Three published packages declared a console script named `hanzo`, competing with
the native CLI and with each other. Measured on a clean venv at hanzo==0.4.3:
`hanzo --help` printed hanzo-cli's program, not the one pkg/hanzo/README.md
documents. Renamed to `hanzo-py` and `hanzo-cli` — script named after its
distribution. Nothing is yanked; both packages still install and run.
- pkg/hanzo 0.4.4 — summary and README now say the CLI is a native binary
(curl -fsSL https://hanzo.sh | sh). Dropped the invented command tour
(`hanzo chat --model gpt-4`, `hanzo node start`, `hanzo router start` on
localhost:4000): none of those verbs exist in the program this package
installs. Kept the three library entry points, each import-checked.
- pkg/hanzo-cli 0.2.4 — `hanzo login` replaced with the native `hanzo auth login`
plus its own `hanzo-cli login`. Verified `hanzo iam users list` and
`hanzo kms secrets list` against the shipped v1.9.18 binary.
- pkg/hanzo-node 0.1.1 — states the two meanings of the name: the `hanzo-node`
COMMAND is a symlink to the Hanzo CLI; this package fetches a different binary
from hanzoai/node, which is private, so the download 404s for the public.
Documentation URL moved off docs.hanzo.ai/node (404) to hanzo.sh.
- root README (published as `hanzoai`) — `pip install hanzo` no longer advertised
as the CLI; model ids zen-coder -> zen5-coder (zen-coder is not in the catalog);
"2452 operations, 1798 schemas" dropped for the spec URL, since the live
surface is 1058 paths / 1465 operations / 1139 schemas.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
hanzoai/cloud's release now sends `repository_dispatch: spec-update` carrying
(version, sha, spec_sha256). hanzoai/ci's `client:` lane fetches openapi.yaml AT
THAT SHA, REFUSES if the bytes hash to anything else, regenerates, writes
.spec-lock beside the code, and — only after this repo's own `test:` block has
passed over exactly those bytes — commits and cuts a patch.
NOTHING HAS EVER SENT THAT EVENT. The assumed sender was hanzoai/openapi, which
has zero workflows; where a generate.yml existed at all it had run twice in its
whole life, both failures, or never. That is the hole this closes, and closing
it is why the document moved: from hanzoai/openapi hanzo.yaml (hand-merged, 1742
paths, fed by nothing) to hanzoai/cloud openapi.yaml — smaller at 1058 paths,
emitted from the code by each app's own router, and gated on every cloud release
by a drift check that regenerates it from source. A smaller true document beats
a larger unverified one.
The lane is defined ONCE, in hanzoai/ci. What was hand-rolled per repo is
deleted with it.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
pkg/hanzoai/cloud is generated, and until now this was the only client of the
seven with no in-repo way to produce or verify it. The driver lives in
hanzoai/openapi (generate.py + sdks.yaml), so a checkout of python-sdk alone
could not even ask whether its committed client matched the document.
scripts/generate.sh is a CALL SITE, not a second driver — the same eight lines
java-sdk and kotlin-sdk already run, ending in `generate.py python --repo $PWD`.
That distinction is the whole point: the previous scripts/generate.sh here was a
real second driver, it did `rm -rf pkg/hanzoai`, and it was deleted for that.
This one cannot, because generate.py owns exactly the one take path sdks.yaml
names.
Measured against hanzo.yaml@9781a56: +159 -110 ~135. That drift is what the gate
exists to refuse; it is reported here, not silently regenerated, because the
fleet's regeneration is one coordinated wave and not seven.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
The document grew: cloud's woven spec was merged and won, taking hanzo.yaml from
1132 paths / 1519 operations / 779 schemas to 1737 / 2452 / 1798.
pkg/hanzoai/cloud/ is now 263 api + 2031 model modules, all importing.
`generate.py python --check` reports [python] clean.
The resync also RENAMED nearly every operationId to cloud_<method>_<path>, which
renames every generated method: billing_billingBalance became
cloud_get_v1_billing_balance, cloud_AgentsController.Create became
cloud_post_v1_agents. Examples written against the old names stop resolving —
exactly what the examples gate exists to catch. It went red; this is the fix.
Every flow was re-probed against api.hanzo.ai unauthenticated and with a bogus
key, because a spec says what SHOULD be served and only a request says what IS.
All eleven operations answer 401/403 — routed and identity-gated. Two moved:
store to the PROVISIONING plane (POST /v1/kv, GET|DELETE /v1/kv/{name}). The
per-key data plane the spec also describes is mounted nowhere: GET
/v1/kv/keys/{key} 404s, PUT and DELETE 405, kv.hanzo.ai 404s the whole
prefix. A round-trip on keys could not run.
tools to GET /v1/tools, the catalog. A live JSON-RPC door at POST /v1/mcp
answers tools/list with 730 tools but is absent from hanzo.yaml, so the
generator emits no method and an example would have to bypass the SDK
to reach it. Of the declared MCP routes /v1/automations/mcp returns 405.
hello stays on bot_authMe: /v1/ai/account answers 200 with
type="anonymous-user" to a request with NO Authorization header, so a hello
built on it certifies a key that would 401 everywhere else.
All six run and report the server's own refusal for a bogus key:
hello 403 no validated principal store 403 X-Org-Id required
chat 401 API key validation failed agent 403 X-Org-Id required
money 401 sign in to view billing tools 403 a validated principal required
money goes through the generated *_without_preload_content variant, because its
two operations are declared with a `default` response and no content so the
typed methods return None though the server sends JSON — a spec gap, and not a
small one: 696 of 2425 operations model no response body. That raw variant does
NOT raise on 4xx (the check lives in the typed deserialization these lack), so
the example checks status itself; without it a 401 body printed as the balance.
3.1.5 -> 3.1.6. 3.1.5 is live on PyPI, so this is a real patch above it.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
REGENERATED pkg/hanzoai/cloud/ from hanzo.yaml @ 07783f5 via the canonical
driver (hanzoai/openapi generate.py python) — 1132 paths, 1519 operations, 779
schemas, landing as 239 api + 1116 model modules. `generate.py python --check`
reports `[python] clean`: the committed tree is byte-identical to a fresh
generation, with no local strip of any kind.
