob, oq, oerr := DecodeOpenMarket(EncodeOpenMarket(pool, baseA, quoteA))
if oerr != nil || op != pool || ob != baseA || oq != quoteA {
t.Fatalf("open-market round-trip = (%x,%x,%x) err=%v", op[:2], ob[:2], oq[:2], oerr)
}
// balance-resp
bs, ba, berr := DecodeBalanceResp(EncodeBalanceResp(StatusPlaced, 12345))