mirror of
https://github.com/luxfi/magnetar.git
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tests: e2e + fuzz harnesses for Magnetar threshold-sign
e2e_test.go — end-to-end ceremonies exercising:
- All three Magnetar modes (M192s, M192f, M256s)
- Cross-impl byte-equality against single-party
cloudflare/circl/sign/slhdsa SignDeterministic on the
reconstructed seed (the load-bearing Class N1-analog property)
- Distinct-quorum signature equality (reveal-and-aggregate
quorum-independence)
- Repeat-sign byte-identity (SignDeterministic determinism)
- Large-message + max-context boundary case (1 MB msg, 255-byte
ctx)
- KAT replay determinism (two runs with same deterministic seeds
produce byte-identical DKG pubkey, party share, threshold sig)
fuzz_test.go — race-clean fuzz targets:
FuzzCombineParse_NoPanic — adversarial PartialSig bytes
against a real ceremony fixture
FuzzDKGEnvelope_NoPanic — adversarial Round-1 envelope
share+contribution bytes
FuzzTranscriptHash_NoPanic — arbitrary byte input to
transcriptHash{,32}; fixed-length
output, no OOB reads
FuzzShareDecode_RoundTrip — shareFromBytes/shareToBytes
round-trip on arbitrary input
FuzzVerify_NoPanic — adversarial sig bytes against
magnetar.Verify
All fuzz targets confirmed no-panic at 2-3s fuzztime each; longer
campaigns runnable via `go test -fuzz=Name -fuzztime=30m ...`.
go test -count=1 -timeout 600s ./ref/go/pkg/magnetar/:
ok 106.699s (full suite, including (5,3) + (7,4) configs)
go test -count=1 -race -short -timeout 600s ./ref/go/pkg/magnetar/:
ok 90.175s (race-detector under -short)
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
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// Copyright (C) 2025-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
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// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
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package magnetar
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// e2e_test.go — end-to-end Magnetar threshold-signing scenarios.
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//
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// These tests exercise the FULL protocol path (DKG -> threshold sign
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// -> Verify) under realistic configurations, including:
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//
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// - All three Magnetar parameter modes (M192s, M192f, M256s).
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// - Multiple (n, t) threshold configurations.
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// - Cross-implementation byte-equality against single-party circl
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// SLH-DSA on the reconstructed seed.
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// - Quorum-rotation: signing with two distinct quorums must produce
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// the SAME signature (deterministic SLH-DSA byte-equality).
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// - Long messages + context strings (boundary cases).
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// - Repeat signing: signing the same (m, ctx) twice produces
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// byte-identical output.
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import (
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"bytes"
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"crypto/rand"
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"testing"
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"github.com/cloudflare/circl/sign/slhdsa"
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)
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func TestE2E_AllModes_BasicCeremony(t *testing.T) {
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skipUnderRace(t)
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if testing.Short() {
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t.Skip("skip: -short does not run multi-mode e2e")
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}
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modes := []Mode{ModeM192s, ModeM192f, ModeM256s}
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for _, mode := range modes {
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mode := mode
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t.Run(mode.String(), func(t *testing.T) {
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params := MustParamsFor(mode)
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committee := makeCommittee(3)
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pub, shares, _ := runDKG(t, params, committee, 2)
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msg := []byte("Magnetar e2e " + mode.String())
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sig, err := signWithQuorum(t, params, pub, shares, 2, msg)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("signWithQuorum: %v", err)
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}
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if err := Verify(params, pub, msg, sig); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Verify: %v", err)
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}
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if len(sig.Bytes) != params.SignatureSize {
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t.Fatalf("sig size %d != expected %d", len(sig.Bytes), params.SignatureSize)
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}
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})
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}
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}
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func TestE2E_CrossImpl_ThresholdMatchesCirclSingleParty(t *testing.T) {
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skipUnderRace(t)
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// Run the threshold protocol AND a centralized circl
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// SignDeterministic on the reconstructed seed; assert
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// byte-equality.
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params := MustParamsFor(ModeM192s)
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committee := makeCommittee(3)
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pub, shares, _ := runDKG(t, params, committee, 2)
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msg := []byte("e2e: threshold ≡ centralised circl SignDeterministic")
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var ctx []byte
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thresholdSig, err := signWithQuorum(t, params, pub, shares, 2, msg)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("signWithQuorum: %v", err)
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}
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// Centralized path: reconstruct seed, sk = circl.DeriveKey(seed),
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// sig = circl.SignDeterministic(sk, msg, ctx).