The path count fell from 1885 because the spec deleted 18 products it authored
and served nowhere. Nothing here was lost to a collapse — LLM.md carried an open
defect saying 127 of 411 operations went missing to 23 case-variant tag groups
(AI/ai, Users/users). That is now fixed upstream, and this regeneration proves
it: 239 distinct tags produce 239 api modules, exactly 1:1.
Generating at all required two spec fixes. Both landed in hanzoai/openapi first,
neither is patched here:
- fc0c17a 35 /v1/platform operations carried no `responses`. OAS 3.x requires
it and openapi-generator aborts the whole document, so hanzo.yaml
was producing no client in ANY language.
- 07783f5 ChatCompletionResponse.choices was `items: {type: object}` — so
choices[0].message.content came out List[object], unusable without
a cast, on the most-called route in the API.
SIX EXAMPLES under examples/{hello,chat,money,store,agent,tools}, plus
examples/client.py as the single place a base URL or an env var is resolved.
Same six, same names, same order as the TypeScript set, so a reader who knows
one can navigate the other. They import from hanzoai.cloud — the generated
surface new work targets — not the frozen pkg/hanzoai/{api,models}.
Each flow's call sits behind `if __name__ == "__main__":` deliberately: that is
what lets the gate IMPORT all six to prove every `from hanzoai.cloud import X`
still resolves, with no API key and no socket. A spec change that renames or
drops an operation goes red in CI instead of in a user's app.
CI is the fleet convention and this repo had none: root hanzo.yml + a 7-line
cicd.yml importing hanzoai/ci. The gate is two blocks — import every generated
module (for generated code that IS the build step; there is no compiler to catch
a bad $ref or a model referencing a class the generator declined to emit), then
import the six flows. Both provision an interpreter with uv, because the arc
runner image promises none and a gate that silently no-ops is worse than none.
Scope is deliberate: the cloud client and its flows, not all 65 packages, so a
red gate means "the client the spec just produced is broken" rather than
"something, somewhere". Publishing is untouched — .hanzo/workflows/publish-pypi.yml
stays canonical because it reads the PyPI token from KMS. Two publish paths is
one too many.
3.1.4 -> 3.1.5. PyPI still serves 3.1.1; the tree has been ahead since the KMS
secret at hanzo/prod/python-sdk-publish went unseeded.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
Picked up by running the test suite; the lock had drifted behind the workspace
member's own version. No dependency changed.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
A previous commit here claimed the "Actions has been disabled for this user" 422 no
longer reproduced, citing enabled=true from
`gh api repos/hanzoai/python-sdk/actions/permissions` plus green Dependency Graph
runs. Both are true and neither is evidence: the first is repo scope, the second is
GitHub triggering its own workflow.
Dispatching still 422s as hanzo-dev. The same dispatch as zooqueen succeeds — which
is how hanzo-iam 1.30.2 finally reached PyPI at 21:05 today. The restriction is on
the account, so "are Actions enabled" and "can we trigger a workflow" are separate
questions and the repo-level check answers the wrong one.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
hanzo-iam has been stuck at 1.30.0 on PyPI while 1.30.1 and 1.30.2 sat committed.
The native job publishes from KMS (hanzo/prod/python-sdk-publish), which is the
contract the rest of the fleet uses — and that path has nothing to read, because
the tokens live as GitHub Actions secrets on this repo, where values are
write-only and cannot be copied into KMS.
GitHub is the only place that can read them. This job is workflow_dispatch ONLY,
so it never competes with the tag-driven native release; it is a re-keying tool,
not a second release path.
Everything else in the release is already proven. With a placeholder seeded in
KMS, the native job logged in, fetched the secret, built
hanzo_iam-1.30.2-py3-none-any.whl and reached upload.pypi.org, failing 403 on the
fake credential and nothing else. So the pipeline works; the credential is the
only gap.
Retire this file once the real tokens are seeded into KMS. Two publish paths is
one too many and the native one is the keeper.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
The first run of the KMS-backed job ended at `exitcode '22': failure` with no
error line in the log. That reads like a network fault or bad credentials. It
was neither: KMS login succeeded, and the SECRET FETCH 404'd because the path
`hanzo/prod/python-sdk-publish` has never been seeded.
The step runs under `bash -e -o pipefail`, so `curl -sf` on an absent path exits
22 and kills the step before the guard below it can say anything. The guard I
added in the previous commit was therefore unreachable — it could never fire on
the one condition it exists to explain.
The fetch now captures the HTTP status instead of failing the shell, so an
unseeded key prints its status and the guard reports which path is empty.
Credentials are unchanged and still masked; only the diagnosis changes.
Proof this is a path problem and not a credential one: hanzoai/extension runs the
identical login against the identical org-level KMS_CLIENT_ID/KMS_CLIENT_SECRET
(the only copy that exists on the forge) and gets past it — its `extension-publish`
path is seeded, so its publish reaches the packaging step.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
hanzo-iam 1.30.2 was tagged, the tag reached git.hanzo.ai, a runner picked the
job up, and it failed in 56s. The job read `secrets.PYPI_TOKEN` off the forge,
and no such secret is there — the hanzoai org carries GHCR_TOKEN, GHCR_USER,
GH_PAT, KMS_CLIENT_ID, KMS_CLIENT_SECRET, OCI_TOKEN, OCI_USER, REGISTRY_TOKEN
and nothing for PyPI. So its own guard fired and PyPI stayed on 1.30.0, which
still calls the legacy verb routes the server is removing.
That secret is absent because it is not supposed to be there. hanzoai/extension
states the contract: the KMS machine identity is the single bootstrap credential
on the forge, and every publish credential is pulled from KMS at run time. This
job was the one that had not been migrated, so it asked the forge for something
the contract forbids storing.
Now it follows the same shape: KMS login, then PYPI_TOKEN and
HANZO_AI_PYPI_TOKEN from org `hanzo`, env `prod`, path `python-sdk-publish`.
Both are masked. The two-token fallback is unchanged — PYPI_TOKEN owns most
hanzo-* projects, HANZO_AI_PYPI_TOKEN the rest, so a 403 scope-miss on one is
covered by the other.
Absent credentials still FAIL rather than skip. A publish that no-ops and
reports green is worse than one that breaks, which is the lesson extension paid
for with v1.9.37.
The tokens exist as GitHub repo secrets, where values are write-only and cannot
be read out, so they must be seeded into KMS by hand once.
Also corrected the header: the HTTP 422 that motivated leaving GitHub no longer
reproduces (Actions ran green there on 2026-07-28). The migration stands on its
own terms, and the note now says so rather than resting on a stale symptom.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
_users() called /v1/iam/get-users and then did
users = data if isinstance(data, list) else []
The verb answered a bare JSON list. The native /v1/iam/users answers
{"users": [...]}. So swapping only the path would have left that isinstance check
False and reported ZERO users for a healthy org — an empty result, not an error,
surfaced through an MCP tool an agent then reasons over. Both halves change here.
The dict branch also accepts "data" so a server still on the legacy envelope
keeps working during rollout; it goes when the compat surface does.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
23 call sites across hanzo-iam and hanzo-tools-iam reached IAM over the legacy
verb surface — get-user, get-users, get-application(s), get-organization(s),
get-providers, get-role(s), get-user-count, get-user-roles, and the
oauth/access_token spelling. Those routes are being removed: HIP-0111 forbids
them, and a capability with an RFC uses its RFC.
Two things had to change together, which is why this adds routes.py rather than
editing the literals in place. The verb surface answered {status, msg, data} at
HTTP 200 even for a miss; the native surface returns the object at the top level,
uses real status codes, and NAMES its lists — {"users": [...]}, not
{"data": [...]}.
Swapping only the path is the dangerous half-migration, and hanzo-tools-iam shows
why: it did `users = data if isinstance(data, list) else []`, so against a native
response it would have reported ZERO users for a healthy org. Not an error — an
empty list. Both halves changed there.
routes.unwrap reads either shape so a fleet mid-rollout keeps working, and still
RAISES on the legacy error envelope because callers depended on that rather than
on a falsy return. It is deliberately temporary: once every server serves native
only, the envelope branch is dead and goes with it. Only a body whose keys are
exactly the envelope's is unwrapped, so a native row with its own `data` column
survives.
These admin methods had no coverage while they called the verb surface — the
reason migrating them blind was the risk. tests/test_routes.py pins it: no route
may contain "/get-", the token endpoint must be the one discovery advertises,
every list route must declare its key (a missing one unwraps to [] and reads as
empty), and neither client may carry a path literal. Falsified — restore a verb
in the table or in a client and the suite names it.
99 pass. tests/test_fastapi.py cannot collect in this environment
(starlette/httpx version clash, unrelated to this change); hanzo-tools-iam's
suite cannot either (`from mcp.server import FastMCP` against the installed MCP
SDK) — both verified pre-existing by reproducing them with these changes stashed.
Rebased onto upstream's IAM_ROUTE_PREFIX refactor rather than merged: that
refactor centralised the prefix but kept the verbs, so the two changes compose.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
hanzoai/openapi beb4ea2 collapses an operation to its primary tag. Seven
commerce/pricing operations were being emitted twice under one identifier —
2381 lines of duplicate methods on CheckoutApi, CloudApi and InfrastructureApi.
The 21 deletions are the more interesting half. Generating over the existing
tree rather than into an empty one left files behind that no current generation
produces, and api/__init__.py had drifted into importing three of them:
from hanzoai.cloud.api.ai_api import AiApi # the module defines AIApi
which is an ImportError on "import hanzoai.cloud" — the package did not load at
all. A fresh generation is self-consistent; the accumulated one was not. Same
root cause as js-sdk 2.0.2.
Tests: 6 passed. tests/test_zap_transport.py fails to collect on main too
("cannot import name 'Hanzo' from 'hanzoai'") — unrelated and pre-existing,
verified by stashing this change and re-running.
Spec: hanzoai/openapi f9dbb2b (cloud 8143fc0e).
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
Regenerated pkg/hanzoai/cloud from hanzo.yaml. Consumed: cloud 8143fc0e,
openapi 2861089 (was f581a0e when 3.1.2 was cut).
openapi 3300cda took {org} out of the KMS secrets contract — the org is read from
the token now — and 3.1.2 shipped from before it, so its KMS methods addressed a
path the server no longer serves:
/v1/kms/orgs/{org}/secrets -> /v1/kms/secrets
/v1/kms/orgs/{org}/secrets/{rest} -> /v1/kms/secrets/{rest}
kms_get_v1_kms_orgs_org_secrets -> kms_get_v1_kms_secrets
kms_post_v1_kms_orgs_org_secrets -> kms_post_v1_kms_secrets
Five request/response models renamed with them. Nothing else in the 1885-path
surface moved: 5 models added, 5 removed, 6 files changed.
3.1.2 never reached PyPI (the tag cannot get to git.hanzo.ai — sync-from-github
fast-forwards main only, never tags), so this is fix-forward, not a replacement.
PyPI still serves 3.1.1; 3.1.2 stays a tag.
The upstream tag-casing collision came back exactly as LLM.md said it would: the
regen rmtree'd the tree and `import hanzoai.cloud` raised ImportError again on
AiApi/ApiKeysApi/McpApi. Stripped the same 9 dead lines. It will return on every
regen until one tag spelling per service lands in the per-service specs — that
also recovers the 127 of 411 operations those 23 colliding groups still drop.
No test pins the KMS route: asserting spec content here would make this repo a
second source of truth for routes and fight the pull-only contract. test_smoke
pins structure instead — import, version, surface breadth. 6 passed.
Version 3.1.2 -> 3.1.3, patch only.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
pkg/hanzoai/cloud/ (2163 files) has existed on disk untracked and never shipped.
This commits it, so the operator surface cloud already serves is finally callable:
AdminApi.plugin_admin_plugins / _enable_plugin / _disable_plugin / _reload_plugin
Generated by hanzoai/openapi `generate.py python` from hanzo.yaml (1885 paths,
69 merged per-service specs). Consumed: cloud 8143fc0e, openapi f581a0e.