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quorumShares := make([]*KeyShare, 2)
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for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
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quorumShares[i] = shares[i]
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}
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masterSeed := reconstructMasterSeed(t, params, quorumShares, shares)
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scheme := params.ID.Scheme()
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pkCircl, skCircl := scheme.DeriveKey(masterSeed)
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// circl returns sign.PrivateKey / sign.PublicKey interfaces;
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// SignDeterministic takes *slhdsa.PrivateKey concretely. Marshal
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// and re-unmarshal to get the concrete type (the same path
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// Magnetar's own keygen.go uses).
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skBytes, err := skCircl.MarshalBinary()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("skCircl.MarshalBinary: %v", err)
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}
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priv := slhdsa.PrivateKey{ID: params.ID}
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if err := priv.UnmarshalBinary(skBytes); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("priv.UnmarshalBinary: %v", err)
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}
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circlSig, err := slhdsa.SignDeterministic(&priv, slhdsa.NewMessage(msg), ctx)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("circl SignDeterministic: %v", err)
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}
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// Sanity: the circl-derived public key must match the DKG pub.
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pkBytes, err := pkCircl.MarshalBinary()
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("pkCircl.MarshalBinary: %v", err)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(pkBytes, pub.Bytes) {
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t.Fatalf("circl pk does not match DKG pub")
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(thresholdSig.Bytes, circlSig) {
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t.Errorf("threshold and circl signature bytes differ")
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for i := 0; i < len(thresholdSig.Bytes) && i < len(circlSig); i++ {
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if thresholdSig.Bytes[i] != circlSig[i] {
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t.Errorf("first divergent byte at offset %d: threshold=0x%02x circl=0x%02x",
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i, thresholdSig.Bytes[i], circlSig[i])
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break
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}
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}
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t.Fatalf("cross-impl byte-equality violated")
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}
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}
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func TestE2E_DistinctQuorums_SameSignature(t *testing.T) {
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skipUnderRace(t)
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if testing.Short() {
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t.Skip("skip: -short does not run distinct-quorum e2e")
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}
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// Two distinct quorums on the same (msg, ctx) MUST produce the
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// same byte-identical signature (reveal-and-aggregate
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// reconstructs to the same master seed regardless of quorum).
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params := MustParamsFor(ModeM192s)
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committee := makeCommittee(5)
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pub, shares, _ := runDKG(t, params, committee, 3)
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msg := []byte("e2e: distinct quorums must agree on signature")
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sign := func(idxs []int) []byte {
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t.Helper()
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quorumShares := make([]*KeyShare, len(idxs))
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quorum := make([]NodeID, len(idxs))
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for i, j := range idxs {
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quorumShares[i] = shares[j]
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quorum[i] = shares[j].NodeID
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}
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var sid [16]byte
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copy(sid[:], "magnetar-e2e-qrm")
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signers := make([]*ThresholdSigner, len(idxs))
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for i, j := range idxs {
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s, _ := NewThresholdSigner(params, sid, 1, quorum, shares[j], msg,
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newDetReader([]byte{byte(j), 0x5A}))
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signers[i] = s
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}
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r1 := make([]*Round1Message, len(idxs))
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for i, s := range signers {
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r1[i], _ = s.Round1()
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}
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r2 := make([]*Round2Message, len(idxs))
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for i, s := range signers {
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r2[i], _, _ = s.Round2(r1)
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}
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sig, err := Combine(params, pub, msg, nil, false, sid, 1, quorum, len(idxs), r1, r2, shares)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Combine: %v", err)
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}
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return sig.Bytes
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}
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sigA := sign([]int{0, 1, 2})
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sigB := sign([]int{2, 3, 4})
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if !bytes.Equal(sigA, sigB) {
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t.Errorf("distinct quorums produced different signatures")
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t.Fatalf("quorum-independence violated")
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}
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}
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func TestE2E_RepeatSign_DeterministicByteIdentical(t *testing.T) {
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skipUnderRace(t)
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params := MustParamsFor(ModeM192s)
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committee := makeCommittee(3)
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pub, shares, _ := runDKG(t, params, committee, 2)
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msg := []byte("e2e: repeat sign must be byte-identical")
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sig1, err := signWithQuorum(t, params, pub, shares, 2, msg)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("first sign: %v", err)
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}
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sig2, err := signWithQuorum(t, params, pub, shares, 2, msg)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("second sign: %v", err)
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(sig1.Bytes, sig2.Bytes) {
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t.Fatalf("repeat sign produced different signatures (SignDeterministic should be byte-identical)")
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}
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}
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func TestE2E_LargeMessage_BoundaryOK(t *testing.T) {
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skipUnderRace(t)
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if testing.Short() {
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t.Skip("skip: -short does not run large-message e2e")
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}
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// Long messages (1 MB) and the FIPS 205 §10.2 max-context (255
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// bytes) must work end-to-end.
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params := MustParamsFor(ModeM192s)
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committee := makeCommittee(3)
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pub, shares, _ := runDKG(t, params, committee, 2)
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msg := make([]byte, 1<<20) // 1 MB
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if _, err := rand.Read(msg); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("rand.Read: %v", err)
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}
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ctx := make([]byte, 255)
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for i := range ctx {
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ctx[i] = byte(i)
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}
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// Run Combine with explicit ctx.
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quorum := []NodeID{shares[0].NodeID, shares[1].NodeID}
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var sid [16]byte
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copy(sid[:], "e2e-large-msg-01")
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signers := make([]*ThresholdSigner, 2)
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for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
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s, _ := NewThresholdSigner(params, sid, 1, quorum, shares[i], msg, nil)
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signers[i] = s
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}
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r1 := make([]*Round1Message, 2)
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for i, s := range signers {
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r1[i], _ = s.Round1()
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}
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r2 := make([]*Round2Message, 2)
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for i, s := range signers {
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r2[i], _, _ = s.Round2(r1)
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}
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sig, err := Combine(params, pub, msg, ctx, false, sid, 1, quorum, 2, r1, r2, shares)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Combine: %v", err)
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}
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if err := VerifyCtx(params, pub, msg, ctx, sig); err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("VerifyCtx: %v", err)
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}
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}
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func TestE2E_KATReplay_Deterministic(t *testing.T) {
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skipUnderRace(t)
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// Run the same ceremony twice with the SAME deterministic seeds;
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// both runs MUST produce byte-identical artifacts (DKG pubkey,
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// shares, threshold sig). This is the KAT-determinism invariant.
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runOnce := func() (pubBytes []byte, shareBytes []byte, sigBytes []byte) {
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params := MustParamsFor(ModeM192s)
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committee := makeCommittee(3)
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pub, shares, _ := runDKG(t, params, committee, 2)
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msg := []byte("e2e: KAT replay determinism")
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sig, err := signWithQuorum(t, params, pub, shares, 2, msg)
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if err != nil {
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t.Fatalf("signWithQuorum: %v", err)
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}
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pubBytes = append(pubBytes, pub.Bytes...)
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shareBytes = append(shareBytes, shares[0].Share...)
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sigBytes = append(sigBytes, sig.Bytes...)
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return
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}
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p1, s1, sig1 := runOnce()
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p2, s2, sig2 := runOnce()
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if !bytes.Equal(p1, p2) {
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t.Fatalf("KAT replay: DKG pub differs")
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(s1, s2) {
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t.Fatalf("KAT replay: party-0 share differs")
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}
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if !bytes.Equal(sig1, sig2) {
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t.Fatalf("KAT replay: threshold sig differs")
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}
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
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// Copyright (C) 2025-2026, Lux Industries Inc. All rights reserved.
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// See the file LICENSE for licensing terms.
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package magnetar
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// fuzz_test.go — fuzz harness targeting Magnetar's wire-format parsers.
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//
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// The fuzz targets exercise:
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//
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// - Round-1 / Round-2 / DKG envelope wire parsing under arbitrary
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// adversarial byte input (no Round-1 / Round-2 should panic; all
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// malformed inputs must produce a typed error).
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// - The Combine commit-bind re-derive: an attacker who controls
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// (Round1.Commit, Round2.PartialSig) cannot cause Combine to
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// panic or return a partially-tampered signature.
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// - Transcript-hash injection: arbitrary byte sequences fed to
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// transcriptHash32 / transcriptHash MUST produce a fixed-length
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// digest with no out-of-bounds reads.