One driver, so delete the second one. scripts/generate.sh fetched the spec itself
and then did `rm -rf pkg/hanzoai` + copied generator output over it — which would
have deleted the hand-written config/mcp/protocols/session/zap/api_response
modules AND the new cloud/ tree. Nothing referenced it. hanzoai/openapi's
generate.py + sdks.yaml is the only way now; LLM.md records the pipeline.
`import hanzoai.cloud` raised ImportError as generated. hanzo.yaml has 23 tag
groups differing only by case; openapi-generator maps both spellings to one
module, and for AI/ai, API Keys/api-keys and MCP/mcp it then emits imports for
classes it never wrote (AiApi vs AIApi). Stripped those 9 dead lines. The same
collision silently drops 127 of the 411 operations in those groups — that one is
upstream and only a single tag spelling per service fixes it; noted in LLM.md.
Version: 3.1.1 -> 3.1.2, patch only. pkg/hanzoai/__init__.py said 1.0.0 (the
generator default) — now resolved from the installed distribution, same pattern
as hanzo_cli/hanzo_iam in f453dae8. uv.lock refreshed to match committed pkg
versions. test_smoke.py locks the cloud import, the four plugin ops, and that
__version__ equals the distribution: 6 passed.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
0.15.13 shipped the 166-service surface switched off. `tools/list` against a
clean install returned 40 tools with no `hanzo`, and the server logged
"unified `hanzo` tool unavailable — keeping per-service tools enabled".
The import was fine; the mode gate was not. register_all_tools() asks
is_tool_enabled("hanzo", True), which returns tool_config["hanzo"] whenever the
key exists rather than falling back to the default. ModeLoader builds that
config by disabling every TOOL_REGISTRY key and re-enabling only the active
mode's tools. TOOL_REGISTRY has "hanzo"; the default personality's list did
not — so the "True" default was never reached and the tool was explicitly off.
Two things broke together, because the per-service cloud tools are retired only
once `hanzo` is enabled: the unified surface was absent AND the ten tools it
replaces were still mounted. The exact state 929e103e set out to end.
`hanzo` belongs in ESSENTIAL_TOOLS. It is an axis like fs or git — the single
seam to the platform — not a mode-specific extra. It stays out of
ESSENTIAL_SYSTEM_TOOLS so it remains disableable.
Verified in a clean uv venv from built wheels only (no editable, no PYTHONPATH):
tools/list now returns 31 tools including `hanzo`, and api/auth/billing/commerce/
iam/ingress/kms/mpc/paas/team are correctly gone (40 - 10 + 1). The tool answers
hanzo(service="services") with 166 services read live from
https://api.hanzo.ai/v1/openapi.json.
A test now pins the gate where it is actually decided. It fails against the
installed 0.15.13 (3 of 4) and passes against 0.15.14 — an import-level check
cannot catch this, because the import succeeds.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
The unified `hanzo` tool imports HanzoCloud from hanzo_tools.core, which
hanzo-tools first shipped in 0.3.3 — but nothing in the dependency graph
required it. hanzo-tools-api asked for `hanzo-tools-core>=0.1.0`, an empty
shim whose own floor is hanzo-tools>=0.3.2, and 0.3.2 has no cloud.py at all.
A resolver was therefore free to satisfy every constraint and still produce an
install where `from hanzo_tools.core import HanzoCloud` raises ImportError.
That is exactly what happened: the legacy-tool gate logged "unified hanzo tool
not importable" and fell back, and the dev venv had to install hanzo-tools
editable to get a working `hanzo`.
Name the real dependency at the real floor:
- hanzo-tools-api: hanzo-tools-core>=0.1.0 -> hanzo-tools>=0.3.4. It imports
hanzo_tools.core directly, so it must depend on the package that owns it;
the >=0.1.0 shim floor also still admitted the shadowing duplicate.
- hanzo-tools-vector: hanzo-tools>=0.3.0 -> >=0.3.4 (cloud_vector.py).
- hanzo-mcp: hanzo-tools>=0.3.2 -> >=0.3.4, hanzo-tools-api>=0.3.1 -> >=0.3.2.
Metadata only, on versions not yet published. No version bumps.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
The `hanzo` dispatcher hand-listed 10 services in SERVICE_TOOL_PATHS, so the
other ~150 cloud products were unreachable until someone cut a Python release.
Project the surface from cloud's /v1/openapi.json instead: cloud tags every
operation with its product (the first path segment after /v1/), so that document
already IS a service/action catalog. 166 services are now reachable, and a newly
mounted app is callable the moment cloud serves it.
Still exactly one MCP tool — agents degrade badly with hundreds — now shaped
hanzo(service, action, params, method), with `services` listing the catalog and
an empty action listing a service's actions.
Delete the local Infinity vector store (3,546 lines). It shipped no embedder, so
its only possible output was random vectors: it ranked "Bananas are yellow" above
an auth document for the query "authentication oauth jwt". A previous fix put the
mock behind HANZO_VECTOR_ALLOW_MOCK, but a fake that a flag can re-enable is
still a fake, and a tool that lies to an agent is worse than a missing one. The
package keeps only the cloud-backed VectorTool, and a test now fails if any
module in it imports `random`.
Make the legacy-tool gate honest: hide the per-service tools only once the
unified tool genuinely imports. It does not import against released hanzo-tools
(HanzoCloud is newer), and disabling them unconditionally would have left no
cloud tools at all.
- spec.py: catalog projection, cache keyed per spec source, stale cache beats
failing a call. HANZO_OPENAPI_URL decouples catalog from target so a partial
local host can be driven with the full registry.
- HanzoCloud.call: one generic seam for the verbs the spec names (PUT/PATCH/
DELETE); auth also resolves the hanzo CLI's IAM session, memoized.
- 40 new tests covering action naming, template binding, method inference,
param split, and cache fallback.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
is_authenticated() was `load_token() is not None` — a string-presence check
that returned True for the literal "fake.not.a.real.jwt". Every permission
decision downstream of it was therefore a lie. This makes the client side of
Hanzo auth actually work, end to end. Builds on the /v1/iam prefix already on
main; the endpoint paths were necessary but not sufficient.
hanzo_iam.tokens — the ONE credential judge. Verifies the signature against
the issuer's published JWKS plus exp/iss/aud, and fails CLOSED: an unreachable
JWKS is not a pass, because a client that cannot check a signature does not
know the token is good. Reason codes distinguish "expired" from "offline".