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//
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// Run:
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// go test -fuzz=FuzzCombineParse_NoPanic -fuzztime=60s ./ref/go/pkg/magnetar/
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// go test -fuzz=FuzzTranscriptHash_NoPanic -fuzztime=60s ./ref/go/pkg/magnetar/
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// go test -fuzz=FuzzShareDecode_RoundTrip -fuzztime=60s ./ref/go/pkg/magnetar/
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import (
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"bytes"
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"testing"
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)
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// FuzzCombineParse_NoPanic — feed adversarial (Round1, Round2,
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// allShares) tuples to Combine and assert it never panics.
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//
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// Constructs a real (n=3, t=2) ceremony fixture, then fuzzes the
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// PartialSig bytes of Round2 messages. Combine must return either nil
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// or a typed error — never panic.
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func FuzzCombineParse_NoPanic(f *testing.F) {
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// Seed corpus: empty, zero-fill, random ASCII.
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f.Add([]byte{}, []byte{})
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f.Add(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0}, 384), bytes.Repeat([]byte{0}, 384))
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f.Add([]byte("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"), []byte("BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB"))
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f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, party0PartialSig, party1PartialSig []byte) {
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// Set up the fixture once per fuzz invocation. We can't move
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// this outside the closure because go fuzz doesn't expose a
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// per-iteration setup hook; the SLH-DSA DKG is slow but the
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// fuzz framework batches.
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params := MustParamsFor(ModeM192s)
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committee := makeCommittee(3)
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pub, shares, _ := runDKGOrPanic(t, params, committee, 2)
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msg := []byte("fuzz combine parse")
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var sid [16]byte
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copy(sid[:], "fuzz-combine-001")
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quorum := []NodeID{shares[0].NodeID, shares[1].NodeID}
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// Build legitimate Round-1 from real signers; Round-2 messages
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// carry the fuzz-supplied PartialSig bytes.
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signers := make([]*ThresholdSigner, 2)
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for i := 0; i < 2; i++ {
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s, err := NewThresholdSigner(params, sid, 1, quorum, shares[i], msg,
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newDetReader([]byte{byte(i), 0x99}))
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if err != nil {
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t.Skip()
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}
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signers[i] = s
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}
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r1 := make([]*Round1Message, 2)
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for i, s := range signers {
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r1[i], _ = s.Round1()
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}
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r2 := []*Round2Message{
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{NodeID: shares[0].NodeID, SessionID: sid, Attempt: 1, PartialSig: party0PartialSig},
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{NodeID: shares[1].NodeID, SessionID: sid, Attempt: 1, PartialSig: party1PartialSig},
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}
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// MUST NOT PANIC. Returning an error is fine.
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defer func() {
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if r := recover(); r != nil {
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t.Fatalf("Combine panicked on fuzz input: %v", r)
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}
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}()
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_, _ = Combine(params, pub, msg, nil, false, sid, 1, quorum, 2, r1, r2, shares)
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})
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}
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// FuzzDKGEnvelope_NoPanic — feed adversarial envelope share+
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// contribution byte combinations to a Round-2 ingest path.
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func FuzzDKGEnvelope_NoPanic(f *testing.F) {
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f.Add([]byte{}, []byte{})
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f.Add(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0}, 192), bytes.Repeat([]byte{0}, 96))
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f.Add(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xFF}, 192), bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xFF}, 96))
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f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, fuzzShare, fuzzContribution []byte) {
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params := MustParamsFor(ModeM192s)
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committee := makeCommittee(3)
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myID := committee[0]
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sess, err := NewDKGSession(params, committee, 2, myID, newDetReader([]byte{0, 0, 0}))
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if err != nil {
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t.Skip()
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}
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// Run my Round-1 so the session has internal state.
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myR1, err := sess.Round1()
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if err != nil {
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t.Skip()
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}
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// Build a peer Round-1 from the fuzz inputs.
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peerR1 := &DKGRound1Msg{
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NodeID: committee[1],
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Envelopes: map[NodeID]DKGShareEnvelope{
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committee[0]: {Share: fuzzShare, Contribution: fuzzContribution},
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committee[1]: {Share: fuzzShare, Contribution: fuzzContribution},
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committee[2]: {Share: fuzzShare, Contribution: fuzzContribution},
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},
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}
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// Add a stub for the third party so the round2 envelope size
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// check has the right cardinality.
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thirdR1 := &DKGRound1Msg{
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NodeID: committee[2],
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Envelopes: map[NodeID]DKGShareEnvelope{
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committee[0]: {Share: fuzzShare, Contribution: fuzzContribution},
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committee[1]: {Share: fuzzShare, Contribution: fuzzContribution},
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committee[2]: {Share: fuzzShare, Contribution: fuzzContribution},
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||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer func() {
|
||||
if r := recover(); r != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("DKG Round2 panicked on fuzz envelope: %v", r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}()
|
||||
_, _ = sess.Round2([]*DKGRound1Msg{myR1, peerR1, thirdR1})
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// FuzzTranscriptHash_NoPanic — feed arbitrary byte sequences to the
|
||||
// transcript hash primitives.
|
||||
func FuzzTranscriptHash_NoPanic(f *testing.F) {
|
||||
f.Add([]byte("tag"), []byte("payload"))
|
||||
f.Add([]byte{}, []byte{})
|
||||
f.Add(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xAA}, 1024), bytes.Repeat([]byte{0x55}, 1024))
|
||||
|
||||
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, tag, payload []byte) {
|
||||
// transcriptHash32 produces a fixed-length output regardless
|
||||
// of input.
|
||||
defer func() {
|
||||
if r := recover(); r != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("transcriptHash32 panicked: %v", r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}()
|
||||
// Customisation strings must be ASCII; truncate fuzz tag.
|
||||
var cs string
|
||||
if len(tag) > 64 {
|
||||
cs = string(tag[:64])
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
cs = string(tag)
|
||||
}
|
||||
out := transcriptHash32(cs, payload)
|
||||
if len(out) != 32 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("transcriptHash32 output length %d != 32", len(out))
|
||||
}
|
||||
out48 := transcriptHash(cs, payload)
|
||||
if len(out48) != 48 {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("transcriptHash output length %d != 48", len(out48))
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// FuzzShareDecode_RoundTrip — round-trip the share wire codec on
|
||||
// arbitrary input. The wire format is fixed-length (seed_size * 2
|
||||
// bytes per share); the codec MUST be invertible on any input of the
|
||||
// right size and reject any other length.
|
||||
func FuzzShareDecode_RoundTrip(f *testing.F) {
|
||||
f.Add([]byte{}, uint32(0))
|
||||
f.Add(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0}, 192), uint32(1))
|
||||
f.Add(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xFF}, 192), uint32(255))
|
||||
|
||||
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, buf []byte, evalPoint uint32) {
|
||||
defer func() {
|
||||
if r := recover(); r != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("shareFromBytes panicked: %v", r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}()
|
||||
// Lengths that aren't a multiple of 2 produce a truncated
|
||||
// share; we still don't panic.
|
||||
decoded := shareFromBytes(evalPoint, buf)
|
||||
re := shareToBytes(decoded)
|
||||
// The re-encoded length is len(buf) - len(buf)%2 (the codec
|
||||
// drops the odd trailing byte). For valid even-length inputs
|
||||
// the round-trip is exact.
|
||||
if len(buf)%2 == 0 && !bytes.Equal(re, buf) {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("shareFromBytes/shareToBytes round-trip not byte-identical")
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// FuzzVerify_NoPanic — Verify must never panic on adversarial sig
|
||||
// bytes.
|
||||
func FuzzVerify_NoPanic(f *testing.F) {
|
||||
f.Add([]byte{})
|
||||
f.Add(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0}, 16224))
|
||||
f.Add(bytes.Repeat([]byte{0xFF}, 16224))
|
||||
|
||||
f.Fuzz(func(t *testing.T, sigBytes []byte) {
|
||||
params := MustParamsFor(ModeM192s)
|
||||
sk, err := GenerateKey(params, newDetReader([]byte("fuzz-verify-seed")))
|
||||
if err != nil {
|
||||
t.Skip()
|
||||
}
|
||||
defer func() {
|
||||
if r := recover(); r != nil {
|
||||
t.Fatalf("Verify panicked: %v", r)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}()
|
||||
sig := &Signature{Mode: ModeM192s, Bytes: sigBytes}
|
||||
_ = Verify(params, sk.Pub, []byte("fuzz-verify-msg"), sig)
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// runDKGOrPanic — fuzz-friendly DKG helper. Same as runDKG but uses
|
||||
// crypto/rand for randomness so each fuzz iteration is independent.
|
||||
func runDKGOrPanic(t *testing.T, params *Params, committee []NodeID, threshold int) (*PublicKey, []*KeyShare, [48]byte) {
|
||||
t.Helper()
|
||||
return runDKG(t, params, committee, threshold)
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user