`alg: none` is absent from the accepted list by construction. An opaque API
key cannot be judged offline, so it is confirmed against userinfo rather than
assumed valid for being a non-empty string.
hanzo_iam.oauth — a real login: authorization code + PKCE (S256) over a
loopback redirect, with a deadline. Not the device grant, which would be the
better CLI UX: iam implements RFC 8628 fully and advertises it, but no PUBLIC
client is registered, so POST /v1/iam/oauth/device answers 401 invalid_client
for hanzo-cli, hanzo-app, hanzo-cloud and hanzo-console alike. Registering one
public app is the whole server-side fix; shipping a device path that always
401s would be a lie in code. The password grant is out for the same reason
(401 invalid_client without a secret), so `--no-browser` now prints the URL
instead of prompting for a password it cannot use.
The loopback listener binds a REGISTERED redirect_uri. iam compares
redirect_uri by exact string and does not apply RFC 8252 §7.3 port-agnostic
loopback matching, so a CLI cannot pick a free ephemeral port — the previous
code bound 8399 (cli) and 8398 (bot), neither registered, and /authorize
refused both with a bare 400 before the user saw a login page. It listens on
127.0.0.1 and ::1 because the registered URIs spell "localhost", and sets
SO_REUSEADDR because the previous callback sits in TIME_WAIT for ~60s and
would otherwise EADDRINUSE a second login on a port nothing is using.
hanzo_iam.store — keyring first, else an atomic 0600 file. The old path did
write_text() then chmod(0600), so with umask 022 a bearer token sat at 0644
between the two calls. Now it is created private and renamed into place. The
PaaS session cache goes through the same writer.
Two definitions of IAMConfig existed; models.py's was the one every client
imported, so the endpoint properties main had just fixed on config.py's were
dead code. One now, in config.py, plus jwks_uri and device_endpoint.
The bot and CLI login copies are gone; both call the one flow. whoami and
`hanzo bot login` no longer print claims from an unverified decode — that
rendered an attacker-chosen identity as fact.
The Team tool refuses instead of pretending: api.hanzo.ai/team is the
marketing SPA (200 text/html), so raise_for_status() passed and .json() blew
up. There is no Team API; HANZO_TEAM_URL stays as the seam for when one ships.
PaaS token exchange reports its real diagnosis: POST /v1/auth/login 404s while
/v1/org and /v1/user 401, so the API is up and gated but the exchange route is
not deployed at that edge. No client-side workaround exists, so it says so.
Tests fail against the old behaviour, which is the point: 5 session tests fail
against the shipped is_authenticated and 4 store tests fail against
write-then-chmod. 134 pass alongside main's KMS suite.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
The first pass left three classes of config that BOTH tsc 5.9 and tsc 7
reject. Each was proven against both compilers before changing:
TS5090 A `paths` target must be relative once `baseUrl` is gone. The
first pass skipped the "./" prefix wherever baseUrl pointed at
the config's own directory, reasoning it was semantically
equivalent. It is not — without baseUrl a non-relative target
is rejected outright, by 5.9 as well as 7.
TS5110 `moduleResolution: node16` requires `module: node16`. The first
pass mapped commonjs projects to node16 resolution alone, which
BROKE those configs for the current toolchain. Both are now set.
TS5102 `downlevelIteration` is also removed in TS7; it was missing from
the dead-flag list.
Verified: repos that tsc 7 previously refused (base-studio, js-sdk, kv-js)
now report zero config errors on tsc 7 AND tsc 5.9.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
TypeScript 7 is the native Go compiler and removes `baseUrl` and
`moduleResolution: node|node10`. Both appear here, so `tsc` from TS7
refuses the config outright (TS5102 / TS5108) and cannot typecheck.
`paths` targets resolve relative to `baseUrl` when it is set and relative
to the tsconfig file otherwise. Every `baseUrl` folded here already
pointed at the config's own directory, so dropping it moves nothing and
the targets are left byte-identical. Where a baseUrl pointed elsewhere,
each affected target was rewritten as join(baseUrl, target).
`moduleResolution` was chosen from the declared `module`: commonjs ->
node16, esnext/preserve -> bundler. Configs whose `module` is unset or
exotic were left alone rather than guessed at.
The result is accepted by BOTH toolchains, so nothing has to upgrade
TypeScript in lockstep. Verified on hanzo/chat packages/api: tsc 5.9
779 -> 778 errors (no regression), and tsc 7.0.2 now runs the project
in 2s where it previously refused the config.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
Superseded: the Hanzo GitHub App pushes a webhook, so the forge tracks GitHub
without a per-repo workflow. This file called git.hanzo.ai/api/v1/.../mirror-sync
— a Gitea API for a system we no longer drive — and would sit inert in every repo.
One mechanism, in one place, instead of ~350 copies of a cron.
The fork moved its API off /api to /v1, so every call built against
${{ github.server_url }}/api/v1/... now 404s. Verified live with a control:
/v1/version 200, /api/v1/version 404, a nonsense path 404.
This is the build-dispatch in sync-from-github, so a fast-forward from GitHub
was landing commits and then silently failing to trigger the build.
test_version read `assert "0.1.0" in r.stdout` and passed only because
hanzo_cli.__version__ was stale at 0.1.0 while pyproject said 0.2.2. The one
test positioned to catch the version drift was asserting the drifted value, so
single-sourcing the version in f453dae8 is what finally made it fail. It now
compares against hanzo_cli.__version__ and cannot enshrine a wrong value again.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
Same drift as the CLI, in all three packages: a hardcoded __version__ that no
longer matched pyproject.
hanzo_iam/__init__.py 1.1.1 vs pyproject 1.30.0 (29 minor versions apart)
hanzo_cli/__init__.py 0.1.0 vs pyproject 0.2.2
The hanzo_cli one was load-bearing: click's version_option reads it, so it is
the reason `hanzo --version` answered "0.1.0" — a release that never existed.
All three now resolve from the installed distribution, so there is one answer.
Patch bumps for the two packages changed in 68877409 (never a lazy major):
hanzo-cli 0.2.2 -> 0.2.3 entry point removed, __main__ added, PKCE, token path
hanzo-iam 1.30.0 -> 1.30.1 endpoint properties on the exported IAMConfig
Verified on a clean venv: __version__ == importlib.metadata.version for all
three, `hanzo --version` 0.4.4, `python -m hanzo_cli --version` 0.2.3, 58
commands. hanzo-iam 19/19; hanzo-cli's failures are unchanged live-service auth.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
`hanzo` depends on `hanzo-cli`, and BOTH declared `[project.scripts] hanzo`.
Entry-point resolution is install-order dependent, so which CLI a user got was
a coin flip — and hanzo-cli kept winning. The result:
$ hanzo auth login
Error: No such command 'auth'.
So the "auth login is broken by Cloudflare 1010" story was real but unreachable:
users never got as far as the HTTP call, because the binary they had did not
have an `auth` command at all. Publishing that fix would have changed nothing.
One command, one owner:
- hanzo-cli drops its console script. `hanzo` is the ONE command.
- `paas` and `bot` are mounted into it — the only two groups with no equivalent.
`kms` is NOT mounted: `hanzo secrets` is a strict superset (audit/grant/
revoke/rollback/rotate/versions on top of the same get/list/set/delete), and
two commands for one concern is what we are removing.
- hanzo_cli grows a __main__ so it stays invocable as `python -m hanzo_cli`,
and its e2e suite targets that instead of whatever `hanzo` resolves to.
Endpoints, one definition:
- models.IAMConfig (the class the package EXPORTS) gains the HIP-0111 endpoint
properties. config.IAMConfig had them, but nothing imports that one — a
second same-named class nobody uses is how the legacy path survived.
- config.py + fastapi.py stop hand-assembling paths and read the constants.
- password_login posted to `/oauth/token`, which is not a 404: IAM serves a
200 text/html SPA catch-all for unregistered paths, so it received a login
PAGE and json() blew up on HTML. Verified: legacy 200 text/html vs canonical
401 application/json.
PKCE, because this is a public client:
- browser_login ships no client_secret, so the authorization code was the only
secret in the flow and it arrives over a plaintext loopback redirect. The SDK
already accepted code_challenge/code_verifier; the CLI simply never passed
them. RFC 8252 §8.1 / RFC 7636 S256.
Version, one source:
- pyproject said 0.4.4, __init__ said 0.3.47, cli.py said 0.3.48, and the
installed binary reported 0.1.0 — four answers, none right. Now resolved
from the installed distribution.
Verified on a clean venv: entry-point providers 2 -> 1, commands 10 -> 58,
`hanzo --version` 0.1.0 -> 0.4.4, all four endpoints canonical. hanzo-iam
19/19 pass; hanzo-cli's 20 failures are unchanged before and after and are all
live-service auth (no stored token in this environment).
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
Git never descends into an EXCLUDED DIRECTORY, so `.hanzo/` followed by
`!.hanzo/workflows/` does not re-include anything: the directory is pruned
before the negation is ever considered. My previous commit only landed the two
workflow files because I forced them with `git add -f`; the next workflow file
added would have been silently dropped, which is the same failure mode that left
this repo briefly with no CI at all.
Verified both ways rather than reasoned about — `git add` on a fresh file under
.hanzo/workflows/ is refused with `.hanzo/`, accepted with `.hanzo/*`.
hanzoai/universe already documents this exact trap in its own .gitignore; this
now matches that proven form.
The previous commit removed 13 GitHub workflows and added none, because
`.hanzo/` is in .gitignore here — so `git add .hanzo` silently did nothing and
the repo was left with no CI at all. `git status` reported the deletions
cleanly; only the missing additions gave it away.
`.hanzo/` is ignored on purpose (it also holds local agent scratch), so this
negates just the workflows path — the same shape hanzoai/universe already uses
to ignore `.hanzo/` while tracking its six workflow files.
Now landed: .hanzo/workflows/publish-pypi.yml (native, runs on
hanzo-build-linux-amd64) and .hanzo/workflows/sync-from-github.yml.
git.hanzo.ai is the canonical forge and GitHub is a mirror, so this repo's CI
had no business living in .github/workflows. It also did not work: Actions is
disabled at the ACCOUNT level for the identity that pushes here —
gh workflow run publish-pypi.yml
HTTP 422: Actions has been disabled for this user
— and a tag push produced no run for the same reason. Thirteen workflows (ci,
test, test-windows, test-hanzo-mcp, test-hanzo-tools, quality-gate, docs,
generate, generate-api-providers, hanzo-packages-ci, publish-external-dists,
publish-pypi, test-auto-publish) looked like CI and could not run. That is worse
than having none, and it is how `hanzo` 0.4.4 sat tagged-but-unpublished while
PyPI kept serving 0.4.3 — a build whose `hanzo auth login` cannot complete,
because Cloudflare rejects urllib's default User-Agent with `error code: 1010`
and the token exchange 403s after the user has already signed in.
Depending on GitHub to ship a fix for our own CLI was the actual defect.
Now:
.hanzo/workflows/publish-pypi.yml — native, runs on hanzo-build-linux-amd64
.hanzo/workflows/sync-from-github.yml — the proven fast-forward-only pull
.github/workflows/sync.yml — a mirror nudge, nothing else
The tag → package mapping is carried over intact and checked against real tag
shapes: hanzo-v0.4.4 → hanzo, hanzo-dev-0.1.0 → hanzo-dev, hanzoai-3.1.1 →
hanzoai, hanzo-tools-vcs-v0.1.2 → the tools set, v1.0.0 → all. The package list
is auto-discovered from pkg/ rather than hardcoded, because the old hardcoded
lists silently dropped newly added packages.
Both native workflows parse as valid YAML. The PyPI token must exist as a secret
on git.hanzo.ai for the publish to run; the job fails loudly with that message
rather than half-publishing.
Ships 50d442eb. 0.4.3 cannot complete a login at all: Cloudflare rejects
urllib's default User-Agent in front of hanzo.id with `error code: 1010`, so the
token exchange 403s AFTER the user has already signed in through the browser.
Also adds the PKCE S256 that flow never had, and moves off the legacy
/oauth/* + /api/device/code paths onto the canonical /v1/iam/oauth/* surface
hanzo.id advertises.
Patch bump from the last published version (0.4.3), per the release rule.
Three defects in `hanzo auth login`, found while auditing HIP-0111 compliance.
1. LOGIN DID NOT WORK AT ALL. urllib defaults its User-Agent to
`Python-urllib/3.x`, which Cloudflare refuses in front of hanzo.id with
`error code: 1010` — a 403 that never reaches IAM. The browser leg looked
fine, the user signed in, and THEN the token exchange died, so the failure
landed after the user had already authenticated. Measured on the live host:
POST /v1/iam/oauth/token UA=Python-urllib/3.11 -> 403 (CF 1010)
POST /v1/iam/oauth/token UA=hanzo-cli/python -> 400 (reaches IAM)
POST /v1/iam/oauth/device UA=Python-urllib/3.11 -> 403 (CF 1010)
POST /v1/iam/oauth/device UA=hanzo-cli/python -> 400 (reaches IAM)
Every outbound request now identifies itself. The device flow was dead the
same way.
2. NO PKCE. The flow had zero code_challenge/code_verifier — `state` only,
which is CSRF protection, not interception protection. HIP-0111 Security
Considerations makes PKCE S256 mandatory, and RFC 8252 §8.1 requires it for
native apps specifically: this redirects to a fixed loopback port (1456) that
any local process can bind or race, so an intercepted authorization code was
directly redeemable. Now S256, with the verifier bound into the exchange.
hanzo.id advertises `code_challenge_methods_supported: ["S256"]`.
3. LEGACY PATHS (HIP-0111 §4.4). It called `/oauth/authorize`, `/oauth/token`
and `/api/device/code` — the `/oauth/*` and `/api/*` spellings the standard
retired, the latter breaking the absolute "no /api/" rule. Replaced with the
canonical paths hanzo.id actually advertises in its discovery document, held
in ONE constant block so no call site spells a path itself (§4.3):
/v1/iam/oauth/authorize /v1/iam/oauth/token /v1/iam/oauth/device
`/api/device/code` was not merely non-canonical — it answers 401; the real
device endpoint is `/v1/iam/oauth/device`, per discovery.
Also drops a redundant function-local `import base64` now that the module
imports it.
Push-event dispatch in this repo is intermittent — the two commits before
this one produced zero workflow runs — so there was no way to exercise a
package's test job on demand. Both publish jobs are already gated
(auto-publish on github.event_name == 'push', publish-to-pypi on a tag ref),
so a manual run can only test.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
kms.hanzo.ai runs luxfi/kms, which has never served an /api/* route. This
SDK was sending Infisical's: /api/v3/secrets/raw for every secret operation,
/api/v3/auth/login for user auth, /api/v1/auth/kubernetes-auth/login for k8s.
Only one call in the whole package — /v1/kms/auth/login — was ever real.
It stayed invisible because older luxfi/kms builds embedded a console SPA
behind a root catch-all that answered every unmatched path with 200
text/html. A wrong URL came back as a JSON decode error, which reads like a
parsing bug in the client rather than "this endpoint does not exist." That
catch-all is gone (cmd/kms/main.go ends in notFoundJSON), so those paths now
return honest JSON 404s and the SDK fails outright.
The route table is not the only thing that was wrong. The data model was
Infisical's too — project_id, workspace, secret version, secret comment,
shared-vs-personal type — and luxfi/kms has none of those concepts. It keys
one value by (org, path, name, env) in ZapDB at kms/secrets/{path}/{env}/{name}
and a write upserts it in place. Half-migrating would have left response
models that cannot validate what the server sends, so the vocabulary moves
with the paths:
list_secrets(path, env) -> names GET /v1/kms/orgs/{org}/secrets
get_secret(path, name, env) GET /v1/kms/orgs/{org}/secrets/{path}/{name}
put_secret(path, name, value, env) POST /v1/kms/orgs/{org}/secrets (create AND replace)
delete_secret(path, name, env) DELETE .../secrets/{path}/{name}
health() GET /v1/kms/healthz
Two server behaviors now have one home, hanzo_kms/routes.py, shared by the
sync and async clients so they stay mirror images:
- The server splits the trailing path at its LAST slash into (path, name),
so each segment is escaped individually. Escaping the joined string
encodes the separators away and the server reads one long name. A name
containing "/" is rejected outright: it would be written under one key
and read back under another, so the write looks like it succeeded and
the read never finds it.
- There is no versioned read. get_secret(version=N) raises
VersionUnsupportedError rather than quietly returning the current value.
org is new and required — it scopes both the URL and the JWT owner claim.
Constructor field, HANZO_KMS_ORG, defaults to "hanzo".
Auth collapses to what the server actually offers: client credentials
exchanged at /v1/kms/auth/login, or a pre-issued IAM bearer token. The AWS,
Azure, GCP, Kubernetes and SRP methods were Infisical's and none were served.
That also fixes a divergence where the async client silently ignored
HANZO_KMS_TOKEN — env parsing is now one function.
Callers migrated with it: hanzo-cli's `hanzo kms`, the hanzo-tools-kms MCP
tool, and hanzo-tools-auth's session client, all of which were building the
removed auth models and calling the removed create/update pair. Each now
constructs KMSClient() and lets it read the environment.
Tests: pkg/hanzo-kms/tests pins the wire shape — no request URL may contain
"/api/", per-segment escaping survives the server's last-slash split, sync
and async emit byte-identical request lines, and a decoder rejects the
200-HTML/JSON-404 shapes instead of reading them as empty results. Wired into
hanzo-packages-ci without `|| true`, so a regression turns CI red instead of
waiting for a decode error in production.
hanzo-kms 1.1.0 -> 1.1.1.
Co-authored-by: Hanzo Dev <[email protected]>
The client had OIDC paths written inline at each call site, so the canonical
route existed in as many places as it was used and drifted per method. Moves
them to named constants in models.py — OIDC_DISCOVERY_PATH, OIDC_JWKS_PATH,
OIDC_TOKEN_PATH, OIDC_INTROSPECT_PATH — and has both the sync and async
clients read those.
Values match the canonical IAM surface (HIP-0111): discovery
/.well-known/openid-configuration, jwks /v1/iam/.well-known/jwks, token
/v1/iam/oauth/token, introspect /v1/iam/oauth/introspect, authorize
/v1/iam/oauth/authorize. No legacy /oauth/* and no /api/ prefix.
One definition per route, so sync and async can no longer disagree.
The one-shot constructor note= sets self.note (a str), which shadowed the
note() method → 'str object is not callable' at call time. The running-log
accumulator is now log(); note= stays the one-shot note. Proven end-to-end
logging 9 kernel-perf experiments (4 proven / 5 refuted) to the live
api.hanzo.ai/v1/research with hypothesis+verdict+provenance.
Add the scientific-method frame to the experiment handle: state a hypothesis
+ prediction up front, .note() the running log, and .conclude(verdict ∈
proven|refuted|inconclusive, because=...) to seal it. A refutation is
recorded as clearly and durably as a proof. finish() defaults a stated
hypothesis to inconclusive — a finished run never silently reads as proof.
All fields serialize into the record's meta alongside the auto-captured
provenance (git sha + lib versions), so a verdict is queryable evidence.
Backward-compatible: every new param is optional.
snapshot/report now SUBMIT the bytes (base64 content); the server hashes them and owns
the sha256 + ref — the SDK no longer asserts a (poisonable) hash or a client ref. _headers
sends ONLY the per-org key (Bearer); it never mints X-User-Id/X-Org-Id (a cross-tenant
forge the gateway strips) — any dev bypass is server-side.
The ONE way producers record/query R&D evidence via /v1/research (HIP-0512),
generated-shape from openapi/research and wrapped in a tiny verb surface so
hand-rolling is the worse choice:
exp = research.experiment(kind, subject, task) # get/create → handle
exp.record(item, model, result) # attempt, idempotent by stable id
exp.snapshot(bytes) / exp.report(text) # diary artifacts (sha256-addressed)
exp.finish(value) # seal the run
research.query(project=, kind=) # read canonical
Zero-config auto-instrumentation (caller supplies no provenance): captures git
sha/branch/dirty, lib versions, host, and THREE self-documenting narrative sources —
the calling code's docstring (what this experiment is), the commit messages since this
experiment's last recorded run (what changed + why), and an optional note. The project
self-documents as a side effect of running.
Importer-agnostic: ingest() is one idempotent POST; any source (SQLite backfill, git
history, kernel-perf campaign) maps to stable ids and re-imports as a no-op. Stdlib
only (urllib); per-org key auth; private-by-default.
Adds a shared HanzoCloud client (core/cloud.py; lazy httpx, api.hanzo.ai /v1)
and wires the cloud half of the hybrid tools: code gains cross-repo
search/context/ask/index over the cloud index, vector gains a cloud-backed
store plus an infinity-embedded local option, net gains a vision tool. Bumps
hanzo-tools 0.3.2->0.3.3, -code 0.1.2->0.1.3, -net 0.1.2->0.1.3, -vector
0.2.0->0.2.1 and declares httpx where the cloud path is used. New tests cover
the code/net cloud actions. import hanzo_tools.core is green.
raw.githubusercontent.com/hanzoai/openapi/main/hanzo.yaml 404s (openapi is a
private repo), so every spec-update regen failed at the fetch. Fetch hanzo.yaml
through the GitHub Contents API with a SPEC_TOKEN (repo/contents:read on
hanzoai/openapi) instead. Local SPEC=... override unchanged.
Co-authored-by: zeekay <[email protected]>
Flags were natively supported in Rust (the hanzo-flags crate — the evaluation
core, pub-exported for Rust callers and FFI-exported for the rest), Go (in-process
via CGO to that core), and TypeScript (@hanzo/flags over /v1/flags). Python was the
gap. This closes it.
hanzo-flags POSTs an evaluation context to cloud /v1/flags — the same
PostHog-compatible endpoint every other client speaks — and answers is_enabled /
variant / payload from the response. It mirrors @hanzo/flags exactly: a HanzoFlags
client bound to one host, load(distinct_id, person_properties=, groups=), the same
three-field result, an async twin, and a one-shot evaluate().
Two invariants match the family: fail-open (a transport error yields the last good
or empty result with errors_while_computing set, never a raise on the hot path)
and cache-by-context+TTL. Zero runtime dependencies — stdlib urllib only, so a
flag check never drags httpx/pydantic into a service.
Tests stand up a local /v1/flags stub and prove the request shape is
PostHog-compatible, the accessors resolve booleans/variants/payloads, the TTL
cache holds, and both a 5xx and an unreachable host fail open. 7/7 green.
Hand-written package for the engine /v1/training API: ServiceClient +
TrainingClient (create/list/get/delete/forward_backward/optim_step/
sample/save_weights), dataclasses, sync httpx, completed-future
.result() wrapper so tinker fut.result() code ports 1:1. 22 pytest
tests over httpx.MockTransport, no network.
Wired like siblings: publish-pypi hanzo-train-* tag case, rye+uv
workspace member, uv source, pyright exclude. uv.lock relock also
catches the lockfile up to on-disk truth (hanzoai 3.1.1,
hanzo-tools-browser 0.5.10) -- no package versions changed.
The browser MCP tool no longer requires a human to have started zapd.
ZapdConsumer.connect() now dials the router and, on failure, auto-starts
the shared singleton (locate the zapd binary, spawn it detached, wait for
the socket) then dials once more — mirroring zapd's own host-mode
connect-or-spawn. No consumer-side lock: the singleton invariant lives in
zapd (advisory-lock bind), so concurrent spawns are safe. The OS unit is
the primary starter; this is the bare-machine fallback so the tool just
works.
The browser MCP tool no longer requires a human to have started zapd.
ZapdConsumer.connect() now dials the router and, on failure, auto-starts
the shared singleton (locate the zapd binary, spawn it detached, wait for
the socket) then dials once more — mirroring zapd's own host-mode
connect-or-spawn. No consumer-side lock: the singleton invariant lives in
zapd (advisory-lock bind), so concurrent spawns are safe. The OS unit is
the primary starter; this is the bare-machine fallback so the tool just
works.
zeekayandHanzo Dev